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SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED

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SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED

A DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMOUS WORDS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

ILLUSTRATED WITH QUOTATIONS FROM STANDARD WRITERS

BY THE LATE

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CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD; LATE ARCHDEACON OF JAMAICA, AND VICAR OF ERITH

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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

It has appeared to the writer of the following pages that occasion has long existed for a new book on the Synonyms of the English Language, which should be written in some respects from fresh points of view, and should be of a fuller character than commonly belongs to works on this subject.

The present edition has been revised, and considerably enlarged.

The Author feels bound specially to acknowledge material aid in his labours derived from the latest edition of M. Guizot's "Dictionnaire Universel des Synonymes de la langue Française," from which, bearing in mind the differences between the genius of the French and the English, he has extracted much valuable matter. He has also analyzed and assimilated the observations of previous writers on English Synonymy—a branch of literature which has hitherto borne very scanty fruit in our own country. Such writers are Crabbe, Taylor, Graham, and the late Archbishop Whately.

While he has exercised his own independent judgment and original thought, he has not scrupled to incorporate views of other writers where he believed that he might do so with advantage. His object has been neither a display of originality on the one hand, nor a servile compilation on the other, but such a combination of his own ideas with those of valued authorities as might tend to produce a useful work on the subject in hand. It would be needless to say to how great an extent any writer on English Synonyms must at present be thrown on his own resources.

He must acknowledge also invaluable help, in the quotations from Dr. Richardson's "English Dictionary," which, from the comprehensive range of authors quoted, will in many cases be found to furnish, as it were, a literary biography of the words in question. The arrangement of their meanings in Webster has also been occasionally of good service.

The list of words noticed has been purposely made as ample as possible; for observation has taught him that our acquaintance

with the distinctive force even of familiar words is often less accurate than we are apt to imagine; besides which, the requirements of *foreign* students of our language seemed in a peculiar way to claim his sympathy and consideration.

He has been careful to give the derivations of the words analyzed, so far as this was necessary for a fundamental conception of the nature of the words themselves; and in this department he has sought the guidance and corroboration only of advanced and scientific etymologists. On the other hand he has striven to avoid the temptation of undue amplification on these points, feeling himself bound to keep steadily in view the distinction between a Philological Treatise and a Dictionary of Synonyms.

In regard to the quotations, he has endeavoured to make them as illustrative as possible of the observations which have gone before, by selecting passages in which they are employed with *characteristic* force by leading writers of the language. It would have swollen the book to unwieldy dimensions, and have been altogether alien to its character and object, had he given quotations of the words under *every* sense in which they might have been employed, or treated them in all cases as Words and not as Synonyms.

An Index has been added to the present edition. This will serve not only as a guide to the Synonyms as arranged, but also will enable the reader to institute independent comparisons of the words, if he should desire to do so.

The Author, at the time of his death, had already put together a large amount of material for a new edition, for which he had also written the above Preface. My own work has been simply such revision as was necessary while the Dictionary was passing through the press.

H. P. S.

SYNONYMS DISCRIMINATED.

A

ABANDON. FORSAKE. DESERT. RELINQUISH.

The etymological force of ABANDON (Fr. *abandonner, à bandon, at liberty;* feudal Lat. *bandum, an order, decree;* see BRACHET) has well-nigh disappeared from this word. To embandon or abandon was, primarily, to bring under the power of another; and as this would imply the surrender of all control on the part of the original possessor, it is easy to see how the consequential idea has in modern English become the primary, and then the exclusive, meaning. To abandon is now, in the most comprehensive sense, to give up *finally* and *absolutely*, whether with or without transference of the thing abandoned to some person or power external to ourselves. A trace of the old meaning, that of placing beyond jurisdiction and so disclaiming possession, appears in Shakespeare:

"Madam wife, they say that I have dreamed
And slept alone some fifteen years or more.
Lady. Aye, and the time seems thirty unto me,
Being all this time *abandoned* from your bed."

Spenser used the form *aband.*

No praise or blame is absolutely expressed by the term abandon, which is one of the widest in the language, though it has a tendency to imply blame when used of persons without qualification. So to abandon friends sounds blameworthy, because under this simple expression the mind contemplates nothing but a deserted friendship. Yet it is right to abandon friends, if they betake themselves to what is dishonest or disgraceful. We may abandon persons or things; in particular, places, positions, ideas, opinions, hopes, expectations, offices, possessions, good or evil habits, as the case may be. But that which is abandoned is always a thing of consideration, not a thing of little value or a matter of petty detail. We may abandon wealth, but not a purse. Where loss or injury is entailed on the person abandoned, or the abandonment is a dereliction of duty, this moral colouring belongs not to the force of the term, which is essentially no more than that of *final leaving or surrender*, but to the circumstances of the case. It is only when all efforts to save his ship are hopeless that the captain abandons her to the rocks and waves. In times of early Christianity men were called upon to abandon houses, lands, and relatives in such a way as would be now not only uncalled for, but an unjustifiable desertion of them. We may observe that a twofold idea seems inherent in abandonment. We may abandon directly or indirectly, either by actively transferring, or by avoiding and taking ourselves off. The former force was the predominant in the old English, the latter in the new.

"See how he lies at random carelessly diffused
As one past hope *abandoned*,
And by himself given o'er." MILTON.

FORSAKE is the A. S. *for-sacan*, meaning orig. to *oppose, object* (BOSWORTH). In usage it implies some degree of antecedent habituation or association which is given up. We forsake relatives to whom we were naturally bound, friends with whom we once associated, habits which we had contracted, opinions which we had entertained, places which we used

to frequent. The cause of forsaking is altered taste or habit, variation of custom, alienated, or abated attachment. So, rhetorically, "the blood forsook his cheek," that is, left its wonted place. The term does not go beyond this breaking off of previous habit or association, the making that a matter of neglect or avoidance which before was matter of inclination and seeking; and, like abandon, implies in itself neither praise nor blame, which depend on the circumstances of the forsaking. Inasmuch as there is implied in forsake a former personal connexion with ourselves, we are not said to forsake abstract forms of good. We forsake houses, lands, friends, possessions, not wealth, station, or rank. These we are said to abandon or renounce. Persons on being forsaken by those who once loved them have sometimes abandoned themselves to despair.

"For wele or wo she nill him not *forsake*."
CHAUCER.

To DESERT (Lat. *dĕsĕrĕre; to forsake* or *abandon; de* and *serere, to join or bind together*, as opposed to *asserere, to fasten*—fasten hand to hand and so *assert* a claim) is applicable to persons, places, causes, principles, or undertakings in conjunction with others. We abandon but do not desert efforts or undertakings which are purely our own, and in which we owe no obligation or allegiance to others. The term desert always implies blame except when used of *localities*. To desert a person, a principle, or a cause, *e.g.*, is by the force of the term blameworthy; for it involves the abandonment of sympathy, help, countenance, protection, effort, where these were our bounden duty, and where the contrary involves a breach of trust, fidelity, honor, or natural obligation. Not so to desert a locality, which may be indifferent, justifiable, or compulsory. It was from overlooking the fact that *places* might be deserted that some have laid it down that all desertion is disgraceful. "A deserted fortress," a "deserted village." On the other hand it is opprobrious in the following, where the word land means more than locality:—

"No more excuses or delays. I stand
In arms, prepared to combat hand to hand,
The base *deserter* of his native land."
DRYDEN.

Like forsake, desert implies some degree of previous habituation and association, but the bond broken in forsaking is that of attachment, in deserting duty; hence we are not said to desert what there was no moral obligation to adhere to, as, *e.g.*, a statement, an expression, or a mere opinion; but principles which we were bound to support as being pledged to maintain them. Desertion involves the withdrawal of active co-operation, forsaking of sympathetic association. Desert is more purely voluntary than forsake. We may forsake under a feeling of imperative duty, our inclinations giving way to motives which our reason dares not discard; but we desert when we dislike our duty, or are prevailed upon by some external preference or allurement to escape from it.

To RELINQUISH (Lat. *rĕlinquĕre*) is to give up under some influence, power, or physical compulsion. We relinquish as an act of prudence, judgment, or necessity that which, had we been left to ourselves, we should have continued to hold. The act of relinquishment may of course prove subsequently to have been necessary or unnecessary, wise or unwise. A wounded hand may be *compelled* to relinquish its grasp. In matters moral I relinquish my scheme on finding it impracticable, or my opinion on finding it untenable, or my hope on finding it vain. *Some* degree of previous struggle with ourselves is gone through before we finally resolve to relinquish, or some external influence is brought to bear upon us which induces us to do so.

"The Disdaine met him, and brought to him from her Majesty letters of revocation with commandment to *relinquish* for his own part the intended attempt." — HAKLUYT.

It may be observed that abandon and desert express more positive acts of the mind than forsake and relinquish. He who abandons has finally resolved, he who forsakes has undergone change of mind, he who deserts has sacrificed

principle or duty, he who relinquishes has ceased to hope or to endeavour. As the others are applicable both to things and persons, so relinquish belongs to things alone. In troublous times men have sought to preserve their treasure by concealing it under the earth; if, after a while, it should be discovered by another, the law will not allow him to assume on the part of the original owner an intention to abandon it. Prosperity quickly raises about us a crowd of flatterers, who would be the first to forsake us in time of adversity. It is an aggravation of misfortune, if one who had long professed attachment should not only capriciously forsake us but also desert us in a moment of difficulty and danger. How often do we engage ourselves in pursuits which bring us far more anxiety and labour than profit or pleasure, which yet from habit or some other cause we cannot persuade ourselves to relinquish.

ABANDONED. PROFLIGATE. REPROBATE. UNPRINCIPLED. DEPRAVED.

ABANDONED (see ABANDON) is strictly a part. passive of the verb abandon, though used as an independent adj. In the former capacity it follows, of course, all the meanings of its verb. As an adj. it has the meaning of self-abandoned, and that to vice; for the ways of wickedness are easy, and not to struggle is to sink. It is used of persons and character, and so, by association, of life and conduct. It is a voluntary surrender of self to the temptation of self-indulgence; self-control and the estimation of others being disregarded and defied. The abandoned man is emphatically not the misguided, seduced, or overborne man. The abandoned man is impatient of discipline and even of reflexion; he is wanting in virtuous ambition; he is without aspiration, and has nothing worthy to be called belief. Pleasure and ease are his only happiness, and all else is either a labour or a dream. His social nature seeks relief in the companionship of others like himself. This systematic character renders the term inapplicable to single acts, however atrociously bad.

"Nor let her tempt that deep nor make the shore
Where our *abandoned* youth she sees
Shipwrecked in luxury and lost in ease."
PRIOR.

REPROBATE (Lat. *reprŏbatus, tried and rejected*) expresses that character in which a course of self-abandonment to vice results; one cast away without hope of recovery, the very desire and recognition of good being lost, all repentance cast off, the bitter becoming sweet and the light darkness, by a confirmed blunting of the moral perception. The reprobate is regarded as one whom it would be fruitless to attempt to reclaim. This state the abandoned may not yet have reached.

"And strength and art are easily outdone
By spirits *reprobate*." MILTON.

The PROFLIGATE man (Lat. *profligāre, to dash down*) is he who has thrown away, and becomes more and more ready to throw away, all that the good and wise desire to retain, as principle, honour, virtue, possessions. Hence it follows that the very poor or obscure man, though he might be abandoned and even reprobate, could not be profligate. For profligacy is a vice of the great, the powerful, and the rich. We speak of a profligate monarch, nobleman, court, ministry, aristocracy; of a corrupt or demoralized, but not profligate, peasantry. Profligacy is characterized by shamelessness and a defiant disregard of morals. The old physical use of the term has disappeared, as in Bishop Hall's letter to the Pope:—

"Is it for thee to excite Christian Princes, already too much gorged with blood, to the *profligation* and fearful slaughter of their own subjects?"

The modern use of it appears in the following:—

"Hitherto it has been thought the highest pitch of *profligacy* is to own instead of concealing crimes, and to take pride in them instead of being ashamed of them."—BOLINGBROKE.

The UNPRINCIPLED man is not necessarily abandoned to ways of licentious self-indulgence, or profligate of expenditure. He may, in the affairs

of sensual enjoyment, be even abstemious, and in those of expenditure penurious. But as the abandoned man sins against self-control and the profligate against sobriety, so the unprincipled against justice and integrity. The abandoned man injures himself primarily and others only indirectly; the unprincipled is ready to erect his own interests on the ruins of the interests of others. The term unprincipled, not an ancient one in our language, has a twofold meaning; first, wanting in good principle, or conspicuously marked by an absence of it; in which sense it is, negatively, applicable to acts, plans, or proceedings; and secondly, not acting on good principle or acting upon the contrary toward others; in which sense it is applicable to persons only. The first employment appears in the following:—

"Whilst the monarchies subsisted this *unprincipled* cession was what the influence of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon never dared to attempt on the younger."—BURKE.

The second in the following:—

"Others betake themselves to State affairs with souls so *unprincipled* in virtue and true generous breeding, that flattery, and courtships, and tyrannous aphorisms appear to them the highest points of wisdom."—MILTON.

DEPRAVED is a term which points to external circumstances or continued practices which have gradually perverted the nature. (Lat. *depravare, to pervert, distort.*) Depravity is perversion of the standard of right, and the term is employed not only of morals, but also of manners, taste, and the arts; and in a peculiar physical sense (which however is technical) of the humours of the body; a phrase which illustrates the radical meaning of the term, corruptly departing from a state of wholesome function. Depravity involves the substitution of false for true principles, or the less worthy for the more worthy, the pretentious for the meritorious, the showy for the intrinsically solid and valuable, the meretricious for the chaste; that which attracts the admiration of the ignorant and vulgar for that which will bear the test of exact criticism; a conventional standard of morality for the true, the virtuous, and the right. It is that defective estimation which follows the assumption of a corrupt test.

"When Reason and understanding are *depraved*, and as far corrupted as the very passions of the heart—when then the blind lead the blind, what else can we expect than that both fall into the ditch!"—SHERLOCK.

By the constant keeping of evil company a man's taste and character will of necessity become *depraved*. There is danger that he may grow *unprincipled* in his dealings, that he may *abandon* himself to allurements and temptations, that he may go on to exhibit an open *profligacy* of conduct, and finally sink into the condition of a reprobate, whom conscience ceases to encourage or to warn. In old English the verb deprave was often used in the sense of to malign.

ABASE. HUMBLE. DEGRADE. DISGRACE. DEBASE. HUMILIATE. DISHONOUR. DEPOSE. DEPRESS. LOWER.

There was a time when the word *abase* (Fr. *abaisser, bas, low*) was used in a purely physical sense, as by Shakespeare:—

"And will she yet *abase* her eyes on me?"

To abase is now only applied to persons. It is to bring low or to lower in such a way as that the person lowered shall be deeply conscious of the lowering. But this is not of necessity on account of great guilt or disgraceful conduct. That of which the person abased is primarily conscious is unworthiness in reference to others' estimation of him or to his own. In abasement we suffer a contradiction of, or voluntarily forego, as the case may be, our own peculiar pretensions. It may even be meritorious to abase or humble one's self (of these two abase is the stronger term). This could never be said of degrade or disgrace. The penitent man humbles himself, the remorseful penitent abases himself. In either case a conquest is gained over pride, arrogance, or self-will. He is abased who suffers a diminution of his dignity, merit, or repute.

"Absorbed in that immensity I see,
I shrink *abased*, and yet aspire to Thee."
COWPER.

To HUMBLE (Lat. *hŭmĭlis, low*), though not in one way so strong a term as abase, has a fuller moral meaning. He who is abased is brought low, he who is humbled recognizes the right of being so brought. It bears reference to some former condition of exaltation or estimate of self, as the proud man may be humbled by the reverses of fortune. He who suffers no more than overwhelming shame in his reverses or change of condition is abased without being humbled. He is humbled, who is forced to become acquainted with those vicissitudes of nature or fortune, to which hitherto he had been blinded by unreflectiveness or pride. He is abased, whom conscience or circumstances have undeceived in his claims to moral or social superiority.

"The plain meaning of the Apostle is to declare in one continued sentence that Christ when He was in the form of God *humbled* Himself by condescending to take upon Him the form of man, and not only so but humbled Himself yet further by condescending to die even the death of a malefactor."—CLARKE.

DEGRADE (Lat. *de, down*, and *grădus, a step*) bears reference to some standard or level, moral or social, below which the person degraded or who has degraded himself is supposed to have fallen. Unlike abase and humble, which belong to sentient beings, degrade is not confined to persons, but is applicable to anything capable of an accession or diminution of dignity. Art is degraded when it is treated only as a trade. The higher the social position, or the moral responsibility of the person, the more degrading is the dereliction. The higher the standard to which persons may reasonably be expected to conform, the more degrading is the forfeiture of self-respect. Sensuality, for instance, is peculiarly degrading in those who have great powers of mind, meanness of dealing in the affluent, low companionship in the nobly born.

"Moments there must be when the sinner is sensible of the *degradation* of his state, when he feels with pain the slavish dependence under which he is brought to fortune and the world, to violent passions and settled habits, and to fears and apprehensions arising from conscious guilt."—BLAIR.

DISGRACE is to deprive of respect (O. Fr. *disgrace, dis-* and *grace*, Lat. *grātia, favour*). He who disgraces another deprives him of such social regard as would otherwise belong to him. He who disgraces himself deprives himself of the respect of others. Disgrace is to the feeling of respect what DISHONOUR is to its outward token. Hence disgrace is rather in a man's self, dishonour depends rather upon others. While conscience may excite in us a feeling of disgrace, we can have none of dishonour except it be inflicted upon us by others. Yet in the term disgrace there seems to be a blending of the two ideas of the Latin *gratia* and the English grace, namely, internal comeliness and external favour. The minister who is capriciously dismissed by his sovereign is said to be disgraced. Yet it is plain that he is in no other sense so than as being merely thrown out of favour, while as regards his own character he is rather dishonoured than disgraced. The general who is taken captive after a gallant resistance never could be disgraced, though he might, by an ungenerous victor, be dishonoured or insulted. Dishonour may be only for a moment, disgrace is more permanent. We have an exemplification in the following of the twofold idea of grace, from which the double aspect of disgrace arises:—

"And with sharp quips joy'd others to deface,
Thinking that their *disgracing* did him *grace*."
SPENSER.

"He that walketh uprightly is secure as to his honour and credit; he is sure not to come off disgracefully either at home in his own apprehensions, or abroad in the estimation of men."—BARROW.

When a man is so humbled that his state becomes externally manifest or conspicuous, and is reflected in the condition and circumstances of the person humbled, he may further be said to be HUMILIATED, that is, brought to a condition and a sense of humility. So strong a part does this

external element play in the word, that one who is only self-conceited may be humiliated by being thrown suddenly into an undignified and ludicrous position. The proud man is humbled, the vain humiliated. He who humbles himself endeavours to cherish a feeling of humility, he who humiliates himself places himself in the attitude of humility. Hence we are seldom said to humiliate ourselves. Persons or circumstances may humble us; but it is circumstances, commonly speaking, that humiliate us. The case is a little different with the noun humiliation, which is the only substantive form of the verb to humble, whose meaning therefore it follows. Yet in such a phrase as a "Day of Fasting and Humiliation," the term conveys the idea of both internal and external self-humbling.

"The former was a *humiliation* of Deity, the latter a *humiliation* of manhood."—HOOKER.

To DEBASE (*De* and Eng. *base*), though of the same etymology as abase, is to deteriorate or make base not the position but the internal nature as regards worth, or essential purity. Debased coin is so mixed with alloy as to have lost much of its intrinsic value. A debased style of architecture has become corrupt by deviation from the type and principles of the pure. In all things debased a normal condition, form, character, principles, or model is implied which has been forgotten, deserted, or violated. The systematic deviation from the standard of virtue leads to moral debasement, from the standard of correct rule and pure taste to artistic debasement.

"The great masters of composition know very well that many an elegant word becomes improper for a poet or an orator, when it has been debased by vulgar use."—ADDISON.

DEPOSE (Fr. *deposer*) expresses the formal act of authority or of a superior, and is a complete taking away of the office, or dignity; while degrade may express a partial lowering in rank, or removal to an inferior grade.

"A tyrant over his subjects, and therefore worthy to be *deposed*."—PRYNNE.

DEPRESS (Lat. *deprĭmĕre*, part. *dēpressus, to press down*) is physical and analogous. It denotes the exercise of some uniform influence to lower permanently. The muzzle of a gun is depressed which is kept pointing towards the ground, the mind is depressed which is weighted by some burden of thought or reflexion. He is depressed whose merits, though they entitle him to promotion, are stifled by the jealousy of superiors.

"The Gods with ease frail Man *depress* or raise." POPE.

LOWER, formed from the adj. low, follows the various meanings of that adj. Its forces are in the main three: 1, to reduce in physical elevation, as to lower a flag; 2, to abate the feeling of exaltation, as to lower pride; 3, to bring down in value, amount, rank, dignity or estimation, as the price of goods, the rate of interest, professional position, or the respect of individuals, or of the public. Like the simpler and Saxon words generally, its application in proportion to its extensiveness is weak specifically. It stands opposed to "raise," and is as comprehensive and no more pointed in its force.

ABASEMENT. LOWNESS.

An idea of degradation common to these two terms makes them synonyms; but they have strong differences. ABASEMENT (Fr. *abaisser, to lower*) expresses the act of bringing low or the state consequent upon this, and always implies a former state more elevated. LOWNESS (allied to *lie* and *lay*) expresses simply the condition of that which is low in any of the numerous senses of the word low, such as physical depression, meanness of condition or character, absence of sublimity, meekness, mental depression, an inferiority of degree, a deep pitch or inaudible character of sound. The physical meanings of lowness are not in modern English shared by abasement, which has only a moral application. Abasement is a condition of inferiority bearing reference to our own possible position, lowness or inferiority to others. Abasement is moral or social degradation, and by an extension of meaning the painful

consciousness of this. Jesus Christ was willing to be born in a condition of weakness and abasement. Abasement is voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary abasement is a virtuous act of the soul, by which it seeks to counteract and repress the natural tendency to pride. A low disposition on the other hand is incompatible with honour, and begets contempt. The low is opposed to the lofty in principle and sentiment, and the refined in taste and manners. A low character is one which might be expected to associate and sympathize with the basest of mankind, a low style is such as would commend itself to the vulgar. That abasement which is the result of misfortune does not forfeit the right to consideration. Lowness is not deserving of consideration. Virtuous sentiment may reconcile the ambitious to a low estate in life, and assure them that by itself it involves no abasement, while yet it is a legitimate object of effort to exchange a lower condition for a higher, if it be done by just and honest means.

"'Tis immortality, 'tis that alone,
Amidst life's pains, *abasements*, emptiness,
The Soul can comfort." YOUNG.

Lowness consists in want of birth, merit, fortune, or condition. It may be observed that the noun lowness has not the strong character of disparagement which belongs to the adjective low. The latter is always derogatory except when employed either physically or of social inferiority of rank.

ABASH. CONFOUND. CONFUSE.

To be ABASHED is the O. Fr. *Esbahir*, *to astonish*, part. *esbahissant*; connected with the English *bay*, to gape, whence to stand at *bay*.

To be abashed is to be under the influence of shame, and therefore will vary according to the degree and character of the shame felt. The over-modest are abashed in the presence of superiors, the guilty at the detection of vice or misconduct. Abase stands to the reason and the judgment as abash to the feelings. The former implies a sentence of unworthiness felt to be passed against one's self, the latter shows itself in the downward look, the blushing cheek or the confused manner, and may even be the pure effect of natural modesty.

"But when he Venus view'd without disguise,
Her shining neck beheld, and radiant eyes,
Awed and *abash'd* he turn'd his head aside,
Attempting with his robe his face to hide."
CONGREVE.

To be CONFUSED (Lat. *confundere*, part. *confusus*, *to pour together*, *to perplex*) denotes a state in which the faculties are more or less beyond control, when the speech falters and thoughts lose their consistency. This may be from a variety of causes, as failure of memory, conflicting feelings, a bewildered judgment, over-modesty, shame, surprise, a sense of detection to one's dishonour. It is an embarrassing self-consciousness accompanied by a humiliating sense of shortcoming. We have formed our plan and arranged our materials; the former is perhaps forestalled, the latter by some accident disordered. We are thrown into disturbance, the time is lost, whither shall we look for help?

"Till I saw those eyes I was but a lump; a chaos of *confusedness* dwelt in me."—BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

To be CONFOUNDED, though another form of the same word, is far stronger, denoting an utter inability to exercise to any practical purpose the power of thought and speech, the reason being overpowered by the shock of argument, testimony, or detection. To confuse is in its primary and simpler sense a milder term than confound. Things are confused, when they are in a state of promiscuous disorder. They are confounded, when they are so mixed up together that they become undistinguished and indistinguishable, their individuality being lost.

"So spake the Son of God, and Satan stood
A while as mute, *confounded* what to say."
MILTON.

ABATE. LESSEN. DIMINISH. DECREASE.

With the exception of the last, these synonyms are employed grammatically as both transitive and intransitive verbs. The simplest and

therefore the least specifically characteristic is LESSEN (A. S. *læssa*, adj. *less*), meaning to make or to give less, as in force, bulk, number, quantity, or value.

"St. Paul chose to magnify his office, when all men conspired to *lessen* it."—ATTERBURY.

DIMINISH (Lat. *dīmĭnuĕre, mĭnus, less*) is the exact Latin equivalent of the Saxon lessen, but is commonly substituted for lessen in the intransitive sense. The receding object diminishes rather than lessens. There is hardly a shadow of difference between the terms, except that the Saxon one is the more conversational, the Latin more likely to be employed in rhetorical, or scientific phraseology.

"Hide their *diminished* heads."
MILTON.

ABATE (Fr. *abattre, to beat down*) refers to *force*, and never to size, or anything in which the idea of force is not more or less implied. A storm, pain, mental emotion or excitement, the vigour of youth, and the like, abate. Of old the verb had a strong transitive force in a physical application, as to abate, that is, beat down the walls of castles. This active force is still preserved, but not in its physical application. The term has grown milder. We speak of abating pride, zeal, expectation, hope, ardour, a demand or claim; and in legal language (though this is of course technical) of abating a writ, a nuisance, or a tax, the idea being that of annulling validity or legal force. The word is employed with singular appropriateness in the following passage from Paley's Moral Philosophy.

"The greatest tyrants have been those whose titles were the most unquestioned. Whenever the opinion of right becomes too predominant and superstitious, it is *abated* by breaking the custom."

DECREASE (Lat. *dēcrescĕre—de, down*, and *crescĕre, to grow*) differs from diminish in denoting a more gradual and sustained process. We might even speak of an instantaneous diminution, but not of an instantaneous decrease. To decrease is gradually to lessen or diminish. Yet we use the term decrease in some cases to express more strongly the idea of diminution by *inherent* force, or from an *internal* cause, as distinguished from external and more palpable influences; at least when speaking of physical matter or subjects, as the cold decreases through the season of the year. Property is diminished by extravagance. To decrease is relatively to diminish absolute and positive. Things diminish which are simply made less through any cause. Things decrease which exist in varying degrees of less or more. Of the nouns, diminution expresses a state, decrease a process. A diminution in the rate of mortality is the result of the decrease of an epidemic. The cause which produces diminution, as it is more external, so is commonly more traceable than that which produces decrease. The royal authority may be diminished by a specific revolution, having such diminution for its object. It may decrease as the result of a variety of causes, *e.g.*, the tendency of subsequent legislation, the development among the people of the sense and the claim of self-government.

"The olive-leaf which certainly them told
The flood *decreased*." DRAYTON.

ABERRANT. ABNORMAL. ECCENTRIC. EXCEPTIONAL. ERRATIC.

ABERRANT (Lat. *ăberrāre, to wander away*) denotes that which deviates unaccountably from the uniform law of operation or procedure.

"They not only swarm with errors, but vices depending thereon. Thus they commonly affect no man any further than he deserts his reason or complies with their *aberrancies*."—BROWN'S *Vulgar Errors*.

The term is applied to natural deviation from the type of a class or order, as an aberrant animal or vegetable form; while as regards the actions of responsible agents, or the thoughts of reflecting beings, it denotes a departure from the line of sober conduct, or consistent thought: so moral and intellectual aberrations. That is *abnormal* in outward nature which exhibits a structure opposed to the usual structure; and generally speaking, that which exemplifies procedure contrary to the received rule, law, or system.

ECCENTRIC (Lat. *ex, out,* and *centrum, a centre;* Gr. ἐκ and κέντρον) denotes that which is a departure, or analogous to it, from movement in a natural orbit.

EXCEPTIONAL (Lat. *excĭpĕre,* part. *exceptus, to except*) is applied generally to anything which strikes common observation as unlike what is familiar in similar cases. Of these, the two first are terms enlisted into modern science, while eccentric and exceptional are applicable to other and unscientific matters. The former of these was astronomical before it became moral or descriptive. In its technical use, an eccentric body is one which moves in a circle, which, though coinciding in whole or in part with another in area or volume, has not the same centre; hence deviating from ordinary methods or usual appearance or practice. It is technically opposed to concentric. The primary and secondary ideas appear combined in the following:—

"For had I power like that which bends
the spheres
To music never heard by mortal ears;
Where in her system sits the central sun,
And drags reluctant planets into tune;
So would I bridle thy eccentric soul,
In reason's sober orbit bid it roll."
WHITEHEAD, *on Churchill.*

Neither ABNORMAL nor EXCEPTIONAL are found in the older English literature.

ERRATIC (Lat. *errāticus, errāre, to wander*) has a scientific application—as *e.g.* to geological material borne away from its original site. Erratic differs from eccentric in being confined to human conduct, while eccentric belongs to character and appearance also. The eccentric character is inoffensive and simply odd; but there is danger that the erratic person may involve himself or others in mischief. Yet this force has been acquired in recent times. Its older use was that of idly wandering, as in the following:—

"The season of the year is now come in which the theatres are shut, and the card-tables forsaken; the regions of luxury are for a while unpeopled, and pleasure leads out her votaries to groves and gardens, to still scenes and *erratic* gratifications."—RAMBLER.

ABETTOR. ACCESSORY. ACCOMPLICE.

An ABETTOR (O. Fr. *abetter, to deceive, incite*) is one who in any way promotes the execution of a scheme without taking a direct part in it. If he do so, he becomes, according to circumstances, something more than an abettor. He is an ACCESSORY (Lat. *Accessōrius,* DUCANGE) if he assists directly, but in an extraneous capacity; an ACCOMPLICE (Lat. *ad, to,* and *complĭcāre, to fold together*) if he is intimately bound up in the project and responsibility of the scheme as a prime mover. It is in this way that in treason there are no abettors, the law not allowing the supposition of indirect agency in the case, but regarding it as necessarily direct. Advice, promises, rewards, or even the observance of silence and a forbearing to oppose may constitute an abettor, but no one can be negatively an accessory or accomplice. Generally speaking, it may be said that abettors urge and promote, accessories aid or assist, accomplices design and execute. In Law, an accessory before the fact is one who procures, counsels, or commands another to commit a felony; an accessory after the fact is one who, knowing of the felony, assists, comforts, or conceals the felon. It deserves to be remarked, that these terms are by usage restricted almost universally to bad or unlawful deeds or causes, although Woolaston in his "Religion of Nature" speaks of "abetting the cause of truth." The older use of Shakespeare is still the common one:—

"And you that do *abet* him in this kind
Cherish rebellion, and are rebels all."

"An *accessory* is he who is not the chief actor in the offence, nor present at its performance, but in some way concerned therein, either before or after the fact committed."—BLACKSTONE.

Dryden uses the term accomplice in the sense of a partner in guilt:—

"Link'd hand in hand th' *accompice* and
the dame
Their way exploring to the chamber came."

The ordinary use is that of Johnson in the following —

"And thou, the curst *accomplice* of his treason,
Declare thy message, and expect thy doom."

ABHOR. DETEST. ABOMINATE. LOATHE.

Of these the plainest is LOATHE (A. S. *láthian, to loathe*). It is also the most purely physical, being in the first place employed to express nausea or physical disgust. The sick man loathes his food. It is employed of moral objects, by a strong metaphor or analogy. In loathing there is a kind of passive disgust, which in the other synonyms is more active and demonstrative.

"A wicked man is *loathsome* and cometh to shame. The word translated *loathsome* properly denotes such kind of persons to be as nauseous and offensive to the judgments of others as the most *loathsome*, unsavory things are to their tastes and smells."—BISHOP WILKINS.

TO ABOMINATE (Lat. *ăbōmĭnor*, part. *abōmĭnatus; ab, from*, and *ōmen*) is literally to shrink from, deprecate as ominous, and so to turn away from as not to be endured. Abominate occupies a place midway between loathe, which is strongly physical, and detest, which is, as we shall see, emphatically moral; and in either case denotes that kind of strong dislike which would excite protest and avoidance. ABHOR (Lat. *abhorrēre, to shrink from with a shudder*) differs from abominate in being more expressive of strong involuntary recoil, while abominate is more reflective and voluntary. He who abominates would destroy or remove, he who abhors would escape from and avoid. Abominate is more applicable to the concrete forms of things, abhor to the abstract.

"That very action for which the swine is *abominated*, and looked upon as an unclean and impure creature, namely, wallowing in the mire, is designed by nature for a very good end and use, not only to cool his body, but also to suffocate and destroy noisome and importunate insects."—RAY.

"I may perceive
These Cardinals trifle with me; I *abhor*
This dilatory sloth, and tricks of Rome."
SHAKESPEARE.

DETEST (Lat. *dētestāri, to call upon the Deity as a witness against some person or thing*) denotes a spontaneous and energetic hatred of what is bad in principle or which is strongly disapproved, and in our mind condemned; not the feelings only, but the judgment being concerned in it. It is a misapplication of the word to employ it of what is physically impure or personally disagreeable. We abominate what is offensive, we abhor what is essentially uncongenial, we detest what is contemptible or evil, we loathe what is nauseous and disgusting. Thus there is more of feeling in abhor, more of reason in detest. Detestation is a kind of hatred which does not rest in feeling, but tends to find energetic expression in words and protestation. The sick man abhors remedies and food, the miserable wretch detests the day on which he first saw the light.

"For as the gates of Hades I *detest*
The sordid wretch whom want can tempt to lie."
COWPER, *Homer.*

ABIDE. STAY. SOJOURN. DWELL. RESIDE. LODGE.

TO ABIDE (A. S. *ābīdan, to stay constantly*) expresses no more than a personal halting or dwelling. It is indefinite as to time, and may be temporary or permanent, according to circumstances. We may abide in a place for a time, or for life. The radical idea is, however, that of a persistent stay. To abide by a decision is to adhere to it with moral fixity of purpose. But it involves some counter idea of unsettlement in the habits or acts of the person or persons abiding, and the likelihood of after-removal. An abode is hardly a place of perpetual habitation. STAY marks distinction of place, and has, as it were, a topographical force. I stay (connected with the Lat. *stāre, to stand*) here, or there, in the town, in the country, at home, or in the house of a friend. As to stop is not to proceed, so to stay is not to change one's place. Stay is more conversational than abide, which is more formal and historical. SOJOURN (Fr. *séjourner*, Lat. *subdiurnare*) expresses a personal stay necessarily temporary, yet implying a living in that place as regards food and shelter, which are not necessarily implied in either stay or abide. He stayed or abode, but not sojourned, in

the woods all night. It belongs to localities made homes for the time, and not belonging to one's self. A sojourner is by the force of the term a stranger. To DWELL (A.S. *dwellan*, which however is an active verb, *to retard, to lead astray*, "the peculiar modern use being Scandinavian": SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) indicates a permanent stay in a place which to some extent at least has become one's own home. The idea of permanent resting may be illustrated, as in the case of abide, by other applications of the term, as when a speaker is said to dwell upon a word, or a singer on a note. To RESIDE (Lat. *rĕsīdēre*, *re-* and *sĕdēre*, *to sit*) is a more dignified term, not applicable like abode and dwelling to the inferior animals, and carrying with it a notion of civilization and society, of elegance of living, of responsibilities of office, and of rights of property. The poor man dwells in a humble cottage near the hall where the lord of the domain resides. Hence the force of reside is not so strictly continuous as the others. A person may be said to reside where he has a residence, which he in the main occupies, though he should be even frequently absent. LODGE (Fr. *loger*) conveys the idea of an occupation of a portion of some larger place of residence, or a spot in a wider area, and so commonly a temporary stay under a common roof. I stay in Paris, I lodge in the Champs Elysées. As stay refers to the place, so lodge to the house in that place. We stay and abide for a long or short time. We sojourn pleasantly or otherwise. We lodge conveniently or not. We dwell continually. We reside continually or occasionally.

"There is no virtue whipt out of the court. They cherish it to make it *stay* there, yet it will no more than *abide*."—SHAKESPEARE.

"Say, uncle Gloucester, if our brother come,
Where shall we *sojourn* till our coronation?" SHAKESPEARE.

"He made the Arabians change their manner of living, who are otherwise called Scenites, as much as to say Tent-*dwellers*, because they are vagrant people that *dwell* in no other houses but tents, which they ever use to carry with them."—NORTH'S *Plutarch, Transl.*

"His Grace (Henry VIII.) therefore willing and minding to revoke you all by little and little, except you, Sir Gregory, being his ambassador there continually *residing*."—BURNET.

"*Stay*, and *lodge* by me this night." SHAKESPEARE.

ABILITY. SKILL. CAPACITY. CAPABILITY. CLEVERNESS. TALENT. GENIUS.

Of these, ABILITY (Fr. *habile*, Lat. *hăbĭlis*, *skilful*) is of wide application. It may be shown in things physical, moral, intellectual, social, legal, professional, casual. It deserves, however, to be observed, that while the adjective able is employed in this wide manner in specific connexion—as he is an able lawyer, able to commit passages rapidly to memory, or able to lift a great weight—this adjective, when not so connected, is never used (any more than the noun ability) to mean physical power. For instance, we might say, "I doubt your ability to move that *stone*;" but not "He moved the stone with comparative ease, being a person of great ability." Ability is partly a gift of nature, partly a product of training, study, and experience. The able man is he who makes great use of what he knows. An able general must have commanded with success. "Natural *abilities*," said Bacon, using the term in the plural (after the analogy of parts, talents, wits, and formerly intellects), "are like natural plants that need pruning by study." In its widest sense ability is the power of doing, the possession of needful faculties and needful means and opportunities for the performance of a thing, and is opposed to inability; the power of applying knowledge to practical ends. The erudite man, for instance, or the philosopher, however profound, is not able until he brings his knowledge to bear upon a purpose.

"They say that all lovers swear more performance than they are *able*, and yet reserve an *ability* that they never perform, vowing more than the perfection of ten, and discharging less than the tenth part of one."—SHAKESPEARE.

Quickness of mind, showing itself especially in readiness to contrive means to an end, whether material or

mental, is called CLEVERNESS. Cleverness in things of pure physical treatment is called dexterity. It is remarkable that cleverness is not a term of old English literature, the old adjective clever having been only of late put into the form of a noun. It is not a term of the highest order of praise, and belongs to ordinary transactions and concerns of life. A modern writer has illustrated this by making one of his characters, a silly young nobleman, apply to Shakespeare the epithet of clever. Cleverness is natural aptitude which dispenses with much instruction. That cleverness in things physical which requires not only adroitness of manipulation but judgment and discernment as the result of experience, is SKILL. The root-meaning of skill is discernment—such accurate knowledge as sees and allows for differences. So the old phrase "it skilleth not"—it makes no difference. Hence it came to mean an art distinctly professed, which was called a skill, and finally applied as above. It is special and technical, not general like cleverness. We might speak of such an one as a clever man and skilful physician. Skill is neither of purely abstract knowledge nor of mere physical habituation, but lies midway between the two, and practically comprises both. A skilful man combines theory with practice.

"The ship would quickly strike against the rocks for want of *skilfulness* in the pilots."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature.*

CAPACITY (Lat. *căpăcĭtātem*) is potential rather than actual, and may be no more than undeveloped ability. It is employed commonly of the intellectual, though not excluded from the moral nature (as we speak of a capacity for virtue), and is not employed at all of the physical powers, where capability would take its place. Generally speaking, capacity stands to understanding as ability to action, though the same person may possess both. So the capacity of a great general would be rather in his power of remembering, interpreting, and calculating the movements of the enemy, in grasping and recognizing the character and resources of a country, with reference to the movements of the campaign, his ability in his actual direction of those movements, and in the disposition and employment of troops in action.

"An heroic poem resembles the accomplishment of some great undertaking which requires the duty of a soldier, and the *capacity* of a general."—DRYDEN.

CAPABILITY (Lat. *căpăbĭlis, susceptible of*), when employed passively of things and not persons, means specific practicability, as a plot of ground intended for landscape gardening may be said to have great capability for the purpose. When applied to persons it may be said that generally, as capacity is the inherent faculty of understanding, so capability is the inherent faculty of use or action, especially of mental action. So we should say of a hopeful student of philosophy that he had capacity, the main end being knowledge; of a hopeful student of oratory that he had capability, the main end being action. It is not impossible, nor even uncommon to find capability combined with want of ability in the same person and in kindred matters. For instance, one has great capability for learning, and so becomes learned, yet has no ability to teach, lacking the power of imparting knowledge to others. Hence the common observation that the most erudite men are not necessarily the best instructors. Capable denotes sufficiency of qualification, able, the possession of it in an eminent degree. He is capable who is not incapable. He is able who is more capable than others.

"Sure he that made us with such large discourse
Looking before and after, gave us not
That *capability* and godlike reason
To rust in us unused." SHAKESPEARE.

TALENT, a term borrowed from the Scripture Parable of the Talents, and GENIUS (Lat. *gĕnius, the tutelar deity of a person or place*) differ, in that talent is the capacity of learning rules, and the capability of readily acting upon them; genius is that innate intuition which is hardly conscious of rules, and can in a measure, by natural force, supersede the use, that is, the specific recognition of them.

"Like many other men of *talent*, Fielding was unfortunate."—SIR W. SCOTT.

"Homer was the greater *genius*, Virgil the better artist."—POPE.

In the oldest English, as in Chaucer, the word talente is used in the sense of desire or propensity, the Latin *animi affectus*. This comes, no doubt, from the idea of weight, bias. For the Greek τάλαντον meant a certain weight as well as a certain value of metal. So Gower:—

"But not to steal a vestmente,
For that is nothing my *talente*"

i.e., propensity.

Talent may be hid and require to be searched for, genius develops itself. Genius creates, talent learns, apprehends, and executes. Talent needs opportunities, genius makes them for itself.

ABJURE. RECANT. RETRACT. REVOKE. RECALL. RENOUNCE. REPUDIATE.

All these terms refer to the verbal undoing of what has been, or in some cases of what might be, maintained, declared, or professed. *Abjure* (Lat. *abjūrare, to deny on oath*) retains so much of its original as to mean a deliberate and solemn giving up. Hence it applies to things seriously maintained and therefore seriously abandoned. It is to give up deliberately, as principles of belief or conduct, allegiance to a sovereign, claims, connexions or obligations, or even pleasures and advantages. We abjure what we declare ought not to be held, or not by us. Yet in order to abjure a thing it is not necessary to have actually held it. So in this country and elsewhere men abjure allegiance to the Pope, not the less for having never rendered it. It implies a protest against the thing abjured, whereas we may renounce what we regard as trifling, or what we still value though we renounce it. Policy may induce us to renounce, but principle compels us to abjure. Abjuration is always taken in a favorable sense as being dictated by a love of truth or right and an aversion to their contraries. The error, if any, is intellectual not moral. On the other hand we may recant in form but not in heart.

"A Jacobite who is persuaded of the Pretender's right to the crown cannot take the oath of allegiance, or if he could, the oath of *abjuration* follows, which contains an express renunciation of all opinions in favour of the exiled family."—PALEY.

To RECANT (Lat. *rĕcantāre*, lit. *to chant back, to recall*) refers not so much (like abjure) to any inherent solemnity in giving up, as to the formality and publicity of doing it. A man may change his opinions in secret, but he recants them openly. So entirely does the idea of publicity occupy the word, that the recantation is complete though it should be feigned and hollow, so long as it be openly and precisely made. Moreover a change of opinion real or professed is implied in recant, which as we have seen is not necessarily implied in abjure.

"How soon would ease *recant*
Vows made in pain as violent as void."
MILTON.

To RETRACT (Lat. *retractāre, to rehandle, reconsider*) is a taking back for the purpose of undoing the practical effects of what has been declared. It has a more varied application than recant, being employed of other matters than doctrine or opinion, to which recant is properly restricted. We retract promises on which others have calculated, expressions by which others may have been wounded or misled, accusations which we feel cannot be supported. As we abjure on principle and recant either on principle or policy, so we retract under the influence of interest or the force of circumstances. As in strength of purpose we abjure, so in the same we often refuse to retract. Though Henry IV. of France abjured Calvinism, he would not retract the promise of protection he made to the Calvinists. A recantation is primarily by word of mouth, a retractation is also by writing.

"I would as freely have *retracted* the charge of idolatry as I ever made it."—STILLINGFLEET.

REVOKE and RECALL are the same word under a Lat. (*rĕvŏcāre, to call back*) and an English form; but though thus identical etymologically they are employed with some little difference. Recall is more conversational and ordinary, less formal and

authoritative than revoke. We recall generally or in particular, inaccurate or otherwise objectionable expressions; but formal acts, authoritative decrees, orders, and solemn promises are revoked.

"The lord in the Gospel really forgave his servant all his debt, but *revoked* the grant on that servant's new misbehaviour."—WATERLAND.

"In his retractations he recalleth and correcteth this."—CUDWORTH.

RENOUNCE (Lat. *rĕnuntiāre, to send a message opposed to a previous one*; cf. prov. Eng. to "backword") is a wide term applicable to anything bearing a close relationship to one's self whether mental or external, as hopes, designs, claims, possessions, one's friends, the world. It is to proclaim against all connexion, actual or possible, between one's self and the thing or person renounced, even extending to such things as maxims or customs which one intends no longer to follow, and to claims and pretensions which one is determined to put forward no more. It was to these last that the word primarily applied. It is possible to renounce willingly or reluctantly. As the thing renounced commonly has the nature of a good or supposed good, or some value or interest real or imagined, renunciation ordinarily involves a decided change of sentiment and an act of indirect preference of something else over the thing renounced.

"A solemn *renunciation* of idolatry and false worship under the general title of the devil and all his pomps."—WATERLAND.

Unlike the foregoing, REPUDIATE (Lat. *rĕpŭdiāre, to divorce*) is only applicable where a relation has been established, or sought to be established, towards us from without, either in the course of nature or by the force of circumstances. We renounce opinions irrespectively of others; we repudiate them when others have fastened upon us the charge of holding them. We repudiate what has come to be closely associated with us. The idea of repudiating obligations or debts is recent, and a deviation from the earlier, which was that of unworthiness (not simple rejection) in the thing or person repudiated.

"Servitude is to be *repudiated* with greater care by us than domination is effected by them."—PRYNNE.

ABOLISH. ABROGATE. REPEAL. REVOKE. ANNUL. CANCEL.

Of these ABOLISH (Fr. *abolir*, Lat. *ăbŏlēre*) is the most general, and is applicable to many things to which the rest are inapplicable. It denotes the voluntary exercise, or the operation of extinctive power. Anything which is entirely done away with so that it is as if it had never been, may be said to be abolished. The term ordinarily involves some length of standing in the thing abolished. As a synonym with the above terms it denotes the total doing away with laws, customs, institutions, and the like, by any power, gradual or sudden, personal or impersonal; as, *e.g.* a specific act of legislation may abolish a right, or as the silent influence of fashion or a change of taste may abolish a custom. The application to persons is obsolete, though Tennyson says:—

"His quick instinctive hand
Caught at the hilt as to *abolish* him."

"The *abolition* of spiritual courts, as they are called, would shake the very foundations on which the Establishment is erected."—WARBURTON.

ABROGATE, though primarily applicable to laws (Lat. *abrŏgare, to repeal*, in the general assemblies of citizens of Rome, literally to ask back or off a law), has been extended to customs as having a force like that of law. The essential force of abrogation is the exercise of authority to undo what authority had previously established or recognized. Non-usage may abolish, but a positive act is required to abrogate. To say that a thing was abrogated by disuse would be to imply that disuse furnished a power or ground for causing it to cease. Old practices are often abolished by new ones superseding them. What equity had established has been abrogated by despotic power.

"It appears to have been an usual practice in Athens, on the establishment of any law esteemed very useful or popular, to prohibit for ever its *abrogation* and *repeal*."—HUME.

REPEAL (Fr. *rappeler*, Lat. *re-appellāre, to call back*) is applied charac-

teristically to the acts of a number, as an assembly or council may repeal a law. An irresponsible ruler would hardly be said to repeal, because the word wears an air of legality. In the resolutions of deliberative assemblies, which have not the force of law but are only regulatively binding upon its members, the term employed is *rescind*. To REVOKE (Lat. *rĕvŏcāre*) stands to personal, as repeal to collective, authority. As a despot does not repeal, so a parliament does not revoke. As laws and customs are abrogated or repealed, so edicts are revoked, and, indeed, any formal expression on the part of individuals, especially such as affects others, *e.g.* an epithet or promise, whether in word or writing. The proclaimed law is revoked, the written law is repealed. The revocation, not the repeal, of the edict of Nantes. The repeal, not the revocation, of the Irish Union. The object of revocation is that an act or a word should be regarded as if it had never been made; the object of repeal is that a thing should cease to have force or operation.

"A devise by writing may be also *revoked* by burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating thereof by the devisor, or in his presence and with his consent."—BLACKSTONE.

ANNUL (Lat. *annullāre, to bring to nothing*) expresses no more than the rendering inoperative of what before had force, whether by law, custom, or consent. The term belongs to legal enactments and compacts. Annulling is done by some provision to the contrary, proceeding either from authority or those from whom the original provision emanated. A reciprocal obligation may be annulled by the parties who imposed it upon themselves, but if the binding force were one of authority the annulling force must be such also.

"Your promises are sins of inconsideration at best, and you are bound to repent and *annul* them."—SWIFT.

To CANCEL is a kind of annulling. (Lat. *cancellāre*, to strike through writing by diagonal lines of erasure resembling *grating*, Lat. *cancelli*, pl.) It is to undo something the force of which affected the condition of another, as a promise, a contract, or an obligation. It is like the erasure or tearing-up of a bond. A thing may be annulled virtually, as by the force of circumstances which neutralize, invalidate, or supersede it; but it is cancelled by some deliberate or specific exercise of power striking out what had operative force, whether in law or moral obligation. The term wears a legal, social, or conventional air, belonging to transactions between man and man.

"Shake hands for ever, *cancel* all our vows." DRAYTON.

ABOVE. OVER. BEYOND. UPON. These terms all have both a physical and a figurative meaning. Physically, ABOVE indicates a superiority of physical altitude, as the sun is above the earth, an interval being supposed, without exact verticality. OVER indicates what is expressed by above, with the addition of the idea of verticality, as the cloud hangs over the sea. UPON denotes what is expressed by over, with the addition of contact, or the absence of the interval supposed by ABOVE, as the crown is placed upon the king's head. BEYOND relates to the horizontal or to the measurement of length and not height, though it may chance that this length is measured vertically, and may or may not imply adjacency, as the river and the country beyond; the ivy has grown beyond the first storey of the house. These analogies are preserved in the metaphorical uses of the words. So if we said that the general was above the captain we should mean that he was of higher rank in the army; over the captain would mean that he exercised authority in regard to him specifically. When one misfortune comes upon another it is as if there were no respite or interval between. When a thing is beyond conception it is as if the stretch and grasp of the mind were insufficient to reach so far.

"The Gospel places morality *above* rites and ceremonies."—JORTIN.

"For He, be sure,
In height or depth still first and last will reign
Sole King, and of His kingdom lose no part

By our revolt, but *over* Hell extend
His empire." MILTON.

"A place *beyond* all place, where never ill
Nor impure thought was ever harboured."
FLETCHER.

"He sawe *upon* the grene gras
The faire flower freshe springe." GOWER.

ABRIDGE. ABBREVIATE. CURTAIL. CONTRACT.

Of these ABRIDGE and ABBREVIATE are etymologically the same word, the Latin form *abbrēviare* becoming the French *abréger* (*brēvis, short*). Yet abbreviate is hardly ever used but in the simple sense of to shorten, while abridge is applied with more play of metaphor, as to abridge powers and privileges. We speak peculiarly of abbreviating words in writing, as Dr., Lieut., Esq. To abridge is to shorten by condensing or compressing, whilst to abbreviate is to shorten by cutting or contracting. In literary abridgments we have the same substance in smaller compass, and if the abridgment is well made the original runs a risk of being neglected for it.

"This book was composed after two old examples of the same kind in the times of Ethelbert and Alfred, and was laid up as sacred in the Church of Winchester, and for that reason, as graver authors say, was called Liber Domus Dei and by *abbreviation* Domesday Book."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

Differences deserve notice between ABRIDGE, CURTAIL (formerly *curtail*, Lat. *curtus, docked*), and CONTRACT (Lat. *contrahĕre*, part. *contractus, to draw together*). When used of things not purely physical, abridge seems usually to refer to number and duration, curtail to extent, and contract to compass or sphere of exercise. Hence, for instance, pleasures or privileges are abridged and contracted when they are made fewer and shorter, curtailed when the sphere of their exercise is in any way diminished, contracted also when the inherent power of enjoyment is lessened in individuals. Commonly also the exercise of personal power curtails, and the force of circumstances contracts privileges or enjoyments. It should be observed that unlike ABRIDGE and ABBREVIATE, which may accidentally involve diminution of value, incompleteness, or deficiency, these are necessarily involved in curtail and contract. We may say, generally speaking, that pleasures are abridged, privileges or expenditure curtailed, and powers contracted; but they are employed to a large extent interchangeably. It may also be said that time is abridged, and space contracted, which fundamental rule may best govern the application of the words. ABBREVIATE, ABRIDGE, and CURTAIL, belong to artificial processes. CONTRACTED is a term sometimes expressive of natural limitation within narrow bounds, as the stream is by drought contracted within narrow limits. A person of contracted mind is so either from want of largeness of sympathy or understanding constitutionally, or as the result of narrowing influences which have cramped and fettered it.

"That man should thus encroach on fellow-man,
Abridge him of his just and native rights."
COWPER.

"Have the burdens of the war compelled them to *curtail* any part of their former expenditure?"—BURKE.

"In all things desuetude doth *contract* and narrow our faculties."—*Government of the Tongue.*

ABRIDGMENT. COMPENDIUM. EPITOME. SUMMARY. ABSTRACT. DRAUGHT. DIGEST. SYNOPSIS. PROGRAMME.

An ABRIDGMENT is anything which purports to give the substance of a literary production in a shorter form. Some such abridgments are formed by the simple omission of portions which are regarded as unessential or subordinate, some by a condensation of the diction or style, but the substance of the original is in an abridgment supposed to be unaltered. It is the same thing shortened, and is itself a work. It may be added that ABRIDGMENT may be used as a generic term under which most of the others might be included.

"An *abridgment* or abstract of anything is the whole in little, and if it be of a science or doctrine the abridgment consists in the essential or necessary parts of it contracted into a narrower compass than where it was diffused in the ordinary way of delivery."—LOCKE.

COMPENDIUM (Lat. *a shortening*,

abridging) is not of a work but of a subject, purporting to give as much as need be known of some branch of science or knowledge in a concise form, and is also a work, as a compendium of universal history. SUMMARY (Lat. *Summārium, summa, the sum or total*) professes to give heads or general results of the body of a narrative or lengthened statement, as in headings prefixed to chapters. ABSTRACT (Lat. *abstrāhĕre, to draw off or away*) gives the general drift and tenor, and belongs rather to writings than to printed books. The summary is commonly deficient in consecutiveness of style; while the abstract, unlike the abridgment, may be a production in which the form has been altered by the reproducer, who may have assimilated the subject-matter, and re-expressed it in a style of his own.

"The Sermon on the Mount, which is a summary of a Christian's life."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"All those excellent persons of whose acts and sufferings we have a *compendium* or abridgment in this chapter."—BISHOP HALL.

A DRAUGHT (literally, *a thing drawn out*) commonly precedes the work, and is of the nature of a sketch or outline intended for the guidance of another who is to fill it up and finish it. The term is more technical than literary, as of deeds or judicial proceedings.

"And thus Poetry and the Writer's art, as in many respects it resembles the Statuary's and the Painter's, so in this more particularly, that it has its original *draughts* and models for study and practice."—SHAFTESBURY.

EPITOME (ἐπιτομή, ἐπιτέμνω, *I abridge*). It is such an abridgment as prunes or lops off all but the most salient and characteristic points or features, and is a summary of all that is most distinctive. We may observe, as regards present use, that as compendium is of science, so epitome is of facts or history.

"This sentence (St. Matthew vii. 12), I read unto is very fitly placed towards the close of our Saviour's admirable Sermon in the Mount, as being in great measure the *epitome* and sum of what the Divine Preacher had there expressed more at large."—BISHOP ATTERBURY.

A DIGEST (Lat. *dīgĕrĕre, to distribute, arrange*; part. *digestus*) has for its object arrangement or re-arrangement of given materials in an orderly, convenient, and available shape, under proper letters, as the DIGEST of Roman Laws by order of Justinian; and results in abridgment, though brevity is not its primary or direct purpose.

"If we had a complete *digest* of Hindu and Mahommedan laws after the model of Justinian's celebrated Pandects, we should rarely be at a loss for principles and rules of law applicable to the cases before us."—SIR W. JONES.

SYNOPSIS (*σύνοψις, a collective view, a table of contents*) differs from the preceding, with the exception of summary, in not aiming at any style in consecutiveness, and in giving nakedly and disjointedly a view of all needful points, as in a chart or table. It aims at totality and juxtaposition, so that a number of matters may be viewed as a whole, and in their reciprocal bearings or concurrence. A synopsis of general history brings into conspicuous collocation facts which would otherwise lie as it were dispersed or disconnected in the several particular histories.

"Not to reckon up the infinite helps of interlinearies, breviaries, *synopses*, and other loitering gear."—MILTON.

As synopsis gives what is to be observed, so PROGRAMME (*πρόγραμμα, a public notice, programme*) gives what is to be done. It is a summary of practical proceedings, and belongs not to the past but the future.

ABRUPT. RUGGED. ROUGH.

These terms may be taken in their order to express the same thing in gradually lessening degrees. Those features of nature, which on a large scale are precipitous (Lat. *præcĭpĭtem, headlong*) on a lesser are *abrupt* (Lat. *abrumpĕre, abruptus, to break off*). Abruptness on a smaller scale is RUGGEDNESS (A.S. *hreog, rough, stormy*), and this, on a reduced scale again, is ROUGHNESS (A.S. *hreof, rough, scabby*). The terms have their figurative uses. An abrupt style or manner is one that

passes from one point to another by jerks, without easy transitions. Such abruptness may be shown in the combination of manner and words, as an abrupt salutation, an abrupt departure. Shakespeare must have contemplated the word in its etymology when he wrote

"Or if thou hast not broke from company
Abruptly, as my passion now makes me,
Thou hast not loved."

Of ruggedness and roughness, the former commonly belongs to appearance, the latter to character and bearing, yet not exclusively so. Scott, in his "Christian Life," speaks of that unmanly sharpness and *ruggedness* of humour which renders us perverse and untractable in our conversation. In this sense it is less coarse and violent than roughness, which carries with it the idea of a rude overbearing. Ruggedness is characteristic of the individual only; roughness passes on to the treatment of others.

"Sleek o'er your rugged looks."
SHAKESPEARE.

"To take a cause out of your hands into mine I do but mine office. You meddle further than your office will bear you, thus *roughly* to handle me for using of mine."—BURNET.

Abrupt is opposed to continuous or unbroken, rugged to even, rough to smooth. The abrupt and the rough may be the result of nature or the effect of character or art. The rugged is never artificial. An abrupt manner, a rough behaviour, a rugged disposition or humour. The first comes of want of refinement and social training, or in some cases is the sudden action of feeling; the second from want of moral discipline; the third from selfish inconsiderateness. Men of equable temper, good breeding, and self-command are not abrupt. He who has sympathy with others is not rugged in his humours.

ABSENT. ABSTRACTED. DIVERTED. DISTRACTED. ABSORBED. ENGROSSED.

Of these the simplest is *absent* (Lat. *abesse, to be absent*), which denotes either the specific or habitual state of one whose mind is inattentive to what is going on before or around him. Absence may be the result of a habit of abstract thought, or the opposite, namely, an impatience of pure reflexion or casual inattention. It implies naturally thought, but not deep thought.

"What is commonly called an *absent* man is commonly either a very weak or a very affected man."—CHESTERFIELD.

ABSTRACTED, on the other hand (Lat. *abstrăhĕre*, part. *abstractus, to draw away*), implies the influence of something sufficiently strong to draw off the mind from present things and fix it in a state of rapt contemplation of others. One may be abstracted in solitude, one is absent only in the company of others. The mind of the abstracted man is closely at work, that of the absent man may be engaged with light fancies. The absent man is in one place while his mind is in another. He sees not present objects, nor hears what is said. He is at Paris in the midst of London, and when others are talking of love he is engaged with mathematics or the contrary. Absence differs from DISTRACTION in being the result of a single influence, while distraction (Lat. *distrăhĕre, to draw asunder*) may be of many, nor has it the uneasiness and disturbance of distraction. Moreover, distraction implies an influence in contradiction to some proposed matter of thought for which the mind is accordingly incapacitated, while in abstraction it is wholly given to it. The distracted man, taking the term in that sense in which it is opposed to the absent, has his eyes and ears open to everything at once, and so cannot be attentive to anything in particular. In trying to hear everything he apprehends nothing clearly. A common cause of distraction is a tiresome talk to which politeness compels us to listen, while words of interest fall upon our ears from another quarter. As regards social conversation, the absent do not care for it, and the distracted get no benefit from it. Our own ideas make us abstracted. External objects distract us. Hard study, responsible and arduous duties, strong passions, make persons abstracted. Trifles are

enough to distract, more especially the young and thoughtless. A dreamy habitude leads to abstraction; a lively curiosity to distraction. The absent man makes irrelevant answers, the abstracted does not answer, the distracted is continually answering himself.

"Whether dark presages of the night proceed from any latent power of the soul during her *abstraction*, or from the operation of subordinate spirits, has been a dispute."—ADDISON.

"As for me, during my confinement to this melancholy solitude, I often divert myself at leisure moments in trying such experiments as the unfurnishedness of the place and the present distractedness of my mind will permit me."—BOYLE.

DIVERTED is a term of lighter meaning, and is applicable to cases of mental recreation or amusement, in which the mind is turned aside (Lat. *dīvertĕre, to turn aside*) from studious or grave thought to matters less serious. Further remarks will be found under AMUSEMENT. ABSORBED (Lat. *absorbĕre, to suck up, to engross*) and ENGROSSED (Fr. *gros, big*; Lat. *grossus*) differ from the preceding in denoting, not so much a drawing off from present matters, as an intense or excessive contemplation of them. Absorption excludes distraction and diversion of the mind, which is swallowed up with present employment. ENGROSSMENT of mind is relative absorption; that is, absorption to the disregard of other matters which may possibly have equal or greater claims upon the attention. So it may be well to be absorbed, but it is not altogether well to be engrossed.

"Circe in vain invites the feast to share,
Absent I wander and *absorpt* in care."
POPE.

"Too long hath love engrossed Britannia's stage,
And sunk to softness all our tragic rage."
TICKELL.

ABSOLUTE. DESPOTIC. ARBITRARY. TYRANNICAL.

Of these ABSOLUTE (Lat. *absolvĕre*, part. *absŏlūtus, to loose or free from restraint*) denotes simply the possession of unlimited and irresponsible power, without implying anything as to the way in which it may be exercised, or, necessarily, that it is exercised at all; only that it exists. Absolute power is independent of all other power, and superior to it. It is rarely employed of the character and acts. When so employed it may be said that the absolute man expects exact and unquestioning obedience, which may be exacted in a spirit of calm determination. It is a character of firmness, and makes itself felt continually within the sphere of its influence.

"An honest private man often grows cruel and abandoned when converted into an *absolute* prince."—ADDISON.

DESPOTIC may be used either in the abstract, of the power, like absolute, or relatively, of the way in which it is exercised. Despotic power may have been acquired with the consent or through the instrumentality of others. The Greek δεσπότης was strictly a master of slaves, hence an absolute ruler whose subjects were slaves; while τύραννος meant a sovereign ruler whose power was unlimited by law or constitution. His conduct might be the very opposite of cruel, and he might owe his elevation to the State, or to some party in it. As employed by ourselves in a moral sense, the despotic character is he who enforces implicit obedience to his will. Absolute is a term general and descriptive. Despotic is political or social. A man is absolute in himself, despotic in his rule over others. When absolute power resides in the ruler of a State, the form of government is a despotism. The moralist may draw the reflexion how unfit man is to wield absolute power, from the fact that it has been found impossible that the terms tyrant and despot, tyrannical and despotic, should preserve a morally neutral meaning. TYRANNICAL, in modern parlance, relates not only to the disposition and proceedings of the governing party, but to the result upon the governed. It associates the suffering or oppression of the latter with the domination and caprice of the former. The despotic man may be not less exacting, but he is a more equable character than the tyrannical man. For the despotic feels more sure of his power, while the tyranni-

cal makes the most of his opportunity. The despotic character will, however, naturally tend to become tyrannical; that is, when the will is thwarted, or against those who thwart it. The spoilt child allowed to be a despot will grow into a tyrant. Despotism is measured by the will of the person, tyranny by the excess of legitimate authority. A democrat would call any monarch a tyrant by reason of his excessive possession of power, though a humane sovereign of a Constitutional State could never be called a despot. Despotism is a more established force than tyranny. Despotism is crushing, tyranny vexatious. The former reduces to submission, the latter rouses to resentment. A people lies powerless under a military despotism, and rises in rebellion against the tyranny of an aristocracy.

"Whatever the will commands the whole man must do, the empire of the will over all the faculties being absolutely overruling and *despotic*."—SOUTH.

"These poor prisoners eat nothing but rice and drink water, and are *tyrannically* insulted over by their rigid creditors till the debt is paid."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

The ARBITRARY character (Lat. *arbitrārius*, having to do with *arbitration*; 2, depending on the will) expects submission where nothing but his own will or decision constitutes the principle of rule; hence, as impressiveness belongs to the despotic, fickleness is associated with the arbitrary. The arbitrary character is far less violent than the tyrannical or despotic. The despot enforces his will, the tyrant his power, the arbitrary man his preference. Tyranny is always hateful. Despotism may, under certain circumstances, be exercised with salutary effect and in the interest of its subjects. Arbitrariness reflects upon the character and disposition of the man, but not on the truth of his opinions or on the justice of his decisions.

"By an *arbitrary* proceeding, I mean one conducted by the private opinions or feelings of the man who attempts to regulate."—BURKE.

ABSOLUTE, POSITIVE.

These terms are applicable to the subject-matter of statements. An absolute or positive statement. They express an incontestable truth, but under different aspects. ABSOLUTE is the Lat. *absŏlūtus*, part., from *absolŭĕre, to loose or detach*; hence that is absolute which is complete in itself, freed and unfettered, and dependent upon nothing for its existence, continuance, or support. POSITIVE (Lat. *pŏsĭtīvus, settled by agreement*) is that which has a real substantial position, existence, or force of its own as opposed to what is negative or to what is relative. A positive good is distinguished from a negative good. It is a positive good to be happy, a negative good to live unmolested, a relative good to become possessed of a field advantageously adjoining one's estate, which, therefore, has a value for one's self which it has not for others. The word absolute is passive, indicating a state; the word positive has the Latin termination "*-īvus*," which probably marks an inherent quality or force. A positive law is one which has the force of a law laid down as distinguished from a moral obligation. Hence it follows that a positive truth or statement is one which cannot be shaken or impugned; an absolute truth cannot even be touched. An absolute truth is true independently, a positive truth is true incontestably. I know absolutely, and therefore can speak positively. The system of philosophy called Positivism excludes everything but natural phenomena, and properties with their ascertainable and known, because invariable, relations in time and space. Such relations are called laws, and are discovered by observation, comparison, and experiment. The system excludes all inquiry into causes efficient or final, that is, what produces things, or why they are produced. It declares that such things imply an assumption of *absolute* knowledge, which is not possessed by mankind.

ABSOLUTION. PARDON. REMISSION.

The PARDON (Fr. *pardon*) is in consequence of an offence, and re-

gards principally the person who has committed it. It depends upon the person offended, and produces reconciliation when it is sincerely asked and sincerely accorded.

The REMISSION (Lat. *rĕmissionem*) follows upon a crime, and relates specially to the penalty with which it deserves to be visited. It is accorded by the dispensing power in the State or community, and interposes to arrest the execution of justice.

The ABSOLUTION (Lat. *absŏlūtionem*) is in consequence of a fault or sin, and relates mainly to the guilty state of one who has offended against the laws divine, and who by ecclesiastical authority, after penitence, is reinstated in the condition and rights of the innocent.

ABSOLVE. ACQUIT. EXONERATE. CLEAR. EXCULPATE.

To ABSOLVE (Lat. *absolvĕre, to loose*) is against the idea of sin and guilt having a religious or gravely moral application. It refers to the loosing of solemn obligations, or the setting free from the consequences of moral or religious offence. Even in its lighter significance, absolution is still a loosing from such ties as it would be sin or guilt to violate, as oaths, promises, and the like.

"Compelled by threats to take that bloody oath,
And the act ill, I am absolved by both."
WALLER.

As ABSOLVE applies to offences against the laws of God and man, or from moral obligations towards the latter, ACQUIT (Fr. *acquitter*, Lat. *adquietāre, to settle a claim*) bears reference to specific charges of offences against the laws of man only. Absolution sets free the conscience, acquittal the person, goods, or reputation. Absolution sets free the guilty; acquittal recognizes the innocent. Acquittal is a kind of legal reparation which establishes the accused in his former state. Yet, though the legal effect of acquittal is always complete, the moral effect may be variable. A man may be acquitted on the ground of clear and ample evidence in his favour, or the want of such evidence against him. Absolve is the more moral, acquit the more judicial term. Human authority acquits, the force of circumstances may absolve.

"Those who are truly learned will *acquit* me in this point, in which I have been so far from offending that I have been scrupulous, perhaps to a fault, in quoting the authors of several passages which I might have made my own."—ADDISON.

To CLEAR (O. Fr. *cler*, Lat. *clārus*, *clear*) is the simplest and most general of these terms. A man is cleared by anything, whether fact or argument, which shows him to be innocent. It implies, therefore, the antecedent innocence of the party, while absolve implies an antecedent offence, except where it is used in the sense of to free from an obligation. The innocent are cleared, the guilty are absolved.

"Although innocency needs no defence as to itself, yet it is necessary, for all the advantages it hath of doing good to mankind, that it appear to be what it really is; which cannot be done unless its reputation be cleared from the malicious aspersions which are cast upon it."—STILLINGFLEET.

EXONERATE and EXCULPATE are both less formal than absolve and acquit. They imply a moral, the former a magisterial decision. They may be used of cases in which blame is imputed without any public indictment. They indicate, however, some superiority, real or assumed, in the person who exonerates or exculpates. The terms, however, are also employed of the process of proving, as well as the act of declaring free from blame. In this sense a man may be exculpated, or he may exculpate himself; he may also be exonerated by himself or another. Exculpation (Lat. *culpa, blame*) is a rescue from the guilt, exoneration (Lat. *exŏnĕrāre, to unload*) from the charge and liabilities of an offence, or even, in a different sense, from the burden of an obligation. Exculpation, as the term implies, is restricted to faults and crimes; exoneration extends to other responsibilities than those of fault or blame. Exculpation is from an actual fault or offence, exoneration may be even from the suspicion of it. Exculpation is a simple term, exoneration a metaphorical term.

Hence the wider and more varied application of the latter to things which press upon us as moral burdens, as by obligation external or self-imposed. I am exculpated by the decision of a judge; I may be exonerated by the indulgence of a friend.

"I entreat your Lordships to consider whether there ever was a witness brought before a court of justice who had stronger motives to give testimony hostile to a defendant for the purpose of *exonerating* himself."—*State Trials*.

"In Scotland the law allows of an *exculpation*, by which the prisoner is suffered before his trial to prove the thing to be impossible."—BURNET.

ABSTAIN. FORBEAR. REFRAIN. DESIST.

Of these ABSTAIN (Lat. *abstĭnēre, to hold off*, act) is the most general in its sense. It is simply not to do when to do would be possible. We may abstain with a slight effort of self-control from what we are inclined to do, or with a stronger effort from what we are powerfully attracted to do, or with no effort at all from doing that which we might have done in the ordinary course, but which we avoid doing from the thought of inconvenient or disastrous consequences. We may abstain under the strongest impulses or the slightest tendencies. Prudence or a sense of duty may cause us to abstain from things in themselves indifferent.

"He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet *abstain*, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better—he is the true way-faring Christian."—MILTON.

As abstain regards mainly an external object with which we refuse to connect ourselves, or an external act which we refuse to perform, so both to FORBEAR (literally, to bear or keep, and *for* with the sense of negation; to withhold) and REFRAIN (Lat. *refrēnāre, to bridle, curb*) regard mainly the internal impulse which we resist. Refrain and forbear differ in the degree of the impulse and in the nature of it. In refraining we put a stronger check upon ourselves than in forbearing. To refrain from doing a thing is to prevent ourselves from doing it. To forbear doing a thing is not to do it when we might. We for the most part refrain from what primarily affects ourselves, we forbear doing that which primarily affects others. Refraining belongs rather to a decision of will, forbearing is the result of antecedent judgment or reflexion. The force of refrain appears more plainly in the reflexive use of it—to refrain one's self, to which forbear has no parallel.

"In pretence of *forbearance* they resolve to torment him with a lingering death."—BISHOP HALL.

DESIST (Lat. *dēsistĕre, to stop from*) expresses voluntary cessation of hitherto continuous action. It differs from abstain in not being applicable to objects, but only to actions, and also in implying a notion which abstaining excludes. He who abstains from doing a thing does it not, he who desists does it for a while, or to a certain extent. We desist from a course of action or systematic pursuits, and, commonly speaking, because we see that they are unseemly, unjust, or profitless; and sometimes from weariness or dissatisfaction.

"A Politician *desists* from his designs when he finds they are impracticable."—BLAIR.

ABSTINENCE. FAST.

These terms are technically distinguished. ABSTINENCE (see ABSTAIN) is a refraining from certain sorts of food.

"The temperance which adorned the severe manners of the soldier and the philosopher was connected with some strict and frivolous rules of religious *abstinence*; and it was in honour of Pan or Mercury, of Hecate or Iris, that Julian on particular days denied himself the use of some particular food."—GIBBON.

FASTING (A.S. *fæstan, to fast*; Teuton. *fast, i.e. firm*; and so *to keep, i.e.* from food; or (?) as an ordinance), whence fast is to refrain from food altogether.

"From hence may an account be given why the inhabitants of hot countries may endure longer *fasting* and hunger than those of colder, and these seemingly prodigious and to us scarce credible stories of the *fastings* and *abstinence* of the Egyptian monks be rendered probable."—RAY, *The Creation*.

ABSTINENT. SOBER. ABSTEMIOUS. TEMPERATE. MODERATE.

ABSTINENCE expresses the power and the habit of refraining from indulgence of the appetites.

"Be *abstinent*, show not the corruption of thy generation. He that feeds shall die, therefore he that feeds not shall die, therefore he that feeds not shall live."—BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

When abstinence refers to matters of food and drink, it is called ABSTEMIOUSNESS.

"Promised by heavenly message twice descending
Under her special eye
Abstemious I grew up, and thrived amain."
MILTON.

SOBER (Lat. *sōbrius, i.e., se-*, prefix, meaning *separation*, and *ebrius, drunken*), denotes the character which by its natural gravity is constitutionally untempted to excesses of any kind, being content with what is moderate and sufficient. It has, however, two characters, according as it is employed of abstinence from intoxicating liquors and of the character generally. In the former use it denotes no more than the opposite to intoxicated, so that a man may be called sober who is not drunk, though he be not at all abstemious, and, through strength of constitution, or even habitual drinking, may be able to drink much without being affected by any degree of intoxication. In its more widely moral significance, sober applies to all situations, and even to thoughts and opinions as well as outward behaviour. In this way sobriety includes reserve, discretion, moderation, restraint. It consists in not saying, doing, thinking, feeling excessively, but in all these things being according to the rule of right reason.

"*Sobriety* is sometimes opposed in Scripture to pride, and sometimes to sensuality."—GILPIN.

TEMPERATE (Lat. *temperāre, to temper*) expresses the character which is well-balanced in its appetites, and to which moderation, even though it be the result of effort, is yet congenial. As abstinence is the power of refraining altogether, so temperance is the power of enjoying with moderation. We are temperate in what is good, we abstain from what is not good. Some are compelled to take refuge in abstinence, feeling their inability to be temperate. MODERATION (Lat. *mŏdĕrātionem, a limiting*) and temperance are very nearly alike; but moderation is a somewhat wider term, belonging both to the desires and to the subject-matter of their gratification. So we might say a person of moderate desires, temperate habits, and sober disposition, character, or life. But we must press yet farther the distinction between temperance and moderation. Temperance is the regulative measure of the person, moderation of the thing. Temperance is the mean between over-abstemiousness and over-indulgence. Moderation is the mean between too much and too little. The temperate man is content with that which is moderate. Generally speaking, people are abstinent from rule or policy, sober from natural constitution, temperate from virtue and upon principle, moderate from reason and sound judgment, and frugal by philosophy.

"What goodness can there be in the world without *moderation*, whether in the use of God's creatures or in our own disposition and courage? Without this justice is no other than cruel rigour, mercy unjust remissness, pleasure brutish sensuality, love frenzy, anger fury, sorrow desperate mopishness, joy distempered wildness, knowledge saucy curiosity, piety superstition, care wracking distraction, courage mad rashness."—BISHOP HALL, *Christian Moderation*.

"*Temperance* permits us to take meat and drink not only as physic for hunger and thirst, but also as an innocent cordial and fortifier against the evils of life, or even sometimes (reason not refusing that liberty) merely as matter of pleasure. It only confines us to such kinds, quantities, and seasons as may best consist with our health, the use of our faculties, our fortune, and the like, and show that we do not think ourselves made only to eat and drink here."—WOOLASTON, *Religion of Nature*.

ABSTRACTION. ABDUCTION. These terms are expressive of surreptitious or unlawful carrying away. The difference lies in their application. The former is applied to articles of value, the latter only to persons. To pick another's pocket of a purse, or to carry away for one's own use and possession some commodity out

of his house, is ABSTRACTION (Lat. *abstractionem, abstrăhĕre, to draw off or away*). The taking away of his wife, child, or ward, whether by fraud, persuasion, or open violence, is ABDUCTION (Lat. *abductionem, abdŭcĕre, to lead away*).

ABSTRUSE. CURIOUS. RECONDITE. QUAINT.

These terms are employed of matters of art or learning. In the things of knowledge, that is abstruse (Lat. *abstrūdĕre*, part. *abstrūsus, to thrust away, hide*) which is thrust away, and as it were out of common sight removed from easy understanding—with an occult, rather than a plain meaning. In this way ideas, knowledge, reasoning, expressions may be abstruse. Anything is abstruse which for any cause is remote from apprehension, as from an involved or enigmatical style, as well as from the generally inaccessible character of the department of knowledge to which the matter belongs. It must be observed, however, that *some* character of remoteness or profundity in the subject-matter is needed to constitute the abstruse, and that the term would not be applicable to common every-day matters expressed with a want of clearness. RECONDITE, on the other hand (Lat. *rĕcondĕre*, part. *rĕconditus, to stow away*), belongs purely to the subject-matter of thought and knowledge, and in no degree to the mode of uttering it. The recondite is that which lies out of the plain path of observation, or the beaten track of inquiry, and is known to the few who care to search for it without being of necessity, when found, perplexing to the understanding, like the abstruse. A matter recondite in itself may sound abstruse to him before whom it is put, or from the way of putting it. The CURIOUS (Lat. *cura, care*) wears, so to speak, a double aspect, according as it implies minute care in formation or composition on the one hand, or minute care in inquiry and investigation on the other. Strictly and etymologically, the artist is curious; and, by consequence, the work which shows traces of his care and exactness. Then a third element is imported into the word, viz., minuteness and care in investigating such things. The curious denotes that which is the result of specific investigation or accidental discovery, and when found impresses the mind with a mingled feeling of familiarity and use. Curious and cunning artists produce curious works, which by lovers of such arts are made the objects of curious search and study. Such objects are called curiosities. They are neither quite strange and new, nor quite common and familiar, but for the most part strange renderings of familiar things. They excite interest and stimulate inquiry; they appeal to the faculty of inquisitiveness, and gratify it.

"Let the Scriptures be hard; are they more hard, more crabbed, more *abstruse* than the Fathers?"—MILTON.

"It is true our bodies are made of very coarse materials; of nothing but a little dust and earth. Yet they are so wisely contrived, so *curiously* composed."—BEVERIDGE.

QUAINT is from the O. Fr. *coint, neat* (Lat. *comptus*). Its primary meaning is, artificially elegant or ingenious, then affectedly artificial, and finally, odd, antique, yet retaining always an element of the pleasing. The idea of quaintness belongs at present most commonly to style of thought and verbal expression in which appears a combination of fancy, originality, delicacy, and force, yet a disharmony with present modes. Quaint architecture, for instance, is in detail antiquated and curious, showing an obsolete beauty and an unfashionable ingenuity.

"You were glad to be employed
To show how *quaint* an orator you are."
SHAKESPEARE.

ABSURD. FOOLISH. IRRATIONAL. PREPOSTEROUS. PARADOXICAL.

ABSURD is the Lat. *absurdus, irrational, dissonant*, denoting that which jars against common-sense and received notions of propriety and truth, as when an argument is reduced to an absurdity on which every man's judgment is competent to determine; or men form absurd, that is, practically

improbable expectations, or conduct themselves in an absurd manner, that is, one in which even common persons would perceive a palpable unfitness. The ridiculous or ludicrous are not of the essence of the absurd, though the absurd, especially when exhibited in matters of demeanour, dress, action, and the like externals, will be probably attended with ludicrous effects. An absurd remark is out of tune with the general subject, and comes from one who does not see the point at issue. It is like a note struck in a different key from that of a piece of music.

"That we may proceed yet further with the atheist and convince him that not only his principle is *absurd* but his consequences also as *absurdly* deduced from it, we will allow him an uncertain extravagant chance against the natural laws of motion."—BENTLEY.

IRRATIONAL (Lat. *irrātiōnālis, devoid of reason*) is employed to express sometimes the want of the faculty of reason by nature, as in the phrase "the *irrational* animals;" sometimes a deficiency in its exercise, and, like the rest of these synonyms, is applicable to persons, to principle, and to conduct. It is a more serious term than absurd, involving more serious results as a dereliction of that reason which is the distinctive light and guide of men. As absurdity lies in false relation, so irrationality lies in absurd conception. Hence it is applied rather to matters theoretical than practical, principles, schemes, suppositions, notions. Expectations may be irrational. Profound ignorance or inexperience, or extravagant credulity may lead us to entertain what is irrational. Absurdity belongs to things, irrationality to our estimate of them. If we could not see a manifest absurdity, we should be ourselves irrational.

"These are all of them suggestions of internal sense, consciousness, or reflexion, which we believe because we believe them to be true; and which, if we were not to believe them, would bring upon us the charge of *irrationality*."—BEATTIE.

As irrational denotes the contradiction of reason, so FOOLISH denotes the insufficient exercise of it. So the conduct of children is not called irrational, but silly or foolish. As the irrational is unsound in principle, and contrary to experience, so the foolish is contrary to the practical understanding. The fool speaks and acts absurdly and irrationally in things practical and moral. Hence folly is closely allied to wickedness, as wisdom to virtue. As the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, so the fool says in his heart there is no God. He wants, or has lost the natural light which enables a man to choose the better way which coincides with his higher, truer, and more solid interests. The fool mistakes the relative value of things. As wisdom is reason perfected by knowledge, so folly is reason deluded or uninformed. Even irrational animals are called foolish when they seem to be neglecting the light of instinct in self-preservation. Some men of low mental ability are nevertheless too shrewd to be called fools. Some who are philosophers in intellect are fools in practice.

"It is *foolishly* imagined in France that to deprive one great man of his dishes of silver and gold, and another of his money, will be of advantage to the poor."—FOX.

As the absurd contradicts every-day notions of fitness, so the PREPOSTEROUS (Lat. *præpostĕrus, reversed in order*), the putting, as it were, of the cart before the horse, contradicts every-day notions of right relationship. To say that a thing is preposterously absurd is to say that it exhibits such gross unfitness as to amount to a contradiction of the common sequences of causes and effects. The term is now used as a mere synonym for very absurd, as by Dryden:—

"What's more preposterous than to see
A merry beggar, mirth in misery?"

The following exhibits the exact use of the term:—

"Some indeed *preposterously* misplace these, and make us partake of the benefit of Christ's priestly office in the forgiveness of our sins and our reconcilement to God, before we are brought under the sceptre of His kingly office by our obedience."—SOUTH.

PARADOXICAL (παράδοξος, *contrary to opinion, paradoxical*), belongs to forms

ot statement. When Southey speaks of a "perverse and paradoxical intellect," he only means one which likes to express itself in paradox. A paradox is a proposition which in form is out of harmony with common conceptions, yet is not so in substance. It is truth, reason, or consistency wearing the garb of the false, unreasonable, or absurd. By analogy, the term paradoxical may be extended beyond matters of verbal expression to anything which conveys an impression or a meaning in a manner contrary to expectation. For instance, to many persons a man dressed in yellow for mourning would present a paradoxical appearance. The paradox vanishes when he is told that the man is a native of a country where yellow means mourning.

"A gloss there is to colour that paradox, and make it appear in show not to be altogether unreasonable."—HOOKER.

ABUSE. MISUSE.

As verbs and synonyms (the root of both being the Lat. *uti*, part. *usus*, *to use*) these words seem to be, in the following manner, distinguished. To MISUSE is simply to use in a wrong way, to ABUSE is to misuse in such a way that hurt accrues to the thing misused, or to some other. To misuse may be the consequence of inexperience or unfamiliarity with the thing used; to abuse is intentionally to use it in wrongdoing. In misuse one offends against reason, order, propriety, method, interest; in abuse against justice or honesty. In misuse there is derangement, in abuse excess. Excess is the characteristic in the idea of abusing one's powers, or the patience and forbearance of others. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that the abusing of one's own powers may arise from imprudence or even generosity, as where the anxiety to serve or benefit others has made us forget the care and consideration due to ourselves.

But, generally speaking, to misuse is to use with waste of power; abuse is to use with wrongfulness of purpose. Language is abused when it is employed to deceive, to advocate injustice, to excite bad passions, in blasphemy, and the like. It is misused when it is spoken unidiomatically or ungrammatically.

"The gravest and wisest person may be *abused* by being put into a fool's coat."—TILLOTSON.

"How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover, and that perhaps in words little suspected for any such *misuse*."—LOCKE.

ACADEMY. SCHOOL. COLLEGE. UNIVERSITY. SEMINARY. INSTITUTE.

ACADEMY is a term borrowed from the Greek ἀκαδήμια, a gymnasium in the suburbs of Athens where Plato taught. Hence the Platonic schools were called academies, and societies of learned men have since been called academies. The term is also applied to societies for promoting the fine arts and sciences, as the Academy of France, the Royal Academy of Painters in England, and many others. It is an affectation to call a school for young boys an academy. It is evident that no common living together is involved in the simple idea of an academy, which is constituted simply on the principle of a community in learning or art, and denotes more than their first rudiments.

"In a conference of the French Academy, one of the Academicians desired to have their opinions on the conduct of Paul Veronese, who, though a painter of great consideration, had, contrary to the strict rules of art, in his picture of Perseus and Andromeda, represented the principal figure in shade."—SIR J. REYNOLDS.

A SCHOOL (Greek, σχολή, *leisure*), commonly expresses among ourselves the idea of youthful students and the discipline and instruction of elders, except where the word is used in the sense of a school of art, as of painting, meaning a succession of artists of the same style. Even here, however, the earlier painters or founders of the style are spoken of as masters, and their imitators as pupils. Like academy, but more strictly, common study is implied in school, but not of necessity common living together. Academy and school are also applicable to places where bodily accomplishments are practised, as a School of Fencing, or a Riding Academy.

"This place should be at once both *School* and University, not needing a remove to any other house of scholarship, except it be some peculiar College of Law or Physic, where they mean to be practitioners."—MILTON.

In COLLEGE (Lat. *Collēgium, colleagueship;* and so *any kind of corporation*) is involved, on the other hand, a society of persons living together or acting officially in concert. And this is the essence of the idea, that of learning being accidental. Some colleges are not institutions of learning or science, as the College of Cardinals. A college in the educational sense is supposed to be more under public government than a school, which may be strictly private.

"When we consider the greatness of our wants in this kind, we should be tempted to wish for a *College* destined for the supplial of a sufficient number of able missionaries in constant succession, brought up from their early youth in such a discipline as may be judged best fitted for such a service."—WARBURTON.

An aggregate of colleges may form an UNIVERSITY, which, however, is not thereby constituted, but rather by being a place of *universal* learning (Lat. *universĭtatem*, orig. *a guild corporation*) has commonly a corporate existence and rights which are recognized by the State to which it belongs. A university may consist of one or more than one college. The building called the University of London is not a college, but represents a central seat of learning to which colleges are affiliated.

"As it resembled a royal court in regard of those many noblemen and persons of quality that lived in it, so one might esteem it an *University*, for those many accomplished men in all kinds of knowledge and good learning that were his domestics."—STRYPE.

ACCEDE. ASSENT. CONSENT. AGREE. COMPLY. ACQUIESCE. CONFORM.

ACCEDE (Lat. *accēdĕre, to go to* or *join*) expresses a voluntary going forth of the mind, to attach itself to some proposed matter. That to which we accede is of the nature of something proposed to our consideration, as a request, or a plan of action. We accede when we go over to the side, as it were, of another, in consequence of his representations made to us. We accede when we agree to the terms of a person or party or a convention.

"And vain were reason, courage, learning, all,
Till power *accede;* till Tudor's wild caprice
Smile on their cause."—SHENSTONE.

As we accede to practical proposals, so we ASSENT (Lat. *assentire*) to matters of judgment as enunciated in speculative propositions. We assent to a thing when we admit it to be true, or recognized as such, whether formally proposed to our acceptance or not. It is opposed to dissent, which is to express an opposite or different opinion, as assent a similar or the same. It is purely mental, but is also taken for the voluntary *expression* of concurrence, as an act of the judgment.

"Subscription to articles of Religion, though no more than a declaration of the subscriber's *assent*, may properly enough be considered in connexion with the subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretation."—PALEY.

CONSENT (Lat. *consentīre*) is to concur to some practical purpose, to agree to act according to the will of another. But the noun consent bears the meaning of collective assent, as in the phrase, "the universal consent of mankind." Consent is given to others in some matter in which they are interested, and which is promoted by such agreement on our part. Some superiority, either personal or of position, springing out of the circumstances is implied in consent. Assent may be the result of some proposal or request to express it. Consent is always consequent upon request. The effect of assent is to involve in the responsibility of expressed opinion; the effect of consent is to implicate in a course of action.

"My poverty and not my will consents."
SHAKESPEARE.

AGREE (Fr. *agréer=prendre à gré*, i.e. *ad grātum, to receive favourably*, from Lat. *grātus,*) is the most comprehensive. Assent is agreement of opinion; consent, agreement of action; acceding, agreement to proposals; conformity, agreement to outward rules or practices; compliance, agreement to

submit one's self to the wishes of another. As the rest are voluntary and deliberate acts, so agreement may be voluntary or involuntary. Agreement may be between persons and things, or a person and a thing. It may be a harmony of will, moral likeness, mechanical aptitude, external similarity; and, in short, anything which is not disagreement or difference. Agreement may be complete or partial, of all points or of some only. Things agree which harmonize in opinion, feeling, statement, proposal, appearance, operation—that is, where they meet in some third term, which is a test or standard of judgment, sentiment, expression, or evidence, purpose, likeness, or result.

"Knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and *agreement* or disagreement, and repugnance of any of our ideas."—LOCKE.

COMPLY and CONSENT (the former from Lat. *complēre, to fulfil*, through It. *complire*, not Fr. *complier*) very nearly coincide, but compliance denotes far more strongly and personally the surrender of one's own will to that of another. We may comply reluctantly or gladly. We comply with the wishes of another as such; but we might consent to do a thing on its being shown to be for our own interest, or if a sufficient inducement were held out to us, though it should not be of any particular advantage to the person who should endeavour to induce us to act. To consent is a more independent act than to comply. In consenting we recognize proper ground of action, though at the request of another. In complying we recognize nothing but his desires. Consent may, and generally does, come from a superior, or one independent of us; complying, from one who is in some degree the inferior or weaker. If we consent wrongly, it is from an error of judgment; if we comply wrongly, it is from weakness of character. Not to consent is to refuse; not to comply is to resist.

"He that *complies* against his will,
Is of the same opinion still."
HUDIBRAS.

TO ACQUIESCE (Lat. *acquiescēre*) is to concur with what is said or done in some degree short of a full and hearty concurrence, and even with the mere absence of contradiction or opposition. Acquiescence is a passive act dictated by prudence, duty, or necessity. It is a negative or permissive act which refrains from challenging the truth of statements, or the justice of decisions and dispositions. It is the act of an inferior by position or circumstances. It is a kind of consent or compliance, which comes not so much from the will or the judgment as from a determination to have no will and exercise no judgment of our own in the matter.

"Submission to God's will, and *acquiescence* in the event disposed by Him."—BARROW.

CONFORM (Lat. *conformāre, to form symmetrically*) denotes, as the structure of the word expresses, an external, or at least formal, agreement. We conform only in externals, or the opinions which affect them, or the rules which regulate them. We conform to habits, customs, and practices; not to thoughts, but to the modes in which they find expression; not to principles, but the action which is the result of them. An outward conformity may even conceal an inward dissent.

"I think those who make laws and use force to bring men to Church *conformity* in religion seek only the compliance; but concern themselves not for the conviction of those they punish."—LOCKE.

ACCELERATE. HASTEN. SPEED. EXPEDITE. DESPATCH. QUICKEN. URGE. INSTIGATE.

Of these HASTEN, SPEED, QUICKEN, are used both as active and neuter verbs; EXPEDITE, DESPATCH, ACCELERATE, URGE, only actively. It is as active verbs that they are here considered.

ACCELERATE (Lat. *accĕlĕrāre*) has much the sense of the English form QUICKEN (A.S. *cwic, quick, alive, lively, rapid*), which is the most generic of all. Accelerate refers to some movement already begun, and except as a scientific term, is not applied to the object itself—the rotation of a wheel, not the wheel itself, is accelerated; the speed of a horse, not the horse. In this respect it

differs from HASTEN, which may be employed where no movement has as yet begun; and in the sense of shortening the interval before something takes place, as to hasten a person's departure. It has a character more purely mechanical than hasten. To accelerate is to cause increased velocity of movement; to hasten (cf. German, *hasten*) is to cause diminished occupation of time. In hastening we have a final object, in accelerating we may have no more than an operative object. I hasten the despatch of business in order that it may be the sooner concluded; I accelerate the rotation of the grindstone that it may grind the more effectually. The setting of additional sail, by accelerating the speed of the vessel, will hasten our arrival at the port. If we accelerate a conclusion, it is that we accelerate the process by which it is arrived at.

"Motion may be in an endless variety of directions. It may be quick or slow, rectilineal or curvilineal. It may be equable, or *accelerated*, or retarded."—REID.

"The two Houses, finding things in this posture, *hastened* the departure of their Commissioners to the Isle of Wight, with powers and instructions to treat with the King."—LUDLOW.

SPEED in this sense (A.S. *spēdan, to hasten*) is a little old-fashioned, and is rather used when the idea of prosperous or successful furtherance is intended, without of necessity an increase in the rate of motion. It belongs to the enterprises, undertakings, and transactions of men, which occupy time, and run a prescribed course, and need management and regulation.

"*Speeder* of Night's spies
And guide of all her dreams' obscurities."
CHAPMAN, *Homer*.

URGE is employed in matters in which the action of persons is concerned, and is only poetically used in the sense of propel mechanically (Lat. *urgēre*), as by Gray—

"To chase the rolling circles' speed,
Or *urge* the flying ball."

We say, however, to urge a consideration, argument, plea, and the like. It conveys the idea of hastening by pressure, and from a feeling of the danger or undesirableness of light suggestions or delay.

"My brother did *urge* me in this act."
SHAKESPEARE.

He who urges acts under a grave impulse. Circumstances as well as persons may urge, that is, exercise, strong inducement to action when we reflect upon their nature and consequences. When we urge we supply a stimulus to action where it is wanting, or we regard it as wanting. The use of the whip will urge the horse to his highest speed. Ambition will urge men to arduous, almost to desperate attempts. We are urged equally by the violent promptings of passion, and by the incontrovertible force of reason. To urge stands midway between incline, which is weaker, and compel, which is stronger.

EXPEDITE and DESPATCH (Lat. *expĕdire*, and Fr. *dépêcher*, It. *dispacciare*) are employed of transactions in business, but expedite refers rather to the hastening of the process, despatch to the attainment of the end; so that both may concur, in the same phrase, to expedite the despatch of business. The idea of expediting is to free from incumbrances, so as to enable to move faster; the idea of despatching is to unfasten, and so to set loose or free. A matter is expedited when it is got over more quickly, it is despatched when it is disposed of as done. To despatch a messenger is to send him off, to despatch an enemy is to send him out of life.

INSTIGATE (Lat. *instīgare*) is only used towards persons, and commonly in an unfavourable sense. We urge to honest exertion, and instigate to crime. The idea of instigation is that of goading on to do something; to this has come to be added that of a secret motive or impulse. Instigation is a means, by stimulation and secret excitement, of urging one to do what he is not otherwise inclined to do, and which he may even resist. He who is instigated is forced on in some way. Sound and sober reasons, however unanswerably forcible, do not instigate, though they may prompt, urge, and even compel.

"Your Imperial Majesty's just influence, which is still greater than your extensive power, will animate and *expedite* the efforts of other sovereigns."—BURKE.

"Ere we put ourselves in arms, *despatch* we
The business we have talked of."
SHAKESPEARE.

As the idea of quick is first that of life, and then that of such active movement as flows from life, the verb quicken follows this twofold idea, and besides being employed of the mere acceleration of motion, may be used also of increasing the motive faculty, as in the following:—

"Like a fruitful garden without a hedge, which *quickens* the appetite to enjoy so tempting a prize."—SOUTH.

"He hath only *instigated* his blackest agents to the very extent of their malignity."—WARBURTON.

ACCENT. EMPHASIS. STRESS.

Of these, STRESS is the most general, expressing an idea of effort (O. Fr. *estroissir*, *to straighten*), while EMPHASIS (Gr. ἔμφασις, from ἐμφαίνομαι) expresses the idea of light and shade, and ACCENT (Lat. *accentus*) that of intonation. Metaphorically, stress is used as the others are not—upon ideas, arguments, or moral considerations. We lay stress upon that to which we attribute importance, to which we desire to assign a prominent place in our representations. As accent and emphasis belong not to thoughts but to their utterance in language, so accent is on syllables, emphasis on words. The object of accent is grammatical, for the purpose of characterizing words; the object of emphasis is rhetorical, for the purpose of drawing the idea which they express into prominence, and illustrating the sense by a marked pronunciation of the word. Accent is a matter of rule, and belongs to the requirements of the language, and in no sense to the taste of the speaker. It has in some cases its written signs which are invariable. Emphasis is variable, and depends, where it is deliberate, on the taste and interpretation of the reader or speaker; where it is spontaneous, on his emotion.

"Agreeably to this (short pronunciation of our words) is a remarkable peculiarity of English pronunciation, the throwing the *accent* farther back—that is, nearer the beginning of the word, than is done by any other nation."—BLAIR.

"The voice all modes of passion can express
That marks the proper, and with proper *stress*:
But none emphatic can that actor call,
Who lays an equal *emphasis* on all."
LLOYD'S *Actor*.

ACCEPT. RECEIVE. TAKE.

Of these, TAKE (A.S. *tacan*, *to take*, *lay hold of*) which is the simplest and most purely physical, is employed in the twofold sense of spontaneous assuming, and of ready receiving at the hand of another; in other words, to assume with or without the intervention of another person. The force oscillates between the most active and the most purely passive senses. I take a thing by force, or I take an injury—that is, endure without resenting it. In this passive sense it is employed of inanimate substances to denote no more than a natural impressibility, or capability of being acted upon. Wax will take the impression of a seal. In fresco painting the moist ground will take the colors better than when dry.

RECEIVE (Fr. *recevoir*, Lat. *rĕcĭpĕre*) is purely passive. Like take, it belongs both to voluntary agents and inanimate substances. I receive a friend at my house; I receive a blow; the wax receives the impression. When employed of the former, take is more or less voluntary, even in its passive sense. Receive may be voluntary or involuntary. To take a blow is passive and voluntary. To receive a blow is passive and involuntary. The voluntariness is distinctly prominent in ACCEPT (Lat. *accĭpĕre*, part. *acceptus*), which always implies pleasure, or at least readiness. On the other hand, we receive gladly or unwillingly, as the case may be. We accept what we choose to take from another, we receive what he chooses to give us. The difference may be illustrated by the difference between receiving an apology or an invitation and accepting it. It is to be noted that accept is not used in this sense of persons whom we always receive, sometimes gladly, sometimes ungraciously, unless the person is in some way presented to our choice. Acceptance is an active, voluntary, and conscious reception. We are commonly said to receive thanks and to accept services. Receive may denote

no more than not refusing. We ought always to be grateful for benefits we have received, and to be very slow in rejecting what we have once accepted.

"And toward the education of your daughters
I here bestow a simple instrument,
And this small packet of Greek and Latin books,
If you *accept* them, then their worth is great." SHAKESPEARE.

"Justification always supposes two parties, one to give, and another to *receive*, whether without any act at all on the receptive side, as in the case of infants; or whether accompanied by receptive acts, as in the case of adults, who may be properly said to *accept* and assent to, as well as to *receive* and enjoy."—WATERLAND.

"*Take*, eat, this is my body."—*English Bible*.

"Do I fully trust in God as the Giver and *Taker* away of all earthly things?"—GILPIN.

ACCEPTABLE. GRATEFUL. WELCOME.

That is ACCEPTABLE (See ACCEPT) which is gladly to be received as a relative good as coinciding with our circumstances and requirements. But this only within certain limits, for it is not a strong term. The appropriate belongs essentially to the acceptable: we should be speaking ironically if we said of any gift of great value that it was acceptable. That is acceptable which is suitable in itself and pleasant to receive. The acceptable is determined as much by the judgment as by the feelings.

"If the mind is at any time vacant from every passion and desire, there are still some objects that are more *acceptable* to us than others."—REID.

GRATEFUL (Lat. *grātus*) expresses not so much what is recognized as a good as rather what is sensibly delightful and consonant with the feelings. Hence, unlike acceptable, it may be predicted of things which are not gifts at all, nor of the nature of possessions. A donation of money is grateful to the poor man, as gladdening his heart with the means of obtaining what otherwise he could not possess; acceptable to him as reflecting upon the improvement of his condition consequent upon it. The grateful commonly meets a natural, as the acceptable an artificial or casual want. The cool breeze is grateful to the fevered patient. As the acceptable excites satisfaction, so the grateful excites joy or pleasure. The acceptable meets a requirement, the grateful a want.

"Hope's *grateful* stimulus produces a pleasing and salutary flow of the animal spirits, and diffuses a temperate vivacity over the system."—COGAN.

WELCOME, as the word plainly indicates, belongs to that which comes to us gladly, and includes, like grateful, many things besides gifts or things offered to our acceptance. What is welcome is always of the nature of an event. It is, strictly speaking, not the person, but his arrival or coming which is welcome. Welcome expresses, more positively than acceptable or even grateful, the fact that the thing has accrued to the person. That which is acceptable or grateful one would be glad to have, that which is welcome has arrived. The former express the qualities of things, the latter their effect upon ourselves.

"O *welcome* hour!"—MILTON.

ACCEPTANCE. ACCEPTATION.

These words, which are only different modifications of the word accept, have come to be employed with some distinction of meaning; depending, nevertheless, entirely upon usage. It is, however, consonant with their etymology that acceptance should have the more subjective and active, acceptation the more objective and passive, sense. So acceptance denotes the act or process of receiving, acceptation the mode in which the word or thing is received. The acceptance of a word would mean the recognition and reception of it, either by an individual or into the vocabulary of a language. Its acceptation would be its force and meaning after it had been so received. The acceptation of a word is conventional. It depends upon what a particular people or generation may regard as its direct and proper force. So, for instance, the Lat. *abūti, to use wrongly*, has gone out in different meanings in the French *abuser* and the English *abuse* as regards persons,

the French notion of abuse in such cases being deception, the English, coarse denunciation. The acceptance of a word lies more commonly in the genius of a language, which seems to possess, so to speak, an instinctive faculty of admitting what is consonant, and rejecting what is uncongenial to it. Like all instincts, however, it is not unerring; and we are sometimes surprised to find what we regard as a rejection without a cause, where the acceptance of the word would have added to the resources of the language.

"Such with him
Finds no *acceptance* nor can find."
MILTON.

"'Friend,' quoth the Cur, 'I meant no harm,
Then why so captious, why so warm?
My words in common *acceptation*,
Could never give thee provocation.'"—GAY.

ACCESS. APPROACH.

Both these words are employed both of the drawing near and of the line of movement by which it is effected—that is, of the act and the way; but ACCESS (Lat. *accessus*, from *accĕdĕre*, *to approach*) bears reference rather to the capabilities, APPROACH (Fr. *approcher*, Lat. *appröpriare*, BRACHET) to the way, of drawing *near*. In approach, the question is as to the right or wrong line or method, or the safety or expediency of making it at all. In access, it is as to the ease or difficulty of finding or obtaining it. Approach is used in more varied senses than access, which commonly means capability of reaching or being reached. Approach is the act of drawing near, and is applicable to time as well as space, or, in a secondary sense, bears the meaning of resemblance, an analogy existing between the ideas of similarity and approximation. Access is a complete, approach a partial, act. Approach may still leave an interval between us and the object approached; access precludes the idea of such interval. In regard to persons, one would sometimes gladly approach them, but cannot gain access to them. In such cases we commonly approach them in order to insinuate ourselves into their good graces, and seek access to them on the ground of some matter of interest in which we believe that they may render us assistance.

"They anon
With hundreds and with thousands trooping came
Attended, all *access* was thronged."
MILTON.

"By thy *approach* thou mak'st me most unhappy."
SHAKESPEARE.

ACCIDENT. CONTINGENCY. CASUALTY. INCIDENT.

All these terms express the occurrence of events in the producing of which, our own design had no part. Of these ACCIDENT (Lat. *accĭdere*, *to befall*) and CASUALTY (Lat. *casuālis*, *fortuitous*) are more closely personal than CONTINGENCY (Lat. *contingĕre*, *to fall to the lot*) and INCIDENT (Lat. *incĭdĕre*, *to befall*). Although the term accident means in itself no more than a befalling, it is never used without qualification to express the chance occurrence of anything good, but requires a modifying term; as, a lucky accident. An accident bears reference to some person to whom an event occurs undesignedly. In the phrase "by accident," as, "I met him by accident in the street," the idea of untoward befalling is not implied as in the case of the simple noun, an accident. Accident is the concrete of which chance is the abstract. Chance instanced in somebody becomes accident. We may see how the term accident was on the turn in Shakespeare's time, from an unexpected occurrence to an untoward one, in the line,

"Of moving *accidents* by flood and field."

Casualty, like accident, tends to an unfavourable sense. The use of such words seems to indicate the feeling of mankind, that where things occur not as the consequence of human forethought and design, they are in the majority of cases infelicitous or disastrous. A casualty is first a chance occurrence, then an infelicitous one; as an accident is first a chance occurrence, then a disastrous one. Casualty is more independent of ourselves than accident. An accident may be, and commonly is, attributable to our own acts, as through rashness or neglect; but there are casualties which no

human prudence could foresee or prevent. A casualty of this kind would be the death of another at a certain moment, or our own. Human life is subject to casualties, but it is only liable to accidents. Accidents spring immediately out of the situation of the individual. Casualties out of the character, condition, or circumstances which he shares with others. Men and women might suffer equally from the upsetting of a carriage, but the life of men being more active and public, involving many dangerous trades and professions, exposes them to more serious and frequent casualties than that of women.

"The cause why the children of Israel took unto one man many wives, might be lest the *casualties* of war should in any way hinder the promises of God concerning their multitude, from taking effect on them."—HOOKER.

A CONTINGENCY is to a circumstance or set of circumstances what an accident is to a person or set of persons; but the effect of an accident is simple, that of a contingency complex. An accident is a chance, a contingency is a chance upon a chance. When one event or set of events happens to fall in with another event or set of events, so as to produce a result of practical moment, this is a contingency. It is a dependent or resultant occurrence, an event which flows out of antecedent circumstances, themselves fortuitous, and so itself a fortuitous combination.

"The remarkable position of the Queen rendering her death a most important *contingency*."—HALLAM.

INCIDENT, like accident, expresses a befalling without importing the idea of chance, though it may owe its interest to a certain unexpectedness. It is an event regarded irrespectively of what led to it, but not precluding the plain recognition or ascertainment of its cause, as *e.g.* an incident in a voyage or history. As an accident belongs to things without, and comes in to mar, interrupt, or even stop a course of things, so an incident belongs to that course, and is a varied feature or episode in it. It is to action what episode is to narrative, a deviation without loss of continuity, being not untoward or frustrative, but illustrative and helpful. It may be observed that the notion of harm which associates itself with casualty is not attached to casual, which means simply coming in collaterally, coinciding with other matters, but not having any important effect upon them, so that its meaning borders upon that of trivial.

ACCOMPANIMENT. CONCOMITANT. ADJUNCT. APPENDAGE.

An ACCOMPANIMENT (see *Accompany*) is that which goes by nature or may be made to go with another thing by reason of its fitness or harmony. The purpose of an accompaniment is to make that which it accompanies fuller, better, and more complete. Being itself of a different nature or character from that which it accompanies, it adds to it in value or efficiency.

"We have the same representative of Hymen in an epithalamium, the usual indispensable accompaniment of a wedding."—WARTON.

A CONCOMITANT (Lat. *concŏmĭtare, to accompany*) is that which follows another thing by its physical or moral force and tendency, or belongs to it in time and historically. In concomitant the fact of accompaniment, rather than any purpose or fitness, is expressed.

"The length of this account I flatter myself will be excused, as it contains a few curious particulars which are not foreign to the subject, and which *concomitantly* illustrate the history of the arts."—WALPOLE.

An ADJUNCT (Lat. *adjungĕre*, part. *adjunctus, to join to*) is that which is joined to another thing, not being an essential part of it, or belonging to it in nature, but which may be with advantage attached to it, or, as a fact, has been, so that the two go together.

"The nature, properties, *adjuncts*, and effects of God's law."—BARROW.

APPENDAGE (Lat. *appendĭcium*) is commonly (where it is not used in a purely physical sense) something or the nature of a privilege or possession, which by its suitableness or agreeableness enhances the value of the larger or more considerable thing to which

it is annexed. It may be purposely added to it or drawn after, and in some sense required by it. So local privileges may constitute valuable appendages to a title and estates. On the other hand, sumptuous equipages may be a necessary appendage to such a position. Appendages, if not actually onerous, are either valuable or honourable.

"Modesty is the *appendage* of sobriety."
—Bishop Taylor.

ACCOMPANY. Attend. Escort.

To Accompany (L. Lat. *compāniōnem*, from *con*, *together*, and *pānis*, *bread*, a companion, being literally a *messmate*) and Attend (Lat. *attendĕre*, *to give heed to*, Fr. *attendre*, *to await*) are applicable both to things and persons; Escort only to persons. When applied to persons Accompany implies some sort of equality between the two persons or parties, Attend some measure of inferiority in one to the other. Escort (Fr. *escorte*; as if from Lat. *excorrĭgĕre*, *to set straight*) is accompaniment of or attendance upon persons for the sake of protection from danger or insult, though where there is little risk of this the escort assumes the character of honourable and deferential accompaniment. It is not a term of long-standing in the language, and according to usage may be employed with equal correctness of the protection afforded by one person and by more than one. It is used of a single person in the following:—

"To-day shut out, still onward press,
And watch the seasons of access—
In private haunt, in public meet
Salute, *escort* him through the street."
Francis' *Horace*.

When used of things, Accompany indicates rather a simultaneous, Attend a consequent, association. So we say such a thing is attended with serious consequences where we could not employ accompanied. This force the verb has in common with the noun attendant, which means often not only an inferior companion but one who waits or follows upon another one, accompanies another out of regard, or to show him honour, or as an act of friendship, or as deriving pleasure from his society. One escorts from fear of danger on another's behalf, toward whom one entertains honourable regard. One attends out of a more delicate regard, or as discharging a duty which consists in being ready to take his orders or supply his wants. The subordination, implied in attendance, may be voluntary, as when a friend, out of friendship, attends another in sickness.

"The Persian dames
(So were accustom'd all the Eastern fair),
In sumptuous cars *accompanied* his march."
Glover.

"All knees to Thee shall bow of them that bide
In heaven, or earth, or under earth in hell,
When Thou *attended* gloriously from heaven
Shalt in the sky appear." Milton.

We commonly speak of companions as agreeable or not, of attendants as numerous or not, of an escort as strong or not. Accompany and Attend are the terms ordinarily employed to express the causation and sequence of phenomena. In that case we use accompany, when the results are simultaneous; attend, when one result leads to another. Exploring expeditions into unknown countries are invariably accompanied with danger and hardship, and frequently attended with loss of life.

ACCOMPLISH. Effect. Execute. Achieve. Perform.

Accomplish (Fr. *accomplis*; Lat. *ad* and *complēre*, *to fill up*) denotes the complete fulfilment of a plan proposed in some measure by one's self. One is not said to accomplish the designs of another as such, though of course we may make them ours. This is done by no adherence to a fixed course, but by the employment of any resources of which we may be possessed, and any instruments of which we can avail ourselves. It is no simple or trivial thing which is said to be accomplished, but something of a complex nature, involving sustained effort in labour or in skill. Personal qualifications, generally, being applied efficiently, lead to accomplishment. To accomplish is to realize a project. We accomplish when we fill up to the needful or proposed extent by doing what is suf-

ficient for the purpose. So characteristic is this of the term, that it is employed of cases in which the requirement is measured by simple duration, as to accomplish a period of servitude.

"And Tullius sayth, that grete thinges ne ben not *accomplised* by strengthe ne by deliverneesse (cleverness) of body, but by good conseil, by auctoritee of persones, and by science."—CHAUCER.

To EFFECT (Lat. *effĭcĕre, to effect, to work out a thing*) relates to the bringing about of a thing as a result, as to ACCOMPLISH is to bring it about as a project. We accomplish by doing what is sufficient; we effect by the application of right means. As the measure of accomplishment is the capability of the agent, so the measure of effect is the potency of the cause. Yet the term is not associated with the operations of mechanical or impersonal powers, but with personal agents, who are said to effect when they set in operation adequate causes. And so long as these means or causes are adequate, they may be in themselves either momentous or slight. A knowledge of the mechanical powers enables man to effect what cannot be effected by the most powerful of beasts. Sometimes one person has effected his purpose by entreaty, where another had employed intimidation without effect.

"The Christian Dispensation was necessary to fulfil the purposes of God to man, and to effect that which the divine counsels had decreed in relation to him."—BISHOP HURD.

EXECUTE (Lat. *exsĕqui*, part. *exsĕcūtus, to follow out*) expresses a mode of action, not a result, like ACCOMPLISH and EFFECT. We do not accomplish or effect till we have ceased to work. We begin to execute when we begin to act. When we seek to accomplish or effect, the object is before us. When we execute, the object is, so to speak, behind us. We have not to gain it, but to realize it or carry it out. That which we have to accomplish or effect has no existence till it is accomplished or effected. That which we seek to execute is already in existence, though its effectuation is left to us. A law is made, a design conceived, an object defined, a project recognized, a plan drawn, a command given, a commission entrusted; but they need to be carried out, and this carrying out is the execution, whether the thing to be executed emanated from myself or, as more commonly, from another.

"Would it not redound to the discredit of an earthly prince to permit that the attendants on his person, the officers of his court, the *executors* of his edicts should have the least injury offered them—should fare scantily or coarsely, should appear in a sordid garb?"—BARROW.

ACHIEVE (Fr. *achever, à chef, to a head or end*) is to accomplish under special circumstances of difficulty, but differs from the foregoing in that some degree of excellence is attached to the idea, either in the striving or the thing striven for, or both. None of the other synonyms go beyond the fact, and imply nothing of the merit of doing. And although a matter cannot be in itself more than accomplished, effected, or executed, yet there may be room for reflexion that it might have been more fully accomplished, more faithfully or exactly executed, or more permanently effected. But the thing achieved has been pushed to the extreme limit of success, both in the result and the mode in which it has been gained. In the others chance may have combined with effort, but he who has been helped by luck in any degree has not achieved.

"No exploits so illustrious as those which have been *achieved* by the faith and patience, by the courage and prudence, of the ancient saints. They do far surpass the most famous *achievements* of Pagan heroes."—BARROW.

To PERFORM is to carry on with sustained or continuous action, to perform perfectly is to do this out to the end. We perform what is prescribed or marked out by rule as a part or duty, a function or office, a commandment. In all the rest the end is wellnigh everything, in performance the end is frequently nothing, and the doing everything. A performance as such, has no object beyond itself. It is itself an end, the thing being

done for the sake of doing it, or for some purpose which goes along with it, as the exhibition of some quality in the performer, or some pleasure accessory to it. Continuous function according to prescribed rule is performance, whether it be physical, mental, moral, or partly one and partly another, as dancing upon a rope, mental arithmetic, an act of benevolence, or playing a musical instrument, or taking part in a dramatic representation.

"Some men are brave in battle who are weak in counsel, which daily experience sets before our eyes. Others deliberate wisely, but are weak in the *performing* part."—DRYDEN.

ACCOST. SALUTE. ADDRESS. GREET. HAIL.

ACCOST (Fr. *accoster*, Lat. *accostare*) is literally to come to the *side*, Lat. *costa*, of or up to a person, with the purpose of addressing him. In old English writers occurs the form "accoast," which was employed as a geographical term.

"So much of Lapland as *accoasts* the sea." FULLER.

The idea of the movement has dropped out of the word, which has come to mean exclusively the purpose of it, namely, the address. It denotes the direction of words to a person in an unpremeditated way whom chance circumstances have thrown in one's way. One accosts another as one meets him in the street, the object being in the first instance to bring one's self before his notice. Hence in accosting there is some degree of abruptness by the necessities of the case, or familiar acquaintance with the person.

"If you would convince a person of his mistake, *accost* him not upon that subject when his spirit is ruffled or discomposed with any occurrences of life, and especially when he has heated his passions in the defence of a contrary opinion."—WATTS.

SALUTE (Lat. *sălūtare, to wish health*) is to exhibit on meeting some sign of friendship or respect which may or may not consist in, or be accompanied by, words. Among acquaintance it is hardly a voluntary act, and is required by the usages of society. While accost is of equals and in words, salute is not uncommonly of superiors and without words. To salute is deferential, to accost may be so, or it may be quite the contrary. Saluting is momentary and not sustained; while accosting may be momentary in regard to act, and sustained in regard to the words.

"I shall not trouble my reader with the first *salutes* of our three friends."—ADDISON.

ADDRESS (Fr. *s'adresser*, which traces back, through certain changes, to Lat. *dirĭgere, to direct*) may be with or without personal meeting, as by letter. It is more sustained than accost. So we might accost a person for the purpose afterwards of addressing him at length. Both accost and salute belong more restrictedly to the moment of first meeting. The verb address is applied sometimes directly to the person addressed, sometimes to the thing, as an observation or a letter addressed to him. For further remarks see the noun ADDRESS.

"The shortest and best prayer which we can *address* to Him who knows our wants and our ignorance in asking is, 'Thy will be done.'"—BOLINGBROKE.

GREET (A. S. *grétan*) is to salute with some demonstration of personal feeling. This is commonly favourable, as to greet with smiles, but usage sometimes employs the term in reference to the contrary, as the appearance of an unpopular orator, for instance, is greeted with yells and hisses. It is demonstrative recognition by words or other signs and expressions. We accost and salute only persons directly. We may greet their acts or words. By a poetical analogy the term is even extended to events, though, in its older use, it was confined to persons, as very elegantly in the following:—

"Roget, droope not, see the spring
Is the earth enammelling,
And the birds on every tree
Greete this morn with melodie."
BROWN.

When used of events it has the force of welcome or the reverse, but with a stronger element of emotion.

HAIL (Icel. *heill, i.e., hale, healthy*, and connected with *heal* and *health*,

answering to the Lat. *salve!* and so to "salute") has lost its etymological force, and means now such a short demonstrative accosting as shall arrest the attention, as when we speak of hailing a ship at sea. We hail in order to cause and excite attention by some cry of recognition, or some short and stirring form of words, to which we add effect by the very force and sound which we impart to them. In greeting we demonstrate our feelings in regard to the person, in hailing we recognize something in him. A multitude, when it greets a man as their Prince, is moved by feelings of loyalty. In hailing him as their Prince they do no more than give outward token of accepting him as such. This may be a formal act following upon his election, or an outward acclamation concealing inward disaffection.

"I pray'd for children, and thought barrenness
In wedlock a reproach. I gain'd a son,
And such a son as all then *hailed* me happy.
Who would be now a father in my stead?"
MILTON.

ACCOUNT. BILL.

As synonyms these words express in common a representation or statement of charges on money.

ACCOUNT (Lat. *ad* and *computare*, to *compute*, of which *count* is an abbreviation) enters more into details than a BILL (O. Fr. *bille*, a label or note of the value of an article, L. Lat. *billa*). Hence bill has commonly but one side to it, embodying a charge of one party against another. An account may have two sides to it, a balance being finally struck in favour of one side or party in the account.

"To love's *account* they placed their death of late,
And now transfer the sad *account* to fate."
PARNELL.

"Ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man's estate, and ordered to the best, that the bills may be less than the estimation abroad."—BACON.

ACCOUNT. NARRATIVE. NARRATION. DESCRIPTION. RELATION. RECORD. HISTORY. TALE. MEMOIR. STORY. ANECDOTE.

An ACCOUNT, being literally a rendering of counts, is a detailed statement of what makes up a thing, what brings it about, and what it is composed of when it is brought about. An account is an explication of facts, and a true account is an exact explication of them. It may be of any complex phenomenon, as of an ordinary personal occurrence, an historical transaction, a physical law or fact, an artificial system or theory. It is not a term of high historic dignity, but refers to matters of the more familiar kind. We should speak of Thucydides' history, rather than account, of the Peloponnesian war. The virtue of an account is not to be lengthy but concise, clear, sufficiently full, and correct. It should contain neither more nor less than the sum of the facts. Its end is to convey instruction with fidelity. Accounts may be vague, coming in from various and unverified sources. On the other hand, narrative, description, and relation, imply more distinctly a narrator, describer, and relater.

"For this cause chiefly we thought it good to yield up an *account* of our faith in writing."—BP. JEWEL.

A NARRATIVE (Lat. *narrāre*, to *relate*) differs from a *narration*, as the objective from the subjective, that is, the narration is the narrative viewed in connexion with the mind and act of the narrator. A narrative is not like an account of any complex fact or transaction, but only of such as are characterized by an historic sequence. A narrative belongs to occurrences. It is not only bound to truth of fact and a representation of details in the order of occurrence, but it possesses a rhetorical style. In narration general truth takes the place of minute exactitude; the manner takes precedence of the evidence. It may be the combined result of study and art. It has to do, not with naked facts, but with facts clothed. It does not dispense with interest in aiming at instruction. Its virtue is to be clear, consecutive, striking, touching, elegant, descriptive, illustrative. Livy's narratives of the battles of early Roman history cannot be regarded as historical.

RELATION (Lat. *rĕferre*, part. *rĕlatus*, *to relate*, *record*) is literally a

bringing back. To relate in old English meant simply to bring back. So Spenser—

"Till morrow next again
Both light of heaven and strength of men
relate."

But before this it had been commonly used in the sense of bringing back by recital, representing in story.

"And *relacion*
Maketh to the Quene how he had do."
GOWER.

The term connects the matter closely with the speaker, making the action a strictly personal one. It is such an account as is given by an individual of facts which he has either actually experienced, or has assimilated and made his own. Therefore the virtues of relation are the virtues of the relater, such as come from a close observation, a lucid intellect, a sound judgment of the relative importance of events, sympathy, candour. Unlike narration, it may be very inartistic yet very effective, from the vivid and natural manner of the relater. A narrative gains by rhetorical completeness, a relation by unstudied simplicity. The narrator presents you with a finished account, the relater with the aggregate of his own experience in fact and feeling. It belongs, however, to a more familiar, shorter, less grave, and more personal subject than narrative, so that a very commonplace occurrence may become peculiarly interesting from the mind and manner of the relater.

"Those *relations* are commonly of most value in which the writer tells his own story."—JOHNSON.

"In the *narration* of the poet, it is not material whether he *relate* the whole story in his own character, or introduce some of his personages to *relate* any part of the action that had passed before the poem opens."—BLAIR.

HISTORY (Gr. ἱστορία, *a learning by inquiry*) is a formal and connected account of many events in series, for which some degree of importance is claimed as illustrative of men and nations, an account standing to a history as an item to a general sum. So we might speak of the account of the Plague of Athens as given in the history of Thucydides. For further remarks see HISTORY.

"Secondly, we have likewise a most ancient and credible *history* of the beginning of the world. I mean the *history* of Moses, with which no book in the world in point of antiquity can contend."—TILLOTSON.

The presumption at least is that a history is true. This is not necessarily the case with Story (the word is an abbreviated form of History), which may be fictitious. Where it is not fictitious there is still implied an inferior degree of dignity and importance, the subject turning generally upon incidents of private and domestic life, as the story of Robinson Crusoe, the story of Fabricius and the Elephant, the story of the Babes in the Wood. The interest of history lies in occurrences and transactions on a great scale; the changes of political constitutions; the deliberations of senates, the increase of popular power, the shock of battles, the celebration of triumphs, the progress of armies, the lives of factious and ambitious leaders, heroes, orators, statesmen. The interest of story lies in the adventures of persons more like ourselves generally, in personal enterprises, in scenes of home life. In history we look on as upon a grand spectacle. In story we identify ourselves with what is passing, and feel that fortune might have made us principal actors in it. Our minds are occupied engagingly, and the introduction of history plays only a secondary part. A story may instruct, but its first purpose is to entertain. It should combine, in an unpretending manner, the virtues of narration and relation.

"A *story* in which native humour reigns,
'Tis often useful, always entertains."
COWPER.

In TALE (A. S. *tal*, *a reckoning speech*) the subject is often fictitious, not of necessity, but because the primary characteristic is not truth but relation. As a good story is entertaining, so a good tale excites sentiment or sympathy. A tale may be true or false, or a compound of truth and falsehood. A tale is etymologically a telling off or counting off (compare *Account*) of matters in narration. A tale is commonly a story of personal experience involving hap-

piness or unhappiness, success or disappointment, prosperity or the reverse. It is a story coloured by human feelings and fortunes, turning on individual cases. A true tale, a false tale, a tale of happiness, a pitiful tale, an ingenious tale, a tale of glorious achievements, a tale of lying wonders. We may tell a tale as it has been told to us, or we may invent it, or mix narrative with invention. As story borders more closely upon narrative, so tale upon relation. The character of a story depends more upon the matter, the character of a tale on the reciter. In the phrases tale-bearing, tale-telling, we seem to recognize the ideas of personal incident which receive a colour from the relater.

"In thy faint slumbers I by thee have watch'd,
And heard thee murmur *tales* of wars."
SHAKESPEARE.

A DESCRIPTION (Lat. *describĕre, to write off, to write down*) professes to be a portraiture in language, giving the fact or the object as it strikes the eye or the mind with fidelity of representation. It is delineation in detail. It is not in itself a story or narrative, though it becomes a kind of story or narrative to him to whom it is given; as, *e.g.* a description of the whole appearance of a person where the sequence is the order of representation and not of occurrence. Its excellence consists in fidelity to the original, and a fine and natural accuracy. External objects, occurrences, transactions, are the common subject of description, while philosophically, description is a kind of popular definition which consists in an enumeration of the essential characteristics of a thing. As description is word-painting, or word-sketching, the measure of description is the power of the describer over the representative employment of language, superadded to a natural capacity to receive vivid and exact impressions in himself. The case is somewhat different between descriptions of outward objects and mental impressions or sensations. In the former case we describe by commensurate terms, in the latter by likenesses and analogies to impressions derived through other senses. A description of a man would consist in specifying, numbering, measuring, and delineating, in giving his hue, complexion, stature, dimensions, character of features, characteristic expression of countenance, apparent age, and so on. The blind man described his impression of scarlet, which was purely a mental one, by saying that he believed it must be like the sound of a trumpet, that is, that it stood to the impressions of sight as such sounds to the impressions of hearing. Spenser used the form discrive:—

"How shall frail pen *discrive* her heavenly face
For fear through want of skill her beauty to disgrace."

AN ANECDOTE (Gr. ἀνέκδοτος, *not published*) is literally an incident not given out or published, and so in private keeping or circulation. It is the relation of a characteristic matter of fact relating to individuals, and therefore stands to story as species to genus. It is commonly a passage of private life.

"Antiquity has preserved a beautiful instance in an *anecdote* of Alexander the tyrant of Pheræ, who, though he had so industriously hardened his heart as to seem to take delight in cruelty, even murdering many of his subjects every day without cause and without pity, yet, at the bare representation of a tragedy which related the misfortunes of Hecuba and Andromache, he was so touched with the fictitious distress which the poet had wrought upon it that he burst out into a flood of tears."—STERNE.

ACCOUNTABLE. ANSWERABLE. RESPONSIBLE. AMENABLE. OBNOXIOUS. LIABLE. SUBJECT.

ACCOUNTABLE (see ACCOUNT) means literally liable to be compelled to give an account or standing in such a relation as involves it. It is sometimes, like responsible, used in the abstract sense of being possessed of reason and so being master of one's own actions, and by consequence bound to render an account of them. As a synonym with the above-mentioned it denotes in a marked manner a personal service or relationship which is subordinate to some superior person, as a steward

is accountable to his employer. It is a specific condition springing out of a specific relationship.

"The first point to be endeavoured after is to impress upon children the idea of *accountableness*, that is, to accustom them to look forward to the consequences of their actions in another world."—PALEY.

This specific subordination does not attach, or not in so marked a manner, to RESPONSIBLE (Lat. *respondēre, to give answer*), which is far more general. A responsible office may be one of great personal influence and dignity, and of moral responsibility rather than specific accountableness. Hence responsibility extends beyond acts to their issues. I am accountable to my superior for what I do. I may be held in the judgment of others responsible for the consequences of what I do. I may, by a voluntary agreement, make myself responsible for what may occur to a person towards whom I stand otherwise in no relation of accountableness.

"He has been pleased to ask, 'Is the doctor willing to be *responsible* at last for the nature, quality, and tendency of all his notions?'"—WATERLAND.

ANSWERABLE is in English what RESPONSIBLE is in Latin, and so expresses the simplest and most generic sense of these terms. It expresses a relation to simpler and commoner things for one's conduct in matters of minor trusts and mere ordinary duties. I am answerable when I take upon myself a common risk for the habits or good behaviour of another; for the safety of some article left in my keeping. I am answerable in cases where some pledge has been given for the performance of an act or the fulfilment of an engagement, the breach of which would involve loss, disgrace, punishment, or disappointment. Accountable and answerable rather express the fact, and responsible the nature of condition. Hence there is in answerable a latent force which does not belong to responsible, or less observably that of being liable to punishment or penalty in case of failure in such trust or duty.

"If I pay money to a banker's servant, the banker is *answerable* for it."—BLACKSTONE.

This force of liability to punishment comes out more strongly still in OBNOXIOUS. This is due to the classic meaning of the term, which is properly applied to "one who, on the ground of a mischief or wrong committed by him, is justly liable to punishment (*ob noxam pœnæ obligatus*). It has what has been termed a lax and slovenly" use, as a "vague, unserviceable synonym for offensive. We punish, or wish to punish, those whom we dislike, and thus obnoxious has obtained its present sense of offensive." It may be added, that in this vague sense it has extended beyond subjects capable of punishment, and we speak of obnoxious smells. In its correct application it expresses not only a liability but, in some cases, that the stage has been reached when the possible position of the answerable has become actual, and punishment or resentment may be expected in consequence of the liability incurred.

"Our *obnoxiousness* to the curse of the law for sin had exposed us to all the extremity of misery, and made death as due to us as wages to the workman."—SOUTH.

AMENABLE (Fr. *amener, to lead* or *guide to*) means liable to some thing or person which has an inherent power to bind or compel, as laws, rules, authority, a parent, a governor. It sometimes further bears the sense of a natural willingness to recognize such power, and then becomes an epithet of moral conduct or character, as when one is amenable to discipline, advice, or reason, or simply amenable. To be amenable is to be accountable so far as one is bound by laws and regulations.

"The sovereign of this country is not *amenable* to any form of trial known to the laws."—JUNIUS.

LIABLE (Fr. *lier*, Lat. *ligāre, to bind*) expresses in a simple and comprehensive manner a relative capability of being acted upon; and not only has nothing of the strictly personal action involved in accountable, or the moral dignity of responsible, but is applicable even to merely physical influences, as silver is liable to be tarnished by damp. It is, like answerable, used for certain common

and familiar obligations, as to be liable for the debts of another. This would mean that a power would be forthcoming to compel their payment. To be answerable for them would rather mean that this power resulted from some relation to the debtor, natural, incurred, or assumed on the part of the other party. I am liable by law; I am answerable also by my own acts or obligations. Hence, as the distinctive capacity of a thing is very likely to find exercise, or the distinctive quality of a thing to find something to act upon it, the word liable has become a synonym for likely, that is, likely to act or be affected in a certain way under certain circumstances, as in the following:—

"In geometry we are not *liable* to adopt the same paradoxical conclusions as in algebra, because the diagrams to which our attention is directed serve as a continual check on our reasoning powers."—STEWART.

It may be worth while in this place to notice the difference specifically between LIABLE and SUBJECT. Subject (Lat. *subjĭcĕre*, part. *subjectus, to cast* or *place under*) stands to nature as liable to circumstances. Men are subject to error from their mental, to death from their physical, to temptation from their moral constitution, to anger from the irritability of their temperament. They are liable to catch cold in draught, and to arrest for debt. From one point of view it may be said that we *are* subject, and *become* liable; or, again, we are subject to that which dominates over us as partaking a common nature, we are liable to what affects us as individuals. That to which we are subject, as, for instance, death, will overtake us sooner or later. That to which we are liable, as, for instance, accident, may be happily escaped, or by circumspection avoided. Subject implies the pressure of a more uniform, liable of a more casual influence.

"For what is strength without a double share
Of wisdom? Vast, unwieldy, burdensome,
Proudly secure, yet *liable* to fall
By weakest subtleties." MILTON.

"All human beings are *subject* to decay."
DRYDEN.

ACCREDIT. ENTRUST, DELEGATE. COMMISSION. DEPUTE.

These words express the idea in common of reposing trust or conferring authority on another for a purpose of one's own. The simplest and most general is to ENTRUST, to place in a position of trust or by a converse use to commit to a person's trust or faithful keeping. We entrust persons with offices, property, or even secrets. In all cases we entrust on the ground of a belief of a sufficiency of intelligence, and such personal regard to one's self, as well as such probity of character as would induce the other to act for our own interests, or at least not to neglect or oppose them. Him whom we entrust with anything we constitute a guardian on our own behalf. It is great folly to entrust matters of importance to the weak, the careless, the thoughtless, or the dishonest.

"He (the Lord of all the families of the earth) will enter into a severe scrutiny how we may have employed all those talents that He hath *entrusted* us with."—SHARP.

ACCREDIT (Fr. *accréditer*) is to place in the position of acting as one's representative, and of showing him to be so in a formal and public manner, if necessary, as by giving him credentials. It is a term of diplomacy. To accredit is to place in a position of public trust.

"I am better pleased indeed that he (the reviewer) censures some things than I should have been with unmixed commendation; for his censure will, to use the new diplomatic term, *accredit* his praises."—COWPER.

To DELEGATE (Lat. *dēlēgare, to entrust*), is to cause to be done by another that which one has to do one's self. It is closely allied to DEPUTE (Lat. *deputare*, in the sense of *to allot to*), but both persons and duties may be delegated, while persons only are deputed. The appointment makes the deputy; the being sent elsewhere to act makes the delegate. A member of parliament is the deputy of the people as soon as he is returned; he is then delegate when he has gone to the metropolis to represent their interests. The term delegate is employed of important matters of public

interest. A deputy may be no more than the representative of an official of low rank. The deputy merely does what the other is not present to do in person. The delegate has a greater freedom of responsible action, and may have but little less than independent powers.

"This change from an immediate state of procuration and *delegation* to a course of acting as from original power, is the way in which all the popular magistracies in the world have been perverted from their purposes."—BURKE.

"Christes *deputie* or vicar."—UDAL.

To COMMISSION (Lat. *committĕre, to entrust*) differs from depute in that the latter refers to a continuous charge or vicarious office. He who is deputed is a representative; he who is commissioned has no representative capacity. To commission does not go beyond the act or work, and does not imply necessarily a permanent office. We commission at will, and in cases where it suits our convenience to act through others. It is in general the superior that commissions the inferior in order to avail himself of his services. A monarch, for instance, appoints a commission of inquiry in the interests of the public. It is evident that a commission depending upon the will and convenience of another may be of any character which it is consonant with such will and convenience to confer, from the execution of a trivial trust to the investiture of official dignity.

"We are to deny the supposition that he (Moses) was a private person at that time of killing the Egyptian, but that he was even then *commissioned* by God Governor of Israel, and, consequently, in the right of a governor might revenge the wrong done to his subjects."—SOUTH.

ACCRUE. SUPERVENE. DEVOLVE. REDOUND.

The ideas common to these terms are those of certain things coming upon or out of others, so that persons are affected by them. In ACCRUE (Fr. *accrú*, part. of *accroître*; Lat. *accrescĕre, to grow to*), that which accrues comes from a natural tendency in its cause to produce it, as wealth accrues from industry; that is, there is in industry an inherent aptitude to produce wealth. It is also a personally relative term, involving the idea of some person to whose benefit or harm the thing accrues. That which accrues is of the nature of increase, profit, or damage. It is, as it were, the fruit which a thing bears naturally.

"Good men consult their piety as little as their judgment and experience when they admit the great and essential advantages *accruing* to society from the freedom of the press, yet indulge themselves in peevish or passionate exclamations against the abuses of it."—JUNIUS.

SUPERVENE (Lat. *supervĕnīre, to come upon*) expresses the simple event of one fact occurring upon another, which other may be itself a result. That which supervenes intensifies the preceding cause or pre-existent state of affairs. It comes in unexpectedly with little sequence apparently of cause and effect, yet with very decisive results. A man broke his leg by a fall, fever supervened, and he died. The effect of that which supervenes is in proportion to the aptitude of actual circumstances to be affected by it for detriment or improvement.

"His good will, when placed on any, was so fixed and rooted, that even *supervening* vice, to which he had the greatest detestation imaginable, could not easily remove it."—FELL'S *Life of Hammond*.

DEVOLVE (Lat. *devolvĕre*) is literally to *roll down upon*, but is employed only in the figurative sense, with an idea of transmission or succession. In the absence of one who has a duty to perform, that duty will often devolve upon one who is the nearest bound by obligation or interest to perform it. On the removal of the proprietor of an estate by death, the estate devolves upon the next heir; that is, alights as it were on him who is the next halting point in the course of the succession. Things which devolve are of the nature of duties, privileges, responsibilities, tasks, offices, obligations, powers, or possessions.

"Which was augmented by the state of the sayd Richard, and the *devolution* of the same to Henry IV."—GRAFTON.

To REDOUND (Lat. *rĕdundāre, to flow back, to redound*) is to come back as a consequence of good or ill upon an actor, originator, or promoter,

That which redounds is a remoter effect of human action or something following upon that effect, whether the action be one's own or of another. It is a result of a general and abstract nature, and commonly of the nature of profit, advantage, reputation, interest, gain, credit, or the contrary of these. It supervenes as a practical consequence, and accrues as the secondary product of a fact accomplished. That which redounds may have been contemplated in action, but it was not primarily or directly aimed at, being an effect of an effect. I perform a gallant or generous action. My motive was the pleasure or satisfaction of benefiting another. The act may redound to my interest through the gratitude of those benefited, or to my honour and reputation through public admiration of the deed.

"There will no small use *redound* to them from that manufacture."—ADDISON.

ACCUSTOM. HABITUATE. INURE. USE. TRAIN. FAMILIARIZE.

Of these terms to USE (Lat. *ūti*, part. *ūsus, to use*) is the simplest and the generic. It is also the most colloquial, yet seems to be seldom employed, though its passive participle *used* is very common. To ACCUSTOM (O. Fr. *acostumé*; Lat. *consuetūdinem*, whence Eng. *custom*) is employed both of states and actions. HABITUATE (Lat. *hăbĭtuare*) only of states. Hence an alteration of mind is implied in accustom, an alteration of conditions only in habituate. I may even be accustomed to events which happen to me independently of any will or action of my own. One is habituated to what one has often felt, accustomed to what one has often experienced in any way. I may be accustomed to ill treatment without being at all habituated to it. INURE (Lat. *ĭnūrĕre, to brand, impress*) advances a step beyond habituate, and indicates the process of habituation against uncongenial influences till use leaves little or no pain or inconvenience. TRAIN (Fr. *trainer*) is to accustom by a given course of practice to a given capacity. FAMILIARIZE (Fr. *familiariser*) is to make well known by practice or converse. We are familiarized with that which, after we have often witnessed or meditated upon it, has produced a lively and lasting impression upon us. Thus we may be familiar with sights, scenes, processes, facts, truths. Chance or intention may have accustomed, habituated, inured, or familiarized, but only purpose and system can train us.

ACHIEVE. FINISH. TERMINATE.

One ACHIEVES (Fr. *achever, chef, a head*) by working skilfully, perseveringly, or undauntedly at what has been undertaken or commenced. One FINISHES (Fr. *finir*; Lat. *finire, to end*) by putting the last stroke to what is far advanced. One TERMINATES (Fr. *terminer*; Lat. *terminus, an end* or *limit*) what ought not to be continued further, by some act of discontinuance. So that the characteristic force of achieve is bringing the undertaking to its last stage, that of finish is the actual arrival of this period, and that of terminate the cessation of the thing itself. After achieving one enjoys the sight or the thought of the work or the action brought to a successful end. It is the realization of one's efforts. One may desire to finish what has cost much loss of time and labour, and for other reasons, as, for instance, that one may pass on to something else, or from weariness of the particular employment. Terminate is hardly applied to any other matters than discussions, differences, or disputes, and those which have the nature of a course or career. The achievement of a thing is its complete development, its perfect and entire execution, the bringing it to a state which could not be improved upon, and a point which could not be surpassed. The end is opposed to the beginning, after which there can be nothing to do, as nothing done before the beginning. We have to make an end as we make a beginning; we achieve when we have worked the whole; we finish when we have worked the concluding part. The termination is that point of time or space where a thing stops. It presupposes duration or continuity,

One may finish well or ill, and more or less expeditiously, more or less effectively, but there is only one way of achieving.

ACID. Sour. Acrid. Bitter. The two first words express not different things, but rather different degrees of the same quality. "Acid," says Taylor, "is an artificial, concentrated, corrosive, sourness." Sourness (connected with the German *sauer* and other Northern forms) is a kind of mellowed Acidity (Lat. *ăcĭdĭtātem*) as acidity is a sharpened sourness. Acrid (Lat. *ācer*, with suffix *-id*) denotes the combination of acidity or sourness with harshness. Lemon juice is acid; milk may turn sour; unripe fruit is often acrid. Bitter (A.S. *biter*, from *bītan*, *to bite*) expresses a different taste altogether, too familiar to need any attempt at description. It may be observed that in their secondary uses, sour is expressive only of human disposition, while bitter is expressive of feeling and expression, as bitter hatred, bitter sarcasm, and also of the character of external events as affecting ourselves, as bitter misfortune.

ACKNOWLEDGE. Own. Confess. Avow. Recognize.

To Acknowledge is to admit that one has knowledge. Its element of publicity it has in common with the other synonyms. It is the opposite to denying, keeping back, or concealing a fact.

"So ech that denyeth the Sone hath not the fader, but he that *knowlechith* the Sone hath the fader also." — Wiclif's *Translation of the 1st Ep. S. John.*

We necessarily acknowledge only such facts or matters as are personally related to ourselves, because by the supposition the original facts were in our own keeping. The avowal of such facts furnishes others with peculiar and complete evidence. The extent to which acknowledgment furnishes knowledge to others in the sense of information which they did not previously possess is a matter of degree. To acknowledge one's obligations for the kindness of others is little more than to express them. To acknowledge one's fault may or may not imply that it was not known to others. To acknowledge a secret marriage is to give others a completeness of information which otherwise they had not possessed. Yet the term where it means more than openly to avow a relationship, as to acknowledge a son, implies some amount of knowledge, or, at least, tendency to belief in others already existent.

"Eke shamefastness was there as I tooke hede,
That blushed red and darst nat ben a *know*,
She lover was, for thereof had she drede,
She stood and hing her visage downe alow." Chaucer.

Own has two forces: 1, that of simple possession; and, 2, that of avowing such possession or fact of relationship to one's self. Both acknowledge and own in this latter sense commonly imply some degree of ignorance, doubt, or previous concealment, as in the case of offences acknowledged or owned which before were only imputed. We acknowledge and own in cases where our evidence supplements the suspicion of others, and imply some degree of supposed culpability. The more intimately the matter is connected with one's self the better may we employ own; the more simply we regard it as a matter to which we give publicity, the better may we employ acknowledge. I own a state of feeling, for instance; I acknowledge an action. I acknowledge that violence was perpetrated in the course of the proceedings, but I will not own to having instigated or sanctioned it.

"And now, my dear, cried she to me, I will fairly *own* that it was I that instructed my girls to encourage our landlord's addresses."—Goldsmith.

It should be noted that to Own, *i.e.*, to possess, the A. S. *ágnian*, and to Own, *i.e.*, to admit, the A. S. *unnan*, are, strictly, different words. Length of use, however, has so blended them, as to make the disentanglement scarcely possible.

On the other hand, to Confess (Lat. *confĭtēri*, part. *confessus*) may be of some action of which the persons to whom we speak may be abso

lutely ignorant, as in the voluntary confession of a penitent to a priest. If the action be known, but not the author, the declaration that we did it would be an owning of it, that is, an acknowledgment of one's authorship of it. The essence of acknowledging an offence consists, as we have seen, in declaring our self-consciousness, so that we may acknowledge a fault even after we have been known and proved to have committed it. In that case, to acknowledge a fault is to recognize it as it is viewed by others. If both the doer and the deed were known, we should hardly use either own or confess. Yet a prisoner is said to make a full confession even after he has been judged, convicted, and sentenced. This is probably because his confession is regarded as perfecting the evidence against him, or making his crime a matter of absolute knowledge. We confess actions, opinions, and feelings as we acknowledge facts, and own our participation in them. It may be added that ACKNOWLEDGE and OWN are applied to matters of less grave moment than confess, which denotes a more formal publicity. We confess sins and crimes; we acknowledge and own errors, mistakes, faults, and minor offences. So characteristic of confession is the giving of formal publicity to something connected with one's self, that the term is used where this is the case of matters in which no blame attaches, as in the acknowledgment of a belief or opinion in one's self, as in the following:—

"Spite of herself e'en Envy must *confess*
That I the friendship of the great possess."
AUTHOR (?)

To Avow (Fr. *avouer*, which orig. meant *to swear fealty to*, LITTRÉ), to declare with boldness and frankness. This implies at the same time our own consciousness of right, and of the fact that others do not think us so, or at least are not fully persuaded of it, for in that case no boldness of utterance would be needed. We do not avow what we are ashamed of, but we avow our motives, reasons, opinions, actions, spontaneously, as asserting at the same time what is true or right. We confess spontaneously as admitting ourselves in the wrong. We acknowledge and own with less freedom as acting under some necessity or obligation, or assenting to what we are charged with.

"I followed Nature's laws, and must *avow*
I broke my bonds, and fled the fatal blow."
DRYDEN.

ACQUAINTANCE. FAMILIARITY. INTIMACY.

ACQUAINT (O. Fr. *acointer*, L. Lat. *adcognĭtare*). Acquaintance is that slight knowledge of another person which springs from occasional intercourse. The word acquaintance, however, has a force which may be modified, so that we may speak of a slight or an intimate, a superficial or an accurate acquaintance with persons or subjects, as, for instance, authors, books, branches of science. That with which we are acquainted we in some degree know, but beyond this knowledge nothing is implied in the way of feeling towards the object or person. We may be sufficiently acquainted with a man to know that we should never desire to be on intimate or even familiar terms with him. In social parlance the word acquaintance is not satisfied by that amount of observation and experience which enables us to recognize or identify a person. An acquaintance is one with whom we have already held such social intercourse as would justify us in renewing it.

"Contract no friendship or even *acquaintance* with a guileful man. He resembleth a coal, which, when hot, burneth the hand, and when cold, blacketh it."—SIR W. JONES, *Translations*.

FAMILIARITY (Lat. *fămiliārĭtātem*, *fămilia* being *a household, consisting of the members of the family and the slaves or servants*). As acquaintance means first knowledge, then social knowledge, so familiarity has the twofold sense of common conversance and common conversation. A state of familiarity is, as it were, a result of living together, or of frequent intercourse. Those who live in the same house, frequent the same place, are engaged in the same routine of business or pleasure, who, in short, find themselves often thrown together, be-

come familiar. Such habitual reunions have two results: the one, that persons become more than superficially acquainted with each other; the other, that they come to waive formal rules and usages of society, and throw off ceremonious restraints. These facts correspond with the twofold meaning of familiarity, which is applicable both to things and persons. In the one sense we speak of a familiarity with a particular branch of science, in the other of an impertinent familiarity, which is carried too far.

"All this was before his (Horace's) acquaintance with Mæcenas, and his introduction into the court of Augustus, and the *familiarity* of that great Emperor."—DRYDEN.

INTIMACY (Lat. *intĭmus, inmost*) expresses in regard to persons such acquaintance as has grown into a sustained and unreserved intercourse of the closest kind, with friendship and sympathy in thought and feeling. Intimacy, like acquaintance and familiarity, may be employed to characterize our knowledge of facts, processes, or circumstances. Intimate knowledge arises from very frequent repetition and exhibition, so that we have exercised opportunities of varied and close observation. The noun intimacy, however, is confined to persons, though we say an intimate knowledge or acquaintance. The terms acquaintance, familiarity, and intimacy may be regarded as in some cases expressive of degrees of comparison in practical knowledge. An acquaintance with a foreign language enables us to translate or comprehend it; a familiarity with it comes from the frequent employment of it; an intimate knowledge would embrace its idioms, authors, and finest shades and distinctions of meaning.

"If it were so needful before the Fall, when man was much more perfect in himself, how much more is it needful now against all the sorrows and casualties of this life to have an *intimate* and speaking help, a ready and reviving associate in marriage."—MILTON.

ACQUIRE. GET. OBTAIN. GAIN. WIN. EARN. ATTAIN. PROCURE.

TO ACQUIRE (Lat. *acquīrĕre*) is a continuous process in which we *get* something by our efforts and abilities. GET (A.S. *gitan*) being the simplest, most vernacular, and therefore most generic of the terms, all the rest of which may be regarded as modes of getting. Industry and talent are commonly requisite for acquiring, and we use the term of solid and beneficial results, though sometimes of things solid, but not beneficial, as to acquire a bad name. As the process of acquiring is continuous, that which is acquired comes to us by the force of the term gradually, by sustained endeavour and in the course of time. Knowledge by sustained efforts in detail, honour as our conduct becomes more widely known, reputation as our character is more talked about, fortunes as our stock is added to more and more. If successful in our efforts we acquire from the time that we begin to seek, and the only measure of our acquirement is our endeavour. A quality of permanence attaches to that which we have acquired.

"No virtue is *acquired* in an instant, but step by step."—BANUS.

OBTAIN (Lat. *obtĭnĕre*) implies less of continuousness in the efforts to get the thing obtained, which may even be done through the means of others, as when a young man obtains a valuable appointment through interest, without having acquired through patience and industry the qualifications of the position. One may obtain in a variety of ways, as by patience, energy, honourable or dishonourable means, entreaty, fraud, force, luck. We have obtained when we have done something to put into our possession a good or supposed good, the idea of chance being excluded. If a man obtains a prize in a lottery, what is expressed is not his luck simply, but the happy circumstance that he bought a ticket.

"Some pray for riches, riches they obtain."—DRYDEN.

GAIN (Fr. *gagner*) says little about the mode, but implies a character in the result, namely, that it is valuable or desirable. To gain is to obtain a good. There is in gain an element of risk and chance. It is expressive of

speculative profit. As we acquire possession, and obtain our object, whatever it may be, so we gain rewards, distinction, public favour, livelihood, advancement. Successful gamblers and successful traders are both said to gain.

"What shall it profit a man if he *gain* the whole world and lose his own soul?"—*English Bible.*

To Win (A.S. *winnan, to contend, gain*) is to gain with the added notion of certain chances or competitors against us, or as surmounting difficulties or opposition. To have gained is satisfactory, to have won is happy or lucky also. It may be even purely lucky, which gain never is, as to win a toss. A general gains a battle, or obtains the victory, but he wins the day as against his adversary and the chances of war. We gain in so far as we act with intention, we win in so far as we act prosperously. What is gained or won may be only a partial or transitory possession; we gain or win to-day what we may lose to-morrow. We gain the good opinions of others by consistently worthy action; we sometimes win their affection without an effort.

"And whereas religion is the greatest *winner* of men's affections, he (Essex) endeavoured to allure unto him the Puritans and their ministers, whom the Queen did not at all like of, and withal the Papists by seeming to pity their afflicted condition."—Camden.

To Earn (A.S. *earnian, to gain*, orig. *to reap*) is to do that which entitles to recompense or reward, whether it be actually bestowed or not, but commonly implying that it has accrued. A labourer earns his wages by rightly doing his right amount of work. A soldier earns distinction or promotion by doing his duty, or by his bravery. Like acquire, it is sometimes used in an unfavourable sense, in which cases it is the product of misdirected effort. In this sense gain also may be employed.

"To have *gained* this harm and loss."—*English Bible.*

In earning, the thing obtained is an equivalent, a balance as it were being struck between the thing expended and the thing awarded. To earn is to purchase with labour, as to buy is to purchase with money.

"You, then, who are initiated into the mysteries of the blindfold goddess, inform me whether I have a right to eat the bread I have *earned* by the hazard of my life or the sweat of my brow."—Burke.

To Attain (Lat. *attingere*), which is used as an intransitive as well as an active verb, indicates a mark proposed beforehand, or abstractedly one which has been reached. All degrees of effort are implied in it, and sometimes no effort at all, as "he has attained the age of forty years." It is in that case definitive, not of endeavour, but of progression. When used as an intransitive verb, it is commonly found associated with some expression indicative of degree, as to attain to perfection or to a high pitch of excellence. We attain that which we have brought within our reach, or to the level of which we have raised ourselves.

"While we are curious in tracing the progress of barbarism, we wonder more that any arts existed than that they *attained* no degree of perfection."—Walpole.

Procure denotes acquirement through a careful use of means to the end. It applies to such things as are regarded as needful or desirable to possess. We obtain honour; we procure the necessaries of life. It is a term of a very practical character. We procure things by knowing where to look for them and how to get at them, not by prodigious effort, extraordinary knowledge, sudden luck, or profound research. We often procure by simply acting upon rule. By certain substances combined in certain proportions the chemist procures a substance which is not the mere sum of the substances combined, or in other words a compound, but a distinct substance.

"Such dress as may enable the body to endure the different seasons the most unenlightened nations have been able to *procure*."—Johnson.

ACQUIREMENT. Acquisition. Both are from the same verb (see Acquire), but in usage acquisition belongs to material or physical, acquirement to moral and intellectual things. The acquirements of learning, the acquisition of fortune. The

force of acquire, namely, to get gradually, is stronger in acquirement than acquisition. The latter sometimes means no more than a happy accession to the stock of what one possesses already.

"It (the Gospel) is not confined to persons whose intellectual excellences are superior to their neighbours, or who exceed others in understanding and the *acquirements* of the mind."—WATTS.

"Her cook, an *acquisition* made in France,
Might put a Chloe out of countenance."
CHURCHILL.

ACQUIREMENTS. ATTAINMENTS. ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

The idea of developed capacity is common to these terms. ACQUIREMENTS (Lat. *acquīrĕre*) are opposed to natural gifts. In the broadest sense, anything which has been learnt, or is the result of study, pain, or practice, is an acquirement. But as commonly used, and in the plural number, the term denotes purely intellectual results, as of history or languages, or the subjects of study as distinct from practice. ATTAINMENTS (O. Fr. *ateindre*, Lat. *attingĕre, to touch, come in contact with*) differs not in the idea of the subject, but in relating to the progress and efforts of the student. ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Fr. *accomplir, to accomplish*) are of those things in which study and art are combined to produce skill or adroitness. They turn upon the elegant, the graceful, the pleasing, the effective, or the useful. An accomplished painter, poet, musician, orator. We might even say an accomplished student where the idea was that of the grace rather than the depth of his educational acquirements. Varied acquirements, solid attainments, charming accomplishments.

ACRIMONY. ACERBITY. ASPERITY. ANIMOSITY. TARTNESS. HARSHNESS.

ACRIMONY (Lat. *ācrĭmōnia*) denotes a deep-seated bitterness and, as it were, corrosiveness of feeling, which may show itself in language or manner. It may or may not be personal, and may be generally excited by the recollection of circumstances. A disappointed man, for instance, is apt to allude with acrimony to the circumstances of his disappointment. Acrimony is the result of disappointment or wrong, real or supposed, or personal dislike, or may be caused by ill-tempered disputations and criticisms. It is an habitual sourness, showing itself in small things. It is the mark of a small mind. As a scientific term, it has been applied to a certain character of the humours of the body and the juices of plants, as the acrimony of the bile; hence its moral meaning of a biting sharpness produced by an embittered spirit.

"These milks (in certain plants) have all an acrimony, though one would think they should be lenitive."—BACON.

"Like a lawyer I am ready to support the cause on which give me leave to suppose I shall be soon retained, with ardour and, if occasion be, with subtlety and *acrimony*."—BOLINGBROKE.

ACERBITY (Lat. *ăcerbĭtatem, bitter taste, severity*) is less deep-seated and energetic than acrimony, and more chronic. It is not so much excited as acrimony is by external causes as constitutional and innate. Indeed, in the old use of the term, it was seldom connected with human disposition, but with acts, measures, and operations, as of penalty or bodily pain So Bacon says:—

"There are some penal laws fit to be retained, but their penalty is too great, and it is ever a rule that any over great penalty, besides the *acerbity* of it, deadens the execution of the law."

Acerbity is the expression of a character wanting in natural mildness and sweetness.

ASPERITY (Lat. *aspĕrĭtātem, roughness of surface, severity*) relates rather to the manner than to the disposition. It is a rough way of dealing with others which is not incompatible with a love of fairness, and indeed often accompanies it, and, being quite consonant with substantial kindness of heart, is widely different from acrimony and animosity, which are essentially uncharitable. A reproof, just in itself, is conveyed with asperity. This is the fault of one who is more intent on enforcing than sensitive of the effect of what he is enforcing upon the feelings of others. It often springs

from a slight feeling of resentment against a real or supposed insensibility of others to the truth or force of what we say, and so is a spontaneous effort to make up for what we feel we lack in persuasiveness.

"I hope it is no very cynical *asperity* not to confess obligations where no benefit has been received."—JOHNSON.

ANIMOSITY (Lat. *ănĭmōsitatem*) is essentially personal. It is an active and energetic dislike. It commonly springs from some personal or party feud, as the animosities of race or religion. It is a violent, irritable, and inconsiderate ill-will, and may be felt exclusively in one quarter.

"How apt nature is, even in those who profess an eminence in holiness, to raise and maintain *animosities* against those whose calling or person they pretend to find cause to dislike."—BISHOP HALL.

HARSHNESS (Dan. *harsk*, *rancid*) is much the same thing in English as ASPERITY, derived from the Latin. We commonly use the term not of the habitual demeanour or nature generally, but of treatment on some particular occasion, as some incidental act or word; and it conveys the idea of needless or unwarranted severity of speech or conduct, proceeding from want of consideration or feeling, where a more sympathetic and thoughtful mind would have seen it to be unmerited and misplaced. It is the characteristic of unfeeling natures where it is habitual. Acrimony may subside or vanish on a better knowledge. Animosity may be pacified or reconciled, asperity corrected, but harshness is ingrained. Its most effective cure is providential trouble or affliction. It is both unkind and rude.

"No complaint is more feelingly made than that of the *harsh* and rugged manners of persons with whom we have an intercourse."—BLAIR.

TARTNESS (A. S. *teart*, *tart*, *severe*) is that slight asperity which is more unbecoming than bitter, and indicates a union of cleverness with inconsiderateness and self-conceit. It is the fault especially of some women and children. When used as it is almost exclusively, it denotes a pungent readiness of mind, which is useful and justifiable in repartee.

"One jeeringly saluted him, 'Good morrow, Bishop quondam,' to which Bonner as *tartly* replied, 'Good morrow, knave semper.'"—FULLER.

ACT. ACTION. DEED.

ACT and DEED are etymologically almost the same thing. *Actum*, from the Latin *agere*, *to do*, being equivalent to *deed* (A. S. *dæd*), or the thing done. They are, however, viewed from different points. The deed is the result viewed, as it were, historically, the act is the result viewed in connexion with the power and will of the doer. Deeds are good or bad. Acts are voluntary or involuntary. In many cases *action* and act might be used indifferently, yet some distinction between them is observable. Act is never used of things mechanical. When so used action is equivalent to mode of mechanical movement, as the action of a steam engine, or when nothing else is contemplated, of a horse. An act is the simple exertion of power preceded by volition; an action is a complex exertion of the same, and is more continuous, and occupies more time. To poke the fire is a physical act, to recollect a circumstance a mental act, to reconcile friends who have quarrelled a praiseworthy action. Hence the action often comprises several acts under itself which go to make it up. The act denotes power. The action involves the mode in which the power is exercised. To speak generally, acts are primarily physical, and secondarily moral; actions are primarily moral, and secondarily physical: a benevolent action and an act of benevolence. In the former case we think of the quality of benevolence as carried out into practice. In the latter of a physical movement prompted by a moral quality or impulse. Momentary intentions and impulses show themselves in like acts, as hasty decisions on rash acts; but as the life and character of a man, such are his actions. When we speak of the moral character or of any quality as the motive and account of something done specifically, we use the term act, not action. So, on the one hand, generally good or bad actions, faithful, charitable, prudent, foolish, despe-

fate actions are equivalent to acts of faith, of charity, of prudence, of folly, of desperation. An action is used both of what is important and unimportant, but an act, if it have any thing moral in it, and be more than a mere physical movement, implies some degree of importance. Our actions are tests and indications of our character; our acts are sometimes out of harmony with them. The actions of a wise man are so far wise actions, but the wisest occasionally commit acts of folly. Acts of the same character frequently repeated by the same person will create a habit. What is done under the force of that habit, and considered in connexion with it, is an action. A deed is a graver and more emphatic term than an act. An act may be confined to the agent. A deed has its prominence, importance, and influence upon others. It is remarkable that the acts of bodies or communities are not called deeds, which belong to individuals only. In many cases act and deed may be used interchangeably, yet it is no tautology to say, "This is my act and deed." It is my act so far as I and no other do it. It is my deed inasmuch as the thing itself is done and completed in form and validity.

"Cato said the best way to keep good *acts* in memory was to refresh them with new."—BACON.

"The Lord is a God of knowledge, and by Him *actions* are weighed."—*English Bible.*

ACTION. GESTURE. GESTICULATION.

These terms may be regarded as belonging in common to the art and practice of oratory. Action when so employed is not general in its relation to the person, but refers to some part of it set in motion, more especially the hands and arms, as being the parts most commonly and naturally moved. On the other hand, the action of a horse is his way of movement in pacing or locomotion. In this sense the term is also mechanical, and we speak of the action of a steam-engine. A GESTURE (Lat. *gĕrĕre*, part. *gestus*, *to bear*) is a particular, significant, and illustrative action, as when in sarcastic speech, for instance, one shrugs the shoulders. When gesture is sustained, frequent, vehement, or demonstrative, it becomes GESTICULATION (Lat. *gesticŭlationem*).

"Suit the action to the word."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Morpheus of all his numerous train express'd
The shape of man, and imitated best;
The walk, the words, the *gesture* could supply,
The habit mimic, and the mien bely."
DRYDEN.

"Indeed that standing is not so simple a business as we imagine it to be is evident from the *gesticulations* of a drunken man who has lost the government of the centre of gravity."—PALEY.

ACTOR. PLAYER. PERFORMER.

Of these PERFORMER is the least specific, inasmuch as performance need not be of a dramatic character at all, such as a performance on a musical instrument or a tight-rope. We may play in private but we perform in public. The idea of perform has been explained under that head. The difference between ACTOR (Lat. *actŏrem*) and PLAYER (*A.S. plesan*, *to sport*) is that the latter is incompatible with high art. We speak of an actor of celebrity and a strolling player. A player is essentially professional and acts for hire, an actor may exhibit his talent in private theatricals or for mere love of the art. When persons perform, as it were, insincere parts on the stage of life, professing what they do not feel, or dissembling for their own ends, we call them actors, not players. In the following the poet probably uses the lower word as being the more depreciatory, as expressing the routine and mercenary character of social professions as well as the idea of assigned parts to be fulfilled.

"All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely *players*."
SHAKESPEARE.

Not so the following:

"Like a dull *actor* now I have forgot my part,
And I am out even to a full disgrace."
SHAKESPEARE.

ACTUAL. TRUE. POSITIVE. VERITABLE. REAL. CERTAIN. EXTANT. PRESENT.

Of these TRUE (A.S. *treowe*, *a trust*)

is the simplest, denotes that a thing is as represented, that the statement or expression answers to an objective reality and does so completely, that is, is neither false nor inaccurate. A true relation gives an account of occurrences which contains neither more nor less than has taken place, arranged in the order of their taking place, and in such proportion of statement as leaves no room for partial or total exaggeration, without counterfeit or adulteration. Truth is expressed whenever subject and predicate are rightly united in an affirmative or negative proposition. But in the broad sense of the word we may distinguish truth of perception, truth of fact, of narration, of statement, of representation, of expression, of conception. In this broad sense truth is conformity to reality in the world of matter or of mind. As regards ourselves truth is right belief or correct impression. The statement "This is Thomas," is true if I am right in applying the name to the individual before me. My impression of the shape of the earth is a true one if I have that of an oblate spheroid. I believe what is true if I believe that all men are mortal, because the persons denoted by the subject are never found but in connexion with the attribute of mortality connoted by the predicate.

"Our ideas being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be *true* or false, no more than a single name of anything can be said to be true or false."—LOCKE.

As the word true marks the precise existence of objective verity, VERITABLE (Fr. *véritable*) expresses truth of representation, or truth in its expository aspect. True, when asserted of anything, means that it is what we say it is, veritable that we say what it is. As the fact is said to be true, the medium by which the fact is conveyed is said to be veritable. It is not a veritable history which reports to us the doings of Romulus, if his existence be not true in fact. The use of veritable is a little strained on purpose in the following, yet it seems to bear out the distinction just drawn,

"This Emperor was so wise in all things that among them that were merry he was of great mirth, and in verities he was very *veritable*."—*Golden Book.*

"Real works of nature or *veritable* acts of story."—BROWN'S *Vulgar Errors.*

POSITIVE (Lat. *positivus*) denotes that the truth is so ascertained as to exclude all possibility of doubt or question, being a matter of demonstration as distinct from supposition or inference. It has also a subjective sense, in which it means the manner or state of mind of a person possessed, or believing himself possessed, of such truth, and is thus opposed to doubtful in mind. A positive fact is one which is direct and determinate, in opposition to that which is indirect, indeterminate, or negative.

"'Tis *positive* 'gainst all exception."
SHAKESPEARE.

ACTUAL (Lat. *actuālis*) belongs to that which is beyond the state of mere probability, possibility, tendency, progression, or evolution. As a term of the scholastic philosophy *actuālis* was opposed to *potentialis*, and had its existence in *esse* not in *posse*. The actual is the conceivable realized, and where this conceivable thing is not only possible but natural to conceive or to be expected in a certain order of things, actual, like the French *actuel*, comes to have the force of present in time. While the monarch is dying the heir-apparent to the throne is only not the actual king.

"How insensibly old age steals on, and how often it is actually arrived before we suspect it."—COWPER.

As the actual is opposed to possible, probable, conceivable, or approximate, true to false, positive to indeterminate, dubious, indirect, or negative, and veritable to supposititious or unauthentic, so REAL (Lat. *reālis*) is opposed to imaginary or feigned. It expresses that which has an existence of its own, and not such as our fancy might attribute to it, or our ingenuity impose upon it. When we speak of the actual condition of a country we refer to that to which it has been brought, *e.g.* by previous acts, events, processes, and regard it as the sum of antecedent causes, which have resulted

in that state. When we speak of its real condition we mean that in which alone it exists as a subject of consideration. A real object of compassion is not artificially made up. A real sentiment is neither disguised nor pretended.

"Our simple ideas are all *real*. All agree to the *reality* of things."—LOCKE.

CERTAIN (Fr. *certain*, Lat. *certus*) differs from the foregoing in some important respects. Certain is a subjective term. That is certain which follows necessarily or demonstratively from the inferences of reason, the evidence of the senses, or testimony of men. Certainty is the subjective form of truth. It belongs to persons, and represents states of mind, and is only transferred secondarily to external facts. When we speak of a fact as certain we mean that we apprehend it as true. Hence, unlike the others, certain may express not only what has happened but what has not, if we conceive its future happening to be a thing of necessity, and so are sure of it. The cause being recognized or ascertained, its effect is certain. The sun will certainly rise to-morrow, that is, this follows (if we believe that it does) from the knowledge and experience which we possess. Things which are actual, true, positive, veritable, or real, are unalterably fixed. They cannot be set aside; we must recognize and acquiesce in them. On the other hand, I am continually liable to find myself mistaken in what I believed to be the certainty of things which may turn out on corrected or more extended evidence to be either false, or contingent and variable.

"I hope before I have done to make it evident that this way of *certainty* by the knowledge of our own ideas goes a little further than bare imagination, and I believe it will appear that all the *certainty* of general truths a man has lies in nothing else."—LOCKE.

SURE (Fr. *sûr*, Lat. *sēcūrus*) is, according to its etymology, first unanxious or careless, that is, having a sense of sureness, and thence objectively, having the nature that induces it, fixed, permanent, regular, inevitable. As a synonym with certain, and as applied to persons, we may observe that sure is more closely associated with operation and action, certain with fact and knowledge. The fact is certain, the operation sure. Necessary sequence in action or cause and effect is expressed by SURE; as a sure remedy, a sure success. I am certain of what I have persuaded myself is true. I am sure of what I believe to be firmly established, and which I do not so much feel convinced of as regard as in itself fixed. In proportion as we speak of truth of nature we use the term sure, in proportion as we rely on the conviction of our own minds we use the term certain. Men are sure of what they have seen, and certain of what they have heard. I am sure of a fact, certain of a theory, sure that the sun is in the sky to-day, certain that it will rise to-morrow. On this supposition that things are generally speaking sure in themselves and certain to us, we may understand how no tautology would be involved in such a phrase as the "sure and certain hope of the resurrection to eternal life." The term certain seems more generally applicable to matters of speculation and where evidence is in question. First principles are certain. We speak of mathematical certainty not sureness. Practical matters and general rules are sure. One is certain of a point of science, sure of a moral truth. The philosopher claims his right of question on every point which is not certain. The prudent man distrusts that of which he is not sure.

"It shows indeed, supposing they took up this practice as a matter of duty, that they were in doubt which was the right way they were obliged to keep, and therefore for *sureness* they would keep both."—SHARP.

We believe what is certain, we count upon what is sure. The friend on whom we can rely we call not certain but sure. When a thing is testified by a sure witness it is certain.

That is EXTANT (Lat. *ex-stant-em*, *standing out* or *forth*) which still stands out in prominence, and has not been denuded or overwhelmed by any destructive, removing, or superseding

force, such as violence or the lapse of time. Bentley used the term in its literal and physical sense, when he spoke of a body partly immersed in a fluid and partly *extant*.

"There are some ancient writings still *extant* which pass under the name of Sibylline oracles."—MELMOTH'S *Cicero*.

It is a term full of picturesque meaning. We look, for instance, upon some ancient graveyard. We cannot doubt that it contained formerly other monuments or tombstones besides those which are before us. Some have decayed, some have been taken away, some by frequent alterations of the level of the ground may yet lie unknown beneath its surface; but others have escaped these changes, chances, and influences, and are in the strict sense of the word extant.

That is PRESENT (Lat. *præsentem*) which is before us, that is, an object to us in time, space, or thought, as opposed to the past, the future, or the absent. It denotes simultaneity in time and place with intelligent beings who take cognizance of things present. Collocation or contemporaneousness is not presence. It may be observed that presence in space involves presence of time, but that the converse is not true. The twofold aspect of the present is made up of the here and the now. The meaning of the word present and presence is satisfied if the state of things is such that cognizance *might* take place, though in fact it has not. In this way one person might say to another, "I was present at such a meeting, and was surprised afterwards to hear that you had been there, as I did not see you." In the presence chamber of the monarch may be some who escape his observation. In this sense presence signifies such nearness as is easily and perfectly compatible with personal communication. This involves sameness of place. The fact that it might be just possible to establish a communication, as by speaking to a person in another room or by an electric wire across the Atlantic, would not constitute presence.

"These things have I spoken unto you being yet *present* with you."—*Eng. Bible.*

ACTUATE. IMPEL. INDUCE.

ACTUATE (L. Lat. *actuare, to put in action*) is to subject to an impulse and so quicken into action. This is apparent from the older form which it has supplanted, *activate*. That is actuated which has its natural powers roused and made more intense or active. So Bacon: "Snow and ice especially being holpen and then cold *activated* by nitre or salt will turn water to ice, and that in a few hours."

In the following it is applied to moral or spiritual things :—

"The soul being an *active* nature is always propending to the exercising of one faculty or other, and that to the utmost it is able; and yet being of a limited capacity it can employ but one in height of exercise at once: which when it loseth and abates of its strength and supreme vigour, some other whose improvement all this while was hindred by this its ingrossing rival, must by consequence begin now to display itself, and awaken into a more vigorous *actuation*."—GLANVILL.

We are actuated when we are internally stirred to action by an exciting cause. We may be impelled by menaces or induced by sober consideration; we are actuated by passion, desire, instincts of nature, love, hope, fear, which produce an acceleration of the movements of our moral life. What most actuates us depends on the peculiarities of our nature or our circumstances at a given moment. One man is actuated by a sense of duty to do what another would only do under great excitement. One is actuated by reason as effectively as another by passion.

"He that studies to represent one of known and eminent merit to be a mere fool and an idiot, *gives* himself the lie and betrays that he is either *actuated* with envy or corrupted by a faction."—BENTLEY.

IMPEL (Lat. *impellĕre, to drive on*) implies nothing of the nature of the force which induces action, beyond the fact of its strength, which is irresistible, or at least unresisted. When we are actuated, volition is quickened; when impelled, it is in some measure superseded by a foreign force. He who is impelled is borne along a course, as he who is INDUCED (Lat. *inducĕre, to lead into*) is led up to a point.

That which impels us drives us before it—we go along with that which induces us. The one has the mastery over us. To the other we give in our adhesion, and are not simply subject to its force but recognize it as adequate to the ends of action. Hence it commonly expresses such milder constraints as come of reason, judgment, and persuasion, and is applicable not only to matters of external action but of preference and mental action; as *e.g.* to be induced to like or select one thing rather than another, or to expect, hope, or believe some thing.

"Offer a man a gratuity for doing anything, for seizing, for example, an offender. He is not obliged by your offer to do it, nor would he say he is, though he may be *induced*, persuaded, prevailed upon, tempted."—PALEY.

ACUTE. KEEN. SHREWD. SAGACIOUS. SHARP.

SHARP and ACUTE are much the same; ACUTE being the Lat. *ăcūtus, sharpened*, from *acuĕre, to sharpen*. SHARP (A.S. *scearp*) expresses the lowest order of human quickness of perception, like that of the lower animals, while acute expresses sharpness of observation and understanding. This kind of difference, if there be no other, is usually apparent in cases in which two words represent respectively Saxon and Latin equivalents, the former expressing generally the more physical and primary ideas. The sharp animal or person has his faculties of observation continually on the alert, nothing escapes him. It is a sharp dog whose eyes, nose, and ears are always doing their work. The sharp person perceives and observes every thing before him, the acute one sees deeper into any matter to which his attention is drawn. He discovers well; as, for instance, falsehood underlying truth, or the converse. He goes beyond the sharp person in being not only observant but discriminating. He can deal with speculative and abstruse matters, and sees rapidly where the important points lie.

"Many other things belong to the material world wherein the *sharpest* philosophers have not yet obtained clear ideas."—WATTS.

"Chrysoppus, the *acutest* of all the Stoics, was at first a racer."—BENTLEY.

SHARP, ACUTE, and KEEN (A.S. *cêne, keen, warlike*) are all employed of matters of pure sensation, in which the idea of mental perception is entirely subordinate; as sharp pain, acute disease, a keen sense of shame, where it will be seen that the two former belong more naturally to physical, the last to moral pain. KEEN denotes an exceeding degree of sharpness. Physically, points are acute, edges are keen, and either might be called sharp. A knife should be sharp, a skewer sharp-pointed or acute, a razor keen. The keen person is one of powerful penetration; he sees clearly and afar off: the acute one of understanding in speculative, and the sharp in practical matters of common life, business, and conversation.

"In his Etnean forge the god of fire
That falchion laboured for the hero's sire
Immortal *keenness* on the blade bestow'd
And plunged it hissing in the Stygian flood."
DRYDEN'S *Virgil*.

"His *acuteness* was most eminently signalized at the masquerade, where he discovered his acquaintance through their disguises with such wonderful facility."
JOHNSON.

ACUTE, as used of bodily pain or disease, is opposed to chronic, and employed of a specific disease, while SHARP is an epithet of pain generally. Sharp suffering; acute rheumatism; a keen sense of injury, disappointment, and annoyance, but also, unlike the rest, a keen relish or enjoyment, a keen sense of the ridiculous. Keenness is a more active element of character than either sharpness or acuteness. The keen person not only feels and perceives, but seeks. He has an appetite to satisfy—he is an eager searcher. He not only sees readily, but hunts up, as it were, what it is to his interest to procure. The keen man is likely to make a fortune, and has a somewhat dangerous skill in this respect. Our appreciation of the quality is tempered by distrust lest it should be inconveniently practised upon ourselves. A sharp remark is a

quick and clever one. An acute remark is an intelligent one. A keen remark shows insight into human nature.

"Their weekly frauds his *keen* replies detect,
He undeceives more fast than they infect."
DRYDEN.

Keenness ought to be in the satirist; acuteness in the lawyer, the diplomatist, or the scientific investigator; and shrewdness in the conversationalist or the wit.

SHREWD (which originally meant *ill-disposed*) denotes one who is practically clever at analyzing motives and accounting for conduct by a kind of instinctive power. Shrewdness is in matters of common occurrence what acuteness is in matters calling for higher intelligence.

"Some of the observers on board the 'Centurion' *shrewdly* suspected, from the appearance of her armour, that instead of steel it was only composed of a particular kind of glittering paper."—ANSON'S *Voyages*.

SAGACITY (Lat. *săgācĭtatem*) is a higher quality than shrewdness. It manifests faculties of practical intelligence and penetration inherent in the nature. It is practical wisdom which is independent of the deductions of reason or the guidance of rules. It is the genius of common-place. It is penetrative and discriminative, but unlike shrewdness, goes on from discernment to action. It detects the hidden, unravels the complicated, tracks the intricate, solves the difficult, elucidates the obscure. Slight indications, which would generally be overlooked, are by the sagacious observed and turned to account in arriving at conclusions. He sees connectedness under apparent disconnexion. It is not mere conjecture on the one hand nor scientific induction on the other; yet it partakes of both. The necessities of his animal existence quicken to an almost superhuman power the sagacity of the American Indian. On the other hand, Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbits of a planet from certain observed points in it is, perhaps, the highest recorded exemplification of scientific sagacity. Sagacity is proleptic, good at theory and hypothesis. It divines, anticipates, foresees, discloses.

"A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas (that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other) is, I suppose, that which is called *sagacity*."—LOCKE

ADD. ANNEX. APPEND.

To ADD (Lat. *addĕre*) is simply to put one thing on to another. It applies to things as they exist in number or quantity, or conceived so to exist, as in the case of a material mass, a numerical sum, or a logical or metaphysical aggregate; as to add to a heap of gold, or to two hundred, or to the comfort, happiness, misery, benefits, or disadvantages of society or of men. It increases by aggregation the thing added to. Addition is the opposite of subtraction, as augmentation is of diminution. Whether adding results in collocation, junction, or coalition, depends on the nature of the subject and the case.

"All the praises and commendations of the whole world can *add* no more to the real and intrinsic value of a man than they can *add* to his station."—SWIFT.

To ANNEX (Lat. *annectĕre*, part. *annexus, to bind together*) is not used of number nor in the unmodified sense of fastening one thing on to another, but implies some whole or main body which is affected by the annexation. It implies also the subordination or relative smallness of the thing annexed. The greater is not annexed to the less, but the less to the greater, as a province to an empire or a condition to a grant. A dog is not annexed to his kennel, but seals are to a watch, as they become appendages to the same. Things annexed pass into general and permanent connexion, which we still, however, conceive as separable. They accompany, or follow, the fortunes of the things to which they are annexed. As the purpose of addition is to increase the quantity of the thing added to, so the purpose of annexation is to increase its value, dignity, importance. Sometimes the thing annexed has a modifying or regulative force over that to which it is annexed. As

in the case of a codicil to a will, or a penalty to a prohibitory law, or a reward to the fulfilment of certain proposed conditions. It is physical, political, and legal, or conventional in its different aspects.

"With regard to the other adjacent islands which are subject to the crown of Great Britain, some of them are comprised within some neighbouring country, and are, therefore, to be looked upon as *annexed* to the Mother Island, and part of the kingdom of England."—BLACKSTONE.

To APPEND (Lat. *appendĕre, weigh something to any one*) is to join in such a way that the thing to which something is appended shall be more fully competent to answer its purpose. It denotes a posteriority of relationship, and may be the result of afterthought. It is employed like annex in the sense of a physical hanging on, as in the instance given above, to append a seal to a watch-chain, where the only difference is that between fastening and suspending: and in a figurative sense, as to append notes illustrative of a text. That which is appended stands as an accessory to the principal thing.

"There is a further purpose *appended* to the primary one."—J. TAYLOR.

ADDRESS. SPEECH. ORATION. HARANGUE. DISCOURSE. APPEAL.

Of these, ADDRESS (Fr. *adresser*) derives its specific character from the character of the occasion, and the person to whom it is made. It is a formal, and more or less continuous speaking to a person, a collection of persons, or a personified object. It may be of great length or very short, in the latter case it is equivalent to ACCOST. The address may be purely spoken or read, or partly read and partly spoken, or purely written, and recognizes a peculiar capacity in the persons addressed. It bears upon some subject or occasion. The address should be appropriate, clear, and tempered to the quality, character, and circumstances of the person addressed, whose attention it is desired to procure. It must not be wanting in tact, tedious, unsuitable in phraseology, bald, or high-flown; not over-elaborate and abstruse on the one hand, nor shallow and flippant on the other. The term is used sometimes of the mode as well as the matter of address.

"See, they approach! :
This grove shall shroud me till they cease their strain,
Then I'll address them with some feigned tale." MASON.

A SPEECH (A.S. *sprecan, spæcan, to speak*) very closely resembles an address, but belongs to another point of view. It looks at the matter from the side of the speaker, as address does from the side of the hearer. It is less formal than address. So we are accustomed to hear of an address to the throne, and a speech from it. It is presumed to be unwritten, being a kind of spoken dissertation on some subject to which it owes its unity, without being specifically addressed to one or more persons, but rather uttered in their hearing, as bearing on topics of common interest to speaker and hearer. It should be ready, fluent, neat. In the case of speeches in Parliament, the speech frequently rises to the dignity of an oration: on the other hand, speeches from the hustings are commonly HARANGUES. In a play, a set form of words of some length is called generally a speech, though it should happen to be a soliloquy. On the other hand, a soliloquy and an address are contradictions in terms.

"Every circumstance in their *speeches* and actions is with justice and delicacy adapted to the persons who speak and act."—ADDISON.

An ORATION (L. *ōrātiōnem*) is a formal and public speech, laying claim to a lofty and refined character, being necessarily what speeches are occasionally, the product of premeditation and study, which is due to its gravity and dignity; for the term is applied not, like speech, to ordinary, but to extraordinary occasions of rhetorical effort. The oration commonly turns on matters of criticism or of panegyric. It aims at captivating the imagination, and rousing the passions and emotions. Its beauties lie in its being elevated, forcible, delicate, brilliant. It presents different aspects, and involves different styles in an effective versatility. It appeals successively

to fact and fancy, to reason and feeling. It deals in history and parable, in hard figures and brilliant similitudes. It uses the lightest and the most massive implements of rhetoric. In order to effect this it has its rules, which extend to matters of arrangement, style, diction, enunciation, and even taste in expression, attitude, and gesture.

"And after the procession, the King himself remaining seated in the quire, the Lord Archbishop upon the grace of the quire made a long *oration*."—BACON.

HARANGUE (Fr. *harangue*, originally from Ger. *hring, a circle, an assembly*). By it we denote such speeches as have for their special object to raise the feelings, or to give vent to them, and so are not subject to the rules of an oration, but admit of any style, however discursive, and are untrammelled by the laws of taste. They are modes of address often resorted to by persons of more energy than training, or on occasions when orations would be thrown away, or not listened to. They have to be spoken on occasion without time for premeditation. The excellence of harangue lies in its life. It is essentially stimulative of thought or action.

"The author of the Ecclesiastical Polity had in so many books of his own endeavoured to *harangue* up the nation into fury against tender consciences."—MARVEL.

When DISCOURSE (Lat. *discursus*) is used synonymously with these it conveys the idea of a methodical and instructive speech, addressed primarily to the understanding. Its object is exposition and explanation, and its excellence consists in being orderly, lucid, exhaustive, logical. Discourse may be familiar, historical, academical, philosophical, theological. Its character is enunciative.

"My intention in this and some future *discourses*, is to set before you the divine authority of the Christian Religion; and that I may do this the more effectually, and with the greater degree of evidence, I propose to lead your thoughts as it were step by step towards the important conclusion."—PEARCE, *Sermons*.

An APPEAL (Fr. *appeler*, Lat. *appellāre*) is a call made upon a person for a special purpose, as to defend himself, or to give a decision. In the language of the old law, the accused might be said to be appealed as well as the judge. Hence, to appeal is to have recourse to authority and power, especially with a personal interest, and so in an earnest way for the purpose of having one's position confirmed, or assured. The orator is said to appeal to anything in human nature, which might be stimulated to induce men to act or speak in the required way. One man in discourse appeals to the reason of another, to his passion, prejudice, common sense, love of justice, selfishness, hopes, fears, or anything else which may gain him over, or induce him to do or feel as desired. The excellence of an appeal lies in its being touching, earnest, powerful, stirring, persuasive, convincing, sympathetic. Other things besides words have a power of appeal, and may help the words—such are looks, gestures, tears, attitude. The word is now of general application, but was in the original use of it, legal and technical.

"Long have we sought t'instruct and please mankind,
With studies pale, with midnight vigils blind;
But thank'd by few, rewarded yet by none,
We here *appeal* to thy superior throne;
On wit and learning the just prize bestow,
For fame is all we must expect below."
POPE.

ADDUCE. ALLEGE. ASSIGN. ADVANCE.

These terms are all employed to express what is employed in logical confirmation. To adduce (Lat. *adducĕre, to lead to*) is simply to impart or apply to the case in hand, something that bears upon it. It may be an argument, an instance, a quotation, an illustration, a general consideration, a proof, an indirect confirmation, or its contrary; something which shall invalidate or tend to disprove. It may be regarded as the generic term, of which the rest are exemplifications.

"The price had it seems before the tax been a monopoly price, and the argument *adduced* to show that sugar was an improper subject of taxation demonstrated perhaps that it was a proper one."—ADAM SMITH.

To ALLEGE (Fr. *alléguer, to cite as an authority*) is, according to its legal origin, to bring forward some-

thing which is of the nature of a plea, excuse, or justification, and therefore implies some antecedent charge, or burden of proof. An allegation is a statement of fact bearing upon a moral or legal issue. One alleges facts or reasons to maintain or defend a position or an example, as a justification of conduct, or a general consideration in palliation of an offence. As a legal term, and especially of ecclesiastical law, ALLEGE applied not only to the plea, but also to the original charge. This force still survives in the word, though less prominently, as when it is said that certain charges against a person were alleged.

"Courageous chief,
The first in flight from pain, hadst thou *alleged*
To thy deserted host this cause of flight,
Thou surely hadst not come sole fugitive."
MILTON.

To ASSIGN (Lat. *assignāre*) is to mark out something which shall stand in a certain relation to another thing, and is therefore employed in as many connexions as there are relations which it expresses. I assign one thing as the cause of another, its limit, its signification, its purpose, its origin, its account, its work, its method, personal use, enjoyment, or possession. I assign a point of time for an event, and the like. Assignment has the character of specification and limitation, combined in connexion with a particular object. It declares that one thing belongs to another and in what respect.

"The only adequate and *assignable* reason of the difference is that the latter have a source to draw from which was unknown to the former."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

To ADVANCE (Fr. *avancer*, *avant*, *before*, i.e. *ab ante*) is voluntarily to put forward; and, especially, something against which we challenge argument or are prepared to make defence. Commonly speaking, in argumentative charge we advance; in reply we allege. Doctrines or opinions are advanced, and especially such as are new in character and strange to those who hear of them. They betoken some degree of boldness and originality in him who advances them.

"I have heard of one that having *advanced* some erroneous doctrines of philosophy, refused to see the experiments by which they were confuted."—JOHNSON.

ADEQUATE. SUFFICIENT. COMPETENT. PROPORTIONATE. COMMENSURATE. ENOUGH.

ADEQUATE (Lat. *ădæquātus*, part. *made equal*) means literally made equal to, or brought to the level of another thing. It expresses the equalization, not of simple quantity, but of forces, powers, means, resources. It expresses the coming up to some requirement in regard to a material, intellectual, or moral standard. That which is adequate either meets a demand or fulfils a purpose.

"To fear GOD, that is wisdom; that is, is the proper and *adequate* wisdom, suitable to human nature and to the condition of mankind."—HALE.

SUFFICIENT (Lat. *sufficere*, *to suffice*) has to be distinguished more especially from adequate and ENOUGH, (A.S. *genóh*, *genóg*). ADEQUATE is general, SUFFICIENT is specific. ADEQUATE is enough according to the nature of the case, SUFFICIENT is enough to meet a specific demand. ADEQUATE looks toward the end that is answered, SUFFICIENT towards the person that requires. An adequate remuneration is one which on the whole is fair—which balances or equalizes what has been done and what is received. A sufficient remuneration is one which is enough to discharge the obligations of the payer. An inadequate return for benefits received may be unsatisfactory both in character and amount; an insufficient return is only one that is too small. Adequate regards the force and value of things, sufficient their employment. This character of sufficient will be seen to hold good when compared with enough. Enough relates to internal satisfaction, sufficient to the demands of a purpose. Enough is the quantity which one wishes to have, sufficient the quantity which one wishes to employ. A miser has sufficient for all his wants, yet has never enough. The prodigal man never has what is enough or sufficient. He cannot be content with what he has, for he is

always desiring to spend more than he possesses. When we have had as much as we want we say it is enough. When we feel that we have been adequately supplied, we say it is sufficient. There is a use of enough which is expressive simply of the existence of a quality in a satisfactory measure, being equivalent to the adverbs rather and very. It augments either slightly or considerably the positive force of adjectives. In the phrase, "The place is pleasant enough," the augmentation is slight. In the phrase, "He will be ready enough to do what you ask him if you pay him well," it is greater.

"Whose wealth was want, whose plenty made him poor,
Who had *enough*, yet wished evermore."
SPENSER.

"Thus with your reverence me thinketh that this evidence as to this point is *sufficient*."—GESNER.

COMPETENT (Lat. *compĕtĕre, to coincide, to be suitable*) denotes the possession of sufficient personal qualifications. It is not precisely the same thing as qualified; for qualifications may be arbitrary or conventional. Competency comes of native sufficiency. It mostly respects mental endowments and attainments. A person is competent or not to undertake an office, to decide a question, to give advice, to manage a business, and the like; where the competent man has his advantage, is in matters practical, social, and official. Competency is practical power, which comes of natural ability strengthened by experience, observation, and conversance with some particular department of knowledge or business.

"A competent knowledge of the world."
—BISHOP ATTERBURY.

COMMENSURATE and PROPORTIONATE are exclusively terms of the relation of things, and not the qualities of persons, except so far as such qualities are treated after the analogy of quantity and number. PROPORTIONATE (Lat. *prōportionātus*) denotes the just relationship of one thing to another in extent, amount, or force. Where the proportion, as in the case of commensurateness, is between the means and the end, it becomes a synonym with adequate and sufficient. COMMENSURATE (Lat. *commensurātus*, adj.) expresses a coincidence or equality in measure or extent of a fixed geometrical character, while PROPORTIONATE might denote also a concurrent relationship according to circumstances which may make it variable. Nor is the idea of proportion that of commensurateness. In the commensurate there are only two terms; in the proportionate there are four necessarily. Proportion presupposes a ratio. Commensurate means only that two or more things have the same or an equal number or quantity. Two things of the same dimensions are commensurate; two things which bear the same relation to a third thing in point of quantity are in the same proportion to that third. "The rental of a man's house is commensurate with his income," would mean that the whole of his income went to pay his rent. "His rent is in proportion to his income" presupposes a rule that what a man pays in rent of his house ought not to exceed a certain portion of his income. Hence in commensurateness there is no idea but that of totality or equal wholes; in proportion there is that of division and distribution also. But COMMENSURATE has become confounded with PROPORTION from the circumstance that some attribute or quality of a thing may be conceived as continuously accompanying it for a period of time. This introduces an idea of proportion. For instance Tillotson says:—

"Those who are persuaded that they shall continue for ever cannot choose but aspire after a happiness *commensurate* to their duration."

Now this is capable of being conceived in two ways; either that their happiness and eternity both lasting together are commensurate, or that their happiness may bear the same relation to eternity that they themselves will, which becomes proportion.

"O let us be sure then our confidence, our claims to heaven, improve not above their *proportion*, that we preserve this symmetry of the parts of grace, that our hope be but *commensurate* to our sincerity, our daringness to our duty."—HAMMOND.

ADHERENT. Follower. Partizan. Disciple. Scholar.

Of these the simplest is Follower, which is employed generically of all the rest, with meanings of its own, such as a pursuer, a lover, a dependent, associate. When the Follower (A.S. *fylgan, to follow*) is such from a belief of the truth or right of such doctrines or principles he becomes a Disciple (Lat. *discĭpŭlus*), as learning or having learnt to believe in them. Scholar (see School), like disciple, is used of one who learns from another; but the scholar learns from a teacher, the disciple from a master. The scholar is trained in the rudiments of things, the disciple in the more advanced branches. Nor are the lessons used of the same subject-matter. The disciple is engaged with doctrines and principles as they regard philosophical systems, and such sciences as admit of a variety of sentiments and views; the scholar in such as have been fixed, and have simply to be learnt. The scholar is in common learning what the disciple is in philosophy, politics, or religion. The scholar learns directly from his teacher by simple and personal communication, the disciple may be removed by an interval of some generations from the time of the master whose principles or system he learns by tradition or by books. The Adherent (Lat. *ădhærēre, to stick to*) manifests his attachment in a public way, the term being employed of those who openly support persons or causes, while one may be a disciple in secret. The disciple upholds the opinions of another, the adherent his interests. The same person may be both an adherent and a disciple, because a system of principles may also be a cause as regards the world in which it has to be maintained and spread. The Partizan (Fr. *partisan*) is one strongly and perhaps violently attached to a party, and the interests they represent or have embraced, naturally accompanied with a strong attachment to those who lead or hold them. It is the relation of disciples or adherents in an energetic and exclusive way, and is commonly taken to involve an excessive or illiberal and one-sided attachment to a person, a party, or a cause. A faithful follower, a firm adherent, a true disciple, a violent and prejudiced partizan.

"Luther and his *adherents* hold this heresy, that all holy order is nothing."—Sir T. More.

"No Indian Prince has to his palace
More *followers* than a thief to the gallows."
Hudibras.

"The monarchic and aristocratical and popular *partizans* have been jointly laying their axes to the root of all government, and have in their turn proved each other absurd and inconvenient."—Burke.

"We are not the *disciples* of Voltaire."—Burke.

"The Romans confessed themselves the *scholars* of the Greeks."—Johnson.

ADHERENCE. Adhesion.

These words (Lat. *ădhærēre, to stick to*), which were once freely interchanged, have parted almost entirely, so that the former expresses the moral, the latter the physical idea of close conformity or attachment. Adherence to a statement, a duty, or the like; adhesion to a substance. There is, perhaps, an exception in the solitary case of the phrase "to give in one's adhesion to a principle or a party."

ADHERENT. Attached. Annexed. Inherent.

A thing is Adherent (Lat. *ădhærēre, to stick to*), either by a union which is formed by nature, or by the contexture and continuity of the material. It is Attached (Fr. *attacher*) by arbitrary or artificial bonds, by which it is kept in a purposed place, situation, or connexion. It is Annexed (Lat. *annectĕre*, part. *annexus, to bind on to*) by such a junction as results from the will and appointments of man. Inherent has the force of that intimate connexion, which is essentially instituted in the nature of things, and may be either physically or morally employed. The wax of the seal adheres to the letter. The sails of a ship are attached to the mast. Sometimes a minor appointment is annexed to a greater, to enhance its importance or emoluments. There are certain evil tendencies naturally inherent in human nature. Adherent, except as a noun in the sense of follower or support, does not lend itself so readily as attached to a moral

use. The metaphorical employment of attached in the sense of united by affection or interest is familiar enough.

ADHESIVE. TENACIOUS.

The difference between these terms is best illustrated by their etymology. ADHESIVE is the Lat. *ădhærĕre, to stick to.* TENACIOUS, *tĕnăcem, holding on, tenĕre, to hold.* The ADHESIVE, therefore, may be regarded as one kind of the TENACIOUS, expressive of that quality by which one thing holds on to another, surface to surface, by the inherent properties or qualities of such surface, while the tenacious expresses the property of holding on in any way. So ivy is tenacious so far as it clings to a ruin; it is adhesive, inasmuch as it spreads itself over the expanse of the wall, and by its minute fibres forms a surface of vegetation. ADHESIVE does not share with TENACIOUS the secondary sense in which tenacious is employed of a persistent adherence to claims, rights, or opinions.

ADJUST. ARRANGE. RANGE. ACCOMMODATE. ADAPT. COMPROMISE.

ADJUST is to set right (O. Fr. *ajoster*; L. Lat. *adjuxtare, to put side by side*). The word implies either an external standard or measure to which matters have to be applied, or some condition of inherent fitness, propriety, shape, or order to which they are to be reduced. Dress is adjusted when its several articles are suitably arranged and worn according to their right place and use. Quarrels are said to be adjusted when the alleged wrongs on both sides are referred to some satisfactory decision, arbitration, or agreement.

"When things were thus far *adjusted* towards a peace, all other differences were soon *accommodated*."—ADDISON.

ARRANGE (Fr. *arranger, rang*, Eng. *rank*) deals with particulars, as ADJUST with wholes. We adjust by rightly ordering the parts so as to form an orderly whole. We arrange separate and particular articles, whether as parts of a whole or not. We arrange according to the fitness of things to stand by each other, while in ranging nothing more is denoted than the placing in a line of separate articles. Items which have nothing in common, but that they are movable units, may be ranged, that is, placed in a row. They bear some character in which they stand related to one another when they are arranged, which may or may not be in a line. Practical convenience, seemliness, or order for its own sake is the object in arranging. Articles of furniture in a room are arranged when they are relatively placed according to their form, colour, use, and the like. In a procession the persons are ranged when the line is formed; arranged when the order of precedence and accompaniment is fixed. We range books in order to arrange a library. To range is to put in place; to arrange is to put in right place. To range is a physical and, as it were, mechanical art. To arrange needs thought, taste, knowledge. When we range we are bound to a certain course. When we arrange we are at liberty to choose our principle or mode of arrangement, as efficiency, availableness, scientific precision, or pleasurable effect, or any other such cause.

"In vain you attempt to regulate your expense if into your amusements or your society disorder has crept. You have admitted a principle of confusion which will defeat all your plans, and perplex and entangle what you sought to *arrange*."—BLAIR.

We ACCOMMODATE (Lat. *accommŏdare*) when we make one thing supply what the other requires. Both persons and things are subjects of accommodation. When we accommodate ourselves to circumstances, we aim at producing a conformity between our wishes and actions, and the limits imposed upon us by them. In this case some sacrifice of ourselves is implied. We contract our desires to the measure of their possible fulfilment. If we accommodate a friend with lodgings or a loan, we put him into such a position that his wants in each respect are commensurate with his means of meeting them. When we accommodate differences we bring persons into such harmony that the demands of neither are in excess of what the other is ready to meet. When we accommodate an event to a

prophecy, it is by so representing the event, or so stretching or narrowing the terms of the prophecy, that the same space of meaning shall be covered by both as accordant and coincident expressions.

"It is not the endeavour of Moses or the prophets to discover any mathematical or philosophical subtleties, but rather to *accommodate* themselves to vulgar capacities."—Bp. Wilkins.

Compromise (Lat. *comprōmittĕre*) is in its rudimental meaning a joint or mutual promise, and, in particular, a promise to refer a matter to the decision of an arbiter. Then, singularly enough, the subject of this arrangement dropping out, the arrangement alone survived; and, the idea of arbitration being abandoned, the term came to mean almost the opposite to its original idea, namely, that of mutual concession without any extraneous decision; an adjustment of the matter between the parties themselves in a spirit of conciliation or policy; for it would often happen that cases destined for an arbiter were never carried so far, but privately arranged. In the phrase, "The person is compromised," the idea of obligation or engagement is uppermost; that is to say, he has done something which places him in a certain position or has implicated him in a responsibility, though he may not have seen and intended the full consequences of his act. In the other phrase, "The matter was compromised," the idea of the private arrangement is uppermost; that is to say, it was determined by mutual concession, and not carried to law. At present the spirit of compromise is that of forestalling judicial or authoritative decision by timely concessions, a giving and taking on both sides. Compromise is the resort of persons with whom policy is a stronger motive than principle, or with those who, being desirous of truth and justice, will secure to themselves or their cause as much of them as circumstances will permit, rather than run the risk of losing them by too rigorously insisting upon their own views and claims. In proportion as men are inclined to believe that exact forms are either irrelevant to truth or obstructive to it, they will advocate compromise; in proportion as they regard them as essential to its conservation they will regard compromise in the light of moral cowardice and unfaithfulness.

"An abhorrence of concession and *compromise* is a never-failing characteristic of religious factions."—Hallam.

ADMIRABLE. Excellent. Exquisite.

Of these terms the first relates to an impression produced upon our mind, the two others to the character inherent in objects. That is Admirable (Lat. *admīrābĭlis*) which is literally worthy of admiration. And admiration is a state of mind produced by the involuntary appreciation of what is excellent in nature, in art, or in the sentiments and actions of mankind. Hence the measure of the Admirable is the faculty of the mind for discerning and appreciating such excellence. Admiration is wonder or surprise mingled with approbation, and accompanied by pleasing emotions. That is Excellent which surpasses (Lat. *excellĕre, to surpass*) other things of the same kind in good, desirable, or estimable qualities. Superiority in an object which is purely material, as the fine growth of a tree, or the special costliness of a gem, is not excellence. The excellent always bears reference either to what is morally good, or materially serviceable or desirable in connexion with the requirements of men. An excellent person is morally virtuous and estimable. An excellent house could not mean one of architectural beauty, but one well built for purposes of habitation. The excellent is in moral things an object of praise, and in material things an object of advantage. That which is Exquisite (Lat. *exquīrĕre*, part. *exquīsītus, to seek out*) exhibits excellence of a peculiar, rare, choice, or delicate kind. It requires refinement of taste and a delicate sensibility to appreciate it. The excellent may be on any scale. The exquisite has never the attribute of size, though it may characterize objects of size. It is a term more artistic than moral, and

does not belong to character or acts, yet is not inapplicable to the moral nature, sensibility, and sentiments. It may imply a high degree of excellence in art, but belongs also to what is not matter of art, as "exquisite torture," that is, rarely, peculiarly, and, as it were, refinedly intense. It has a more superlative force than either admirable or excellent. It is the product of a combination of mental power and delicacy.

ADMISSIBLE. PERMISSIBLE.

These stand related as argument to act. That which is ADMISSIBLE (Lat. *admittĕre*, part. *admissus, to admit*) may be conceded as true, just, fair, convenient, probable. That which is PERMISSIBLE (Lat. *permittĕre*, part. *permissus, to permit*) may be conceded as a thing which may be done. A supposition, for instance, is admissible, a proceeding permissible.

ADMIT. RECEIVE.

When employed in regard to persons the difference in usage between these words seems to be that the former does not imply what the latter does—a peculiar relation to self as the result of the process. To ADMIT (Lat. *admittĕre*) is to open an entrance to another. To RECEIVE (Lat. *rĕcĭpĕre*) is so to open it as to bring him into some close relation to one's self. I admit a person into a public building. I receive him into my own house. Hence receive implies a stronger exercise of the will than admit. I admit him into my house to whom I do not refuse entrance. I receive him whom I cause to feel welcome. Both ADMIT and RECEIVE are applicable to merely physical objects and processes. Yet the same analogy is preserved in that case. ADMIT only involves the absence of exclusion, RECEIVE an adaptation between the two objects. This difference is exemplified in the following sentence of Locke:—

"There are some ideas which have *admittance* only through one sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them."

ADMIT. ALLOW. GRANT.

These terms are here compared only in regard to matters of speculation and argument. In that sense GRANT (O. Fr. *graanter, creanter, to assure*) is relative to the person of another. It expresses such a concession as benefits or strengthens the position of him to whom it is made. To ADMIT is abstract, and belongs to the propriety, truth, or justice of what is conceded. The concession is the result of the force of argument which renders it impossible to deny, or of a previous knowledge or conviction which one feels must, in justice, be carried to the account of the opposite party. To ALLOW (Fr. *allouer*, Lat. *ad, to, laudare, to praise*) is negative, while admit is positive. I admit what I cannot deny. I allow what ought in fairness to be granted. Logical necessity compels me to admit. Argumentative honesty requires that I should allow. ADMIT denotes what is due to the case. ALLOW what is due to him who argues, as a claim.

"Even a real miracle cannot be *admitted* as such, or carry any conviction to those who are not assured that the event is contradictory to the course of nature."—FARMER.

"The ruin'd spendthrift now no longer proud,
Claim'd kindred there, and had his claims *allow'd*."
GOLDSMITH.

There is more freedom and voluntariness in GRANT than in either ALLOW or ADMIT; so that the term sometimes refers to such concession as an antecedent to all argument whatever, as in the following:—

"I take it at the same time for *granted* that the immortality of the soul is sufficiently established by other arguments."—STEELE.

ADMITTANCE. ADMISSION.

ADMITTANCE belongs more simply to the mere act of allowing to enter ADMISSION in a moral sense to the reception with some sort of sanction. Hence admittance is purely local, as admittance into a building. Admission rather bears the meaning of a right of admittance, or the power of demanding an entrance. It is the right of admission which procures the admittance. The admission of the truth of a charge; the admittance of light into an apartment. Admission is more in the admitter, admittance in

the admitted. There is admission when persons are willing to admit. There is admittance when the way is left open.

"Of the foolish virgins who watched not, neither had trimmed their lamps, but were too late to buy oil when the bridegroom came, 'tis observed that they found no more place of *admittance* than if they had been slothful still."—CLARKE.

"Our Bishops are made in form and order as they have been ever, by free election of the Chapter, by consecration of the Archbishop and other three Bishops, and by the *admission* of the Prince."—BISHOP JEWEL.

ADMONISH. ADVISE. CAUTION. WARN.

ADMONISH (Lat. *admŏnĕre*) respects the moral conduct, and is the act of a superior. The personal expression of authoritative advice constitutes admonition. It has two aspects, looking to the past and the future. It bears reference to something done or probably done, thus in force resembling censure, and to something also likely to be done in the future, from which the person admonished is sought to be kept, thus approaching to warning. Admonition notes the past with disapproval, and at the same time represents the ill consequences of any repetition of the offence. It serves to put persons on their guard against wrong conduct, and is therefore most called for in those who are most prone to transgress. It cautions against error only in cases where error is a moral fault, as where it occurs through negligence, indifference, inattentiveness, and the like. It involves reason and remonstrance on the act, and authoritative declaration of its ordinary consequences. "Admonitio," says Cicero, "est quasi lenior objurgatio." Admonition is a kind of mild reproof. Coming from superiors in age or position, and having prevention for its object, it often implies that the admonisher himself will visit more severely in the way of punishment a repetition of the offence. Resting in the power of such superior it will be subject to his discretion in its exercise, and he will admonish a favourite, or one in whose character he feels confidence, where perhaps he would have visited another with punishment. It is of course possible that the superiority implied in the right to admonish should be rather assumed than real. A belief or possibly knowledge of their own moral or intellectual superiority will lead some persons to take up the attitude of admonition toward others.

"It has long been charged by one part of mankind upon the other, that they will not take advice, that counsel and instruction are generally thrown away, and that in defiance both of *admonition* and example all claim the right to choose their own measures, and to regulate their own lives."—*Adventurer*.

ADVISE (Fr. *aviser, avis, opinion*) has reference solely to the future except in the sense, not here considered, of formal notifications. It is positive in its effect, as ADMONISH is negative. Advice prompts as admonition deters. We advise persons as to their future conduct by giving rules and directions, and imparting information so far as it may be needed, as we possess it, or it bears upon the matter in hand. As admonition is for the unruly, so advice is for the inexperienced. For further observations see ADVICE.

"The person who pretends to *advise* does in that particular exercise a superiority over us, and can have no other reason for it, but that in company, or with himself, he thinks us defective either in our conduct or our understanding. For these reasons there is nothing so difficult as the art of making advice agreeable."—*Spectator*.

WARN (A.S. *warnian, to beware, to warn*), bears simply upon the hurtful as a possible event of the future, and like ADVICE, and unlike ADMONISH, has no reference to the past. It deals with the moral only so far as it is prudent, and with the immoral so far as it is dangerous, that is, not as having a certain character, but as followed by certain consequences.

CAUTION (Lat. *cautiōnem, wariness*) and WARNING are closely allied, but there are differences. Both respect the personal interest or safety of others, but WARN is a more determinate word than CAUTION. We might caution another against probable inconvenience arising from a certain step.

We should warn him against certain evil accruing from it. In caution we draw the attention of another mainly to his own conduct, which we desire him to be careful in regulating; in warning, to certain evils external to himself which we desire that he should avoid. Warning implies a far greater amount of positive knowledge in the speaker than caution. I warn another as absolutely knowing the consequences of action, whereas I may caution him for the very reason that I do not know them; and indeed, generally speaking, the ground of warning is certainty, the ground of caution is uncertainty. Caution relates to conduct, warn to the circumstances or issues of conduct. We warn a man against approaching danger. We caution him against running into it. We are cautioned against speaking rashly, we are warned of the consequences. Admonitions come only from persons, for personal considerations give them their weight; but events may serve as cautions and warnings. In the former case they make us circumspect, in the latter observant.

"*Cautioning* us to take heed lest we be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness."—TILLOTSON.

"As two broad beacons set in open fields
Send forth their flames far off to every shire,
And *warning* give that enemies conspire,
With fire and sword the region to invade
So flamed his eyne with rage and rancorous ire." SPENSER.

ADOPT. EMBRACE.

These terms are employed to express the identification of ourselves with opinions, or forms of truth not hitherto professed by us. They differ in the feelings, and so, to some extent, in the motives leading to such action. We ADOPT (Lat. *ădoptāre, to take for one's self*) views, opinions, a form of persuasion, a mode of action, and the like, from necessity or fitness, or as believing them to be true, or right, or convenient. We EMBRACE them (O. Fr. *embracer*) with eagerness, a stronger exercise of the will, and a more complete sympathy. That which we adopt we are prepared to defend and make use of. That which we embrace satisfies our needs and meets our mental requirements. The term adopt belongs more to the outside of things, embrace more to their inner qualities. I may adopt the statement of another, and make it my own, as effectively or conveniently expressing my own meaning. I embrace his opinions when I have become persuaded of their truth and am glad to have found them. European travellers in the East often adopt the dress of the Mussulman without embracing his faith.

ADORE. REVERENCE. REVERE. VENERATE. WORSHIP.

ADORE (Lat. *ădōrāre*) is primarily the act of worship which consists in addressing prayer. It implies therefore a belief in the continued existence and superhuman attributes of the object adored. It is by virtue of them that it is worshipped, or constituted an object of prayer. It is by an exaggerated metaphor that the term is employed to designate the warmest devotion to other persons. It involves a higher and more purely intellectual estimate of its object than worship, which is also more purely external. So the lowest forms of religion consist in the worship of material objects, while the highest consist in the sincere and intelligent adoration of the one supreme God. It is the conception of power which leads to worship, of purity also which leads to adoration. We adore God for His perfections. We sometimes adore the creature in spite of its imperfections. We adore when we pay the tribute of admiration as to a Being of a divine or superhuman character. The term sometimes denotes no more than the fervent attachment of an inferior, as good princes are said to be adored by their subjects. Adoration of God, then, is first, simply prayer; then the recognition of those attributes which are the ground of prayer, and the feelings consequent on that recognition. It is the rendering to Him the homage of reason which, however, so naturally expresses itself in outward homage that the term is sometimes employed to express this directly.

"Rejoicing but with awe
In *adoration* at his feet I fell
Submiss." MILTON.

As ADORATION is primarily mental and secondarily external, so WORSHIP (Eng. *worth, worthship*) is primarily external and secondarily mental. Adoration may be genuine without worship, but worship without adoration would be hypocrisy. The radical idea of worship is that of placing on a higher level than one's self for the purpose of showing honour, the association being close between exaltation and virtue, as in the word excellent, which means first, raised in position, then exceeding in goodness. To worship is to regard as eminently good or great. It has gone through many degrees of meaning, from that of paying respect, as in the title of mayors of boroughs, or the phrase "with my body I thee worship," to that of rendering divine honours, or venerating with religious rites. It is natural to apply to the gods or God terms expressive of social or political exaltation. To adore is a mental or spiritual act; to worship is partly made up of physical acts. Details of a ceremonial, as for instance the burning of incense, may be so many parts in a complex act of worship. Hence it would follow that worship is the wider or generic term, and that adoration is a kind of worship. The prevailing feeling in adoration is our own inferiority and unworthiness, which would lead us to prostrate ourselves in the presence of a being morally superior to ourselves. The prevailing feeling in worship is the power and superiority of the object worshipped. In worshipping we pay homage to the power, wisdom, and goodness of God. In adoring we express our own weakness and dependence upon Him.

"If the *worship* of God be a duty of religion, public *worship* is a necessary institution, forasmuch as without it the greater part of mankind would exercise no religious *worship* at all."—PALEY.

Between REVERE (Lat. *rĕvĕrēri*) and REVERENCE (Lat. *rĕvĕrentia*) there is the difference between a sentiment entertained and a sentiment manifested. To reverence is to show in deportment that which is due to inherent sanctity of character, whether divine or human. REVERE is more intimate to the feelings, and may refer to what is preserved as sacred in the mind, independently of any external signs of respect, as to revere the memory of a deceased friend. It is possible to reverence, though we could never be said to revere, places and objects for the sake of those persons to whom they have belonged, or those persons, things, or uses with which they are closely associated in our minds.

"The Jews made him an object of terror more than of awe and *reverence*, and their religion was a system of the rankest superstition; for nothing can be more true than what St. Austin quotes somewhere from Varro, that they who are religious *revere*, and the superstitious fear, God."—BOLINGBROKE.

Between REVERENCE and VENERATE (Lat. *vĕnĕrāri*) there seems this main difference, that the object of veneration is not so far removed from ourselves as the object of reverence; that there is more of worship in reverence, as of the name of God, and more of esteem in veneration, as of the good and aged. Associations of antiquity lead to veneration, associations of religion and piety to reverence. Veneration is a profound respect; reverence is a respectful fear which inspires a feeling of restraint.

"*Veneration* is a higher degree of respect in which the mind seems to be more forcibly struck with wisdom connected with the sterner virtues. Hence we speak of characters which are more venerable than amiable."—COGAN.

ADORN. DECORATE. EMBELLISH. GARNISH. ORNAMENT.

Of these ADORN (Lat. *ădornāre*) expresses the accession of beauty in its highest and truest character. The process is one of the best taste and value. It is an advance upon decoration. A house just built must be DECORATED (Lat. *dĕcŏrāre, to decorate*). This is done by the paperer, the plasterer, the gilder. After this is done it may be magnificently adorned with costly and massive furniture, with marbles, paintings, and works of art generally. It may be employed of things

purely moral, as of a character adorned by many virtues. When a thing is adorned it is as if the adorning affected the whole object and enhanced its entire nature, not adventitiously but intrinsically. A certain degree of worth, beauty, dignity, or value must belong to that which is to be adorned. On the other hand DECORATE never rises above the adventitious introduction of what is materially ornamental. When decoration has no character of natural grace, but is purely artificial with the purpose of attracting attention, it becomes EMBELLISHMENT; which is a term of so little moral dignity that it is not employed, as ADORN and DECORATE may be, of the human person; only inanimate objects are embellished. The high-born beauty is adorned with costly gems. The rustic beauty decorates herself with wild flowers. The tradesman embellishes his shop-front. Embellishment is more vivid than decoration when it is purely material. The purpose of decoration may be little more than to avoid over-plainness. The purpose of embellishment is to draw observation to itself. Yet embellishment may be otherwise than material. A narrative may be embellished by clever and striking anecdotes, while it is adorned with passages of eloquence.

We EMBELLISH by modifying a thing in its constituent parts, and by so interspersing the ornamental, that the ornate character of certain portions, sections, or features shall affect the impression derived from the whole. We adorn by superadding uniform beauty; we decorate by introducing uniform ornamentation; we embellish by ornamental touches.

GARNISH is the Fr. *garnir*, which is connected with the English *warn*. The French original has the double sense of fortification and decoration. It is first to provide with what is necessary for binding together or sustaining, and then to do this handsomely. This idea survives in the English word, so that to GARNISH is to surround with ornament, not to affix ornamentation. That which is garnished is ornamentally set up. A fort wall is decorated or embellished; a dish, a chamber, a may-pole, is garnished, set up and beset with decorative surroundings. The etymological force is exactly preserved in the following:—

"The gorgeous city *garnish'd* like a Bride,
Where Christ for Spouse expected is to passe,
With walls of jasper compass'd on each side
Hath streets all paved with gold more bright than glasse." SHIRLEY.

The noun ORNAMENT (Lat. *ornamentum*) is also used as a verb. This fact denotes its meaning. To ornament is to affix one or more ornaments. An ornament is a specific decoration—in itself a distinct design and work of art. The front of a Greek temple was ornamented, among other things, with triglyphs. Modern vases are sometimes ornamented with Etruscan patterns. Ornament, as compared with decoration, is a separate adjunct. The frame of a picture or a mirror is decorated with gilding and ornamented by mouldings and patterns. We decorate surfaces and ornament certain points or portions of it. We ornament permanently; it is possible to decorate only temporarily. The ornamentation of a building belongs to its architecture. Its decoration may indicate a festive season. In decoration we beautify the whole, in ornamentation we illustrate parts. A fine window with rich tracery and well-stained glass of correct design, greatly ornaments a church. By too free a use of gilding, colour, or flowers, it is quite possible to over-decorate a church.

"At church with meek and unaffected grace,
His looks *adorned* the venerable place."
GOLDSMITH.

"I have been told by them that have seen both that our Church did then exceed the Romish in ceremonies and *decorations*."—MARVEL.

"Milton, though he fetched this beautiful circumstance from the Iliad and Æneid, does not only insert it as a poetical *embellishment*, like the authors above mentioned, but makes an artful use of it for the carrying on of his fable."—*Spectator*.

ADROIT. EXPERT. DEXTEROUS.

ADROIT (Fr. *adroit*, *à* and *droit*, *straight*) is literally the faculty of going straight to an object. It is used

of other matters than those of physical manipulation, as an adroit answer. It implies an unfixedness of subject-matter. So, for example, we may not say adroit upon a musical instrument. It implies a clever versatility, and so may be negative in its character. We may elude or parry as well as thrust adroitly. Adroitness is the product of natural quickness and experience or practice. An adroit act compasses its end with rapidity and effectiveness, whether in speech or action. Its movement is quick, sudden, telling.

DEXTEROUS (Lat. *dextĕra*, or *dextra, the right hand*) nearly resembles ADROIT, so that in some cases the same act might be designated by either term; but ADROIT refers to the thing done, DEXTEROUS to the mode, means, or implement of doing it. An adroit stroke; dexterous management. The adroit use of the bow would consist in cleverly hitting the mark on one occasion. Its dexterous use would mean the same thing done habitually. We may say, "Throughout the whole course he managed his horses dexterously, and turned one dangerous corner most adroitly." In moral matters dexterity is a term of unreserved approbation. Not so adroitness. The dexterous man manages skilfully, the adroit man ingeniously and elusively. A dexterous man holds his course through difficulties, an adroit man finds a way of escape from them. Even the dexterous examiner finds difficulty in dealing with an adroit witness.

EXPERT (Lat. *expertus*, part. of *expĕriri, to try*) is a word implying trained dexterity. Expertness is determined by some art or system of rules. It is the result of practice, that is, of often doing the same thing, until at last it comes to be done with a calculable regularity, so that the effect becomes less intense, and the end more certain and effective.

"There were no marks of *expertness* in the trick played by the woman of Endor upon the perturbed mind of Saul."—COGAN.

"They smooth the plank very expeditiously and *dexterously* with their adzes, and can take off a thin coat from a whole plank without missing a stroke."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"May there not be a great deal in the ingenious versatile, in the skill and *adroitness* of the artist, acquired as yours has been by repeated acts and continual practice."—BISHOP HORNE.

ADVANTAGE. BENEFIT. BOON. PROFIT. INTEREST.

These terms are synonyms in so far as they denote something by which a person is bettered—that is, they are all relative forms of good. But the good is regarded from different points of view. An ADVANTAGE (Fr. *avantage, avant, forward*; Lat. *ab, ante*) is that which puts a man forward—that is, places him in a better state as regards society or his position in it, or some office or work which he has to do, as the advantages of a good education. It respects external circumstances of profit, honour, or convenience, and turns upon the wishes and wants of life. An advantage is not a final form of good, but rather something which puts us in the way of acquiring further good. The advantageous is not only desirable but promotive and helpful.

"Whatever *advantages* I obtain by my own free endeavours and right use of those faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's providence and government as if they were given me immediately by Him without my acting."—WOOLASTON.

BENEFIT (Lat. *bĕnĕfĭcere*, sup. *bĕnĕfactum, to do good*) is anything which makes the condition of the person who receives it happier or more prosperous. It may be conferred upon us by another, or it may come to us as the result of a process directed to the purpose. Some benefits are conferred, others are reaped. A rich man may heap benefits upon a poor man. The man of sedentary habits takes a walk for the benefit of his health. Benefits are commonly matters of the body or the estate. The advance of mechanical science redounds to the benefit of the human race.

"He now found that such friends as *benefits* had gathered round him were little estimable. He now found that a man's own heart must be ever given to gain that of another."—GOLDSMITH.

PROFIT (Lat. *prōfĭcere, to go forward, to be useful*) is so far like

BENEFIT, that it is a real and substantial addition to the sum of our well-being, but it comes to us in a peculiar way. It is gain arising out of a thing—the balance of benefit after something expended, whether in action, in labour, or in money. It is in its fullest sense the excess of acquisition over expenditure in any way in which those words may be applied. Advantages may come to us adventitiously; benefits may be conferred upon us, but profit is always the product of our own doings.

"The revenue derived from labour is called wages; that derived from stock by the person who manages or employs it is called *profit*."—ADAM SMITH.

A BOON (Dan. and Sw. *bön, a petition; see* SKEAT'S *Etym. Dict.*) is a specific benefit, a private and personal good, a gift peculiarly acceptable, meeting in a peculiar way the circumstances or wants of the individual. It has a relative, rather than an absolute and universal value. What is a great boon to one man it might not be worth another's while to accept.

"If you mean to please any people you must give them the *boon* which they ask; not what you may think better for them, but of a kind totally different."—BURKE.

INTEREST (Lat. *intĕrest, it concerns*) expresses both the fact and the feeling of concern. It is in the former sense that we have to deal with it here. The interest of a person or a community is the sum total of what concerns them; the aggregate of their well-being; all that it behoves them to possess in regard to happiness and prosperity. It is not a form of good, but any and all good, as it relates to them specifically.

"Divisions hinder the common *interest* and public good."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

ADVENT. ARRIVAL.

Both these terms are employed to signify the coming of objects in space and of events in time. But ADVENT (Lat. *advĕnire*, part. *adventus*) signifies no more than a coming to.

ARRIVAL (Fr. *arriver*, for which see BRACHET) implies progressive movement, a course and a specific destination. Advent is abstract, arrival is specific. Advent regards our anticipation of the thing that comes, which is accordingly fulfilled by its coming. Arrival regards the movement of the thing that comes, which is accordingly terminated when a given point is reached.

ADVENTURE. ENTERPRISE.

Both are marked occurrences or transactions of which the issue is determined by chance, but the ADVENTURE (Fr. *aventure*, L. Lat. *adventūra*) befals us, and the ENTERPRISE is sought. We undertake enterprises, and meet with adventures. An enterprise (Fr. *entreprendre*, part. *entrepris, to undertake*) is a bold, hazardous undertaking. An adventure is something befalling us of an unusual, perhaps romantic character. The best adventure is that which ends in the safety of the party after strange incidents and a complication of perils. The best enterprise is that which ends in the success of the party after a complication of dangers and difficulties. It was an indomitable spirit of *enterprise* which led the Spanish discoverers of the new world. The lives of Columbus, Cortes, and Pizarro were full of *adventures*.

ADVENTUROUS. ENTERPRISING. VENTURESOME.

The first of these, the ADVENTUROUS (Fr. *aventure, an enterprise*; L. Lat. *adventūra*), is one who is primarily led by a spirit of boldness, and either courts, or at least disregards danger. The ENTERPRISING (Fr. *entreprise, undertaking, enterprise*) is primarily led by the desire of achieving a bold scheme or undertaking in itself profitable or good. The enterprising combines calculation with boldness to a greater extent than the adventurous, whose character is liable to degenerate into the rash or foolhardy. The enterprising is not deterred by peril, the adventurous loves it for its own sake. Yet adventurous is a loftier term than VENTURESOME. The former expresses the character, the latter the spirit or act of the moment. There is a chivalrous element in the adventurous. The venturesome thing

is ordinary, but attended with risk. An adventurous course, a venturesome act. Columbus was adventurous. He who would trust his weight upon thin ice is venturesome.

"I thence
Invoke thy aid to mine *adventurous* song,
That with no middle flight intends to soar
Above th' Æonian Mount, while it pursues
Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme."
MILTON.

"Through hardy *enterprise*
Many great regions are discovered."
SPENSER.

"It must ever redound unto the honour of his memory, that bold and *venturesome* act of his in so bravely casting off the long-usurped power of the Pope in these realms."
—STRYPE.

ADVERSE. CONTRARY. OPPOSITE. INIMICAL. HOSTILE. REPUGNANT. AVERSE.

ADVERSE (Lat. *adversus, turned towards, hostile*), belongs both to external circumstances or influences, and to the sentiments or acts of men. That which is adverse acts to the hindrance or disadvantage of another. It is commonly employed of that which tends to thwart our plans or movements by an opposing force or influence, either actively resisting, or, more commonly, negatively impeding and obstructing. Adverse circumstances retard and make more difficult the progress of our purposes and schemes. Adverse winds exercise a counteractive force on the movements of the ship. Opposition of sentiment makes others adverse to our designs.

"Happy were it for us all if we bore prosperity as well and wisely as we endure our *adverse* fortune."—SOUTHEY.

CONTRARY (Lat. *contrārius, contrà, against*) does not imply the specific relation involved in adverse, but is a more abstract term. A thing is adverse in the way in which it operates, contrary in its own nature. The adverse is the contrary in operation. Things are contrary which have very great unlikeness to each other in character and attributes. They are OPPOSITE (Lat. *opponĕre*, part. *oppŏsĭtus, to set over against*) when they have this unlikeness in the greatest possible degree. There is in opposite a geometrical exactitude which does not belong to contrary. Things may be more or less contrary, but not more or less opposite. The contrary has wide differences, the opposite has nothing in common. The contrary negatives the majority of the attributes; the opposite negatives them all. Contrary is to quality what opposite is to position. Opposition is complete and measured contrariety. So virtue is contrary to vice and opposite to vice—contrary in its total unlikeness in character, manifestations, motives, and practical effects; opposite in that its definition might consist in affirming all that is denied and denying all that is affirmed of virtue. Contrary is a moral and metaphysical, as opposite is a mathematical term. The opposite side of the street would be the north side, if the speaker were on the south; the contrary side would be the opposite to that about which some idea had been entertained or some statement made. Opposite is static in its character, contrary is dynamic. Contrary things are sure to come into some collision with each other; opposite things are simply utterly removed.

"Many of them (the bones of the human body) conspire to one and the same action, and all this *contrarily* to the laws of specific gravity."—RAY.

"Novels by which the reader is misled into another sort of pleasure *opposite* to that designed in an epic poem."—DRYDEN.

The remaining synonyms all express adverseness, contrariety, or opposition in human feeling or action. INIMICAL (Lat. *ĭnĭmīcus*) and HOSTILE (Lat. *hostilis*) are very similar, but INIMICAL is not so strong a term as HOSTILE, rather implying the possession of such feelings or qualities as would naturally lead to opposition or a refusal to aid; while HOSTILE denotes a more positive, open, and energetic display of such opposition. The adverse tends to thwart, the inimical to discourage, the hostile to defeat and destroy.

"We are at war with a system which by its essence is *inimical* to all other governments."—BURKE.

REPUGNANT (Lat. *rĕpugnare, to fight*

against) is now almost exclusively applied to things, not persons. It denotes that which either excites a feeling of dislike in a person, or is essentially discordant with something else, and so both contradicts its character and is inconsistent with its working. That is repugnant which possesses an incompatible character or attributes—a contrariety in matters of mind, feeling, emotion, passion, spirit, principle, purpose, character. An act may be consistent with the letter of a law but repugnant to its spirit.

"*Repugnant* to the principles of human nature."—STILLINGFLEET.

Like INIMICAL and HOSTILE, but unlike repugnant, AVERSE (Lat. *āversus, alienated*, part. of *āvertĕre, to turn away*) is applicable only to beings of consciousness and will, and that in reference to their inclination and tastes. We are adverse to what we disapprove, averse to what we dislike; though it may often happen that the two states of mind may coexist towards the same object. One may be adverse to cruelty as feeling bound to oppose it, averse to it as feeling an abhorrence of it. We are averse to what is opposed to our reason and to what is uncongenial to our tastes; to entering upon such courses or taking such steps as we may feel to be on any account objectionable; as well as to acts, conduct, or employments which are foreign to our nature.

"What female heart can gold despise?
What cat's *averse* to fish?" GRAY.

ADVERSITY. MISERY.

ADVERSITY (Lat. *adversĭtātem*) is an untoward condition of circumstances in regard to individuals.

MISERY (Lat. *mĭsĕria*) is a pitiable condition of persons in regard to happiness. Misery is great unhappiness, which may spring from pain of body or mind, destitution, disappointment, bereavement, desertion, and other such causes. Adversity is the failure of the good, the desirable, or the successful in life.

ADVERTISE. PUBLISH.

To PUBLISH—literally, to make public (Lat. *publĭcāre*)—is the more general, for we may publish by simply speaking openly on a subject, or a general mass of information may be published in a book.

To ADVERTISE (Fr. *avertir*, Lat. *advertĕre*) is to *turn the attention* of persons or of the public to some specific fact of presumed interest; and is not taken to include oral but only written or printed forms of notice, when the noun ADVERTISEMENT is employed. This follows naturally from the fact that such modes of specific publication are the most effective, and therefore common. We publish a thing when we simply give it circulation, notoriety, and authenticity; we publish what we conceive to be matter of general interest under a wish that something known to us shall not be unknown to the world: we adopt such means as are calculated best to make it widely known. That which is published is of the nature of a fact, an event, or a circumstance. The term is not expressive of either praise or blame. The occurrences of the day are published in newspapers to the general convenience. A treacherous friend will publish a fact which was confided to his keeping. That which we publish is new, that which we advertise may be not absolutely new in itself. To advertise is to draw the attention of others to what it is essential that they should know, or which it concerns them not to neglect.

"The great skill in an *advertiser* is chiefly seen in the style that he makes use of. He is to mention the universal esteem or general reputation of things that were never heard of."—*Tatler.*

"Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public. To forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity."—BLACKSTONE.

ADVICE. COUNSEL.

Both ADVICE (Fr. *avis, opinion; à vis, i.e. ad vīsum, according to what has seemed right*) and COUNSEL (Fr. *conseil*, Lat. *consĭlium*) are given for the practical direction of conduct. Advice is given by one who is, or affects to be,

possessed of superior knowledge. Hence advisers are often official or professional, as being conversant with some particular branch of knowledge or department of affairs, as a legal or medical adviser. Advice concerns the result rather than the means by which it is arrived at. If we have great confidence in the opinion of another, we are content to take his advice and act upon it without inquiring into the grounds of it, which in many cases we might not be competent to understand.

COUNSEL is given by those who are or affect to be of superior wisdom and experience in the general affairs of life. The trained man is qualified to give advice, the sage or wise man to give counsel. Counsel commonly enters more into the reason of things and the grounds of preference for one course of conduct rather than another. Advice is less reciprocal than counsel. Advice is simply given from one to another, and sometimes gratuitously and without being welcome. Counsel is asked for as being felt to be needed. By the very force of the term it is a collective or conjoint act. Many may take counsel together, and it has happened in many such cases that the advice of one has determined the rest. Counsel is good or evil; advice is sound or unsound. Advice should be prompt and confidential, counsel kind and sincere, modest, and without affectation of superiority. Advice is authoritative, counsel sympathetic. Advice is used also in the sense of formal notification, with which we are no farther concerned here than as it shows that the element of information predominates over that of deliberation, which attaches to counsel.

"We may give *advice*, but we cannot give conduct."—FRANKLIN.

(The saying is one of Rochefoucauld's.)

The following is an apt definition of counsel:—

"*Counsel* is where a man saith Do, or do not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it."—HOBBES

ADVISEDLY. DELIBERATELY. PURPOSELY.

He who acts ADVISEDLY (see ADVISE) does so with a full knowledge of the circumstances and consequences of his conduct. He who acts DELIBERATELY (*dēlīberare, de* and *librāre, to weigh*) takes time to weigh the matter. He who acts PURPOSELY (see PURPOSE) has set it before him by a distinct intention. The first cannot plead that he erred through ignorance, nor the second that he was hurried, nor the last that his deed was accidental.

AFFABLE. COURTEOUS. CONDESCENDING. ACCESSIBLE.

AFFABLE (Lat. *affābĭlis*), is literally easy of address. By usage, a superior in whom no pride makes him difficult of access, who is naturally disinclined to shut himself up in his own dignity, is said to be affable. To be affable is to be easy without familiarity, and to be gracious without the air of condescension.

The demeanour of the affable flows from his nature, as that of the COURTEOUS (literally, him who has the manners of *courts*) springs from training and good breeding. Affability is in superiors. Courtesy may be between equals, yet it involves some degree of social rank common to the parties. Being more external to the person than AFFABLE, and of the nature of something won rather than inherent, COURTEOUS admits of a more objective use than affable. An affable disposition; a courteous reception. Courteous expresses no more than the gracefully respectful, affable implies an insinuation of good-will. One might be punctiliously courteous, yet by no means affable. Indeed, a studied courtesy is sometimes substituted for affability in the case of those who wish to keep others at a distance. Courtesy, however, extends to acts, while affability is confined to manner. Affability makes people agreeable, courtesy makes them obliging.

CONDESCENDING (Lat. *condescendĕre, to come down*) is a term which denotes no more than such a stooping to the

condition of inferiors as is compatible with either humility or pride. There is a moral and practical condescension which is in the highest degree virtuous and graceful, as when the strong condescend to the weak, the wise to the ignorant, the bold to the timid, the upright and self-controlled to the defects and infirmities of others; and there is a formal and ceremonious condescension which is compatible with a great amount of pride, carrying with it an assumption of the elevated or meritorious, and is in short an arrogant politeness.

ACCESSIBLE (Lat. *accessĭbĭlis*), as at present employed, denotes a kind of official virtue, a readiness to communicate where communication is desired, especially on matters of business and with persons high in office.

"This led him (Charles) to a grave reserved deportment in which he forgot the civilities and the *affability* that the nation naturally loved, to which they had been long accustomed."—BURNET.

"We cannot omit to observe this courtly, shall I call it, or good quality in him, that he was *courteous* and did seem to study to oblige."—STRYPE.

"Spain's mighty monarch
In gracious clemency does *condescend*
On these conditions to become your friend."
DRYDEN.

AFFAIR. BUSINESS. CONCERN.

There is a loose conversational use of these words in which it may be well to distinguish them, though the two latter are not dignified enough for any high literary connexion. We speak of an AFFAIR (O. Fr. *afaire*, i.e. *à faire*), when we refer to something which has happened without caring to be specific about it, but allude to it in a light and superficial manner. An affair is any fact which personally affects, whether as an occurrence, a duty or obligation, a transaction or employment; and in the plural, AFFAIRS, the aggregate of such things as they interest, affect, or devolve upon, individuals or communities. According to the character so attaching to the idea is the epithet qualifying it. Affairs are trivial or serious, onerous or light, political, pecuniary, domestic, personal, simple or complicated, manageable or mysterious, and the like.

As an affair is that which interests, so a BUSINESS (A. S. *bysig*, *busy*) is that which occupies or employs. An affair is external, but affects persons.

BUSINESS and CONCERN (Fr. *concerner*, Lat. *concernĕre*, *to mix together*) are personal. A business demands the time or engages the attention—a concern excites the regard and touches the welfare. A business is easy or difficult, slight or troublesome, tedious or quickly despatched, and the like. A concern is public or private, and can hardly be otherwise than grave unless we unduly magnify trifles; and may be serious and even momentous. Affairs are said to be administered, business transacted, concerns managed. Men are bound to do their business lawfully and honestly, yet not to allow the affairs of this world to supplant the concerns of the next.

"An *affair* which had no manner of relation to money."—STEELE.

"We may indeed say that our part does not suit us, and that we could perform another better; but this, says Epictetus, is not our business."—ADDISON.

"*Concerns* where truth and honour are engaged."—STEELE.

AFFECT. CONCERN. INFLUENCE. MOVE. TOUCH.

That AFFECTS us (Lat. *affectāre*, *to draw to oneself*) which produces a specific alteration of our condition whether in body or mind. Inanimate as well as animate substances are affected by what produces a different physical state. Our frames are affected by cold and heat as our minds are affected by joy and sorrow, or our circumstances by prosperous and adverse events. Variations of temperature affect the thermometer.

"Incorporal it cannot be, because it (light) sometime *affecteth* the sight of the eye with offence."—RALEIGH.

CONCERN (see above) is applied only to matters of human interest. That concerns us which has a tendency to affect our condition for better or for worse; and conversely we are said to be concerned when we experience the anxiety or eager interest which

things having that tendency are calculated to excite whether on our own account or that of others. That which affects us is of the nature of fact; that which concerns us is of the nature of probability, except when concern is used in the sense of sympathetic interest.

To INFLUENCE (Fr. *influence*, Lat. *influentia*) is to affect in a particular mode, that is, by a gentle penetrative or insinuating power. So we use the term of such forces as being effective are also occult; *e.g.* magnetic influence, planetary influence. In regard to intelligent beings, influence extends beyond states to motives. "He was little affected by the argument," would mean that his state of mind, his opinions, or his feelings, underwent little or no change. "He was little influenced by it," would mean that his acts or resolutions were little likely to be altered in consequence. "He was much concerned at what he heard," would mean that his feelings were wrought upon and his interest enlisted. That which affects usually acts in a direct and uniform manner, that which influences in a manner more indirect and uncertain.

"The fall of a cottage by the accidents of time and weather is almost unheeded, while the ruin of a tower which a neighbourhood hath gazed at for ages with admiration strikes all observers with *concern*."—BISHOP HURD.

"It shews the anxiety of the great men who *influenced* the conduct of affairs at that great event to make the revolution a parent of settlement and not a nursery of future revolutions."—BURKE.

As a moral term, MOVE (Lat. *mŏvēre*) preserves the analogy of its physical applications. The idea of the verb MOVE is, first, that of change of place brought about in the constituent elements of a body or in the whole of it. In that sense movement is opposed to quiescence or rest. But secondly, as any movement which is not vibration only removes from one spot and places on another, in that way movement involves the idea of abandonment and of approximation—a change of place as well as mere unrest. Hence in its moral meaning, to move has a twofold sense; first, to agitate, disturb, or produce emotion, and secondly to persuade or prompt to action. To move is to bring out of a state of indifference or of inaction.

To TOUCH (Fr. *toucher*) bears to MOVE the same analogy in its moral as in its physical use. When we touch we produce an impression, and awaken in sentient creatures a sensibility; when we move we produce an agitation. We are touched first and moved afterwards. A stern judge may be touched by what he sees or hears without being moved from his purpose or decision. One is touched with the tenderer sentiments, moved with the stronger emotions; touched with pity, sympathy, compassion, regret; moved with anger, indignation, hatred, revenge, or with the same things as those by which we are touched, but in a stronger degree. "Touched with pity, he was moved even to tears."

"And in effect there is a strange *movingness*; and if the epithet be not too bold, a kind of heavenly magic to be found in some passages of the Scripture."—BOYLE.

"The last fable shows how *touchingly* the poet argues in love affairs."—ADDISON, *Ovid's Metam.*

AFFECT. ASSUME. PRETEND. These words are here taken as expressing the idea in common of taking to one's self and exhibiting as one's own that which in some way or degree is not so. The terms might in some cases be used interchangeably, as to affect, assume, or pretend surprise; but the ideas expressed by the words would be different.

ASSUME (Lat. *assūmĕre*) is the simplest term. It is to take to one's self something, by way of appropriating it or wearing it as if it fitted and belonged to us. In this way material articles may be assumed if they carry with them any significance as a badge or cognizance. When something morally characteristic is assumed, it is implied that the assumption does not sit naturally upon us; as, when a man assumes an air of indifference, either the feeling is not quite real, or the exhibition of it is forced and exaggerated. In such cases we assume with the view of making an impression upon others.

"Nothing has been more common in all ages than to see faction and ambition *assuming* the mark of religion."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

To AFFECT (see above) denotes a forced, studied, and sustained assumption of something which is more than an external thing, such as may be simply assumed; but some quality, feeling, taste, preference, knowledge, desire, love, habit, custom, mode, style, or demeanour. We affect with the view not only, as in assumption, of impressing others, but of misleading them as to our inner mind or state of feeling. We assume arrogantly, we affect hypocritically; we assume in order to gain an advantage over others, we affect in order to conciliate them. It is commonly pride which leads us to assume, and deference to affect.

"Few know thy value and few taste thy sweets,
Though many boast thy favours, and *affect*
To understand and choose thee for their own." COWPER.

PRETEND (Lat. *prætendĕre*) is literally *to hold out* to observation. It is less demonstrative than ASSUME, and more unreal than AFFECT. One assumes what is not natural, and affects what is not genuine; but one pretends that which, though in itself false, is put forward as true. It aims at deception and at some profit from the fraud, and this not in demeanour only, but specific words. Yet there is another force of the word which comes out in the form of the noun *pretension*, and which is by no means the same as pretence. In this sense to pretend to a thing is to aspire to it. We might say of a man that he has considerable pretensions to learning, without at all meaning that they were deceptive or groundless. In this way pretension is the putting forth of a claim or the assertion of a right, and pretend supposes a justice that ought to be rendered. Pretension thus becomes a synonym with aspiration. One aspires to what one desires to obtain as a lofty acquisition; one pretends in cases where the hope seems justified by one's estimate of one's own worthiness. One aspires in secret, one pretends openly. If we miss the first we grieve, if the second we are humiliated. In the following quotation the twofold aspect of pretend is involved:—

"It is the shallow, unimproved intellects that are the confident *pretenders* to certainty, as if, contrary to the adage, science had no friend but ignorance."—GLANVILL.

AFFECTIONATE. KIND. FOND.

AFFECTIONATE (Lat. *affectiōnem, feeling, of mind or body*) is literally the quality of being, or the tendency to be moved towards an object with tenderness and good-will. It regards in particular some endearing relationship; as we say, an affectionate father, husband, wife, son, daughter, friend. Affection is a natural, instinctive feeling. It has not the reasoning attachment of friendship, nor the ardour of love, but is quite compatible with the first, and may grow into the second. It is kept alive by habitual converse, and is apt to be altogether lost under separation. It may be felt toward the lower animals, and reciprocated by them.

KINDNESS (literally, *a feeling of kin or kind*) belongs rather to natural temperament than specific association. It is possible to be kind to strangers, and to persons generally. The epithet kind qualifies actions; affectionate only feelings and dispositions. Affection is measured by feeling, kindness by treatment. Kindness is often a duty or a virtue where affection would be quite out of place, as from a master to a servant.

FOND (properly, part. of old verb, *fonnen, to be foolish, to dote*) retains much of its etymological character. It expresses the weak, self-indulgent side of affection. If this is carried to the extent of over-indulgence, the object has too much power or influence, and fondness becomes servitude, whether to inanimate things or animate; for fond is employed, unlike the others, of immaterial objects, and especially of occupations, pursuits, pleasures. So characteristic is weakness of the tendency of fondness, that in some connexions the term fond is used as simply equivalent to foolish, as a fond, that is, unfounded imagination—one in which inclination to believe has taken the place of truth. So in Articles of Religion, xxii., "a fond thing, vainly invented."

AFFINITY. Relationship. Consanguinity. Kindred.

Of these, the first stands to the second as species to genus. Relationship (Lat. *rĕlātiōnem, reference*) expresses in the broadest way the union of two things in a third, which is the foundation of the relationship, or as it was called by the schoolmen, "fundamentum relationis."

"Thus in the *relation* of greater and less between two magnitudes, the fundamentum relationis is the fact, that one of the two magnitudes could, under certain conditions, be included in without entirely filling the space occupied by the other magnitude. In the relation of master and servant, the fundamentum relationis is the fact that the one has undertaken, or is compelled to perform certain services for the benefit and at the bidding of the other. Examples might be indefinitely multiplied, but it is already obvious that whenever two things are said to be related, there is some fact or series of facts into which they both enter; and that whenever any two things are involved in some one fact or series of facts, we may ascribe to these two things a mutual *relation* grounded on the fact. Even if they have nothing in common but what is common to all things, that they are members of the universe, we call that a *relation*, and denominate them fellow-creatures, fellow-beings, or fellow-denizens of the universe. But in proportion as the fact into which the two objects enter as parts is of a more special and peculiar, or of a more complicated nature, so also is the relation grounded upon it. And there are as many conceivable *relations* as there are conceivable kinds of fact in which two things can be jointly concerned."—J. S. Mill.

Affinity (Lat. *affĭnĭtātem*) is a kind of relationship, namely that which consists in closeness of agreement, conformity, or connexion, the result of natural and inherent homogeneousness, or similarity. In human and social affairs, Affinity is relationship by marriage, in contradistinction to Consanguinity (Lat. *consanguĭnĭtatem*) or relation by blood. There is an affinity between sounds when they are like in character, or are of the same pitch, or enter into the same chord. So colours and languages have their affinities when they have certain elements in common. In chemistry, affinity is that attraction between heterogeneous particles or bodies which forms compounds. In natural history, affinity is a relationship depending on similarity of structure constituting species or groups. There is an affinity between the husband and wife, in consequence of the marriage tie. It is well if there be also an affinity of sentiment and taste.

"Some have thought the Cameleon's name not unsuitable unto its nature. The nomination in Greek is a little Lion, not so much for the resemblance of shape, as *affinity* of condition."—Brown's *Vulgar Errors*.

"The most universal public *relation* by which men are collected together is that of government, namely, as governors and governed, or in other words, as magistrates and people."—Blackstone.

"Am I not *consanguineous?* Am I not of her blood?"—Shakespeare.

Kindred (A. S. *cyn, kin*) is regarded by Blackstone as virtually identical with consanguinity, when he says:—

"*Consanguinity* or *kindred* is defined by the writers on these subjects to be 'vinculum personarum ab eodem stirpite descendentium,' the connexion or relation of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor."

As the adjective kind expresses the sort of feeling which is prompted by nature among those who belong to the same species, so the adjective kindred expresses that harmony of association which belongs to things of a common descent—(A. S. *cyn, offspring*, and *-rǽden, state or condition*) sympathetic, congenial, kindred spirits. The philanthropist, through fellow-feeling, claims mankind as his kindred. Some words have an etymological affinity, others a kindred signification.

AFFIX. Attach. Apply.

Affix (Lat. *affĭgĕre*, part. *affixus*) is used in a purely external and physical sense, as to affix a placard to a wall; and metaphorically, as to affix a stigma to a person. The notion is that of arbitrarily placing one thing upon another without any amalgamation or unity of the two. The object of affixing is, that one thing may be durably and conspicuously placed upon another. We commonly affix to a surface, which serves as a support and ground of the thing affixed.

A title is affixed to a book, a seal to a document, a name to an idea. In matters of moral and mental association that which is affixed and that to which it is affixed have some permanent connexion with each other. In merely physical processes this may or may not be the case. The seal which is affixed to the parchment goes with the document to give it authenticity. The bill affixed to a door might have answered its purpose equally had it been affixed to a gate-post.

"We see two sorts of white butterflies fastening their eggs to cabbage-leaves, because they are fit aliment for the caterpillars that come of them. Whereas should they *affix* them to the leaves of a plant improper for their food, such caterpillars must needs be lost."—RAY.

ATTACH (Fr. *attacher*) is to connect things that ought, or are intended to go together. One attaches a thing for the purpose of preventing it from separating itself, or becoming separated, or of changing its place beyond certain narrow limits. Morally we are attached by interest and by affection. In such cases, attachment is a bond from which we do not desire to be freed. Physically, we attach by means of some substance or article, such as a hook, a nail, a string. Physically, that which is affixed rests with the other body if stationary, or moves bodily with it if it be in motion. But the thing that is attached may have some freedom of motion, while that to which it is attached may be fixed. Attach involves connexion, but not necessarily contact, as in affix. In regard to the employment of words and ideas, to affix is a primary, to attach a secondary process. If I say I attach a certain meaning to a word, or great importance to an announcement, I do not establish, but only recognize that meaning or importance as already existing. I believe I am right in attributing it. It could only be the force of custom, or of authority, that would affix a definite meaning to a word.

"There is no man but is more *attached* to one particular set or scheme of opinions in philosophy, politics, or religion than he is to another. I mean if he hath employed his thoughts at all about them. The question, then, we should examine is, how came we by those *attachments?*"—MASON.

APPLY (Lat. *applicare, to join on*) is to cause one thing to touch another at many, or all points of contact. We apply the hand to the mouth, a plaster to a sore. It is a purposed and sustained contact. In mental or moral things, there is an idea of congruity and permanent relationship involved in applying. It is to fix closely, to devote specifically, to attribute pointedly, to connect appropriately, to direct personally.

"He that *applied* the words of any language to ideas different to those to which the common use of that country *applies* them, however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by such words be able to convey much of it to others without defining his terms."—LOCKE.

AFFLICTION. DISTRESS. TROUBLE. GRIEF. SORROW.

AFFLICTION (Lat. *afflictiōnem*) is a deep and grievous malady of mind or body, which may or may not be retributive—that is, the consequence of blamable conduct or life. So it is commonly said that man inflicts and God afflicts. The term affliction is employed to express both the state of mind and the event which produced it. The cause of affliction may be momentary or lasting, but the affliction itself is permanent as well as sore. The sudden loss of a friend may produce the affliction of a lifetime. The infliction of pain may of course take place upon any sentient being, but affliction implies that power of reflecting upon the nature and extent of the trouble which is possessed only by reasoning creatures. It is a passive state of prostration, sad, silent, and sustained. It comes from the loss of friends, health, property; and from great deprivations, as of the senses or the limbs.

"I do remember now; henceforth I'll bear
Affliction till it do cry out itself
Enough, enough, and die."
SHAKESPEARE.

DISTRESS (Lat. *districtiōnem, punishment*) may be from a physical or a mental cause. It is in itself more mental than physical. Distress does

not imply the acutest degrees of bodily suffering, and indeed is inapplicable to them. It may be entirely independent of physical pain. It is a painful interference with the mind's calmness and activity, a combined feeling of suffering and helplessness. The crew of a ship in distress may be in physical suffering from want of food and the like; but it is not pain that is primarily expressed by the term, but privation, anxiety, fatigue, exposure, and helplessness. He who is in distress is distracted in mind and uneasy, not knowing whither to turn or how to procure relief. It involves a troubled perplexity of feelings.

"Of all the *distressful* calamities to which man's life is subject, sickness is the most afflictive."—WARBURTON.

TROUBLE (Fr. *troubler, to disturb*) is, as its name expresses, a disturbance of mind, but it is lighter than affliction and distress. Troubles ruffle the smooth current of life and prevent the usual attention to duties. Trouble is opposed to peace. It is a lighter distress. A distress is alleviated by being borne patiently, a trouble may often be got rid of by energy and effort.

"Our people greatly rejoiced of their great good hap to have escaped so many hard events, *troubles*, and miseries as they did in that voyage, and had great cause therefore to praise the Almighty who had so mercifully preserved and delivered them."—HACKLUYT.

GRIEF (Lat. *grăvĕ*, neut. *a heavy thing*) and SORROW (A. S. *sorg, sorh*) are very nearly alike, but GRIEF is the more active and demonstrative of the two. It expresses a poignant state of mental trouble, while sorrow is more still and reflexive and is commonly tinged with regret. It contemplates things as they might have been, and deplores the fact of their occurrence. Being more reflexive than sorrow, it is often found mingled with compassion for others, and with remorse on our own account. Grief is caused by bitter calamities and misfortunes which come to us from outside. Sorrow may be the consequence of our own acts. Sorrow in the last degree is profound; grief is violent. Sorrow mourns; grief cries aloud. The adjective sorry has a much lighter force than grieved. "I am grieved that this should have occurred," is at least an earnest statement. "I am sorry for it" might be said very lightly, as a formal or even an ironical apology. Affliction is sharp and deep, and being prolonged affects the course and character of life. Distress is distracting, embarrassing, severe. Trouble is depressing and burdensome; sorrow, deep and brooding. On the other hand affliction is allayed by time and habit. Troubles pass away, grief subsides, sorrow is soothed and cheered, distress is mitigated.

"*Sorrow* is humble and dissolves in tears,
Make not your Hecuba with fury rage,
And show a ranting *grief* upon the stage."
DRYDEN, *Art of Poetry*.

AFFORD. YIELD. PRODUCE. BEAR.

The tree YIELDS fruit, the mine yields metal, the sea yields fish. (A. S. *geldan, to pay*, and so *to yield*, as, the earth yields produce.) That which a thing yields is that which it surrenders by virtue of its nature and properties. So the tree yields shade as well as fruit. A contented life yields happiness—that is, happiness comes out of it in the regular and natural course of things. It is commonly implied that the thing yielded has some value, and in many cases the yield is in return for something expended in the form, for instance, of money or labour. Ground better tilled will yield the better crop. Money at interest will yield six or seven per cent. The idea in YIELD of giving up in answer to the seeking of another, appears in the following:—

"There he tormenteth her most terribly,
And day and night afflicts with mortal pain,
Because to *yield* him love she doth deny,
Once to me *yold* not to be *yold* again."
SPENSER.

But YIELD is more absolute than AFFORD, which is more relative. The tree yields fruit though none should gather it.

TO AFFORD (O. Eng. *aforthen*, A. S. *ge-forthian, to further*) is to yield in some direction for some end or to some person. "The sea yields fish" means that fish naturally live in it, and so may be got out of it

by the efforts of man to procure them, as valuable and in return for his labour. "The sea affords fish," means that fish represents one of man's natural wants, and that the sea may be made to supply them. That which is yielded is a product or result; that which is afforded is the supply of a demand.

"The quiet lanes of Surrey, leading to no great mart or rendezvous, *afford* calmer retreats on every side than can easily be found in the neighbourhood of so great a town."—GILPIN.

To PRODUCE (Lat. *prŏdŭcĕre, to bring forward or forth*) is to operate as a cause bringing a thing into existence as an effect. So the sea does not produce fish as the vine produces grapes or drunkenness produces misery. It might be admissible to say that the mine produces minerals, but it would be much better to say that it yielded or afforded them, for it is the forces of nature which really produce them, while they are yielded to man's efforts at procuring them, and afforded for their various uses. The spreading tree does not produce shade. This is produced by the interception of the sun's rays. But it affords shade generally and specifically, yields a cool place of repose to the tired labourer lying beneath its branches. That which is afforded or yielded, be the process slow or rapid, is either part of the substance of the original or in close natural connexion with it. That which is produced may have no natural connexion with that which produces it beyond that of cause and effect. Hence produce is often employed of cases in which a considerable interval of time or intermediate causation may intervene between the origin and the result. Things are yielded and afforded to our efforts and desires. They may be produced against our wishes and in spite of all our efforts to prevent them, as a spark in a magazine may produce an explosion and a concussion by which lives are lost. It is as true that vice produces misery as that virtue produces happiness. The character of the thing produced is as various as the character of the causes or uniform antecedent operations preceding it. Like or different causes will produce like or different effects. To produce a thing artificially is only to employ those natural agents with the properties of which experience has made us conversant. To set in motion a train of antecedents is to produce. Hence to produce is a synonym not only with afford and yield, but also with cause.

"White colour can in no manner be explained exclusively by the laws of the *production* of red colour. In any attempt to explain it, we cannot but introduce as one element of the explanation the proposition that some antecedent or other *produces* the sensation of white."—J. S. MILL.

BEAR (A. S. *beran*) is used, as almost all Saxon words are, in the simplest and most familiar, which is commonly the most purely physical reference; and is the plainest synonym of produce. It belongs almost exclusively to the processes of natural generation, as the mother bears children, the tree bears fruit. Less direct bearings are expressed by produce. The plant bears seeds and the seeds produce flowers. The fountain affords or yields, but does not bear nor produce; but may be said to discharge water. BEAR conveys the idea of forming within itself, YIELD of giving from itself, AFFORD of giving to another, PRODUCE of forming through another thing.

"Here dwelt the man divine whom Samos bore." DRYDEN.

AFTER. BEHIND.

AFTER (A. S. *æfter*, a comparative form) respects an order to which two things belong in common: one man comes after another in rank or in a procession. It belongs to the ideas of precedence or antecedence, and subsequence in time or space.

BEHIND (A. S. *behindan*) respects the position in space of two things without any idea of consecutiveness. The letter O comes after the letter D in the alphabet. Behind is only used of physical relationship, except to express inferiority in excellence and in the questionable phrase "behind time." After is opposed to before in the sense of earlier or precedent,

behind to before in the sense of in front of. AFTER has a motive force, BEHIND has not.

"Aha! the Fox, and after him they ran."
CHAUCER.

"In the journey of life some are left *behind* because they are naturally feeble and slow, some because they miss the way, and many because they leave it by choice, and instead of pressing onward with a steady pace, delight themselves with momentary deviation, turn aside to pluck every flower, and repose in every shade."—*Rambler*.

AGGRESSOR. ASSAILANT.

The latter is a stronger term than the former. The AGGRESSOR (Lat. *aggressōrem, aggrĕdior, I assail*) is simply the person who begins the quarrel. This may be by a strong act of provocation yet short of attack.

The ASSAILANT (Fr. *assaillant*, part. of *assaillir*) commits the first overt act of violence.

"Self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against *aggressors*, but many times also to prosecute such and only such as are wicked and dangerous."—WOOLASTON.

"An *assailant* of the Church."—MACAULAY.

AGITATION. TREPIDATION. TREMOR. EMOTION.

Of these TREMOR (which is a Latin word *trĕmor, a shaking*, from *trĕmĕre, to tremble*) is a term of purely physical meaning, though the state may have been induced by a mental cause of excitement. Alarm, fear, anxiety, eagerness, or what is familiarly termed nervousness, may produce tremor in persons; or in material substances it may be the result of concussion or any agitating force. The whole frame may be in tremor or some part of it only, as there may be a tremor of the voice.

"Then the earthquakes mentioned by Josephus shook the whole land of Judea; and the disaster at Nicomedia, as Marcellinus informs us, was occasioned by a *tremor* which went over Macedonia."—WARBURTON.

TREPIDATION (Lat. *trĕpĭdātionem*) represents the moral aspect of that which is physically represented by tremor. It is not applicable like tremor to parts, but only to the whole person. The Latin *trĕpĭdāre* meant to tremble or be agitated from some mental cause which might be hurry or fear. The former English use of trepidation was co-extensive with this Latin use, but the meaning of bustle has vanished, and that of agitation from terror alone survives.

"The irresolute repugnance of some, the hypocritical submission of others, the ferocious insolence of Cromwell, the rugged brutality of Harrison, and the general *trepidation* of fear and wickedness, would, if some proper disposition could be contrived, make a picture of unexampled variety and irresistible instruction."—*Idler*.

AGITATION (Lat. *agĭtātiōnem*) is that disturbance of mind which shows itself in a perturbation of demeanour. Yet agitation enforces the manner as trepidation weakens it. When used physically, agitation is the excess of tremor. The light air causes a tremor of the woods. The storm agitates the sea. Trepidation of manner is the result of one feeling, agitation may be the result of many conflicting feelings. It is the inquietude and restlessness of the soul. It may come of external occurrences or internal movements, as of grief, hope, desire, disappointment, or any passion.

"We all must have observed that a speaker *agitated* with passion, or an actor who is indeed strictly an imitator, are perpetually changing the tone and pitch of their voice as the sense of their words varies."—SIR W. JONES.

AGREE. ACCORD. COINCIDE. CONCUR.

Of these the most comprehensive is AGREE (Fr. *agréer, i.e.* from *à gré*; Lat. *grātum, agreeable*). The word expresses any and every sort of congruity of relationship. For instance, all harmony in taste, fact, form, statement, feeling, appearance, motive, purpose, or properties, may be expressed by the word agreement. All statements are reduced to the two forms of affirmative and negative propositions, and no more comprehensive term can be found for them than to say that they express the agreement or disagreement of ideas. So that the remainder of these synonyms may be regarded as expressing some character or mode of agreement.

"When we possess ourselves with utmost security of the demonstration

the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones does necessarily *agree*, and is inseparable from the three triangles."—LOCKE.

ACCORD (Fr. *accorder*, Lat. *accordāre*) may have been influenced by the idea of the Latin *chorda*, a cord, in addition to its genuine derivation; and so is sometimes used in the simple sense of musical harmony. As a synonym with the above, it denotes a general agreement, such as may be determined by taste and observation rather than by scientific exactitude. Things are not so much demonstrated as felt to accord. Two equal triangles would be said to agree but not to accord, except in some non-mathematical way, as, if they were put in as evidence. Accordance is an undefined agreement in general character and spirit, and in the impression produced. Opinions agree; feelings, sentiments, narratives, descriptions, statements, impressions, accord; a resemblance which, without being exact, is considerable, would be sufficient to constitute accordance. Things agree in their own nature, they accord by virtue of similar impressions which they make upon us, or a common relationship which they suggest to our minds. Accordance in things excludes that which is discrepant, and in persons that which is dissentient.

"My heart *accordeth* with my tongue."
SHAKESPEARE.

COINCIDE (Lat. *coincidĕre, to fall in together*) is an analogous term. Things which coincide fall in together, as it were, geometrically, as if covering the same space. This may be mere matter of accident, and, indeed, the idea of chance is expressed in the noun coincidence if it be used without qualification. Persons do not coincide, though their wishes or plans may. Coincidence may be of time as well as space, as one event or date in a particular history may coincide with another. As feeling verifies accordance, so observation verifies coincidence. As things agree in nature and accord in character, so they coincide in time and space, coincidence by itself involving no unity or community of nature.

"If a rational being as such is under an obligation to obey reason, and this obedience or practice of reason *coincides* with the observations of truth, these things plainly follow."—WOOLASTON.

CONCUR (Lat. *concurrĕre, to run together*) is applied as coincide is not, directly to persons as well as things. Concurrence is a meeting together or, as it were, confluence of forces, causes, motives, influences, sentiments or opinions, wills. Things that agree are something in common, things that concur do something in common, things that coincide may have nothing in common (beyond their coincidence). Concurrence in things is confluence of causation and eventuality. Concurrence in persons is coincidence of will or opinion voluntarily expressed, as when a judge says that he concurs in the judgment of his brother judge. It then denotes union of judgment from an independent quarter. Judgments, statements, testimony, are concurrent as moving parallel to and falling in with something else (for such is the twofold idea of concurrence, viz., parallelism and coincidence) and so tending to support the same point.

"The Egyptians, as we are assured by the *concurrent* testimony of antiquity, were among the first who taught the soul survived the body and was immortal."—WARBURTON.

AGREEABLE. PLEASANT. PLEASING. CONGENIAL.

All these terms are predicable both of persons and things. AGREEABLE is not so strong a term as PLEASANT (Fr. *plaisant*). The agreeable is congenial to us, the pleasant, as the word denotes, executes pleasure. In short, the pleasant is a more active degree of the agreeable, and like it is applicable to things both moral and physical.

PLEASING differs from pleasant in not applying to matters purely physical. A fruit of pleasant, not of pleasing, taste. So we apply pleasant to things in their abstract character and relations—a pleasing thought, a pleasing variety, contrast, succession, aspect, uniformity, alternation, and so

worth. Again, pleasant belongs rather to the effect specifically produced, pleasing, to the power of producing it. A pleasant manner is one which we find agreeable, a pleasing manner one which people in general would be likely to think so. Where they are applied to the same object, PLEASING is more vivid than PLEASANT, but less extended. The manners, the countenance, make persons pleasing; the mind, disposition, humour, conversation, make them pleasant. Wit, humour, geniality, and cheerfulness of nature, make men agreeable; complaisance and the absence of affectation make women agreeable. Localities are pleasant as gratefully affecting the senses. Prospects are pleasing as forming combinations such as artists would enjoy. Generally speaking, that which gratifies the senses is pleasant; that which satisfies the mind, taste, judgment, or imagination, is pleasing. Moreover, pleasing is active, pleasant has an almost passive sense. That is pleasing which imparts pleasure. That is pleasant which comports with pleasure, or in which pleasure may be found. A pleasant book is such before it is opened or read; those who read it will find pleasing narratives and descriptions.

The CONGENIAL (Lat. *con-, together, gĕnĭālis, genial, pleasant*) is that which is agreeable, pleasant, or pleasing, from its natural suitableness to individual taste, habit, temperament, or even the passing mood of the hour.

"If *congeniality* of tastes could have made a marriage happy, that union should have been thrice blessed."—MOTLEY.

"There is great pleasure in being innocent because that prevents guilt and trouble. It is *pleasant* to be virtuous and good, because that is to excel many others. It is *pleasant* to grow better, because that is to excel ourselves. Nay, it is *pleasant* even to mortify and subdue our lusts, because that is victory. It is *pleasant* to command our appetites and passions, and to keep them in due order within the bounds of reason and religion, because this is a kind of empire. This is to govern."—TILLOTSON.

"Pym's speech was esteemed full of weight, reason, and *pleasingness*, and so affectionate it was that it gained pity and remorse in the generality." — WOOD, *Ath.*

AGREEMENT. CONTRACT. COVENANT. COMPACT. BARGAIN.

AGREEMENT (see AGREE) expresses in the broadest manner the consent of individuals or parties, formally or informally expressed by word or writing. To agree is to come to terms.

"And thus the covenant that ye made with death shall be disannulled, and your *agreement* that ye made with hell shall not stand."—*Bible*, 1539.

A CONTRACT (Lat. acc. masc. *contractum, an agreement, contract*) is a binding agreement between individuals, formally written and executed. To contract is to reduce terms to writing.

"It is impossible to see the long scrolls in which every *contract* is included, with all their appendages of seals and attestations, without wondering at the depravity of those beings who must be restrained from violation of promise by such formal and public evidences."—JOHNSON.

The COVENANT (O. Fr. *convenant*, and *covenant;* from *convenir, to agree*) is a contract or item of a contract signed, sealed, and delivered. In technical usage the verb contract has reference to a complex transaction; covenant to a single act. For example, I contract to build a house of such a character, according to such plans, within such a time, for such a sum. I covenant that I will pay a sum of money before a certain time.

"A *covenant* to do any action at a certain time or place is then dissolved by the covenantor when that time cometh, either by the performance or by the violation."—HOBBS.

A COMPACT (Lat. *compăcisci*, part. *compactus, to make a compact*), unlike contract and covenant, may be among many persons or parties, while contract and covenant are between two. It may be entirely informal, and is generally grounded on the word passed, as when an association enters into a compact to preserve secrecy.

"Wedlock is described as the indissoluble *compact*."—MACAULAY.

Compact belongs not to ordinary social agreements, for the security of which the law makes provision.

BARGAIN (Fr. *barguigner, to haggle*, L. Lat. *barcaniare;* LITTRÉ) is confined to trade, or at least

and taking. The bargain is so far informal or not legally binding, but only binding in honour. The process and the result of debating the terms of transfer are both called bargains. When the terms of a bargain are definitely settled, the parties come to an agreement; but it is often found necessary to keep persons to enter into a contract, and to go through the complete process of a covenant.

"It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business."—ADAM SMITH.

AIM. OBJECT. END. VIEW. SCOPE.

The AIM (O. Fr. *aesmer;* Lat. *æstĭmāre, to estimate, appraise*) is the immediate, the END (A. S. *ende*) the ultimate object.

VIEW (Fr. *vue*) denotes a definite though wide purpose, and, inasmuch as it signifies such contemplation as has speculation for its purpose, bears the meaning of general opinion or judgment; especially in the plural.

SCOPE (Gr. *σκοπός, an aim*) is wider still, and stands to speculative purpose as view to speculative opinion. It combines the idea of range with that of aim. Some persons aim at amassing a fortune as a step to rank; with others wealth is itself the end. The aim is the object viewed in connexion with the person seeking to attain it. The speaker or writer will sometimes eliminate superfluous matter as not falling within the scope of his treatise or remarks. The framer of a legal document on behalf of a client in endeavouring to give technical validity and precision to his wishes will naturally ask whether in that shape the document meets his views. Our views are often better felt than expressed or analyzed, so that it is quite possible to entertain imperfect and vague views. The aim and the object are clearly recognized. The end is the most fixed: it is the point that one desires to reach. One follows the routes which one believes to lead to it, and makes efforts to arrive at it. The view is less distinct. It is that which one wishes to compass, and takes the most suitable measures to carry out.

The OBJECT (Lat. *objectāre, to throw against, oppose*) is the more definite. It is that which we desire to attain, and adopt the requisite means for securing. A good prince has no other object in his government than to make the country a flourishing one in arts, sciences, justice, and material wealth. He has the happiness of the people in view. One proposes an end; one holds views; one aims at an object. Reason would forbid us to have unattainable ends, chimerical views, or worthless objects. If I have just views and honest aims, I propose to myself an object which will conduct me to the end of my exertions.

"Vain hopes, vain *aims*, inordinate desires." MILTON.

"It ought not to be the leading *object* of anyone to become an eminent metaphysician, mathematician, or poet, but to render himself happy as an individual."—STEWART.

"The chief *end* or happiness of a thing."—BP. WILKINS.

"Not present good or ill, the joy or curse,
But future *views* of better or of worse."
POPE.

"The main *scope* and design of all divine revelation hath been the gradual discovery of this great mystery of the mediation."—SCOTT.

AIR. MANNER. MIEN. DEMEANOUR. BEARING.

AIR (Lat. *aër*, which, like *spīrĭtus*, came to mean *disposition*) is in this connexion taken to denote the general unanalyzed impression produced by a person. Anything which by its appearance suggests certain moral or mental associations, may be said to have an air. A certain expression in words, for instance, may wear a legal or logical air, that is, it seems as if it would be, so to speak, at home in law or logic. Personally, the air pervades the whole individual, and is suggestive of his associations, or his condition of mind. He has the air of a gentleman or a common person; a confident or a bashful air. It is independent of movement, or at least may be expressed in the slightest movements, and strikes an observant person at the first glance. It is the

manifestation of habitual character. It enters into all he does, and is the spirit or way in which he does it. In those things of which it can be predicated, it is the character which comprises all other peculiarities in detail. When all has been described in an apartment, for instance, it remains to be said whether it has an air of comfort or discomfort, poverty or wealth, a cheerful or a gloomy air. In persons the air is so naturally theirs as to seem to have been born with them. It is the composite result and effect of all that the person is in body and mind—countenance, figure, bearing, action, disposition, feeling.

MIEN (Fr. *mine*) is of somewhat variable usage. It is spoken sometimes of the countenance, sometimes of the figure, even including the dress; and sometimes of these as expressive of a state of mind, as, a dejected mien. It represents the state of the person at the time, and is susceptible of alteration; while AIR is inseparable. A change of circumstances may change the whole mien of a man, but nobility will wear a certain air even in rags.

"It is certain that married persons who are possessed with a mutual esteem, not only catch the *air* and way of talk from one another, but fall into the same traces of thinking and liking."—*Spectator.*

The term MIEN is used by Boyle in the sense of expression of the eyes:—

"I observed in her eyes a *mien*, a vivacity and sprightliness."

And by Gray in the sense of attitude and gesture:—

"With thundering voice and threatening *mien*." *Hymn to Adversity.*

The MANNER (Fr. *manière*) is the regulation of the movements in social intercourse. In its narrowest sense it is synonymous with mode or way of doing, and in that sense is considered elsewhere. The meaning under consideration is more fully expressed by the plural, *manners*. In this sense manner is the expression of that feeling which is requisite to the very existence of polite society—the outward token of self-restraint and consideration of others which civilized intercourse demands, and without which it could not be conducted. Good manners are an insinuation of good-will. Bad manners imply its absence or its opposite. They are influenced by training and education. The manner of another may be imitated by clever mimicry. The mien is less easily imitated, and might require appliances of art in costume, &c. The air is not to be imitated at all. It is the unconscious outcome of the nature. Manner is graceful or ungraceful; manners polite or rude.

"The boy is well fashioned, and will easily fall into a graceful *manner*."—STEELE.

MANNERS has a yet wider meaning when employed of society or communities. The manners of a person ought to conform to the rules and customs of good society. The manners of a people ought to conform to rules of right morals. Burke must have been speaking of manners in the widest sense, as personal and public, when he said:—

"*Manners* are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us by a constant, steady, uniform, inevitable operation, like that of the air we breathe in."

Compare the Lat. *mōrēs.*

DEMEANOUR (O. Fr. *démener, to conduct or manage*) is a more pointed and specific term. It is the manner as specifically influenced by the disposition and feelings of the occasion. One gives one's self an air, one affects a manner, one wears a mien, one exhibits a demeanour. It is that sustained bearing which persons assume consciously or unconsciously, as fit and appropriate, or called for—as in the case of the demeanour of a judge on the bench, of a victor to his captive, of a friend to a friend, or an enemy. Slight changes of feeling may affect the manner. A change of mind or opinion in regard to one with whom one had associated familiarly will alter one's whole demeanour towards him. A manner has to be studied, a demeanour regulated. A good air impresses; a good manner, or good manners, engage. An unpleasing impression produced by a lofty air may be afterwards dissipated by a good manner,

In the plural, airs is always used disparagingly, as equivalent to petty affectations and assumptions. Manners which sit well enough when they are easy, become ridiculous when they betray effort at affecting them. Manners are the test by which society judges and prefers. It has been said that a disagreeable manner will seem to make even virtue, talent, and good conduct intolerable.

"Their *demeaning* of themselves when they were come to the highest or thrown down to the lowest degree of state."—NORTH, *Plutarch.*

BEARING (A. S. *béran, to bear or carry*) is a simpler word than the French air, manner, and demeanour. The bearing is commonly taken to mean the carriage of the person in regard to circumstances, as the demeanour is in regard to other persons. The monarch on his way to the scaffold has shown a composed and royal bearing, though he may have preserved almost entire silence. The bearing is the looking of the character, and the sustaining of the part. It is the manner under circumstances which put it to the test.

"High of *berynge*."—WICLIF.

AIR. ATMOSPHERE.

These terms both express that fluid which we breathe, and which surrounds our earth. They differ in the aspects under which they are viewed. The AIR (Lat. *aër*) is the popular and conversational term. The ATMOSPHERE (*ἀτμός, vapour,* and *σφαῖρα, a sphere*) is the more scientific. The air is that which we breathe, which fans our cheeks, in which the birds fly about. It is keen or mild, clear or thick. The atmosphere is the same thing, as it surrounds our planet. It is compressible, ponderable, and the like, has a certain density, and is analyzable into oxygen and nitrogen gases.

ALARM. TERROR. FEAR. FRIGHT. CONSTERNATION. TREPIDATION. AWE. DREAD. PANIC. APPREHENSION.

ALARM (It. *all' arme*, a cry, "*to arms!*") retains the characteristic suddenness expressed by the words from which it is derived. It is first, the summons to self-defence consequent on a common danger; then any sound or other indication which may have such effect of warning; and finally the feeling consequent upon such a signal. The characteristic of alarm is suddenness, and the appearance of some phenomenon which is indicative of danger. This may be for others or for ourselves, or for both together. Alarm by no means implies an overwhelming or incapacitating fear. It may even arouse to self-defence. The distinct suggestion of an indistinct danger belongs to alarm. In the case of an alarm of fire we comprehend clearly the character of the danger without as yet knowing the extent of it.

"All men think all men mortal but themselves,
Themselves when some *alarming* shock of fate
Strikes through their wounded hearts the sudden dread." YOUNG.

TERROR (Lat. *terrōrem*) is an overpowering and confusing sense of danger. It tends, not like alarm, to arm, but to disarm us, and put us to hazardous flight. Under the influence of terror we fly from we know not what, to we know not where. Yet the object which excites terror may be distinct enough. It is an agitation which is the direct influence and effect produced by the exciting cause of the terror, which, if excessive, incapacitates us; if short of this, prompts us to escape. Things slight but suggestive may cause alarm. Magnitude and power belong to things that excite terror. It may be reasonable, but it is not suggested or governed by reason. Robinson Crusoe was alarmed when he saw the footprint on the sand. The sudden thunderclap inspires terror. One is struck or filled with alarm, seized with terror. Alarm rouses us, terror makes us tremble. A man of great strength and savage disposition would, but for the protection of the laws, be the terror of his neighbourhood.

"Through the stern throat of terror-breathing war." DRAYTON.

FEAR (A. S. *fær, a sudden danger*) is the generic term which comprises the rest. It is the natural feeling produced by the instinct of self-pre-

servation, at the actual nearness or supposed nearness of the dangerous, or, in a milder way, the odious. In one sense fear is a passion. In another it is an intellectual state, and the latter is again actual or hypothetical. Hence there may be said to be three kinds of fear, of which the following would be examples. 1. The fear of a savage beast. 2. The fear of the cold. 3. The fear of the consequences of exposure to cold. The first is produced immediately by an impression upon the senses. The second is the result of association. The third of reasoning by anticipation. Thus the feeling of fear is commensurate with, and runs parallel to, man's intellectual faculty of apprehending the presence of danger, superadding to the animal instincts a power of apprehension peculiarly his own.

"*Fear* is a painful sensation produced by the immediate apprehension of some impending evil."—COGAN.

When the nearness of danger is rather speculative than manifest, it gives rise to the feeling of APPREHENSION (Lat. *apprehensionem, a grasping with the mind*), the third kind of fear illustrated above. It is the intellectual consciousness of possible danger, and is therefore the lowest or least energetic form of fear. Indeed, the idea of fear at all is only incidental to the term, though usage has made it the most prominent. As we apprehend coming pleasure as well as coming pain, the term apprehension might, consistently with its etymology, have expressed hope as well as fear; but custom, which is the arbiter of speech, the *norma loquendi*, has decreed it otherwise. We may fear persons; we apprehend only occurrences, whether actions or events, or the results of either.

"The pain of death is most in *apprehension.*" SHAKESPEARE.

FRIGHT (A. S. *fyrhtu, fright*) is the sudden confusion of the senses by an external appearance, which produces in an instant an unreflecting fear. It is an instantaneous and excessive perturbation. It paralyzes and takes complete possession of the mind. It makes people stand aghast. It shows itself in the rigid posture of the body, and the dazed stare of the countenance.

"When lo! the doors burst open in a trice,
And at their banquet terrified the mi̇ee.
They start, they tremble in a deadly *fright*,
And round the room precipitate their flight." FRANCIS, *Horace.*

CONSTERNATION (Lat. *consternationem*) is that state of powerlessness which is the combined result of terror and amazement, the latter, however, predominating. It seizes the mind, benumbs the reasoning powers, and is a kind of intellectual fright, and may be produced by what we learn as well as by what we see or hear. For further remarks, see the article SURPRISE.

PANIC (*Πᾶνϊκόν δεῖμα, panic fear*, any sudden unaccountable terror being ascribed to Pan, from his having been supposed to have struck terror into the Persians at the battle of Marathon) is commonly taken to denote that sort of fear which is at once sudden, indefinite, and contagious among a multitude, though sometimes used also in reference to an individual in the sense of a wild and unaccountable fear. A panic is a fantastic fear—a fright without any external cause accounting for it.

"*Consternation:* This species of fear is a strong foreboding of tremendous evils, which are likely to follow misfortunes which have already taken place."—COGAN.

"But the serpent said unto Adam, Tush! this is but a *panick* fear in you, Adam. You shall not so surely die as you conceit."—H. MORE.

"The first author of it (the general shout) was Pan, Bacchus' lieutenant-general, in his Indian Expedition, where being encompassed in a valley with an army of enemies far superior to them in number, he advised the god to order his men in the night to give a general shout, which so surprised the opposite army that they immediately fled from their camp; whence it came to pass that all sudden fears impressed upon men's spirits without any just reason, were called by the Greeks and Romans *panick* terrors."—POTTER'S *Greece.*

ALERTNESS. ALACRITY. AGILITY. ACTIVITY. BRISKNESS. NIMBLENESS.

ALERTNESS (It. *all' erta, on the watch*) and ALACRITY (Lat. *ălacri-tatem*) very nearly resemble each

other. Alertness comes of natural or constitutional promptitude. He is alert who is eagerly vigilant, whose interest in his position and circumstances is such as to render him alive to the possibility of occurrences that may affect them. Alacrity comes rather from the impulse of the will set upon a particular movement. This may be on one's own behalf or another's. So one not remarkable for alertness might show alacrity in complying with the request of another.

"The mountain torrents on every side rushed down the hills in notes of various cadence as their quantities of water, the declivities of their fall, their distances, or the intermission of the blast brought the sound fuller or fainter to the ear, which organ became now more *alert*."—GILPIN'S *Tour*.

The ideas of alacrity are humorously contradicted in the following:—

"The rogues slighted me into the river with as little remorse as they would have drowned a blind bitch's puppies fifteen in the litter; and you may know by my size that I have a kind of *alacrity* of sinking."—SHAKESPEARE.

AGILITY (Lat. *ăgĭlĭtātem*) denotes physical activity, as in the monkey, the runner, the acrobat, or the gymnast. It is the product of corporeal vigour and lightness of frame. It involves flexibility of the body and limbs.

NIMBLE (A. S. *nĕmal, niman, to catch, seize*) has, contrary to the usual order, been transferred from the mental to the bodily capacities. It meant quick of apprehension, then handy, adroit. It is now confined to the agile use of the feet in particular.

"He that before wholly attended upon his body to make it excel in strength or *agility*, that he might contend victoriously in the Olympic games, then made it his business to improve and advance his soul in knowledge and virtue."—BATES, *Immortality of the Soul*.

"Ovid ranged over Parnassus with great *nimbleness* and *agility*."—ADDISON.

ACTIVITY (Lat. *activitatem*), having a derivation in common with agility, is applied to both body and mind, and denotes such a general combination of life and movement as readily meets the practical business of life. The active man has in the physical sense a tendency to the use of his body from inherent life and strength and a dislike of sedentariness; in the moral sense a love of employment and a dislike of remaining unemployed. Alertness and alacrity are shown on specific occasions, though they belong to certain characters; but agility and activity are permanent qualities.

"Man is an *active* creature. He can not be long idle."—HALES.

BRISKNESS (Welsh, *brysg, quick, nimble*) is that liveliness of mind which shows itself in quickness of manner and movement; a constitutional alertness shown in the minor requirements of life, and in matters of recreation no less than in matters of duty. Briskness is the outcome of vivacity, as alertness of vigilance, activity of ardour, and alacrity of willingness.

"*Brisk* toil alternating with ready ease."
WORDSWORTH

ALL. WHOLE. EVERY. EACH.

These are not so much synonyms as words employed in kindred ways on which it may be well to remark.

ALL (A. S. *eal*) is collective. EVERY (i.e. *ever-each*; A. S. *æfre, ever*; *ælc, each*) is distributive and collective. EACH (A. S. *ælc*) is distributive and individual. ALL regards a body in its numerical totality, whole in its quantitative totality. "All men" is equivalent to the whole human race. EVERY implies first a class, and then the separate members of it dealt with exhaustively. EACH implies first a class and then the separate members dealt with one by one.

EACH denotes things taken severally, EVERY describes them taken singly. Besides these distinctions, EACH relates to two or more individuals, EVERY always to more than two.

"Whose serious muse inspires him to explain
That all we think and all we act is vain."
PRIOR.

"*Every* thing is endowed with such a natural principle whereby it is necessarily inclined to promote its own preservation and well-being."—WILKINS, *Natural Religion*.

"Let's *each* one send unto his wife,
And he whose wife is most obedient

To come at once when he doth send for her
Shall win the wager which we will propose."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Upon this question, what supported or kept up this chain, would it be a sufficient answer to say that the first or lowest link hung upon a second or that next above it; the second, or rather the first and second together, upon the third; and so on *ad infinitum?* for what holds up the whole?"—WOOLASTON.

But ALL, like WHOLE and unlike EVERY and EACH, is used of quantitative totality. It is, however, only of mental subjects that it is so used. In that case, as whole is the sum of the parts, so all is the sum of the species. "All hope is lost," means hope of every kind. "The whole idea is false," would mean that no portion of it was true.

ALLEGIANCE. LOYALTY.

ALLEGIANCE (older form, *allegeaunce;* SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.: a-, i.e.* Lat. *ad, to,* and O. Fr. *ligance, homage*) is the recognition of a binding relationship toward a superior, and so a principle of action; while LOYALTY (Fr. *loyal*) is a personal sentiment of attachment to an individual ruler (Fr. *loi, law*). Allegiance has been extended to apply to parties, principles, systems, and causes. It is evident, however, that personal relationship is involved in these. Allegiance might be to any government, as, *e.g.* to a republican form of it. Loyalty is even applicable to relationships of minor superiority, as, *e.g.* to leadership of a party, or even of friend to friend. It carries with it in that case the ideas of pure, frank, and generous deference, consent, and support rendered at once, without compulsion and without effort. Allegiance conveys the idea of formally professed or sworn obedience. A wife bears loyalty, though not allegiance, to her husband, on account of her equality with him.

"Hear me, recreant, on thine *allegiance* hear me." SHAKESPEARE.

"Unhappy both, but *loyal* in their loves."
DRYDEN.

ALLIANCE. LEAGUE. CONFEDERACY. ASSOCIATION. PARTNERSHIP. COMBINATION.

These terms express in common the idea of union and communion among persons. They vary in implying a different character and purpose for such unions.

ALLIANCE (Fr. *alliance; allier, to ally;* Lat. *alligare, to bind to*) is literally the state of being bound. It is applicable to individuals, families, states, and communities or parties. Alliances are voluntarily sought. Alliance between persons is for friendship, mutual protection, or assistance. It is in this case presumed to be honourable. When between families, it involves union by marriage, and the consideration or influence of the houses so allied. When between States, it is for purposes offensive or defensive, or both; when between parties or communities, it is dictated by policy, as an alliance between Church and State.

"Adrastus soon with gods averse shall join
In due *alliance* with the Theban line."
POPE.

LEAGUE (Fr. *ligue*) is from the same root (Lat. *ligare, to bind*). It attaches men to some common cause or principle; and, as leagues are generally self-constituted by the inferior or weaker for protection against the superior or stronger, their mode of constitution and action is irregular. Hence there is often attached to league the idea of self-interest in predominance. Identity of interest will even bind together persons who would never otherwise have associated, in an almost unnatural league.

"And let there lie
'Twixt us and them no *league,* no amity."
DENHAM.

A CONFEDERACY (Lat. *confœdĕrātus, bound together by a covenant*) is a formal and covenanted compact. As we naturally mistrust secrecy in others, we give to confederacy between nations an honourable meaning, but confederacy among individuals is a synonym with conspiracy. A confederacy politically may be regarded as the union of several independent leagues. For its relation to individuals, see CABAL. The league is less comprehensive and less permanent than the confederacy. The States of the American union are in permanent confederacy. The Cove-

nanters in Scotland were to Calvinism what the League in France was to Catholicism.

"The Grecian Commonwealth, while they maintained their liberty, were the most heroic *confederacy* that ever existed, they were the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men."—HARRIS, *Hermes*.

ASSOCIATION (Lat. *associāre, to associate*, verb act.) is in its full etymological application the most comprehensive of all, inasmuch as all involve the idea of association. But in common usage an association is something of a lighter and less lasting character than the others. It is often such an union as is kept alive merely by the spirit of union brought to bear upon a temporary object. It will be more or less permanent, according to the end which it proposes. Some associations quickly achieve their end, and are at once dissolved. Some are for the purpose of common work and continuous employment, as an association for investigating the geology, botany, or archæology of a district. In some cases the association, recognizing a permanent end, assumes an organization, and calls itself a society.

"In my yesterday's paper I proposed that the honest men of all parties should enter into a kind of *association* for the defence of one another."—ADDISON.

PARTNERSHIP is that association of two or more persons which is based on a community of personal interests, and which must be secured by more or less formal sanctions. In this sense man and wife enter into partnership. When extended beyond this it relates to matters of gain and profit in commercial dealing. It involves the joint employment of money, goods, labour, skill, or any one or more of these, with a view to a communication of proceeds.

"In this *partnership* all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the *partnership* has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion."—BURKE.

COMBINATION, in its fullest sense, belongs to inanimate things, as forces, circumstances, substances, ideas. Combination is a species of connexion. (Lat. *combīnāre, con-* and *bīni, a pair*). As applied to persons, it tends, like league, to an unfavourable or unlawful sense. It is the association of many persons in private for the purpose of some object desired in common. For the exact idea of combination generally, see CONNECT. As lawful purposes can in well-regulated communities be commonly compassed by ordinary means, combination conveys the idea of conspiracy or union against some existing power not altogether peaceful or honourable. The term, however, admits being so qualified as to neutralize this force. A union for a good purpose, as in the cause of humanity and science, is not spoken of in an unqualified manner as a combination, though persons may combine in it.

"A solemn *combination* shall be made
Of our dear souls." SHAKESPEARE.

Alliances, leagues, and confederacies admit of every degree of formality and solemnity in their sanctions. The bonds of relationship and of friendship, the advantages of superior knowledge and experience, and the assurance of assistance in time of need are the ordinary motives to alliances. The object of a league is ordinarily the reduction of a common enemy, or a defence against his attacks. It is an union of force and design to carry out a particular scheme or enterprise in the hope of reaping the fruit of it as against another. A confederacy is an union based on mutual interest and support. League and confederacy are employed only of persons and powers, alliance also of things, as the alliance of the principles of the world with those of the Gospel, or of the efforts of art with those of nature. Alliances are for the great, the powerful, and the healthy; confederations for those under trouble, or oppression, or weakness by their littleness; leagues for the designing and malicious. An alliance is sought for the sake of satisfaction; confederation for action, league for victory, success, or gain; association for entertainment and useful occupation. The life of alliance is harmony; of confederation, concert; of league, self-interest; of association, a common spirit; of com-

bination, a common end. The alliance unites. The association brings together. The confederation constitutes. The combination co-ordinates. The partnership yokes. The league binds. Friendship will form an alliance; patriotism a confederation; sympathy an association; policy a partnership; discontent a league. The wise ally themselves. The prudent confederate themselves. The congenial associate themselves. The oppressed league themselves.

ALLOT. APPOINT. DESTINE. APPORTION. ASSIGN.

To ALLOT (Fr. *allotir*, an old law term: LITTRÉ) is to give as a lot. We may allot to one or to many. To APPORTION is to allot according to proportion (Lat. *portiōnem, a portion*). Allotment determines the thing itself, apportionment determines the quantity of it. Allotment is used only of things, not of persons, except where the personality is taken no account of, as to allot certain troops to a district. Allotment is more arbitrary than apportionment, for allotment may be of different things, while apportionment is of different assignments from the same stock. It has pleased Divine Providence not only to apportion wealth unequally to the rich, but to allot riches to some and poverty to others. Apportionment is regulated by a principle of distribution, allotment by the will of him who allots.

To APPOINT (L. Lat. *appunctāre, to arrange, settle*) is to assign a particular thing in a particular way for a particular purpose. The origin and force of the word, however, is to be traced, not to the Latin, but to the French. The French "point" was used in the sense of condition, arrangement, turn, plight, case. Hence the L. Lat. *appunctāre, to determine or arrange a controversy*. Hence our own expression that a remark is to the point, and that an establishment is well-appointed. To appoint is specifically to arrange, to select, and apply to a purpose in hand. Both persons and things are appointed, but in either case it is in reference to some purpose, work, or end. I allot from a sense of fitness; I appoint as part of an arrangement. To allot is in some sense to give; to appoint is to fix only. Hence there are many cases in which they would not be jointly employable. If I say I appoint a time for meeting, I mean I select and assign it towards the purposes of the transaction. If I say I allot it, I mean that I take it as a portion of the time at my disposal, and give it to the business in hand. If I say that I apportion it, I mean that I give it feeling that I give as much as I ought. We should allot judiciously, apportion fairly, appoint precisely.

"As no man can excel in everything, we must consider what part is *allotted* to us to act in the station in which Providence hath placed us, and to keep to that."—MASON.

"Man hath his daily work of body or mind
Appointed, which declares his dignity,
And the regard of heaven on all his ways.
While other animals inactive range,
And of their doings God takes no account."
MILTON.

"God having placed us in our station, he having *apportioned* to us our task."—BARROW.

As all the other of these synonyms bear upon the immediate present, so DESTINE (Lat. *destĭnāre*) upon the future. The act of destining is as it were an act in abeyance, and takes full effect in the future, and is at present in reservation. A person has a task allotted to him on which he is supposed at once to enter, or he is appointed to an office the obligations of which he incurs immediately; but he may be destined to the office before the appointment is made. Moreover, destination is not always relative. It may be absolute—that is, things may be destined simply to be or occur.

"Mark well the place where first she lays her down,
There measure out thy walls and build thy town;
And from thy guide Bœotia call the land
In which the *destined* walls and town shall stand." ADDISON, *Ovid*.

ALLOW. PERMIT. SUFFER. TOLERATE.

It ought to be observed that there are in ALLOW two distinct forces, the meaning, viz., of to permit and to afford.

To PERMIT (Lat. *permittĕre*) is used rather in a passive, while ALLOW

has a more active sense. If I allow him I give him at least some degree of sanction, however small; if I permit, I only do not prevent him.

SUFFER (Lat. *sufferre*) is more passive still, and may be entirely against the inclination. On the other hand, it may be purely negative, as the indolent master suffers his pupils to be idle. There are in allow, permit, suffer, and tolerate, degrees as regards the will. I allow what I myself sanction or will. I permit what another wills. I suffer that about which I am content to have no will. I TOLERATE (Lat. *tŏlĕrāre*) that which is against my will.

"Without the King's will or the State's *allowance*." SHAKESPEARE.

"If by the author of sin is meant the *permitter*, or not a hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be *permitted*, or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow—I say if this be all that is meant by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense; it is no reproach for the Most High to be then the author of sin."—EDWARDS, *Freedom of the Will*.

It should, however, be observed that in matters not of the will of individuals only, but of formal or public sanction, PERMIT is a stronger term than ALLOW. In this connexion the case is reversed. If the law permit me to do something, it sanctions my doing it; on the other hand, it may allow of my doing it from the case not having been contemplated and provided for by law. One tolerates a thing when, having the power to prevent it, one does not exercise the power. One suffers it when one does not oppose, either feigning ignorance, or not having power to prevent. ALLOW supposes the thing allowed to be good. PERMIT, that it may be good or bad. TOLERATE and SUFFER, that it is bad or believed to be so.

"I suffer him to enter and possess." MILTON.

"Alleging that if God ruled the world so much wickedness and impiety would not be *tolerated* therein."—BARROW.

ALLOW. GRANT. BESTOW. AFFORD.

The leading idea in ALLOW is proportionateness, or measured giving; in GRANT, favour, or willing giving; in BESTOW—a compound form of *stow*—substantial benefit, or solid giving; and in AFFORD, personal sparing or relative giving. A father allows his son a certain sum yearly; kings grant pensions; gifts and honours are sometimes bestowed upon the unworthy; relief is afforded to the poor or the sick. We allow what is claimed or expected, we grant what is asked, we bestow what is valued, and afford what is needed.

"If it (my offence) be weighed
By itself, with aggravations not surcharged,
Or else with just *allowance* counterpoised,
I may, if possible, thy pardon find."
MILTON.

"This mutual convenience introduced commercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale, *grant*, or conveyance."—BLACKSTONE.

"Almighty God, though He really doth and cannot otherwise do, yet will not seem to *bestow* his favours altogether gratis, but to expect some competent return, some small use and income from them."—BARROW.

"Great Dryden next, whose tuneful Muse *affords*
The sweetest numbers and the fittest words." ADDISON.

ALLUDE. REFER. ADVERT.

These words are often used indiscriminately, but they are by no means identical in meaning.

To ALLUDE (Lat. *allūdĕre*) is indirect, REFER (Lat. *rĕferre*) is positive and direct. If I quote an author, for instance, not by name but by description, subject, period, or style of writing, I allude to him; but if I attribute something to another, specifically and plainly, I do not allude but refer to him. Allusion is often so vague that confusion arises from ignorance of the person or period alluded to. The fault of reference is not obscurity, but inexactness. A wrong reference—an obscure allusion.

ADVERT (Lat. *advertĕre, to turn to*) has in it a character of casualty, almost of abruptness, as if in adverting, one suddenly turned aside to take notice

of something in connexion with the main matter in hand, but with no intention of dwelling upon it. The noun ADVERTENCE is equivalent to conscious observation.

"The people of the country *alluding* to its foam (Buttermere Lake) call it Sour Milk Force."—GILPIN'S *Tour*.

"But to do good is not only our greatest duty, but our greatest interest and advantage, which is that that Solomon chiefly *refers* to in the text."—SHARP.

" Now to the universal whole *advert*,
Our earth regard as of that whole a part."
BLACKMORE.

ALMOST. NEARLY.

NEARLY is more strictly applied to matters of quantity, time, space, and fact; ALMOST to matters of progression, degree, or force. So if we said, " He is nearly ten years of age," we should mean that his age was separated from ten by a small interval. Almost ten would mean that in a little he would reach or have reached it. It may be observed that while NEARLY is used grammatically with a negative, ALMOST is never so preceded. That which is begun and approaches its completion is almost done ; that which is on the point of being begun, is nearly begun. A man almost killed has suffered a severe injury, a man nearly killed has escaped.

ALSO. TOO. LIKEWISE. BESIDES.

Too is a slighter and more familiar word than ALSO, which is more formal. ALSO means, as well as. LIKEWISE, in a similar manner. Too, in addition. BESIDES denotes parallel addition. ALSO cannot be used for LIKEWISE if there be only a similarity of position grammatically, and no community of nature. So " He is a prince and also a musician" may be said, because it is only a logical or grammatical unity that is expressed, the same person being a subject of two propositions. " He is a prince and likewise a musician," we could not say, by reason of the absence of any community of character between the things expressed by the terms. Grammatically, Too cannot begin a sentence, while ALSO can.

ALWAYS. CONTINUALLY.

One does ALWAYS that which one does at all times and on all occasions ; one does CONTINUALLY that which one does without intermission or interruption. One is bound always to prefer duty to pleasure. It is impossible to be continually at work. One is also bound always to speak, when in company, with a certain consideration of others; this of itself will prevent us from speaking continually. As CONTINUALLY belongs to prolongation of time, so ALWAYS belongs to recurrence of occasion.

AMBASSADOR. ENVOY. PLENIPOTENTIARY. DEPUTY. MINISTER.

AMBASSADOR (Fr. *ambassade, an embassy*) is a minister of the highest rank resident in a foreign country even in times of peace, and keeps up by the style of his living the dignity of the country which he represents; while an ENVOY (Fr. *envoi, a sending*) is commonly not permanently resident, but sent on a particular occasion. The term applies especially to the ministers of monarchs, MINISTER (Lat. *mĭnister, an attendant on a monarch*) being the general term for foreign political representatives.

" Since the Congress of Vienna, representatives have been usually divided into three classes: *ambassadors, envoys*, and *chargés des affaires*, the last of these communicating not between the heads, but between the foreign departments of Governments. *Ambassadors* are sent by Great Britain to Russia, Austria, the German Empire, Italy, France, and Turkey; our other ministers abroad are termed *envoys*, or ministers plenipotentiary."—BRANDE AND COX, *Dict. of Lit., Science, and Art.*

The envoy, like the ambassador, exercises his functions in a sumptuous manner. The PLENIPOTENTIARY, as his name implies (Lat. *plenus, full, pŏtentia, authority*) is one vested with full powers to treat with a foreign government, especially when its relations are precarious. Personal influence, diplomatic talent, and loyalty are needed in the plenipotentiary.

The DEPUTY (Fr. *député*, Lat. *dēpŭtare, to decide*) has much less power, being sent upon a specific mission which he is bound to execute with dignity, strictness, and despatch. Ambassadors and envoys speak and treat in the name of their sovereigns, but the first are invested with a representative duality; the second are authorized

ministers, but not representative members in the full sense of the term. No such high rank and power is ever enjoyed by deputies who appear and speak in behalf of some subordinate section of the community, or some private body. The title of minister comprises the functions of ambassador and envoy; that of deputy assimilates itself to those of an agent. Magnificence of living and personal dignity belong characteristically to the ambassador. Cleverness in negotiation constitutes the merit of an envoy. Natural talent and aptitude for business are desired in a deputy. Deputies may be sent to sovereigns, though they are not sent by them. The title plenipotentiary commonly accompanies that of ambassador-extraordinary.

"The commerce of the Turkish Company first occasioned the establishment of an ordinary *ambassador* at Constantinople."—ADAM SMITH.

"As when some faithful *envoy*, who at large
Receives commission for a weighty charge,
Chides his neglect, recalling to his thought
Some valued purpose 'midst his zeal forgot,
And ere he sees his lord with eager care
Bends every power the omission to repair."
HOOK, *Orlando Furioso.*

"The British *Plenipotentiaries* were directed to give the same assurances to the Dutch *ministers* at Utrecht, and withal to let them know that the Queen was determined by their late conduct to make peace, either with or without, but would much rather choose the former."—SWIFT.

"When I was at Assamea some of the principal inhabitants of several different cities complained to me of the excessive appointments that were decreed to their *deputies*."—MELMOTH, *Cicero.*

AMBIGUOUS. EQUIVOCAL.

AMBIGUOUS (Lat. *ambĭguus*) qualifies such a form of expression as leaves the sense doubtful.

EQUIVOCAL (Lat. *æquĭvŏcus*) is the character which belongs to a term as having more than one meaning. So ambiguous is negative; equivocal is positive. In an ambiguous sentence I do not see the grammatical sense. In an equivocal sentence there is more than one sense, each plain enough, but I do not know which to take. Ambiguity obscures the expression; equivocation conceals the intention of the speaker. The former is far less often the result of design than the latter, which is a synonym with prevarication. In deliberate equivocation, it is intended that the hearer should take what is said in a sense favourable to the speaker; and this is made possible by the use of variable or elastic terms. Equivocation is presumed to be intentional; but confused, or inadequate ideas, or a style wanting in lucidity, will often lead to ambiguity. Primarily, EQUIVOCAL is an epithet of terms. AMBIGUITY, of expressions or sentences. When a saying is equally intelligible in two distinct senses, it is equivocal. The relative "who" as referring to more than one possible antecedent is a fruitful source of the equivocal. "The son of John Jones who committed the theft," leaves it equivocal whether the father or the son was the thief. Puns are another—

"Tout ce qui porte plume
Est crée pour *voler*."

may either express flight as an attribute of winged animals, or thievishness as an attribute of attorneys. It is to be observed, however, that it will frequently happen that the same expression may be characterized either as ambiguous or as equivocal. The equivocal is always ambiguous, though the ambiguous may owe its ambiguity to other causes than the multiform meaning of terms. He who wishes to be ambiguous will resort to equivocation as one way of concealing his meaning, and a more available way than the construction of involved sentences.

"Taking advantage of a sentence or word that might be *ambiguous* or doubtful."—SIR T. ELYOT.

"The *equivocal* title of the 'Apostolical' given to the Roman creed."—WATERLAND.

AMEND. CORRECT. REFORM. EMEND. RECTIFY.

Of these AMEND and EMEND are really the same word, *ēmendāre* in Latin becoming the Fr. *amender*. The root is Lat. *menda*, a fault. In usage, AMEND means positively to better, EMEND, negatively to remove faults. Emend is more commonly used of literary matters, amend of moral, and of productions of the understanding, as a law or an arrangement.

"Graunt me, Lord, grace of *amendement*."
PIERS PLOUGHMAN.

To CORRECT (Lat. *corrĭgĕre*, part. *correctus*) is to bring to a conformity with rule, moral, artificial, or scientific, by removing faults; and, by an extension of meaning, punishing them. In the latter case the correction is, unhappily, no guarantee for the amendment. To REFORM (Lat. *rĕformāre*) is to correct or amend by a continuous process and with permanent effect. In reference to persons it has the sense of to reclaim from wrongness of life; and to institutions, from inherent corruption, deterioration, or disorganization. Correction redresses errors and omissions for the purpose of bringing back to an order or to a standard. Amendment is brought about in that which to some extent has been well done. Reform denotes the state of a thing re-established in its right order or condition. Correction is more in detail. Amendment and Reform more general, extensive. A correction of faults will constitute an amendment of character, which, if completely sustained, will result in an entire reform. Reform is predicated of such things as wear a character and pursue a course of conduct—that is, are associated with the individual natures or collective proceedings of men.

"Under what manner, therefore, should I now submit this book to be *corrected* and *amended* of them which can suffer nothing to be well?"—TYNDAL.

"The practical definition of what the popular branch of our legislature was at this day he took to be precisely this: an assembly freely elected, between whom and the mass of the people there was the closest union and the most perfect sympathy. Such a House of Commons it was the purpose of the Constitution originally to erect, and such a House of Commons it was the wish of every *Reformer* now to establish."—PITT, *Speech on Parliamentary Reform*.

"I hardly left a single line in it without giving it what I thought an *emendation*."
—MASON.

To RECTIFY (Lat. *rectĭfĭcare*) refers to something done, and denotes the adjusting of what is wrong without reference to any continuity of habit. We rectify things only, and wrong things. It belongs to intellectual as well as moral subject-matter; as *e.g.* to rectify the errors or exaggerations of a statement; but it has also as correct a bearing on cases of purely physical adjustment. Between correct and rectify there is a great likeness. But we rectify when we make things right, we correct when we make them exact or true. We correct by adjusting to an external test, we rectify by putting into normal condition. I rectify a timepiece when I set it in good order for going; I correct it when I make it indicate the true time.

AMAZEMENT. WONDER. BEWILDERMENT.

AMAZEMENT is connected by Wedgewood with the Italian *smagare, to discourage, dispirit*; Fr. *s'esmaier, to be sad, thoughtful, astonished*. SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.* considers AMAZE, formerly *amase*, to be the A. S. intensive prefix *á-*, compounded with *maze*; and thus = *to confound utterly*. Amazement is a combination of WONDER (A. S. *wundrian*) and a feeling akin to dismay—a blank, open-mouthed astonishment, affecting the senses and the reasoning faculties. Wonder is more calm and rational. Wonder increases with the exercise of reason and contemplation, amazement oppresses the reason. In wonder the mind may be active and the tongue eloquent; in amazement one is mute and overborne.

BEWILDERMENT is literally the wildness of perplexity. When it is mixed with wonder it is the strongest form of amazement; but it may have no wonder in it, in which case it is the result of extreme perplexity. A man is bewildered by the presentation before his mind of many different objects, having equal claim to choice or preference in judgment or in action, by which he is reduced to a state of perplexed inaction.

AMBUSH. AMBUSCADE.

These words are both derivatives from the Low Lat. *boscus, a bush, wood*,—literally, a personal concealment in a wood or trees. Of old the word was AMBUSH; AMBUSCADE is more recent. The latter is, however, seldom used but as a strategic term, and is also used of the persons in ambush. Hence ambuscade is associated with the legitimate operations of war; ambush

with a cowardly attack upon enemies or objects of ill design. The wild beast lies in ambush, the commander plans an ambuscade.

AMIABLE. ESTIMABLE.

These adjectives follow the distinction of the verbs from which they are derived. Love is produced by the exhibition of such moral qualities as are *attractive*, esteem by such as are deserving of *regard*. The ESTIMABLE (Lat. *æstĭmābĭlis*) person is higher than the AMIABLE (Lat. *ămābĭlis*), though not so interesting to ourselves. The latter character is contemplated with affection and pleasure, the former with affection and respect. The amiable disposition is often weak, capable of pleasing, and desirous to please, yet, by this very thing, liable to act unthoughtfully, inconsiderately, unjustly. The estimable disposition may be better relied on. It is tempered by right feeling, and not only kindly or compliant feeling. He who is merely amiable is wanting in independence of character, and so, being willing to please all, will often disappoint and dissatisfy many. He who is estimable exercises justice in small things, and would avoid all cause of offence, not by seeking merely to please all, but to give all their due.

AMICABLE. FRIENDLY.

These words are etymologically equivalent, the Latin *amicus* being the English *friend* (A. S. *freond*). But AMICABLE is the more formal word of the two, and so indicates less warmth of feeling personally. FRIENDLY is positive in its force, while AMICABLE often means no more than the absence of quarrel. And so it often refers to the externals of conduct or to a conventional friendship, as in the case of the amicable adjustment of disputes. We are bound in Christian duty to live amicably with all, but it would be, perhaps, impossible to feel friendly towards all in equal degree. FRIENDLY means with the feelings of friends; AMICABLE, after the manner of friends. When persons are friendly, their intercourse will be amicable.

"Even those that break the peace cannot but praise it, how much more should they bid for it that are true friends to it and to that *amicableness* that attends it?"—BP. TAYLOR.

"There are several texts in the New Testament which interpret the love of our neighbours to mean universal benevolence or friendliness towards the whole kind, as opportunities may offer."—WATERLAND.

AMPLE. SPACIOUS. CAPACIOUS.

These words convey in common the idea of extent or largeness. But AMPLE (Lat. *amplus*) is always relative to some standard of want or need. Ample is fully enough, as scanty is barely enough. Anything which is more than sufficient is ample, whether in quantity, number, space, or amount in any way. It applies, unlike the other two, not only to fixed, but also to variable amounts, or to things that can be narrowed or extended; an ample robe has been made of full measure.

"How may I
Adore Thee, Author of this Universe,
And all this good to man, for whose well-being
So *amply* and with hands so *liberal*
Thou hast provided?" MILTON.

SPACIOUS expresses what is of superficial largeness in reference to human habitation, movement, or occupation. A spacious garden gives plenty of space for recreation. An ample garden is fully sufficient for this and all other purposes of a garden, as to the supply, for instance, of fruit and flowers.

CAPACIOUS (Lat. *căpăcem*) is large in external measurement. In the ample, one has satisfaction, in the spacious freedom, in the capacious roominess and stowage. AMPLE is equally applicable to things moral and physical — ample powers, ample ground. SPACIOUS is applicable only to physical extent, except by metaphor; while CAPACIOUS belongs in its primary sense to the material, and in the secondary to the intellectual. That is ample which exceeds requirement. That is spacious which gives no idea of circumscription. That is capacious which is not easily overfilled, nor checks the process of depositing or storing.

"In that *spacious* place ships of the greatest burden may ride afloat."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

"No figure is so *capacious* as this (the sphere), and consequently whose parts are so well compacted and united, and lie so near one to another for mutual strength."—RAY

AMUSEMENT. DIVERSION. ENTERTAINMENT. SPORT. RECREATION. PASTIME.

AMUSEMENT (Fr. *amuser, to amuse*) is employed to express both the thing that amuses and the state of being amused. An amusement is an employment or occupation which gives ease to the mind whether purposely sought or not. It is continuous action sufficiently interesting to prevent a sense of labour and of time, and may or may not have a special object beyond itself. It is a lull of the mind, and a release from mental efforts and serious reflexions without being a merely passive state. Amusement implies something to which the attention is given continuously, and on which it muses. The mere absence of *ennui* without the positive sensation of pleasure is sufficient to constitute amusement, yet there must be a lightness of occupation tending to the side of mirth, though not necessarily exciting it, and certainly not exciting the contrary. Hence it is in one sense a synonym with beguile.

"High above our heads at the summit of the cliff sat a group of mountaineer children *amusing* themselves with pushing stones from the top and watching as they plunged into the lake."—GILPIN'S *Tour*.

DIVERSION (Lat. *diversiōnem, a turning aside*) is an amusement viewed relatively to the more serious business of life, from which it is a deviation. As we are amused by having our attention turned to a thing, so we are diverted by having our attention turned from it. Hence diversion is more strongly counteractive than amusement, and implies a higher degree of excitement—such, for instance, as may amount to positive merriment. Diversion is a livelier term than amusement. When one is amused, the time passes unmarked; when one is diverted it passes marked only by lively and agreeable sensations. We are amused by a tale, diverted by a comedy. One does not say that the tragedy diverts, because it is too serious; nor amuses, because it is too earnest. He must be wellnigh weary of life whom nothing can amuse; he must be deep in melancholy whom nothing can divert. One may amuse one's self, one is diverted by other things or persons. One may, therefore, be amused in solitude; one is diverted only in company. It is not well to give way to a fondness for diversions, for it is likely to create an incapacity for quiet amusements, as draughts too strong destroy the relish for those which are weaker, and exciting pleasures make common pleasures tame. Calm, sedentary, and sometimes, unhappily, frivolous, things amuse. It requires something more animated to divert.

"They must act as their equals act, they must, like others, dress, keep a table, an equipage, and resort to public *diversions*. It is necessary according to their ideas."—KNOX, *Essays*.

ENTERTAINMENT is a term which has assumed with ourselves a lighter character than belongs to its French original. In Fr. *entretien* means more sustained conversation. The proceedings of a debating society are more closely allied than anything else to the original idea of entertainment. Yet the entertainment with us has so much in common with this that the idea is that of social amusement of a more or less refined character, as a play, a descriptive lecture, a musical performance, and the like. The intellect and the taste are sought to be enlisted in entertainment, and those are the most entertaining books which appeal to such capacities of amusement as belong to the refined and educated. Common people prefer diversions, and are incapable of appreciating entertainments.

"But the kind hosts their *entertainment* grace
With hearty welcome and an open face;
In all they did you might discern with ease
A willing mind and a desire to please."
DRYDEN.

SPORT (O. Fr. *se desporter, to amuse oneself*) represents a species of bodily recreation peculiarly adapted to the young and agile, and taking place for the most part in the open air. A game may or may not be sedentary, sport never is. But sport belongs to conversation as well as action, and sport in that case means playful talk without serious meaning—irony, banter, jest,

and the like, are in that sense sport. A sport may be defined to be a diversion of the field such as fowling, hunting, fishing. It differs from game in the further particular that besides being capable of being carried on in solitude, it is not governed by rules of conformity.

Game, again, is used of mental recreation, as a game of chess.

"In areas varied with mosaic art,
Some whirl the disk, and some the javelin dart;
Aside, sequestered from the vast resort
Antinous sate spectator of the sport."
POPE.

RECREATION (Lat. *recreāre, to renew*) is, like diversion, counteractive, but not necessarily so energetic, and comprises all degrees of relaxation, from the most active to the least active of amusements. Still some amount of action is involved, otherwise, it would be repose. It belongs especially to the studious, the industrious, and those who are engaged in the responsible duties of office. To such recreation is a relief from past labours and a preparation for resuming them. It may be an amusement, a diversion, an entertainment, or a sport, and it is commonly sought and taken with a view to its restorative effects.

The PASTIME is, as its name denotes, a means of pleasantly passing the time. It is the active amusement which beguiles the leisure hour which otherwise might hang tediously. It is a happy relief to the industrious to find recreation: it is better that for the indolent there should be found a pastime than that he should be left to his own idleness.

"So that of necessity they must either apply their accustomed labours, or else *recreate* themselves with honest and laudable *pastimes*."—MORE'S *Utopia*.

ANALOGY. RESEMBLANCE.

ANALOGY (Gr. *ἀναλογία*) is often used familiarly as if it meant no more than moral similarity or resemblance. It is true that the words analogy and likeness might often be used interchangeably, bnt analogy is not simple likeness. Analogy is a resemblance of relationships. It expresses a fixed quantity. Resemblance may exist in any degree; the resemblance of the whole being striking to our sense and observation in proportion to the number of points in detail which are similar. If two trees are very much alike in height, growth, shape of leaves, and general colour, there is no analogy, but a resemblance between them. On the other hand, there is an analogy between the branches and a man's arms, so that we sometimes speak of an arm of a tree; for the relation of the branch to the trunk of the tree is like that of the arms of a man to the human body. If I argue that because the seed dies in the earth before it springs up anew, therefore it is probable that the human body will rise again after death; this is as to the idea only a resemblance; as to the argument, an analogy; the principle being some community in the ground of the likeness; as, for instance, that as the same God is the Author of a natural and of a spiritual world, He may be expected to act in regard to each upon similar or common laws.

"The schoolmen tell us there is an *analogy* between intellect and sight, for as much as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body, and that he who governs the state is *analogous* to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is *analogically* styled a pilot, being to the state what a pilot is to the vessel."—BISHOP BERKELEY.

"To do good is to become most like God. It is that which of all other qualities gives us the *resemblance* of His Nature and perfection."—SHARP.

ANALYSIS. RESOLUTION. REDUCTION.

ANALYSIS (*ἀνάλῦσις*) is from Gr. *ἀναλύειν*, the equivalent of the Lat. *rĕsolvĕre, to resolve*. But though in meaning identical, they differ somewhat in application. Analysis is a chemical and metaphysical term. We analyze a substance into its component parts, or a complex notion into its constituent ideas, or a sentence into its parts of speech. Resolution means the same thing, but is also applicable to other processes than those which belong to human intelligence and skill. The action of the elements may resolve a substance into its component parts, but it does not analyze it. Resolution expresses the fact or

process, analysis the scientific intention as well. Resolution may be accidental, analysis is conducted with the purpose of cognition. REDUCTION (Lat. *rĕductiōnem, a bringing back*) is like resolution as being the result either of intelligence or of mechanical operation; but it means a different thing. As to resolve is to loose or separate, so to reduce is to bring back. A thing resolved is taken to pieces, a thing reduced is taken to another form usually inferior, weaker or more elementary. After resolution there are many parts or particles, differing among themselves. After reduction there is one substance altered in form or condition or aspect. Men may be reduced to tribes, animals or vegetables to classes, many rules to one comprehensive rule, a number from one denomination to another without altering its value, shillings to pence, stone to powder, a metal from other substances with which it is combined. On the other hand the atmosphere is resolved into oxygen and nitrogen gases, or the idea of amazement into wonder and bewilderment, or the commandments of the decalogue into the duty towards God and that towards our neighbour. If we were to use the term reduced, in this last case we should mean that *the number* ten was reduced to the number two, or ten commandments to two commandments, which is no analysis or resolution of the subject matter. Analysis searches, resolution decomposes, reduction alters in form.

ANIMAL. BRUTE. BEAST.

ANIMAL (Lat. *ănĭmal*) comprehends every creature endowed with that life which is superior to the merely vegetative life of plants, and therefore includes man. It is sometimes, however, made to express distinctively other animals than man. In that case we have to suppose a further distinction drawn between the rational and the irrational animal life.

"Animate bodies are either such as are endued with a vegetative soul as plants, or a sensitive soul as the bodies of animals, birds, beasts, fishes, or insects, or a rational soul as the body of man and the vehicles of angels if any such there be."—RAY, *on Creation*.

BRUTE (Lat. *brūtus, irrational*) and BEAST (Lat. *bestia*) stand related each in its own way to man. BRUTE is the animal regarded in reference to the absence of that intelligence which man possesses, BEAST (except where the word is used in the sense of cattle) in reference to that savage nature of which man is or ought to be devoid. The indolent, senseless, and violent brute; the cruel, savage, vile or filthy beast. Hence while the term animal is applicable to insects, neither brute nor beast is so, being insusceptible of moral comparison with man. In applying the terms figuratively to the character and disposition of men, ANIMAL denotes one who follows the instincts and propensities of his lower nature to the neglect of moral restraints and intellectual sympathies; BEAST one who grovels in sensuality, BRUTE one whose nature seems deadened to fine feeling.

"We cannot teach *brute* animals to use their eyes in any other way than that in which nature hath taught them."—REID.

"Inspiring dumb
And helpless victims with a sense so keen
Of injury, with such knowledge of their strength,
And such sagacity to take revenge,
That oft the *beast* has seemed to judge the man."
COWPER.

ANIMATE. INSPIRE.

To ANIMATE (Lat. *ănĭmāre*) is literally to put life or soul into a thing. To INSPIRE (Lat. *inspīrāre, to breathe into*) is to impart an influence to the nature of another as if by a breath. The difference lies in what is supposed to be communicated. The lower influence is expressed by the word animate, so that the term is applied to the mere imparting of life, or the appearance of life. The soul animates the body, the marble of the sculptor appears animated. The higher, more spiritual, or finer faculties and feelings are said to be imparted by inspiration, as to be inspired with a sublime courage or devotion. Animation quickens the physical and inferior, inspiration the mental, moral, and spiritual impulses, as of human nature. So ANIMATE lends itself the more easily to express evil influences; as to be animated by a spirit of revenge. That

which animates incites to action already begun, accelerates it, and postpones the conclusion of it, giving energy, fire, and warmth. He has to be animated who is wanting on the score of spirit, who is cold and indifferent in action, who requires to be drawn out of apathy, who is to be quickened out of sluggishness, having a weak will or little earnestness. He who is animated by hope of a reward uses all his faculties more briskly. He who is inspired with a love of glory will be so enthusiastic as to have little regard for anything but the distinction which is the object of his endeavours.

"Wherever we are formed by Nature to any active purpose, the passion which *animates* us to it is attended with delight, or a pleasure of some kind."—BURKE.

ANIMATION. LIFE. VIVACITY. SPIRIT.

ANIMATION (*see* ANIMATE) and LIFE (A. S. *lif*) are employed alike to express the appearance of one actuated by the lively impulses of nature. Life is used both for the possession of the functions of organic life and the exhibition of them in a demonstrative degree. VIVACITY (Lat. *vivācĭtātem*) differs from animation in expressing itself rather by the manner, speech, and movements, while animation may be confined to the countenance. SPIRIT (Lat. *spīrĭtum*) stands to action as vivacity stands to movement, and animation to aspect. It is that vivacity which sustains itself in difficulty or danger, and is accompanied by self-assertion when needed. Animation is in the soul, vivacity in the temperament, spirit in the heart. Animation is subjective, there is a sense in which life is objective. A picture has life when it presents the external character of natural truth. Life in this sense exhibits the facts of life, as animation the feelings of life. Animation is apparent in the person, life is thrown into the thing. An exuberance of animal life and spirits will produce vivacity, which for a time may be enlivening, but afterwards becomes oppressive. Animation is gentle, spiritual, intellectual; vivacity is animal. A man without vivacity will be a dull companion. He who speaks or declaims without animation, probably lacks interest in the subject or the occasion. He who is known to be wanting in spirit, will let slip the opportunities of the enterprizing and be a prey to the selfish and the aggressor.

"Heroes, in animated marble, frown,
And legislators seem to think in stone."
POPE.

"They have no notion of *life* and fire in fancy and words."—FELTON.

"Their attitudes, their *vivacity*, their leaps out of the water, their frolics in it, which I have noted a thousand times with equal attention and amusement, all conduce to show their excess of spirits, and are simply the effects of that excess."—PALEY.

"With all the warmth of a zealot in the cause of virtue, he (Juvenal) pours his majestic verse, and amid the most spirited invective and the finest morality, emits many a luminous irradiation of poetry beautifully descriptive."—KNOX, *Essays*.

ANNOUNCE. PROCLAIM. PUBLISH. DECLARE.

Things which are of the nature of intelligence are ANNOUNCED (Lat. *annunciāre, to announce, proclaim*). Facts which are tidings, as well as persons, are announced. Announcement often bears reference to something by no means new, but already expected. It implies some degree of formality. An invited guest is announced. A marriage is announced in the newspapers. Announcement may be to many, to few, or to one. It commonly refers to things just coming or just come. The approach of royalty is sometimes announced by a salvo of artillery. Announcement may be in words, or by signal without words.

"Her (Queen Elizabeth's) arrival was *announced* through the country by a peal of cannon from the ramparts, and a display of fire-works at night."—*Gilpin's Tour*.

PROCLAIM (Lat. *prōclāmare*) applies only to what is or may become matter of public interest, and is made in the hearing or cognizance of many. We say in the cognizance, because proclamation may be of writing; as, tidings, opinions, the movements of great men or their edicts. As ANNOUNCE is in its character official, or personal, so PROCLAIM is authoritative. A monarch proclaims, a child might announce. As ANNOUNCE may refer to what is to

take place after an interval of time, as an intended departure may be announced, so PROCLAIM and PUBLISH (Lat. *publicāre*) usually refer to things present. In such phrases as to proclaim or publish an intention the subject is in fact present. There is a close alliance between PUBLISH and PROCLAIM, but PUBLISH may belong to any means for putting a matter in the possession of the public. We proclaim our own acts or intentions, we publish what interests or concerns others to know. We announce in order to apprize, as we DECLARE (Lat. *dēclārare*) to remove obscurity, secrecy, or doubt. We publish that all may know. We proclaim that they may know whose business or duty it is to know. We announce that they may know who are interested in hearing. When we declare we do not desire so much a wide publicity for what we say, as a distinct understanding. It is spoken out clearly and unreservedly, because we wish it to be well known, understood, and believed. A lover declares his passion. A suitor his intentions. A criminal his accomplices. Proclamation is authoritative, but short-lived, publication.

"Now had the Great *Proclaimer* with a voice
More awful than the sound of trumpet cried
Repentance, and Heaven's kingdom nigh at hand
To all baptized." MILTON.

"For the instruction, therefore, of all sorts of men to eternal life, it is necessary that the sacred and saving truth of God be openly *published* unto them, which open publication of heavenly mysteries is by an excellency termed preaching."—HOOKER.

"But the attorney answered them that he is not the *Declarer* of his intentions; he must be judged by the book, by his words, above all by the effect."—*State Trials.*

ANNOY. MOLEST. TEASE. AGGRIEVE. PERSECUTE.

ANNOY is from the O. Fr. *anoier*, the modern Fr. *ennyer* (Lat. *in ŏdio esse, to be an object of dislike*). MOLEST (Lat. *mŏlestare*). TEASE (A. S. *tæsan, to pluck, to tease*). That which offends annoys by its presence. Annoyance is the action of the hateful or offensive, not of the positively painful. To be subjected to what we dislike is the etymological force of annoyance. It may be mental or physical, a repetition of discordant sounds, a glare of light, the misconduct of a friend. As annoyance depends upon our own feelings or circumstances, more than in the inherent nature of things, it will often happen that what may be an annoyance to us is not so to others, or to ourselves at some other time. Inaptitude of times and seasons, disregard of measure and propriety in things may lead to annoyance. We may even be annoyed with ourselves. MOLEST is physical, and comes only from without. It denotes an active though temporary trouble. That which annoys us is distasteful. That which molests us is oppressive, burdensome; it disturbs the order of our being and action. It is like the perpetual sense of a foreign body brought into contact with us. It is difficult to bear. We may sometimes reason ourselves out of annoyance, but molestation is too obtrusive to be so disposed of. The sense of molestation is often produced by the repetition of causes of annoyance. One is molested by insults, by begging applications, by the visits of a fly or a wasp. We are not molested by facts or circumstances in themselves, or by what we hear or is reported to us; but by that which galls, fatigues, or haunts us by unwelcome repetition. We feel especially molested in some course which is interrupted, or some state disturbed, or some occupation obtruded upon; as sleep may be molested by unpleasant dreams, or study by distracting noises.

"Save where from yonder ivy-mantled tower
The moping owl doth to the moon complain
Of such as wandering near her secre bower
Molest her ancient solitary reign."
GRAY.

We are teased by unpleasant trifles which by their recurrence cause irritation of mind. Teasing is a lighter form of molesting. We are molested by the importunities of men, teased by those of children.

"But as a whelp starts up with fear
When a bee's humming in his ear;

With upper lip elate he grins
As round the little *teazer* spins."
FENTON.

AGGRIEVE (nearly the same as *aggravate*, Lat. *aggrăvāre, to burden, annoy*) points to an uneasy sense of injurious treatment. He is aggrieved who is wounded in his pride, his liberty, his sense of fairness; as by insult, oppression, extortion. We are aggrieved when we are not dealt with as we think we ought to be. Annoyance aggrieves when we reflect upon it as personal, uncalled-for, or inconsiderate. The aggrieved person considers that he has cause to complain that he has not been taken into due account, or that he has been the object of wrong.

"*Aggrieved* by oppression and extortion."—MACAULAY.

To PERSECUTE (Lat. *persĕqui*, part. *persĕcutus*) is persistently to aggrieve, to follow up with injury or annoyance, to afflict on purpose, and through dislike or hatred, to punish by harassing inflictions. One may fancy one's self aggrieved by misunderstanding the motives and conduct of another, but there can be no mistake about persecution, which is always intentional on the part of the persecutor. Persecution is such informal punishment as individuals take upon themselves to administer. Having no legal or public sanction it cannot inflict as it desires the penalty of displeasure in full. It is therefore induced to fall back upon such instalments of it as opportunities allow, or as can be inflicted with impunity to the persecuted. Persecution attests the weakness of the person or the cause which has recourse to it. It proves an inability to conciliate or to convince, and often when the immediate cause has passed away, it is the resort of petty vindictiveness and retributive malice.

"*Persecution* produces no sincere conviction, nor any real change of opinion; on the contrary, it vitiates the public morals by driving men to prevarication, and commonly ends in a general though secret infidelity by imposing, under the name of revealed religion, systems of doctrine which men cannot believe, and dare not examine; finally, it disgraces the character, and wounds the reputation of Christianity itself by making it the author of oppression, cruelty, and bloodshed."—PALEY.

ANOMALOUS. IRREGULAR.

That is IRREGULAR (Lat. *in, not*, and *rĕgŭla, a rule*) which is a deviation from the common rule. That is ANOMALOUS (Gr. ἀνώμαλος, *ἀ-, not*, and ὁμαλός, *even*) which is out of the common run of things. That which is irregular is an *exception* to rule, that which is anomalous is *not reducible* to rule. That which is irregular is a departure from a course or process, that which is anomalous stands alone, being unlike the tenour of one's observation or experience. Hence a *solitary or rare exception* to a rule *becomes an anomaly*.

ANSWER. REPLY. REJOINDER. RESPONSE.

The general idea common to these terms is that of words given in required return for words. An ANSWER (A. S. *andswarian*, orig. *to swear in opposition to, to respond*) is given as being specifically demanded. So an answer follows a question as the supply upon the demand; and in a debate an answer to a speech meets certain points, according to preconcerted understanding and arrangement. To the answer in the latter case the term REPLY (Fr. *répliquer*, Lat. *replĭcare, to fold back, to make a reply*) would be applicable. A reply is a formal answer to an argumentative assertion which is far more than a question or interrogation. It commonly implies a statement to the contrary of that to which it replies. An answer may be simply commensurate with the terms of an interrogation. A reply goes beyond them, and does not necessarily suppose interrogation at all. An answer is asked, a reply may be volunteered without being asked, and to the surprise of the speaker. So we may reply to a remonstrance, a reprimand, or objurgation. A reply is an answer offered or demanded or expected, or the contrary, and extending beyond mere affirmation or negation.

"When a man asks me a question, I have it in my power to *answer* or be silent, to *answer* softly or roughly in terms of respect, or in terms of contempt."—BEATTIE.

"The plaintiff may plead again, and *reply* to the defendant's plea. The plaintiff in his replication may totally reverse the plea."—BLACKSTONE.

REJOINDER expresses not, as REPLY does, a formal and lengthened counter-statement, but one within a short compass and of a pointed character. It follows upon a remark directly or indirectly personal, and is dictated by a desire to give the speaker something as good as he brings, to place him upon the same level as that to which he would reduce the other. The term bears the technical meaning of a reply upon a reply.

"*Rejoinder* to the churl the king disdained,
But shook his head and rising wrath restrained." POPE.

RESPONSE (Lat. *rēsponsum*) is sometimes only a more learned word for ANSWER. But it has also a character of its own in which it differs from REJOINDER in being not an antagonistic but an accordant answer. It extends beyond words to acts and feelings, which are in accordance with those of another. The responses of a liturgy are framed in harmonious correspondence, the prayers of the people echoing back as it were the sentiments of the priest in prayer. An intelligent and feeling remark will often find a response in the heart or mind of another.

"Tertullian takes notice that the *responses* in Baptism were then somewhat larger than the model laid down by Christ, meaning than the form of Baptism, and he refers the enlargement of the *responses* to immemorial custom or tradition."—WATERLAND.

ANTIC. GESTICULATION.

An ANTIC (Fr. *antique*, Lat. *antīquus, ancient*) is literally an antiquated grotesque movement of the whole body or such a posture of it. GESTICULATION (Lat. *gestĭcŭlatiōnem*) is a movement of the whole body or limbs, whether accompanied by speech or not, of which the purpose is to express some meaning, to indicate some sentiment, or to signify some direction to another. The gesticulation has its characteristic in illustrating or enforcing a meaning; the antic is often the most striking when it is meaningless, gratuitous, or insubordinate. A formal and demonstrative act, of which the value or significance bears no proportion to the main action or purpose, is called in the language of critical satire, an antic. Gesticulations at the point when they are excessive, so that the manner outstrips the matter, become antics. Gesticulations may be connected with the most tragical or the most ludicrous subjects; antics are never serious, though they may be farcically solemn.

APARTMENT. ROOM. CHAMBER.

APARTMENT (Fr. *à part*, *i.e.* Lat. *ad partem, apart*) meant originally, not a chamber, but a portion of a house, a suite of rooms set aside for a particular purpose; as it were a compartment of a house; it came subsequently to be applied to a single chamber. CHAMBER (Fr. *chambre*, Lat. *cămĕra*) is a vaulted space, a place with an arched roof. ROOM is the A. S. *rúm, space*, in the sense in which we say "there is room enough:" hence, space set apart in a house, and enclosed in walls. Hence the characteristic idea of apartments is variety of chamber compactness, that of room, accommodation. Apartments should be elegant and sufficiently numerous. A room spacious, commodious, well proportioned. A chamber neat, snug, private.

APOCRYPHAL. SUPPOSITITIOUS.

That which is APOCRYPHAL (Gr. *ἀπόκρῦφος, hidden*) is negatively unauthenticated or unproved. That which is SUPPOSITITIOUS (Lat. *suppŏsĭtĭcius, substituted*) is positively false or forged. There may be in the apocryphal much that is venerable, but the mind turally recoils from that which is put forth under false pretences. The Church of Rome retains in the Canon of Scripture certain books which, by the Protestants, are regarded as apocryphal. A slight increase of evidence in its favour might convert the suppositious into the apocryphal. On the contrary, the story of William Tell, once generally believed, must now, for want of evidence, be admitted to be at least apocryphal.

It may be observed that the term apocryphal is restricted to matters of statement, and especially literary productions supported by dubious evidence, while supposition is extended generally to what is put forward as true, being counterfeit; as a suppositious child.

APOLOGY. DEFENCE. JUSTIFICATION. EXCUSE. PLEA.

An APOLOGY (Gr. *ἀπολογία*) had originally the simple meaning of *defence*, as Bishop Jewel's "Apology for the Church of England." As such it wears a literary air. In such cases it supposes the charge of imperfection, but not necessarily the recognition of it. As at present employed, the word means something said by way of amends, and so becomes practically the contrary to a defence, and an admission of some wrong or impropriety said or done, or some omission of which the speaker acknowledges himself guilty. It is dictated by a sense of social justice or of deference. He who apologises defends himself by acknowledging himself in the wrong.

"For in the Book that is called mine *apology* it is not required by the nature of that name that it be any answer or defence for mine own self at all; but it sufficeth that it be of mine own making an answer or defence for some other."—SIR T. MORE.

It will be seen that DEFENCE (Lat. *dēfendĕre, to defend*) and JUSTIFICATION (Lat. *justificationem*), although the same as APOLOGY in one of its senses, are its opposite in another; namely, in the fact that they do not altogether admit wrong committed. Yet justification is a stronger term than defence. The apology in the case of an accused person is his defence, which may or may not be complete, while his justification is a proof of more than innocence, namely, that he did right in what he did. Justification is the object of apology, and apology the effort at justification. Like defence, apology presupposes charge or attack, while justification may be volunteered. We apologise to another or to others. We justify or defend what we ourselves have done, and sometimes what we advance as a claim. We defend ourselves by either admitting or denying that we have so acted as alleged. We justify ourselves by first conceding the fact, and then defending the rights of it. Where the defence admits the allegation, it does not extend beyond a palliation of the charge, or a demonstration of its allowableness. It is possible that a justification may go no farther. On the other hand, it may prove positively a high degree of truth and right. Defence is a more formal word than justification. It may be against proceedings in courts of law, or in answer to some public challenge. Nor is it confined to acts, but is applicable to the vindication of opinions. Justification is less formal. It is of acts and conduct, and is made in the presence of any with whom we may wish to set ourselves right. The grounds of justification are indefinite, and would depend, for their force, on the character and views of those before whom the justification was made. A technical defence may be successful, yet fall short of a moral justification.

EXCUSE (Lat. *excūsare, to free from blame*) is a weaker term than defence and justification, and is applicable to matters of less gravity. Serious offences may be defended or even justified; in which case the argument would go to show that they were only apparent, not real offences: but they are never excused. An excuse admits the fact charged or the thing done, but endeavours to show that it ought to be leniently dealt with, on the ground of extenuating circumstances, and is often the line adopted by pleaders when justification seems impossible. It is then tantamount to a weak defence. An excuse may be against an obligation as well as a charge, as when an invitation is met with an excuse. In such cases excuse refers not to something done, but omitted to be done. It depends for its validity less on its intrinsic force, than on the disposition of those to whom it is made. It commonly carries an unfavourable reflexion, and a good excuse is most probably only apt, clever, and ingenious. The person who employs the

excuse, is said to excuse himself, while he who accepts the excuse, is also said to excuse him.

"And there are few actions so ill, unless they are of a very deep and black tincture indeed, but will admit of some extenuation at least from these common topics of human frailty, such as are ignorance or inadvertency, passion or surprise, company or solicitation, with many other such things which may go a great way towards an *excusing* of the agent, though they cannot absolutely *justify* the action."—SOUTH.

A PLEA (Fr. *plaid*, Lat. *plăcĭtum, an ordinance*) is a specific point of self-defence. It is as it were an item in the general sense of a defence, so that we may put in successively one plea, and then another. Technically speaking, the allegation of the plaintiff is answered by the plea of the defendant. An apology is satisfactory or unsatisfactory, a defence is successful or unsuccessful, justification is complete or partial, an excuse valid or invalid, a plea strong or weak.

"*Defence* in its true legal sense signifies not a justification, protection, or guard, which is now its popular signification, but merely an opposing or denial (from the French verb *défendre*) of the truth or validity of the complaint."—BLACKSTONE.

"They towards the throne supreme
Accountable made haste to make appear
With righteous plea their utmost vigilance
And easily approved." MILTON.

APPARATUS. PARAPHERNALIA. These stand related as the useful to the ornamental. APPARATUS (Lat. *appărāre, to adjust*) is the aggregate of implements of art, or physical organs necessary to form some production or promote some natural function. PARAPHERNALIA is a L.L. adjective, the substantive *bona*, i.e. *goods*, being understood. The paraphernalia were such goods as a wife possessed beyond her dowry, and were her own property independently of her husband: παρά, *beyond*, and φέρνη, *dower*. As this kind of property would naturally consist mainly in personal ornaments and apparel, the word came to signify an aggregate of furniture or implements subservient to some ornamental purpose; such as robes, hangings, movable decorations, costly utensils.

APPARENT. VISIBLE. CLEAR. DISTINCT. MANIFEST. PLAIN. OBVIOUS. EVIDENT. CONSPICUOUS. PALPABLE. PERCEPTIBLE. TANGIBLE.

APPARENT (Lat. *appārēre, to appear*) is used in the sense of either clear, visible, as opposed to concealed or dubious; or, secondly, seeming as opposed to real; or, thirdly, seeming in the sense of probable, and so opposite to certain. It is in the first of these senses that it is a synonym with the above. That is apparent which the bodily eye sees or the understanding perceives. The word says nothing of any properties of the thing which it qualifies, but only states the fact. It serves to qualify properties of things visible. Thus the star is visible. Its brightness is apparent. This would mean a very different thing from saying, the object is apparently grey, in reference to a colour about which, whether from distance, want of light, or some such cause, we were in doubt.

"When there is no *apparent* cause in the sky, the water will sometimes appear dappled with large spots of shade."—GILPIN'S *Tour*.

VISIBLE (Lat. *vīsĭbĭlis*) expresses what can be seen physically by the sense of sight. It admits of every degree, from the barely discernible to the conspicuous. That is visible which is not invisible. Unlike apparent, visible expresses the property by which the thing is capable of being seen. That is apparent to me which is, by its own nature and properties, visible.

"Maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things *visible* and invisible."—*Nicene Creed*.

The CONSPICUOUS (Lat. *conspĭcuus*) is the prominently visible. The cause of this prominence is indefinite; one object being conspicuous by its size, another by its colour, another by its elevation. That is conspicuous which makes itself seen. A man may be conspicuous by being unlike others, or eccentric. The term, as applied to persons externally, is either favourable or the contrary. Persons may be unenviably conspicuous by reason of awkwardness of manner, or conceit, or extravagance, outlandishness, or

over-bright colouring in dress. It is by analogy that conspicuous is employed to express moral distinction, as by Macaulay:—

"A man who holds a *conspicuous* place in the political, ecclesiastical, or literary history of England."

Clear (Lat. *clarus*) expresses primarily that on which the light shines with unobstructed brightness. The clear object stands out against the sky and in form well defined.

That is Distinct (Lat. *distinguĕre*, part. *distinctus, to distinguish*) which is clear in its parts and clearly separated from other objects. The opposite to clear is dim or obscure, the opposite to distinct is confused. It is possible to see an object as in a fog clearly without seeing it distinctly. It is clearly visible, inasmuch as we can have no doubt of its being there, and understand it to be what it is. It is indistinctly visible, inasmuch as the parts which constitute it are not fully distinguishable. At some distance out to sea, I see clearly a boat. I take my telescope, and then observe distinctly that there are four persons in it. Clearness is absolute distinctness, as distinctness is relative clearness. The terms belong to sound as well as sight. A well-toned bell has a clear sound. In a distant peal I hear the tones most distinctly. A clear truth is well comprehended, a distinct truth is held independently.

"Things that move so swift as not to affect the senses *distinctly* with several distinguishable distances of their motion, and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind, are not also perceived to move."—Locke.

Manifest (Lat. *mănĭfestus*) expresses that which is very plainly and palpably apparent. The Latin *manifestus* had the peculiar sense of clearly convicted. Dryden used the term in one of its classic senses when he says:—

"Your eyes beheld
The traitor *manifest*."

And again:—

"Calistho there stood *manifest* of shame."

That is manifest which is brought to light out of comparative darkness, and exhibits itself without concealment. A man taken off his guard will often manifest his true character, though he may habitually conceal or keep it in check. A manifest liar stands convicted. A manifest contradiction needs no criticism, but by its own inherent force makes itself apparent. It is a term of mental and moral rather than of purely physical application. Not material objects, but their properties or facts connected with them, as statements and truths, are said to be manifest.

Plain (Lat. *plānus*) belongs to matters both of the senses and the intellect. We see, hear, smell, taste, feel, speak plainly. As that is clear which is lucid in itself, so that is plain of which ordinary faculties can take cognizance. The plain path lies open to the view, level and mapped out under the eye. A plain course is distinct, intelligible, unobstructed. A thing may be stated so clearly as to be plain to the meanest understanding.

"Why, 'tis a *plain* case."
Shakespeare.

Obvious (Lat. *obvius, coming or going to meet*) retains the force of its etymology. That is obvious which we cannot help understanding, which it is impossible to overlook, which carries its own meaning on the face of it. Its plainness supersedes all explanation or comment. An obvious remark is a truism, for by its nature it is as clear to others as it is to one's self. The literal meaning is set forth in the following:—

"The hero's bones with careful view
select;
Apart and easy to be known they lie
Amidst the heap, and *obvious* to the eye."
Pope.

Evident (Lat. *ēvĭdentem*) denotes what is easily recognizable as a fact or truth. That is evident which is plainly seen. What is clearly proved is evident, what proves itself is obvious. Some effort of mind is needed to discern what is evident, none to take in what is obvious. The axioms of mathematics are obvious. Truths

deduced from them are evident. It is obvious that the whole is greater than a part. It is evident that moral truth must be morally accepted, for it is incapable of demonstration. The apparent is opposed to the indistinguishable, the clear to the obscure, the visible to the invisible, the manifest to the disguised, concealed, or suppressed; the plain to the unintelligible or doubtful, the obvious to the recondite or abstruse, the evident to the questionable, the conspicuous to the inconspicuous or minute.

"No idea, therefore, can be undistinguishable from another from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself; for from all other it is *evidently* different."—LOCKE.

APPEARANCE. ASPECT.

APPEARANCE (Lat. *appārēre, to appear*) is used for the fact, the character, and the semblance or seeming nature, of appearing. It is in the two latter points that it is a synonym with aspect. The appearance of a thing is total. Its aspect is partial. The aspect, in short, is a part of the appearance. The formation of the word (Lat. *aspĭcĕre*, part. *aspectus, to behold*) shows this. The human appearance is the human figure, with the accidents of dress and others, the human aspect is the human face. The whole of any subject or object, with the properties and substance of it, is its appearance. Its aspect is some one characteristic side or face of it, which it presents to us as a point of view. The aspect carries with it an expressiveness which does not belong to its mere appearance. The appearance wears a character, the aspect wears a meaning. The heavens have a clear or cloudy appearance, a serene or stormy aspect. The appearance is a conclusion in itself, the aspect suggests further conclusions. In the moral as in the natural world we cannot see an object in its entirety, but can only in series connote those different aspects which make up our conception of the thing.

"Tydides stood, in *aspect* lion-like
And terrible, in strength as forest boars."
COWPER, *Iliad.*

APPEASE. ALLAY. ALLEVIATE. RELIEVE. PACIFY. MITIGATE. SOOTHE. ASSUAGE. CALM.

APPEASE (O. Fr. *apaisier*, O. Fr. *à pais, to peace*) is literally to bring to a state of peace. It is to reduce a state of violence, tumult, disturbance, excitement by luring back to peace; that is, to the common and proper order and harmony which belongs to things, and out of which they have been carried so as to be in a state of internal commotion. Although not inapplicable to physical elements and influences, APPEASE seems to suit moral cases far better. The storm calms; wrath or the cravings of men and beasts are appeased. In order to appease it commonly happens that something has to be paid, because when moral beings need to be appeased, they are in some condition of violent satisfaction, or demand.

"We, like unskilful or unruly patients, fondly imagine that the only way to *appease* our desires is to grant them the objects they so passionately tend to."—BOYLE.

PACIFY (Lat. *pacĭfĭcare*) has etymologically the same sense as APPEASE, but is employed of lesser disturbances of mind, and of mind only. Pacify belongs to the feelings of men, and not in any way to the force of things. While violent anger or eager appetites are appeased, importunity, discontent, peevishness, restlessness, or petty tumults are pacified.

"Not one diverting syllable now at a pinch to *pacify* our mishap."—L'ESTRANGE.

CALM (Fr. *calme*) is positive and direct, as appease is indirect. To appease is to put an end to violent motion. To calm is to produce great tranquillity. We have seen that the commotion which needs appeasing is of a special kind. Other kinds may be calmed. As anger, for instance, is appeased, so fear, or anxiety, or uneasiness is calmed. He who is under vexation, disappointment, or despair, needs to be calmed. He is to be appeased who wields his passions. He is to be calmed also who is overmastered by them. The strong therefore need to be appeased, and the weak calmed. Just and full satisfaction appeases, soothing words and assurances are

often needed to calm. In the cases to which they are both applicable, to appease involves a more permanent settlement than to calm. Clever treatment may sometimes calm, but satisfaction of mind is involved in being appeased. He who is calmed is for the time set at rest. He who is appeased has no more cause of desire or discontent.

"The affairs of Turkey were then in great disorder. The Grand Seignior died soon after, and his successor in that Empire gave his subjects such hopes of peace that they were *calmed* for the present."—BURNET.

The term RELIEVE (Lat. *rĕlĕvāre*) is employed in all cases where a pressure of a burden exists, or may be imagined. Pain or grief is said to be relieved when it is either partially or entirely removed. The same may be said of duties, cares, responsibilities, anxieties. On the other hand, that which is ALLEVIATED (Lat. *allĕvare, to lighten*) is only partially removed. A pain is alleviated by being made less. Commonly speaking, the person is relieved when the burden is alleviated. Things which affect our feelings are alleviated. Those which affect our condition or circumstances may be said to be relieved. The object of giving relief to the poor is the alleviation of the pressure of poverty.

"The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order as he had done before, as the comforters of their distress and the *relievers* of their indigence."—ADAM SMITH.

"The calamity of the want of the sense of hearing is much *alleviated*; comparatively speaking, it is removed by giving the use of letters and of speech, by which they, the deaf, are admitted to the pleasure of social conversation."—HORSLEY.

MITIGATE (Lat. *mītīgāre, to soften*) stands to the severe, as relieve and alleviate to the oppressive. Things are mitigated which affect us hardly, harshly, painfully; as anger, penalty, pain, evil, hatred; and even physical influences, as cold, or the taste of sharpness. It is, like ALLEVIATE, expressive of a diminishing not a removing influence. Cruelty or acidity mitigated remains cruel and acid. It is used only of things or the qualities of persons, not of persons themselves. Severity in action, suffering, or treatment, is susceptible of mitigation. Time, though it may never remove, is sure to mitigate an affliction. It is part of wise legislation to mitigate over-rigorous laws.

"All it can do is to devise how that which must be endured may be *mitigated*."—HOOKER.

ASSUAGE (O. Fr. *assuager*, Prov. *assuaviar*, Lat. *suāvis, sweet*: SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) is to soften down. It is very like MITIGATE, but is more positive and active. When pain is mitigated, it is less severe than before, when it is assuaged we have a feeling of relief and ease. It is to pain and grief, that is, to mental and bodily suffering, that ASSUAGE is ordinarily applied. But it is applicable to any strong emotion, passion, or appetite which is fierce or violent in its character, as ardour, anger, hunger.

"But to *assuage*
Th' impatient fervour which it first conceives
Within its reeking bosom, threatening death
To his young hopes requires discreet delay."
COWPER.

ALLAY (Fr. *alléger*, Lat. *allĕviāre*) is employed in reference not so much to the violent or the painful, as to that which excites, disturbs, and makes uneasy. If pain is assuaged, irritation is allayed. Harassing thirst, eager curiosity, feverish restlessness, pain which is more irksome or severe, sorrow which belongs more to regret than to remorse, are allayed.

SOOTHE (A.S. *gesothian, to soothe*) belongs both to persons and to what they suffer, while ALLAY is applicable only to the suffering. It indicates its reduction, and that often only temporary, rather than its removal. It denotes, perhaps, more strongly than ASSUAGE, a feeling of comparative comfort in him whose suffering is softened. The angry man soothed is not only no longer angry, but in a softened state of mind. The pain that is soothed is almost converted into pleasure.

"Gentle stroking with a smooth hand allays violent pains and cramps, and relaxes the suffering parts from their unnatural tension."—BURKE.

"Sacred history has acquainted us with the power of music over the passions, and there is little doubt but the verse as well as the lyre of David was able to *soothe* the troubled spirits to repose."—KNOX, *Essays*.

APPLAUSE. PRAISE.

Although these words are applicable both to persons and things, yet APPLAUSE (Lat. *applaudĕre*, part. *applausus*) is better suited to things, such as actions, discourses, or performances. And PRAISE (cf. Fr. *priser, to prize*, Lat. *prĕtiare*) to persons. One applauds in public, and at the moment when the action is done, or the speech pronounced. One praises at all times, on all accounts, and under all circumstances, the absent and the present, for what they do, or are, or have become. Applause is the lively expression of our satisfaction at the exhibition of excellence in persons, and may be even by gesture or significant actions, as clapping the hands. Praise is supposed to be based upon judgment, and to be the expression of discernment. It is manifested in words exclusively. Almost any applause is flattering. But we put praises to the test, and require that they should be delicate and sincere. Slight applause is so far grateful. Slight praise is often indirect condemnation. From formal and flippant praises we naturally recoil; the former may be hollow ceremony, the latter may be only irony.

APPLICATION. ATTENTION. STUDY.

These terms express different degrees of attention which the mind gives to the subjects with which it is occupied. Application is serious and sustained attention. It is needful for knowing the *whole* of a subject. MEDITATION (Lat. *mĕditationem*) is a reflecting attention given in detail, which is needful for knowing thoroughly. STUDY (Lat. *stŭdia*, pl. *studies*) is a strong and laborious attention needful for resolving complex subjects, or overcoming difficulties. Application implies the will and desire of knowledge. Meditation implies sympathy with the subject, and a desire to become familiar with it in all its aspects. Study implies difficulty or importance in the subject-matter, a firm resolution to master it, not to be deterred by its difficulties, nor repelled by its hardness. Soundness of mind for application, penetration of mind for meditation, and strength and breadth of mind for study.

ATTENTION (Lat. *attentiōnem*) is a condition of mind; its ordinary attitude, so to speak, in study. It may be casual. We often give attention without being employed in study. We shall not understand the most ordinary observation addressed to us without some degree of attention. Attention is no more than the giving of the mind to a subject to the disregard of other subjects. APPLICATION (Lat. *applicātiōnem ănĭmi, Cic.*) is a wider term than attention, and is not only a state of mind, but a power. Application involves attention. Having application, I am able to give attention. Application is the faculty of sustained attention. Many persons are capable of attention (in short, to some extent every thinking being is so), who have not application. Their attention, therefore, is irregular and inadequate. Study should be systematic; its subjects rightly apportioned as to arrangement and the time to be devoted to it. It will vary in character according to the subject of it, which may be any department of human knowledge. Study should be systematic, application diligent, attention close. Habits of study are formed in these earlier stages by converting the attention of the young into application by indirect methods, such as by making the subjects of learning attractive, or by the adventitious enhancement of them by prizes for competition.

"That very philosophy which had been adopted to invent and explain articles of faith was now studied only to interest us in the history of the human mind, and to assist us in developing its faculties, and regulating its operations."—WARBURTON.

"They say the tongues of dying men
Enforce *attention* like deep harmony."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Had his *application* been equal to his talents, his progress might have been greater."—JAY.

APPOSITE. RELEVANT.

These terms have an exclusive reference to the suitableness or propriety of statements in relation to some main case or argument. RELEVANT is the Fr. *relevant*, the participle of *relever*, probably in the sense of holding in feudal tenure. APPOSITE is Lat. participle *appŏsitus*, *placed in juxtaposition*. Hence APPOSITE expresses a quality, RELEVANT a force. A remark is apposite which harmonizes with the case under consideration. An observation is relevant which helps the main question to a decision. That, however, which is done directly by that which is relevant, may be done indirectly by that which is apposite. The apposite elucidates, the relevant promotes discussion. The apposite is a proposition; the relevant either an argument, or something which links itself on to argument. Apposite remarks are commonly made in general conversation by persons not taking a main part in the discussion, but throwing in pertinent sayings as listeners. The relevant owes its force solely to its argumentative appropriateness; the apposite is also timely, and often tells with peculiar effect upon the conjuncture at which it is introduced.

APPRAISE. APPRECIATE. ESTIMATE. ESTEEM. VALUE. PRIZE.

APPRAISE and APPRECIATE are different forms of the same word, Lat. *apprĕtiare*, of which the Lat. *prĕtium*, *price*, is the root. The English *praise* has the same origin, meaning literally, to set a *price* or value. Material goods are appraised for the purpose of ascertaining their market value. Things are appreciated at their moral value; as character, conduct, acts, persons. Appreciate looks on the favourable side of things. We appreciate not a man's faults, but his merits. This idea of favourable regard appears yet more strongly in the adjective appreciative. An appreciative audience is one which appreciates the excellences of the exhibition.

ESTIMATE (Lat. *æstīmāre*) is an act of judgment. ESTEEM (from the same origin) is an act of valuing or prizing with moral approbation. Nice calculation is necessary to estimate, nice feeling also to appreciate. An union of sound judgment with refined sensibility enables persons to appreciate. That which has to be estimated is open to view, that which has to be appreciated must often be sought out first. Appreciation notes things not only at their moral worth, but according to their individual and peculiar excellence. Women have a truer appreciation, that is, a more delicate perception of character, than most men. He who can appreciate perceives the niceties and specialities of a case. He does not overlook what is worthy of regard. He sees the importance of what, to people in general, are unimportant differences. I estimate a thing when I determine its present or future value or importance. This is sometimes done in a rough way, and only approximately. I appreciate it when I see characteristics of it in detail. I esteem another when I estimate his character as worthy of regard. Esteem is akin to affection. To VALUE a thing (Fr. Lat. *value*, *subst.*, from *valoir*, *to be worth*) is to affix the idea of worth, great or small, real or fictitious, pecuniary or moral.

PRIZE (Fr. *prix*, *price*) and ESTEEM denote mental action, the former being commonly employed of external, the latter of moral things, or of external things for the sake of something beyond themselves. I value a book highly or cheaply. I prize it for its intrinsic worth or for the sake of the person who gave it to me. I do not esteem it at all, though I may esteem the author or the donor of it. The state of mind involved in prizing anything is one of the highest regard; the thoughts are concentrated on the object; it is treasured with a strong personal feeling. It is jealously guarded, and the possession of it confers a happiness on the possessor, which he is fain to think peculiar to himself. He thinks himself more fortunate than others who have it not. The value we set upon that which we prize may be more than just.

"No, dear as freedom is, and in my heart's
Just estimation prized above all price;
I had much rather be myself the slave
And wear the bonds than fasten them on him." COWPER.

VALUE, like APPRECIATE and ESTEEM, takes the favourable side. It commonly means to set a high value; as to appreciate is not only to affix a price or value, but its just and due amount. This favourable leaning does not belong to APPRAISE or ESTIMATE. How often are the good esteemed! It would seem strange that it should not be so—they do not provoke the ill feelings of human nature—they are inoffensive and kind. Yet how seldom are they appreciated for those hidden values and self-denials, into which the world little cares to inquire!

"The statute therefore granted this writ, by which the defendants' goods and chattels are not sold but only *appraised*, and all of them except oxen, and beasts of the plough, are delivered to the plaintiff at such reasonable appraisement and price, in part satisfaction of the debt."—BLACKSTONE.

The strict etymological use of appreciate appears in the following:—

"A sin, a vice, a crime, are the objects of theology, ethics, jurisprudence. Whenever their judgments agree they corroborate each other; but as often as they differ, a prudent legislator *appreciates* the guilt and punishment according to the measure of social injury."—GIBBON.

In contrast with this, Bishop Hall uses the term as follows: He says that the golden vials of incense of the angels in the apocalypse represent "both their acceptable thanksgivings and their general *appreciation* of peace and welfare to the church of God upon earth."

"Their wisdom which to present power consents
Live dogs before dead horses *estimates*."
DANIEL.

"*Esteem* is the value which we place upon some degree of worth. It is higher than simple approbation, which is a decision of judgment. *Esteem* is the commencement of affection."—COGAN.

"Authors like coins grow dear as they grow old,
It is the rust we value, not the gold."
POPE.

APPREHEND. COMPREHEND. UNDERSTAND. CONCEIVE. PERCEIVE.

To APPREHEND (Lat. *apprĕhendĕre*) is, literally, *to lay hold of* by the mind after the analogy of grasping with the hand. It is the simplest act of the understanding, the recognition of a fact. APPREHENSION in this sense (Fr. *appréhension*, as a synonym with fear) expresses no process or result of animate knowledge, profound insight, or mature judgment, but such a view or belief as we are inclined to entertain upon the ground of ordinary indications, and our present state and stock of information. I may apprehend a thing as true or false, probable or improbable, desirable or undesirable. Apprehension is a low and limited understanding of a thing. Where the nature of the thing is plain or common, apprehension answers the purpose of understanding it. The axioms of mathematics are intuitively, or at least naturally and easily, apprehended. In the following we have such a use of APPREHEND as to illustrate the two-fold meaning of understanding and fear. When the fact apprehended is future, probable and unwelcome apprehension combines the ideas of recognition and dread.

"It was once proposed to discriminate the slaves by a particular habit, but it was justly *apprehended* that there might be some danger in acquainting them with their own numbers."—GIBBON.

COMPREHEND (Lat. *comprĕhendĕre, to clasp*) is an advance upon apprehend. It is very like UNDERSTAND. To understand is to have the free use of one's reasoning powers in recognizing the nature, properties, relation, use, or meaning of things. We understand matters of ordinary discourse and the practical business of life. To comprehend is to embrace a thing in all its compass and extent. I understand the meaning of a word. I comprehend the action of a machine. I understand a thing when I can explain it, and show its relation to other things. I apprehend a thing when it is brought into direct relation to my own mind. I comprehend it when I know all about it. Accordingly UNDERSTAND marks more commonly a conformity of ideas with terms employed, COMPREHEND with the nature

of the thing propounded, and CONCEIVE (Lat. *concĭpĕre*) with the order and purpose of something presented to the mind. One understands languages, comprehends sciences, conceives possibilities, and apprehends facts. CONCEIVE sometimes belongs to the entertainment of an idea, and sometimes of a judgment or belief. In either case one conceives with more than the use of the understanding, and with a combination of understanding and imagination. I fill up the void in the actual by importing ideas of the possible. I suppose causes, reasons, objects or purposes, by supplying which I seek to give an account of the thing to myself. I apprehend, understand, and comprehend things present. I conceive things future and unrealized. I conceive a plan, purpose, design. The courtier understands the ways of the court. The mathematician comprehends his problem. The man of business apprehends that there will be a rise or fall of prices, and conceives that it must be owing to such a cause. The architect conceives the plan of a building.

"It was amongst the ruins of the Capitol that I first *conceived* the idea of a work which has amused and exercised near twenty years of my life."—GIBBON.

"And how much soever any truth may seem above our *understanding* and *comprehension*, yet if they come attested by His divine infallible authority, we have infinitely more ground to be persuaded of them than we are of any thing that we ourselves may seem to *comprehend* or *understand*."—BEVERIDGE.

PERCEIVE (Lat. *percĭpĕre*) has a two-fold meaning. We perceive external objects, when the mind becomes aware of their presence by the senses, and also perceive truths, when the mind has been led, whether by reasoning or otherwise, to take cognizance of them. It is difficult to understand what is enigmatical, to comprehend what is abstract, to conceive what is confused, to perceive what is indistinct, to apprehend what is unlikely in reason or in fact.

"Jupiter made all things, and all things whatsoever exist are the works of Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and heaven, and what are between them, and gods and men, and all animals, whatsoever is *perceivable* either by sense or by the mind."—CUDWORTH.

APPROACH. APPROXIMATE.

These verbs (Lat. *appropiare* and *approximare*) are both formed originally from the Lat. *prŏpe, near, proximus, nearest.* They differ in the degree of nearness expressed. When two things approach, the interval between them is materially lessened. But they may be said to approximate if the interval is in any degree lessened, though it may after all be very great. An approximate calculation is sometimes professedly inexact, and only the best that can be made. Approximate has a more abstract application than approach. Approach implies a diminution of distance, or o what may be conceived as analogous to distance. Approximation may mean the diminution of difference, as in character or properties. The character of the lowest savage approximates to that of the brute. In this sense approximation is similarity.

"Let matter be divided into the subtilest parts imaginable, and these be moved as swiftly as you will, it is but a senseless and stupid being still, and makes no nearer *approach* to sense, perception, or vital energy than it had before."—RAY, *On Creation.*

"The largest capacity and the most noble dispositions are but an *approximatum* to the proper standard and true symmetry of human nature."—J. TAYLOR.

APPROBATION. APPROVAL.

APPROBATION (Lat. *approbatiōnem*) is the sentiment of which APPROVAL is the expression. We entertain approbation and express approval. It is possible to feel in our hearts approbation of conduct in others, which we may not have the moral courage to sanction by open and unreserved approval.

APPROPRIATE. SUITABLE.

APPROPRIATE (Lat. *appropriāre, to make one's own*) is to SUITABLE (Fr. *suite, a following*) as the subjective to the objective, the appropriate being the suitable in conception, and never employed of physical or mechanical adaptation. SUITABLE is, therefore, the wider term and simpler. That is suit-

able which is in any way adapted to a thing. That is appropriate which accords with the conceptions formed of it. Suitable belongs rather to the purpose and use of things. Appropriate to their manner and character. Suitable is a practical term. Appropriate is a term of taste. Suitable may be between two physical or two moral terms; appropriate implies, at least, one moral. Again, appropriate is a more specific, suitable a more general term. That is appropriate which peculiarly fits or suits the general character, or some property or peculiarity of a thing. That is suitable which is not unsuitable; the one is an apt, the other a permissible, accompaniment.

"In its strict and *appropriate* meaning, especially as applied to our Saviour's parables, it (parable) signifies a short narrative of some event or fact, real or fictitious, in which a continued comparison is carried on between sensible and spiritual objects, and under this similitude some important doctrine, moral or religious, is conveyed and enforced."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

"Raphael, amidst his tenderness and friendship for man, shows such a dignity and condescension in all his speech and behaviour as are suitable to a superior nature."—ADDISON.

APPROPRIATE. USURP. ARROGATE. ASSUME.

The idea common to these words is that of making or pretending a right. Of these, the widest in signification and most varied in force is the last. To ASSUME (Lat. *assūmĕre*) is to take to one's self. This may be done with or without right, and in any degree from the most temporary to the most permanent assumption. We assume truth, probability, right, that is, we conceive them as proved or granted; in which sense the word is considered elsewhere. We do not assume physical objects simply as such, unless they have some force or significance beyond themselves. I take, not assume, my hat; but if I placed in it a feather as a badge of leadership or party, I should be said to assume it. It is in connexion with this sense of taking, in order to wear, that assume so often bears the meaning of taking with pretence, or falsely assuming.

"*Assume* a virtue if you have it not."
SHAKESPEARE.

ASSUME and APPROPRIATE indicate less demonstrative action than USURP (Lat. *usurpāre, to make use of*, and, afterwards, to *usurp*) and ARROGATE (Lat. *arrŏgāre, to adopt, to claim unfairly*). I appropriate a thing when I make it peculiarly mine; and as this may be to the exclusion of others having an equal or better right to it, the word is tinged with an idea of injustice. The radical idea of appropriate is to make property to belong, to set apart, for a peculiar relation, use, or possession, either in regard to one's self or in regard to some other. In this point it differs from the rest, which are applicable only to one's self. Right and wrong are blended in arrogate. To arrogate is to assume as one's right in a haughty manner; to usurp is to take to one's self that which is in the use or enjoyment not properly one's own. The term belongs to power, titles, rights, possessions, authority, privileges, and the like. In their most unfavourable senses, appropriation is without right, usurpation is against right, arrogation claims right, and assumption ignores right. The selfish and unfair appropriate, the audacious and intrusive usurp, the vain arrogate, the cool, determined, and insolent, assume.

"Pompey, Crassus, and Cæsar, had found the sweets of arbitrary power, and each being a check to the others' growth, struck up a false friendship among themselves, and divided the government betwixt them, which none of them was able to *assume* alone."—DRYDEN.

"But these (glebe tithes, &c.) are sometimes *appropriated*, that is, the benefice is perpetually annexed to some spiritual corporation."—BLACKSTONE.

"The half lettered are forward, and *arrogate* to themselves what a modest, studious man dares not, though he knows more."—WOOLASTON.

"An *usurper* can never have right on his side."—LOCKE.

APT. READY. PROMPT.

These terms all denote the possession of mental activity, with, however, some shades of difference. The APT man (Lat. *aptus, fit*) is he who can with comparative ease qualify himself for the exercise of some function of body or mind. Aptness is specific

capacity rapidly developed. A man may be apt to learn or apt to teach. In its wider sense APT means naturally fitted, as having a tendency to produce an effect or even to be affected; hence inclined, liable.

READY (A. S. *rǽd*) expresses both a passive condition of things, and an active quality of persons. The ready is he who can meet the requirements of a particular case without much forecasting, who from the armoury of his own resources can draw at short notice what is wanted for immediate use on an occasion. The apt man is so by natural power and fitness. The ready man by natural quickness and versatility of mind. The former in time learns much, the latter in a moment speaks or acts effectively.

PROMPTITUDE (L. Lat. *promptitūdo*) is an attribute of persons exclusively. The prompt man is ready for practical purposes and matters of business, as the ready man is prompt for purposes less grave or exigent, as in reply or rejoinder. The prompt man is so by virtue of an energetic will. The ready man has cleverness, the prompt man decision. He sees the necessity of immediate action, and loses nothing by delay. He who is not ready is slow, he who is not prompt is dilatory. The ready man meets a difficulty, the prompt man an obligation.

"*Apt* to teach."—ENG. BIBLE.

"*Ready* in devising expedients."—MACAULAY.

"To the stern sanction of the offended sky
My *prompt* obedience bows." POPE.

APTITUDE. FITNESS.

FITNESS is not confined to any kind of subject in particular, being equally moral and material in its application. APTITUDE expresses the active fitness of moral beings and character, while FITNESS is only passive. In material subjects, fitness is a quality or condition, aptitude a latent force. Oil has naturally an aptitude to burn, and men have an aptitude to acquire habits, good or evil. Aptitude implies a particular purpose, action, or effect, inherent in the subject. Fitness a mere external suitability, congruity, or commensurateness. Fitness belongs to objects, aptitude to the qualities of objects.

ARBOUR. BOWER.

The ARBOUR, a corruption of the word *harbour*, has come to designate the bower, or rustic shelter which was a conspicuous feature of it.

BOWER is the A. S. *búr*, *a chamber*, with which in Old English it was simply equivalent; the lady's bower being the lady's chamber. Arbour became confounded with the Latin *arbor*, and thus probably has come to mean a thick-set retreat of overshadowing foliage; and the bower from being the private chamber within the house became the leafy recess or refuge beyond it. In their modern application, the words seem to differ very slightly. But ARBOUR has the more artificial sound. As an arbour is an artificial bower, so a bower is often a natural arbour. The woods furnish, by the natural interlacing of their boughs in many places, such retreats as would be called bowers rather than arbours.

ARCHIVES. RECORDS.

Strictly speaking, and according to their etymology, the latter are documents, and the former places in which those documents are preserved. It may be said generally that any authentic memorial of facts or proceedings is a RECORD (Lat. *recordāri*, *to remember*). The Greek ἀρχεῖον meant the court of a magistrate, being the repository of public acts.

ARCHIVES is never used but in the sense of documents connected with the past history and transactions of the state. RECORDS with greater latitude is employed of any kind of occurrences, as of social proceedings or local history.

ARDUOUS. DIFFICULT. HARD.

HARD (A. S. *heard*) expresses in a blunter and more general way what DIFFICULT (Lat. *difficilis*) and ARDUOUS (Lat. *arduus*) express in a more particular and refined way. Any tough business of the mind or the hand

may be called hard. It is simply a strong analogous term. That is hard which seems to resist our efforts and tax our strength. Difficulty is a kind of hardness, namely, that which requires some mental aptitude besides mere work and perseverance to overcome. The making of roads is not difficult work. It is simply hard work. But it is difficult for the engineer when the country does not furnish the requisite material, and he has to substitute some other material which, perhaps, has to be brought from a distance, while the means of transit and transport are not at hand. Hardness is simple. Difficulty is complex. ARDUOUS denotes that which requires the sustained exertion of mind or body. It calls not only for an ingenious mind, and a patient, persevering spirit, but for some loftiness of aim. It will probably be made up of many hardnesses and many difficulties which have to be successively encountered, endured, and overcome before the end, which, from the first, was seen at a distance, shall have been attained. In hardness there is no disproportion between the means and the end, the faculties and the work. The opposite is rather implied in the term. To accomplish a hard task needs time, patience, and perseverance. In difficulty, such a disproportion does exist, and it has to be supplied out of the mental resources of the agent. And after all, the difficulty may be insuperable. A difficult operation in surgery does not involve great bodily effort, but is constituted by the delicacy of the matter operated upon, and the need of constant care to avoid the serious consequences of slight deviations or of casual ignorance or oversight. In things which are arduous, the difficulty comes rather from within, the danger of a lack of energy or effort. An arduous undertaking is commonly a demand rather upon a man's moral strength than upon his sagacity or skill. An arduous undertaking is naturally such to all. On the other hand, that which is hard or difficult to one, may be quite easy to another.

"Have you been evil spoken of, and your character injured when you knew yourself innocent? this is *hard* to bear as worldly principles."—GILPIN'S *Sermons*.

"Was ever anything *difficult* or glorious achieved by a sudden cast of a thought!"—SOUTH.

"Hear how learn'd Greece her useful rules indites,
When to repress and when indulge our flights,
High on Parnassus' top her sons she show'd,
And pointed out those *arduous* paths they trod."
POPE.

ARGUMENT. CONTROVERSY.

ARGUMENT (Lat. *argumentum*) is that which argues, or is brought forward in arguing. An argument may be complex, elaborate, replete with varied reasoning, but it is single, uniform. CONTROVERSY (Lat. *contrōversia*) is antagonistic argument, and in an extended sense the sum of the arguments on both sides of a question. A preacher may have well sustained the argument of his discourse, but he must never flatter himself that it will not be made matter of controversy among his hearers.

ARISTOCRACY. NOBILITY.

The ARISTOCRACY, in the ancient sense of the term, was a governing body of the chief or best men, ἀριστοκρατία—ἄριστος, *best*, and κρατεῖν, *to rule*. So Ben Jonson—

"If the Senate
Right not our quest in this, I will protest them
No aristocracy."

Hence it has come to signify among ourselves the upper classes, especially those who are raised above trades and professions. The NOBILITY (Lat. *nōbilitatem*) consists of those who hold patents of peerage, and in a wider sense, their families. Hence it follows that though the nobility belong to the aristocracy of the country, there will be a large portion of the aristocracy who are not personally ennobled nor belong by birth to noble families, as the landed aristocracy. By an extension of the term we apply it to some who have no pretensions to the claim of patented nobility. There is an aristocracy of talent and of wealth, but those who are in this sense ennobled, depend for their titles on the conflicting sentiments of mankind.

ARMISTICE. TRUCE.

These terms are coincident in their general meaning of a temporary cessation of hostilities between parties contending in battle. The TRUCE (Old Eng. *trewes*, A. S. *tryws-ian*, *to pledge one's faith*) is the less formal of the two, so that it has found its way into common metaphorical language, as ARMISTICE (Lat. *armistĭtium*; Lat. *arma*, *arms*, and *sistĕre*, *to stop*) has not. So the word TRUCE is often employed to express a cessation, temporary or otherwise, of what is vexatiously antagonistic; as in noisy arguments, or the intermission of tedious or painful action of any kind. The consent of commanders, or according to the laws of honourable warfare, the mere exhibition under certain circumstances of a flag, may bring about a truce for some particular purpose, such as a consultation between the rival generals, or an opportunity for burying the bodies of the slain. An armistice is more formal and prolonged, and is regulated by articles and conditions; as, for instance, that on the cession of a small territory, a besieged town shall be permitted to revictual its garrison.

ARMS. WEAPONS.

ARMS (Lat. *arma*) seems to be used both in a general and a specific sense. In the general sense it means all that a man carries when armed, that is, of offensive and defensive. In this general sense it is distinguished from WEAPON (A. S. *wǽpen*), which always means an implement of active or offensive warfare. But usage has introduced another distinction. Weapon is employed of such implements as are extemporaneously assumed, or of such things as are converted into implements of defence, while arms is used of those which are uniformly made and recognized as such. According as it is regarded with fixed character, a thing may be called an arm or a weapon. The sword is one of the soldier's arms, and a necessary weapon it is. The tongue may be used as a poisoned weapon. A spade is in itself an implement of husbandry. It may be a formidable weapon in the hands of an angry rustic. ARMS, unlike WEAPON, is a rhetorical term, and stands for the deeds and exploits of war.

"*Arms* and the man I sing."
DRYDEN'S *Virgil*.

"He lays down
His *arms*, but not his wills."
MILTON.

"Woman's *weapons*, water-drops."
SHAKESPEARE.

ARRIVE. COME.

TO COME (A. S. *cuman*) is vague, and independent of time, manner, or circumstances. TO ARRIVE (Fr. *arriver*) denotes an anticipated or appointed coming. It is used of things, persons, events, and time, or points of time. Things come by chance or nature. They arrive by order or arrangement. The train comes when it approaches. It arrives at a certain place and hour.

"In the Epistles of S. Paul, S. Peter, and S. James, we find frequent mention of the *coming* of our Lord in terms which, like those of the text, may at first seem to imply an expectation in those writers of His speedy *arrival*."—HARLEY.

ARROGANCE. PRESUMPTION. SELF-CONCEIT. PRIDE. VANITY. HAUGHTINESS.

ARROGANCE (Lat. *arrŏgantiam*) is exactly what the word is formed to express, a habit of arrogating to one's self deference, or, as it has been defined, "exclusive self-deference." It is the extreme of self-assertion. Go where he will, the arrogant man carries his claims with him, claims of superiority as in social position, the expression of opinion, or what not. It is often a partial fault of character, and persons are found arrogant on some matters who are not so on others. Superiority or claim of some kind must exist as the foundation of arrogance. It is the fault of the great, not of the little. To demand as a right, though the claim be just, in cases where it would have been conceded, and where the demand therefore was superfluous, is still arrogance. Arrogance is a mode of action or behaviour resulting from a condition of mind. Arrogance is not only not self-conceit, but may be in opposition to it. A man in expressing an opinion may be so far

from believing that he is in the right that he may feel himself in the wrong, yet arrogance will expect that he should be yielded to.

"*Arrogance* is always offensive, because in demanding more than its due—for this meaning appears in the etymology of the word—it manifests a petulant and injurious disposition that disdains to be controlled by good breeding or any other restraint."—BEATTIE.

Arrogance is more overbearing than SELF-CONCEIT, which is merely the entertaining of an overweening opinion of one's self, and may be far less obtrusive than the former. It is commonly more ridiculous and less troublesome. Like arrogance, it may be confined to particular matters, and these may be personal trivialities. He may greatly over-rate himself on one point, and under-estimate himself in others. Self-conceit is the fault of persons who have had little training, or have received it apart from others. Contact, and even collision of minds in varied intercourse with others, as in the political world or at a public school, is its best corrective.

"Nothing so haughty and assuming as ignorance where *self-conceit* bids it set up for infallible."—SOUTH.

From these PRIDE (A. S. *prút*) differs in being, so to speak, more true. The arrogant, but more especially the self-conceited, are in intellectual error. Self-conceit blinds a man into mistaking ignorance for knowledge. Pride lies only in falsity of degree, or excess. It is an exaggerated estimate of the value of something which really belongs to us or exists in us, and by consequence involves a disposition to disdain others, converting superiors into equals, and equals into inferiors. A proud man over-rates what he possesses, a conceited man imagines himself to possess what is not his. A man who is proud of rank, wealth, or abilities, really possesses these advantages, but sets a wrong or disproportionate estimate upon them; in such a way, for instance, as to overlook the claims of virtue.

"Pride is that exalted idea of our state, qualifications, or attainments, which exceeds the boundaries of justice and induces us to look down upon supposed inferiors with some degree of unmerited contempt."—COGAN.

HAUGHTINESS seems often constitutional. The haughty person breathes a superior atmosphere to other people, or imagines it. (Fr. *haut, high.*) It proceeds from pride, of which it is to a great degree the external manifestation, showing itself in the manners and deportment.

"As many more can discover that a man is richer than that he is wiser than themselves, superiority of understanding is not so readily acknowledged as that of fortune, nor is that *haughtiness* which the consciousness of great abilities incites, borne with the same submission as the tyranny of affluence."—JOHNSON.

VANITY may exist with pride or self-conceit, but is not implied by either. It is literally emptiness (Lat. *vānĭtātem*); thence it came to mean something unreal, hollow, bad. At length, as applied to personal character, it denoted an excessive desire of applause, approbation, or admiration for qualities we possess as well as those we possess not. It differs from pride in having to do with matters more closely connected with one's self personally. One is not, generally speaking, vain, for instance, of titles and estates, but proud. The subjects of vanity are good looks, talent, personal influence, smaller successes, and the like. The vain person cares more to be admired than approved. The proud man is content with his own judgment of himself. The vain man is always looking at himself through the medium of other people's ideas, being greedy of admiration he seeks to occupy their thoughts. Pride is above this, and so in some respects is seen to be almost the opposite of vanity. The proud man is by his very pride above all care to be false. The vain man will accept compliments to an excellence which he does not possess. The proud man is best corrected by setting before him his own shortcomings, or those of the things on which he prides himself. The greatest mortification to a vain man is to take no notice of his claim to admiration. If pride is hateful, vanity is contemptible.

PRESUMPTION (Lat. *præsumptiōnem*)

is especially a fault of the little. It is self-flattery in matters of social precedence. It is so far unlike pride that pride possesses but over-estimates; presumption possesses not, but claims to possess, and that over the heads of others. The presumptuous man strives to be on a level with those above him, and shows his character in obtrusiveness of conduct; or he arraigns the acts and opinions of those who are far better able to judge and act than himself. Presumption is a determined form of self-conceit. Pride makes us esteem ourselves. Vanity makes us desire to be esteemed by others. Presumption flatters us with a vain idea of superiority, privilege, or power. It thinks more of the chances of adventure than of the conclusions of experience. It is hazardous in its own favour. Presumption may manifest itself in many ways, and in cases in which other persons are or are not concerned. It is presumption to take precedence of one who is of higher social rank. It is presumption to come before a critical audience with an unprepared address. In many cases the best cure for presumption is to take the presumptuous man at his word.

"*Vanity* is that species of pride which, while it presumes upon a degree of superiority in some particular articles, fondly courts the applause of every one within its space of action, seeking every occasion to display some talent, or some supposed excellency."—COGAN.

"And through *presumption* of his matchless might,
All other powers and knighthood he did scorn." SPENSER.

ARTFUL. CUNNING. DECEITFUL. DESIGNING. CRAFTY. SLY. WILY. SUBTLE.

ARTFUL is, as the term literally expresses, *full of art*, in the sense of contrivance. But it is tinged with an unfavourable complexion. The artful character exercises for his own purposes means which baffle the interpretation, or escape the observation of others. Artfulness is trained cunning. The artful person will often gain an end which he does not appear to be aiming at, and by the very fact that he does not. He exerts his ingenuity in misleading. He is fruitful in expedients for producing false impressions. He is most artful when he seems most natural, and designs with an undesigning air. He is observant, and measures the capacities of others for the purpose of playing them false. He can both make a trap and set it.

"*Artful* in speech, in action, and in mind." POPE.

CUNNING (A. S. *cunnan, to know*) is the same faculty of acting with concealment and disguise, as applied to the lowest orders of wants or designs. It is the more simple and animal aspect of artfulness. Yet this is a recent force of the word. Cunning is literally knowing, and has the same unfavourable sense as knowing. Yet the Bible speaks of "*cunning* artificers." "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her *cunning*," that is, skill. It expresses now the characteristic quality of the fox. ARTFUL is positive and active, CUNNING may be in reserve and concealment, only being connected with the instincts of self-maintenance and self-preservation.

"The fox in deeper *cunning* versed,
The beauties of her mind rehearsed." MUIR, *Fables*.

DECEITFUL (Lat. *dēcĭpere*, part. *dēceptus, to deceive*) denotes a more settled purpose of leading others astray. In the artful and cunning deceit may be only a means to an end. The artful fencer, or the cunning animal which doubles upon the scent of the hounds is not deceitful. The deceitful is ready, if necessary, to falsify truth and honour to gain his end. It is only the intellect of a man that can be in the full sense of the term, deceitful. It is a term of the moral disposition rather than the mental nature. Artful and cunning both imply some degree of natural aptitude; but a person may be in character deceitful, that is, he may have the impulse to deceive without the faculty. For further remarks, see DECEIVE.

"But sin, by that *deceitfulness* which the Apostle speaks of in the text, hides its deformed appearances from the eyes of foolish men, and sets before them nothing but

pleasures and profit, joy and vanity, present security and very distant, very uncertain, very remote fears."—SOUTH.

DESIGNING (O. Fr. *designer*) denotes artful conduct exercised with a specific purpose of effecting desired objects, sometimes to the extent of injuring or misleading others. Indeed, the injury of another may constitute the design. But the character of the designing flows from a mental habit of forestalling the future. The designing man is always laying plans for the sake of remote consequences. He is artful for the sake of ulterior results. He is trying to turn others to account. For further remarks, see DESIGN. It may be observed that DESIGNING, in the sense of artful, is of recent use in English literature, though "designement" had a tendency to mean a crafty or evil design. So at present we are more likely to speak of a design against a man, than a design for his benefit.

"This *designment* appears both iniquitous and absurd."—WARBURTON.

CRAFTY (A. S. *cræft, artifice, skill*) has, from the idea of skill, dropped into that of cunning. Craft is the cunning of practice. It is a way of acting. It designs and conceals. It misleads and eludes. Crafty belongs to the development of human character. The child may be cunning. The old man is crafty. Craft is wisdom perverted and debased. Its policy is crooked. The crafty man has a talent for dexterous deception in matters of life and business.

"To prudence, if you add the use of unjust or dishonest means such as usually are prompted to men by fear or want, you have that crooked wisdom which is called *craft*, which is a sign of pusillanimity."—HOBBS.

SLY (Ger. *schlau, sly, skilful*; compare A. S. *sláw, idle, lazy*?) expresses the character of the artfully cunning. The sly is more observant and vigilant than active or designing. The sly person observes furtively, and has a tendency to act in the same way. Underhanded observation and practice mark the sly man.

"The eye of Leonora is slyly watchful while it looks negligent."

There is often very little design in slyness, and persons seem to act slyly from disposition when they might have acted openly with equal advantage to themselves. They will be sly from a mere dread of publicity and demonstrativeness. Animals that have been ill-treated become sly.

"They tempted me to attack your high ness,
And then with wonted wile and *slyness*
They left me in the lurch." SWIFT.

WILY is literally being *full of wile*, which is the same as guile. Wiliness shows itself in matters of self-interest and self-preservation. A wily adversary quietly waits his opportunity of wounding, and can make opportunities for himself. He is artful in attack, defence, and escape. He employs stratagem in dealing with others. A wile is a low stratagem or insidious artifice.

"Implore his aid, for Proteus only knows
The secret cause and cure of all thy woes;
But first the *wily* wizard must be caught,
For unconstrained he nothing tells for naught." DRYDEN.

SUBTLE (Lat. *subtilis*, perhaps *sub, under*, and *tela, a web, being woven fine*). It is in itself a term of neither praise nor blame, which depends upon the use to which the quality which it expresses is put. The subtle mind analyzes motives, sees minute differences. In its full sense, it is applicable to nothing lower than the human understanding. The subtle intellect can follow out a subject into its complicated relations without becoming perplexed by its intricacies, or misled by its casual resemblances to that which may be alien to it. Subtlety has the quality of mental fineness, sensibility, delicacy. Yet subtlety of thought is not the same thing as delicacy of thought, for delicacy touches the truth only, subtlety may empty itself in creating fallacies. A subtle adversary is formidable, because he will dissect either truth or falsehood as far as it may suit his purpose.

Spenser uses the term in what has been thought to be its etymological meaning when he says.—

"More *subtle* web Arachne cannot spin."

ARTICLE. CONDITION. TERM
These terms agree in their relation

to matters of agreement or compact between persons. Article and condition are used in both the singular and plural numbers. Term in this sense only in the plural.

The ARTICLE (Lat. *artĭcŭlus, a joint, a clause, or word*) is no more than a distinct portion into which the main substance of a document or literary work is divided. It is of general application, as the Thirty-nine articles of religion, the articles of the Creed, of a contract, of regulation, of War, of a periodical, and the like. It is, in this connexion, a documentary division varying in nature according to the nature of the document.

TERMS (Fr. *terme*, Lat. *terminus*) are declarations or promises which, when assented to or accepted, settle the contract and bind the parties.

A CONDITION (Lat. *condĭtiōnem*) is a clause in the same, which has for its object the suspension, defeat, or modification of the main obligation. Terms imply a more or less complex transaction. A condition may belong to one of the simplest nature. Terms imply a degree of equality between contracting parties. A condition may be imposed by a superior, as in granting a privilege or a permission. Terms and conditions will, in some cases, amount to the same things viewed in different ways. So far as it is a matter of mutual agreement, that is a term, which, when regarded as essential to the holding good of the compact, becomes a condition. The terms of an agreement are *its substance*, the conditions are *its sanction*. Hence in a particular case the terms may be liberal, and the conditions stringent and even severe. Terms are arranged equitably or submitted to from necessity. Conditions emanate from some controlling or modifying power.

ARTIFICIAL. FICTITIOUS. FACTITIOUS. CONVENTIONAL. NOMINAL.

ARTIFICIAL (Lat. *artĭfĭcialis*) and FICTITIOUS (Lat. *fictĭcius*) are nearly allied. As ARTFUL means done with art, as opposed to simplicity, so ARTIFICIAL means done by art as opposed to nature. That is artificial which is the production of imitative art. The fictitious is the creation of what has no natural existence. An artificial tale of distress, for instance, would be one of which the circumstances well imitated what was natural or probable. A fictitious tale would be one of which the incidents had no existence but in the deceitful ingenuity of the narrator. In the idea of the artificial there are two elements: 1. that of art as distinguished from nature, and 2. that of art as distinguished from simplicity. Dryden uses it in the former sense, when he says:—

"In the unity of Time you find them so scrupulous that it yet remains a dispute among their poets whether the *artificial* day of twelve hours more or less be not meant by Aristotle rather than the natural one of twenty-four."

In the second by Tillotson:

"These, and such as these, are the hopes of hypocrites, which Job elegantly compares to the spider's web, finely and *artificially* wrought, but miserably thin and weak."

The term CONVENTIONAL (Lat. *conventiōnālis*) expresses first, that which is agreed upon among men as members of a community or of society, and then having no existence but in such agreement. A conventionalism grows out of custom, and is sanctioned by usage. Where it has no existence beyond this, a conventionalism is a social fiction. Conventional morality, for instance, is not truth or right, but such a degree or sort of it as may by society be tacitly agreed upon as sufficient to meet its demands. As the artificial is opposed to the natural, and the fictitious to the real, so the conventional is opposed to the natural and genuine. The conventional is artificial, so far as it is the product of an artificial state of existence; it is fictitious, so far as it is made on purpose; but it may possibly be neither against truth nor right, and only represent a form commonly in vogue. Almost all professions may be said to have conventional language, that is, forms and terms appropriated to them and distinctively employed by them.

The NOMINAL (Lat. *nōmĭnālis, nōmen, nōmĭnis, a name*) is that which exists in *name* only. The nominal is commonly the creation of artificial necessity. It meets a requirement where that requirement does not exact more than a formal supply. It is the substitution of an insubstantial for a substantial fulfilment.

The FACTITIOUS (Lat. *factĭcius*) is the elaborately artificial in things of a moral, social, or material kind. A factitious demand is one which has been artificially created by pains and effort bestowed to produce it. That is factitious which is made up. The term points more to the labour, and less to the skill, which produces the artificial.

"The *conventional* language appropriated to monarchs."—MOTLEY.

"He passed eighteen months in *nominal* attendance on lectures."—MACAULAY.

"He acquires a *factitious* propensity; he forms an incorrigible habit of desultory reading."—DE QUINCEY.

ARTIST. ARTIZAN. ARTIFICER. MECHANIC. MECHANICIAN.

All these bear reference to ART (Lat. *artem*). The man who applies the resources of art to constructive manufacture is an ARTIFICER. The term has been, in a great measure, superseded, or its meaning divided among the rest. It survives, as a rhetorical term, the "great Artificer of the Universe;" and, as a technical term, of a military character. A soldier-mechanic is called an artificer.

"Another lean unwashed *artificer*
Cuts off his tale, and talks of Arthur's death." SHAKESPEARE.

There seems to be little difference between the ARTIST and the ARTIZAN as regards their professions, beyond the dignity of their employments. He who exercises any fine art well is called an artist. He who exercises any mechanical art well is called an artizan. It is in the superior skill of his labour that the artizan differs from the MECHANIC (Gr. μηχᾰνῐκός, *inventive*), the mechanic being one who employs instruments other than agricultural in his work. A gunmaker would be an artizan, a shoemaker a mechanic. The artist may be unprofessional, or an amateur artist. The professor or student of the principles of mechanics, as distinguished from the workman, is called a MECHANICIAN.

"Art can never give the rules that make an art. This is, I believe, the reason why *artists* in general and poets principally have been confined in so narrow a circle."—BURKE.

"If workmen become scarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages, but at first requires an increase of labour; and this is willingly submitted to by the *artizan*, who can now eat and drink better to compensate his additional toil and fatigue."—HUME.

"An art quite lost with our *mechanics*, a work not to be made out, but like the walls of Thebes and such an *artificer* as Amphion."—BROWN'S *Vulgar Errors*.

"The commonwealth of learning would lose too many observations and experiments, and the history of nature would make too slow a progress, if it were presumed that none but geometers and *mechanicians* should employ themselves about writing any part of that history."—BOYLE.

ASCEND. MOUNT. ARISE. RISE. CLIMB. SCALE.

ASCEND (Lat. *ascendĕre*) and MOUNT (Fr. *monter*) are employed as both transitive and intransitive verbs, while RISE and ARISE (A. S. *rísan, árísan, to arise*) are used only as intransitives. It is in the intransitive sense that the two former are synonyms with the latter. The simplest of all is RISE, of which the rest may be considered as modifications. To rise is irrelative, to arise is relative to something out of which the thing arises. To arise is also definite and limited, to rise is indefinite and progressive. A person arises from his bed, and the final point of rising is gained when he stands upright. A bird, or a balloon rises in the air, that is, goes higher and higher indefinitely. RISE, like ARISE, is used in a figurative as well well as a physical sense. It then expresses a gradual increase or enhancement, as arise expresses effectuation and result.

"It is not their nominal price only, but their real price which *rises* in the progress of improvement. The *rise* of their nominal price is the effect, not of any degradation of the value of silver, but of the *rise* in their real price."—ADAM SMITH.

"No grateful dews descend from evening skies,
Nor morning odours from the flowery arise." POPE.

Mount, like rise, is progressive, but it expresses a process with a limit, and points to the limit or end, while Rise has no such limit. Consequently mount is a transitive verb, as rise is not. We say the birds rose, meaning that they took wing upwards. They did not mount, because the action was unmeasured. On the other hand, the tide mounts because we have in our minds a certain line towards which it tends, and which it will not exceed. In mount will always be found to underlie some implied degree of rising which is measured or not considerable, while ascend may express a course indefinite and considerable. Ascend is sometimes employed for mount, in order to give dignity. The rider mounts his horse; the sovereign ascends the throne. Ordinarily speaking, we ascend a mountain, but not a horse. To ascend a hill is to go higher and higher up it, to mount is to get to the top of it. Ascend conveys the idea of a more considerable degree of altitude than mount.

To Climb (A. S. *climban*) is to ascend, step by step, and with the use of the arms as well as the legs, in a series of personal efforts. To Scale (Lat. *scāla, a ladder*) is to pass over any difficult height by personal exertion. To climb points to the effort of the person to scale to the arduous nature of the thing. As the idea is that of passing a wall or rampart by a besieging ladder, we speak of scaling when a difficult summit has been reached, and a vantage ground gained.

"The idlest and the paltriest mime that ever *mounted* upon bank."—Milton.

"Its hooked form is of great use to the rapacious kind in catching and holding their prey, and in the comminution thereof by tearing. To others it (the mouth) is no less serviceable to their *climbing* as well as neat and nice comminution of their food."—Derham.

"The mountain tops confirm the pleasing sight,
And curling smoke *ascending* from their height."
Dryden.

"Manlius Capitolinus was the first Roman knight or man at armes that was honoured with a murall crown of gold for *skaling* over the wall in an assault,"—Holland, *Pliny*.

ASCENDANCY. Empire. Influence.

These three terms express moral power exercised over men. Ascendancy (Fr. *ascendant*, Lat. *ascendĕre, to ascend*) is the power of *superiority*. Empire (Lat. *impĕrium*) is the power of *force*. Influence (Fr. *influence*) is the power of *insinuation*. Of these, ascendancy is the most *absolute*, subjecting personal interests, desires, sentiments, will, to him who exercises it. Empire is the most *despotic*, being that to which one's desires and will offer only an ineffectual resistance. Influence is the most *mild and insensible*, causing the sentiments and ideas of another to become one's own. For men direct their conduct by their will, and their will follows their opinions. Ascendancy commonly comes from the stronger mind, but influence belongs even to the weak when they are pure and good. The husband may have an ascendancy over his wife at the same time that she has no little influence over him. Power of character commonly gives ascendancy, determination of will gives empire, penetration and address give influence. Where another exercises ascendancy over us, we must feel some regard for him, where empire some fear, where influence some persuasion of his intelligence. If men would examine themselves they would probably have to acknowledge some propensity which has the ascendancy over them, the empire of some passion, or the influence of some prejudice. Influence alone is employed of the subtle, but powerful, forces of nature. The weather has a constant influence upon the body and the health. Some have believed in influences of the stars.

ASCERTAIN. Verify.

Both these terms denote the establishment of a thing as true. They differ in the different states of mind and the different modes of inquiry belonging to each process. To Ascertain is to prove whether a thing is true or not, to Verify (Lat. *vĕrĭfĭcāre*) is to prove that it is true. Of old, Ascertain had the force of to prove true and to make sure; these senses it has parted

with, so that they are now expressed by the verbs *verify* and *secure*, while it has retained to itself the sense mentioned above. I am in doubt whether a circumstance has occurred or not, and I make inquiries to ascertain. I feel convinced that it has occurred, but not being furnished with evidence to prove it, I search for that evidence that so I may verify it. Ascertain commonly relates to matters of practical life, verify to matters of literary or speculative truth. I ascertain a common fact, I verify a point of history or science.

ASCITITIOUS. ADVENTITIOUS. ASCITITIOUS or ADSCITITIOUS is from the Lat. *adsciscĕre*, part. *adscītus*, more commonly *asc-, to admit, to adopt*. ADVENTITIOUS is from the Lat. *adventĭcius, foreign, advĕnire, to arrive*. Hence the meaning of the former is adjoined or assumed, that of the latter foreign, accessary, accidental. Both may be opposed to what is intrinsic, essential, substantial, and so both may partake of an unfavourable meaning. But properly the ascititious is in the act of the person, adventitious in the quality of the thing. The former is foreign in introduction, the latter foreign in nature. The former is irregularly borrowed, the latter irregularly supervenient.

ASCRIBE. IMPUTE. ATTRIBUTE. These words belong to the process of assigning cause, and apparently are used in accordance with the nature of the cause assigned. Causation may be regarded as physical, moral, or mixed. Mixed causation or human production is expressed by ASCRIBE (Lat. *ascrībĕre*). I ascribe such a book to such an author. Ascribe is also used in the simple sense of refer, without any idea of causation, but of quality or property; as to ascribe glory to God, that is, to express an attribute of His nature. Like IMPUTE, (Lat. *imputāre*) it has commonly, as impute has invariably, a personal reference. Impute expresses moral causation or human motive; as I impute such conduct to his generosity, his cruelty, or his ignorance, as the case may be. Physical and moral causation is expressed by ATTRIBUTE (Lat. *attrĭbŭĕre*, part. *attrĭbūtus*). I attribute the loss of the ship to the violence of the storm, or I attribute his behaviour to his ignorance. To ascribe is to write one thing to the account of another, whether as a quality, an appurtenance, or as the effect of a cause. To attribute is to form an act of judgment by which we connect a thing with a person, or with another thing, as the source or cause of it either immediately or indirectly. To impute a thing to a person is to make him morally responsible for it, so as to connect its merit or demerit with him. Hence attribute expresses the nearer, impute the remoter cause. I attribute the fall of the Roman empire to the successful invasions of the barbarians; I impute it to internal corruption. To attribute is the plainer, to impute the more complex act. It is remarkable that, except in the theological sense of imputing righteousness or merit, the term is commonly used of bad motives, or untoward causes of conduct. One attributes things, one imputes the good or evil consequences of things, but much more commonly the latter. One ought not to ascribe unjustly, nor attribute lightly, nor impute gratuitously. Knowledge or belief ascribes, judgment attributes, prejudice imputes.

"Behold Sir Balaam, now a man of spirit,
Ascribes his gettings to his parts and merit.
What late he called a blessing now was wit,
And God's good Providence a lucky hit."
POPE.

"Nor you, ye proud, *impute* to these the fault
If memory o'er their tombs no trophy raise
Where through the long-drawn aisle and fretted vault
The pealing anthem swells the note of praise."
GRAY.

"It is a practice much too common in enquiries of this nature to *attribute* the cause of feelings which merely arise from the mechanical structure of our bodies, or from the natural frame and constitution of our minds, to certain conclusions of the reasoning faculty."—BURKE.

ASHES. EMBERS. CINDERS. ASHES (A.S. *æsce*, pl. *æscan*) denotes the residue of earthy particles which are exhibited after combustion of com

bustible bodies, whether vegetable, animal, or mineral. EMBERS (A. S. *æmurian*, "an unauthorized word, but apparently of correct form": SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) are smouldering ashes. CINDERS (Fr. *cendres*, Lat. *cinĕres*) are things of combustible matter partially burnt, whether actually burning or not. A cinder differs from an ash in being capable of further combustion or ignition, and from embers in being separated from the burning mass.

ASK. REQUEST. BEG. BESEECH. SUPPLICATE. ENTREAT. IMPLORE. SOLICIT.

To ASK (A. S. *áscian*) is to seek to obtain by words. But the character of these words may vary from the humblest entreaty to a demand. Its further sense of obtaining information by words of inquiry is not here considered. It is the simplest and broadest term for making a request. It implies no particular sort of relationship, as of superiority or inferiority between parties. The master asks the servant, and the servant the master, to do a thing. It is the ordinary term for expressing ordinary requirements.

"And I beseech you come again to-morrow.
What shall you *ask* of me that I'll deny,
That honour saved may upon asking give?"
SHAKESPEARE.

REQUEST (Lat. *rĕquīrĕre*, part. *rĕquīsītus*) is a more polite word for the same thing. Nevertheless the latter is sometimes used with an implied sense of authority, amounting virtually to a command. REQUEST is not a strong term, carrying with it neither urgency of want nor vehemency of word.

"*Requesting* him to accept the same in good part as a testimony and witness of the good hearts, zeal, and tenderness we owe us him and his country."—HACKLUIT.

To BEG (O. E. *beggen*, thought to be a contraction of A. S. *bed-ec-ian*, and so a frequentative of *bid*) is more earnest; an , except when used in a kind of irony, is the act of an equal or an inferior, as request may be of an equal or a uperior. To beg is not a term of marked character. We may beg boldly or timidly, but in any case some degree of dependence is involved. The term beg is a useful one when the speaker wishes to combine impressiveness of entreaty with deference or respect.

"In *begging* other inferior things it may become us to be reserved, indifferent, and modest; but about these matters wherein all our felicity is extremely concerned, it were a folly to be slack or timorous."—BARROW.

Neither ask, request, nor beg, are so strong as BESEECH (*be-* and O. E. *sechen*, *to seek*). To beseech and to ENTREAT (O. Fr. *entraiter*, *to treat of*) are much the same, but beseech belongs more to feeling, entreat to argument. We entreat an equal by what he knows, feels, or can understand; we beseech a superior by his goodness or his greatness. There is condescension when we entreat an inferior, as a father may entreat a son to be more diligent for his own sake. This is to urge on grounds of affection and argument combined.

"The servant therefore fell down and worshipped him, prostrated himself at his master's feet, and in the most moving terms *besought* him, saying, 'Have patience with me and I will pay thee all.'"—BISHOP PORTEUS.

"So well he woo'd her, and so well he wrought her
With fair *entreaty* and sweet blandishment."
SPENSER.

To SUPPLICATE (Lat. *supplĭcare*, lit. *to ask with bended knees*) and to IMPLORE (Lat. *implōrare*, *to beg with tears*) both imply extreme distress and earnestness; but we may implore equals, we supplicate only superiors; for supplication denotes abject humility, as in a slave, or an offender, supplicating for pardon. We commonly beseech on the ground of personal influence, as in the phrase, "I beseech you for my sake." In imploring we strive to move the feelings as of pity, sympathy, or compassion.

To SOLICIT (Lat. *sollĭcĭtare*) has lost its classic force of *causing anxiety*, though it appears prominently in the cognate adjective, *solicitous*. To solicit, with us, is to ask with a feeling of strong appreciation or interest in what we ask, and implies what a superior only can grant, or at least what we can receive only from the

favour of another. We solicit not matters of vital importance, as the necessaries of life, but rather that which is pleasant, desirable, or advantageous to procure, such, for instance, as places of trust and emolument.

To CRAVE (A. S. *crafian*) is to ask with eagerness so as to gratify a desire or satisfy a natural want. It is the expression of a longing on the part of one who is reduced to the condition of a suppliant by the urgency of that for which he asks.

"Whose mercy the most opulent of us all must one day *supplicate* with all the earnestness of abject mendicity."—KNOX.

"With piercing words and pitiful *implore*."
SPENSER.

"To *solicit* by labour what might be ravished by arms was esteemed unworthy of the German spirit."—GIBBON.

"For my past crimes my forfeit life receive,
No pity for my sufferings here I *crave*."
ROWE

ASPECT. VIEW.

VIEW (Fr. *vue*) is *subjective*, being the application of the faculty of sight to an object considerable or complex.

ASPECT (Lat. *aspĭcĕre*, part. *aspectus*, *to look at*) is *objective*, being the way in which the thing contemplated presents itself to our view. I have a view from my window. This view may have a fertile, a barren, a harsh, or a smiling aspect. The aspect is often of an individual object in detail. A thing may have a singular aspect. The view is permanent, the aspect variable. I have from the same window a view of the sea; on no two successive days is its aspect the same. A false view is an error of one's own observation. A false aspect is a deceptive character in the object contemplated, though it is possible that something in ourselves may so invest it. Passion and prejudice may be said to lead to false views of things, or to present things under false aspects.

ASSEMBLY. ASSEMBLAGE. GROUP. COLLECTION. GATHERING. COMPANY. MEETING.

ASSEMBLY and ASSEMBLAGE are from O. Fr. *assembler*, L. Lat. *assimŭlare*, *to bring together*. They are both applicable to persons, and ASSEMBLAGE to inanimate objects also. Where they refer to persons, ASSEMBLY implies a voluntary, ASSEMBLAGE an involuntary, collection. A number of persons skating on the ice is not an assembly because, though their employment is common, their object is not. The assemblage might become an assembly, should some topic of interest suggest itself to be discussed. As the objects in an assemblage possess a certain amount of conspicuousness, assemblage is said of illustrious, assembly of ordinary, persons. In a large assembly may be often observed a striking assemblage of characters, countenances, figures, dresses.

"He scarce had finish'd, when such mur murs fill'd
Th' *assembly*, as when hollow rocks retain
The sound of blustering winds, which all night long
Have roused the sea." MILTON.

"In sweet *assemblage* every blooming grace
Fix Love's bright reign on Teraminta's face." FENTON.

GROUP (Fr. *groupe*) is applied to objects both animate and inanimate. A group is an assemblage of no considerable number, regarded with an eye to its configuration, or such relations of the parts as might be noticed for their artistic effect in colour or form. A group has a completeness of outline which isolates it from surrounding objects.

"Du Fresney tells us that the figures of the groups must not be all on a side; that is, with their faces and bodies all turned the same way, but must contrast each other by their several positions."—DRYDEN.

COLLECTION (Lat. *collectiōnem*) expresses a number of persons or things brought together by some force external to themselves, which has made them one either as to unity of nature, or by identity of place, while ASSEMBLY denotes a meeting purposely made and purposely sustained. A collection of persons may be the result of a common object, or it may be fortuitous. ASSEMBLAGE points rather to the unity of the time and place at which the gathering occurs; COLLECTION to the variety and diversity of quarters from which the component members of it have come. Collection

may be fortuitous and mechanical. Refuse substances are collected at the mouths of rivers.

"They (the Collects) are generally so exactly suited to them (the Epistle and Gospel) that some think they take their name from being *collected* out of those parts of Holy Writ. But the use of the word in the Bible and the Fathers being applied to denote the gathering together of the people in religious assemblies, thence some ritualists say the Collects are prayers made among the people *collected* or gathered together. Others think they are named Collects because of their comprehensive brevity, because the priest in them sums up the desires of the people in a little room. I may add in this variety my own conjecture that these prayers have been named Collects from their being used so near the time of making the *collecton* before the Holy Communion."—COMBES.

MEETING, a body met together (A.S. *métan, to meet, obtain*), is of many persons, though in its abstract sense of a coming together, it may refer to two only. It conveys the idea of involuntary union, or of persons finding themselves together. It also implies more strongly the idea of a specific point or locality at which the meeting takes place. Where a meeting of persons has been purposely convened, it is still a term of less dignity than assembly. We speak of the meeting of Parliament in the general sense of the reunion of its members. Parliament itself may be regarded as an august assembly. Local matters are discussed at local meetings. A meeting conveys also the idea of fewer numbers and greater familiarity among its constituents than assembly.

"Understand this Stethva to be the *meeting* of the British poets and minstrels for trial of their poems and music sufficiences, where the best had his reward, a silver harp."—DRAYTON.

ASSERT. AFFIRM. ASSEVERATE. AVER. AVOUCH. PROTEST.

To ASSERT (Lat. *assĕrĕre, to take to oneself*) and AFFIRM (Lat. *affirmāre*) both denote the making of a statement, but ASSERT, true to its origin, is subjective, AFFIRM objective in its character. I assert a thing as a truth, or as a conviction of my own mind. I affirm it as a proposition. Assert therefore has a metaphysical, affirm a logical force. I assert boldly, I affirm distinctly. The opposite to ASSERT would be to suppose or to imply. The opposite to AFFIRM is to deny; or again, we confute an assertion and deny an affirmation. A man may affirm a thing because he would rather do so than deny it, or he may affirm it for the sake of discussion upon it. But when he asserts it he takes upon himself the consequences of his statement. Hence bold assertions commonly indicate a combination of ignorance and rashness. In deliberative assemblies a resolution of fact is said to be affirmed, not asserted by the meeting, because the moral responsibility of individuals is not the idea of it, but a proposition unanimously assented to.

"I can hardly believe that anyone will assert that a parcel of mere matter left altogether to itself could ever of itself begin to move. If there is any such bold *asserter* let him fix his eyes upon some lump of matter, for instance, a stone, piece of timber, or a clod cleared of all animals, and peruse it well."—WOOLASTON.

"If one writer shall *affirm* that virtue added to faith is sufficient to make a Christian, and another shall zealously deny this proposition, they seem to differ widely in words, and perhaps they may both really agree in sentiment, if by the word virtue the affirmer intends our whole duty to God and man, and the denier by the word virtue means only courage, or at most our duty toward our neighbour, without including in the idea of it the duty which we owe to God."—WATTS' *Logic*.

To ASSEVERATE (Lat. *asseverāre*) is to assert or affirm in a peculiarly earnest and forcible manner for the purpose of inducing conviction thereby, or possibly as being one's self under the influence of energetic persuasion.

"I will come, and some of you shall see me coming. Can it be supposed that in such an *asseveration* the word to come may bear two different senses?"—HARLEY.

AVER (Fr. *averer*, Lat. *ad-vērare, vērus, true*) is the more solemn, as asseverate is the more energetic term. I aver that which I formally declare to be true. To aver, in the technical language of pleading, is to state what one is prepared to prove. It belongs, therefore, to matters of knowledge and fact. I aver that a thing is so, which I have no right to do unless I am prepared with positive demonstration for it.

"I shall only *aver* what myself have sometimes observed of a duck when closely pursued by a water-dog. She not only dives to save herself, but when she comes up again, brings not her whole body above water, but only her bill and part of her head, holding the rest underneath, that so the dog, who in the meantime turns round and looks about him, may not espy her till she have recovered breath."—RAY.

To PROTEST (Lat. *prōtestāri, to declare publicly, to protest*) is to aver in a serious and public manner, indicating not only the truth of the thing, but one's own sincerity in making the statement. Protestation, when it is relative, becomes antagonistic; and so the noun PROTEST has come to convey the idea of a declaration against some other thing or person; but this is accidental, not essential, to its meaning, which is open and solemn declaration with the energy of sincerity, expressive of the importance as well as the truth of the thing said. It belongs commonly to cases in which the individual is, as it were, on trial, or where he writes to obtain credit for purity of motive. Affirmation, averment, and assertion, are of facts generally; protestation is of such facts as are closely connected with one's self, and so matters even more of feeling than of fact. One protests that he has or has not taken such a part in a transaction, or that he was innocent, or that he is influenced by certain feelings, as of sympathy or regret in regard to it. Protestations sometimes stand in contradiction to actions, and seem to express one motive while they indicate another.

"Collecting an army on the borders of Normandy, he *protests* that his measures are pacific."—LANDON.

AVOUCH (Fr. *à*, i.e. *ad, to*, and Eng. *vouch*, Lat. *vŏcare*) is to make a declaration, not only in a positive manner, but in favour of some person, or in maintenance of some cause. To avouch a thing is to place one's self in the position of a witness for it. So Shakespeare uses the noun AVOUCH in the sense of simple evidence.

"Before my God I might not this believe
Without the sensible and true *avouch*
Of mine own eyes."

ASSISTANT. COADJUTOR.

ASSISTANT (Fr. *assister, to assist*) and COADJUTOR (Lat. *cŏadjŭtor, a colleague*) differ only in quality. The menial servant, or one much younger, may be an assistant, but the coadjutor is in a measure on a level with him whom he aids, and with whom he is associated in some honorable office. The assistant aids by doing many things which the principal does not do. The coadjutor aids by doing the same kind of things, and so sharing the burden of duty.

"In one respect, I'll thy *assistant* be."
SHAKESPEARE.

"The plebeian ædiles were chosen out of the common, and were in some respects a sort of *coadjutor* to the Tribunes."—MELMOTH.

ASSOCIATION. SOCIETY. COMMUNITY.

All these terms have both an abstract and a concrete signification. It is in the latter that they are here compared.

ASSOCIATION (Lat. *assŏciāre, to make a companion of*) is literally the institution of companionship. This may be between two or more. An association, as compared with a SOCIETY, is less strictly organized. It is the result of a common interest in an object or subject. It springs from a feeling that the efforts of individuals are likely to be more efficient when they are co-operative, and expresses a stage short of that which is expressed by society. Societies are in the main literary, scientific, moral, philanthropical, or religious. In the society the tentative condition of the association has been passed, and it has grown into an institution upon a large and public scale. So we speak of the Zoological Society, the Humane Society, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. In its widest sense society is co-extensive with the human race.

A COMMUNITY (Lat. *communĭtātem*) is a society having reciprocal rights, privileges, interests, manners, and customs; in short, a common way of living together. This may be on a large or a small scale, beyond that of the family. Some communities are

states; some are like large families, as in the case of a religious fraternity.

"*Associations* of mysterious sense,
Against, but seeming for the king's defence."
DRYDEN.

"God, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the greater instrument and common tie of *society*."—LOCKE.

ASYLUM. REFUGE. SHELTER. RETREAT.

ASYLUM (Lat. *ăsȳlum*, Gr. *ἄσῦλον*, neut. adj., *safe from violence*) signified originally a place whose sanctity protected it from lawlessness and war. As a synonym with the others given above, the idea expressed is more permanent.

The REFUGE (Fr. *refuge*, Lat. *rĕfŭgium*), the SHELTER (connected with *shield*) affords some protection against specific violence or hostile force, as the storm-tost ship seeks shelter from the storm, or men and women in old times sought shelter in monasteries from the lawlessness and violence of the times.

A RETREAT (Fr. *retraite*) is a place where we may find rest, quiet, or retirement; as an escape from toils, a cessation of responsibilities, or an opportunity for leisurely reflexion, as the man of active and public life loves some rural retreat for his old age or in the intervals of work. The term asylum is not used but in an honourable sense, which is not the case with refuge. The contemplative find an asylum in solitude. Robbers and wild beasts have their places of refuge. The haunts of idlers, gamblers, thieves, and vagabonds are not called asylums. Certain sacred places, as churches or religious institutions, had, and in some countries still have, a right of asylum; that is, the criminal or accused who could fly to them might claim not to be removed. Of this character were the Mosaic cities of refuge.

"Earth has no other *asylum* for them than its own cold bosom."—SOUTHEY.

"The hapless unbeliever, while disordered nature is sounding in his ears, hath nowhere to fly for *refuge* from its terrors."—WARBURTON.

"That pleasing shade they sought, a soft *retreat*
From sudden April showers, a *shelter* from the heat." DRYDEN.

ATTACHMENT. AFFECTION. TENDERNESS. FONDNESS. LOVE. LIKING.

A feeling of love may be expressed by ATTACHMENT (Fr. *attacher, to fasten*) or AFFECTION (Lat. *affectiōnem*). Affection is the state of one who feels towards another with warmth and tenderness. Attachment, that of one who is bound to another by strong and lasting ties. Affection may spring from natural relationship, as the affection of a child to its parent, or from personal predilection, as in the companionship of the purest friends. Attachment is the result of circumstance, as *e.g.* association, congeniality of disposition, tastes, pursuits, or kindness shown. Affection is more a thing of sentiment. Attachment involves principle also. A strong affection, a lasting or faithful attachment. So strongly does the element of habituation belong to attachment, that the term is applicable to many things to which affection is inapplicable, as the memory of another, one's own principles, profession, country, or even the locality in which one resides, or places of favourite resort. Affection is attachment combined with a higher degree of warmth. It is also a wider term. Attachment is not felt towards inferiors, while affection may be felt towards all. I feel affection towards a favourite dog, which is strong in proportion to his attachment to his master. A mother feels affection, but hardly attachment to her child.

"Conjugal *affection*,
Prevailing over fear and timorous doubt."
MILTON.

"There is no man but is more *attached* to one particular set or scheme of opinions in philosophy, politics, and religion, than he is to another. I mean, if he hath employed his thought at all about them. The question we should examine then is, how came we by those *attachments?*"—MASON.

TENDERNESS (Fr. *tendre*, *tender*) has, as a synonym in this connexion, its active and its passive side. In the latter it has the force of tender-hearted.

that is, possessing a sensitiveness of sympathy to an extreme degree, which would shrink from inflicting, and can with difficulty bear the sight of suffering. It is in this sense passive benevolence. In the former it is a quality of affection or a mode in which it is shown. Its characteristic is the treatment of others with gentleness, delicacy, thoughtfulness, and care, entering into feelings, anticipating wants, supplying the smallest pleasures, and studious of comforts. It is the accompaniment of affection in its work of tending the weak and dependent, the aged or the sick. It belongs to natures refined as well as loving, and possessing that considerateness of which finer dispositions only are capable.

"Fatherly fond, and *tenderly* severe."
SMART.

FONDNESS (O. E. *fonnen, to be foolish*, of which verb *fonned* is the part.) retains so much of its original meaning as not to apply to any profound attachment or to any predilection for what is lofty or important. It is applicable to inanimate as well as animate things. In regard to persons, it is the caressing expression of a feeling more demonstrative than deep. We may have a fondness for certain pursuits which are of no grave or high character, not scientific, *e.g.* or philosophical. In attachment and affection there may be self-sacrifice; in fondness there is self indulgence.

"The profusion of ornaments with which they are loaded are marks of her continual *fondness* for dress."—WALPOLE.

LOVE (A. S. *lufu*) is the most general of all these terms. It includes natural affection as of parent and child, desire and delight in one of the opposite sex, strong and devoted liking, and, in a more general way, good-will and kindness, which desires the happiness of its object without any strong feeling of personal tendency. Affection is towards objects not far removed from one's self in nature and circumstances, so that it implies either community or equality of state. So though man may love God, it would be unnatural to say that man could have affection towards God. Affection longs to benefit, to tend, to protect. Love aspires also to obtain and enjoy the mere presence of its object. Love is such a strong mental or sensual drawing to an object as varies in every degree of purity and right; affection is more orderly, regular, and constant, less rapturous and passionate.

"In peace *love* tunes the shepherd's reed;
In war he mounts the warrior's steed;
In halls in gay attire is seen,
In hamlets dances on the green.
Love rules the court, the camp, the grove,
And men below and saints above,
For love is heaven, and heaven is love."
SCOTT.

LIKING (A. S. *lician, to please*) expresses that kind of inclination of mind or feeling towards objects animate or inanimate which flows from congeniality of nature. In regard to the former, it implies no strong feeling of affection or love (to which, indeed, it stands opposed), nor any disinterested desire of the welfare or happiness of another. It has, like fondness, an element of selfishness, for we like what gives us pleasure. Liking may be grounded on very different qualities from those which excite love. Love involves some degree of admiration, though admiration is not in itself love; but we may like persons for amiable qualities, even when those qualities betray weakness.

"The men, though grave,
Eyed them, and let their eyes
Rove without rein till in the amorous net
Fast caught, they *liked*, and each his *liking* chose."
MILTON.

ATTACK. ASSAIL. ASSAULT. ENCOUNTER.

Of these ATTACK (Fr. *attaquer*; "really the same word as *attacher*."—BRACHET) denotes a falling upon with force, whether the object be a personal enemy or an inanimate material. It may be with material weapons, or with words and the movements of controversy. We may attack a man's person, his reputation, or his opinions. The attack may be violent or insidious; and that which is involved in the idea of attack is premeditated harm, not necessarily commencing with open

violence. Some attacks are opened by stratagem. To attack is to perform the first act of hostility.

"Henry V. drew up his army on a narrow ground between two woods, which guarded each flank, and he patiently expected in that posture the *attack* of the enemy."—HUME.

To ASSAIL (Fr. *assaillir*) is to attack in a vehement, sudden, and energetic manner, and often involves the idea of repeated minor efforts of attack. It denotes less powerful but more brisk action than attack. Those who are attacked naturally think of self-defence; those who are assailed are often so disconcerted by the novelty and variety of the attack, as not to know what course to pursue.

In ASSAULT (Fr. *assaut*, O. Fr. *assalt*) the idea is that of a hand-to-hand approach; in ASSAIL we rather imply the use of missile weapons. Moral attack is expressed by ASSAIL, physical by ASSAULT. We attack a man's character when we speak evil of it; we assail him with abuse, irony, epithets, as if words were like missiles thrown at him.

ENCOUNTER (O. Fr. *encontrer*) is a measured attack, though the occasion of the meeting may have been accidental. It is the measuring of strength between two parties, while an attack or an assault may possibly be borne without resistance. While ATTACK and ASSAIL, too, may be used as against inanimate things, ENCOUNTER implies properly a struggle between living beings.

"A thousand battles have *assailed* thy banks." BYRON.

Or, in the moral sense:

"The papal authority was steadily though gradually *assailed*."—HALLAM.

The assaulting of the papal authority would have implied an unlawful or insulting violence which was not meant. ATTACK and ENCOUNTER have often the sense of coming unexpectedly upon what is dangerous, and are even extended to what is difficult. We are said to encounter not only perils, but obstacles. An encounter involves movement and counter-movement. Two knights or two ships may encounter each other, but the attack or assault made by an army upon the walls of a castle is not an encounter. this takes place subsequently between the besiegers and the besieged.

"Ensnared, *assaulted*, overcome, led bound." MILTON.

"Full jolly knight he seem'd, and fair did sit,
As one for knightly giusts and fierce *encounters* fit." SPENSER

ATTENTIVE. INTENT.

These words, formed from the Lat. *tendĕre, to stretch*, are, the one passive, or indicative of a state, the other active. I am ATTENTIVE when my ear or my mind is in an attitude of listening, and I am ready for any impression that may be made upon either. I am INTENT when I am in an attitude of being stretched forward toward a thing in eagerness, premeditation, and desire. I am attentive to *receive*, I am intent upon *doing*. He who is attentive allows an object to be proposed to him by another; he who is intent has proposed one to himself. He who is not attentive is heedless, he who is not intent is indifferent and inactive. I am attentive to the voice of persons, to the claims of duty. I am intent on a certain work or design, on reaching a certain point, on gaining a proposed end.

ATTITUDE. POSTURE.

ATTITUDE, which word, as "connected with the painter's art," came from Italy: SKEAT, Etym. Dict. (It. *attitudine*, Lat. *aptĭtudĭnem*), is closely allied to POSTURE (Fr. *posture*, Lat. *pŏsĭtūra*). But posture is generally natural; attitude is studied, either for the general purpose of looking graceful, or as illustrative of some sentiment, intention, action, subject, or words. ATTITUDE is a term of greater dignity than POSTURE. It is more significant. If ATTITUDE have no meaning beyond itself it is mere POSTURE. It is evident that, according as the uppermost idea is the mere placement of the body, or the *reason* of its being so placed, the same thing is regarded as a posture or as an attitude. The posture of the suppliant is an attitude of supplication. Positions of the body which are forced, odd, or ungainly, are called postures. Those which are

noble, agreeable, and expressive, in which the expression of the countenance aids the *pose* of the limbs and body, are called attitudes. Postures often are to the body what grimaces are to the countenance. Attitude is to the figure what expression is to the face. The clown deals in ridiculous postures, the tragic actor assumes dignified attitudes. Yet that which is an attitude fit for certain occasions would become a ridiculous posture if exhibited on other. On meeting with something very startling, one often assumes unconsciously an attitude of surprise. It is painful to keep the body long in the same posture. The attitude is the posture with expression.

"A particular advantage of this *attitude* so judiciously assigned to Virtue by ancient masters, is, that it expresses as well her aspiring effort or ascent towards the stars of heaven as her victory and superiority over fortune and the world."—SHAFTESBURY.

"He held his hand in a *posture* to show that I must be carried as prisoner."—*Voyage to Lilliput.*

ATTRACTIONS. CHARMS.

These terms are here regarded in their application to personal appearance and manners. ATTRACTIONS (Lat. *attractionem, a drawing together*) is a very general term. It may denote what excites admiration in the person, face, or figure. It is more physical than CHARMS (Fr. *charmes*, Lat. *carmen, an incantation or charm*). But both one and the other extend beyond the idea of *merely* physical beauty, though some amount of this probably is implied in both. Attractions owe to the mind the greater part of their force, while charms involve of necessity amiability of character from which they materially spring. A well-formed figure, bright looks, animation, wit, gaiety, coquetry, may add to female attractions, or are enough to constitute them. A kindly smile, an expression of sensibility, candour, simplicity, unaffectedness, have their charms. Men are smitten by attractions, touched by charms. Attractions may be helped out by study or art, charms are never so effective as when they are perfectly natural. Women in love, it has been said, under-value their allurements, neglect their attractions, and dare not count upon their charms. On the other hand, she who wishes to captivate should forget the first, make the most of the second, and leave the third to themselves. The term CHARMS expresses something more pure than allurements, and more morally estimable than attractions.

ATTRACTIVE. ALLURING. INVITING. ENGAGING.

That is ATTRACTIVE (Lat. *attractivus*) which draws attention, interest, observation, admiration, and the like, in a moderate degree. It is an epithet both of things and of persons. That is ALLURING (Fr. *à leurre, to the bait*) which attracts the fancy, the interest, or the desires so strongly as to draw away from other matters, and to create a wish for more and more enjoyment—as for instance the pleasures of society, which often lead on to a craving for more and more excitement. As ATTRACT is a milder term than ALLURE, so it does not convey in so marked a way the idea of insidiousness in the influence. One may be attracted by what strikes the eye, the imagination, the ear, or the understanding; one is allured by what gives, or is believed to give, enjoyment or pleasure. Though persons, as well as things, may allure, yet the epithet ALLURING belongs to the latter. INVITING (Lat. *invītāre*) is not employed of persons, while ENGAGING (Fr. *engager*) is employed of persons exclusively. That is inviting which draws us by a natural and inherent force of persuasion over our movements and actions to derive pleasure from it as a source; as fine weather is inviting—that is, attracts us to go forth and enjoy it. ENGAGING belongs to the disposition and manners of persons, as having an unstudied power of winning the esteem or affection. The use of ENGAGING, in this elliptical sense, is modern. It is, of course, equivalent to engaging—that is, enlisting or securing—the regard. The whole phrase is thus given by Blair:—

"The present, whatever it be, seldom *engages* our attention so much as what is to come."

That is attractive which awakens interest. That is alluring which awakens desire. That is inviting which prompts to take and enjoy. That is engaging which takes possession of the mind and heart.

"Cato's Soul
Shines out in every thing she acts and speaks,
While winning mildness and *attractive* smiles
Dwell on her looks, and with becoming grace
Soften the rigour of her father's virtues."
ADDISON.

"Though caution'd oft her slippery path to shun
Hope still with promised joys *allured* them on;
And while they listen'd to her winning lore
The softer scenes of peace could please no more."
FALCONER.

"If he can but dress up a temptation to look *invitingly*, the business is done."—SHARP.

AVARICE. CUPIDITY. COVETOUSNESS.

AVARICE (Lat. *āvārĭtia*) is employed of the specific passion for money; while CUPIDITY (Lat. *cŭpĭdĭtātem*) and COVETOUSNESS (O. Fr. *covoiter*, from Lat. *cŭpĭdĭtare*) are used, the former of valuable possessions, the latter of goods in the abstract. Hence one may be said to be covetous of rank or celebrity, to which both avarice and cupidity would be inapplicable. The avaricious man is inordinately desirous of gain. He heaps up and cannot bear to part with his wealth. The covetous man desires property, wealth, or possessions, especially when he sees them in the hands of others. The covetous, though eager to obtain money, are not so desirous of retaining it. The same man may be covetous and a spendthrift, but the avaricious are not free spenders. Cupidity is the eager love of gain, avarice the selfish love, covetousness the unjust love.

"To desire money for its own sake, and to hoard it up, is *avarice*, an unnatural passion that disgraces and entirely debases the soul."—BEATTIE.

"For that tyrant, blinded and glutted with the *cupiditie* of ruling and sovereignty, commanded Edward my brother and me to be slain and despatched out of this mortal life;" *Henry VII.*—HALL.

"The word in Greek is πλεονεξία, which properly signifies *covetousness*, or an intemperate, ungoverned love of riches."—LOCKE.

AVENGE. REVENGE. VINDICATE.

These are all derivations of the Lat. *vindĭcāre*, which, in the case of the two former, have come through the French. The idea common to all is that of taking up a cause against opposition or wrong. Grammatically there is a difference in the ways in which the words are employed. I avenge myself upon another, or I avenge another, or I avenge a wrong. I revenge myself upon another. I vindicate, not persons, but their acts, rights, claims, and the like. To AVENGE is to inflict pain for the sake of retaliation, either one's own or another's. This may be an act of justice. To REVENGE is simply to inflict pain for pain, or wrong for wrong, to satisfy vindictive desire. To VINDICATE is always presumed to be an act of generosity and justice. The infliction of pain may come of it, but this is not the object sought, which is to reinstate what has been oppressed or misrepresented, in the way of claims, rights, causes, statements, principles, conduct, of persons. We avenge others, we revenge ourselves. To vindicate is an act of spontaneous justice, to revenge of passionate retaliation. We avenge another's wrongs and vindicate his rights.

"How little reason this king had to impute the death of Hotham to God's *avengement* of his repulse at Hull may easily be seen."—MILTON.

"*Revenge* is an insatiable desire to sacrifice every consideration of pity and humanity to the principle of vindictive justice."—COGAN.

"Yea, and we shall by daily experience see in the world that if one proud man injure or oppress an humble man, it is a thousand to one another undertakes his patronage, defence, and *vindication*, and very oftentimes is a means of his protection and deliverance."—HALE.

AUGUR. PRESAGE. FOREBODE. BETOKEN. PROGNOSTICATE. PORTEND.

The idea common to these terms is that of declaring something future on the ground of some present indication. With the exception of PRESAGE, in which its use in regard to

persons seems somewhat forced, these terms are equally employed of persons and events or circumstances. AUGUR and PRESAGE are peculiarly near akin. AUGURY (Lat. *augŭrium*)—probably formed from the word *avis, a bird*, and a root *gur = telling*: cf. Skt. *gar, to shout, garrire*, &c.—was drawn originally from the song, flight, or other action or condition of birds; whence the term augury has come to be applied to specific conjecture concerning future consequences. PRESAGE (Lat. *præsăgium*) comes from *sägire*, that is, according to Cicero, De Divin., *to perceive or discern acutely*; so that to presage is originally to be wise beforehand—to declare facts belonging to the future. An augury is an idea of anticipation. A presage is a sign which announces the future. Presage partakes more of the nature of proof, augury of inference. The augury is more in our minds, the presage more in the object, though in our minds also. The augury is the more uncertain, the presage the more certain indication. The former turns upon the imaginary, speculative, and, possibly, vague or frivolous; the latter upon what is real, certain, probable, or known. Hence AUGURY amounts to a more light or vague, PRESAGE to a grave and seasonable, conjecture. Beside these distinctions, PRESAGE relates to the fact or event, AUGURY to the felicitous or infelicitous nature of it. The presage is sure or doubtful, the augury happy or unhappy. In the presage one considers the nature, the force, the reality of its relation to the thing pointed to; in augury the smiling or sinister look of it, the evil or the good which is attached to it, the agreeable or disastrous end to which it points. Hence PRESAGE points to more specific results than AUGUR. I augur well for the man when I see the ingenuousness of the boy. On the other hand, from his successes at school I presage distinction in after life.

"I shall do well:
The people love me, and the sea is mine,
My powers are crescent, and my *auguring* hope
Says it will come to the full."
SHAKESPEARE

"Plotinus observes, in his third Ennead, that the art of *presaging* is in some sort the reading of natural letters denoting order, and that so far forth as analogy obtains in the universe there may be vatication."—STEWART.

FOREBODE (*fore*, and A. S. *bodian, to command, to order*) is, literally, to declare beforehand, but is by usage restricted to the prescience or anticipation, rather than the verbal announcement of evil. To forebode is vague, dim, imaginative. Evils of no definite character, or number or precise time of appearing, are foreboded; while augur and presage belong equally to evil and to good.

"My heart *forebodes* I ne'er shall see you more." DRYDEN.

BETOKEN (A. S. *ge-tacnian, to betoken, signify*) and PORTEND (Lat. (*pŏrtendĕre, to indicate*) relate to tendencies of events, and do not belong to any personal prediction. They differ in being suggestive, the former of ordinary, the latter of extraordinary sequences, whether preternatural or not. The aspect of the sky betokens rain, or portends a storm. But BETOKEN differs from all the rest in being not restricted to matters of the future. A certain act of a moral kind betokens the spirit which dictated it.

"A dewy cloud, and in the cloud a bow *Betokening* peace." MILTON.

"It was the opinion of the Gentiles that if one victim proved faulty, or *portended* evil, another victim might have a more propitious aspect, and be accepted."—JORTIN.

To PROGNOSTICATE (προγνωστικός, *prescient*) is exclusively personal, and an act of mind. It applies to great and small forthcomings, which are, as it were, heralded by certain characteristic symptoms or indications, which observation has shown to precede them. Prognostication is prediction based upon indication, and regulated by induction; augury is based upon external appearances combined with conjecture.

"The causes of this inundation cannot indeed be regular, and therefore their effects not *prognosticable* like eclipses."—BROWN'S *Vulgar Errors*.

AUSPICIOUS. PROPITIOUS. FAVOURABLE. GENIAL.

The AUSPICIOUS (Lat. *auspĭcĭum*, lit. *bird-inspection*) and PROPITIOUS (Lat. *prŏpĭtĭus*) are both forms of the FAVOURABLE (Lat. *fāvōrābilis*). The term FAVOURABLE is the most comprehensive and the least specific in its meaning. It is applied to anything which tends to further our designs, whether it be the goodwill of men, or the forces of nature, as a favourable wind; or the confluence of events, as a favourable moment or circumstance. That is propitious which is favourably inclined; that is auspicious which looks favourable, and seems an indication of coming good or success. AUSPICIOUS cannot therefore be applied, like PROPITIOUS and FAVOURABLE, to persons, but only to events and appearances. That is auspicious which looks as if success were at hand; that is propitious which causes or grants success; that which inclines or is well disposed to us, which aids, seconds, or is ready to serve us, is favourable. That which is above us, or stronger than we, yet ready to protect or assist us, or having that tendency—which comes to our succour, and having power exerts it on our behalf, is propitious. The inefficient may be favourable; the powerful only can be propitious. Persons and circumstances show themselves every day as favourable or unfavourable to us. It is in trouble, danger, or enterprise, that men say they hope that heaven or fortune may be propitious.

"The *favourableness* of the present times to all exertions in the cause of liberty."—BURKE.

"Thus were their lives *auspiciously* begun,
And thus with secret care were carried on."
DRYDEN.

"And now to assuage the force of this new flame
And make thee more *propitious* in my need,
I mean to sing the praises of thy name,
And thy victorious conquest to areed."
SPENSER.

The GENIAL (Lat. *gĕnialis*: *see* GENIUS) is that which warms and fosters into life, vivifies, and nurtures; hence fostering the natural enjoyment of life —sympathizing with it and promoting it. The genial is opposed to the chilling in natural effects, and the austere in human dispositions. The genial breeze invigorates; it freshens while it warms. The genial disposition is bright, warm, and pleasant, and has pleasure in the pleasure of others. Originally, genial meant natural, or inborn; "genial pride" was the pride of a person's nature.

"For me kind nature wakes her *genial* power." POPE.

AUSTERITY. SEVERITY. RIGOUR. STERNNESS. STRICTNESS.

The primary meaning of AUSTERE (Lat. *austĕrus*) is *harsh*, like the flavour of inferior or unripe fruit; and in this sense English writers have sometimes used it, as Bishop Harley:—

"The sweetness of the ripened fruit is not the less delicious for the *austerity* of its crude state."

Austerity is the result sometimes of constitutional disposition; sometimes of a stern view of the nature of life; sometimes of both combined. When austere is applied to looks, manners, and the like, what is meant is, that they are the looks, manners, and the like, of an austere person—of one who takes a somewhat sour view of the enjoyments and relaxations, and dwells habitually upon the duties and denials of existence. The austere man is accordingly exacting upon himself as well as upon others. An austere master speaks but to command, and commands so as to be obeyed. The countenance of the austere seldom relaxes into a smile. Those views, doctrines, principles, precepts, habits, persons, which are painful to the moral taste and unpalatable to human nature are austere. Austerity shuns luxury and social enjoyment, and courts self-mortification, and preaches this to others.

"Such was the life the frugal Sabines led;
So Remus and his brother God were bred,
From whom th'*austere* Etrurian virtue rose;
And this rude life our homely fathers chose."
DRYDEN.

SEVERITY (Lat. *sĕvērĭtatem*) is the constitutional tendency to enforce the rigour of discipline or retribution, without being deterred by pity from the execution of punishment; or to insist on such things as might be hard

or painful to others. Austerity is a part of the nature; severity a tendency which appears in the treatment of particular cases: hence severity may be, on principle, resorted to in specific instances.

"I am very apt to think that great *severity* of punishment does but very little good, nay, great harm in education."—LOCKE.

RIGOUR (Lat. *rĭgōrem, stiffness, severity*) is an unbending adherence to rule or principle, an inflexibility which renders inaccessible to allurement, entreaty, or any force employed to induce one to relax the strictness of his adherence. Severity is a way of thinking and judging. Rigour is a way of punishing and exacting. The severe man condemns, and excuses not; the rigorous man enforces, and relaxes not. Rigour is seldom desirable except where an example has to be made.

"Capitation taxes are levied at little expense, and where they are *rigorously* exacted, afford a very sure revenue to the state."—ADAM SMITH.

STRICTNESS (Lat. *strictus, severe*) is rigour in reference to rule, and is an abridger of liberty in favour of method. It is commonly taken in a favourable, as SEVERITY in an unfavourable sense. Unlike the rest, strict is used in an objective sense. Not only is the enforcer and multiplier of rules called strict, but rules themselves may be strict. In this manner we speak of strict obligations, duty, regulations, the strict meaning of an expression. In these cases it bears the sense of rigorously nice, limited, or restricted. A strict rule is that which does not admit of being relaxed. A strict meaning is that which is commensurate with the term; which comprises all that it signifies, and leaves no room for importing or associating what is foreign or irrelevant.

"We greatly deceive ourselves if we imagine that God requires greater *strictness* of life at one time than at another."—GILPIN.

STERNNESS (A.S. *stern; stern, severe*) is more applicable to look, demeanour, and manners than to nature or disposition. The stern man may be severe and even cruel; on the other hand, sternness is sometimes assumed as a disguise of tender feeling. The commander may sternly order a punishment, while he is much moved inwardly, and would have gladly been spared the occasion. The severe man has no such compunction.

"The public father who the private quell'd
As on the dread tribunal *sternly* sad."
THOMSON.

AUTHORITATIVE. IMPERATIVE. IMPERIOUS. COMMANDING.

AUTHORITATIVE denotes either a character or a manner which possesses or pretends authority. It also follows the twofold sense of *authority*—that is, having power to establish, and power to command; and is an epithet both of things and persons. Hence it is in its turn a synonym with determinative, magisterial, and dictatorial; or having binding authority, exercising authority, and assuming authority. It differs from COMMANDING in implying some right to be followed or obeyed. Nor does COMMANDING (Fr. *commander*) belong to the internal force of things, or the power and authority of persons, but only to their personal attributes. A commanding presence or voice is one which has a tendency to procure to itself deference and attention. It seems that, when directly applied to persons, AUTHORITATIVE implies the undue assumption of an air of authority. On the other hand an authoritative manner, though not ordinarily agreeable, may be called for by circumstances.

The following will illustrate the twofold use of authoritative:—

"The mock *authoritative* manner of the one, and the insipid mirth of the other."—SWIFT.

"A layman should not intrude himself to administer the sacred functions of *authoritative* teaching."—BARROW.

Of IMPERIOUS and IMPERATIVE (Lat. *imperare, to command*) the former is the more personal. IMPERIOUS characterizes a disposition to command, showing itself in an exacting behaviour; while IMPERATIVE belongs to the thing required or to the feel

ir g, not habitual, but on the occasion, of the person commanding. An imperious person is selfish and overbearing. We may be imperative, or speak imperatively, from a sense of necessity, and even circumstances may render a thing imperatively necessary. The imperious character manifests itself especially under contradiction, and with some degree of temper.

"The suits of kings are *imperative*."—BISHOP HALL.

"Oh, that my tongue had every grace of speech,
Great and *commanding* as the breath of kings." ROWE.

"His bold, contemptuous, and *imperious* spirit soon made him conspicuous."—MACAULAY.

AUTHENTIC. GENUINE.

The distinction drawn by Bishop Watson is as follows, between the AUTHENTIC (*αὐθεντικός, warranted*) and GENUINE (Lat. *gĕnŭinus*) :—

"A genuine book is that which was written by the person whose name it bears as the author of it. An authentic book is that which relates matters of fact as they really happened. A book may be genuine without being authentic, and a book may be authentic without being genuine. The books written by Richardson and Fielding are genuine books, though the histories of Clarissa and Tom Jones are fables. The history of the island of Famosa is a genuine book. It was written by Psalmanazar, but it is not an authentic book, though it was long esteemed as such, and translated into different languages; for the author in the latter part of his life took shame to himself for having imposed upon the world, and confessed that it was a mere romance. Anson's Voyages may be considered an authentic book. It probably contains a true narrative of the principal events recorded in it; but it is not a genuine book, having not been written by Walter, to whom it is ascribed by Robins."

In reference to this, Archbishop Trench says ("Select Glossary," under AUTHENTIC) :—

"Of 'authentic,' he has certainly not seized the true force, neither do the uses of it by good writers bear him out. The true opposite to *αὐθεντικός* in Greek is *ἀδέσποτος* (*i.e. not owned, anonymous*) and authentic is properly having an author, and thus coming with authority, authoritative; the connexion of author and authority in our own language, giving us the key to its successive meanings. Then an authentic document is in its first meaning a document written by the proper hand of him from whom it professes to proceed. In all the passages which follow it will be observed that the word might be exchanged for authoritative."

I venture to suggest, as a reconciliation of these conflicting authorities, that Bishop Watson's view exactly coincides with the force of the French *authentique*; as also the word *genuine* in English is opposed not only to what is adulterated or fictitious, but also to what is spurious in origin.

According to the French use of the term, that is an *authentic* act which has formality, legality, proof, and so inherent validity. An authentic copy is one which may be used for the purposes of the original. That is authentic to which our credence is incontestably due. An authentic report of facts is relied upon not simply on the authority of the person who drew it up. The following remarks, extracted from Webster's "Synonyms," are much to the purpose :—

"We call a document genuine when it can be traced back ultimately to the author or authors from whom it professes to emanate. We call a document authentic in the primary sense of the term, when, on the ground of its being thus traced back, it may be relied on as true and authoritative; and in this sense the term is used in respect to legal instruments. But in general literature it has obtained a wider signification. We can often rely upon statements as true without knowing the name of the person with whom they originated. Their claims to be believed may rest on collateral evidence of the most unquestionable nature, and such statements are accordingly spoken of as authentic. This secondary use of the term is the one now most in use. Thus we speak of an authentic report of facts, authentic history, &c. Hence writers on the evidences of our religion speak of the genuineness and the authenticity of the sacred Scriptures, meaning by the former that the books have come down to us uncorrupt from their original sources; and by the latter that they may be relied upon as true and authoritative in all matters of faith and practice."

AUTHORITY. POWER. JURISDICTION. DOMINION.

AUTHORITY (Lat. *auctōrĭtātem*) is the right of exercising POWER (Fr. *pouvoir*), no matter what the character of the power may be. It is based upon the grounds of some relationship, so that it is natural, moral, domestic, social, political, and the like. Under moral authority might be included that which comes from superior knowledge generally, or better specific information. Authority is based either upon conventional or natural right, otherwise it becomes usurpation. As political authority is limited by right, so parental authority is limited by age. It is in their moral significance that AUTHORITY and POWER are here regarded as synonyms. Authority leaves the more liberty of choice, power has the greater force. Superiority of mind and stature gives authority. Attachment to persons contributes much to the power which they exercise over us. Such power lives by entreaty or persuasion, inducing us to yield ourselves to what others desire of us; or it gains its ends by art. The art of finding out weak points, and seizing the advantage to be derived from them, gives a great amount of power. The authority which we have over others is always honourable. It comes of some degree of merit or excellence. Power comes of some binding influence of the heart or interests. To the good and wise friend we ought to accord an authority in matters of opinion, and a certain power over us for practical guidance, so long as we do not part with our discretion, or render an unreasonable compliance or submission. In their political aspects, too, authority and power differ. In this relation, authority is the right of civil or political administration. It is the principle of which power is the action. Authority is derived from the laws, and power is derived from authority. Of God alone it can be said that His authority is unlimited or His power absolute. Strictly speaking, the only natural authority is that of the parent over the child. Every other authority comes of law or positive enactment. Power is no more than the possession of means to compel to an action or condition.

"For that which obtaineth universally must either have some force in itself to command acceptation or else must be imposed by some over-ruling *authority*."—BISHOP HALL.

"*Power* gradually extirpates from the mind every humane and gentle virtue."—BURKE.

Politically, AUTHORITY is the active right of administration. POWER is the faculty of carrying into execution such orders as come from a superior authority. Authority is derived from the laws. Power lies in those whose office it is to execute the laws. Hence power is subordinate to authority. Authority which is excessive militates against divine and natural law, as power which is excessive transgresses the limits of right jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION (Lat. *jūrisdictionem*) is the possession or exercise of political authority within limits legally defined—that is, over certain persons or within certain localities, or on certain subjects and in certain cases. In its widest sense, JURISDICTION is the administration of justice by means and under conditions furnished by the laws.

"But at present, by the long uniform usage of many ages, our kings have delegated their own judicial power to the judges of their several courts, which are the grand depositories of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and stated *jurisdiction* regulated by certain and established rules, which the Crown itself cannot now alter, but by Act of Parliament."—BLACKSTONE.

DOMINION (L. Lat. *dominiōnem*, *dŏmĭnus*, *lord*) is a term of general, rather than technical or exact import. It means lordship or the exercise of it; and, politically, a territory within which it is exercised. Like POWER and unlike AUTHORITY, it implies nothing necessarily as to lawfulness. Man has dominion over the inferior animals. The dominion is in itself given him by God, but as man exercises it, it is sometimes a merciful, sometimes a merciless dominion. DOMINION is as vague as JURISDICTION is definite and exact, and is used in a great variety of analogous cases. The

dominions of a Sovereign are the territories under his crown, regarded irrespectively of the local modifications of his authority. So India and Canada, though in very different forms, are included in the British dominions.

"Though for a while the pleasure of sin may captivate, and unlawful gain may bring its present advantage, yet we may depend upon it a time will come when sin will assert his *dominion*."—GILPIN.

AUTHORIZE. EMPOWER. ENABLE.

The idea common to these terms is that of imparted, delegated, or transmitted power.

ENABLE (*see* ABLE) is the widest. It may denote the giving of physical, moral, mental, or official competency. To enable a person is to put him into a position to do a thing, and by an extended application to do it rightly, or with propriety. He who is enabled is made intrinsically stronger.

"Temperance gives nature her full play, and *enables* her to exert herself in all her force and vigour."—ADDISON.

He who is EMPOWERED (pref. *en*, *in*, and *power*, Fr. *pouvoir*) receives an external accession of strength. A document empowers a man to act officially; food enables him to bear fatigue. AUTHORIZE belongs exclusively to the exercise of active rights. EMPOWER belongs also to the bestowing a capacity, or conferring passive qualifications. I authorize an agent to make a demand for money, and empower him to receive it. EMPOWER has a force more strongly technical, or legal; AUTHORIZE more general and moral. I am authorized to conclude a fact when I do so upon authentic and sufficient evidence. To such a case, implying the rightful exercise of my own powers of mind, the word EMPOWER does not apply. Persons or the state of circumstances authorize; the State or the law empowers. The law authorizes the magistrate to impose a certain penalty—that is, would bear him out if any question of his right to do it were to arise. But it also empowers him to do it—that is, invests him with liberty to act for himself in the matter, conferring upon him a jurisdiction which in his private capacity he does not possess.

"For let a vicious person be in never so high a command, yet still he will be looked upon but as one great vice *empowered* to correct and chastise others."—SOUTH.

"Since God evidently designed the regular course of nature for the support and comfort of man, we seem *authorized* to conclude that He will apply its irregularities and disorder to his punishment, correction, and admonition."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

AUXILIARY. SUBSIDIARY. ANCILLARY.

That which is AUXILIARY (Lat. *auxĭliārius*) operates in conjunction with that which it aids, so as to produce a result. That which is SUBSIDIARY (Lat. *subsĭdiārius*, *subsĭdium*, *support*, being originally the troops stationed in the third line of battle as a reserve, from *subsĭdēre*, *to settle down*) is in the relation of means available for the purpose of producing that result. That which is auxiliary is directly promotive, that which is subsidiary is subserviently applicable. That which is auxiliary is already in action, that which is subsidiary may remain in reserve: the former *is* of use, the latter *may* be. Auxiliary testimony increases the evidence. Subsidiary testimony has this *property*. Hence there is an equality implied in the auxiliary, an inferiority in the subsidiary. ANCILLARY (Lat. *ancilla*, *a handmaid*) is a term formed to express a more marked inferiority or subserviency of co-operation. Being a purely metaphorical term, it is commonly employed of abstract rather than material operations, in the sense of subordinately promoting intellectual, scientific, literary, or political ends. That which is ancillary contributes to the work, that which is subsidiary contributes to the means, that which is auxiliary contributes to the end.

AVERAGE. MEAN. MEDIUM.

AVERAGE (L. Lat. *averagium*, orig. *a portion of work done by cattle*; pl. *averia*) is a mean proportion, a medial sum or quantity made out of several unequal sums or quantities, or, in a

general way, a medial statement or estimate derived from several specific cases. If A contributes ten pounds, B twelve, and C fourteen, the sum is thirty-six, and the average twelve. It is the opinion of some persons that a principle of compensation runs through human affairs; that if one enjoys more than another, that other suffers less; that if one has more desires gratified, another has fewer desires; and so that, though it is not capable of demonstration, yet an average of human happiness may be conceived to exist.

A MEAN (Fr. *moyen*, Lat. *mĕdium*) is the point or place intermediate between two extremes—the middle rate or degree. If nine and seven are the extremes, eight is the mean. The mean is sometimes the same as the average, that is, it is formed by adding the quantities together and dividing by their number. This is the arithmetical mean. The geometrical mean is the square root of the product of the quantities. But a mean is not always a quantity having an intermediate value between several others from which it is derived; it is sometimes expressive of that which is morally equidistant between opposite extremes. Thus moral virtue, according to Aristotle, lay in a mean state or condition, each particular virtue being a mean between a vice of defect and a vice of excess; as liberality between niggardliness and prodigality, courage between fear and foolhardiness; and so on. MEDIUM, in addition to the sense of mean, has also that of an intervening substance—as an atmospheric medium, a circulating medium. Where this intervening object is an instrument by which a thing is done, it is nearly equivalent to the plural *means*, but the medium may be an agent as well as an instrument.

AWARD. ADJUDGE.

The difference exists between these terms which exists between the office of the arbitrator and the judge. Every arbitrator is a judge, though every judge is not an arbitrator. To ADJUDGE is simply to decide by a judicial opinion or sentence; where this is between persons of opposing interests, the adjudication is an AWARD (O. Fr. *eswardeir*, formed from O. H. G. *warten, to look at, guard*). The term ADJUDGE (Lat. *adjūdĭcare*) is applicable to the case as well as the object; AWARD, only to the object. Accordingly, those who adjudge act upon law and rule, to which they are bound exactly to adhere; those who award act often upon their *own* judgment, or their views of the comparative merits of cases and persons.

AWARE. CONSCIOUS. SENSIBLE.

AWARE (A. S. *gewær*, *wary*) belongs to the knowledge which is needful for one's own sake in the regulation of conduct or the regulation of interests. It refers to matters of ordinary, common, or practical information, or to any facts or truths as bearing upon ourselves. We are not said to be aware of what is matter of pure science, unless it practically concerns us in some way. I am aware of a thing, when my knowledge of it is such as to lead me to take it into due consideration. Such knowledge is the result of observation and experience. When we are aware of a thing, we bear in mind its relative nature and consequences. I know a certain scientific truth: if I enter into argument connected with it, it is necessary that I should be aware of it, otherwise a false step in the reasoning may be the result.

"Fastidious or else listless, or perhaps
Aware of not' ing arduous in a task
They never undertook, they little note
His dangers or escapes, and haply find
There least amusement where he found the most." COWPER.

CONSCIOUS (Lat. *conscius*) belongs to reflexive, as SENSIBLE (Lat. *sensĭbilis, perceptible to the senses*) to perceptive knowledge. I am sensible of a thing when I feel it. I am conscious of it when I reflect upon it. I am aware of it as a fact which concerns me, but is external to myself. Both conscious and sensible imply the personal nature of the matter of knowledge and its character as intrinsic to one's self. A sick man is sensible of a change for the better when he experiences a bodily improvement. He is conscious of it when he could not with truth

deny it. I am conscious that another has behaved to me in a certain way: I feel sensible of gratitude to him.

"*Consciousness* is the perception of what passes in one's own mind."—LOCKE.

"It is the good acceptance, the *sensibleness* of, and acquiescence in, the benefactor's goodness that constitutes the gratitude."—BARROW.

AWKWARD. CLUMSY. UNGAINLY. UNCOUTH.

AWKWARD (O. E. *awk, contrary, wrong;* and termination, *ward—i.e. in the direction of*) denotes untowardness of movement, which is also to some extent expressed by CLUMSY, which seems, originally, to have meant *benumbed, cramped*; cf. *Du. klemmen, to pinch*. AWKWARD has an active, CLUMSY a passive meaning. Clumsiness comes of natural heaviness of limb and want of symmetry of figure. Awkwardness is specific in relation to some particular action which may be the result simply of want of experience—as the novice in the use of an implement is necessarily awkward till he has become familiar with it, though he may even have a natural aptitude for it. A person is awkward in movement, clumsy in shape. The latter is a natural cause of the former.

"*Awkwardness* is a more real disadvantage than it is commonly thought to be. It often occasions ridicule. It always lessens dignity."—CHESTERFIELD.

"The manufacture would be tedious, and at best but *clumsily* performed."—*Spectator*.

In the phrase "an awkward excuse" we regard the maker of it. A clumsy excuse points to the nature of it when made. In the colloquial expression "an awkward affair," the etymological force of the word seems kept up. It is an affair that goes wrong, and in a contrary way to the right way.

UNGAINLINESS is a chronic awkwardness of manner. It is the want of that which was once expressed by the word *gainly*, now obs., meaning *gracious*; and, though in form of expression negative, like almost all such negatives, expresses a positive defect.

"Flora had a little beauty and a great deal of wit, but then she was so *ungainly* in her behaviour, and such a laughing hoyden."—*Tatler*.

In the moral sense Hammond speaks of "misusing knowledge to UNGAINLY," that is ungracious, unsuitable, "ends."

UNCOUTH (A. S. *uncúd, unknown, uncouth*) is in matters of general demeanour, what awkward and clumsy are in movement or action. Strange, odd, awkward things are said by the uncouth, and unconventional things done, from want of knowledge and familiarity with the ways of the trained society in which he finds himself. It belongs to style of language and thought, as well as manner and dress. The uncouth person gives the notion of one who has been allowed to run wild without systematic education.

"The dress of a New Zealander is certainly to a stranger at first sight the most *uncouth* that can be imagined."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"The *uncouthness* of his language and the quaintness of his thoughts will not, it is hoped, disgust the delicacy of readers unaccustomed to the writings of our old divines."—KNOX.

AZURE. BLUE.

BLUE (Fr. *bleu*) is the generic term.

AZURE (O. Fr. *azur*) is the blue of the sky—cerulean blue.

B

BABBLE. PRATTLE. CHATTER. CHAT. PRATE.

To BABBLE (onomatop. cf. Fr. *babiller*) is to talk small talk in an easy but monotonous flow. Babbling is a fluency which takes no note of the relative importance of matters of conversation. As the object of the babbler is rather to relieve himself than to instruct others, he is apt to become indistinct and unintelligible in his speech, and to speak in a murmurous flow. Old men who have lost energy, and employ speech merely as a vent to mental impressions and recollections as they successively arise, or are revived, are apt to babble. As babbling excludes reflexiveness and restraint in speech, a babbler sometimes means an indiscriminate talker, hence a tale-bearer or gossip. Poetically, the term has been applied to the perpetual babbling sound of running water, "babbling brooks."

"When St. Paul was speaking of Christ and His Resurrection, the great Athenian philosophers looked upon all he said to be mere *babbling*."—BEVERIDGE.

CHATTER (onomatop. cf. Fr. *caqueter*.) The English *chatter* is employed of the inarticulate sounds of some animals, as of birds; hence talk which consists of the rapid repetition of sounds without much sense. An old form of the word was *chitter*. As babbling is often the product of infirmity, as in the aged, so chatter comes from over-activity of mind in little matters. When quick perception and nervous activity are combined with want of mental power, they produce that which is called chatter.

CHAT, a shorter form, is confined to the easy and social interchange of conversation on matters of no high moment, but sufficiently interesting to the parties engaged. Chattering is especially manifest among women and children in parties of themselves. The chatterer is a person of fussy self-importance. As babbling is subdued, so chattering is loud and harsh. As a single person babbles, an assembly of persons provoke one another to chattering, which is often the life of such gatherings.

"Birds of the air, perceiving their young ones taken from their nest, *chitter* for a while in trees thereabout, and straight after they fly abroad, and make no more ado."—WILSON'S *Arte of Rhetorike*.

"The mimic ape began his *chatter*,
How evil tongues his life bespatter,
Much of the censuring world complain'd
Who said his gravity was feign'd."
SWIFT.

"She found as on a spray she sat
The little friends were deep in *chat*."
COTTON'S *Fables*.

PRATE and PRATTLE are connected with the Dutch *praaten*; prov. Ger. *praten*. Prattling is the innocent talk of young children, while prating belongs more to elders, and is talking much but to little purpose. The former is innocent, lively, childlike; the latter is graver, impertinent, and obtrusive. Solemn or pompous talk combined with a shallow knowledge of the subject is prating.

"This is the reason why we are so much charmed with the pretty *prattle* of children, and even the expressions of pleasure or uneasiness in some part of the brute creation."—SIDNEY'S *Arcadia*.

"These *praters* affect to carry back the clergy to that primitive evangelic poverty which in the spirit ought always to exist in them (and in us too, however we may like it), but in the thing must be varied."—BURKE.

BAD. EVIL. WICKED. NAUGHTY.

Of these, BAD (cf. Cornish, *bad, stupid, insane*; and Gael. *baodh, vain, giddy*: SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) is the simplest and widest term. Every thing is presumed to have, in its true and normal state, a distinctive nature, character, and force, by which it manifests itself aright, and answers its proper idea and purpose. When this is so, it may be pronounced good, when the contrary, it is bad. The term BAD denotes that which is wanting in good qualities in any sense, moral or physical, and this in any degree hurtful, defective, or only unfavourable. A man is bad when, instead of the characteristic qualities of human nature in its rightful state—as, for instance, sobriety, humanity, equity, justice, kindness—he exhibits habitually the contrary vices, or any

one in particular. It may be observed that a thing is sometimes called bad as being relatively offensive or noxious, as a bad, that is, offensive smell. An air which is in itself pure yet keen, is spoken of as bad for a person of delicate lungs.

"Every one must see and feel that *bad* thoughts quickly ripen into *bad* actions, and that if the latter only are forbidden, and the former left free, all morality will soon be at an end."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

EVIL (A. S. *yfel*) is now only employed in a moral sense. It is the potentially bad—that which has a nature or properties which tend to produce badness. It belongs to persons and their properties, words, or deeds, and to abstract causes, not specifically to material substances. Evil is inherent and malignant. Badness is a quality; evil is that quality as it is judged of and recognized, or forecast by rational and intelligent beings. That is evil which produces unhappiness, misery, pain, harm, suffering, injury, calamity. Hence, any deviation from conscience, law, or sound religion, is evil. BAD expresses a condition, EVIL a principle or power. A bad condition; an evil influence. Badness is an attribute of present things, evil may take effect upon the future. Badness may be in default of good, evil is always in opposition or antagonism to it. A stubborn disposition is a bad one, but not so far an evil one. Badness may be negative: anything which exhibits a great degree of inferiority may be called bad; but evil is positive and pernicious.

"*Evil* news rides fast, while good news baits." MILTON.

Though the best men have in them something of the sinful and the evil, they are not therefore to be called WICKED. The term is used of things as well as persons, in which case it is only employed reflexively—a wicked act being the act of a wicked person. The wicked person is so in his whole nature, and systematically. He lives in sin and wrong. He contradicts, whenever he desires it, any law, human or divine; hence wickedness includes immorality and sin, or offences human and divine. As evil is malignant and internal, so wickedness is mischievous and active.

"Self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to persecute such and only such as are *wicked* and dangerous."—WOOLASTON.

NAUGHTY (A. S. *nawiht, nâwt, nothing; good for nothing*) had of old the same extensive kind of application as bad, and was applicable to anything which was not what it ought to be—as "naughty figs" in the English version of the Book of Jeremiah. It now denotes those minor offences which are the results of little self-indulgences, waywardness, and self-will, and expresses characteristically the faults of children. There is an ingenious combination of the old and the new idea of "naughty" in the following.

"Play by yourself, I dare not venture thither,
You and your *naughty* pipe go hang together." DRYDEN'S *Theocritus*.

BADGE. COGNIZANCE.

The BADGE (L. Lat. *bagia*; Fr. *baga*; *i.e.*, *bacca, a ring*) is a personal mark of distinction used, except where the contrary is specifically expressed, in an honourable sense. Where it is a party distinction, this would depend upon the estimate formed of the party.

A COGNIZANCE is a French term, more purely heraldic. The badge is personal, the cognizance is of the family or house. A servant might bear the cognizance of his master's family with his livery, but he could have no right to bear his badge. Nevertheless, the cognizance might be spoken of in reference to the servant who bore it, as the badge of his retainership; that is—as being, in regard to himself personally, a distinctive mark.

"Charity, which Christ has made the very *badge* and discriminating mark of His religion."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

"For which cause men imagined that he gave the sun in his full brightness for his *cognizaunce* or badge."—HALL, *Henry VI.*

BADLY. ILL.

BADLY belongs more naturally to the thing done, and the act of doing it; ILL to attendant circumstances, ab-

stract character, and to the conception of things rather than their execution. If we wished to disapprove a matter both in purpose and performance, we might say that it was ill-conceived and badly executed. A thing may be ill-judged without being badly done—that is, it may be objectionable, not in itself, but in regard to the season or circumstances of it.

BAFFLE. DEFEAT. DISCONCERT. FRUSTRATE. DISCOMPOSE. FOIL.

BAFFLE (a corr. of Lowland Scotch, *bauchle, to treat contemptuously;* for change of *ch* to *ff*, cf. *tough, rough, &c.*: SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*), like the rest of these synonyms, is used both of the schemer and the scheme. He who baffles does so by skill, forethought, address. The baffled finds that the baffler has been before him, and has taken just so much out of his arrangements as to make his plan ineffectual. Hence, BAFFLING commonly implies versatility in the baffler, and repeated little counteractions. Baffling winds seem to shift with the ship's course. It is evident that it is only as employed of persons that baffling involves skill. An obstinate disease may baffle the skill of the physician.

"Experience, that great *baffler* of speculation."—*Gov. of the Tongue.*

The chess-player who plays a losing game is baffled by the play of his adversary, but he is not of necessity thereby *defeated* (O. Fr. *défait*, part. of *défaire, to undo*). DEFEAT is final, while BAFFLING may be final or progressive, unless it be used of some one design said to be baffled. Baffling, then, is a kind of defeat, not, as defeat may be, by superior force or skill, but by skill only; so that one may be baffled yet still strive, but when one is defeated, the strife is over.

"Too well I see and rue the dire event
That with sad overthrow and foul *defeat*
Hath lost us heaven." MILTON.

DISCONCERT (O. Fr. *disconcerter*, originally, from Lat. *consĕrĕre, to join together*), whether applied to persons or their plans, is to throw into confusion, such as may or may not terminate the proceeding. He is disconcerted, whose ideas fall, as it were, to pieces, and cease to be joined together. Sequence, continuity, consistency, are destroyed for the time, and the actor or speaker, if he is not to be entirely baffled, must institute them anew. Those persons who have strong self-love, but no great readiness of mind, are apt, in the common intercourse of life, to be disconcerted by trifles Disconcerting falls far short of defeat. The disconcerted man is thrown off the line of thought, speech, or action, and does not know how to find his way back.

"Far from being overcome, never once *disconcerted*, never once embarrassed, but calmly superior to every artifice, to every temptation, to every difficulty."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

What DISCONCERT is to the purpose and the plan, DISCOMPOSE (Lat. *dis-, apart*, and *compŏnĕre, to put together*), is to the feelings. He who is discomposed is thrown out of a state of serenity, as he who is disconcerted is thrown out of self-possession. A man may be discomposed without being in the smallest degree disconcerted. He may have his feelings disturbed, while his judgment remains unaffected. Persons of irritable temper are apt to be discomposed. He who is disconcerted becomes more or less silent. He who is discomposed may become more energetic in speech.

"Every opposition of our espoused opinions *discomposeth* the mind's serenity."—GLANVILL.

FRUSTRATE (Lat. *frustrāri*, or *-re*) is to make a purpose miss its end—to cause that it shall not attain or secure that which it sought. In common parlance, schemes, designs, or movements, are baffled, efforts are defeated, arrangements are disconcerted, policy is confounded, purposes or hopes are frustrated, feelings or thoughts are discomposed, attempts are foiled.

The term FOIL, which most resembles baffle (Fr. *fouler, to trample upon, to hurt*) seems to imply an undertaking already begun, but defeated in the course of execution. One may be baffled by anticipation, one is foiled by counteraction.

"Is it to be supposed that He should disappoint His creation, and frustrate this very desire (of immortality) which He has Himself implanted?"—BEATTIE.

"I have endeavoured to find out, if

possible, the amount of the whole of these demands, in order to see how much, supposing the country in a condition to furnish the fund, may remain to satisfy the public debt and the necessary establishments, but I have been *foiled* in my attempts."—BURKE.

BALANCE. POISE.

BALANCE (Fr. *balancer*; Lat. *bilancem, balance, scales*) and POISE (Fr. *poids*; Lat. *pondus, weight*) both denote the establishment of an equilibrium. BALANCE is of different objects, POISE of one. I poise a thing in a given point; I balance it by counteracting its weight with another equal weight. The empty scales in a just balance are balanced each by the other. If one were taken and placed upon a needle upon its absolute centre, without any disturbing force, as of the atmosphere, it would be poised. Balance is consistent with movement in the body balanced or balancing itself. That which is poised is stationary. The bird, through its whole flight, balances itself on its wings. It sometimes stops its flight and poises itself in mid air. A man may balance himself along a tight rope. If he poises himself, he is at one point of it.

"Him science taught by mystic lore to trace
The planets wheeling in eternal race,
To mark the ship in floating *balance* held,
By earth attracted, and by seas repelled."
FALCONER.

"Earth upon
Her centre *poised*."
MILTON.

BALL. GLOBE. SPHERE. ORB.

BALL (Fr. *balle*) expresses any body which is round, or even approximate to rotundity—a ball of cotton, a cricket-ball, a snow-ball, the ball of the toe. It is presumably solid.

"Why was the sight
To such a tender *ball* as th' eye confined?"
MILTON.

GLOBE (Lat. *glŏbus*), on the other hand, regards entirely the form and not the composition. It is presumed to be perfectly, or almost perfectly round, and may be solid or hollow.

"Mercator in some of his great *globes* hath continued the West Indies land, even to the North Pole, and consequently cut off all passage by sea that way."—HACKLUYT

SPHERE (Lat. *sphæra*, Gr. σφαῖρα) is in Greek what GLOBE is in Latin. Like GLOBE, SPHERE bears reference only to form, not to composition or substance. It is more strictly a geometrical term than globe, and is defined, "a body contained under a single surface which at every part is equally distant from a point within it, called the centre." In its secondary meaning, SPHERE denotes a limited extent of operation, a proper action and influence.

"There is but little variety of other vegetable productions, though doubtless several had not yet sprung up at the early season when we visited the place, and many more might be hid from the narrow *sphere* of our observation."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

ORB (Lat. *orbis*) has at present a somewhat rhetorical character, and is commonly associated with costliness of material, brilliancy or luminousness—as the orb of the royal crown, the orbs of the firmament, or the eyes.

"And her bright eyes, the *orbs* which beauty moves,
As Phœbus dazzles in his glorious race."
DRUMMOND.

An orb is a circular surface. A sphere is a circular envelope. Taylor says, "Rotundity is the common property of all these bodies; but the circle is a hoop, the orb a disk, the sphere a shell, and the globe a ball."

"Within the visible diurnal *sphere*."
MILTON;

that is, the concave region of day.

"Ex solidis globus; ex planis autem, circulus aut orbis." CICERO.

In its secondary sense, SPHERE is to human duties what CIRCLE is to social acquaintance.

BAND. COMPANY. CREW. GANG. TROOP. HORDE.

Of these, COMPANY (Fr. *compagnie*, Lat. *con-, together*, and *pānis, bread*; *a companion* being, literally, *a messmate*) is the generic term. A COMPANY may imply permanent or transient association; and this for the graver or lighter purposes of life, for pleasure or for profit, voluntarily, or as part of a larger organization; as we speak of a company of travellers, elegant company, a trading or mercantile company, a ship's company, a company of persons thrown together by chance, or lastly, in its

abstract sense, company as opposed to solitude. Occupation, recreation, interest or duty may be the bond of a company. The term has no unfavourable sense of itself, but depends for this on the qualifying context. A company of thieves, or a company of angels.

"The blessed angels to and fro descend
From highest heaven in gladsome *companee*."
SPENSER.

BAND (Fr. *bande*) is a number, not large, and generally smaller than company, of persons bound together having a work, design, or employment in common. They may be bound by consent or as an organized body—as a band of soldiers, a musical band.

"Ye see how all around them wait
The ministers of human fate,
And black misfortunes' baleful train;
Ah, show them where in ambush stand,
To seize their prey, the murderous *band*—
Ah, tell them they are men." GRAY.

CREW (O. Icel *krú, a swarm, crowd*, "like many sea-terms, of Scandinavian origin:" SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*), a word often honourably employed.

"A noble *crew*
Of Lords and Ladies stood on every side."
SPENSER.

Its common technical use now is that of a ship's company, in which the legal application assumes the officers to be included. It has picked up an ignoble meaning, according to which it seems to combine the idea of insignificance in the members with a mischievous character of the aggregate.

"Being sufficiently weary of this mad *crew*, we were willing to give them the slip at any place from whence we might hope to get a passage to an English factory."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

GANG (A. S. *gang, a going, a crew*) is a number of persons *going* in company—as a gang of thieves; also a gang of workmen, which is a company of workmen not only seeking, but also employed in a common labour. A large piece of work, especially manual labour, will often be undertaken by labourers working in gangs. Where used in an unfavourable sense, like CREW, it has a more energetic and formidable meaning: as a CREW of men suggests mischief, so a GANG suggests violence.

"In order to furnish at the expense of your honour an excuse to your apologists here for several enormities of yours, you would not have been content to be represented as a *gang* of Maroon slaves suddenly broke loose from the house of bondage, and therefore to be pardoned for your abuse of the liberty to which you were not accustomed, and were ill-fitted."—BURKE.

BANE. PEST. RUIN.

The BANE of anything (A. S. *bana, a killer*) is that which, as it were, wounds or poisons it, inflicting injury or serious detriment on what would be otherwise sound or pleasurable; but though spoiling, not destroying it. The word is not associated with the idea of purely physical hurt or injury, but also with that of moral deterioration of what has an abstract value—as virtue, happiness, well-being, prosperity, hope, success, and the like.

"A monster and a *bane* to human society."
BLACKWOOD.

A PEST (Lat. *pestis, plague*) is that which interferes in a noisome, vexatious, or irritating manner. A pest haunts and annoys; a bane may be inherent. Any bad habit is a bane of happiness to the individual. A pest is always external.

"Of all the virtues justice is the best,
Valour without it is a common *pest*."
WALLER.

The RUIN of a thing (Lat. *ruina, ruĕre, to fall*) is that which destroys it utterly, causing it, as it were, to fall headlong, and to pieces. That which is ruined is marred, spoilt, and for its specific purpose destroyed.

"The *ruin* of the clock-trade."—DICKENS.

BANISH. EXILE. EXPEL. TRANSPORT. EXPATRIATE.

To BANISH (O. Fr. *banir*) is literally to eject by a BAN or public proclamation. To EXPEL (Lat. *expellere*) is to drive out. To EXILE is to send to a place of banishment (Lat. *exĭlium*). The idea common to the three is that of coercive removal of persons; for it is only by a figure of speech that hopes are said to be banished, or thoughts expelled. He is banished who is interdicted from any place to which he has been accustomed, or to which he may desire to resort. The nature of the banishment will depend simply on

the nature of the interdiction. Exile is that specific sort of banishment which relates to one's native country. Banish is the more social, exile the more political term. Exile may be voluntary or involuntary. To expel is merely to drive out with disgrace, and relates to some particular community or section of society.

TRANSPORT (Lat. *transportare, to carry across*), as a synonym of the above, is to carry beyond sea to a penal colony as a penalty, the expenses of which are borne by the State. Banishment may be domestic, or from private circles of society, and denotes more forcible and authoritative, as well as more ignominious removal than exile. We speak of honourable exile, hardly of honourable banishment, save in exceptional cases where the banishment was unjust, and with no fault of the banished, or where the right was on his side. In that respect his sympathizers might call it honourable. Banishment is moral, social, and political; exile only political. Banishment involves a formal public or judicial decree: on the other hand, one goes spontaneously into exile. Banishment is pronounced by a decree of a judicial tribunal; exile by an authoritative order. The Tarquins were banished from Rome by a public decree, Ovid was sent by Augustus into exile. BANISH expresses the idea of being forbidden a certain place, EXILE the assignation of a place of banishment. EXPULSION implies some feeling of dissatisfaction or indignation on the part of those who expel on the ground of moral unfitness, or of offence against social or political order. It is the severing of a corrupt limb from the body, the casting out of an unworthy member. The banished man feels the force of law or social power. The exiled has exchanged the comforts of home for a strange and distant solitude. The expelled carries with him the mark of disapprobation from those who have rid themselves of his society and presence.

"Haste thee, and from the Paradise of God
Without remorse drive out the sinful pair,
From hallow'd ground th' unholy, and denounce
To them, and to their progeny, from thence
Perpetual *banishment*." MILTON.

"Brutus in the book which he writ on virtue, related that he had seen Marcellus in *exile* at Mitylene, living in all the happiness that human nature is capable of, and cultivating with as much assiduity as ever all kinds of laudable knowledge."—BOLINGBROKE.

"One great object is pursued throughout the Scriptures, from the expulsion of our first parents out of Eden to the last of the prophets of Israel, namely, the coming of a great person under various titles, the deliverer from death and destruction, the promised seed there was to come of the woman, not of man, and therefore of a virgin."—SHARPE.

The term *transport* is equally applicable to persons and commodities.

"All these different commodities are collected at Manilla, there to be *transported* annually in one or more ships to the port of Acapulco, in the kingdom of Mexico."—ANSON'S *Voyages*.

EXPATRIATE (Lat. *ex, out of*, and *patria, native country*) denotes the specific alienation from one's native land, for whatever cause, whether in political exile or voluntary emigration. Its characteristic force lies in the negative idea of separation from the relations of home and kindred, the renunciation or loss of privileges of citizenship, and the need of finding by adoption a new country for one's home.

"The allied Powers possess also an exceedingly numerous, well-informed, sensible, ingenious, high-principled, and spirited body of cavaliers in the *expatriated* landed gentry of France."—BURKE.

BANKRUPTCY. INSOLVENCY FAILURE.

These, which are terms of the mercantile world, follow practically in the following order—insolvency, failure, bankruptcy.

The INSOLVENT (Lat. *in- not*, and *solvĕre, to pay*) is simply one who is unable to pay his debts, or meet his obligations and pecuniary liabilities. These may be merely of a personal nature; that is, he may not be in business at all, or he may be in too low a way of dealing to be bankrupt.

The FAILURE (Fr. *faillir, to fail*) is an act or a state consequent upon the positive or presumed insolvency, being a cessation of business pro-

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claimed or known, from want of means to carry it on, and so conveying no reproach.

BANKRUPTCY (Fr. *banqueroute*) is the condition of insolvency, when it has passed into the recognition of the law, which deals with the case and its liabilities according to principles established by legislation; and these may vary in different nations.

"Truman was better acquainted with his master's affairs than his daughter, and severely lamented that each day brought him, by many miscarriages, nearer *bankruptcy* than the former."—*Tatler.*

"Whether the *insolvency* of the father be by his fault or his misfortune, still the son is not obliged."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"The greater the whole quantity of trade, the greater of course must be the positive number of failures, while the aggregate success is still in the same proportion."—BURKE.

BANQUET. FEAST. CAROUSAL. ENTERTAINMENT. TREAT.

Of these, FEAST (O. Fr. *feste*, Lat. *festa*, pl. of *festum*) extends in some of its senses to more than the idea of eating and drinking; and is synonymous with *festival* or holiday. In regard to the former, FEAST points to no more than the abundance and sufficient goodness of the viands, and the satisfaction derived from them. An ample and enjoyable supply, with freedom from the calls of business and leisure to enjoy it, constitute the notion of a feast, and govern its metaphorical application, as in the proverb, "A contented mind is a continual feast."

"There my retreat the best companions grace—
Chiefs out of war and statesmen out of place.
There St. John mingles with my friendly bowl,
The feast of reason and the flow of soul."
POPE.

BANQUET (Fr. *banquet; banque, a bench*, literally, *a feast at which persons sit*) conveys the idea of sumptuous, choice, or magnificent feast. There are no materials, and there is no company too common for a feast, but dainty and exquisite fare is needed for a banquet, which has accessories of elegance such as would be thrown away upon coarse natures.

"Christianity allows us to use the world provided we do not abuse it. It does not spread before us a delicious *banquet*, and then come with a 'Touch not, taste not, handle not.'"—BISHOP PORTEUS.

ENTERTAINMENT (Fr. *entretenir*) refers to other pleasures than those of the palate. Its characteristic is that it is given by some one for the benefit of others, and hence involves the idea of reception, or courteous and hospitable treatment. He who gives an entertainment not only feeds his guests, but studies their enjoyment, throws open his house to their use, and during its continuance places himself at their disposal. It may sometimes happen that an entertainment shall pass with little or no eating and drinking, or that these shall have been made subordinate to other and more intellectual pleasures. Entertainments may be musical, and literary, or even connect themselves with the arts and with science.

"His office was to give *entertainment*
And lodging unto all that came and went.
SPENSER.

A CAROUSAL (Fr. *carrousel, a tilting-match, a carousal*) is in its character opposed to ENTERTAINMENT. It is a feast in which the obligation to strict sobriety is disregarded. It needs little refinement or vivid interchange of thought among a number. Two or three dull persons may sit down together for a night's carouse.

TREAT (Fr. *traiter*) conveys the idea of a kind of entertainment specifically selected, or consonant with the circumstances and relation of the giver on the one hand, and the condition and tastes of the receiver on the other. Any inconsistency in the latter would neutralize the treat, however hospitable and kind might be the intention of the giver. He has exhibited not only liberality, but tact also, who has succeeded in furnishing another with a treat. Superiors give treats to inferiors, and elders to children, and persons who have access to certain sources of enjoyment to those who could not command these for themselves. It denotes innocence and simplicity of enjoyment. How much a treat depends upon the character of the re-

cipient may be inferred from the following:—

"Carrion is a *treat* to dogs, ravens, vultures, and fish."—PALEY.

BANTER. RALLY.

We BANTER (not an old word; perhaps slang?) when we play upon another with words in good-humour. We RALLY (Fr. *railler*) when we slightly *rail*, that is, speak with slight contempt or sarcasm, of some specific fault, offence, or weakness. So BANTER has always a mischievous force, but RALLY often means such lively remonstrance as may induce another to act more properly, more energetically, or less despondingly. Bantering is slightly vexatious and provoking, as rallying is slightly remonstrative. Bantering owes its force more to the way in which the subject is shown up, rallying to the way in which the person is touched. We more commonly banter a superiority of which we are jealous, and rally an inferiority with which we are dissatisfied. Wit must be, according to present notions, an ingredient in both.

"When wit hath any mixture of raillery it is but calling it *banter*, and the thing is done. This polite word of theirs was first borrowed from the bullies in Whitefriars, then fell among the footmen, and at last retired to the pedants, by whom it is applied as properly to the production of wit as if I should apply it to Sir Isaac Newton's mathematics."—SWIFT.

"The only place of pleasantry in 'Paradise Lost' is where the evil spirits are described as *rallying* the angels upon the success of their new-invented artillery."—ADDISON.

BARBAROUS. INHUMAN. CRUEL. BRUTAL. SAVAGE.

These words indicate much the same thing as contemplated from different points of view. CRUEL (Fr. *cruel*, Lat. *crūdēlis*) expresses that kind of disposition which derives pleasure from inflicting pain on other creatures—as the child sometimes, or as the tyrant. Such cruelty is an animal propensity. It must be observed, however, that acts are often called cruel when they are such as would be produced by a propensity, though they have not been in fact so produced. To desert wife and child is a cruel act by reason of its nature and consequences; yet it may proceed, and commonly does, from an excess of selfishness, and not from any pleasure derived from subjecting them to privation. It is by no happy analogy that we speak of cruel disappointments and the like, meaning severe, for in such cases the essence of cruelty—namely, the gratification derived from inflicting of pain—is altogether wanting. The cruel inflict moral as well as physical pain. In the former kind only rational animals share: the cruelty of the lower animals is instinctive and subservient to their natural appetites, that of man may be subordinated to a refined revenge.

"This man [Jefferies] who wantoned in cruelty, had already given a specimen of his character in many trials where he presided, and he now set out with a *savage* joy as to a full harvest of death and destruction."—HUME.

INHUMAN, like many other such words, as, for instance, inconvenient, unpleasant, though negative in form, is in force positive and strong. It denotes that character of person or act which is not checked or guided by principles and sympathies of humanity, or human nature in its kindlier and worthier aspect. Inhumanity, therefore, amounts to premeditated or at least conscious cruelty; and so we speak not of the inhumanity (though we speak of the cruelty) of children, but of grown persons, as having that mature appreciation of the evil they inflict, which is needful to the idea of inhumanity. We more commonly associate cruelty with the execution of deeds, and inhumanity with the ordering or causing of them. The inhuman tyrant gives an unscrupulous order of execution, though he may not think of seeing it carried out. He is dead to compunction and compassion, inexorable and stony-hearted.

"When Alexander had in his fury *inhumanly* butchered one of his best friends and bravest captains, on the return of reason he began to conceive a horror suitable to the guilt of such a murder."—BURKE.

The BARBAROUS, the SAVAGE, and the BRUTAL are epithets which liken

the conduct or disposition to those of barbarous (Lat. *barbărus*) savages (Fr. *sauvage*, Lat. *silvāticus*) and brutes (Lat. *brūtus, irrational*). These terms therefore are only analogous expressions, and might be taken, as they often are, to express other qualities, or to qualify other conditions—as barbarous rudeness, savage manners, brutal ignorance. BARBAROUS and SAVAGE are epithets of manners primarily, and of disposition secondarily; BRUTAL and CRUEL of disposition primarily, and of conduct secondarily; and indeed are hardly applicable to the manners of a community, though they may well be predicated of customs or habits. As the barbarous bears relation to the civilized, we could never speak of the inferior animals as barbarous, yet we speak of them as savage or cruel. In this way the savage is a wild form of cruelty, as the barbarous is a rude, and the brutal an unfeeling form of it. Hence cruelty itself may be characterized as barbarous, savage, or brutal, according to the nature and exhibition of it. The same act may be the result of either barbarity or cruelty, and often an act is called cruel, which ought rather to be called barbarous. The exposure of infants to death is a barbarous act, but has been a custom of some nations, publicly sanctioned and not dictated by cruelty—in some cases by State policy, and in some by peculiar notions of humanity. The barbarous, inhuman, and brutal, can only be said of men; the cruel and savage of beasts as well. Barbarity inflicts death unworthily, cruelty delights in witnessing its infliction. African tribes barbarously put their captives to death, when a civilized people would have spared them; cruelly, when they aggravate the pain of death; savagely, when they dance round their victims in wild glee. The Greeks called all nations barbarians, as counting them inferior to themselves in arts and refinement of manners. Barbarity comes from ignorance consequent upon the want of development of the moral faculties, cruelty from inherent badness, savagery from excessive wildness of temperament.

"Pyrrhus, seeing the Romans marshal their army with some art and skill, said with surprise: These *barbarians* have nothing *barbarous* in their discipline."—HUME.

"So much was he altered by a long succession of hardships that he passed entirely without notice, and in the evening when he was going up to the Prætor's chair he was *brutally* repulsed by the attending Lictors."—GOLDSMITH.

BARE. MERE.

BARE (A. S. *bær, bare, open*) is sometimes used in a restrictive sense in the sense of *no more than*, and as a synonym of MERE (Lat. *mĕrus, simple, pure*); as we might say either the bare necessaries, or the mere necessaries of life. But the force of BARE is sometimes positive, so that MERE is more suitably followed grammatically by some term expressive of negation, while BARE is best construed with an affirmative sentence; as, the bare recital of such a tale would move to tears; the mere shedding of tears is an imperfect compassion. BARE is *purely* restrictive; MERE is used when the restriction is matter of insufficiency or incompleteness. Thus, if I wished to say that a thing was no better than foolishness, I should say that it was mere folly, not bare folly. On the other hand, if I wished to express an insufficiency, not in quality but quantity, I should say the amount was barely, not merely, sufficient.

So in the following examples, "barely as a man" means not also "as a gentleman;" "merely conjectural" means no better than conjectural—that is, not ascertained.

"The study of morality I have above mentioned as that that becomes a gentleman, not *barely* as a man, but in order to his business as a gentleman."—LOCKE.

"As for the rest of the planets their uses are to us unknown, or *merely* conjectural."—RAY.

BARREN. UNPRODUCTIVE.

BARREN (O. Fr. *baruigne*) points rather to the nature, UNPRODUCTIVE (Lat. *prŏducĕre, to bring forth*) to the condition. The rock is barren, the field untilled and neglected is unproductive. The desert would not be called unproductive, but barren. Barren, too, does not admit so easily as

unproductive the idea of degree. The barren field produces no crops, the unproductive field may be not altogether barren, but bear in scanty proportion.

BARTER. CHANGE. EXCHANGE. TRUCK. CHAFFER. INTERCHANGE.

Of these CHANGE (Fr. *changer*) may be taken as the simplest term. Of itself it expresses no more than to effect an alteration, whether this amount to an entire removal, and substitution of another thing or not. It is therefore abstract and indeterminate. I may change the appearance of a thing or the thing itself. As a synonym with the above, it expresses no more than to take one person or thing for another. Some persons change their friends as they change their clothes. The term, however, when so employed, refers to things of the same class or nature. When we have changed our opinions, those which we have adopted anew may be unlike and even the opposite to what we held before, but they remain at least opinions.

To EXCHANGE is to change one thing for another, whether of the same or of a different kind, while to change is only to part with one thing and take another of the same kind. I change my book at the reading-room when I put it back and take another. I exchange it for another or for an article of a different description.

"What shall a man give in *exchange* for his soul?"—*English Bible.*

"We all know how often those masters who sought after colouring *changed* their manner, whilst others, merely from not seeing various modes, acquiesced all their lives in that which they set out with."—SIR J. REYNOLDS.

BARTER (O. Fr. *bareter*) refers, strictly speaking, to commercial exchange of certain commodities for others of the same, but most commonly of different kinds. He who barters is still on the road to market. He is improving his stock by exchanging less negotiable for more negotiable commodities. In the moral sense it is used unfavourably. Mercenary persons will barter conscience for gold.

TRUCK (Fr. *troquer, to exchange, to truck*) is a familiar word, applied to the private bartering of articles of no great intrinsic value, but of common convenience and use. He who barters exchanges goods with a view to the market; he who trucks does not go to market perhaps at all, but makes his profit on the spot in the article itself. It is therefore a term of much less dignity than barter.

"To *truck* the Latin for any other vulgar language is but an ill *barter*. It is as bad as that which Glaucus made with Diomedes when he parted with his golden arms for brazen ones."—HOWELL.

CHAFFER is to purchase as the result of frequent attempt; it is to the talk what higgle is to the transaction. It is connected with A. S. *ceap, a bargain*. So chapman, a seller of wares. It is never used but in a mean sense.

"To *chaffer* for preferments with his gold."
DRYDEN.

INTERCHANGE is distinguished from exchange as denoting not a single act, but a system and repetition of acts of exchange. It is as often employed of moral as of material benefits or commodities. An exchange has no other limit than that of the transaction. An interchange is circumscribed by a circle of society. A methodical exchange is an interchange.

"*Interchanges* of cold frosts and piercing winds."—BISHOP HALL.

BASE. VILE. MEAN. LOW. ABJECT.

BASE is the Fr. *bas, low;* VILE the Lat. *vilis, cheap, worthless;* MEAN the A. S. *mæne*. BASE is stronger than VILE, and VILE is stronger than MEAN. BASE expresses the morally degraded, VILE the morally despicable, MEAN the morally paltry. LOW (perhaps akin to *lay, lie*), unlike the rest, has not only a purely physical, but an analogous social force, out of which that of moral degradation has flowed, but which is independent of it. A low rank is near the bottom of the social scale. A low price is near the bottom of a scale of charges. That conduct in a man is low which is either wanting in dignity morally, or derogates from the dignity of his social condition. A low profession is one

which would only be exercised by persons who had no social standing. A low act is one worthy only of a low profession. Yet a man in a low rank of life may entertain sentiments and exhibit a character worthy of a higher. The epithet low is expressive of such petty dishonesties or meannesses as are unworthy of persons who have even a moderate degree of self-respect. What is base excites our abhorrence, as contradicting all loftiness and generosity of nature—*e.g.* treachery and ingratitude. What is vile excites disgust, as the gaining of a living by the trade of the informer. What is mean excites pure contempt, as prevarication, cringing flattery, niggardliness. Meanness is associated with a dishonourable regard to self-preservation or self-interest; baseness with a dishonourable treatment of others. We feel more hatred and resentment against the base, we loathe the vile, and despise the mean. Low habits indicate a kind of hopeless meanness, depravity, and dishonourableness, the result of an essential incapacity of what is high, pure, noble, generous, or refined. The opposite of lowness is loftiness; of baseness, magnanimity; of vileness, nobility; and of meanness, generosity in feeling and liberality in treatment.

"Yet sometimes nations will decline so *low*
From virtue." MILTON.

"'Si ingratum dixeris omnia dicens,' says the Latin maxim: 'If you call a man ungrateful, you have called him everything that is *base*. You need say nothing more."—BEATTIE.

"Though we caress dogs, we borrow from them an appellation of the most despicable kind when we employ terms of reproach; and this appellation is the common mark of the last *vileness* and contempt in every language."—BURKE.

"There is hardly a spirit upon earth so *mean* and contracted as to centre all regards on its own interest, exclusive of the rest of mankind."—BERKELEY.

The state of the ABJECT (Lat. *abjicere*, part. *abjectus, to cast away*) is one of profound humiliation. Men are low in place or character, vile in the opinion of others, mean in conduct and disposition, base in a profound badness, abject in feeling and under the weight of circumstances. The abject is rejected of fortune and of men. An abject sentiment is one in which honour and self-respect have been thrown away—one past sensibility and uttered without blushing. Abject superstition is of the lowest kind. The man who is in an abject condition has ceased to think of the opinions of others, under the feeling that others have ceased to think of him. He is at once in degradation and in isolation. The mean, the vile, and the abject have to some extent parted with their independence and are despised, but men in power may do base things, and may be dreaded without being at all despised.

"There needs no more be said to extol the excellence and power of his wit, than that it was of magnitude enough to cover a world of very great faults—that is, a narrowness in his nature to the lowest degree, an *abjectness* and want of courage, an insinuating and servile flattery."—CUMBERLAND.

BASIS. FOUNDATION. GROUND. BASE.

BASIS (Lat. *bāsis*, Gr. *βάσις, that on which a thing stands or moves*) and BASE (Fr. *bas*) are used interchangeably; but while BASIS always means the part on which a structure rests, BASE means what approximates to this, or the lower part generally. The basis of a column is that on which it rests. This, strictly speaking, is hidden from view. On the other hand its base is an architectural feature of it. BASE is not commonly used in a figurative sense, which is the case with BASIS: as when we hear of matters being set upon a surer basis.

"Every plague that can infest
Society, and that saps and worms the *base*
Of th' edifice that policy has raised."
COWPER.

"This university had in the conclusion of the last century, the honour of giving birth to a stupendous system of philosophy erected by its disciple Newton on the immovable *basis* of experiment and demonstration."—PORTEUS.

FOUNDATION (Lat. *fundātionem*) and GROUND (A.S. *grund*) speak for themselves. In architecture FOUNDATION is employed of large and complex structures. Figuratively we use BASIS as that on which rest the proceedings of

thought, argument, or the transactions of men, as being the principles on which they are conducted—as the basis of a conception, a conviction, of reasoning, of traffic, of negotiation, and so on. GROUND expresses the warrant or substantial cause, as the ground of belief, feeling, action. So we speak of groundless fears, suspicions, jealousies, meaning imaginary; grounds of legal proceedings and the like. FOUNDATION belongs more peculiarly to matters of belief, feelings, hopes, and the like, rather than matters of practice, in reference to which we use the term GROUND or BASIS. In many cases they might be used interchangeably, as we speak of groundless or unfounded clamours. In their figurative employment in regard to human interchange of argumentation or business, BASIS is the more conventional, FOUNDATION the more deeply seated. We may say that the basis of a transaction is the proposition on which it is grounded, and which furnishes its principle and the end towards which it is conducted. It is necessary that this basis should itself rest on sure and solid foundations of fact or policy, sound and recognized. A hypothesis may be assumed as the basis of our reasoning, and confirmed by facts harmonizing with it; but hypothesis is generally an insecure basis of action.

"From thence I draw the most comfortable assurances of the future vigour and the ample resources of this great misrepresented country, and can never prevail on myself to make complaints which have no cause in order to raise hopes which have no *foundation*."—BURKE.

BASHFUL. MODEST. DIFFIDENT. COY. RESERVED. SHY.

BASHFULNESS is a constitutional feeling, MODESTY a virtue, DIFFIDENCE, except in specific cases where it is grounded on self-knowledge, an infirmity. BASHFULNESS (to *abash*, from O. Fr. *esbahir*, *to astonish*) is excessive or extreme modesty. It is an instinctive, almost animal sensation, though involving intelligence. It is not unbecoming in young persons of either sex, especially in the presence of elders or superiors. It betrays itself in a look of self-conscious timidity, and in grown-up persons is a defect amounting to a mental disease. It would be hard to define bashfulness, especially as it is undefined in those who are subject to it. Bashfulness is best honoured by overcoming the manifestations and not despising the emotion of it.

"Our orators, with the most faulty *bashfulness*, seem impressed rather with an awe of their audience than with a just respect for the truths they are about to deliver. They of all professions seem the most *bashful* who have the greatest right to glory in their commission."—GOLDSMITH.

MODESTY (Lat. *mŏdestiam*) is the absence of all tendency to over-estimate one's self, while diffidence (Lat. *diffidentia*) is the positive distrust of ourselves.

"*Modesty* is a kind of shame or bashfulness proceeding from the sense a man has of his own defects, compared with the perfections of him whom he comes before."—SOUTH.

"There is a degree of pain in modest *diffidence*, but it is amply recompensed by the glow of satisfaction derived from the favourable opinions of others, and by the encouragement thus inspired, that the deficiency is not so great as was apprehended, or too great to be surmounted."—COGAN.

Modesty is one of those virtues which may be regarded as lying in a mean, the mean between diffidence and presumption. Modesty is in some respects very unlike diffidence, for though inclined to claim less than his due, and to accord more than their due to others, the modest man is not deterred from such efforts in the struggle of life as are needful to do justice to himself, while diffidence, if it be a habit of the disposition, leads to positive injustice to one's self, and one's own powers. We may remark that the word DIFFIDENT was formerly used sometimes objectively, and as synonymous with *distrustful of*, *doubtful of*.

COY (O. Fr. *coi*, orig. *coit*; Lat. *quĭētus*) is a term expressive of the reserve of youthful modesty. It is that maidenly reserve in particular, which combines a shrinking shyness with the absence of dislike or displeasure, and may even receive advances with a timid satisfaction.

"When the kind nymph would *coyness* feign,
And hides but to be found again."
DRYDEN.

SHY (? A.S. *sceoh, askew, perverse,* connected with the German *scheu, timorous*) is a term of more comprehensive import. Shyness is never a virtue. It is in some of the lower animals an instinctive feeling answering purposes of self-preservation. It is therefore allied to fear and suspicion. It is a tendency to avoid, arising out of ignorant distrust, a feeling of the absence of the ease which comes from familiarity. Hence habituation to the unfamiliar presence is its natural remedy, and may even lead to the opposite extreme. The child which begins by being shy will sometimes go on to be over-bold. Yet in grown-up persons it assumes a character somewhat different, and the element of one's sensitiveness or self-consciousness is superadded. Hence, so far from being equivalent to modesty, it is often in no small degree the result of a kind of pride, involved in the fear of not appearing to advantage.

RESERVE (Fr. *réserve*, literally, *a holding back*) is sometimes a proud, always a calculating shyness. It belongs to those who are more completely masters of themselves. It is only in its extremes that reserve is a fault—that is, when it approaches too nearly to shyness on one side, or pride on the other. We mean no disparagement when we speak of a dignified or prudent reserve. Reserve is a keeping of one's self, whether sufficiently or too much, within bounds of demeanour; where it is of the mind, it is more premeditated; where of the temperament, more involuntary.

"Men have a *shyness* and jealousy against such truths as they have not been acquainted with."—MORE.

"Where is that ancient seriousness and *reservedness* and modesty that heretofore has been thought not only essential to the spirit of a Christian, but natural to the temper of an Englishman?"—SHARP.

BATTLE. COMBAT. ENGAGEMENT. ACTION.

BATTLE (Fr. *bataille*) is a generic term. As an act, fighting, like the term fight (which is, however, of less dignity), refers to the physical contests of individuals, of small parties, and of large armies. In any case it is suggestive of such fighting as involves an issue of importance, whether it be a matter of personal right or political struggle. In old times personal claims were sometimes decided by wager of battle. Persevering, independent, and resolute men will do battle for what they believe a righteous cause. Battle is strenuous and sustained resistance, with a view to the conquest or destruction of an opposing party, even though it should be a beast and not a man.

"The Scipios *battled*, and the Gracchi spoke." DYER.

COMBAT (O.F. *combatre*) is used with a more direct reference to the reciprocal trial of strength, and is employed of small parties or of individuals, as the combat of the Horatii and Curratii. A combat is a close hand-to-hand encounter, and draws attention to the characteristic qualities of the parties, the weapons they use, or the rules under which they fight. A combat is a spectacle to those looking on. A combat may be a portion of a battle, as in a general battle two combatants may single out each other. The verb combat is used directly of the object of the struggle when it is used in a secondary sense. The astute reasoner combats his opponent's position generally, or his arguments in detail.

"What had I
T' oppose against such powerful arguments?
Only my love of thee held long debate
And *combated* in silence all these reasons
With hard contest." MILTON.

A fight may be accidental; a combat is prearranged; a fight does not imply of necessity the use of weapons; a combat does.

ENGAGEMENT (O. F. *engager, to pledge*) and ACTION (Lat. *actionem*) stand to the battle or the combat as the process of the thing to the thing itself. Engagement is a favourite term for naval fights, and action is not used of personal encounters. ACTION is a wider term than ENGAGEMENT; the latter being the former so far as it refers only to the struggle with the enemy. The verb ENGAGE

might be employed of two combatants, but hardly the noun *engagement*. The action is spoken of as decisive and sharp or not, the engagement as protracted and severe or not, and, between equal or unequal forces, the battle as important or unimportant. Action has a more comprehensive force than Engagement. In naval battles the decks are cleared for action before the engagement commences. To say that the troops engaged well would mean that they fought well; that they behaved well in action would comprise other qualifications, as that they manœuvred well under command.

"A decisive *action*."—Macaulay.

"The battle proved decisive in favour of the house of York, and in consequence of it Edward was, in June, 1461, crowned King of England. There were killed in this *engagement* 36,776 men."—Hawkes.

BEAM. Gleam. Glimmer. Ray. Glitter. Sparkle. Shine.

These words, not excepting Ray, are employed both as nouns and as verbs. Their use as verbs will be sufficiently indicated by noticing their difference in the former capacity. They all express the steadier or less fitful and violent emissions of light, and so stand contrasted with such other synonyms as *flame, glare, flare, flash*, and the like.

Beam in A. S. meant a tree, post; and also (2) a ray of light; and so is analogous, perhaps, to the Lat. *rădius*, whence Ray, which meant properly a staff, or spoke of a wheel. Beam is more nearly allied with Ray in the above list, and Gleam (A. S. *gleam, a gleam*), with Glimmer (akin to *gleam*) and Glitter (cf. O. S. *glittan, to shine*). The beam is ordinarily larger and more powerful than the ray, though not invariably so. The great luminaries of the sun and moon send forth both beams and rays. Smaller luminous bodies, as a lamp, send out rays. The sun emits rays whenever its light is unobstructed: between clouds the same light often escapes as a beam. Ray expresses more directly than Beam the notion of one among a number of lines of light diverging from a luminous centre. Again, Beam is never applied but to light, while ray is also applied to substances analogous to the spokes of a wheel, as for instance, those which form a star-like pattern; as, the rays of the flowers called Composite, or as an order of chivalry might consist of a star with an enamelled centre and diamond rays or points. Gleam, Glimmer, and Glitter have much in common, but Gleam is commonly used of light not very brilliant but undeveloped, yet steady, and beginning, as it were, to make itself visible through surrounding darkness, as the first gleams of the sun at dawn. Glimmer is an unsteady gleam, making itself visible in a tremulous way, and perhaps at intervals. Glitter and Sparkle (A.S. *spærc, spark*) are again much alike, with this important difference, that Sparkle is properly applied to luminous bodies, and Glitter to those that are not so. The fire sparkles, that is, rapidly emits minute fragments of light; but diamonds, properly speaking, do not sparkle, but glitter, as they emit light only in the sense of reflecting it. When we say of the jewel, as we sometimes do, that it sparkles, we lend our imagination in some degree, and think of it as what it is not—a tiny source of light. Shine (A.S. *scinan, to shine, glitter*) denotes the steady emission of light, whether by inherent force or by reflexion. The sun shines when its full flood of light is poured out unobstructedly. Shining talents are uniformly conspicuous, though they will exhibit themselves occasionally in brilliant efforts and successes But Glitter in its secondary sense expresses the idea of a false light, a brightness which is above the inherent value of the substance itself. Sparkle belongs in this application to the sudden sallies of intellectual brightness, as when conversation is enlivened by a sparkling wit. Glisten (allied to *glitter*) expresses a fitful but soft light, especially as modified by moisture. The dewdrop glistens on the grass. Eyes glisten with tears.

"The bleating kind
Eye the black heaven, and next the *glisten*
ing earth
With looks of dumb despair, then sad dispersed,
Dig for the wither'd herb through heaps of
snow." Thomson.

"I saw a beauty from the sea to rise,
That all earth look'd on, and that earth all eyes,
It cast a *beam* as when the cheerful sun
Is fair got up, and day some hours begun."
BEN JONSON.

"Those uncertain *glimmerings* of the light of Nature would have prepared the minds of the learned for the reception of the full illustration of this subject by the Gospel, had not the Resurrection been a part of the doctrine therein advanced."—WATSON.

"Though fainter raptures my cold heart inspire,
Yet let me oft frequent this solemn scene,
Oft to the abbey's shatter'd walls retire,
What time the moon shine dimly *gleams* between." MICKLE.

"Bodies in respect of light may be divided into three sorts: first, those that emit *rays* of light, as the sun and fixed stars. Secondly, those that transmit the *rays* of light, as the air. Thirdly, those that reflect the *rays* of light, as iron, earth, &c. The first are called luminous, the second pellucid, the third opake."—LOCKE.

"A reliance on genius, as it is called, without application, gives a boldness of utterance and assertion which often sets off base metal with the *glitter* of gold."—KNOX.

"She observed to me that she had divers times observed the like alterations in some diamonds of hers, which sometimes would look more *sparklingly* than they were wont, and sometimes more dull than ordinary."—BOYLE.

"Of gold *shone* her coroune." — R. BRUNNE.

BEAT. STRIKE. HIT.

To BEAT (A. S. *beátan*) is an act of repetition, meaning to *continue* to give blows. It is the result of repeated aims and efforts with such implements as are retained in the hand, or with the hand itself. It is, therefore, exclusively the act of an intelligent agent, voluntary and performed in close proximity to the object. To STRIKE (A. S. *strica, a stroke, a pont*) is a single act, though it may be successively renewed. When it is a voluntary act it may be by a missile at a distance. But it may also be accidental, or purely mechanical. A missile or implement aimed at one object may strike another. To strike denotes no more than locomotion ending in contact.

To HIT (cf. Icel. *hitta, to hit upon*) is to strike as the result of aim, and involving the idea of chances of missing it. So we speak of a good or lucky hit. To beat is always designed. To strike is designed or accidental. To hit is the combined result of purpose and chance, or of purpose acting in contingent circumstances.

"Thrice was I *beaten* with rods."—*English Bible.*

"They *struck* him with the palms of their hands."—*Ibid.*

"Just as we experience it in the flint and steel. You may move them apart as long as you please to very little purpose, but it is the *hitting* and collision of them that must make them strike fire."—BENTLEY.

BEAT. DEFEAT.

As these words are used synonymously, BEAT is of more extended application than DEFEAT. BEAT regards rather the power which has gained the victory; DEFEAT (O. Fr. *défait*) the condition to which the beaten person has been reduced. He who is beaten has fallen under the power of his opponent; he who is defeated has been compelled by superior force to abandon his attempt. Power and skill beat, but vigilance may defeat; that is to say, BEAT implies a close, while DEFEAT admits also of a more indirect and remote competition. An open competitor beats; an occult cause, an uncalculated force, and unforeseen contingency, may defeat the best-laid plans. Persons only are beaten, efforts also and schemes are defeated. Unsuccessful competitors in a race are beaten by the superior activity of the winner, and defeated as regards their own exertions to win. He who is beaten is humiliated. He who is defeated is disappointed.

"He *beat* them in a bloody battle."—PRESCOTT.

"Yet Almighty God himself often complains how in a manner his designs were *defeated*, his desires thwarted, his offers refused, his counsels rejected, his expectations deceived."—BARROW.

BEATIFICATION. CANONIZATION.

The former (Lat. *beātĭfĭcare; beātus, blessed*, and *făcĕre, to make*) is a privilege more privately granted by the Pope, to the memory of certain persons

to be regarded after death as saints, whose lives have been considered illustrious for piety and miracles.

The latter (Gr. κἄνονίξω, *I judge by rule*) is a more formal and public trial of the merits of the deceased, previous to his admission to the Calendar. This distinction may seem partly to explain the crowd of names of saints which connect themselves with the Roman Catholic Church. Both acts emanate from the Pontifical authority declaring the blessedness of a departed person, and the kind of religious veneration to be paid to him. In the act of beatification, the Pope pronounces, as an individual; using his authority to grant to private persons or religious orders the privilege of rendering a certain cultus to the beatified person, which is then protected from superstition by his seal and sanction. In the act of canonization, he acts officially as judge, and the Bull of Canonization becomes a law of the Church binding on all the faithful.

BEAUTIFUL. HANDSOME. PRETTY. LOVELY. FINE.

Of these, HANDSOME is applicable to persons, to certain objects, and to acts moral; the rest, both to persons and other objects of sight, whether natural or artificial.

BEAUTIFUL (Fr. *beauté*, Lat. *bellitatem*) is the strongest of these, except, perhaps, LOVELY, but neither BEAUTIFUL, PRETTY, nor LOVELY is applicable to men, who are never permitted to be more than HANDSOME. Treatises have been written for the purpose of explaining wherein the idea or feeling of the beautiful consists. In a work like the present, we have to do with it so far as it is practically illustrated by the use of the terms. The beautiful possesses entirely that which the handsome, the pretty, and the fine possess in part. It involves a certain softness or delicacy, which makes it inapplicable to men. The beautiful comprises fairness and excellence of the parts, as constituting a whole of the same character. Form, colour, proportion, and even movement, are included in it. The beautiful face is perfect in all its features, in complexion, and in symmetry. The beautiful landscape is an assemblage of admirable objects balanced and contrasted in form, grouping, and colouring, as an artist would desire; being also soft and striking. The beautiful is often the result of association of ideas in the mind of the person. A beautiful smile, for instance, is an associated influence. Yet we may well believe that there is a primitive influence in form, to produce that kind of emotion which enters into the compositions of fine art.

"In like manner I have heard it observed by thoughtless people, that there are a few women possessed of *beauty* in comparison of those who want it; not considering that we bestow the epithet of *beautiful* only on such persons as possess a degree of *beauty* that is common to them with a few."—HUME.

The beautiful woman, like the beautiful landscape, is an assemblage of admirable objects, yet with all this she may not be LOVELY. This implies the superaddition to external beauty of an exquisite delicacy; and the stamp of those moral graces of purity and tenderness, without which physical beauty, however striking, falls short of being lovely.

"Beauty is an over-weening self-sufficient thing, careless of providing itself any more substantial ornaments; nay, so little does it consult its own interests, that it too often defeats itself by betraying that innocence which renders it *lovely* and desirable."—*Spectator*.

HANDSOME (derived from *hand*, and the termination *-some*, like the German *-sam*) is a term of the second class of admiration. It meant at first dexterous, and, reflexively, handy, and then comely; as expressing more than pretty, and less than beautiful. There are certain associations connected with the handsome, which seem a little arbitrary and hard to account for. It is easier to note them. For instance, men, women; horses, dogs, and other animals; trees, dresses, articles of furniture, houses, parks; but not views or prospects. The HANDSOME denotes a combination of the fair or comely and the bold. A slight figure, a face of small features, is not handsome. It does not imply so strict an adherence to rule as beauty,

Without being regularly beautiful, a face may be handsome if it is finely, though not exactly formed. The term, when applied morally to actions, retains that second-rate quality which belongs to it, as an epithet of what is admirable physically. The handsome act is not of the highest description, not one of self-devotion, or heroic generosity, but of liberality, and of something more than fairness—a liberal kindness of giving where less liberality would have been quite consistent with justice. Nor, again, is HANDSOME applied physically to objects of small size. The handsome implies a certain scale beyond the PRETTY (etym. uncertain), which belongs to the little in form, nor is the beauty which it denotes of a high order, but a combination of delicacy and grace; yet, inasmuch as we do not prefer by rule, it may be more winning than the other.

"The Romans were so convinced of the power of beauty, that the word 'fortis,' strong or valiant, signifies likewise, fair or *handsome*."—FAWKES.

"If tall, the name of proper stays;
If fair, she's pleasant as the light.
If low, her *prettiness* does please."
COWLEY.

FINE (Fr. *fin, fine, slender;* Lat. *finītus, finished*) seems to have taken to itself by usage a force not originally belonging to it: the fine, being the slender or highly finished, as we speak of a fine line, has come to mean also that which is not little, and implies a certain degree of size and conspicuousness. In short it is opposed to coarse (which is the same as *course* = current, or ordinary), and hence denotes that which is no ordinary thing of its kind, thus involving characteristic excellences, and excluding specific defects.

"The *fine* original of Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, with the staves of Earl Marshal and Lord Treasurer, from whence the print is taken, is at Leicester House."—WALPOLE.

Beauty involves a degree of fineness which prettiness excludes. Softness and symmetry without size are the characteristics of prettiness. A pretty landscape is pleasing. Beautiful scenery is strikingly attractive. Fine scenery may be beautiful, but contains also elements of the bold and grand. Beautiful thoughts have a loftiness and power of sentiment and expression. Fine thoughts are elevating, and clothed in choice expressions. Pretty ideas have a clever and unsubstantial grace, which fits them for versification.

BECOMING. DECENT. PROPER. SEEMLY.

The BECOMING (of which the derivation speaks for itself) expresses that which is harmoniously graceful or attractive from fitness. The becoming sits well upon the person. A becoming dress is congruous with the height, appearance, age, and station of the wearer. Unbecoming conduct reflects discredit upon the character and condition of the person so behaving. Modesty is becoming in youth, gravity in a judge. An innocent cheerfulness of disposition is never unbecoming in any. A remark may be unbecoming in certain society, or at a certain time or place, which might otherwise have been made unobjectionably. The becoming is always in external manifestation, though it may be regulated by moral or abstract principles. It always relates to persons.

"He received the homage of the people with *becoming* dignity."—BRYDONE.

The DECENT (Lat. *dĕcēre, to become*), like the BECOMING, is external or internal. It is a graver term, turning more upon moral fitness. It has a restrictive or negative, rather than a positive force. It is praise to say of a thing that it is BECOMING. It is only right that it should be decent. The decent is that species of the becoming which results from the absence of laxity or excess, and has no meaning of the positively graceful. A person becomingly dressed is an agreeable object. A person decently clad has appropriate and sufficient clothing, and possibly no more. Decency is such a measure of attention to moral, personal, and social requirements, as is demanded by the rules of the community in which we live. Hence decency is based upon a modest deference to the exactions of nature and society, while a defiant disregard of these is indecent.

"As beauty of body with an agreeable carriage pleases the eye, and that pleasure consists in that we observe all the parts, with a certain elegance, are proportioned to each other, so does *decency* of behaviour, which appears in our lives, obtain the approbation of all with whom we converse from the order, constancy, and moderation of our words and actions."—*Spectator.*

PROPER (Lat. *proprius*) means primarily, *peculiarly connected*, or *specifically belonging*. Hence in this connexion it implies an adaptation to a character, person, end, or purpose morally. Propriety is moral fitness, and involves conformity to a law of association. It is a principle which regulates the minor and more ordinary matters of life. Hence an impropriety falls short of a crime, and is an offence against rule, order, taste, custom, and the like. Like DECENT, it denotes the fulfilment of a standard-requirement, and no more. It is a term of approval rather than of praise. A proper expression fairly represents its subject, and conforms to the usage of language, and has no blamable significance; an improper expression would be the contrary of these.

"Visitors are no *proper* companions in the chamber of sickness."—JOHNSON.

SEEMLY, that which *beseems*, or *seems well*, occupies a middle place between DECENT and BECOMING, being more than the first and less than the second. As propriety is a thing of rule, seemliness is a thing of taste; the former belongs to the nature of things, the latter to the effects produced by them.

"I cannot understand that any man's bare perception of the natural *seemliness* of one action and *unseemliness* of another should bring him under an obligation on all occasions to do the one, and avoid the other at the hazard of his life, to the detriment of his fortune, or even to the diminution of his own ease."—BISHOP HARLEY.

BEGGAR. MENDICANT.

He who BEGS (prob. A. S. *bed-ecan*, contracted into *beggen:* SKEAT's *Etym. Dict.*), though generally connected with *bag* into which the beggar puts alms or scraps of food, is so far a BEGGAR.

The MENDICANT (Lat. *mendicare*, to *beg*) expresses more formally one whose trade is begging, as in the case of the Mendicant Friars of the Church of Rome.

BEGIN. COMMENCE.

BEGIN (A. S. *beginnan*) and COMMENCE (Fr. *commencer*) are employed with slight differences. Thus BEGIN sometimes refers only to time or order, while COMMENCE implies action. The alphabet begins, but could not be said to commence with the letter A. So to enter upon a new state may be expressed by BEGIN, but not by COMMENCE, as "after walking twenty miles I began to feel tired." The same applies to an alteration of mind, thought, or opinion. "I begin to think that after all you are mistaken." COMMENCE commonly applies as a verb directly to its object, which is some work or thing to be done, and if the subject be anything else, the term COMMENCE should be dispensed with. It is an absurdity, for instance, to say: "At this part of the performance, the audience commenced to show signs of weariness." The opposite to begin is end, the opposite to commence is complete. BEGIN is used also in the peculiar sense of being the first to do a thing, as distinguished from the act of prosecution, or joint action on the part of another. James is most to blame, for it is he that began the quarrel. Like all words of Latin origin (for the Lat. *initium, a beginning*, is at the root of the French *commencer*, Lat. *com-initiare*), COMMENCE has a more dignified character than BEGIN. Formal and public transactions, ceremonies, and the like, are said to commence; common, and familiar things to begin.

"But *to begin* that which never was, whereof there was no example, whereto there was no inclination, wherein there was no possibility of that which it should be, is proper only to such power as Thine, the infinite power of an infinite Creator."—BISHOP HALL.

"On the 29th, the Queen removed to St. James's, passing through the park, and took her barge at Whitehall, and so to Richmond, in order to her progress, which was chiefly *commenced* to meet her beloved, the Prince of Spain."—STRYPE.

BEGINNING. COMMENCEMENT. ORIGIN. ORIGINAL. RISE. SOURCE.

The distinction between the nouns

BEGINNING and COMMENCEMENT is concurrent with that between the verbs begin and commence, as given above. It follows from these considerations that BEGINNING is a term more proximately connected with its subject than COMMENCEMENT. The beginning of a thing is that part of it which is first in order, whether of observation or action. The commencement of a thing is that which results in the thing itself. The commencement of hostilities between two nations might be the grievance or exciting cause of them; the beginning could only be the full overt act of fighting.

ORIGIN (Lat. *ŏrĭgĭnem*) is used both for the first cause of a thing, and also, with less propriety, for the beginning or earlier part of it. ORIGINAL was once used in the same way, but has come to undergo a scientific restriction—*e.g.*, some believe the wolf to be the original of the dog. It has the peculiar sense of type or earlier form from which a later form is naturally or artificially derived. The original of a picture or a writing is opposed to a copy or a translation. Hence, original expresses a substantial form; origin an ideal cause, or a cause as conceived in the mind. Origin is a term which admits of complex and abstract thought. For instance, the origin of evil is a subject of profound, and perhaps fruitless, speculation.

RISE (Sax. *risan*) is a more practical and familiar term, as ORIGIN is more speculative. Among quarrelsome persons a very trivial matter will give rise to dispute. RISE often means that early portion of a thing's existence in which the origin having taken place, the thing is still in a state of progressive development—as the historic rise, progress, and decline of the Roman Empire.

SOURCE (Fr. *source*, from the Lat. *surgĕre, to rise*, through a late form, *sursa*: BRACHET) conveys the additional idea of something which can be referred to as an origin, whether in the mind only, by way of account, or actually, and for the purpose of drawing material results; as in the one case, when we trace an evil to its source, or in the other when we are said to exhaust every source of pleasure; the term SOURCE thus involving a continuous supply. SOURCE and ORIGIN, though they are of course used also analogously, both refer to physical not logical sequence. A source of information is not only the point at which our information begins, nor that whence it flows to us, but also that to which, as to a spring or fountain, we may recur to draw fresh draughts of knowledge. Consciousness of right is a source of fortitude—that is, supplies continuously the power of endurance. ORIGIN, on the other hand, is not expressive of continued action or operation, so that it may possibly denote no more than a cause which acted for a while, and then passed away. Families, dynasties, discoveries, languages, nations, facts, have their origins, which are the circumstances to which the mind refers as having brought them about. Casual meetings have proved the origins of friendships which have afterwards been sources of much happiness. Generally speaking, the origin is plain or obscure, the source fruitful or barren. The origin is the beginning of things which have sequence or continuity. The source is that kind of beginning which produces succession. The origin gives birth to what before had none. The source opens out what before it contained in itself. Everything in its origin is small until it grows. Everything in its source is weak until it strengthens. It is curious knowledge which teaches us the origin of things. It is practical wisdom which sends us to their source. It is the due consideration of time, occasion, and opportunity, which determines the commencement of proceedings. Almost every subject of thought or action of which the mind takes cognizance may be resolved into a beginning, a middle, and an end. When we know the beginning of a quarrel, we know how long it has lasted.

"In the *beginning* was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."—*English Bible.*

"In the last Lecture, the nature and

origin of the Hebrew Elegy was explained, the form and *commencement* of that species of poetry was traced into the solemn dirges which are chanted at funerals by the professed mourners."—LOWTH.

"This mixed system of opinion and sentiment had its *origin* in the ancient chivalry."—BURKE.

"If there is any one English word which is become virtually literal in its metaphorical application, it is the word *source*. Who is it that ever thought of a spring or fountain of water in speaking of God as the *source* of existence, of the sun as the *source* of light, and of land as one of the *sources* of natural wealth, or of sensation and reflexion as the only *sources*, according to Locke, of human knowledge? propositions which it would not be easy to enunciate in any other way."—DUGALD STEWART.

"O glotonie, full of cursednesse,
O cause first of our confusion,
O *original* of our damnation!"

CHAUCER.

"All wickedness takes its *rise* from the heart."—NELSON.

BEHAVIOUR. DEMEANOUR. CONDUCT.

BEHAVIOUR (A. S. *behæbban;* for change of meaning, see SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) refers to all those actions which are open to the observation of others as well as those which are specifically directed to others. As behaviour refers more especially to actions, so DEMEANOUR (Fr. *demener, to lead or conduct*) refers more directly to manners; or in other words, DEMEANOUR regards one's self, BEHAVIOUR regards others. A man's demeanour may be a question of taste, his behaviour is a moral question. He demeans himself well who has self-respect. He behaves well who has respect to others. The two are very closely allied, because all conduct in society, whether intended to do so or not, affects others than the actor himself, at least indirectly. When Queen Elizabeth boxed the ears of the Earl of Essex, her behaviour was undignified and insulting, and the proceeding was too demonstrative to be a question of demeanour only.

"We are not, perhaps, at liberty to take for granted that the lives of the preachers of Christianity were as perfect as their lessons, but we are entitled to contend that the observable part of their *behaviour* must have agreed in a great measure with the duties which they taught."—PALEY.

"I have been told the same area of Mahometans, with relation to the propriety of their *demeanour* in the conventions of their erroneous worship."—*Tatler.*

As BEHAVIOUR belongs to the minor morals of society, so CONDUCT (L. Lat *conductus, guard, escort*) to the graver questions of personal life. But conduct may be intellectually tested as well as morally. A man behaves himself well or ill; he conducts himself well or ill, ably or inefficiently. Behaviour should be seemly, conduct should be wise. We speak of a man's behaviour in the social circle, of his conduct in his family, as a citizen, or in life. Good conduct is meritorious and virtuous. Good behaviour may be natural or artificial. The conduct has relation to the station of men's lives, or the circumstances in which they are placed. Good conduct will include right behaviour as a part of it, and a proper demeanour will flow necessarily out of it.

"Wisdom is no less necessary in religious and moral, than in civil *conduct.*"—BLAIR.

BEHOLD. SEE. LOOK. VIEW. EYE. CONTEMPLATE. REGARD. OBSERVE. PERCEIVE. SCAN.

BEHOLD (A.S. *behealdan, to hold, to observe*) denotes a looking with fixed observation. We behold only objects of some size and importance, as being worthy of such fixed observation. It may indicate the lowest degree of it, and may be the result of accident. "As I was passing, I beheld such an one so engaged," means little more than I saw him. On the other hand, "I beheld him with gladness," implies more of such interest, but the interest is independent. No more is necessarily implied in beholding than an attentive looking. It is a voluntary act, and involves a sustained regard, which is more prolonged and serious than LOOKING (A.S. *lócian, to look upon*), which is an action precedent to SEEING. As soon as we turn the eyes in the direction of an object, and before it has made a full and distinct impression upon the eye, we have begun to look at it. I am looking in the direction of the object which you describe, but I cannot see it. The object of seeing is not, therefore,

always obtained by looking. Hence the term is used in the general sense of presenting an aspect in a certain direction, as when we say of a house that it looks to the north. Distinct perception of objects is less involved in this than in any of the correspondent terms.

"Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe, and Pilate saith unto them: *Behold* the man."—*English Bible.*

"The emotions produced by Tragedy are upon this supposition somewhat analogous to the dread we feel when we *look* down from the battlement of a tower."—STEWART.

SEE (A. S. *seón*) is the result of voluntary or involuntary looking. To see involves no more sustained or specific exercise of the faculty of vision than is necessary to be aware of the existence or proximity of an object, and is therefore applicable to such rapidly passing objects as from their very rapidity would not allow of being beheld or looked at. The flash of lightning is only just seen and disappears. To see a thing is to take cognizance of it, so that those who have their eyes open cannot help seeing. If you look at the moon, you may see its shape. In a secondary sense, on looking at a question, we sometimes see the difficulties with which it is surrounded. In regard to the faculty of sight, as employed in this secondary sense, Reid has the following remark:—

"It is not without reason that the faculty of *seeing* is looked upon not only as more noble than the other senses, but as having something in it of a nature superior to sensation. The evidence of reason is called *seeing*, not feeling, smelling, or tasting. Yea, we are wont to express the manner of the divine knowledge by *seeing*, as that kind of knowledge which is most perfect in us."

"The organ of *seeing* is the eye, consisting of a variety of parts wonderfully contrived for the admitting and refracting the rays of light, so that those that come from the same point of the object, and fall upon different parts of the pupil, are brought to meet again at the bottom of the eye, whereby the whole object is painted on the retina that is spread there."—LOCKE.

Curiosity prompts us to look, interest causes us to behold, and nature enables us to see. When the person looks, the eye sees. As it has been observed that we may look without seeing, so it is also true that we may see without looking, as when I see an object in one direction, though I am looking in another. The exercise of the mind is so necessary to beholding that we speak of infants as looking, never beholding, for the feeling cannot rise above curiosity. I sometimes look at finery, in which I have very little interest. I behold the forest tree in admiration of its grandeur, or some spectacle which meets my view with astonishment, pity, love, hatred, or contempt.

TO EYE, is to regard indirectly but earnestly, as gratifying some passion, or as under the influence of some emotion or desire of which we are anxious to give no manifestation. The lover eyes his rival's movements with jealousy, the envious man eyes with envy the indication of wealth or greatness in another.

"What but faith, *eyeing* the prize, will quicken us to run patiently the race that is set before us."—BARROW.

A more exact and scrutinizing observation is expressed by CONTEMPLATE (Lat. *contemplāri*, part. *contemplatus*). It indicates such a sustained notice as extends to the distinctive nature of a thing. It is sometimes used of the purely ideal, as to contemplate a possibility or a project, in which case it has a force equivalent to *imagine* and *intend*. *Meditate* is also used in this sense, and is, in some respects, a synonym with CONTEMPLATE. In regard to this, we may observe that we may contemplate sensible objects, present and future things; but can only meditate on actions, qualities, and contingencies, or past events. The starry heavens, or the setting or rising sun, are fit objects of contemplation; the attributes of the Creator, the ingratitude of man, or his combined strength and weakness, his virtues, or his successes, are common subjects of meditation. As used in the sense of intending, CONTEMPLATE bears more directly on the intended action than meditate. We contemplate what we distinctly intend; we meditate what we think we shall one day undertake But in the simpler meaning of contemplate, we have to recognize a

strong action of the mind. For further remarks, see MEDITATE.

"Some few others sought after Him (God), but Aristotle saith, as the Geometer doth after a right line only, ὡς θεατὴς τοῦ ἁληθοῦς as a *contemplator* of truth; but not as the knowledge of it is any way useful or conducible to the ordering or bettering of their lives."—HAMMOND.

As we contemplate to get an intelligent, so we view or scan to get a general impression. To SCAN (Lat. *scandĕre, to climb*) is to take a rapid, as to VIEW (O. Fr. *veu*, part. of *voir*) is to take a more leisurely observation. We scan curiously, by rapidly noting one point after another; we view by taking in the whole at once.

"*Viewing* things on every side, observing how far consequences reach, and proceeding to collect and hear evidence, till reason saith there needs no more, is grievous labour to indolence and impatience, and by no means answers the ends of conceit and affectation."—SECKER.

"Who, finite, will attempt to *scan*
The works of Him that's infinitely wise!"
POMFRET.

To REGARD (Fr. *regarder*) has a moral and discriminative force. It implies certain feelings, or a judgment accompanying the observation. We regard a thing with pleasure, dislike, satisfaction, disgust, and the like; or we regard it as important or unimportant, as an indication of something else, or as likely to lead to certain consequences; while OBSERVE (Lat. *observare*) is to look at for the purpose of noting facts connected with the object, its circumstances, or properties. PERCEIVE (Lat. *percĭpĕre*) expresses the active and intelligent exercise of the faculty of sight. We observe carefully or superficially, we perceive distinctly or confusedly. An animal watches the movements of another animal, a naturalist observes them. That which we perceive has always some interest for us. That which we see may have none at all. We perceive as the result of an effort to see. Some stars are too remote to be perceived by the eye. One sees in a face much, perhaps, to constitute beauty, yet may perceive, by looking more closely at it, a lurking expression of some unamiable quality. We view things for the sake of general impressions, we contemplate them when we supply their associations; we observe them when we desire to gain a distinctive knowledge of them.

"He valued his religion beyond his own safety, and *regarded* not all the calumnies and reproaches of his enemies as long as he made this his constant exercise, to keep a conscience void of offence towards God, and towards men."—STILLINGFLEET.

"But pardon, too, if zealous for the right,
A street *observer* of each noble flight;
From the fine gold I separate the allay,
And show how hasty writers sometimes stray."
DRYDEN.

"Jupiter made all things, and all things whatsoever exist are the works of Jupiter: rivers and earth, and sea, and heaven, and what are between these; and gods and men, and all other animals—whatsoever is *perceivable*, either by sense or by the mind."—CUDWORTH.

BELIEF. CREDIT. TRUST. FAITH. AFFIANCE.

BELIEF (A. S. *ge-lyfan*) is the acceptance of a fact or statement as true without immediate knowledge; and admits of all degrees, from suspicion or surmise to moral conviction. It is the widest of all these terms, the rest being forms of belief. Belief is an assent of the understanding to a thing as probable or true. This may or may not be on logical or sufficient grounds. Belief is confidence in a certain sequence of things, whether ideas or facts, whereby one phenomenon succeeds another. In its simplest and rudimentary forms belief exists in the minds of irrational animals and infants. The philosopher believes that a certain chemical combination will produce a certain effect. The savage may believe that a charm, an incantation, or a sacrifice will produce the same result. The stag believes in a connexion between the glistening brook and the satisfaction of his thirst, though he cannot pass beyond such particular belief to such as are founded on generalizations. Belief may be stated in positive or negative propositions, but this is a difference only of form: the mental state expressed by belief is one and the same. Belief will affect our minds very differently, according as it is an assurance of a coming good or a coming evil—the absence or the pre-

sence of the desirable, the probability or improbability of a gain or a loss, a pleasure or a pain. This belief has to do with human action and happiness, which are only very remotely connected with such scientific belief as is purely speculative, as for instance that the earth is an oblate spheroid. The sources of belief have been divided into three. The Intuitive or Instinctive, Personal Experience, and the Influence of the Emotions. These may be and generally are more or less intermixed.

"That there is satisfactory evidence that many professing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles passed their lives in labour, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their *belief* of those accounts; and that they also submitted from the same motives to rules of conduct."—PALEY.

CREDIT (Lat. *crēdĕre*, part. *crēdĭtus*, *to believe*) and TRUST (connected with *true*), on the other hand, owe their force to something more than external facts of evidence. I give credit to a statement because of some apparent worthiness of belief either in the thing itself or in the person who communicates it. Trust is less purely intellectual and more practical than belief and credit. It is, in short, a practical reliance upon a person or object, grounded on a belief that it is adapted to, or worthy of it. I trust the physician, his word, or his medicine. We sometimes trust ice that is not solid, persons that are dishonest, opinions that are unsound.

"Sith the ground of *credit* is the credibility of things credited, and things are made credible either by the known condition of the utterer or by the manifest likelihood of truth which they have in themselves, hereupon it riseth, that whatsoever we are persuaded of, the same we are generally said to believe."—HOOKER.

"In a word, every man implicitly *trusts* his bodily senses concerning external objects placed at a convenient distance, and every man may with as good a reason put even a greater *trust* in the perceptions of which he is conscious in his own mind."—BISHOP HARLEY.

FAITH (earlier form *fey*, O. Fr. *fei* and *feid*; Lat. *fĭdem*) is very like TRUST, and might in many cases be substituted for it. But it is less instinctive and more speculative. The child trusts his parents; I have faith in the efficacy of a certain medicine. I have trust in God, that is, I feel myself safe in His hands. I believe that He will deal with me mercifully. "I have faith in God" would imply this, but it would imply more; as for instance, that I believe what He tells me simply because it is Himself who says it. In order to have arrived at this I must have come to an antecedent conviction of the perfect character of God. Belief and credit are specifically given on occasions. Trust and faith are habitudes of mind. The former may stop with intellectual assent, the latter prompt to action. The former may even lead to the latter, as the cause to the effect, as the speculative may become the operative. Faith is always practical. Belief on the other hand may lead to no action at all. While faith removes mountains, the devils believe and tremble. To set aside reason in believing is credulity, not faith. Men's beliefs are swayed not merely by their intellects, but by the logic of their prejudices and passions. A full definition of faith in the theological sense is thus given by Clarke:—

"Faith is that firm belief of things at present not seen, that conviction upon the mind of the truth of the promises and threatenings of God made known in the Gospel, of the certain reality of the rewards and punishments of the life to come, which enables a man, in opposition to all the temptations of a corrupt world, to obey God in expectation of an invisible reward hereafter."

BEMOAN. BEWAIL. LAMENT. DEPLORE.

These are words expressive of the external manifestation of sorrow. BEMOAN (A. S. *bi-mænan*, compounded of the prefix *bi-* and *mænan*, *to moan*) takes its complexion from its etymology, and denotes a deep and silent grief too deep for words. It belongs to causes of permanent sorrow—as to bemoan one's hard lot, or adverse fate. He who bemoans what has happened seeks solitude, and dwells upon the loss he has sustained or the evil that has befallen him, and upon the change which it has made in the whole tissue

and complexion of his life. He gives himself up to despondency or despair.

"When a poor-spirited creature that died at the same time for his crimes *bemoaned* himself unmanfully, he rebuked him with this question: Is it no consolation to such a man as thou to die with Phocion?"—*Spectator.*

BEWAIL (O. E. *be-wailen—be-*, and *wailen, to wail*) expresses a less profound and more energetic form of sorrow, commonly for specific events, as such as to bewail the loss of a friend. He who bewails makes frequent reference to the subject of his grief or disappointment. It is unrestrained, and so far from seeking solitude would find some relief in uncontrolled grief by loudly making it known to others.

"And if I must *bewail* the blessing lost
For which our Hampdens and our Sydneys bled,
I would at least *bewail* it under skies
Milder, among a people less austere,
In scenes which having never known me free,
Would not reproach me with the loss I felt." COWPER.

LAMENT (Lat. *lāmentāri*) has less poignancy and more formality than the others. It applies to much lighter causes of trouble, so that we may even lament the folly or weakness of another. It commonly involves strong regret that circumstances should be as they are when they might have been otherwise, as in the case of injudicious conduct which might have been avoided.

"Thammuz came next behind,
Whose annual wound in Lebanon allowed
The Syrian damsels to *lament* his fate
In amorous ditties all a summer's day."
MILTON.

DEPLORE (Lat. *dēplōrāre*) is to feel or express great and deep dissatisfaction.

"To find her or for ever to *deplore*
Her loss." MILTON.

We lament for that which brings sorrow, we deplore when the sorrow itself is reflected upon—as for instance how it might have been avoided, or something specifically infelicitous in the nature of it. So for instance we lament an honourable, and deplore a discreditable misfortune. A father deplores his son's misconduct, and laments his early death. Other sentiments besides mere sorrow are with us when we deplore. We lament occurrences, we deplore circumstances connected with them, causes which led to them, or the character which attaches to them. To deplore is to lament in a reasoning and reflexive way, the mind contemplating the nature of the event or act, and feeling that "pity 'tis, 'tis true."

BENEDICTION. BLESSING.

The BENEDICTION (Lat. *bĕnĕdictionem*) is the invocation of the BLESSING (A. S. *bletsian, to bless*). The blessing is the benefit invoked. A blessing is such a good thing as may be regarded as an item in the general sum of human prosperity and happiness; especially as conferred by some higher person or power. He who is not able to bestow a blessing may, by virtue of his office or relationship, pronounce a benediction.

BENEFACTION. DONATION.

BENEFACTION (Lat. *bĕnĕfactionem*) and DONATION (Lat. *dōnātionem*) both express the act of giving or the thing given for some liberal or charitable purpose; but a donation may be small or large, though it may not be inconsiderable: a benefaction is large enough to have a material effect upon, and to be of lasting benefit to the object. Hence it is frequently employed of the gift of money and lands to institutions by way of endowment or permanent source of income. A very large sum of money given as a donation, if it be funded so as to produce an annual return, becomes a benefaction. Donations benefit individuals. Benefactions augment institutions. Donation is also used to mean a single gift, as distinct from subscription, which often implies a repeated giving.

"Here idle and useless and therefore necessitous persons are taught the best lesson, labour, inured to it, and then sent out with such a stock of industry as will do them more real service than any other kind of *benefaction*."—ATTERBURY.

"They have an opportunity of distinguishing themselves from the lower classes by voluntary donations to the charity box."—*Anecdotes of* BISHOP WATSON

BENEFICENT. BOUNTIFUL. MUNIFICENT. GENEROUS. LIBERAL. BENEVOLENT.

BENEFICENT (Lat. *bĕnĕfĭcus, beneficent*) is a term denoting high excellence. It denotes largeness of bounty springing from the highest purity and goodness of nature, and in its highest form appertains most appropriately to the Creator, and is not confined to any one kind of gifts. It is the outflow of great kindness combined with ample powers. He who, from largeness of heart, confers upon another some great advantage is beneficent, though what he gives be not such a gift as diminishes his own store. Self-denial does not belong to beneficence, because the beneficent is above the condition of suffering from a diminution of what he possesses when he bestows upon others. The term has in modern parlance come to express almost restrictively an attribute of the divine nature. Beneficence also gives not only largely, but wisely and well.

"Whose work is without labour, whose designs
No flaw deforms, no difficulty thwarts,
And whose *beneficence* no charge exhausts." COWPER.

BOUNTIFUL, *full of bounty* (Fr. *bonté*, Lat. *bŏnĭtātem*), is of an inferior kind. Bounty is a natural liberality of giving. The bountiful man takes pleasure in the fulness of what he bestows. He thinks little of the merits of the giving, but to him the sight of the full measure of his gifts is pleasant.

"It is true, indeed, the direction of the public weal is in the hands of a single person, who, for the general good, takes upon himself to ease us of the whole weight and care of government; but still that *bountiful* source of power permits, by a very generous dispensation, some streams to flow down to us."—MELMOTH, *Pliny*.

MUNIFICENT (Lat. *mūnĭfĭcus*) stands to costliness as BOUNTIFUL to amplitude or quantity. It is frequently applied to the object given—as a munificent donation. It is rather external than moral, drawing attention more to the rich quality of the gift, than to any goodness or beneficence of the giver; though these are by no means excluded. The munificent man is one of lordly liberality, and profusely grand in what he gives. Hence munificence may be either the natural manifestation of a princely liberality, or it may be the product of ostentation or selfishness, but the large and costly quality of the gift will, in either case, ensure the term MUNIFICENT. Like the beneficent, the munificent is above the feeling of any loss in giving what he gives. He who should give very largely, but should impoverish himself by so doing, would be self-sacrificing rather than munificent; but the munificent man looks with some indifference on the greatness of his own gift.

"The institution of a School of Statuary in the house of a young nobleman (the Duke of Richmond) of the first rank, rivals the boasted *munificence* of foreign princes."—WALPOLE.

GENEROUS (Lat. *gĕnĕrōsus, well-born, generous*) differs from the foregoing in not relating exclusively to matters of external giving. Generosity is a mental disposition irrespective of the opportunities which may exist for exercising it. It is that nobleness of nature, which not only gives largely but is ready to do so at the cost of sacrifice to self. Hence it applies to forgiving, as well as giving. It comes of a disposition which is alien to meannesses of all kinds, whether niggardliness, malice, or any other. Generosity is nearly allied to magnanimity. It gives when it might withhold; it forgives when it might punish. It will accord praise if due to an enemy. It refuses to take unfair advantages, and will be at pains to do good. It is a virtue of an equal, whom circumstances have made a superior. Hence the Deity, though He may be called Beneficent, Bountiful, and even Munificent, could not be called generous.

"All men affect to seem *generous* and will say they scorn to be base, but generosity is in nothing more seen than in a candid estimate of other men's virtues and good qualities. To this, generosity of nature, generosity of education, generosity of principles and judgment do all conspiringly dispose."—BARROW.

LIBERAL (Lat. *lĭbĕrālis*), like BOUNTIFUL, denotes a character which, when

it gives, gives largely, but like GENEROUS applies to more than matters of material giving. Liberality is a tendency to avoid exact circumscription, and to allow margins in judgment and dealing to the advantage of others. To take a liberal view of a case is so to give width to its facts and interpretations as to admit favourable rather than to force unfavourable, or even exact, and rigid constructions. To give liberally is to avoid calculating what is precisely sufficient or exactly just, and not to fear to exceed lines of rigid dealing in such cases.

"The decency, then, that is to be observed in *liberality* seems to consist in its being performed with such cheerfulness as may express the godlike pleasure that is to be met with in obliging one's fellow-creatures."—*Spectator.*

BENEVOLENT (Lat. *bĕnĕvŏlens, wishing well*), like GENEROUS, belongs to the person rather than the act. The benevolent man may want the means of being liberal in matters of money or gifts, but he will naturally give when he can, and according to his means, from a disposition of wishing well to others. The benevolent will spare to injure as well as be glad to benefit. Benevolence is the principle which is manifested in beneficence, but it may exist passively. The opposite to benevolence is not niggardliness, though the man who is not benevolent will be niggardly in good offices; but selfishness or more positively malevolence. The benevolent man is glad of more happiness in others than he can be himself the instrument of producing.

"When our love or desire of good goes forth to others it is termed good-will or *benevolence*. *Benevolence* embraces all beings capable of enjoying any portion of good, and thus it becomes universal benevolence which manifests itself by being pleased with the share of good every creature enjoys, in a disposition to increase it, in feeling an uneasiness at their sufferings, and in the abhorrence of cruelty under every disguise or pretext. When these dispositions are acting powerfully towards every being capable of enjoyment, they are called the *benevolent* affections, and as they become in those who indulge them operative rules of conduct, or principles of action, we speak of the benevolent *principle*."—COGAN.

BENEVOLENCE. BENIGNITY. HUMANITY. KINDNESS.

BENEVOLENCE. *See* 'Benevolent," preceding article.

BENIGNITY (Lat. *bĕnignĭtātem*) is a less active quality than benevolence. Benignity is, as it were, dormant, or passive benevolence. It is a matter more of temperament than will. It is a tendency to benevolence, but so far short of it that it is sometimes applied metaphorically to other influences than the human will; as the benign, that is, propitious, aspects and influences of the seasons. When employed of persons, benign denotes some degree of superiority in the person. We should be more likely to speak of the benignity of a rich or powerful man than of a poor man. Indeed, benignity is tantamount to a benevolent condescension which enters more into it than sympathy does. It lies in aspect and manner, and is mild, open, genial, pleasing. As benevolence is inherent, so benignity may be shown on special occasions only.

"In a thermometer 'tis only the present and most sublimated spirit that is either contracted or dilated by the *benignity* or inclemency of the season."—*Spectator*

HUMANITY (Lat. *hūmānĭtātem*) expresses an impulse rather than a quality. It is that specific manifestation of active kindness which man as such is, or ought to be, prompted to exhibit to his fellow-man, or to any living creatures with which he is brought into contact. Humanity stands over against special cases which stand in need of it and evoke it. The act of the good Samaritan was emphatically an act of humanity. Yet humanity is not so much a virtue when exhibited as something the absence of which is positively disgraceful and evil. Humanity shows itself in treating none with harshness, in excusing the failings, in supporting the weakness, and in consoling the sorrows or mitigating the pains of others when possible.

"It is a rule of equity and *humanity* built upon plain reason, that rather a nocent person should be permitted to escape than an innocent should be constrained to suffer."—BARROW.

KINDNESS (A S. *cynde, natural*: is

very like benevolence, but is rather a social than a moral virtue. It applies to minor acts of courtesy and good-will, for which benevolence would be too serious a term. "Have the kindness to do so-and-so," is a phrase of social courtesy. To say that the good Samaritan performed an act of kindness would be not untrue, but very inadequate.

"If Achitophel signify the brother of a fool, the author of that poem will pass with his readers for the next of kin. And perhaps it is the relation that makes the *kindness*."—DRYDEN.

BENT. BIAS. INCLINATION. TURN. PROPENSITY. TENDENCY. PRONENESS. DISPOSITION.

All these terms denote a preponderating influence of mind. BENT (participle of *bend*) applies to the will, the intellect, the affections, or the entire nature. As the force of BENT is general and constant, so that of BIAS (Fr. *biais, a slope* or *slant*) is peculiar. A man's bent is his disposition, natural or acquired. He is biased on a particular occasion. So far as he has a bent, it will affect his thoughts, his occupation, his choice of a mode of life. So far as he has a bias, he is swayed in choice, preference or judgment. A bias is like a lateral dip in an inclined plane, or a weight introduced into a ball, which prevents the judgment from following an undeviating course, but sways it aside. The word is used in its etymological sense in the following :—

"If you suppose a die to have any *bias*, however small, to a particular side, this *bias*, though perhaps it may not appear in a few throws, will certainly prevail in a great number, and will cast the balance entirely to that side."—HUME.

"I am of opinion there has not for these many years appeared anything more finished of the kind, if indeed my great affection for him, and the praises he bestowed upon me, do not *bias* my judgment."—MELMOTH, *Pliny*.

"It is the legislative policy to comply with the common *bent* of mankind, and give it all the improvements of which it is susceptible."—HUME.

INCLINATION (Lat. *inclinātionem*) is a tendency of the will to exercise a certain preference, or of the judgment to adopt a certain belief or conclusion rather than others. Its motive principle is within the person, as BIAS proceeds externally from something in the case or circumstances. Temperament may give an inclination, education a bias. In their primary force inclination belongs to bodies both at rest and in motion, bias only to those in motion; inclination is more voluntary and conscious, bias more unconscious and involuntary. Inclination may lead practically to strong results, but it belongs itself to tenderness of the gentler kind.

"Shall I venture to say, my Lord, that in our late conversation you were *inclined* to the party which you adopted rather by the feelings of your good nature than by the conviction of your judgment?"—BURKE.

PROPENSITY (Lat. *prōpensus, inclining towards*) is an unreflecting, constitutional, or even animal proneness, which may be natural, or simply the result of habit. It is always in the direction of action of some kind, external or mental. It is mostly used in an unfavourable sense. We do not speak of a propensity to virtue, or noble or wise actions; but to errors, weaknesses, faults, and vices. Inclination which has become habitual and energetic through want of reflexion and self-control is PROPENSITY. INCLINATION should be distinguished from DISPOSITION, as the active from the passive. Inclination is positive tendency towards an object. Disposition is a state of aptitude for it. Inclination has reference to single acts, disposition to the general frame of mind. He who is inclined to study will probably find a way for himself of beginning it. He who is disposed to study will probably yield to any incentive which may be brought to bear upon him. I am inclined to do what I wish to do. I am disposed to do that to which I have no objection. Inclinations are yielded to or repressed, dispositions are cherished or overcome. The disposition comprehends the springs and motives of many different actions; the inclination sets in the direction of one. We may expect that sooner or later a man will do what he is disposed to do, but we cannot calculate on his executing that to which he is inclined; for other considerations

may suggest themselves to induce him to refrain from following out that inclination.

"It is the duty of every man who would be true to himself to obtain, if possible, a disposition to be pleased."—STEELE.

"For as this strong natural *propensity* to vice and impiety cannot possibly consist with the hypothesis of the soul's coming just out of God's hands pure and immaculate, so doth it most aptly suit with the doctrine of its pre-existence."—GLANVILL.

TURN (Fr. *tourner, to turn*) is a colloquial word, and commonly expresses an innocent preference for a thing, as suiting the taste, and indicative of a natural aptitude for some occupation which is therefore taken up, being that for which there is a natural capacity. As regards the tendencies, not of persons but events, the word TURN expresses such an alteration in the course of things as has resulted from causes not calculated upon.

"There is a very odd *turn* of thought required for this sort of writing (the fairy way of writing, as Dryden calls it), and it is impossible for a poet to succeed in it who has not a particular cast of fancy."—ADDISON.

TENDENCY (Lat. *tendĕre, to tend*) is, perhaps, the most general of all, and, on that account, the least specifically expressive. It denotes a force uniformly operating in a particular direction, whether it be of a moral or a physical kind, and may be the result of mechanical influence, or nature or habit. A tendency is an inherent inclination, sufficiently sustained to be associated with a certain result or end. Yet, like PROPENSITY, it connects itself with unfavourable, rather than desirable results. A tendency is a sustained turn, as a turn is an unforeseen tendency. Whether or not it be that movement, spontaneous and unregulated, is likely to go wrong, certain it is that tendency is seldom a term of the fortunate. Things take a favourable or unfavourable turn, but they have a bad tendency. We do not speak so often in common parlance of a good tendency. Yet this is by no means absolute, and the following is an example to the contrary:—

"In every experimental science there is a *tendency* toward perfection."—MACAULAY

It will be observed, however, that this is not a tendency of circumstances, but of internal growth and development.

PRONENESS (Lat. *prōnus, inclined forwards*) denotes a moral proclivity or constitutional tendency, and is almost universally restricted to an unfavourable sense. It is that condition of an agent which makes him predisposed to certain conduct. It is somewhat like the leaning of a body, which falls immediately that a prop or restraint is removed. PRONENESS expresses the more active form of disposition, yet, like PROPENSITY, though less strongly, is a term of unfavourable rather than favourable meaning. Men are disposed to virtue and prone to vice. Yet this rule is not absolute. Pope says—

"Malice *prone* the virtues to defame."

On the other hand—

"An honest, hearty simplicity, and *proneness* to do all that a man knows of God's will, is the ready, certain, and infallible way to know more of it."—SOUTH.

BEQUEATH. DEVISE. DEMISE.

BEQUEATH (A.S. *be-cwethan, to declare*) points to times anterior to written testaments, when property was devised *by word of mouth* in the presence of witnesses. BEQUEATH is properly applied to a gift by will, or legacy, that is, of personal property; and he who receives it is called a legatee. But it is popularly extended, and construed by the Law Courts to embrace what is properly expressed by DEVISE.

To DEVISE (O. Fr. *deviser, to bequeath*) is properly used for the gift by will of real property.

DEMISE (O. Fr *demise*, fem. part. of *de(s)me e, to dismiss*) is strictly the leaving of property at death to one who has already a claim to it as the heir. Hence the term "demise of the Crown," which is the transfer at the death of the sovereign of the kingdom to the lawful successor. The idea of expectancy belongs to the last, not to the two former.

"I have often read with a great deal of pleasure, a legacy of the famous Lord Bacon, one of the greatest geniuses that our own or any country has produced. After

having *bequeathed* his soul, body and estate in the usual form, he adds,—My name and memory I leave to foreign nations, and to my countrymen after some time be passed over."—*Tatler.*

BEREAVE. DEPRIVE. STRIP.

BEREAVE (A. S. *bereáfian, be-* and *reáfian, to steal* or *rob*) is so to take from another as to leave a feeling of privation or destitution. The things of which we are bereft are of the nature of cherished possessions.

DEPRIVE (Lat. *deprivāre*) is so to take as to leave with a feeling, or in a condition of incompleteness.

STRIP (Low Ger. *stripe, a stripe* or *line*, Ger. *streif*) denotes a sudden, violent, or arbitrary taking away, so as to leave in a condition of destitution. Only sentient creatures are bereaved. Inanimate substances may be deprived or stripped. We are bereaved only of actual and substantial sources of comfort or happiness, we may be deprived of what has only a speculative existence—as hope, opportunity of action, or abstract goods. We are stripped of what is attached to us, belongs to us, is worn by us, or with which we may be regarded as invested. We are bereft of comforts, blessings, possessions, deprived of means, faculties, powers, offices, privileges, and stripped of anything without which we are bare, naked, destitute. BEREAVE has the most purely moral, STRIP the most purely physical force, and DEPRIVE partakes of both. In winter the tree is stripped of its leaves. The widow bemoans her bereavement, while the cold deprives the first of its foliage, and death the second of her natural protector. It is power that bereaves, and force that strips. It may be fraud that deprives.

"Me have ye *bereaved* of my children."—*English Bible.*

"Mr. Pym, in a long-form'd discourse, lamented the miserable state and condition of the kingdom, aggravated all the particulars which had been done amiss in the government, as done and contrived maliciously and upon deliberation to change the whole frame, and *deprive* the nation of all the liberty and property which was their birthright by the laws of the land."—CLARENDON.

"Opinions which at the time of the accession of James, no clergyman could have avowed without imminent risk of being *stripped* of his gown, were now the best title to preferment."—MACAULAY.

BID. CALL. INVITE. SUMMON. CITE.

Of these CALL is the most general (A.S. *ceallian*). It is to raise the voice to attract attention. It is an act of sentient but not necessarily human beings, as in the call of a bird. It implies no relation in particular between the parties calling and called. The strong may call to account, the weak call for help. Metaphorically, circumstances may call for especial exertion. The characteristic of a call is its distinctness. It may be an announcement, a demand, a request, a summons, an invitation, and impersonally a necessity or obligation.

"How often have I stood
A rebel to the skies,
The *calls*, the tenders of a God,
And mercy's loudest cries." WATTS.

To INVITE (Lat. *invītāre*) is to call in such a way as to leave the answer to the will and pleasure of another; but it may be with or without spoken words, as by a look, by inarticulate sounds, by writing. Invitation implies some degree of equality between parties, and is an act of persuasion, or courtesy, or affection. Its characteristic is attractiveness, or an effort of it; and so fine weather is said to invite to exercise or travel.

"Ask of no angel to reveal thy fate;
Look in thy heart, the mirror of thy state.
He that *invites* will not the invited mock,
Opening to all that do in earnest knock."
WALLER.

To BID (A.S. *beódan*), and to SUMMON (Lat. *summŏnēre, to remind*) both imply the authoritative use of words, or other media of communication; but BID extends to action generally, SUMMON to the particular action of appearing at a particular place. BID is imperative and formal; SUMMON, official, legal, or compulsory. We may bid also through kindness or courtesy, as the host bids his guest welcome.

"Sir Roger, who is very well acquainted with my humour, lets me rise and go to bed when I please, dine at his own table, or in my chamber, as I think fit, sit still and say nothing without *bidding* me be merry."—*Spectator.*

"All men, both small and great, dead and living, shall be *summoned* to appear before a dreadful and impartial tribunal, and give an account of all their actions."—SHARP.

CITE (Fr. *citer*, Lat. *citare*) has the particular sense of to call by name, in which it is a synonym with QUOTE. But as compared with SUMMON, it expresses more vividly the authority which has jurisdiction over persons. A person is summoned to appear before a court, he is cited to appear before a judge or a superior. Legally, also, witnesses are cited to give evidence, persons are summoned to answer charges. It is the jurisdiction of the individual which cites, and the authority of the law which summons. Hence, by a kind of metaphor, SUMMON is applied to the force of circumstances, that is, to such calls as are urgent without being authoritative; as when one is summoned to the country from town by important business.

"A Synod was called by the Bishop of Winchester, the Pope's Legate, to right the Bishop; when the King was *cited* to appear, who sending to know the cause, answer was made that it was to answer for his imprisoning of Bishops and depriving them of their goods, which, being a Christian king, he ought not to do."—BAKER, *Stephen*.

BIG. GREAT. LARGE.

BIG (etym. uncertain) expresses such size as gives the impression of burdensomeness, or bulk, as a big box, or a big mountain. Like LARGE, it lends itself more easily than GREAT to express the existence of relative or comparative, but not actual size, as an animal not so big as a flea; while GREAT implies some degree of actual size. BIG carries the idea of physical turgidity and rotundity, as well as size; and then what is morally analogous to these, the moral use being much the less common. The frog that swelled herself out asked her young if she was bigger than the ox. In such a phrase as a year *big* with events, the idea is metaphorical, and equivalent to pregnant.

"*Big*-boned and large of limbs, with sinews strong." DRYDEN.

GREAT (A. S. *greát*) has not so much of this abstract force, but implies some degree of actual size. As BIG belongs to bulk, so GREAT to extent, and LARGE (Lat. *largus*, *wide*, *ample*) to width or capacity. A big building is made of a great mass of material; a great building is lofty, wide, and extensive. A large building would hold a great number of persons or a great quantity of goods. BIG is only inelegantly applied to nouns expressive of number, quantity, or extent, but belongs to the subjects of those qualities. We do not say a big number of persons. Greatness of circumference makes things big. GREAT is used of degree in a way in which LARGE could not be so well used, as, I was greatly disappointed or delighted; and LARGE of quantity where GREAT could not be so well used, as, He was largely rewarded. BIG is always physical, except when used in metaphor. GREAT is also moral and applicable to almost anything that may be conceived to exist in degree, as, a great general, or a great noise. LARGE is physical when employed directly of persons, but may be used morally of qualities. A large man is tall, broad, and heavy; a big man is excessively or irregularly large. A great man is so by reason of his talents or energy, or perhaps only by station and the accidents of birth. Number, quantity, and extent are represented as large. Power, knowledge, strength, wisdom, and such abstract qualities, with their opposites, as ignorance, weakness, and folly, are great.

"*Greatness* of soul is more necessary to make a *great* man than the favour of the monarch, and the blazonry of the herald, and *greatness* of soul is to be acquired by converse with the heroes of antiquity, not the fighting heroes only, but the moral heroes."—KNOX, *Letters*.

"Such as made Sheba's curious Queen resort
To the *large*-hearted Hebrew's famous court." WALLER.

BIND. TIE. LACE.

To BIND is the A. S. *bindan*, to TIE, the A. S. *tigan*. They express different modes of fastening by employing long and flexible material. TIE is applicable to involutions and knots of the material itself—as the string was tied in a knot. BIND im-

plies the circumvolution of the binding-material around what is bound. The horse in the stable is tied up, but not bound up. When two things are tied together, that which unites them is, in some measure, intermediate; when they are bound, it is not intermediate but constrictive. When a thing is tied the whole is in restraint as regards what is external to it; when they are bound, the parts are in restraint as regards one another. The insane patient is bound in a strait-waistcoat, the martyr is tied to the stake. When used metaphorically—that is, morally—the same distinction prevails. The moral tie is an external restraint, as the ties of kindred; the bond is internal, as to be bound in conscience. We are bound by honour, we are tied by party. Some things are tied without being bound, others bound without being tied. Hence the force of the expression—

"*Tied* and *bound* with the chain of our sins."—*Eng. Liturgy.*

LACE (O. Fr. *las, a snare;* Lat. *lăqueus*) is to tie together by interwoven strings, which fasten by connecting at several different points, especially at the edges of a pliable and extended material—

"Look, love, what envious streaks
Do *lace* the severing clouds in yonder east."
SHAKESPEARE.

BIND. OBLIGE. COMPEL. CONSTRAIN. COERCE.

TO BIND (*see* above) is to oblige by the force of such circumstances as are intrinsic to the individual and not imposed upon him by the will and power of another, except in such cases as are purely technical and legal; as for instance, a bond or bail to keep the peace. I am bound by moral obligations, as duty, consistency, honour, promises. I am bound to assist my friend in his trouble if I can. I am bound in honour to speak the truth, keep my word, adhere to engagements, and to make restitution if I have taken unjustly or dishonestly. Hence a man is his own judge of what binds him, or may be bound to do something which he neglects or refuses to do. Men are bound by manifold ties which they recognize or feel for themselves, as affection, interest, policy.

"Even in those actions whereby an offence may be occasioned though not given, charity *binds* us to clear both our own name and the conscience of others."—BISHOP HALL.

OBLIGE (Lat. *obligāre, to bind*), denotes the operation of an external force, as of another's will, but more commonly the force of circumstances. It is commonly employed in cases in which no strong opposition of will in the agent is supposed. It is not so strong as bind, but though not so strong, it is more practical, for, as we have seen, a man may be bound to do what he does not, but that which he is obliged to do he does. Neither BIND nor OBLIGE excludes necessarily the will of the agent. Conscience binds. Prudence and necessity oblige, so that that which obliges may have the assent of the judgment.

"A man is said to be *obliged* when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another. And from this account of obligation it follows that we can be obliged to do nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by, for nothing else can be a violent motive to us."—PALEY.

COMPEL (Lat. *compellĕre, to drive*), unlike the former, denotes either absolute opposition of the will, or that it was powerless, or taken no account of. Compulsion may proceed from persons or from circumstances, whose force we are unable to resist.

"Before the sun has gilt the skies,
Returning labour bids me rise;
Obedient to the hunter's horn
He quits his couch at early morn;
By want *compell'd* I dig the soil;
His is a voluntary toil." COTTON'S *Fables.*

CONSTRAIN (O. Fr. *constraindre*, Lat. *constringĕre*) differs from COMPEL in not implying the same disregard or annulling of the will of the person. COMPEL denotes a purely external force. Constraint may be internal. I exercise moral force when I constrain myself, and I lend myself to moral influences when I am constrained—as for instance when, from a feeling of compassion, I act in a certain way. The principle of compulsion is *force*, that of constraint is *motive*. But constraint

sometimes comes very near to compulsion, as in the following:—

"Thy sight, which should
Make our eyes flow with joy, hearts dance with comforts,
Constrains them weep." SHAKESPEARE.

COERCE (Lat. *coercēre*), like COMPEL, seems to combine the external action of COMPEL with the internal action of CONSTRAIN. Hence the external force of compulsion is simple and direct, of coercion, complex and indirect. In coercion a moral medium is employed as a fulcrum for the lever of compulsion. "Vote for which candidate you please, but if you vote for B, you know the consequences"—this is coercion. In short, coercion is the exercise of any powerful interference with the free exercise of the will of another. Yet it has a social character, and bears more especially upon such acts as men perform not merely as individuals, but brought into contact with society and their fellow-men. It may be added that, unlike the other terms, which have only a positive, COERCE has also a negative force, in which it is nearly allied to restrain, as in the following:—

"Therefore the debtor is *coerced* his liberty until he makes payment."—BURKE.

BISHOP. PRELATE. DIOCESAN.

BISHOP (Gr. ἐπίσκοπος, *overseer*) denotes the spiritual order. The BISHOP is one of the Episcopal Order in the Church, as distinguished from the orders of Priests and Deacons, and if there be any other inferior orders.

The PRELATE (Lat. *præferre*, part. *prælātus*), denotes the rank or *preferment* of the person.

The DIOCESAN (Gr. διοίκησις, *a province, a diocese*) denotes the relationship to a sphere of jurisdiction. In the Church of Rome there are Prelates not in Episcopal orders.

BLAME. CENSURE. CONDEMN. REPROVE. REPROACH. UPBRAID. REPRIMAND. REBUKE. CHIDE. ANIMADVERT. DENOUNCE. OBJURGATE. VITUPERATE. SCOLD.

To BLAME (Fr. *blâmer*, L. Lat. *blasphemare*) is simply to ascribe a fault to a person, or to refer to him as the cause of something in itself wrong or untoward. It is too weak to extend to crimes. We do not blame persons for committing murder, but for accidents or injuries when their occurrence may be imputed to neglect, disobedience, and the like. The idea of imputing fault constitutes blame. But faults consist both in defect and in excess. Kindness is commendable, but over-indulgence is to be blamed. Blame may be exercised by anyone towards another, without distinction of rank or rights, and may extend to motives as well as acts. We often blame the absent, for the object of blame is sometimes not so much to visit others with censure, as to express our own unfavourable opinion. Blame may be indirect, as by adopting one policy or party, we inferentially blame the policy of the opposite party. We may blame ourselves for what we have done or caused. Where there has been no choice there can be no blame. We may blame in secret—that is, in our own minds.

"A wise man may frequently neglect praise, even when he has best deserved it; but in all matters of serious consequence, he will most carefully endeavour so to regulate his conduct as to avoid not only *blameworthiness*, but as much as possible every imputation of *blame*."—SMITH, *Moral Sentiments*.

TO CENSURE (Lat. *censūra, a judgment, opinion*) is the formal, open, or public expression of fault by a superior, or one who assumes to be so for the occasion. To censure is more an act of personal authority than to blame, and is supposed to take place in the presence, or at least the cognizance of the person censured; whereas we may blame the absent or the dead. The conduct may be blamed, as well as the person, but it is only the person that is censured. A certain gravity of offence is implied in censure which seems to be midway between light faults and heavy crimes. The force of blame is proportioned to its moral justice and deserving; but censure is supposed to carry some degree of punishment in its own severity, and the character, moral or official, of him who expresses it. CENSURE expresses a kind of acknowledged right to express blame. A person may be blamed for his good nature, and censured for his negligence.

"Of this delicacy Horace is the best master. He appears in good humour while he *censures;* and therefore his *censure* has the more weight, as supposed to proceed from judgment, not from passion."—YOUNG.

To CONDEMN (Lat. *condemnāre*) applies to grave offences and those who commit them. It is the solemn pronunciation of an adverse judgment, either formally and openly, or in one's own mind. He who condemns passes an adverse judgment with the consciousness that his expression of it will be followed by personal consequences. Condemn is simple, absolute, final. Condemnation implies that the time for extenuation, defence, apology is passed. Censure or blame may be modified, condemnation is complete.

"When Christ asked the woman, 'Hath no man *condemned* thee?' He certainly spoke, and was understood by the woman to speak of a legal and judicial condemnation. Otherwise her answer, 'No man, Lord,' was not true. In every other sense of *condemnation*, as blame, censure, reproof, private judgment, and the like, many had *condemned* her; all those, in short, who brought her to Jesus."—PALEY.

REPROVE (Lat. *rĕprŏbare*) is more strictly personal than any of the foregoing, though it has not the weight of CONDEMN. It is personally to express one's disapprobation to another, commonly one's junior or inferior. It may be no more than to express it simply and in few words, or even by a sign, and so differs from censure, which enters upon the nature of the offence or supposed offence. The wish to convince another of his fault in such a way that he may remember it as a warning for the future dictates reproof. As we may blame and condemn either ourselves or others, so we censure and reprove others only. We reprove others, not so much for the purpose of punishing them as of awakening and benefiting them. Though reproof is not the same thing as blame, censure, or condemnation, it may enter as an element into all three.

'And as a bird each fond endearment tries
To tempt its new-fledged offspring to the skies,
He tried each art, *reproved* each dull delay,
Allured to brighter worlds, and led the way."
GOLDSMITH.

REBUKE (Fr. *rebouquer, to blunt a weapon thrown: see* LITTRÉ, s.v. *reboucher*) is more energetic and less didactic than REPROVE. It is to reprove in a certain manner, that is, with sharpness, or outspokenness. It implies some degree of moral indignation in the rebuker, and may be an indication of moral courage, as when an inferior rebukes a superior, or one blames another to his face as not afraid to do so. A rebuke is administered on the spur of the moment as a sudden check upon another. Reason reproves, impulse rebukes.

"The proud he tamed, the penitent he cheer'd,
Nor to *rebuke* the rich offender fear'd."
DRYDEN.

REPROACH (Fr. *reprocher*, Lat. *re-propriare, to bring near, before the eyes*) differs from the foregoing in its whole tone and spirit. It is the reproof of the inferior, the suffering, or the weak. Its etymological force is to bring *near or home* to another the fault or wrong that he has done. It is between persons related by some kind of tie. The subject of the reproach is an assumed violation of moral obligation, which has redounded to the injury of the reproacher or the reproached, as a son might reproach his father with his own neglected education, or one reproaches another with his neglect of his own duty or interest. According as the fault that has been committed is against one's self or not, will be the nature and degree of indignation or protest roused in the mind against the object of the reproach; but in any case the aim is to raise in the mind of another a feeling of dissatisfaction with himself, "setting before him the things that he hath done." Reflexion may lead one to reproach one's self, in which case the effect of reproach is only inferior to that of remorse. To be without reproach is to be without anything that another might bring home to one's dishonour or discredit.

"The Chevalier Bayard, distinguished among his contemporaries by the designation of 'The Knight without fear and *reproach*.'"—ROBERTSON.

UPBRAID (A. S. *upgebredan*) is akin to reproach. It is to reproach in a certain way, that is, energetically and demonstratively. One may reproach with a look, but one upbraids with earnestness and forcible words. We reproach to make others sorry, we upbraid to make them ashamed. He who reproves does it under some sense of moral responsibility. He who upbraids may possibly do it to serve his own ends, as in the following:—

"He discourages the weak, and weakens the hands of the strong, and by *upbrauding* their weakness, tempts them to turn it into rashness or despair."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

REPRIMAND (Fr. *réprimander*, Lat. *rĕprĭmenda, rĕprĭmĕre, to check*: LITTRÉ) belongs to such censure of individuals as is expressed by a superior in the discharge of his duty as such. When it is official it carries with it the character of a minor penalty. It has also the character of official warning, and is suggestive of heavier punishment on repetition of the offence. The father reprimands his disobedient child, the master his servant, the preceptor his pupil, the commanding officer his subordinate. We do not censure inferiors, nor reprimand superiors.

CHIDE (A. S. *cídan, to chide, brawl*) is a minor and less dignified upbraiding—a finding common fault in a clamorous and angry manner. An appeal to the imperfect reason and childish fears of the young is manifested by the chiding of their children by impatient mothers. We chide the young, the thoughtless, the self-willed.

"As children should be very seldom corrected by blows, so I think frequent, and especially passionate *chiding* of almost as ill consequence. It lessens the authority of the parent, and the respect of the child."—LOCKE.

OBJURGATE (Lat. *objurgāre*) is more naturally used towards equals, as CHIDE and SCOLD (Du. *schelden, to scold*) towards inferiors and juniors. SCOLD has in it more of authority and harshness. CHIDE more of volubility and sharpness. Objurgation may be conveyed in a single sentence.

"The *objurgatory* question of the Pharisees."—PALEY.

VITUPERATE (Lat. *vĭtŭpĕrāre*) conveys the idea of telling censure, or eloquent scolding, conduct being forcibly denounced, and terms effectively administered.

"*Vituperative* appellation."—BEN JONSON.

"A common *scold* (communis rixatrix—for our Law Latin confines it to the feminine gender) is a public nuisance to her neighbourhood."—BLACKSTONE.

ANIMADVERT (Lat. *ănĭmadvertĕre*) is to notice unfavourably and in the way of adverse criticism; and so of necessity applies not to grave offences of morals, but to matters of taste, manners, and measures in regard to their accuracy or propriety. It involves, together with the censure, an unfolding of the objection in detail.

"If the two Houses of Parliament, or either of them had assuredly a right to *animadvert* on either of the Houses, that branch of the Legislature so subject to *animadversion* would instantly cease to be part of the supreme power."—BLACKSTONE.

DENOUNCE (Lat. *dēnuncĭare*) expresses the strongest form of disapproval. While disapproval may be confined to one's own mind, denunciation is open and audible. It expresses not only the calm decision of the judgment, like condemn, but also the further manifestation of outraged feeling. Yet denunciation is not wanting in formality and solemnity. It is the declaration of impending wrath, vengeance, or punishment, or of an adverse judgment, in terms of vehement, yet measured reprobation. It is a case in which indignation makes the judge. It commonly refers acts to a standard, and individuals to a character, so affixing to them certain representative designations. I denounce a man as a villain, or his conduct as influenced by evil motives.

"*Denounced* for a heretic."—MORE.

BLANCH. WHITEN. BLEACH. Of these, WHITEN, to make white (A.S. *hwit*), is the generic term. It

is to induce a whiteness upon a material, either by internal alteration, or by the addition of an external colouring.

To Blanch (Fr. *blanc, white*) is to make white or whiten by an alteration of the inherent and natural colouring matter of the substance, as in the effect of etiolation produced in plants by exclusion of the sun's rays.

To Bleach (A. S. *blácian, to grow pale*) indicates that the process has been effected by the destruction of the colouring-matter of the body, either by the action of the light and air, or the application of some acid.

BLEMISH. Defect. Fault. Flaw.

Blemish (O. Fr. *blesmir, blemir, to wound, soil*: Skeat's *Etym. Dict.*) is a partial or local defect, injury, or contrariety which affects the completeness of the external aspect of a thing, as a spot of white on a horse otherwise entirely black. So metaphorically, a blemish in character refers to reputation, or the view taken of it by others. As the term blemish directly expresses a fault or defect in appearance, so it indirectly implies the contrary in the subject of it. The blemish is small and slight in itself, and is unsightly by reason of so much which is otherwise. Blemishes may be produced by a variety of causes, as nature, faulty operation, accident, violence, time.

"They have possessed other beauties which were conformable to just criticism; and the force of these beauties has been able to overpower censure, and give the mind a satisfaction superior to the disgust arising from the *blemishes*."—Hume.

Defect (Lat. *dēfectus, a want*) is the absence of what is required to constitute completeness of any kind, as of form, substance, or quality, or power—as *e.g.*, a defect in the organization of an animal, a defect of vision, a defect in a work of art, a defect in a mental estimate, as in the material construction of a thing. In regard to products and operations, Defect expresses a marked degree of imperfection: as a blemish mars the individual, so a defect causes to fall short of the type or requirements of the species. A blemish in a painting belongs to that canvas or picture, a defect is a non-fulfilment of the rules of the art.

"And after all, the rules of religion and virtue which were drawn up by these philosophers have been very imperfect and *defective* in many instances."—Watts.

Fault (Fr. *faute*) is a defect as referred to human agency, as a fault of perspective in a painting; while the fading of a colour under natural influences is a blemish, and anything which deteriorated it or detracted from its completeness, whether as a work of art or as an article of furniture, would be a defect. We speak, however, of faults of commission as well as omission. What is wanting is defective, what is ill done is faulty. In this case the one is negative, the other positive. As fault includes in its idea a relation to the doer or maker, so defect expresses something imperfect in the thing. Human imperfection occasions defects in character and conduct. Human weaknesses, temptations, ignorance, error, occasion faults. That is faulty which has what it ought not to have, that is defective which has not what it ought to have. The former requires correction, the latter supply.

"He who is gratified with that which is *faulty* in works of art is a man of bad taste, and he who is pleased or displeased according to the degree of excellence or *faultiness* is a man of good taste."—Beattie.

The term Flaw (A. S. *floh*; cf. Swedish *flaga, a crack*) is primarily applied to such a defect as affects the body or substance of a thing. A flaw in a picture deteriorates its commercial value, a blemish disfigures it as a work of art. A flaw more strictly belongs to those things which owe their value to the quality of their substance, as sound, durable, and of uniform colour or brightness. A flaw in ice is a warning to the skater. A flaw in an emerald depreciates its value. A flaw in a document is metaphorical, and denotes what is analogous to the disruption of substantial continuity or completeness. So we speak of a "flaw in an indictment," and in the following:—

"No; the decree was just and without *flaw*,
And He that made bad right to make the law." COWPER.

BLINK. WINK.

No harder distinction perhaps exists in our language than that which has to be ascertained between these two terms. Both have their secondary as well as primary or physical significations. Even with the best authorities BLINK is explained by WINK, and WINK by BLINK; while in regard to their secondary use in the sense of connivance, we find "to blink at," and "to wink at" employed in this sense by English classical authors. The confusion existing between the terms seems to flow from the likeness of the things. To BLINK (A. S. *blican, to glitter*) may be etymologically either to move twinklingly, like a twinkling star, or to close partially or entirely under the effect of very strong or sudden light.

As to the original meaning of WINK, the A. S. *wincian* meant to nod as well as to wink; and a connexion between *wink* and *wing* has been suggested (cf. Dutch *wicken, to vibrate*). Now when Shakespeare wrote—

"I have not slept one *wink*,"

it is plain that, first, this was no continued but a fugitive closing of the eyes; and, secondly, that it was a closing, not of one eye but of both. We may therefore eliminate the possible supposition that to wink means to shut and close one eye merely because this is the common form of *conscious* winking. To wink is quickly to close and open one eye or both. When Chaucer wrote—

"Than upon him she keb up both her eyne,
And with a *blinke* it came in till his thought
That he sometime her face before had seen,"

he no doubt used the word in the sense of a quick view, or glance. According to the glare and external pressure upon the eye would be the closeness and continuity of the blink. So Sir Thomas More:—

"The eyes yblent
Do *blink* even blind with objects vehemert."

The metaphorical force of BLINKING, then, seems to be to shun, to avoid seeing from a desire to evade; and so only indirectly and negatively to connive at. On the other hand, WINK, when used in this way, has the force of active connivance, the winking being not only a blinding of the eye, but much more significantly a purposed twinkling of it, as a sign of recognition, as well as of a mind at once awake to what is going on, and, as it were, purposely asleep. So Gower:—

"Better is to *wynk* than to loke."

So Udal on Romaines:—

"But to thentente that peace and concord maye amonge you bee maintained, and steadfastly abyde, certain thinges must bee *wynked* at, some things muste bee suffered, and some thinges must gently be taken."

On the other hand, *winke* was used, like *blink*, of involuntary closing of the eyes wholly or partially.

BLOCK. MASS. LUMP.

The BLOCK (Welsh *ploc*) is a solid mass of uniform material, as wood, stone, metal, having one or more plane or approximately plane surfaces.

A MASS (Fr. *masse*) is a body of matter concreted or collected, whether of uniform substance or not; as a mass of gold, or a mass of rubbish.

A LUMP (allied to the English *clump*: WEDGWOOD) is a piece of matter uniform in substance, shapeless, and of no considerable bulk.

BLOODY. SANGUINARY. BLOODTHIRSTY.

BLOODY is primarily purely physical (A.S. *blód*, *blood*) and means having blood, consisting of blood, or more commonly covered or stained with blood. A bloody coat is a coat stained with blood; bloody deeds involve shedding of blood. It is also a vivid metaphorical term. A bloody tyrant is one who has destroyed many lives, and delighted to do so. A bloody period of history is pregnant with wars and deaths.

"When this great revolution was attempted in a more regular mode by government, it was opposed by plots and seditions of the people; when by popular efforts, it was repressed as rebellion by the hand of

power; and *bloody* executions often *bloodily* returned, marked the whole of its progress through all its stages."—BURKE.

SANGUINARY is purely, or almost purely, moral; and is an instance of the tendency of Latin words to appropriate secondary meanings, leaving the primary to the Saxon. The epithet *Sanguinary* belongs to such characters or acts as tend to produce the shedding of BLOOD (Lat. *sanguĭnem*), as a sanguinary disposition, tyrant, war.

"Well, one at least is safe; one sheltered here
Has never heard the *sanguinary* yell
Of cruel man exulting in her woes."
COWPER.

BLOODTHIRSTY is, specifically, the desiring and compassing the effusion of blood as an animal passion; whether from natural appetite, as in the tiger, or, from cruelty or vindictiveness, as in the tyrannical and unforgiving. The tyrant might be called sanguinary, or, by a stronger and coarser term, bloodthirsty; but the tiger is bloodthirsty, not sanguinary.

"The Peruvians fought not, like the Mexicans, to glut *bloodthirsty* divinities with human sacrifices."—ROBERTSON.

BLOOM. BLOSSOM. FLOWER.

There is a conventional difference of usage between these terms, BLOOM (Icel. *Blóm, a blossom*) being employed generally of flowers, and flowering shrubs, BLOSSOM (A. S. *blóstma*) of the flowers of fruit-trees. This distinction is not absolute. We speak of the bloom or blossom of fruit-trees, but hardly of the blossom of the flowers of the parterre. FLOWER (Fr. *fleur*, Lat. *flōrem*) is at once the most generic and common, and also the more scientific term. The little child delights to gather wild flowers. The florist seeks to develop their bloom. The botanist regards the flower as that part of a plant which subserves its reproduction. In their secondary senses the bloom symbolizes the freshest period of existence; the blossom, the opening of promise and hope; the flower, the choice and select portion, that which shows the brightest and the fairest.

BLOW. STROKE. KNOCK.

BLOW (cf. O. Du. *blauwen, to strike*) expresses the violent application of one substance to another. It may be with or without design. If we heard of a blow from a SWORD, we should take it to mean the back, the pommel, or the flat side, otherwise it would be a stroke or cut. A STROKE (cf. Ger. *streich*) is a finer and lighter kind of blow, almost requiring an instrument on purpose. Hence it follows that we very commonly speak of *accidental* blows, hardly ever of accidental strokes; for stroke involves a continuous relative line of movement, or force exercised, even though it be not, as it commonly is, one regulated by design.

"Nor can it be meant that if a man should actually *strike* us on one cheek we should immediately turn to him the other, and desire the *blow* to be repeated."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

BOARD. PLANK.

A BOARD (A.S. *bord*) is wood sawed thin, and of an equilateral shape, or nearly so. A PLANK (Fr. *planche*) is thicker, and on an average of at least two inches in thickness. It is also narrow, or of considerable length in proportion to its width. A BOARD may be of small dimensions and thin. The difference is reflected in the secondary uses of the words. The thickness of the ship's planks suggests the slight interval which may separate life from death. Shipwrecked men are sometimes saved upon planks. A mere plank may serve for a bridge across a chasm. The ideas which belong to the term BOARD are of a different character. It is that round which persons assemble in convivial or deliberative meetings.

BOAST. VAUNT. GLORY. BRAG.

To BOAST (Wel. *bostio*) is to speak in ostentatious language, with a view to self-praise or self-exaltation. A man vain and mendacious will boast of his valorous deeds; a man of vulgarity besides, will boast of his wealth. Nevertheless, mendacity is not essentially implied in boasting; only the habit of drawing things one way, that is, in the direction of self, is injurious to strict truth-speaking.

To boast indicates more of vanity, and to vaunt more of pride. To VAUNT a thing is simply to bring it (perhaps frequently) before others, as a matter of admiration in oneself. To boast implies mere talking about it, with that tendency to a manifestation of personal pomposity and exaggeration which does not belong, or not in so marked a manner, to VAUNT. It may be observed that there is less of falsehood compatible with vaunting than with boasting. It is possible to boast of having done what one never did. We VAUNT (Fr. *vanter*, Lat. *vānĭtare*) that which is true in itself, but on which we place an exaggerated value. To vaunt a thing is to put forth that as solid and substantial which is really *emptiness* (Lat. *vānĭtas*).

BRAG (prob. from the same root as *break*, as to *crack* is to *boast*) is to boast especially of personal achievements, or at least of what is personal. A man may boast of his ancestors, he brags of his performances.

"Made not here his *brag*
Of 'came' and 'saw' and overcame."
SHAKESPEARE.

"The right honourable gentleman has chosen to come forward with an uncalled-for declaration; he *boastingly* tells you that he has seen, read, digested, compared everything; and that if he has sinned, he has sinned with his eyes broad open."—BURKE.

"All others may *vaunt* merely that they have vanquished men, but Sergius may *boast* that he hath conquered and overcome even Fortune herself."—HOLLAND, *Pliny*.

To GLORY (O. Fr. *glorie*, Lat. *glōria*, *glory*) in a thing commonly denotes an antagonistic view of the admirable in oneself, as if one were determined to vaunt it, whatever estimate others might set upon it, by reason of the high value we set upon it ourselves. It is used of anything which bears characteristically a relation to ourselves, as possessions, reputation, acts.

"Whose *glory* is their shame."—*English Bible*.

BOATMAN. WATERMAN.

A BOATMAN is a general term for one whose trade is connected with the navigation of boats. A WATERMAN plies his boat for hire, and is paid for his labour in so doing.

"As late the *boatman* hies him home."
PERCIVAL.

"They ordered the *watermen* to let fall their oars more gently."—DRYDEN.

BODY. CORPSE. CARCASE.

BODY (A.S. *bodig*), as taken in the sense of dead body, and CORPSE (Lat. *corpus*, a body) are applied to human beings; CARCASE (Fr. *carcasse*) only to brutes, except in disparagement. BODY is used of the organization before as well as after death, and is applicable to brutes as well as men, CORPSE only to men. Wedgewood identifies the Saxon *bodig* with the German *bottish*, a cask, of which the root is *bot*, a lump, protuberance, the thick part of anything; so that the primary sense of body is the thick part of the living frame, as distinguished from the limbs or lesser divisions; then the whole material frame, as distinguished from the sentient principle by which it is animated. Other forms of the word *carcase* appear in different languages, with the common meaning of a husk, shell, or case.

"The resurrection of the *body*."—*Apostles' Creed*.

Corpse was further written *corps* and *corse*. So Dryden has in the plural—

"The hall was heaped with *corps*."

"For where the *carcase* is, there will the eagles be gathered together."—*Bible*.

BOISTEROUS. TURBULENT. TUMULTUOUS.

These terms are applied to human behaviour, with certain differences. The behaviour of an individual may be BOISTEROUS (O. E. *boistous*; Welsh, *bwyst*, *wildness*), or the term may be employed of a number of persons. As such, it denotes violence and rudeness of noise in words and movements. It refers to the external manner, and not to the mind, and may proceed from mental conditions of opposite kinds, as one may be boisterous from indignation, or boisterous in merriment. The boisterous is the result of conflicting, contrariant, and irregular forces, exerted without uniformity or self-control. In boisterous weather

the elements show signs of variable commotion.

"On the contrary, he took the fact for granted, and so joined in with the cry, and hallooed it as *boisterously* as the rest."—STERNE.

TURBULENT (Lat. *turbŭlentus, turba, tumult, crowd*) denotes a disposition not only to disorder, but to insubordination.

"As this innocent way of passing a leisure hour is not only consistent with a great character, but very graceful in it, so there are two sorts of people to whom I would most earnestly recommend it. The first are those who are uneasy out of want of thought, the second are those who are so out of a *turbulence* of spirit."—TATLER.

TUMULTUOUS (Lat. *tŭmultŭōsus*) means inclined to make a noise in turbulence or in merriment; but the effect is direct, while that of boisterous is unintended. A boisterous meeting is led into being noisy; a tumultuous meeting is noisy on purpose, and, when difficult to regulate, is turbulent. It is the combination of voices with other sounds in confusion and disorder that constitutes tumult. TURBULENT denotes the resistance of the will or passions; TUMULTUOUS that they are confused and conflicting. A solitary person may be turbulent; a crowd is tumultuous.

"The workmen accordingly very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those *tumultuous* combinations, which generally end in nothing but the punishment and ruin of the ringleaders."—ADAM SMITH.

BOLD. FEARLESS. BRAVE. COURAGEOUS. INTREPID. UNDAUNTED. VALIANT. GALLANT. HEROIC. DARING.

BOLD (A. S. *bald, beald*) refers rather to the readiness to meet danger, than to the conduct under its immediate circumstances. So a man's conduct in the lists may be not in unison with the boldness with which he entered them. FEARLESS denotes a negative state of mind—the absence of fear. This may be either from courage in the presence of danger, or from boldness in being ready to encounter it, or from a belief that no ground exists for apprehension. Boldness expresses a *quality*, fearlessness a *mode* of conduct under specific circumstances.

"Ask an Englishman, however, whether he is afraid of death; and he *boldly* answers in the negative; but observe his behaviour in circumstances of approaching sickness, and you will find his actions give his assertions the lie."—GOLDSMITH.

"This *fearlessness* of temper depends upon natural constitution as much as any quality we can possess; for where the animal system is strong and robust it is easily acquired, but when the nerves are weak and extremely sensible, they fall presently into tremors that throw the mind off the hinges, and cast a confusion over her."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature.*

BRAVE (Fr. *brave*) applies to such dangers as come from living or active opponents, whose power is to be dreaded, implying a sustained energy of soul. The man who plunges into the sea off a high rock is bold, but not brave. Yet when he finds himself swimming in a rough sea he may strike out bravely for the shore. The man who takes a noxious animal in his hand is fearless. The true knight, the good soldier, the spirited lion-hunter, are brave—Pope would add, he who meets death as he ought—

"Who combats *bravely* is not therefore *brave*,
He dreads a death-bed like the meanest slave."

To the COURAGEOUS man (Fr. *courage*) belongs that active fortitude which is shown against every sort of danger. COURAGE expresses a calmer and more persistent quality than bravery. Bravery shows itself in action, courage also in the passive endurance of the nearness of danger without fear. Bravery too is against physical peril, but we recognize a moral courage which encounters such trials as threaten no physical hurt. Courage is more in principle, bravery in temperament. When courage is sustained, and has borne the test of repeated trials, or when it stands the test of extreme danger, in its most appalling forms, as in the case of the Roman who stood unmoved when he was suddenly shown the form of an elephant for the first time, it may be termed INTREPIDITY (Lat. *intrĕpĭdus, undaunted*). As the courage which

is constant is intrepidity, so that which is spirited and adventurous is GALLANTRY (Fr. *galant, worthy, gallant*).

"*Courage*," says Hobbes, "in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a strict and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man on his way to his end."

"That quality (valour), which signifies no more than an *intrepid* courage, may be separated from many others which are good, and accompanied with many which are ill."—DRYDEN.

"As a friend to the House of Brunswick, I cannot but rejoice in the personal safety, and in the personal *gallantry* too, of so distinguished a branch of it (the Duke of York)."—*Anecdotes of* BISHOP WATSON.

VALIANT (Fr. *vaillant*) is mostly restricted to the courage of a soldier in war or combat, and is not so well applicable to persons collectively, now that soldiers act commonly under strict orders, except on extraordinary occasions, when they may act singly. The terms BRAVE and GALLANT have almost supplanted the term VALIANT, which rather reminds us of the knights of old. Yet we should still speak of him as valiant who performed some striking deed of bravery, or met any kind of danger in a spirited way. Valour is active courage. It strikes and strives against repeated perils, and bears great shocks without yielding, and struggles on against heavy odds. Courage is impatient to attack. Valour refuses to yield or fly. Bravery exposes life and courts danger, and prefers death to dishonour. As valour refuses to retreat, so intrepidity refuses to be alarmed.

"Who would not fight *valiantly* when he fights in the eye of his prince?"—BISHOP HALL.

UNDAUNTED (*un-*, not, and the Fr. *dompter*; Lat. *dŏmitare, to tame, or subdue*) is both applicable to persons directly, as expressive of a quality, and is used of acts, or as an epithet of courage and bravery. Undaunted courage is that which sustains itself in spite of many successive terrors and perils, and so is equivalent to intrepidity.

"He proceeded on in the performance of all his duty, and prosecution of his great designs, with *undaunted* courage, with unwearied industry, with undisturbed tranquillity and satisfaction of mind."—BARROW.

The DARING *court* that which the bold are ready to *meet*.

"Courage may be virtue where the *daring* is extreme, if the cause be good."—HOBBES.

HEROIC (Lat. *hērōĭcus*) in conformity with its derivation, leads the mind to the days of the *heroes*, or the *heroic* age, and so is tinged with the notion of personal power or prowess, as well as courage. Magnanimity, too, finds its way in, and the heroic character is one who does deeds of valour, not only for himself, or as a soldier in service, but as a representative man, the champion of another or of a race. It is not only in reference to his boldness or bravery as an individual that we speak of Cocles or of Wallace as a hero.

"No time for lamentation now;
Nor much more cause. Samson hath quit himself
Like Samson, and *heroicly* hath finished
A life *heroic*, on his enemies
Fully revenged." MILTON.

BOLDNESS. ASSURANCE. AUDACITY. HARDIHOOD. EFFRONTERY. IMPUDENCE. SHAMELESSNESS.

In addition to the force of BOLD as a synonym of *courageous*, BOLD and BOLDNESS have a less pronounced meaning, as referring to manner and character under ordinary circumstances. In this way, BOLDNESS is used to denote the absence of shyness and the absence of timidity. According as the term expresses one or the other of these in a becoming or unbecoming degree, boldness is, or is not, a commendable quality. Such boldness as seems to disregard what others regard is not good. Hence, a bold manner in women and young persons is unbecoming. On the other hand, it is a good thing to speak the truth with boldness, as if not to be frightened out of it; or to show boldness in the presence of superiors, if it be with modesty; or in the presence of the proud, as not to be daunted out of one's self-respect.

"In every state of life we may, with an humble *boldness*, address ourselves to Him as to our Father which is in heaven."—BEVERIDGE.

ASSURANCE (Fr. *sûr*, Lat. *sĕcūrus*, *sure*) is that kind of boldness which betokens confidence in one's self, one's powers, or one's cause. When rightly exercised, and in right degree, it is self-possession.

"On informing him of our difficulties, and asking whether we might venture across the plain, he bid us, like Cæsar, with an air of *assurance*, follow him and fear nothing."—GILPIN'S *Tour*.

When otherwise, it is IMPUDENCE, or SHAMELESSNESS. These last are, in fact, correspondent words in different forms (Lat. *impŭdentia*, *in-*, *not*, and *pŭdens*, *modest*), being the same as the Saxon word shamelessness. But IMPUDENCE is commonly used to denote a jaunty disrespect, which, however far removed from a virtue, is yet compatible with innocence. SHAMELESSNESS, on the other hand, commonly denotes an absence of shame where a feeling of shame is due. A high-spirited boy may be occasionally impudent; a profligate woman is often shameless. AUDACITY (Lat. *audācem*, *bold*) and HARDIHOOD which means much the same (*hardy* being Fr. *hardi*, *bold*, a word of Germ. origin), denote, the one the excessive tendency to venture, the other the undue capacity to endure. It is a proof of audacity to venture to an entertainment uninvited, and of hardihood to endure with apparent unconsciousness the astonished looks of the host and hostess. EFFRONTERY (O.Fr. *effronterie*, *ex.forth*, *frontem*, *the forehead*) is very like impudence, but it is a step beyond it. It is the exhibition of self under circumstances peculiarly calling for the contrary, as, for instance, the asking a favour of a person whom you have maligned or injured, or behaving to a superior with the manner of an equal. In effrontery there is implied some degree of insult, which, however, arises not merely from the demeanour, but from the circumstances of the case and the relation of the parties. Audacity is defiant, hardihood is dogged, effrontery is cool.

"*Audacity* and confidence doth in civil business so great effects, as a man may reasonably doubt that besides the very daring and earnestness, and persisting and importunity, there should be some secret binding and stooping of other men's spirits to such persons."—BACON.

"Nor should it be forgotten that he was the first who, in this dialogue, had the *hardihood* to displace Jonson from the eminence to which, by the unanimous voice of Dryden's contemporaries, he had most unjustly been elevated, and to set Shakespeare far above him."—MALONE, *Life of Dryden*.

"Can any one reflect for a moment on all those claims of debt, which the minister exhausts himself in contrivances to augment with new usuries, without lifting up his hands and eyes with astonishment at the *impudence* both of the claim and of the adjudication?"—BURKE.

"And, how much that love might move us, so much and more that faultiness of her mind removed us; her beauty being balanced by her *shamelessness*."—SIDNEY'S *Arcadia*.

"Vice is never so *shameless* as when it pretends to public spirit. Yet this *effrontery* is so common that it scandalizes nobody."—BISHOP HURD.

BOOTH. TENT. MARQUEE.

BOOTH (Icelandic *búd*, *a booth*, *shop*) is now employed to represent almost any kind of shed of light materials for temporary occupation. The booths of fairs are open in front and closed at the back and sides either with canvas or with canvas and boarding combined. The TENT (Fr. *tente*, Lat. *tenta*, *stretched* i.e. *cloth*, part. of *tendĕre*, *to stretch*) is formed of canvas or other material, as skin or woven hair, and stretched over poles fastened in the ground so as to afford an entire enclosure and covering, with an entrance arranged by the disposition of the material. The MARQUEE (Fr. *marquise*) is now used of the larger, more ornamental tent of pleasure grounds, not used as a place of dwelling, but of exhibition or refreshment.

BORDER. BOUNDARY. BOUND. FRONTIER. CONFINE. PRECINCT. LIMIT. PURLIEU.

BORDER (Fr. *bordure*) is the outer edge of land which runs along that part of a territory which lies adjacent to another. It is applied to tracts of size and importance, as the "Border

wars" of England and Scotland. Rhetorically, "Borders," in the plural, is used for the land itself.

"It is most advisable, when we are on the *borders* of death, to provide for that state which lieth just beyond it."—BARROW.

BOUNDARY (O. Fr. *bonne, boundary*) is the object on any one side which indicates the BOUND or extreme extent in circuit. We speak of the bounds of smaller districts, as of parishes or estates; but we use the verb *bound* instead of *border* in speaking of large tracts of country and their geographical position, as we say, France is bounded, not bordered, on the east. Bound has a more restrictive force than boundary, which is more purely topographical, while bound is frequently employed to express the moral limits of things, as we say, "to exceed the bounds of moderation."

"As in geometry, of all lines or surfaces contained within the same *bounds* the straight lines and the plane surface are the shortest, so it is also in morality, by the right line of justice, from the plain ground of virtue, a man soonest will arrive to any well-chosen end."—BARROW.

"The world was ne'er designed for thee;
You're like a passenger below,
That stays perhaps a night or so;
But still his native country lies
Beyond the *bound'ries* of the skies."
COTTON.

The FRONTIER (Fr. *frontière*) is a bound or boundary line of one side only, which is regarded as a front opposed to another front. It must be observed, however, that, while a boundary may be an imaginary or geographical line, a frontier is a slip of actual country, as in the phrase "towns on the frontier." It is a term of military significance. It may be remarked that, in speaking of entering a country at a given point, the term is often incorrectly used in the plural: "we crossed the frontiers," instead of the frontier.

"*Frontier* experience."—W. IRVING.

CONFINES (Lat. *confinium, a confine, a common boundary*) is a word most commonly used of a point upon a line separating two territories, as, "the two kings met upon the confines of the two kingdoms." Confines are *confining* or comprising lines,

"The miraculous birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord Jesus Christ were all events which came to pass within the *confines* of Judæa."—LOCKE.

PRECINCT (*præcingĕre*, part. *præcinctus, to encircle*) is used even more loosely than CONFINES; for, as CONFINES is sometimes used to denote any enclosed space, so PRECINCTS has well-nigh lost the force of exact circumscription, and denotes little more than vicinity, the mind not resting upon any precise boundary, nor perhaps knowing it. "He lived within the precincts of the cathedral," that is, near it, on ground belonging to it, and in some way known as such.

"The common vice of these castle-builders is to draw everything within its *precincts* which they fancy may contribute to its defence or embellishment."—WARBURTON.

The vagueness of precincts becomes yet more vague in PURLIEUS, originally the outer parts of forest land, which, being separated from it by perambulation (*pour allée*, O. Fr. *pur alée*: WEDGEWOOD) were made free from forest laws; hence, the outer parts and undefined environs of any place of importance, but more especially of cities or towns.

"If deer come out of the forest into the *purlieu*, the purlieu man may hunt and kill him, provided he does it fairly and without forestalling."—BLACKSTONE.

LIMIT (Lat. *limĭtem*) has a restrictive force. The limits are those which part off, so that you may not pass them without transcursion or transgression.

"Nature now, as fertile as of old, hath in her effects determinate *limits* of quantity."—DRAYTON.

Bounds, confines, and limits are words which lend themselves readily to moral or rhetorical uses, while boundary, frontier, precinct, and purlieu are purely territorial. Bounds belong to moral limitation, confines to rhetorical contiguity, limits to moral or ideal restriction. Limits *mark* but do not in themselves *enforce* enclosure or restriction. A conventional line as a parallel of longitude may be a limit. A boundary expresses a line, a bound an obstacle,

BOUGH. BRANCH.

The BRANCH (Fr. *branche*) is a limb of a tree regarded simply in its ramifications. The BOUGH (A. S. *bōg*, *an arm*) is the branch invested with leaves, blossoms, or fruit. The branches spread and sometimes vie in size with the parent tree; they grow in gradation from the lowest to the topmost, and furnish resting-places for birds which "sing among the branches." The bough is leafy, luxuriant, bending with the weight of the ripe fruit, broken off from the parent stem, and used for festive decoration or carried about in popular rejoicing. The bough comprises the leaves, the branch may be even contrasted with them. The fruitful bough, rich with the foliage of summer and the fruit of autumn, becomes in winter a leafless branch.

BOUNDLESS. UNBOUNDED. UNLIMITED. INFINITE.

The second and third stand in analogy to the first and last. The UNBOUNDED and the UNLIMITED are those things which have no bounds or limits *in fact;* the BOUNDLESS and the INFINITE (Lat. *infinitus*, *in-*, *not*, *and finis*, *an end*) are those which have none in nature, or possibility, or our conception, or vision. Nevertheless, that which is boundless in nature may be regarded as unbounded in fact, and the infinite in nature as unlimited in fact.

"Is there a temple of the Deity
Except earth, sea, and air, yon azure pole;
And chief his holiest shrine the virtuous soul?
Where'er the eye can pierce, the feet can move,
This wide, this *boundless* universe is Jove."
LYTTELTON, *Cato's Speech.*

"To thee, immortal maid, from this blessed hour,
O'er time and fame I give *unbounded* power.
Thou from oblivion shalt the hero save,
Shalt raise, revere, immortalize the brave."
CONGREVE.

"Some of them told us that the power of the king is *unlimited*, and that the life and property of the subject is at his disposal."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"*Infinite* knowledge is the foundation of all,
"*Infinite* goodness is the author and mover of all,
"*Infinite* wisdom is the contriver and director of all,
"And *infinite* power executes all."
SHARP.

BRACE. COUPLE.

To BRACE (O. Fr. *brace, the distance between extended arms;* Lat. *brāchia;* Fr. *bras, an arm,*) is to bind for the purpose of giving additional strength. To COUPLE (Lat. *cōpŭlare*) is to bind or tie in any way for the purpose of union.

"And ever at hand a drum is ready *braced.*" SHAKESPEARE.

"Some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so *coupled* in their minds that they always appear there together."—LOCKE.

BRACE. COUPLE. PAIR.

A PAIR (Lat. *păres*, pl. *equal*) must have some similarity of nature, which is the cause of its being so naturally, or the occasion of its being made so. A COUPLE requires the same, but is more promiscuous; *any two* of such things constituting a couple, if they are brought into union; while pair often denotes two which are such that the one is the complement of the other: a couple of eggs, but a pair of gloves. BRACE (*see* verb) is used of those things in which it is requisite to their completeness that they should be two in number. It is never applied seriously to persons. It is a technical term among sportsmen.

"The king, who was then at Newmarket, heard of it, and was pleased merrily and graciously to say he could not be there himself, but would send them a *brace* of bucks."—*Spectator.*

"Scarce any *couple* come together but their nuptials are declared in the newspaper with encomiums on each party."—JOHNSON.

The term *pair* was in Old English not restricted to two things, but was applicable to many of equal or like sort; the term pair being of the same meaning as the word *peer;* but applicable to things as well as persons. So a "paire of cards" for a pack.

"There Baucis and Philemon liv'd, and there
Had liv'd long married, and a happy *pair*."
DRYDEN, *Ovid*.

BRANDISH. FLOURISH. WIELD.

BRANDISH (connected with O. Fr. *brand, a sword*) retains its etymological character. It is to flourish like a weapon. When Locke speaks of "brandishing syllogisms, the idea of argumentative weapons is still retained. It is an action of hostility, defiance, or rage.

FLOURISH (Fr. *fleurir, to flourish*) is to make bold, sweeping, and fantastical movements with the hand or something contained in it. It is an action of parade, triumph, bravado, skill. Calligraphers delight in flourishes of the pen, and some orators and rhetoricians in flourishes of metaphor.

WIELD (A. S. *wealdan, to sway*) is indicative of greater weight in the object, and greater power in the person. The knight brandishes his sword, the magician waves or flourishes his wand, the giant wields his club.

BREACH. BREAK. GAP. CHASM.

BREACH and BREAK are connected. BREAK is used for any cessation of continuity, BREACH only when it is a disruption caused by violence. In deciphering imperfect manuscripts we frequently come upon breaks. The artillery may make a breach in the fortifications; or, figuratively, an untoward circumstance producing misunderstanding may make a breach in an old friendship. A break may be slight both in appearance and consequences, a breach is always considerable and serious. A break may be in a thin line, a breach is in a solid mass. A thing may be broken without perfect discontinuity of parts, a breach involves a gaping separation of them.

"For he that openeth the waters but a little, knoweth not how great a *breach* they will make at length."—SPELMAN.

"Considering probably how much Homer had been disfigured by the arbitrary compilers of his works, Virgil by his will obliged Tucca and Varrus to add nothing, nor so much as fill up the *breaks* he had left in his poem."—WALSH.

GAP (connected with *gape*) is the effect of discontinuity regarded simply in itself, and without reference to its nature or its cause, which may have been violence or not. I see a gap in a hedge. The gardener neglected to plant young slips in that part. I see another. It has been caused by the inroads of cattle.

"Then follows an immense *gap*, in which undoubtedly some changes were made by time; and we hear little more of them (the Germans) until we find them Christians, and makers of written laws."—BURKE.

A CHASM (Gr. χάσμα) is a *yawning* void not easily filled, and leaving a sense of this. A chasm in our enjoyments is a large deduction which leaves a sense of hopeless privation.

"The whole *chasm* in nature from a plant to a man is filled up with diverse kinds of creatures."—ADDISON.

BREAK. REND. TEAR. BURST. CRACK. SPLIT. LACERATE.

These words all express a greater or less disruption of continuity; the difference depends upon the force employed, and the substance it is employed upon.

TO BREAK (A. S. *brecan*) implies the entire separation of parts formerly continuous; the degree of force may be great or very slight, as in the cases of a thick stick or a piece of glass.

"He *break* my darts or hurt my power!"
PRIOR.

The particles need to be hard and brittle. When they are soft, tough, and lentous, they can only be RENT (A. S. *hrendan, to rend*), as the beast of prey rends the flesh of his victim. From the nature of the case, that force which in breaking is momentary, in rending is continuous.

"Lest they turn again and *rend* you."—*Bible*.

When the particles are lentous and pliant without being tough, no such force is needed, and the substance is TORN (A.S. *téran, to tear, rend*), as a piece of paper is torn. TEAR has a peculiar sense of its own, in which it signifies merely violently to separate.

"They are always careful to join the small pieces lengthwise, which makes it impossible to *tear* the cloth in any direction but one."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

TO BURST (A. S. *berstan*) is to break suddenly, violently, and with

more or less of explosion, as the result of a force operating outwards; as when the steam bursts the cauldron, or the giant bursts his bonds. Bursting is the final point of excessive tension, the force proceeding from an internal point.

"Atoms and systems into ruin hurl'd,
And now a bubble *bursts* and now a world."
POPE.

To CRACK (onomat. word, of which there are many forms), and to SPLIT (cf. Du. *splitten*) denote longitudinal or transverse forms of partial breakage, where a discontinuity is produced, not extending through the whole substance, or not so complete as to produce separation of parts. Anything more than this is *breaking open*; the difference between cracking and splitting being that the operation of splitting follows some natural or pre-existent cleavage of the material, and cracking does not. To crack a nut is not to break it sufficiently to take out the kernel; if the nut is broken into two or more pieces in the act, this is over and above the cracking.

"Well, let all pass and trust Him who nor *cracks*
The bruised reed nor quencheth smoking flax."
DONNE.

"With sounding axes to the grove they go,
Fell, *split*, and lay the fuel in a row."
DRYDEN.

LACERATE (Lat. *lăcĕrare*) is to tear irregularly, so as to leave a jagged outline. It is now seldom used but of fleshy substances, though of old it had a wider application, and even such substances as air and water were said to be lacerated.

"If there be no fear of *laceration*, pull it out the same way it went in."—WISEMAN, *Surgery*.

BREED. ENGENDER. PROCREATE. PROPAGATE.

BREED (A. S. *brédan*, *to nourish* or *cherish*) is employed in a general way of anything which tends to bring animals into life, and so is employed not only directly of procreation by parents, but of any influence which tends to develop animal life, and even of the keeping of animals for the purpose of their progeny. To ENGENDER (Fr. *engendrer*, Lat. *ingĕnĕrāre*) is to beget; to PROCREATE (Lat. *prōcreāre*) is to produce offspring after the manner of *either* parent. The term is not a familiar one. To PROPAGATE (Lat. *prŏpăgāre*, *prŏpago*, *a layer*) is used of plants as well as of animals, and means to treat for the purpose of extending or multiplying the kind. BREED and ENGENDER are often applied metaphorically, the latter almost exclusively so, in the sense of producing; as, to breed ill-feeling, to engender strife, and the like; where the result is seldom or never favourable or desirable. Propagate is, in like manner, employed in the sense of giving currency, as to propagate doctrines, a belief, a rumour, and the like. In their secondary applications we use the term BREED to express the gradual development of effects by causes, and ENGENDER to express the simple relation of the one to the other, without reference to immediate or deferred production. In this sense the terms are purely moral, not physical or mechanical.

"In brief, must it not follow necessarily, that the earth, which is the mother and *breeder* of men, of living creatures and of all plants, shall perish and be wholly extinct?"—HOLLAND, *Plutarch*.

"True it is that we have seen better days,
And have with holy bell been knoll'd to church,
And sat at good men's feasts, and wip'd our eyes
Of drops that sacred pity had *engendered*."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Poor and low-pitched desires, if they do but mix with those other heavenly intentions that draw a man to this study, it is justly expected that they should bring forth a base-born issue of divinity; like that of those imperfect and putrid creatures that receive a crawling life from two most unlike *procreants*, the sun and mud."—MILTON.

"He (Pythagoras) was the chief *propagator* of that doctrine amongst the Greeks concerning three hypostases in the Deity."—CUDWORTH.

BRIGHT. CLEAR. LUCID. LUMINOUS. VIVID. SPLENDID. BRILLIANT. LUSTROUS.

Of these, BRIGHT (A. S. *beorht*) is used in the greatest variety of meanings, signifying shedding light, transmitting light, reflecting light; and so, metaphorically, expresses many ideas analogous to the several properties or effects of light, as vivid, lucid, clever,

happy, and so on. But, as is usual, the most widely generic synonym is the least forcible. So brightness may exist in a low degree. Almost any object which is not dull is more or less bright.

"However, this was only a transient cloud; they were hid but a moment, and their constellation blazed out with greater *brightness* and a far more vigorous influence, some time after it was blown over."—BURKE.

CLEAR (Lat. *clārus*) denotes *unobstructed brightness*, as when the stars shine clearly, that is, without clouds or haze. A clear style of speaking is one in which the meaning is not obscured by anything which may have that tendency. Clear water is that through which the rays of light pass freely and unobstructedly. This appears in the use of the term in the sense of *without obstruction*, as to stand clear of anything, that is, to keep away from it.

"Then shalt thou see *clearly* to take out the mote that is in thy brother's eye."—*Bible.*

LUCID (Lat. *lūcĭdus, lūcem, light*) is not used in a physical sense, except in poetry or poetical expressions; but of speech and exposition, which are said to be lucid, that is, clear, distinct, intelligible; and in the phrase, *lucid interval*, that is, serene and undisturbed by insanity.

"Full to the margin flowed the *lucid* wave."—FAWKES' *Theocritus.*

LUMINOUS (Lat. *lūmĭnōsus*) is employed of those bodies which emit light, as distinguished from those which merely transmit or reflect it. As used of style, luminous is an advance upon lucid. A lucid speech is one of clearness in diction; a luminous speech is one which is, as it were, lighted up by graces and illustrations calculated to give it especial clearness and effect besides.

"Notwithstanding the numerous objections which have been made to the validity of his reasonings, none of his critics has refused him the praise of the most *luminous* perspicuity."—STEWART.

VIVID (Lat. *vīvĭdus, living, animated*) is shining with a special, and, as it were, living brightness, and indicates the profound harmony which subsists between life and light, no less than between darkness and death. Metaphorically, a vivid imagination is one which invests readily with reality and life. As illustrating the force of vivid, we may observe that unpolished metals, as not reflecting light, are said to be "dead." VIVID is a term of relation or degree. It denotes energetic conspicuousness in objects which, under other circumstances, are less distinctly visible or bright. A vivid light is contrasted with an obscure glimmer.

"A variety of ideas afford us no notion of succession, unless we perceive one come before the other; nor can it be imagined that their degrees of *vividness* or faintness will do the job."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature.*

SPLENDID (Lat. *splendĭdus*) denotes the combination of grandeur with brightness, as a splendid sun or sunset, a splendid ceremony, a splendid orator.

"We see through all this *splendid* obscurity that something grand is approaching. The several shades of darkness by degrees give way. Day comes on more and more, till at length the sun rises in all its glory, and opening into its fullest *splendour*, surrounds the earth from one end of it to the other."—GILPIN.

BRILLIANT (Fr. *briller, to shine*) is shining with a sparkling brightness. In brilliancy there is not only great inherent or reflected light, but the light shines with a changeful and varied play. So, metaphorically, brilliant wit.

"There is an appearance of *brilliancy* in the pleasures of high life which naturally dazzles the young."—CRAIG.

LUSTROUS (Lat. *lustrāre, to light up*) is a forcible word conveying the notion of mingled light and brightness. The term is not the less forcible for being somewhat antiquated, and might well be revived.

"For the more *lustrous* the imagination is, it filleth and fixeth the better."—BACON.

BRIM. BORDER. EDGE. MARGIN. BRINK. VERGE. RIM.

BRIM (A. S. *brim*) is the uppermost edge of any vessel or hollow space, containing, or fitted to contain, fluid, as the brim of a cup, or a river, and so differs from BRINK (Dan. *brink, edge*), which may, or may not imply a space filled with fluid, as we speak of the brink of the goblet and the brink of

the grave or a precipice. A brink is, for this reason, not necessarily of a circular form, or approaching to it, which is ordinarily the case with brim; for where we speak of the *brim* of a river, it is rather of its *brink*, regarded analogously to the brim of a vessel, and so relatively to its capacity of holding water. It would seem that we use the word BRINK of hollow vessels in relation to their *structure*, brim to their *use*. The brink of the tankard is decorated with flowers. The goblet is filled to the brim.

"How often has public calamity been arrested on the very *brink* of ruin by the energy of a single man!"—BURKE.

So characteristic is the use of BRIM, as associated with the idea of fulness, that Dryden employs the verb to brim, meaning to fill:—

"This said, a double wreath Evander twin'd,
And poplars black and white his temples bind,
Then *brims* his ample bowl."

BORDER (Fr. *bordure*), where the word is used to mean more than simply edge, is a finished and extended edge, so constituting a strip or stripe. It is, however, extended inwards, and may be *occupied*, so differing from MARGIN (Lat. *margĭnem*) which is an edge extended outwards and unoccupied. The work commonly finishes *with* the border and *before* the margin. The EDGE (A. S. *ecg*) is the sharp termination of any substance superficially, as the edge of a sword. The RIM (A. S. *rima*, *edge*) is an unextended brim, as the brim is an extended rim. So we speak of the rim of a cup, or the brim, when we regard it as extended by the thickness of the material of which it is composed; of the brim of a hat, as being more than an edge or rim; and of the brim, not rim, of a river, as being extended into the fields adjacent. But RIM is a term more variously applicable than BRIM. It belongs not only to the edge or lip of hollow vessels, but to *any* edging which is of a substantial character. The uppermost moulding in a piece of architecture might be so coloured or gilt as to constitute an ornamental rim. The brim of a tankard, the rim of a dish

VERGE (Lat. *vergĕre*) is the extreme border of anything, regarded in the light of a *termination* to an extended surface, and a line of arrival to one who has traversed it. The idea of BORDER in English varies, as it represents the sense of the French *bord* or *bordure*; in the former it is an edge or confine, in the latter it is an *edging*, an expanded or artificial edge, as the borders of an ornamental garden, or a piece of tapestry.

"They make broad their phylacteries, and enlarge the *borders* of their garments."—*Bible*.

"I should have thought it superfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crowded my *margin* with reference to every author whose sentiments I have made use of."—PALEY.

"Who escaped the *edge* of the sword."—*Bible*.

"Struck through the belly's *rim*, the warrior lies
Supine, and shades eternal veil his eyes."
POPE.

"The *verge* of the king in this respect extends for twelve miles round the king's palace of residence."—BLACKSTONE.

VERGE and MARGIN are, in some sense, opposed. The verge is the boundary which limits movements; the margin is the space whither movement, action, or work does not extend. This appears especially in the secondary uses of the words. We speak of the verge of possibility, and of leaving a margin of discretion.

BRING. FETCH. CARRY. BEAR. CONVEY. TRANSPORT.

BRING is A. S. *bringan*, FETCH, the A. S. *fetian*, and CARRY is the O. Fr. *carrier*, and connected with a large tribe of words, as *car*, *chariot*, *cargo*, *charge*, etc.

The idea common to these three words is transportation from one place to another. They differ in some points of mode and direction of such transportation. First, as to the mode; BRING is used in more than a physical sense. I bring a basket, and I bring good or bad news. Again, FETCH does not necessitate literal transportation. I fetch a loaf from the baker's, but I also fetch a boy who will run an errand for my friend. Nor, again, would CARRY, which, like

bring, is applicable to what is not material, as to carry tidings, be employed physically of any small and very *light* object. I carry a heavy bag, and even an umbrella, but I should not carry a pin to some one who wanted it upstairs, but simply take it. Secondly, as to direction. BRING denotes motion towards, CARRY motion from, and FETCH motion, first from and then towards, while CONVEY (O. Fr. *conveier*) and TRANSPORT (Lat. *transportare*), refer to *any* two points. To BEAR (A. S. *béran*) is simply to have the weight of something upon oneself, whether voluntarily or involuntarily placed. It does not necessarily imply motion, which is always implied in carry. So, Atlas bore, but did not carry, the world on his shoulders. CONVEY and TRANSPORT both imply, more or less distinctly, some route or destination for the carriage, and differ, in that CONVEY applies to lighter objects, even to things not substantial, as to convey a message; while TRANSPORT denotes matters of some substantial weight, as artillery, merchandise, and the like. The notion of an intermediate space between two points is expressed in the word TRANSPORT, the notion of a point of destination in CONVEY.

"What appeared to me wonderful was that none of the ants came home without *bringing* something."—ADDISON.

"Those early wise men who *fetched* their philosophy from Egypt."—WARBURTON.

"No one neglective was
Of Hector's safety; all their shields they couched about him close,
Rais'd him from earth, and giving him in their kind arms repose
From off the labour, *carried* him to his rich chariot,
And bore him mourning towards Troy."
CHAPMAN'S *Homer*.

"His lines are a description of the sun in eclipse, which I know nothing more like than a brave man in sorrow; who *bears* it as he should do, without imploring the pity of his friends, or being dejected with the contempt of his enemies."—TATLER.

"Had it been so, we should naturally have betaken ourselves to prayer, and breathed out our desires in that form wherein they are most properly *conveyed*."—BISHOP ATTERBURY.

"Their canoe, which was a small double one, just large enough to *transport* the whole family from place to place, lay in a small creek near the huts."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

BRITTLE. FRAGILE. FRAIL.

BRITTLE (A. S. *breotan, to break*) is easily broken from the nature of the texture, as glass. FRAGILE, though etymologically correspondent (Lat. *frāgĭlis, easily broken*, from *frangĕre, to break*) is more widely employed of things which are susceptible of injury or destruction, though this be brought about in other ways than literal breakage. Anything which is little calculated to bear the lapse of time, or the rough touch, is fragile. So the body of man may well be called fragile, though not brittle. FRAIL, which is only another form of *fragile*, is nevertheless differently applied. It is employed of the susceptibility to deterioration of beauty or moral purity. The flower, fresh and beautiful, is yet frail; and man's virtue at the best is beset with frailties. FRAIL is especially employed of that which lacks the power of resistance and is weak as a support. The fragile thing easily breaks, the frail thing easily gives way.

"For no man takes or keeps a vow
But just as he sees others do.
Nor are they obliged to be so *brittle*
As not to yield and bow a little."
HUDIBRAS.

"Of bodies some are *fragile*, and some are tough and not *fragile*, and in the breaking some *fragile* bodies break out where the force is, some shatter and fly in many pieces. Of *fragility* the cause is an impotency to be extended, and therefore stone is more *fragile* than metal."—BACON.

"How much more is it necessary that God, who has the tenderest concern for all His creatures, and who is infinitely far from being subject to such passions and variableness as *frail* men are, should desire to be imitated by His creatures in those perfections which are the foundation of His own unchangeable happiness!"—CLARKE.

BROAD. WIDE. LARGE. THICK.

BROAD (A. S. *brád*), though used often of extension laterally, in which case it is identical with WIDE, is also used of that which is extensive every way, as the "broad daylight," "broad acres," or, metaphorically, a broad and liberal view, a broad conversation, meaning such as assumes too much license.

"Whenever she (the mole) comes up into

broad day, she might be in danger of being taken, unless she were thus affected by a light striking upon her eye, and immediately warning her to bury herself in her proper element."—*Spectator.*

WIDE (A. S. *wid*) denotes either lateral space, or extension generally; a wide road is an illustration of the latter, a wide doorway of the former. But a wide doorway is not only one in which the doorposts or sides stand far apart, but one of which the void is considerable. That which is extended in surface or substance is best expressed by BROAD, that which exhibits extensive vacuity by WIDE. A cave may have a narrow or wide (not broad) mouth or entrance. Metaphorically, it means beside the right line or aim, as "wide of the mark."

"We passed Selinus and the palmy land,
And *widely* shun the Libyan strand,
Unsafe for secret rocks and moving sand."
DRYDEN'S *Virgil.*

LARGE (Fr. *large*) is broad with a stricter reference to limits, capacity, and proportion, and is therefore less vague a word than broad. BROAD and WIDE describe merely superficial extent or capacity, LARGE includes *also* that of solidity and capacity; as, a large man, a large room. That which is of considerable bulk or capacity, either absolutely or relatively, may be called large.

"Under the shelter of a cavern'd rock,
The *largest* and the best, the pirate band
Seized and prepared a banquet on the strand."
WILKIE.

THICKNESS (A. S. *thic*) expresses solidity irrespective of the ideas of length and breadth. A short man or a tall, a small cheese, or a large, a narrow plank, or a broad, may be all of them *thick*. The atmosphere in foggy weather is thick, that is, dense, without any regard to measurement. Nevertheless, thickness often means that character in a solid body which involves a line comparatively long to unite opposite planes or surfaces.

"Nor can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and *thickness*, as to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought."—CUDWORTH.

BROOK. STREAM.

The term BROOK (A.S. *bróc*), as applied to an inconsiderable body of running water, expresses its shallow, irregular, and bubbling character. STREAM (A. S. *streám*) the continuity and steadiness of its flow, which is compatible, as BROOK is not, with considerable depth. Accordingly different associations connect themselves with the two terms. The brook is lively, fresh, babbling, running through deep foliage, or over shining pebbles. It murmurs cool through the summer day, and children toy with its water, or play upon its banks. The stream is steady, plentiful, supplying water for irrigation and mechanical application. It is of local importance, and, unlike the brook, can boast a name. It is known to the angler, and forms a natural boundary.

BRUISE. SQUEEZE. POUND. CRUSH.

To BRUISE (O. Fr. *bruiser, to break*) is to injure by collision, so as to destroy the *superficial* continuity or integrity of parts.

"This place was therefore called the Lovers' Leap; and whether or no the fright they had been in, or the resolution that could push them to so dreadful a remedy, or the *bruises* which they often received in their fall, banished all the tender sentiments of love, and gave their spirits another turn, those who had taken this leap were observed never to relapse into that passion."—*Spectator.*

To POUND (A. S. *punian*) is to bruise repeatedly till separation of the parts takes place; which, when carried to the extreme, is pulverization or trituration.

"Thou art a sweet drug, and the more thou art *pounded* the more precious."—MIDDLETON.

To SQUEEZE (A.S. *cwysan, to squeeze, crush*) is to compress a body so that it is acted upon by two or more forces from without.

"Which similitude of them notwithstanding, they would not have to be *squeezed* or pressed hard."—CUDWORTH.

To CRUSH (O. Fr. *cruisir, to crash into pieces*) is to squeeze in a violent and abrupt manner, so that the integrity of the parts is destroyed. Injurious violence is not necessarily implied in squeeze; as in squeezing the hand of a friend.

"Scaliger (Exercit. 186) relates that in Gascony, his country, there are spiders of that virulency that if a man treads upon them to *crush* them, the poison will pass through the very soles of his shoes."—BOYLE.

BUD. SPROUT. SHOOT. GERMINATE.

To BUD (one of a large family of words, cf. *butt*, *button*, Fr. *bouter, to push; see* BRACKET, s.v. *bouter*) implies the previous existence of a developed plant or tree. It is to put forth the first young protuberance, which is composed of an aggregate of leaves or petals, with the rudiments of flowers.

"Let him (the teacher) with a discreet and gentle hand nip or prune the irregular *shoots*, let him guard and encourage the tender *buddings* of the understanding till they be raised to a blossom, and let him kindly cherish the younger fruits."—WATTS.

To SPROUT (A. S. *sprout*, part of *sprytan*) is to come forth in growth generally, and does not presuppose a developed plant, inasmuch as the term is applicable to the first bursting and growth of the seed. As BUD represents the ordinary pushing forth of the nascent leaves or flowers, so SPROUT is commonly used of their unexpected growth, as in parts where they were not looked for, or after certain apparently unfavourable circumstances, as when the plant having become sickly or apparently dead, sprouts forth afresh, or after the operation of pruning.

"Thus the heartiest gratitude, as I have shown in the proper place concerning the purest love, though bearing the fragrantest flowers, *sprouts* originally from the earthy principle of self-interest."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature*.

To SHOOT (A. S. *sceótan, to throw forth*) is to make marked and rapid progress in growth, and is applicable to the whole plant, or to any part of it which is above ground.

"In a third sort, the seed of the word takes deeper hold, and makes very strong and promising *shoots;* but thorns and bad weeds, the earlier possessors of the field, rise up and choke it."—SECKER.

To GERMINATE (Lat. *germĭnāre*) is applied to the commencement of the growth, the first sprouting of the young plant from the seed. The noun *germ* is used with greater latitude for that from which anything flows, the rudimental state of anything which may be conceived to have an organic or complex existence, as the germ of prosperity or civil liberty, the germ of a thought which is expanded into a literary production.

"And for the security of such species as are produced only by seed, it hath endued all seed with a lasting vitality, that so if by reason of excessive cold or drought, or any other accident, it happen not to *germinate* the first year, it will continue its fecundity, I do not say two or three, nor six or seven, but even twenty or thirty years."—RAY.

BUFFOON. WIT.

The WIT (A. S. *witan, to know*), as the name is at present employed, denotes not a person of talent and learning, as the "Wits of Queen Anne's time," but one who, in social conversation, shows a combination of ingenuity and humour. In the BUFFOON (Fr. *bouffon*, It. *buffare, to puff the cheeks in making grimaces*, LITTRÉ) there is little ingenuity, and may be no humour. He amuses by means which are external, antics, grimaces (as puffing out of his cheeks, according to his etymology), postures, and mimicry. He is an artificial fool; and while the wit is essentially a master of common sense, the buffoon produces his effects by violating it. Men laugh *with* the wit and *at* the buffoon.

"The first are those *buffoons* that have a talent of mimicking the speech and behaviour of other persons, and turning all their patrons, friends, and acquaintance into ridicule."—TATLER.

The wit, in the full sense of the term, is the possessor of wit; for remarks on which, *see* BURLESQUE.

BUILD. CONSTRUCT. ERECT. FABRICATE.

Of these to BUILD (cf. A. S. *bóld, a dwelling*) is the most comprehensive. It implies both CONSTRUCTION (Lat. *constructionem*), and ERECTION (Lat. *erectionem*, *ērĭgĕre, to raise vertically*). That which is built is necessarily both constructed and erected, but neither that which is constructed nor that which is erected is of necessity built. To build is to put together after the manner of a house; hence it implies careful collocation of parts, a raising

of the work upwards, and some degree at least of size. The violin is constructed, the organ is built. Construction may be no more than a careful putting together with skill and care, with a view to a permanent shape, and may be a horizontal work. To Erect is no more than to set up on end, as the most elaborate cathedral and the simplest flagstaff. To Fabricate (Lat. *fĭbricare*) more nearly resembles construct, but differs from it as follows. Construct implies an organization or intercollocation of parts, while Fabricate allows of their being uncollocated; as, to fabricate woollen stuffs. It also admits more largely the idea of invention or design. A man constructs a bridge if he only puts it together as a stonemason. Hence, the inventive element in the word having gained prominence, to fabricate is very often used for to forge, that is, to put together fictitiously, yet with a pretence of authenticity. The term Fabricate involves the idea of skill, art, manufacture, and labour; Construct that of order, assemblage, collocation, and disposition. Hence it is employed analogously of language and thought; as, to construct a phrase, an argument, or a system.

"Hence it is that the *building* of our Zion rises no faster because our tongues are divided. Happy were the Church of God if we all spake but one language. Whiles we differ we can *build* nothing but Babel. Difference of tongues caused their Babel to cease, it *builds* ours."—Bishop Hall.

"The necessity of doing something, and the fear of doing something, and the fear of undertaking much, sinks the historian to a genealogist, the philosopher to a journalist of the weather, and the mathematician to a *constructor* of dials."—*Rambler*.

"Now there is no building of pillars, no *erecting* of arches, no blazing of arms that doth more set forth a man's name than doth the increase of children."—Wilson's *Art of Rhetoric*.

"The very idea of the *fabrication* of a new government is enough to fill us with disgust and horror."—Burke.

BUILDER. Architect. Mason.

A Builder (*see* Build), as these terms are now employed, is a person who in some way causes the building of houses, whether by manual labour, or the investment or expenditure of capital. It is therefore possible that he may not be such by profession. Commonly the builder holds an intermediate rank between the Architect (Gr. ἀρχι-τέκτων, *master-builder*), who has to do only with the designs, and the Mason (Fr. *maçon*), who has to do only with the labour.

"The French *builders*, clearing away as mere rubbish whatever they found, and, like their ornamental gardeners, forming everything into an exact level, propose to rest the whole local and general legislature on three bases of three different kinds."—Burke.

"We are by an *architect* to understand a person skilful in the art of building."—Evelyn.

It is possible that the builder and architect may deal with many kinds of building materials, but the mason works only in stone.

"About him left he no *mason*
That stone could lay." Chaucer.

BULK. Size. Magnitude. Greatness.

Bulk (Iceland. *bulk*, *a heap*, one of a very large family of words, having a root idea of *swelling*), denotes material magnitude, or the substance of a mass, irrespective of proportion, symmetry, or anything else.

"That which is devoid of *bulk* and *magnitude* is likewise devoid of local motion."—Cudworth.

Size is abbreviated from *assize* (Fr. *assise*, *a setting down*, *an arrangement of a plan*). In addition to its abstract sense of magnitude, as the Size of a tree, it has a relative and conventional force, by which it denotes classification of magnitudes, as an anchor of the first, second, or third size. I want a pair of gloves a size larger.

"He found here some cockles of so enormous a *size* that one of them was more than two men could eat; and a great variety of other shell-fish."—Cook's *Voyages*.

Magnitude is the Latin equivalent of the English Greatness. Magnitude, however, differs from size in presupposing *some amount* of greatness. So we might speak of the size but not of the magnitude of a minute insect. Magnitude and Greatness are applicable to superficial extent, as Bulk is not, and to number, as Size is not. So we might say, "Ten is a greater number, or a number of greater mag-

nitude than two," "a star of the first or second magnitude." Magnitude is to number what size is to quantity, and is capable of relative or conventional application; as a number of small or less magnitude, but we could not say of small greatness.

"We commonly find in the ambitious man a superiority of parts in some measure proportioned to the *magnitude* of his designs."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

For greatness is a positive term, denoting the presence of size, number, power, nobility, and the like in a *considerable degree*.

"Our *greatness* will appear
Then most conspicuous, when *great* things of small,
Useful of hurtful, prosperous of adverse,
We can create." MILTON.

BULKY. MASSIVE.

The BULKY (*see* BULK) exhibits size without proportion. The MASSIVE (Fr. *massif*, -*ve*) exhibits size combined with compactness of material, *not* excluding proportion. A big portmanteau is simply bulky; the columns of a Norman cathedral are massive. Some inherent value of the material, either natural or artistic, is implied in MASSIVE, none in BULKY. The latter is depreciative. The former a term of praise.

"Money is the best measure of the altered value of things in a few years, because its vent is the same, and its quantity alters slowly. But wheat or any other grain cannot serve instead of money, because of its *bulkiness* and too quick change of its quality."—LOCKE.

"The common military sword is a heavy *massive* weapon."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

BURDEN. LOAD. WEIGHT.

BURDEN (A.S. *byrden*) is something to be *borne*, and always in a certain manner, and for a certain purpose. It is to be transported to some destination, and is imposed upon living creatures. The LOAD (A.S. *hlad*) is a certain quantity of material imposed upon man, beast, or carriage. We speak of the load, not the burden, of a waggon, the load or burden of a beast, but more commonly the burden of a man; yet the same thing in the case of a man may be called a load or a burden; the former when regarded as something which he is charged with the responsibility of transporting, the latter as something laid heavily upon his shoulders. WEIGHT (A. S. *wegan*, *to bear, carry*), refers simply to the pressure of gravitation. It is used in the concrete, as we speak of a certain weight, and in the abstract, the weight of a thing, or a thing of great weight. In this way it is used relatively to a standard or degree of weight; and we might speak of the weight of a burden or a load as being great or even slight.

"He had built at his own expense, to prosecute them, a strong handsome ship which was named the Bark Ralegh, of two hundred tons *burden*."—OLDY'S *Life of Ralegh*

"Our life's a *load*."—DRYDEN.

"Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal *weight* of glory."—*English Bible*.

BURDENSOME. HEAVY. WEIGHTY. PONDEROUS.

BURDENSOME (*see* BURDEN) denotes that which is difficult, and also that which is irksome to carry. A thing of slight specific gravity may be burdensome if we wish to be rid of it. The term burdensome is as often, if not oftener, employed in a secondary or metaphorical, as in the primary and literal sense.

"As exercise becomes tedious and painful when we make use of it only as the means of health; so reading is apt to grow uneasy and *burdensome* when we apply ourselves to it only for our improvement in virtue."—*Tatler*.

HEAVY (connected with *heave*, A.S. *hebban*), is that which is relatively or personally weighty (*see* WEIGHT under BURDEN); as WEIGHTY is that which is in itself hard to lift. So a thing may be heavy for a child to carry which may not be weighty in itself. The term *heavy* is used in the abstract sense of possessing weight, irrespectively of the amount of it, which appears in expressions involving comparison or degree, as we speak of one thing being not so heavy as another; where none of the other terms could be used.

"Though philosophy teaches that no element is *heavy* in its own place, yet experience shows that out of its own place it proves exceedingly *burdensome*."—SOUTH.

PONDEROUS (Lat. *ponderōsus*) de-

notes rather what manifests or gives the appearance of being heavy to carry, whether we have anything to do with carrying it or not. The ponderous volume almost deters us by its very appearance from taking it up. When we watch the movements of the elephant we remark upon his ponderous bulk. Like BURDENSOME, WEIGHTY is more commonly used in the secondary than in the literal sense. As the BURDENSOME is annoying to bear, so WEIGHTY is a term expressive of combined importance and difficulty, as "weighty cares of office," "weighty considerations." PONDEROUS, on the other hand, is not used but in a material, and generally in a somewhat unfavourable, sense.

"The cares of empire are great, and the burden which lies upon the shoulders of princes very *weighty*."—BISHOP ATTERBURY.

"Vanbrugh with his *ponderous* and unmeaning masses, overwhelmed architecture in mere masonry."—WALPOLE.

BURIAL. INTERMENT. SEPULTURE. INTOMBMENT.

BURIAL (A. S. *byrgan, to bury*) is simply the covering of one thing over with others, so as to conceal it from view; as, to bury one's face in one's hands. As used in the above connexion, the burial of a body is the laying it sufficiently deep in the earth to conceal it from view. We even speak of burial at sea. The two applications occur in the following:—

"I observed, indeed, that the present war had filled the church with many of these uninhabited monuments, which had been erected to the memory of persons whose bodies were perhaps *buried* in the plains of Blenheim, or in the bosom of the ocean."—*Spectator*.

So characteristic is the idea of concealment in the term *bury*, that in a secondary sense it is employed in reference to many things of which circumstances combine to prevent the exhibition. A man fitted to adorn society or to be eminently useful to it, is often buried in some remote and obscure locality, beyond which his name is not heard.

INTERMENT (Fr. *interrement*, Lat. *in*, and *terra, the earth*) is a somewhat politer word than burial, but by its etymology more restricted in meaning, and denoting any formal ceremonial or decent placing of the body underground. We might say, "buried like a dog," but we should be more likely to say, "reverently and even sumptuously interred."

"Cromwell's hearse was magnificent, the idol crowned, and (not to mention all other ceremonies which are practised at royal *interments*, and therefore by no means could be omitted here) the vast multitude of spectators made up, as it uses to do, no small part of the spectacle itself."—COWLEY.

INTERMENT involves the idea of earth or soil, not so burial. It is remarkable how the word *inter* has in English literature been confined to the burial of the dead.

SEPULTURE (Lat. *sĕpultūra*) points rather to the mode of burial, and to the rites connected with it; as, to have the "privilege of sepulture," a place of "royal sepulture," and the like.

"The common rites of *sepulture* bestow,
To soothe a father's and a mother's woe.
Let these large gifts procure an urn at least,
And Hector's ashes in his country rest."
POPE.

INTOMBMENT, as its name expresses, is the burying or interring in a tomb (Fr. *tombe*, L. Lat. *tumba*). In its secondary sense it is a metaphor for placing or lying in oblivion.

"When Time, like him of Gaza, in his wrath
Plucking the pillars that support the world,
In Nature's ample ruins lies *intombed*."
YOUNG.

BURLESQUE. PARODY. SATIRE. TRAVESTY. CARICATURE. SARCASM. COMEDY. IRONY. HUMOUR. WIT. LAMPOON.

These are only remotely synonymous. Nevertheless they are here given as such, inasmuch as there is no one which has not the qualities of some one or more of the rest.

BURLESQUE (Fr. *burlesque*, It. *burlare, to ridicule*) is a sort of humour. It draws its amusements from incongruous representation of character, and the placing of persons in situations not proper to their actual positions and circumstances in society. Addison has said that "*Burlesque* is of two kinds. The first represents mean

persons in the accoutrements of heroes, the other describes great persons acting and speaking like the basest among the people." PARODY (Gr. *παρῳδία*), unlike BURLESQUE, is a matter of words only, and does not extend to acts or representations dramatical. It is the humorous adaptation, by alterations here and there of an author's words, to a subject very different from the original.

"From some fragments of the Silli, written by Timon, we may find that they were satiric poems, full of *parodies*, that is, of verses patched up from great poets, and turned into another sense than their author intended them."—DRYDEN'S *Juvenal*.

TRAVESTY (from Ital. *travestire, to disguise, mask*) is analogous to such disguise by dress as shall render absurd. Travesty differs from parody in that parody speaks the meaning put upon the words by the parodist. Travesty makes a thing distort and misrepresent itself. It puts upon it a strange garb, which is therefore a disguise.

"Old naturalism, thus *travestied* in the garb of new religion, his lordship bestows as his last and most precious legacy on his own dear country."—WARBURTON.

It is the *caricature* of literature; for CARICATURE (It. *caricatúra*) is an overcharged representation, in which, while the general likeness is preserved sufficiently to bespeak the original, certain peculiarities are developed and drawn in an exaggerated manner.

"From all these hands we have such drafts of mankind as are represented in those burlesque pictures which the Italians call *caricaturas*, where the art consists in preserving, amidst distorted proportions, and aggravated features, some distinguishing likeness of the person, but in such a manner as to transform the most agreeable beauty into the most odious monster."—*Spectator*.

COMEDY (Gr. *κωμῳδία*) is a kind of dramatic composition and representation of the light and amusing incidents or accidents of common life.

"Whenever Aristotle speaks of *comedy*, we must remember that he speaks of the old or middle *comedy*; which was no other than what we should call farce; and to which his definition of comedy was adapted, *μίμησις φαυλοτέρων*, that is, as he explains himself, an imitation of ridiculous characters."—TWINING'S *Aristotle, Poetics*.

IRONY (Gr. *εἰρωνεία*) is a mode of censuring by contraries. It ridicules by pretending to admire, and condemns by feigned approval. The modern term irony has widely departed from the original Greek *εἰρωνεία*, which was a term of the Socratic philosophy, and meant an *understatement of truth*. The original force, however, is still perceptible in the following:—

"There are mixed in his talk so many pleasant *ironies*, that things which deserve the severest language are made ridiculous instead of odious; and you see everything in the most good-natured aspect it can bear."—*Guardian*.

SATIRE (Lat. *sătĭra*), on the other hand, sets to work in no indirect fashion, but is a clever, lively, and sustained description of the character and acts of persons. It falsifies its character and transgresses its proper limits, when it is anything more than subservient to the exposure of what is defective, blameworthy, or vicious in public administration and conduct, or in personal morals.

"Libel and *satire* are promiscuously joined together in the notions of the vulgar; though the satirist and libeller differ as much as the libeller and murderer. In the consideration of human life, the satirist never falls upon persons who are not glaringly faulty, and the libeller upon none but who are conspicuously commendable."—*Tatler*.

SARCASM (Gr. *σαρκασμός*, lit. *a biting of the flesh*, i.e. *the lips, in rage; a sneer*) is that kind of personal allusion which is vented by indignation or spite. It represents the more virulent aspect of satire, and is justifiable only when grounded on moral indignation; not at all when it issues from personal bitterness or ill-will.

"And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked, &c., *i.e.*, disputed *sarcastically* and contumeliously against it, that certainly there was no such matter."—HAMMOND.

Sarcasm is the contemptuous and derisive expression of uncongeniality with the character, conduct, belief, principles, or statements of another.

HUMOUR is that species of wit—if it be allowed to be wit at all, which is a vexed question—which proceeds from the *humour* of a person (Lat.

hūmōrem, moisture; according to the idea of the old physicians, that certain humours of the body caused certain temperaments), and may, to some extent, as wit does not, display itself in *actions* as well as words. WIT (A. S. *witan, to know*) may consist in a single brilliant thought; but humour is continuous and runs in a vein. It is an equable and pleasing flow of wit, enlivening and amusing without being of necessity brilliant. The essence of wit, in the modern acceptation of the term, consists in the ready and telling appreciation and expression of the agreement and disagreement of things. It comes by nature, as wisdom comes by reflexion and experience, and learning by study and labour. Swift drew attention to the distinction between wit and humour, when he said that humour was "a talent not confined to men of *wit* or learning, for we observe it sometimes among common servants, and the meanest of the people." It may be that wit excites a lively feeling of surprise and gratification, but not a smile or a laugh; this is *always* implied in humour.

"*Wit*," says Locke, "lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and in putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy."

In short, HUMOUR seems to lie rather in the presentation to the mind of amusing incongruity or contrast, WIT in that of brilliant association and comparison, which, however, will often include contrast. Goldsmith has expressed himself very strongly on the difference. He says—

"*Wit* raises human nature above its level, *humour* acts a contrary part, and equally depresses it. To expect exalted humour is a contradiction in terms."

LAMPOON (Fr. *lampon, a taunt, jeer,* from *lampons, let us drink largely:* LITTRÉ) is low personal satire, of which the sole purpose is to ridicule, pain, and annoy individuals.

"Mr. Betterworth," answered he, "I was in my youth acquainted with great lawyers, who knowing my disposition to satire, advised me that if any scoundrel or blockhead whom I had *lampooned* should ask, 'Are you the author of this paper?' I should tell him that I was not the author, and therefore I tell you, Mr. Betterworth, that I am not the author of these lines."—JOHNSON'S *Life of Swift.*

BURNING. ARDENT. FIERY. HOT. SCORCHING.

HOT (A. S. *hât*) denotes simply having heat in the physical or any analogous sense of the term heat.

"Moderation may become a fault. To be but warm when God commands us to be *hot* is sinful."—FELTHAM.

BURNING (A. S. *bærnan, to kindle*) is exhibiting heat, or in any way or degree affecting by heat. When used morally, HOT is applied to the passions, BURNING to the more active desires; the idea of burning being the continuous feeling or transmission of heat in a lively manner. Fire is hot, but the flame burns. So, "a burning sense of shame," "a burning indignation," but, "hot anger."

"Cowley, observing the cold regard of his mistress's eyes, and at the same time their power of producing love in him, considers them as *burning*-glasses made of ice."—*Spectator.*

ARDENT (Lat. *ardēre*, neut. *to burn*) is the Latin equivalent to the English BURNING, but is not so strong a term, and is applied to inclinations as well as desires, as an ardent hope or ambition, ardent zeal. ARDENT is, unlike the others, not used except poetically in any primary or physical sense. *See* FERVOUR.

"There was one Felton, of a good family, but of an *ardent* melancholy temper, who had served under the Duke of Buckingham in the station of lieutenant."—HUME.

FIERY is showing itself like *fire*, that is, tending to project itself upon others. Fiery wrath is that which would consume or injure others if it could. "Fiery indignation" is that which would "devour the adversaries." It is not steady and consuming so much as fitful and flashing.

"Legions of loves with little wings did fly,
Darting their deadly arrows *fiery* bright."
SPENSER.

SCORCHING (O. Fr. *escorcher*, Lat. *excorticāre, to flay*) denotes a heat which affects the surface injuriously or painfully. SCORCHING passions would denote not so much their mere

'eat, as the way in which they redounded to the remorse of those subject to them.

"Some of the pieces which were then brought from its repositories appeared to have been *scorched* with the fire which happened in the town house soon after the bank was established."—ADAM SMITH.

BURNISH. POLISH.

POLISH (Fr. *polir*) is the wider term of the two. It is to make smooth and glossy, usually by friction, as glass, marbles, metals, and the like. BURNISH (O. Fr. *burnir*) is specifically to polish metal by rubbing with something hard and smooth. BURNISH is not used of anything but material substances; POLISH lends itself readily to secondary application; as, polished manners, a polished style, polished society. Burnishing is more closely associated with the original manufacture, so that in some cases the process would hardly be complete without it. Polishing is more often done for a purely ornamental purpose. Wood, for instance, and brass are both polished, but wood is not burnished.

BUSH. SHRUB.

BUSH (one of many similar words; cf. Ger. *busch*, Fr. *bois*) meant originally a wood or wild place grown up in trees. It is commonly employed at present in this sense to express the wild, uncultivated country occupied by the aborigines in the neighbourhood of colonial settlements. The characteristic of the bush and the SHRUB is that instead of growing to a considerable height and throwing out ramifications, it is of short stature, and throws out several stems from the same root. The bush is thick, close, and impervious to the sight; qualities which do not belong so essentially to the shrub. The bush is as frequently wild as cultivated; the shrub is cultivated, choice, ornamental, graceful, and often flowering. Epithets expressive of these characteristics would not harmonize with the term bush.

BUSY. ACTIVE. OFFICIOUS. PRAGMATICAL.

BUSY (A. S. *bysig*) means no more than closely employed, except in the unfavourable sense of fond of unduly employing one's self with the concerns of others from curiosity or inquisitiveness. A person of inactive habits may occasionally be sufficiently interested in anything to be busy. To be busy, whether habitually or not, is to be carefully, sedulously, and absorbingly engaged in a work.

"Despair
Tended the sick, *busiest* from couch to couch." MILTON.

ACTIVE (Fr. *actif*) is having a tendency to employment and a dislike of remaining idle. Such a disposition, if not well employed, is pretty sure to fall into mischief. To be active implies more energy, to be busy more attention. The active man distributes his thoughts, the busy man concentrates them. The former is ready for any employment, the latter dedicates himself to one in particular. A man may be active in disposition, he is busy in fact.

"The soul, being an *active* nature, is always propending to the exercise of one faculty or another."—GLANVILL.

OFFICIOUS (Lat. *officium*, *office*, *duty*) is that aspect of the quality of the busy man in the affairs of others which leads him to the superfluous taking upon himself to advise or to assist them.

"The miserable Rachel now too late discovered the fatal consequences of interfering between husband and wife, and heartily reproached herself for her *officiousness* in aggravating his jealousy."—*Observer*.

PRAGMATICAL (Gr. πραγματικός, πρᾶγμα, *a business*) had at one time the meaning of *busily engaged*. It now means fussily or officiously busy. The pragmatical man exaggerates the importance to others of what he is himself engaged in, and erects little matters into affairs of great moment; his very recreations have a serious air, and it is only by some amount of sacrifice that he can find time for any. The labours and responsibilities of others are light in comparison with his own.

"The fellow grew so *pragmatical* that he took upon him the government of my whole family."—ARBUTHNOT.

BUTT. MARK.

The man who is a BUTT (Fr. *but*, *but*, *aim*) is a MARK (Fr. *marque*).

but the man who is a mark is not necessarily a butt. The word butt is a metaphor, indicating a mark for the shafts of *satire* or ridicule of the most contemptuous nature. A man may be a mark of envy, but he is only a butt for ridicule.

"I mean those honest gentlemen that are pelted by men, women, and children, by friends and foes, and in a word, stand as *butts* in conversation."—ADDISON.

Both terms are taken from archery, the butt being the barrel, whose bung served for the central mark in taking aim.

"*Ben.* I aimed so near when I supposed you loved.
Rom. A right good *mark*-man! and she's fair I love." *Romeo and Juliet.*

BUY. PURCHASE.

To BUY (A. S. *bycgan*) and to PURCHASE (Fr. *pourchasser, to desire and seek to obtain*; L. *captiare, to chase*) are much the same, except that BUY, being the simple Saxon term, is applied to all kinds of objects; PURCHASE has a somewhat more polite air, and, with BUY, is applicable to articles of taste and value. We buy vegetables and purchase jewellery. Again, to buy is specifically to give money; to PURCHASE, being used more often than BUY in a metaphorical sense, extends to the giving or parting with anything to procure something else, as to "purchase at the cost of reputation." Purchase in the New Testament is always to *procure*, never to buy. The term BUY wears an unfavourable air, when it is employed of the procuring by money what might better be the reward of merit.

"The law presumes that he who *buys* an office will by bribery, extortion, or other unlawful means, make his *purchase* good, to the manifest detriment of the public."—BLACKSTONE.

C.

CABAL. CONSPIRACY. COMBINATION. PLOT. FACTION. MACHINATION.

CABAL is from the Hebrew *kabala*, a mystic tradition which it was pretended had come down from Moses along with the Jewish law; hence the term was applied to any association which had a pretended secret. The idea of a *cabal* is that of a party or faction confined to a few, and plotting in secret for their own interests by giving a certain turn to the course of affairs, and getting political power and patronage. The object of a cabal is to affect public opinion on behalf of the intriguing party, and so, although the plan is secret, the means employed may be sometimes secret, sometimes open, as clamour. It carries a political or quasi-political air, true to its original application in the sense of a cabinet or committee. It was a nickname of the ministry of Charles II., Clifford, Ashley, Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale, the initials of whose names spell the word.

"Base rivals, who true wit and merit hate,
Caballing still against it with the great,
Maliciously aspire to gain renown
By standing up and pulling others down.
DRYDEN.

A CONSPIRACY (Lat. *conspirātiōnem*, which, unlike *conspiracy*, denoted *good* as well as *evil accord*) is a secret combination against some person, power, authority, or legitimate interest. In its common occurrence CONSPIRACY denotes a treasonable attempt for the purpose of subverting a dynasty, or re-establishing one, or generally for altering the political face of affairs. It tends to multiply its numbers, thus differing from cabal, which is restricted. The term belongs also to private life. Any agreement to do what is prejudicial to another is recognized by the law as a conspiracy.

"Catiline's *conspiracy*."—ROSE'S *Sallust.*

COMBINATION (Lat. *combinationem, a joining two by two*) need not be for a bad purpose, though it is commonly so used. It is an association of persons united for the purpose of acting or resisting in a matter of their own interests. It differs from CABAL in being more active than deliberative, and from CONSPIRACY in being open and not secret. Social or professional in-

terests are commonly the basis of union and action in combinations, and its work lies in pushing its own demands and resisting those of others. It is evident that the term admits of such a generic sense as would include the others.

"A *combination* of the most powerful men in Rome who had conspired my ruin."—MELMOTH'S *Cicero*.

A PLOT (the same word as *plat*, i.e. *of ground*) is a complicated plan for the accomplishment of a purpose always evil or mischievous. As it expresses the plan as well as the planner, a plot may lie with a single person, though it commonly involves more than one.

"The tempter may cease urging, and yet continue *plotting*."—SOUTH.

FACTION (Lat. *factionem*) meant anciently one of the troops in the games of the circus, and when the circus assumed a political character, the term came to mean a political party. It is now used more commonly of a minority than of a majority, but in either case denotes a party acting unscrupulously for the promotion of their own interests in the community.

"The members of the court *faction* are fully indemnified for not holding places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which they enjoy less conspicuous, but very advantageous situations."—BURKE.

Unquiet, turbulent, jealous, ambitious, vain spirits form cabals. Mischievous, malignant, wicked, and designing spirits form plots. Discontented spirits, indocile subjects, and bad citizens form conspiracies. Social and professional grievances, undue preponderance of power or wealth bring about combinations. Restlessness, combined with views of self-interest, raises up factions. A seditious party in a community or a state while it is as yet weak and undeveloped is a faction. It is a party when it has established its claim to be recognized as one of the powers of that community or state. A cabal works indirectly, a plot darkly, a conspiracy deeply and unscrupulously.

A MACHINATION (Lat. *măchĭnari*, Gr. *μηχανή, a machine*) combines with the idea of contrivance and circumvention that of a purpose which is not only selfish but evil—a wicked plotting against the interests or life of another. It admits even of treachery as an instrument in its dealings. In short, its direct aim is deadly mischief, and it adopts any arts of deception which may compass this end.

"This is the state and known *machination* of him whose true title is the accuser of the brethren."—BISHOP HALL.

CABIN. HUT. COTTAGE.

The CABIN (Welsh, *caban*, *bootn*, *cabin*) belongs to the very poor; the HUT (Fr. *hutte*) to the savage, the COTTAGE (A. S. *cote*, *a cottage*, *den*) to the labourer. A cabin is a miserable hut or cottage. It may be found in a town. Cottages are only in the country. The hut presents the simple idea of shelter from the elements the cabin of extreme poverty and wretchedness; the cottage of rural simplicity and luxuriance. The hut may be the abode of royalty, for savage tribes have their chiefs. The cottage is, with some ornament and cultivation, often an abode of the wealthy.

CAJOLE. COAX. WHEEDLE.

The idea common to these words is that of using petty arts of demeanour to persuade into something connected with a selfish purpose. To CAJOLE (Fr. *cajoler*, for *cageoler*, *to allure into a cage like a bird*) denotes the use of such winning arts, whether of words, as flattery, or more than words, as leads the person under such influence to accede to the wishes of another, even to some little loss or detriment to himself. To COAX (etym. uncertain) expresses the same thing, but with more of persuasiveness and less of art. It is a more simple-minded process. The father may coax his child into doing some unpleasant thing for its own good, and the child may coax the father into making him some little present.

WHEEDLE (cf. Ger. *wedeln*, *to wag the tail*) denotes the reiterated use of clever importunities and little cheats, and, like CAJOLE, often has the sense

of luring against the interest of the person lured. The designing person cajoles, the impudent one coaxes, the artful and dishonest one wheedles.

"After a *cajoling* dream to wake in the aggravation of disappointment."—SMOLLET.

The following gives the word *coax* in its old form:—

"Princes may give a good poet such convenient countenance and also benefit as are due to an excellent artificer, though they neither kiss nor *cokes* them."—PULTENHAM.

"I have already a deed of settlement of the best part of her estate, which I have *wheedled* out of her."—CONGREVE.

CALAMITY. DISASTER. VISITATION. MISFORTUNE. MISCHANCE. MISHAP. MISADVENTURE. CATASTROPHE.

CALAMITY (Lat. *călămĭtātem*, prob. from *calamus, a stalk*, as if *destruction of crops*) is commonly applied to events which produce *extensive* evil, whether public or private, as a bad harvest, a civil war, the death or ruin of the head of a family. The calamity generally befalls from without, and is not a miscarriage of plans, but an independent visitation. Hence a person may be closely connected with a calamity without directly suffering from it. A plague upon a city is a calamity, and is called so even by those who may escape from it.

"Even when they are in prosperity they ever and anon feel many inward stings and lashes; but when any great affliction or *calamity* overtakes them, they are the most poor-spirited creatures in the whole world."—TILLOTSON.

A DISASTER (Fr. *désastre*, Lat. *astrum*, *a star*, a word of astrological character) is an untoward event of great importance coming in to mar or ruin a particular plan, course, or condition of things as incidental to it. Thus, losses in trade, the overturning of a carriage on the road, are disasters.

"This was a real *disaster* to us, as by retarding us half a day it broke the chain of our stages, and laid us under the disagreeable necessity of stopping each ensuing night at a very bad inn."—SWINBURNE'S *Spain*.

MISFORTUNE is the widest, though not specifically the strongest in meaning. Anything which is an untoward event is a misfortune. Calamities and disasters are misfortunes, only they are more than ordinary misfortunes. That is a misfortune which in any way deprives of an actual or contingent good against one's will. But the term is by no means so serious as CALAMITY or DISASTER.

"She daily exercises her benevolence by pitying every *misfortune* that happens to every family within her circle of notice."—JOHNSON.

VISITATION (Lat. *vĭsĭtātiōnem*) is a term used to denote providential infliction or retribution, and is applied to public and private afflictions, as the sudden death of an individual, or the plague in a country.

"There shall not be left in thee one stone upon another, because thou knewest not the time of thy *visitation*."—*Bible*.

MISCHANCE and MISHAP differ from MISFORTUNE in being lighter. Misfortunes to individuals are failures in business, the loss of health, the being born of cruel or over-indulgent parents. Mischances and mishaps are such as interrupt employments or undertakings untowardly. A slight difference, too, exists between MISCHANCE and MISHAP; the mischance is external to the actual employment, and befalls a person while engaged in it; a mishap occurs in the midst of the employment itself. So mischance is less personal than mishap, which often wears a ludicrous air. A sudden frost on a hunting day is a mischance; a fall while hunting is a mishap.

"'For charity,' replied the matron, 'tell
What sad *mischance* those pretty birds befell.'"
'Nay, no *mischance*,' the savage dame replied,
'But want of wit in their unerring guide,
And eager haste, and gaudy hopes, and giddy pride.'"
DRYDEN.

"Ah me! what perils do environ
The man that meddles with cold iron!
What plaguy mischiefs and *mishaps*
Do dog him still with after-claps!"
Hudibras

MISADVENTURE is the more serious form of MISHAP. It is a calamity occurring in the course of some deed or transaction; as if in fencing one accidentally wounded one's adversary.

It combines more strongly than MISHAP the idea of the unfortunate with the doings and proceedings of men.

"We seldom or never find that any nation hath endured so many *misadventures* and miseries as the Spaniards have done in their Indian discoveries."—RALEGH'S *History of the World.*

Mischance and mishap befall us. But we meet with or suffer misadventures, placing ourselves, as it were, within their reach, and unwittingly running into them.

CATASTROPHE (Gr. *καταστροφή, an overturning*) is an event final, disastrous, subversive. The calamity is one event of wide-spread ill. The catastrophe is one event with manifold effects of ill. It is, as it were, a compendium of disasters, and a sum of evils, potent in itself and diversified in its effects. It is in the same character, though with no necessary sense of calamity, that the term is used simply of the winding up or *dénouement* of a dramatic plot. It is then a final illustration and complete solution of all difficulties, a practical termination of the plan when all interest is gone and beyond which it were impossible to continue the action.

"At Abingdon he (the Prince of Orange) was surprised with the news of the strange *catastrophe* of affairs now at London—the King's desertion, and the disorders which the city and neighbourhood of London were fallen into."—BURNET.

CALCULATE. RECKON. COMPUTE. COUNT. ESTIMATE. ENUMERATE. RATE.

To CALCULATE (Lat. *calcŭlare, calcŭlus, a pebble, used in counting*) is to arrive at a result by an arithmetical operation of any kind; hence of various kinds; hence also, *remotely*, a calculation may be formed by using one or more arithmetical processes in succession for the purpose of a common result or product. Calculation goes beyond the actual and present, and may deal with the future and probable. Hence the result of calculation may be approximate only, not exact.

"I fear this learned man may have been somewhat misinformed by the navigators he relies in, or else that the way of allowing for refractions is not yet reduced to a sufficient certainty; for I do not find by those who have purposely gone to the top of it (Teneriffe) that the mountain is so high as his *calculation* makes it."—BOYLE

To RECKON (A. S. *reccan*) is to tell one by one, and deals only with matters of addition and subtraction. It is a process of units only. It is to count into a number, rank, or series; hence, analogously, to place as an item in a moral or social account, as, "I reckon him among the aristocracy." Hence the process of reckoning is more straightforward, and the result of reckoning more exact and certain than calculation, while it is less comprehensive and varied. RECKON has the further character of being relative, economical, or financial. We count for ourselves, we reckon with others. In this way to reckon is to calculate in matters of common interest. The proprietor calculates his expenses of the past year, he computes the probable outlay of the coming year, and perhaps in each case he reckons with his steward.

"Retrospects with bad *reckoners* are troublesome things."—WARBURTON.

But RECKON involves in some cases the use of the logical as well as the arithmetical faculty to determine what is to be reckoned, as in the instance given under COUNT.

To COMPUTE (Lat. *compŭtāre*) bears reference to a sum or value already given. The rising and setting of the heavenly bodies are calculated; but the number of comets that have been visible during the last thousand years could only be computed, all that is likely to increase or diminish the number being taken into account; hence COMPUTE is more than an arithmetical term, and involves the factors as well as the amount of numbers and sums. To compute is to form a numerical estimate, though it is applicable to magnitude. In calculation we proceed from fixed items to a certain result. In computation we proceed from variable items to a probable result. In calculation the goodness of the result depends on the exactness of the method, and the rightness of the application. In computation it

depends, besides these, on the certainty of the data.

"Of time on all occasions, he (Swift) was an excellent *computer*, and knew the minutes required to every common operation."—JOHNSON.

Experience and analogy are great aids in computation.

COUNT is etymologically another form of *compute*, but its signification is nearer to that of reckon. It is to reckon one by one; but as to reckon is to enlist in a number, so to count is simply to register as units. So we might say, "I have counted the bottles; there are ninety without *reckoning* ten which are broken."

"I would not be that guilty man,
With all his golden store;
Nor change my lot with any wretch
That *counts* his thousands o'er."
LOGAN.

In the secondary use of the terms, COUNT stands to reckon as a proposition to a conclusion. I count him faithful that endures, that is, I bring the two ideas or terms into unity. "I reckon that the present sufferings are not to be compared to the glory that shall be revealed hereafter;" that is, *I draw this deduction* (Gr. λογίζομαι).

ESTIMATE (Lat. *æstĭmāre*) is to compute more generally, as to estimate the average or probable market value of goods, distance, and the like, in a rough manner. It is not so numerical as COMPUTE. ESTIMATE has to do not with facts, figures, or dimensions in themselves, but in so far as they relate to ourselves and our interest in them. We may compute the number of acres in a tract of country; we estimate their saleable price, and, so doing, set what is valuable over against what is comparatively or completely worthless.

"Live dogs before dead lions *estimates*."
DANIEL.

ENUMERATE (Lat. *ēnŭmĕrāre*) is to *tell* the number by expressing the terms, and is a process of speech rather than arithmetic. It is to mention as an item in a sum.

"If the Priest pardons no sins but those which are *enumerated*, the penitent will be in an evil condition in most cases, but if he can and does pardon those which are forgotten, then the special *enumeration* is not indispensably necessary."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

To RATE (O. Fr. *rate*, Lat. *rătus*, *reckoned*) is to compute or estimate according to a standard of *proportion*, whether scientific or conventional.

"But I collect out of the Abbey Book of Burton that twenty-one were *ratable* to two marks of silver."—CAMDEN.

CALENDAR. ALMANACK.

The CALENDAR (Lat. *călendæ*, *the calends*, or *beginning of the month*) gives the days of the months in numeral order, and the days of the week with the Sunday letter, and marks those days which are held in ecclesiastical or civil importance.

The ALMANACK (L. Lat. *almanachus*: BRACHET; probably, but by no means certainly, of Arabic derivation) extends to astronomical and meteorological information, and may even venture upon astrological predictions.

CALL. INVOKE. EVOKE.

These terms express in common the action of the voice exercised by one sentient being upon another. CALL (*see* BID) is the most general. Call may be inarticulate. The bird calls its mate. Men call other men or animals more or less tamed or domesticated by whom they are surrounded; that is, who inhabit the same earth as themselves.

We EVOKE (Lat. *ēvŏcare*, *to call forth*) infernal spirits, or spirits of the departed, whose abode is supposed to be in the bosom of the earth.

We INVOKE (Lat. *invŏcare*, *to call on*) the Deity, or saints, or celestial intelligences, as living in heaven, or believed to have power or influence over the earth and men. One calls by some short method, as a sound, a name, and by analogy, a sign or gesture. One evokes by charms, incantations, mystic acts and words. One invokes by vows and prayers. Poets still invoke Apollo and the Muses to aid them in the efforts and flights of their imagination after the manner of the poets of classic antiquity. He who invokes does it for help or succour as an inferior. He who evokes does it as possessing some power and authority, though it may be for suc-

cour, also in giving supernatural information. In invocation the subject is definite and certain. In evocation it is uncertain; but in invocation the power is weak, in evocation strong. Invocation has a weaker force than INVOKE, and sometimes means little more than a formal calling of attention, or an address.

CALM. STILL. QUIET. SERENE. TRANQUIL. PEACEFUL. PLACID. SETTLED. COMPOSED. COLLECTED.

These terms are all applicable to the elements of nature. CALM is applied to the air and the sea. It is a relative term, denoting the absence of perturbation; a calm air is one which is not stormy, a calm sea one which is not rough. In its secondary sense, calm, as applied to the feelings, mind, or conduct, denotes the absence of excitement under circumstances calculated to produce it, and is commonly a praiseworthy feature of character. Yet not invariably so, for it is not good to endure or witness calmly what is cruel or painful or miserable to others.

"The Seventh Book (of Paradise Lost) affects the imagination like the ocean in a *calm*, and fills the mind of the reader without producing in it anything like tumult or agitation."—*Spectator*.

STILL (A. S. *stille*) denotes the absence of movement and of the sound which accompanies it. The night is still when no sounds are heard. It expresses not merely the absence of sound and motion, but a state which is, as it were, poised between past and future activity. That which is still may be regarded as having settled into quiet, and as having the capability to be exercised at any moment, of being again aroused. It is, as it were, a fixed and established state of the silent or the motionless.

"The subtle spoiler of the beaver kind,
Far off, perhaps, where ancient alders shade
The deep *still* pool, within some hollow trunk
Contrives his wicker couch."
SOMERVILE CHASE.

QUIET (Lat. *quietus*) denotes rather an habitual than a passing state; yet, according to present usage, it is more applicable generally to the external circumstances of life than to temper or manners; when employed of these it would rather imply a silent and retiring disposition. "I long to lead a quiet life," would mean a life of retirement from the busy occupations and cares of life. A quiet mind is an unharassed mind; yet quiet does not of necessity involve happiness, for there is a quiet of compulsion, of a swoon, of death. A quiet mind is rather a qualification for a virtuous life, than a virtue in itself.

"Thus leave
Thee, native soil, these happy walks and shades,
Fit haunt of gods? where I had hope to spend
Quiet, though sad, the respite of that day
That must be mortal to us both."
MILTON.

SERENE (Lat. *serēnus*) is used of the atmosphere, and denotes the union of calmness and clearness. A dark night, however still, would not be called serene.

"The place is sickly to them because they come out of a country which never hath any rain or fogs, but enjoys a constant *serenity*."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

When employed in a moral sense, it denotes that quiet which comes from within, as the result of such causes as a bright religious hope, the absence of disturbing passions, and the peace of conscience. It expresses the highest and holiest calm of the soul.

"Wherefore the preferableness of virtue does not arise so much from the transports she occasions, as from the calm *serenity* and steady complacence of mind she ensures."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature*.

TRANQUIL (Lat. *tranquillus*) denotes freedom from commotion or agitation of any kind. It means more than STILL and QUIET, for these denote the external condition only, while TRANQUIL implies also the effect produced on the senses and mind of the observer, which are correspondently affected with a sense of quiet.

"The celebrated *tranquillity* of the Pacific Ocean."—ANSON.

Yet TRANQUIL essentially denotes little more than the absence of any source of discomposure or distur-

bance. In this way it is applied to the condition of communities and collections of persons with more force and propriety than any other of these epithets, which belong more naturally to individuals. A tranquil state of society. The tranquillity of the country. It was a very tranquil meeting. To be tranquil is to be without inquietude; one is tranquil by virtue of the situation in which one finds one's self. Tranquillity implies a sort of indifference to events which renders the mind unassailable by them. The hero, calm in the midst of danger, is not called tranquil. The woods are tranquil when no breeze stirs the leaves. The air is calm when no storm agitates it.

"Oh now for ever
Farewell the *tranquil* mind, farewell content!" SHAKESPEARE.

PEACEFUL, as the word denotes, is *full of peace*, that is, not entirely free from sounds, but free from loud and jarring sounds. Nature is not the less but the more peaceful when certain soothing sights and sounds, such as the smoke of the cottage hearth, or the tinkling of sheep-bells, meet the eye and ear. The epithet is better applied to the *scenes* than to the *elements* of Nature.

"Still as the *peaceful* walks of ancient night,
Silent as are the lamps that burn in tombs." SHAKESPEARE.

As applied to the person and disposition, it denotes not only a state but an habitual tendency. A peaceful disposition is one which loves peace in relation to others, and dislikes and avoids occasions of quarrel. A peaceful atmosphere in the natural and the moral world is one in which there is no strife of warring elements. Tranquillity is in one's self, peace is in relation to others or the world. One has tranquil possession of one's lot when one is perfectly content with it; one has peaceful possession of it when no stranger deprives us of it.

"Our loved earth, where *peacefully* we slept,
And far from heaven quiet possession kept." DRYDEN.

PLACID (Lat. *plăcĭdus*) denotes an unruffled calmness which has a *pleasing* and cheering effect. The night may be still and tranquil, but not placid, if it is dark. Tranquil and gloomy are compatible epithets, not gloomy and placid. The surface of the lake in the still summer night is placid. PLACID denotes more than peaceful. One may be peaceful on principle, but persons are placid by nature. Accordingly it often comes of comparative insensibility, and of a nature constitutionally wanting in fervour. It is very often employed of the face; as, a placid countenance, a placid smile. It is the serene of commonplace.

"*Placid* and soothing is the remembrance of a life passed with quiet, innocence, and elegance."—STEELE.

SETTLED (A. S. *settan, to set*) is a term which bears reference to past commotion, and denotes the return to a state of calm which is likely to continue. When used of persons, it refers to the judgment, determination, and plans of life.

"It is true that a weighty *settled* sorrow is of that force, that besides the contraction of the spirits, it will work upon the radical moisture, and dry it up so that the hair can have no moisture at the root."—HOWELL.

COMPOSED (Lat. *compōnĕre*, part. *compŏsĭtus*) and COLLECTED (Lat. *collĭgĕre*, part. *collectus*) are not used of the life or character, and seldom of the countenance, but almost always of the air or manner. Composure bears reference to the thoughts and feelings, collectedness to action. The person who is composed retains or has recovered his self-possession after some period of, or in spite of, some inducement to over-excitement; he who is collected has, as the term denotes, gathered up his feelings and thoughts, and recovered them from a state of distraction, and is prepared to act with deliberation.

"*Collected* in his strength, and like a rock
Poised on his base, Mezentius stood the shock." DRYDEN.

"In this hurry, one running one way, another running another way, a man was seen walking before the door very *com-*

posedly without a hat; whereupon, one crying out, 'Here is the fellow that killed the Duke!' upon which others ran thither, everybody asking which is he? to which the man without the hat very *composedly* answered, 'I am he.'"—CLARENDON.

CALUMNY. ASPERSION. DETRACTION. DEFAMATION. SLANDER. LIBEL. REVILING. VILIFICATION. TRADUCEMENT.

CALUMNY (Lat. *călumnia*) is that evil-speaking which is based in any degree on what the speaker knows to be false, whether it be a crime or an offence. The calumniator is both a forger and a propagator of evil report against another, and aims at doing him an injury.

"For *calumny* will sear
Virtue itself." SHAKESPEARE.

ASPERSION (Lat. *aspersiōnem, a sprinkling*) is like the bespattering a person with foul water. It brings no definite charge, but seeks by any means to convey an unfavourable impression morally of the character and conduct of another. The etymological force is preserved by Dryden:—

"I will not leave thee liable to scorn,
But vindicate thy honour from that wretch
Who would by base *aspersions* blot thy virtue."

DETRACTION (Lat. *detractiōnem, a drawing away*) is that mode of cheapening another in public or private estimation which consists in granting facts as to his character, but interpreting them so as to diminish or contradict favourable inferences, as when we attribute his acts of giving to motives of ostentation. It comes of cynical views and estimates of human life and motives, or from specific jealousy and envy. It is of wider application than moral or personal character. It consists in lowering the moral and sometimes even the material value or pretensions of anything; as, when we detract from personal merit, from the excellence of an act, or the value or merit of a work of art. Unlike the rest, detraction commonly furnishes a presumption in a person's favour. Excellence or merit must exist or be credited before there could be room for attempts to lower it in the estimation of others.

"If any shall *detract* from a lady's character, unless she be absent, the said *detractress* shall be forthwith ordered to the lowest place of the room."—ADDISON.

DEFAMATION (Lat. *dĕfāmātus, dishonoured*) is essentially public; it is the spreading far and wide what is injurious to the reputation of persons. It is positive as detraction is negative.

"Their aim is only men's *defamation*, not their reformation, since they proclaim men's vices unto others, not lay them open to themselves."—PRYNNE.

SLANDER (O. Fr. *esclandre*, connected with *scandălum*) differs from DEFAMATION in being not only public but also secret and underhanded. The slanderer is not so inventive as the calumniator.

"Whether we speak evil of a man to his face or behind his back; the former way indeed seems to be the most generous, but yet is a great fault, and that which we call *reviling*. The latter is more mean and base, and that which we call *slander* or backbiting."—TILLOTSON.

REVILING (Lat. *vīlis, cheap, worthless*) is eloquent defamation or slander, the copious use of opprobrious or contemptuous language. VILIFICATION is from the same root, but reviling is direct, vilification indirect. We revile a person to his face; we vilify him or his character generally in the eyes of the world. To vilify is simply to *cheapen down* to vileness, and therefore is applicable to anything, and not restricted to persons who have a character of goodness or a reputation for excellence.

"Believe it that can, while he is labouring to destroy the best, the only complete system of morality that ever yet appeared, and to *vilify* that Book which so truly places the whole of religon in doing good."—WATERLAND.

LIBEL is *written* slander or defamation (Lat. *libellus, a little book*). Originally a libel was a document. So the phrase of the present version of the Scriptures, "a writing of divorcement," stood in Wycliffe's version, "a libel of forsaking." It is now any kind of published defamation, whether in print, by pictures, or any other such representations.

"We have in a *libel:* 1, the writing; 2, the communication, called by lawyers the publication; 3, the application to persons and facts; 4, the intent and tendency; 5, the matter — diminution of fame."—BURKE.

TRADUCEMENT is literally *the leading along* as a public spectacle (Lat. *traducere*) and so the holding up to public disparagement. It involves some degree, as of publicity in the process, so of importance or prominence in the thing or person traduced. It is not confined to personal character. Forms, ceremonies, institutions, customs, may be traduced.

"Who libel senates and *traduce* the great,
Measure the public good by private hate."
YALDEN.

CANT. SLANG. JARGON.

CANT (Lat. *cantāre, to sing*). It is the language of thieves and beggars, not intelligible to others than their associates; then the peculiar terminology of any profession, and finally, with a more restricted application, the reiteration of religious phraseology.

JARGON (Fr. *jargon, gibberish*) is applied sometimes to the chattering of birds. So Gower:—

"But she withal no word may sowne
But chitre and as a bird *jargowne*."

Hence, figuratively, unintelligible reiteration of phrases. So the leading idea in CANT is the exclusive and professional stamp of the phraseology, in JARGON sometimes the same, but also the characterless nature of the words used; the same terms or idioms striking the ear with monotonous persistency, and possessing a value with those who employ them which is not appreciated by others, as, "the jargon of the schools."

SLANG is from the Norse *slenja, to fling*, or *sling, to fling insulting words*. From this sense it has departed till it has taken to itself so many accessary ideas as to render the thing called *slang* a very complex matter. It so far resembles CANT and JARGON as to be characterized by reiteration, and an exclusive or class phraseology. But it involves also an element of humour, and of playful rebellion against the ordinary rules and sobrieties of the language in its normal use.

CAPRICE. HUMOUR. WHIM. FREAK. FANCY. FICKLENESS. VARIABLENESS. CHANGEABLENESS. VAGARY.

CAPRICE (Fr. *caprice*, thought by some to be from Lat. *caprum, a goat*, as it were, *a fantastical goat-leap*) is employed both of the quality and of what manifests the quality, that is, an act of caprice. Caprice is the acting on the slightest preference of the moment, and from one moment to another without such choice as is founded on deliberation. It manifests itself in abrupt changes of feeling, opinion, or action.

HUMOUR (Lat. *hūmōrem, moisture*: for explanation of the word Humour, see *Burlesque*) is the indulgence of one's temper or mood at any time, and making that the principle of action. Humour may differ at different times, but caprice is ever variable. Caprice may be a matter of imagination and fancy, but humour is an actual sensation. Humour allows feeling to usurp the place of will, while caprice substitutes fancy. The three terms, humour, fancy, and caprice, denote generally a passing lively feeling; but caprice and humour belong more to the character, fancy to passing circumstances. Humour is quite as compatible with sadness as with its contrary. The coquette has her caprices; the hypochondriac, the tyrant, the imperious man, his humours; the child, or the childish, his fancies.

"Upon his right hand was Industry, with a lamp burning before her, and on his left *Caprice*, with a monkey sitting on her shoulder."—*Spectator*.

"You'll ask me why I rather choose to have
A weight of carrion flesh than to receive
Three thousand ducats. I'll not answer that,
But say, it is my *humour*."
SHAKESPEARE.

WHIM (compare Welsh *chwim, a brisk motion*: WEDGWOOD) differs from CAPRICE and HUMOUR, as not expressing any quality or temper of mind, but something external. We call that a whim which seems to have no better account than personal eccentricity.

"Let every man enjoy his *whim*.
What's he to me, or I to him?"
CHURCHILL

A FREAK (A. S. *frec, bold, rash*: SKEAT's *Etym. Dict.*; cf. Ger. *frech, saucy*) is a humorous, or, at least, lively display of personal eccentricity, a merry whim.

"For many of their actions and opinions were very wild *freaks* of fancy and humour, and would gain men in these days (as foolish and bad as they are) no better name than of lunaticks and bedlams."—GLANVILL.

A FANTASY (Fr. *fantasie*, Gr. *φαντᾰσία*) or FANCY is the product of an eccentric or unregulated imagination. It has to do, in this sense, with matters of possession and enjoyment or pleasure or with their opposites, and not with the treatment of other persons, like HUMOUR, and CAPRICE, though others may be affected by our fancies. It invests objects, without exact attention or inquiry, with supposed charms or otherwise.

"I dare not force affection, or presume
To censure her discretion, that looks on me
As a weak man, and not her *fancy's* idol."
MASSINGER.

Fickleness, variableness, and changeableness apply to human disposition, with these differences: FICKLENESS (A. S. *ficol, vacillating*) belongs rather to the disposition, the others to the temper and mood. As VARIABLENESS and CHANGEABLENESS are used of weather, so they are used analogously of that which belongs to manner and behaviour; variableness of mood, and changeableness of humour. But fickleness is more deeply seated. It is that inconstancy of mind and taste which shows itself in inconstant preferences and attachments.

"When he (Lucas) came to the English, he painted a naked man with cloth of different sorts lying by him, and a pair of shears, as a satire on our *fickleness* in fashions."—WALPOLE.

"An eternal and *unchangeable* cause producing a changeable and temporary effect."—RALEGH.

"But alas! though the just grounds of my joy be steady, yet my weak disposition is subject to *variableness*."—BISHOP HALL.

A VAGARY (Lat. *vāgāri, to wander*) is a *wandering* thought, a whimsical purpose, a fantastic, unsubstantial, inconsecutive imagination. It is a mental, not a moral inconstancy, a caprice of the mind, a pleasurable stroll of the fancy, which, however, may show itself in outward act; a leaving of the beaten path of ordinary conduct for an indulgence in the unfamiliar.

"A most extravagant *vagary*."
BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

CAPTIOUS. CAVILLING. CENSORIOUS. CARPING.

CAPTIOUS (Lat. *captiōsus, captious, sophistical*) denotes an aptness to catch at faults. Another meaning has flowed out of this—difficult to suit, and so peevish. It is an epithet of the disposition. It comes of a mind trained in exact habits of thought combined with an impatience of error. It is applied to matters of taste and exact learning. It is therefore sometimes a fault of the disposition purely, sometimes of the mind and disposition combined. In the latter sense it is thus employed by Stillingfleet:—

"What design can the w- of man pitch upon in a *captious* and suspicious age, that will not meet with objections from those that have a mind to cavil?"

Captiousness, as defined by Locke, is of the former kind, although the excessive tendency to find fault is common to both—in the latter, fault in itself, in the former, fault by which we are personally affected.

"*Captiousness*," says he, "is another fault opposite to civility, not only because it often produces misbecoming and provoking expressions and carriage, but because it is a tacit accusation and reproach of some incivility taken notice of in those we are angry with."

CENSORIOUS (Lat. *censōrius, belonging to a censor, a controller of morals*) has a graver meaning, and expresses a disposition which tends to find serious fault, and to administer reproof; whether on such matters as the CAPTIOUS, or on the subject of morals and conduct, more especially the latter. It comes of an austere and dogmatical spirit.

"They are both very requisite in a virtuous mind, to keep out melancholy for the many serious thoughts it is engaged in, and to hinder its natural hatred of vice from souring into severity and *censoriousness*."—*Spectator*.

"But Colotes, like a sycophant, *cavilling* at him and catching at his words, without

regard of the matter, not arguing against his reasons, indeed, but in words only, affirmeth flatly that Parmenides overthroweth all things in one word by supposing that all is one."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch.*

"Lay aside, therefore, a *carping* spirit, and read even an adversary with attention and diligence, with an honest design to find out his true meaning. Do not snatch at little lapses and appearances of mistake in opposition to his declared and avowed meaning."—WATTS.

Cavilling is the carping of argument, carping the cavilling of ill-temper.

CAVILLING (Lat. *cāvillari, to censure, to quibble*) implies a tendency to captious argument, to start frivolous objections, and find fault without good reason. CARPING (Lat. *carpĕre, to pick* or *pluck*) springs from ill-nature, and so vents itself upon the most welcome objects to such a nature, namely, the words and actions of other persons, as well as their statements.

CAPTIVATE. ENCHANT. CHARM. FASCINATE. ENRAPTURE. ENSLAVE.

To CAPTIVATE (Lat. *captivare, to take captive*) and to FASCINATE (Lat. *fascĭnare*, Gr. *βασκαίνειν*) express something more strong than "to attract." They denote such a power of attraction as exerts itself over the will of the person affected, and draws it away from other objects. A captivating person, or a captivating pursuit, is that which draws one from other persons and other pursuits by a strong influence, leading the person, as it were, *captive*. A captivating landscape is one which arrests our progress to stop and admire it, so charming us as to induce a feeling of regret at turning our backs upon it. Captivation may or may not, therefore, be the result of design; or it may be, as exercised by a woman of the world, the combined result of nature and art. There is always a more or less unfavourable air about the term *captivate*, inasmuch as it denotes some degree of influence exercised to the diminution of perfect liberty of thought or action. The understanding as well as the taste may be captivated.

"No small part of our servitude lies in the *captivation* of our understanding, such as that we cannot see ourselves *captive*."—BISHOP HALL.

Fascination is the extreme of captivation, when the person lies, as it were, spell-bound under some influence of attraction. This may be external or personal beauty or manners, or an extreme feeling of interest; as, a fascinating employment, which so absorbs the attention as to leave no room for interest in anything else. The fascinating acts through the faculty of sight, and exerts a power upon individuals, owing to their peculiar susceptibilities, which is out of proportion to the intrinsic claims of the object to admiration and regard. It quickens the vision morbidly in some directions, and bandages the eyes also.

"Some, to the *fascination* of a name
Surrender judgment hood-winked."
COWPER.

Another aspect of captivate is developed by the word ENSLAVE, literally to make *a slave of*. As to captivate, in one sense, is to bring into captivity, so to enslave is to bring into slavery. There is the same difference, therefore, as between those two. The captive is simply in his captor's power. The slave does his owner's bidding, and has surrendered or been deprived of the independent exercise of his own will to do another's bidding.

"Sensual pleasure is a great abuse to the spirit of a man, being a kind of fascination or witchcraft, blinding the understanding and *enslaving* the will."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

ENCHANT (Fr. *enchanter*, Lat. *incantāre*) and CHARM (Fr. *charmer*, from *charme*, Lat. *carmen, an incantation*) have a close resemblance both in derivation and application. To ENCHANT is a livelier word than to CHARM. We are charmed with what engages the senses and gratifies the taste, as beautiful scenery, sweet music, engaging conversation and manners. The term is even used as synonymous with delight, as, "I was charmed to hear such news." We are enchanted by what so charms the senses as to affect the imagination, to carry us out

of common thoughts and common life, and perhaps place us as in a fairy land of thought. ENRAPTURE (Lat. *răpĕre, to seize*; part. *raptus*) denotes a delight beyond measure, when we are beside ourselves, and transported by enjoyment. When we are enchanted we are taken out of ourselves; when charmed it is by some object which, insinuating itself into the mind, acts like those magical charms, those love philtres, and the like, which are supposed to produce in us effects which we imagine to be natural, and which make us feel their power without being aware of their presence. Custom, which familiarizes all things, destroys enchantment. Reflexion may even dissipate it at once. But both familiarity and reflexion may seem to prolong charms which will bear the test of the judgment and of criticism. There is always a little of surprise mixed with enchantment. Affection comes in and takes part with sentiment in the case of the object which charms us. In rapture, on the other hand, there is unrest; and, so far from bearing the test of reflexion, the very use of reflexion shows that it is passing away.

"We all promise ourselves great pleasure in our journey homewards, and we have great reason to believe it will be *enchantingly* pleasant."—SIR W. JONES.

"Such a lovely image and representation of the true virtue, as Plato said, could not but *charm* men with the strongest degree of love and admiration possible."—CLARKE.

"Explore thy heart, that, roused by glory's name,
Pants all *enraptured*, with the mighty charm." BEATTIE.

CAPTIVITY. CONFINEMENT. IMPRISONMENT. INCARCERATION. BONDAGE. SLAVERY. IMMURING. SERVITUDE.

CAPTIVITY (Lat. *captivĭtātem*) is the state of a *captive*, that is, of one who has been deprived of his liberty by another, however honourable, liberal, or wide the restrictions of such captivity may be. The captive monarch is not the less a captive because he is placed by his courteous captor at his right hand on horseback or at table. The bird is not the less a captive for the size of the cage. The term is restricted to such command over the persons of others as results from successful war. So every captive is a prisoner, but every prisoner (those, for instance, in the gaols) is not called a captive. A distinction is made in the English Litany, which prays for "all prisoners and captives."

"Myself my sepulchre, a moving grave.
Buried, yet not exempt
By privilege of death and burial
From worst of other evils, pains, and wrongs,
But made hereby obnoxious more
To all the miseries of life.
Life in *captivity*
Among inhuman foes." MILTON.

CONFINEMENT (Lat. *confĭnĕ*, or *confinium, a boundary*) is a wider term than CAPTIVITY, as it denotes other kinds of restriction than that of the captive. A person may be confined to the house by sickness. It is the abridgment of personal liberty for any cause or by any sort of force. As applied to persons, it may be partial, as it may be said, "his hands were confined, the rest of his body was free."

"I thank the Almighty I am now all collected in myself; and though my person is in *confinement*, my mind can expatiate on ample and useful subjects with all the freedom imaginable."—JOHNSON, *Life of Savage*.

IMPRISONMENT (Fr. *prison, prendre*; part. *pris, to take*) is confinement within walls, which is the literal meaning of IMMURE (Lat. *in*, and *mūrus, a wall*); but IMMURE is a narrower imprisonment, in which the stony captivity presses closely on all sides. IMPRISON most commonly denotes the involuntary confinement of one by another, IMMURE the mere fact of close confinement, irrespective of any coercion which has produced it; so, to live immured in the walls of a convent may be a voluntary act. Imprisonment is a narrowing of the state of captivity. The bird which is taken captive in the hand is afterwards imprisoned in the cage. Captivity and imprisonment both deprive of some degree of personal liberty, but not of civil rights, which takes place in bondage and slavery. The fair one does not take

her lover prisoner, but captive, and yet sometimes succeeds in making him her slave. The term "prisoner of war" does not necessarily imply confinement in a prison. He is generally a captive rather than a prisoner.

"It is but six or seven years since a clergyman of the name of Malony, a man of morals, neither guilty, nor accused of anything noxious to the State, was condemned to perpetual *imprisonment* for exercising the functions of his religion."—BURKE.

"For six long years *immured*, the captive knight
Had dragged his chains and scarcely seen the light." DRYDEN.

INCARCERATION (Lat. *carcer, a prison*) is an equivalent of Latin form for the more directly French form IMPRISON, but denotes an ignominious imprisonment, such as that of prisoners in a gaol, with as little as possible of personal liberty. So IMPRISON admits more possible freedom than INCARCERATE, and INCARCERATE than IMMURE.

"It (the doctrine of pre-existence) supposeth the descent into these bodies to be a culpable lapse from a higher and better state of life, and this to be a state of *incarceration* for former delinquencies."—GLANVILL.

BONDAGE (a state of being *bound*), SLAVERY (Fr. *esclave*), and SERVITUDE (Lat. *servĭtūdo*, from *servire, to serve as a slave*), all denote the subjection of the person to superior restrictive power. The terms increase in force in the following order: servitude, slavery, bondage. Servitude is simply compulsory service to a master. So the term is even sometimes employed of free and honourable service, in reference to any compulsory terms connected with it. British naval officers will speak of their period of servitude, by which they mean their service as regards a certain term which they are bound to complete; and domestic service is often so termed.

"A hundred were Spaniards, every one well mounted upon his horse, the rest were Indians running as dogs at their heels, and in the most miserable *bondage*."—SIR FRANCIS DRAKE.

"Beauty of every kind is formed to allure, and there is this peculiar advantage in contemplating the beauties of vegetable nature, that we may permit our hearts to be captivated by them without apprehension of any dangerous or dishonourable *servitude*."—KNOX.

Slavery begins where servitude ends. It is that sort of compulsory life of labour which depends upon the will of another—the master owning the servant as a chattel. But even slavery has its degrees; and the ancient Romans had learned slaves who were honourably treated as literary companions of their masters. Bondage is the extreme aspect of slavery, when the slave has become, as it were, a beast of burden, and works, it may be under the lash, as the captive Israelites did in the land of Egypt. Fr. *esclave* is from the L. Lat. *sclavus, slavus, a Slavonian*; originally applied only to Charlemagne's Slavonian prisoners, who were reduced to slavery; and after the tenth century used in a general sense, without distinction of nationality. BRACHET.

CAPTURE. SEIZURE. PRIZE.

CAPTURE (Lat. *captūra*, from *căpĕre, to take*) and SEIZURE (Fr. *saisir*) are used both of the process and the object. The process of capture involves art as well as force, while seizure is effected by force alone. A strong town may be captured after a prolonged siege by a powerful army, or a little bird may be captured in a bird-trap. The highwayman seizes the person or the property of the traveller. PRIZE (Fr. *prise, a taking, a prize*) relates only to the object taken and its value to the taker. It is the result of competitive effort, as in the galleon laden with gold, the slave-ship, or the award of the schoolboy, or student. The term *prize*, is, however, sometimes used to express merely a thing of value, however obtained—as a prize in a lottery, or "I was walking along the road, and I picked up an unexpected prize." The idea is something taken which is of value, and the word is by some thought to be another form of *price* (Lat. *prĕtium*).

"This was very happy for him; for in a very few years, being concerned in several *captures*, he brought home with him an estate of about twelve thousand pounds."—*Guardian*.

"The Indians, having perceived by our *seizure* of the bark the night before that we were enemies, immediately fled into the woody parts of the island."—ANSON.

"Our inheritances are become a *prize* for disputation."—BURKE.

The capture is commonly either an object having life, or something taken in spite of voluntary efforts of resistance. The seizure is commonly of lifeless objects, as contraband goods. The prize is commonly, also, an inanimate object, except where the person who constitutes the prize is so regarded simply for the ransom or other indirect advantage, and value.

CARESS. FONDLE.

CARESS (Fr. *caresse*, Lat. *cārus*, *dear*) is the expression of tender feeling by words and actions. FONDLE (from *fond*, i.e. *infatuated*) is the expression of weak or childish tenderness, and is confined to actions.

"The King of France used him (the Duke of Buckingham) in so particular a manner, knowing his vanity, and *caressed* him to such a degree, that he went without reserve into the interests of France."—BURNET.

"Each time enjoined her penance mild,
And *fondled* on her like a child." GAY.

CARGO. FREIGHT. LADING. BURDEN.

CARGO (cf. Span. *cargo* and *carga*, and L. Lat. *carricare*, *to load*, *charge*) is a ship-load, and in English law means all that is carried by a vessel, except live persons and animals.

"To different lands, for different sins we roam,
And, richly *freighted*, bring our *cargo* home." CHURCHILL.

FREIGHT is a later form of *fraught* (Swed. *frakta*, *to fraught*, *freight*, SKEAT, Etym. Dict.), that with which a vessel is fraught for transportation. As regards floating vessels, the cargo and the freight are the same thing, viewed differently, the freight being the cargo as viewed for transportation. But freight is also used of material of land carriage. Again, the LADING (connected with *load*) is the freight regarded in its weight and quantity, of which consideration is taken by formal record and registration.

"Some were made prize, while others burnt and rent,
With their rich *lading* to the bottom went." WALLER.

BURDEN (*see* BURDEN), in nautical matters is the capacity of a ship, which is ascertained by measurement, and determined by the builder, as a vessel of so many tons burden. In this way burden denotes not an actual load, but an abstract capacity.

"He had built at his own expense to prosecute them, a strong, handsome ship, which was named the bark Ralegh, of two hundred ton *burden*."—OLDY'S *Life of Ralegh*.

CARRIAGE. GAIT. WALK. DEPORTMENT.

CARRIAGE is seldom used now in any other than the physical sense, the metaphorical one of *conduct* being almost obsolete. It denotes the habitual mode of carrying the body, mainly, but not exclusively, while in motion. A graceful or ungraceful carriage may be shown while sitting at table. It would sound antiquated to use the word as Clarendon did :—

"He advised the new governour to have so much discretion in his *carriage*, that there might be no notice taken of the exercise of his religion."

The word is one of formality, and is best employed of the bearing of persons on public occasions, where some degree of personal dignity is demanded.

"His gallant *carriage*."—STIRLING.

Perhaps modern use would be best satisfied by the term *bearing*.

GAIT (another form of O. E. *gate*, *a way*) is the manner of the walk as to the movements of *the legs and feet alone*; as, a shambling gait.

"He had very narrow shoulders, and no calf; and his *gait* might be more properly called hopping than walking."—FIELDING.

The term is one wanting in dignity. We should say an awkward, not a majestic gait.

WALK (perhaps A. S. *wealcan*, *to roll*) is the manner of progress, taking the movements of the *whole body* into account. This use is conversational and modern.

"In length of train descends her sweeping gown,
And by her graceful *walk* the Queen of Love is known." DRYDEN.

DEPORTMENT (Fr. *déportement*) refers to the whole use and movement of the body, as graceful or ungraceful, suitable or unsuitable. It is the carriage of the body as regards social requirements and regulations. Yet we should speak of a person's carriage in public, of his deportment in private life.

"The coldness of his temper and the gravity of his *deportment* carried him safe through many difficulties."—SWIFT.

CASE. CAUSE.

The CASE (Fr. *cas*, Lat. *cāsus, cădĕre, to fall*) is a matter of fact, and the CAUSE (Lat. *causa*) is matter of question. This distinction is not the less sound because the case may be differently stated. The case is learnt, the cause is decided. We state the case, and defend the cause. In the process of a cause, cases are often cited as precedents.

"Yet on his way (no signs of grace,
For folks in fear are apt to pray)
To Phœbus he preferred his *case*,
And begged his aid that dreadful day."
GRAY.

"Plead Thou my *cause*."—*Book of Psalms.*

CASH. MONEY. SPECIE. COIN.

MONEY (*Jūno Mŏnēta*, at whose temple *money* was coined at Rome; whence *mint*) is employed for anything which is used as a circulating medium. In some parts of Africa, for instance, shells are used as money.

"To prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all sorts of industry and commerce, it has been found necessary in all countries that have made any considerable advances towards improvement, to affix a certain stamp upon certain quantities of such particular metals as were in those countries commonly made use of to purchase goods. Hence the origin of coined *money*, and of those public offices called mints."—ADAM SMITH.

CASH (O. Fr. *casse*, Lat. *capsa, a chest*) is ready money, that is, coin, in distinction to anything the value of which depends on credit. The following quotation will show that there was a time when the English cash, like the French *caisse*, was employed of the bank or place where the cash was stored:—

"So, as this bank is properly a general *cash*, where every man lodges his money because he esteems it safer and easier paid in and out than if it were in his coffers at home."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

The word, however, is used in our own sense by Shakespeare and Milton.

"Or as a thief, bent to unhoard the *cash*
Of some rich burgher, whose substantial doors,
Cross-barred and bolted fast, fear no assault,
In at the window climbs, or o'er the tiles."
Paradise Lost.

SPECIE (abl. of Lat. *spĕcies, shape, form*) is money of stamped coin, but is not necessarily ready money, as it may exist in the coinage of a foreign country.

"There was in the splendour of the Roman Empire a less quantity of current *species* in Europe than there is now."—GIBBON.

COIN (O. Fr. *coin*; Lat. *cŭneus, a stamp upon a coin, a coin*) is a specific fabrication of a certain metal, weight, value, and authenticity regarded in its current capacity and representative value, and also in its historical connexion. In the latter only is it regarded by the numismatist, the connoisseur or collector of coins.

"Your coming, friends, revives me, for I learn
Now of my own experience, not by talk,
How counterfeit a *coin* they are who friends
Bear in their superscription." MILTON.

CASUAL. ACCIDENTAL. INCIDENTAL. CONTINGENT. OCCASIONAL. FORTUITOUS.

CASUAL (Lat. *cāsuālis, cădĕre, to befall*) is applied to such occurrences as, coming by chance, have no immediate consequences beyond themselves. The casual is the accidental combined with the unimportant. A casual observer is simply a man who happens to look on; a casual remark is one which happens to be made. The casual is, as it were, a solitary link, and not a concatenation of cause and effect. In short, the trivial is an element in the casual, although it often happens that seeming trifles are followed by important consequences.

"*Casual* breaks in the general system."—W. IRVING.

It is hardly stronger than Occasional, which it much resembles in meaning, as occasional is derived from the same root (Lat. *occāsionem, cădere, to fall out*); but Occasional excludes to a greater extent the idea of chance. Moreover, the casual may occur once, the occasional more than once. However trivial may be the casual circumstance, it was unexpected; whereas the occasional is often expected, and is *generally* known; thus differing from the recurrent or periodic, which are *specifically* known, as "he paid us occasional visits during his stay in the neighbourhood." That which is recurrent without being regular is occasional.

"This time I could not spend in idleness. I therefore very willingly set myself to translate my *occasional* meditations into Latin."—Bishop Hall.

Accidental (another form of Lat. *căděre, accĭděre, to happen*) is a more serious word, and denotes an effect sufficiently important to lead the mind to speculate on the cause which produced it. A thing may be regarded as accidental which in any way happens by chance, as distinguished from design. (*See* Chance.)

"Civil society was instituted either with the purpose of obtaining all the good of every kind it was even *accidentally* capable of producing, or only of some certain good which the institutors, unconcerned with and unattentive to any other, had in view."—Warburton.

Incidental (another form of Lat. *căděre, incĭdere, to fall upon, to happen*) combines the idea of the casual with that of relation, appropriateness, or conformity. An incidental circumstance in a voyage is one which so befalls as to run up into the general count and story of it. Incidental expenses in an account are those which could not be exactly calculated beforehand, but, nevertheless, legitimately or necessarily connect themselves with it. Hence the term is sometimes used in the sense of naturally concomitant, as the anxieties incidental to high office.

"But there is a wide difference between supposing the violence offered to them to be the direct and proper purpose of the act and the *incidental* effect of it."—Bishop Hurd.

Contingent (Lat. *contingĕre, to touch on, or to come to pass*) denotes a union of certainty and uncertainty, or the certain effect of an uncertain or unknown cause; such as are logically expressed in a hypothetical proposition, as "if the skies fall, we shall catch larks." Our catching larks is, so far, contingent upon the skies falling.

"Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth (though we know it not) that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls necessary agents), and some agents with deliberation (and these both he and I call free agents), and that some agents should work and we not know how (and their effect we call *contingents*)."—Hobbes.

Fortuitous (Lat. *fortŭītus; fors, chance*) is commonly employed, when the subject is one of union, aggregation, or combination; as, the "fortuitous concourse of atoms;" a fortuitous union of causes produced such and such an effect, that is, two or more independent causes happened to produce an effect in common. The difference between the terms, Accidentally and Fortuitously, seems to be as follows:—

That happens accidentally which is brought on by causes foreign to the nature of the thing itself, and so sometimes by hazard. That which happens fortuitously has to be simply accounted for by chance. Snow is accidentally but not fortuitously white. That which is accidental is often alterable at will. That which has happened fortuitously is an extraordinary event which could not have been anticipated, because it springs from causes absolutely unknown.

"The old stale pretence of the atheists, that things were first made *fortuitously*, and afterwards their usefulness was observed and discovered."—Ray.

CATALOGUE. List. Roll. Register. Inventory.

Catalogue (Lat. *cătălŏgus, an enumeration*, from the Greek κατάλογος) is more than List (Fr. *liste, an edging or selvage; a list or roll*; so A. S. *list*), which is a narrow and long enumeration of only just such words or names as are necessary to specify the indi-

viduals or items. Catalogue gives some particulars connected with each. So a list of books would be no more than a bare enumeration of them or the names of their authors. A catalogue of books would give also such points as the number of volumes in each work, the binding, place of publication, and the like.

"Every man is ready to give in a long *catalogue* of those virtues and good qualities he expects to find in the person of a friend, but very few of us are careful to cultivate them in ourselves."—*Spectator.*

"Yes, 'tis the *list*
Of those that claim their offices this day
By the custom of the coronation."
SHAKESPEARE.

A ROLL (Fr. *rôle*; Lat. *rotŭlus*) is the same as LIST; but, as LIST is applicable to an enumeration of *articles*, ROLL is a list of names of *persons* only.

"These signs have marked me extraordinary,
And all the courses of my life do show
I am not in the *roll* of common men."
SHAKESPEARE.

A REGISTER (Fr. *registre*; orig. from Lat. *rĕgesta*, *things recorded*) is a record of persons and transactions connected with them, given with some fulness of detail, and according to a prescribed form; as, a parish register of births, deaths, or marriages. Milton uses the term *regest*:—

"Others of later time have sought to assert him (Arthur) by old legends and cathedral *regests*."

"They seem to have *registered* his sayings with wonderful fidelity, but not always in the order in which they come from him."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

The INVENTORY (Lat. *inventārium*) was originally a list of the goods, chattels, and sometimes real estate of a deceased person; afterwards, any catalogue of movables.

"There, take an *inventory* of all I have
To the last penny." SHAKESPEARE.

CATCH. SEIZE. SNATCH. GRASP. GRIPE. CLUTCH. GRAPPLE.

To CATCH (O. Fr. *cachier*; Lat. *capĭare*, *to catch*, *chase*) is to use such effort as shall arrest the movement of an object and gain possession of it. The effort may be indirectly made, as when a bird is caught in a snare. It is an act of some force, but more skill and quickness.

To SEIZE (Fr. *saisir*) is to lay hold by force and retain possession. The thing seized may be stationary or in motion.

To SNATCH (perhaps onomatop. cf. *snack*) is to seize by a rapid and sudden effort for the purpose of appropriation, as seize is for detention.

To GRASP (A. S. *grápian*, *to seize*) is to continue to hold with a strong hold or embrace, for the purpose of detaining, or from fear of losing. It is also employed of comprehension by the intellect.

To GRIPE (connected with *grasp*, *grope*, &c.) is to grasp with a squeeze or pinch; and, in its secondary sense, to keep tight, out of avarice.

"So saying, he *caught* him up, and without wing
Of Hippogrif, bore through the air sublime
Over the wilderness and o'er the plain."
MILTON.

CATCH and SEIZE have both a recognized secondary meaning; the former applying to mental deception or ensnarement, the latter to the influence of emotion, as—

"Admiration *seized*
All heaven, what this might mean or whither tend." MILTON.

"These are the agonies but of one single person whom death *snatches* away in the midst of his years, his pleasures, and his hopes."—STILLINGFLEET.

"Let the reading be pleasant and striking, and the memory will *grasp* and retain all that is sufficient for the purposes of valuable improvement."—KNOX.

"The sacrilegious *gripe* of those execrable wretches."—BURKE.

To CLUTCH (cf. Scotch *cleik*, *clek*, *to hook*, *to snatch*; and? A. S. *geläccan*, *to catch*) indicates a convulsive grasp from a desire to acquire, possess, retain, or make use of. We snatch what is to some extent, separate from us; we may clutch what is already beneath our grasp, as the hand clutches the dagger.

To GRAPPLE (Fr. *grappiller*, *grappe*, orig. *a hook*) is to seize with a hooked grasp, as with the bent finger, or a curved instrument.

"*Clutching* at the phantoms of the stock market." BANCROFT.

"The arms of York
To *grapple* with the House of Lancaster"
SHAKESPEARE.

To grapple involves some counteractive power with which the grappling contends.

CAUSTIC. SATIRICAL. BITING.

The CAUSTIC temper (Gr. καυστικός from καίειν, *to burn*; Lat. *caustĭcus*) is that which infuses into its expressions a certain sharp and penetrating spite; the BITING temper is that which attacks and tears; the SATIRICAL (Lat. *sătĭrĭcus*) is that which takes pleasure in exercising itself on matters which merit blame or ridicule. The satirical spirit has a keen eye for what is bad or wrong, and exhibits it in the most striking light. The caustic spirit finds out the weak part, and infuses into it its poison. The biting spirit lacerates wherever it has an opportunity. Vice and absurdity alone have anything to fear from satire. Weakness, imbecility, and simplicity are the prey of the caustic. Virtue itself is not safe from the biter. The satirical spirit is compounded of humour and bitterness. The caustic tone is wit or humour affected with malignity. The biting spirit is indiscriminately censorious and unfeeling. The weapons of satire are sometimes vehemence, sometimes a lively and bitter pleasantry; of the caustic style, irony, and a pleasantry which is calm, fine, and telling; of the biting tone, force and bluntness rather than sharpness. Satire falls upon persons and their manners; the others are exclusively personal. The biting style often serves the cause of hatred and uncharitableness, attacking the character and reputation. The caustic is more innocent, dealing with oddities and absurdities; the satirical may even take the side of offended virtue, reason, and sobriety, in public morals. Satire is directed to what is apparent, conspicuous, or publicly known; causticity to what is half revealed or exhibited, and biting to what is hidden, of which it seeks to raise suspicion, and sometimes will assume what does not exist.

CAUTIOUS. CAREFUL. WARY. CIRCUMSPECT. PRUDENT. DISCREET.

CAUTIOUS (Lat. *cautus*, part. of *căvēre, to take heed*) expresses the character which realizes the constant possibility of danger whether in physical or moral things. It is PRUDENCE in regard to danger in particular. It is apt to become excessive, and is then over-timidity, and caution may be either wise or weak.

"And yet these same *cautious* and quick-sighted gentlemen can wink and swallow down this sottish opinion about percipient atoms which exceeds in incredibility all the fictions of Æsop's fables."—BENTLEY.

PRUDENCE, on the other hand (Lat. *prūdentia*, for *prōvĭdentia*), is active and positive, while CAUTION is negative, with a frequent tendency to inaction. While CAUTION only deters from the dangerous, PRUDENCE prompts to the desirable, if it be safe.

"*Prudence* is goodly wisdom in knowing of things."—CHAUCER.

DISCREET (Lat. *discrētus*, from *discernĕre, to distinguish*) involves the natural aptitude to discern between good and evil, truth and falsehood, and, on a lower scale, the desirable and the undesirable. As prudence is the quality which enables us to pierce probabilities, and to act accordingly, so *discretion* has to do with facts and circumstances present and before us. The prudent man prepares for what is coming; the discreet man judges of present affairs. It is prudent to provide against bad weather; it is discreet not to allude to an offensive subject.

"He will guide his words with *discretion*."—*Bible*.

CAREFUL (having *care*) expresses what is expressed by cautious, and more besides. The careful person has before him a sense of danger, error, or failure, and, so far, he is cautious; but care proceeds also from interest, zeal, personal attachment toward others. The parent is cautious who tries to keep his child out of harm which is likely to beset him; but he is careful even when he is not thinking of danger, as in his training and education generally. Caution

avoids doing the wrong thing; carefulness seeks also rightly to do the right. Caution is principally concerned with possible error, danger, loss, or failure; careful with present needs, actions and duties.

"Jehoiada then occupied the priesthood, an honourable, wise, and religious man. To his *carefulness* it may be ascribed that the state of the church was in some slender sort upheld in those unhappy times."—RALEGH, *History of the World.*

"Then judge yourself, and prove your man
As *circumspectly* as you can;
And having made election,
Beware no negligence of yours,
Such as a friend but ill endures,
Enfeeble his affection." COWPER.

WARY and CIRCUMSPECT are closely allied; but wary (A. S. *wær, aware*) is applicable to the vigilant cunning of mere animal self-preservation, while circumspect belongs to the higher matters of prudential conduct and morality (Lat. *circumspĭcĕre, to look around*). An animal might be said to be wary, that is, to have an instinctive sense of danger; but only a moral and reasoning being could be circumspect. Wariness is rendered necessary by the *special* probability of loss or danger, while caution and circumspection are needed generally. One ought to be circumspect in all one's dealings. One needs be wary in dealing with dishonest and designing persons. Yet circumspection implies possibility of those lesser dangers which come from the thoughtless dealing with persons. Circumspection saves us from social blunders which may redound more or less to our inconvenience or detriment. It belongs principally to discourse. One is specially bound, for instance, to be circumspect in talking in the presence of strangers, or upon certain subjects, as religion and politics, as being matters on which people think and feel differently, so that offence might be easily given.

"The bear hunts them by scent till he comes in sight, when he advances *warily*, keeping above them, and concealing himself among the rocks as he makes his approaches, till he gets immediately over them and nigh enough for the purpose."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

CAVE. CAVERN. GROTTO.

The idea of a CAVE (Fr. *cave;* Lat. *cāvus, hollow*) is a deep lateral hollow in the rock or earth, involving those of darkness and depth to the profoundest degree.

The CAVERN (Lat. *cāverna*) conveys these ideas in a less degree. It expresses that of vast concavity, and of cover, enclosure, and shelter.

The GROTTO (which is from the L. Lat. *grupta;* Lat. *crypta*, and so allied to *crypt;* Gr. κρυπτός, *hidden*) is not so dark and deep as the cave, nor so vast as the cavern. Instead of the repulsive aspect of the cave or cavern, it has its use and attractions as a place of rustic retreat. There are natural as well as artificial grottos. The cave is for the wild beast, the cavern for robbers, the grotto for those who seek a cool retreat and resting-place.

CAVITY. HOLLOW. HOLE. CONCAVITY. PERFORATION. BORE. EXCAVATION. ORIFICE.

Every HOLE (A. S. *hol, a cave*) is a HOLLOW and a CAVITY (Lat. *cāvĭtātem*), but every hollow or every cavity is not a hole. Hole is generic, a deep hollow, in which the cavity communicates externally by a comparatively narrow or small aperture, or a perforation through a solid body. HOLLOW is the interior part of a hollow body excavated by nature or by art, as the hollow of a nut. Where the cavity communicates externally by two apertures, it is a PERFORATION (Lat. *perfŏrāre, to bore through*). A CONCAVITY (Lat. *concāvĭtātem*) is a slight superficial cavity, as in the eye-glasses called concave. An EXCAVATION (Lat. *excāvātionem*) is a hollow, more or less deep, which has been formed out of a solid mass by some living or mechanical agency. The term *perforation* is sometimes used for that which penetrates but does not pierce through a substance. This is better expressed by BORE, as the bore of a gun (A. S. *borian, to bore*). Bore is, however, used in the same way also, as to bore a tunnel through a mountain. A perforation is, in this case, a lighter thing than a bore, which denotes the laborious piercing on a large scale of solid masses or materials. A thin sheet of paper might be perforated,

not bored. We should not speak of the tunnel above mentioned, as a perforation, though here and there the sea, we might say, has perforated the rocks. An ORIFICE (Lat. *ōrĭfĭcium, an opening*) is an opening which resembles the mouth in form and use, as the orifice of a tube or a flower, open outwardly and closed within.

"Jehoiada the priest took a chest, and *bored* a *hole* in the lid of it."—*Bible.*

"Upon weighing the heart in my hand I found it to be extremely light, and consequently very *hollow*, which I did not wonder at, when upon looking inside of it I saw multitudes of cells and *cavities* running one within another."—*Spectator.*

CAVITY is more a term of descriptive science than HOLE, and is, of course, also essentially distinct from HOLE in the sense of perforation.

"Look upon the outside of a dome, your eye half surrounds it; look up into the inside, and at one glance you have all the prospect of it. The entire *concavity* falls into your eye at once."—*Spectator.*

"Herein may be perceived slender *perforations*, at which may be expressed a black fœculent matter."—BROWN'S *Vulgar Errors.*

"The appearance, therefore, of the dry land was by the *excavation* of certain sinus and tracts of the earth, and exaggerating and lifting up other parts of the terrestrial matters, and by this means the water subsided into those caverns and valleys prepared for its reception."—HALE.

CEASE. DISCONTINUE. TERMINATE.

To CEASE (Lat. *cessare*), when used as a transitive verb, is to put a stop to, or bring to an end simply; when as an intransitive verb, it means in the same way simply to come to an end. The sound ceased. It is more commonly used in the intransitive way. As a transitive verb, it implies a former course of operative action, which is voluntarily terminated by the agent. This notion belongs also to DISCONTINUE (O. Fr. *discontinuer*). The wind ceases to blow, the man ceases talking, and discontinues his work. Between the transitive CEASE and DISCONTINUE there exist some shades of difference. One ceases by abandoning; one discontinues by interrupting; one ceases an operation of any kind, as to cease chattering; one discontinues a set practice or process. To cease involves a more direct act than discontinue. I cease working when I feel wearied by it. In the other, a casual interruption may have compelled me to discontinue it.

"*Cease* to do evil, learn to do well."—*Bible.*

To TERMINATE (Lat. *termĭnāre, to set bounds*) is to discontinue at the ultimate point, and so often means to bring to an appointed end, when the thing ought not to be allowed to go farther. Hence the word is characteristically employed of discussion and dispute. It involves the interposition of power and authority, and stands opposed to *prolongation.* The verb *terminate* is used also intransitively, in which case it means to come to a stop, to meet with a boundary, or something which causes cessation. Both in its transitive and intransitive applications, terminate presupposes some considerable antecedent prolongation, a protraction in the subject. One may cease doing that which has employed one for a very short while, one terminates what has been long, often unduly, continued.

"The thought that our existence *terminates* with this life doth naturally check the soul in any generous pursuit."—BERKELEY.

"I wish that milder love or death,
That ends our miseries with our breath,
Would my affections *terminate;*
For to my soul, deprived of peace,
It is a torment worse than these
Thus wretchedly to love and hate."
COTTON.

CEDE. CONCEDE. YIELD. GRANT.

To CEDE (Lat. *cēdĕre*) is to give up in a formal manner, and with reference to recognized rights and claims on either side, as a nation cedes a territory under treaty to another nation. It is a tribute to the claims of justice, an act of dignity and right combined. Political rights, as well as territory, are said to be ceded.

To CONCEDE, which is a compound form of the above, is to give up with an implication of a power to withhold. It is more commonly used in matters of debate or claim. It is, therefore, an act of discretion or courtesy, or anything short of absolute compulsion.

YIELD (A. S. *yldan, to delay*) is to give up under some degree of pressure at least, if not absolute compulsion.

To GRANT (O. Fr. *graunter*) is to give voluntarily, or upon petition, but not upon coercion or compulsion. It denotes freedom and liberality in giving or giving up.

The whole island (St. Christopher) was *ceded* in sovereignty to the crown of Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht."—GRAINGER.

"The first is *petitio principii*, which fallacy is committed where that is assumed as a principle to prove another thing which is not *conceded* as true in itself."—BROWN'S *Vulgar Errors*.

"The fourth disposition for peace—an *yieldableness* upon sight of clearer truths."—BISHOP HALL.

"Both sides being desirers, and neither *granters*, they broke off the conference."—SIDNEY'S *Arcadia*.

CELEBRATE. COMMEMORATE.

To CELEBRATE (Lat. *cĕlebrāre*) is to extol or honour in a solemn manner. It is used of persons, deeds, events, and days or seasons.

To COMMEMORATE (Lat. *commĕmŏrāre*) is to recall in a solemn manner. Hence it follows that we celebrate what is marked, striking, illustrious. We commemorate what is dear and interesting to us. The same things, from different points of view, may often be said to be both celebrated and commemorated. We commemorate the battle of Waterloo when we mark the day on which it comes round in some special manner. We celebrate it when we treat it as an illustrious day with festivities, public demonstrations, panegyric speeches, and the like. The birthday of the member of a family is annually commemorated by some little observance of the day; but the event is not illustrious enough to be celebrated. Hence, too, events of importance and interest, but of a melancholy character, such as the death of a great or beloved person, would be commemorated, not celebrated. It will be observed from this that CELEBRATE refers to what is past and to what is present, COMMEMORATE only to what is past.

"It may happen in the various combinations of life, that a good man may receive favours from one who notwithstanding his accidental beneficence cannot be justly proposed to the imitation of others, and whom therefore he must find some other way of rewarding than by public *celebrations*."—*Rambler*.

"You will pardon me, I hope, for speaking in this advantageous manner of my own conduct; but as you advise me to alleviate my present uneasiness by a retrospect of my past actions, I will confess that in thus *commemorating* them I find great consolation."—MELMOTH, *Cicero*.

CEREMONY. FORM. RITE. OBSERVANCE.

All these terms relate to the solemn, prescribed, and public acts of society. FORM (Lat. *forma*) is the most generic. FORM means generally a definite and prescribed mode of doing a thing in any transaction of life, and applies to many matters which are not connected with social intercourse and manners, or have a character of publicity; as, a form of returns for registration.

"Many that vehemently oppose *forms* are the greatest formalists."—GLANVILL.

A CEREMONY (Lat. *cærĭmōnia*) is such a form as regulates public transactions, or the demeanour of individuals in cases where any degree of respect has to be shown, whether in mutual civility and propriety, or religious devotion.

"Not to use *ceremonies* at all is to teach others not to use them again, and so diminish respect to himself: especially they are not to be omitted to strangers and formal natures. But the dwelling upon them and exalting them above the moon is not only tedious, but doth diminish the faith and credit of him that speaks."—BACON.

RITE (Lat. *rītus*) is a ceremony of a peculiarly solemn or sacredly important character, which is of a religious or gravely political nature.

"It is very plain that baptism, which is by all acknowledged to be the *rite* of initiating us into Christianity, is in Scripture declared to be the *rite* whereby we are entered and admitted into the Church."—SHARP.

OBSERVANCE (Lat. *observantia*) is, like RITE, of a religious character; but as a rite is performed by public and responsible officers, observances may be kept by individuals, and even in pri

vate, as "some persons are strict in the observance of Lent." Hence the term relates more commonly to the customs and times of observance, as the observance of a sabbath, than to the objects of it. We should say, not the observance, but the *commemoration* of Christ's resurrection; on the other hand, Easter Day is observed. An *observance* is rather a way of acting than a formal, ceremonial, or definite act. Hence we speak of observing a strict silence.

"Since the obligation upon Christians to comply with the religious *observance* of Sunday arises from the public uses of the institution and the authority of the apostolic practice, the manner of *observing* it ought to be that which best fulfils these uses and conforms the nearest to this practice."—PALEY.

CHAFE. FRET. GALL. RUB.

CHAFE (Fr. *chauffer*, L. Lat. *călĕfāre*, contr. from *călĕfăcĕre*), like FRET and GALL, is used metaphorically. It is to excite heat in the mind, as physical heat or irritation is excited by friction. It is commonly employed of the excitement of feelings of irritation, vexation, annoyance, or petty anger.

To FRET (A. S. *fretan*, i.e. *for-etan*, *to eat away*) is used of small irritations, which produce their effect by their continuance and repetition, and sadden the spirits.

GALL (O. Fr. *galler*, *to rub*, *scratch*) is used of such vexations as have a humiliating effect, or, as it were, wound the pride. RUB is no more than friction, which may be wholesome and needful, or galling and vexatious, according to circumstances. It is seldom used, except in the literal sense, though the noun *rub* is sometimes employed of the rough contacts of society. It is employed, unlike the others, of the person suffering, as well as the annoyance suffered; that is, the annoyance is said to *chafe*, or the person to *chafe against* the annoyance.

"The inward *chafings* and agitations of his struggling soul."—SOUTH.

"*Fret* not thyself because of the ungodly."—*Book of Psalms.*

"The necks of mortal men having been never before *galled* with the yoke of foreign dominion, nor having had experience of that most miserable and detested condition of living in slavery."—RALEGH.

"And these are wonderfully busy and active to throw *rubs* and stumbling-blocks in our way."—SHARP.

CHALLENGE. BRAVE. DEFY DARE. CANVASS.

CHALLENGE (O. Fr. *chalongé*, Lat. *călumnia*) is to provoke or summon to answer for something, and therefore can only be *properly* used of personal adversaries. It is a call to combat, which must be appreciated by two persons. It is a rhetorical analogy to speak of *Challenging* danger. To challenge is always in words, unless some significant act be performed which has the expressiveness of words; as, to throw down a gauntlet.

BRAVE (Fr. *brave*) is to meet with courage an opposing danger or force, whether living or not, and whether initiated by words or not. It belongs to physical and moral courage. To *defy* and to *dare*, when used as active verbs, have this difference. To DEFY a person to do a thing (Fr. *défier*) implies the expression of your own cheap estimate of his efforts. To DARE him to do it (A. S. *dyrran*) is to put him on his own courage or resources, with an implied notion that he will think better than make the attempt. The original idea of *reproach*, as lying at the bottom of CHALLENGE, survives in the phrase, "to challenge the truth of a statement," that is, to call it out as untrue, with a view to combat it.

"Yet I am far from thinking this tenderness universally necessary; for he that writes may be considered as a general *challenger* whom every one has a right to attack."—*Rambler.*

"Face not me, thou hast *braved* many men; *brave* not me. I will neither be faced nor *braved*."—SHAKESPEARE.

The radical meaning of defy (L. Lat. *diffidare*) is *to reject affiance*, i.e., faith given; hence to proclaim hostility, or to renounce. So Sir T. Wyatt's oration—

"What word gave I unto thee, Mason? What message? I *defy* all familiarity and friendship betwixt us. Say thy worst."

"What! is Brutus sick,
And will he steal out of his wholesome bed
To *dare* the vile contagion of the night?"
SHAKESPEARE.

To CANVASS, bears a close similarity in application to CHALLENGE, when used of statements. It is a curious word in itself. Canvas (Fr. *canebas*) is the Lat. *cannăbis, hemp*, then woven hemp; then again, as such a material was employed as a strainer, to canvas a matter bore the meaning of the analogous verb to sift; that is to separate carefully the component parts for the purpose of seeing of what the matter was composed, or what it amounted to, examining it to the very grounds.

"An opinion that we are likely soon to *canvas*."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

It is a step in advance of CHALLENGE. For to challenge is simply to call in question, to canvass is to proceed with the question and discuss it.

CHAMPION. HERO. COMBATANT.

A CHAMPION (O. Fr. *champion*, L. Lat. *campiōnem, a man of the field*) is one who is ready singly to contend on behalf of another or a cause, primarily in physical combat, secondarily in any kind of effort or contest; as, a champion in the cause of liberty, religious freedom, political equality, and the like.

"In a battle every man should fight as if he were the single *champion*; in preparations for war every man should think as if the last event depended on his own counsel."—*Idler*.

HERO (Lat. *hēros*) expresses a man of distinguished valour or daring, whether as a champion, combatant, soldier, or man of adventure. The champion is ready to fight; the hero has fought, and has perhaps retired to live a life of peace, and enjoy the reputation of his deeds.

"The most magnanimous *hero* of the field will earnestly solicit the aid of a physician on a bed of sickness."—COGAN.

A COMBATANT (Fr. *combatant*, part. of O. Fr. *combatre, to fight*) is a hand-to-hand fighter in a personal engagement. The term is hardly applicable to regular and disciplined fighting of armies on the modern field of battle. Individual soldiers in action are not called combatants.

"To have the *combat* ended by parting the *combatants*."—SOUTH.

CHANCE. ACCIDENT. FORTUNE. HAZARD. PROBABILITY.

CHANCE (Fr. *chance*, L. Lat. *cădentia*) is a *befalling*. It is used, as was observed under ACCIDENT, in two distinct though closely associated meanings; either, 1, to express the absence of assignable cause, or, 2, the absence of design. An instance of the former is, "By chance the tyrant that morning was in a good humour;" an instance of the latter would be, "I aimed at the red ball, and by chance I struck the white one also." In the former case no cause can be specified, though of course some cause existed; in the latter the cause might be distinctly seen and observed, but the effect was not the result designed.

"It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression that the Scripture thus ascribes every event to the providence of God, but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason that there is no such thing as *chance* or accident; it being evident that these words do not signify anything really existing, anything that is truly an agent or the cause of any event, but they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate cause."—CLARKE.

ACCIDENT (Lat. *accĭdere, to befall*) is relative, as CHANCE is absolute. Accident is chance in some *effect* produced. In chance the abstract may not have become the concrete, as when we say, "Yes, but what if it should chance to turn out differently?" or, "There is a chance of its turning out differently;" but an accident is historical and actual. Hence it follows that accident is very often partial chance, in which chance and design are blended; yet the effect was not designed. Such would be the character of the remark, "He wounded him by accident in fencing." There is a complexion of the untoward in the word accident; if the contrary is meant, we add a word, as a lucky accident.

"Place, riches, favour—
Prizes of *accident* as oft as merit."
SHAKESPEARE

FORTUNE (Lat. *fortūna*) is chance or accident as they regard human life

and its hopes, employments, and undertakings, for good or evil, success or failure. Chance has nothing in it either of order or design. One does not impersonate it, nor attribute to it knowledge or will. Fortune forms plans, but without choice. One attributes to it a will without discernment, and says that she has freaks, or acts blindfold.

"*Fortune* a goddess is to fools alone;
The wise are always masters of their own."
DRYDEN.

HAZARD (Fr. *hasard*, which originally meant *a game at dice*. *See* LITTRÉ, *Dict.*, and also *Supp.*) is the operation of chance so far as man voluntarily places himself within the range of it, and leans to an unfavourable issue. We speak of the chance of success, as well as failure or defeat; of the hazard of defeat, but not of victory. Men will often hazard the loss of a lesser good, for the chance of a greater, or what they may esteem to be such.

"I am always willing to run some *hazard* of being tedious, in order to be sure that I am perspicuous."—ADAM SMITH.

PROBABILITY (Lat. *prŏbābĭlĭtātem*) partakes of the mixed nature of certainty and chance. It is founded upon the doctrine that "like causes produce like effects." The chance or uncertainty is represented by the question, "Are the causes in the present case sufficiently like to past experience?" If so, the thing is probable.

"As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another; so *probability* is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs whose connexion is not constant or immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false rather than the contrary."
—LOCKE.

CHANGE. ALTER. VARY. CONVERT.

CHANGE (Fr. *changer*), which is generic, as also the other two of these synonyms, is employed both as a transitive and an intransitive verb. Used transitively, to change a thing is to put another in its place. This loss of identity is not expressed by the intransitive form; as, he changes every day. To ALTER (L. Lat. *altĕrāre*) is to preserve the identity while we change some portion of it, or some property of it, as its shape or colour. To VARY (Lat. *vārĭāre*) is to cause a thing to differ at different times, or one portion of it to differ from another. A lady varies her appearance when she frequently changes her dress. Even where the same things are referred to, CHANGE is a stronger term than ALTER; the most trivial removal or substitution of detail alters a thing, yet the change may be almost imperceptible. In this case changes are alterations of a considerable character. In some particular connexions these distinctive forces are very perceptible. We alter our opinions when they become in some respects not what we used to hold; we change them when we abandon them altogether, and adopt others in their stead. We should be said to vary a statement if we made it in different forms at different times, to alter it if we made the change but once. To CONVERT (Lat. *convertĕre*) is to transmute or change from one thing to another. Such a change may be either internal and substantive, or external and relative, as wine may be converted into vinegar, or a walking-stick into a weapon of defence.

"That still lessens.
The sorrow, and *converts* it nigh to joy."
MILTON.

"I would not exclude *alteration* neither, but even when I *changed* it should be to preserve."—BURKE.

"Whether shall we profess some trade or skill,
Or shall we *vary* our device at will?"
SPENSER.

CHANGE. VARIATION. VARIETY. ALTERATION.

CHANGE marks the passage from one state to another. VARIATION the rapid passage through many successive states; VARIETY the existence of many individuals of the same species, under conditions partly like, and partly different. ALTERATION is the changed state of an individual. The two former are in action or move-

ment, the latter is in essence or nature. A certain rose may change in colour as it grows. Such a change may be regarded as an alteration of colour, as regards the individual rose, or a variation from the standard or common colour of the kind. Variety would be found in different roses, or in different parts of the same roses.

CHARACTER. LETTER.

CHARACTER is to LETTER (Lat. *lĭtĕra*) as genus to species. Every letter is a character, but every character is not a letter. CHARACTER embraces other distinctive signs stamped or engraved. We might speak of hieroglyphic characters, or the characters of short-hand, which nevertheless are not letters. A letter is a component part of the common alphabet of any language.

"Almost all the men had their names traced upon their arms in indelible *characters* of a black colour."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"The essence of *letters* doth consist in their power or proper sound, which may be naturally fixed and stated from the manner of forming them by the instruments of speech, and either is or should be the same in all languages."—WILKINS.

CHARACTER. REPUTATION. CREDIT.

In this connexion CHARACTER is used of the whole complex constitution of a man's personal qualities. It therefore exists anterior to and independent of his reputation. A common character has no reputation at all. When used of the personal stamp as *regarded by others*, it still differs somewhat from reputation. It is moral, while reputation extends to other qualities. A man has a character for honesty or dishonesty; he has hardly a character for talent; in this case we should use REPUTATION (Lat. *rĕpŭtātiōnem*), because the mental qualities of a person are not that aspect of his nature which passes commonly before the world for judgment. His moral qualities affect his friends and connexions, his intellectual qualities affect himself. CREDIT is that trustworthiness which is based upon what is known of character (Lat. *crēdĕre, to trust*), and relates both to right conduct and the truth of propositions. Credit may be given on specific occasions only; character and reputation are permanent. Character is borne, reputation acquired, credit given. Reputation is more than ordinary; character and credit belong to ordinary deeds, conduct, and persons, unless some specific epithet is added.

"He will represent to him as often, with as much zeal as you or I should, the virtues of his ancestors, and what a glorious weight of illustrious *characters* he has to support."—MELMOTH, *Cicero*.

"*Reputation* is the greatest engine by which those who are possessed of power must make that power serviceable to the ends and uses of government."—ATTERBURY.

"If the Gospel and the Apostles may be *credited*, no man can be a Christian without charity, and without that faith which works not by force, but by love."—LOCKE.

CHARACTER. STAMP. NATURE. KIND. SORT. ASSORTMENT. SPECIES. GENUS. FORM. CAST. ORDER. AIR. MOULD. SHAPE.

CHARACTER in this sense is purposely vague. It is that view of the nature which is external and strikes the natural eye or the eye of the mind as being of a certain order. A landscape of a barren character is one in which certain broad features of barrenness predominate, so as to affect the whole. This is character, in the sense of outline or general configuration, as it strikes the eye at a single glance.

"Let a man think what multitudes of those among whom he dwells are totally ignorant of his name and *character*."—BLAIR.

That is, generally, what manner of man he is. On the other hand, the verb *characterize* has rather the sense of affixing by words an appropriate mark upon a thing or person, as:—

"You must know, sir, that I am one of that species of women whom you have *characterized* under the name of jilts."—*Spectator*.

STAMP (Ger. *stampfen*) is that general impression which a thing gives us of itself: it is in English what character (χάραχτήρ, *impress, stamp*) is in Greek. It is used also in detail, as we speak of a stamp of nobility in personal appearance. The verb *to stamp* is in its secondary sense moral—to

affix a moral character, or at least a distinctive one; to *characterize* is rather logical and definitive. Circumstances may stamp a man, words characterize him.

"A young maid truly of the finest *stamp* of beauty."—SIDNEY, *Arcadia.*

NATURE (Lat. *nātūra*) is a word of wider meaning, embracing all that makes a thing to be what it is, its essence or definition, its properties, forms, tendencies, faculties, qualities, and the like.

"Nature, then, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is the beginning of motion and rest, in that thing wherein it is properly and principally, not by accident; for all things to be seen (which are done neither by fortune nor by necessity, and are not divine, nor have any such efficient cause) are called material, as having a proper and peculiar *nature* of their own."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch.*

KIND (A. S. *cynd*) is the nature according to its place in creation, while SORT (Fr. *sorte*) denotes mere assemblage on vague principles of similarity without any natural affinity; as, a certain kind of animal, a certain sort of coat. When things of a sort are collected for the purpose of being more conveniently dealt with as such, it is called an ASSORTMENT. It is, however, possible that any parcel of things may have a natural affinity, but it is not simply as having it that they are *sorted.*

"Some of you, on pure instinct of nature,
Are led by *kind* to admire your fellow-creature." DRYDEN.

"Shell-fish have been by some of the ancients compared and *sorted* with insects."—BACON.

"An adjective is by nature a general, and in some measure an abstract word, and necessarily presupposes the idea of a certain species or *assortment* of things to all of which it is equally applicable."—SMITH, *Formation of Languages.*

SPECIES and GENUS are Latin scientific, and may perhaps be considered correlative, terms. In Aristotelian logic, the genus is the higher species, that is, the species which approaches nearer to the abstract or supreme genus; while species is the lower genus, or that which approaches nearer to the individual. So the same may be genus or species according to its relative position in the scale.

"In the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the *genus*, or next general word which comprehends it."—LOCKE.

Not that this is the whole process of logical definition, for to the genus has to be added the *differentia* or distinctive property.

FORM (Lat. *forma*) is a particular mode of manifestation in anything which is wont to manifest itself under several like or cognate manifestations, as the same or different form of hat, the same or different form of address, the same or different form of speech.

"Of bodies changed to various *forms* I sing." DRYDEN'S *Ovid.*

CAST (Dan. *kaste, to throw*) is used almost in the same way as MOULD (Fr. *moule*, Lat. *mŏdŭlus*); but we commonly apply CAST to what is personal in countenance, character, appearance, and MOULD when we entertain the idea not only of shape or impression on ourselves, but of formative origin. The two are often associated in the same phrase; as, to be cast in a different mould.

"The business men are chiefly conversan in does not only give a certain *cast* or turc to their minds, but is very often apparent ir their outward behaviour and some of the most indifferent actions of their lives."—*Spectator.*

"My sonne, if thou of such a *molde*
Art made, now tell me pleine thy shrift."
GOWER.

ORDER (Fr. *ordre*) denotes commonly not only the characteristic nature and kind, but a reference to a scale; as we speak of a high or low order. The notion conveyed by such an expression as a thing of the same or a different order, is partly scientific and partly not. The word order in scientific classification commonly means a group of allied individuals more comprehensive than the genus. The term is employed to represent a class or community, which is bound together by common rights, privileges, similarity of occupation, and object, being so recognized by society or the State; as, the order of Priests or Jesuits, the monastic order, or Benedictine order. As employed conventionally, the term

implies relative dignity, value, or worth.

"Men shulde it in the prestes find,
Their *order* is of so high a kynde."
GOWER.

AIR (Fr. *air*, Lat. *aër*; so *spīrĭtus* means *disposition*) signifies such a manifestation of character as is made involuntarily. It is applied both to persons and analogously to things; as we say, such and such a theory wears an intelligible air, by which we mean to grant that there may be something in it accordant with truth and common sense, if it were worth while to examine it.

"It is certain that married persons who are possessed with a mutual esteem, not only catch the *air* and way of talk from one another, but fall into the same traces of thinking and liking."—*Spectator*.

SHAPE (A. S. verb *sceapian*) is simply such external form or configuration as belongs or may be conceived to belong to anything. It differs from form in this character of externality. The form of a thing results from the relative aggregation of its parts, both internal and external, that is, its solidity as well as its surface. SHAPE refers to the superficies, but not the substance. The form includes length, breadth, and thickness; the shape is only what meets the eye. This difference appears more strongly in the verbs than the nouns: to form a thing is as it were to create it. God formed, not merely shaped, man out of the dust of the ground. Nature forms the marble, man shapes the block. He may also be said to form the statue, because he actually makes it; as such, it did not exist before. To form involves the use and preparation of materials; to shape may be no more than to give them a contour superficially.

"And eke his garment to be thereto meet,
He wilfully did cut, and *shape* anew."
SPENSER.

CHARACTERISTIC. DISTINCTIVE.

CHARACTERISTIC (Gr. χαρακτήρ, *an engraved mark*) is employed of that which illustrates or represents the character in a telling way; DISTINCTIVE (Lat. *distinguĕre*, part. *distinctus*) of that which so marks a thing as to separate it from others. That is characteristic, which leads the mind to associate the person or object at once with the class to which he belongs, or the nature which he bears. That is distinctive, which prevents the mind from confounding such person or object with other classes, or investing them with other natures than their own. The distinctive puts back what is strange, alien, unlike; the characteristic brings forward what is native, natural, proper. CHARACTERISTIC has a positive, DISTINCTIVE a negative force. Distinctive is a graver word than characteristic. DISTINCTIVE belongs to the inherent nature and properties of things, CHARACTERISTIC to our impressions about them and the general way in which they strike us. That which is distinctive marks the properties of the class, that which is characteristic expresses the peculiarities of the individual.

CHARGE. ACCUSE. IMPEACH. ARRAIGN. CRIMINATE. INDICT.

Of these CHARGE (Fr. *charger*, *to load*) is the most generic. It is to lay upon a person a burden, hence specifically of imputed guilt; and this either formally or legally, or generally and morally. Hence it refers to many things which are not of the specific nature of crimes; thus, a dereliction of duty, or dishonesty, or a want of fidelity to one's self, may be the object of a charge. "I charge him with having indolently let slip many occasions of improving his condition." There is another use of the term in which the burden laid is one of responsibility, without any connexion with the imputation of fault or crime. It is a word of solemn adjuration, and of ordinary commission. I charge another with a message, or I charge him to speak the truth.

"Men do not pick quarrels with their friends, and therefore when we find any *charging* the Scripture with obscurity and imperfection, we have reason to believe they have no comfort from it."—STILLINGFLEET.

ACCUSE (Lat. *accūsāre*) refers to failings, faults, or crimes by which *others* are injured. It also implies more than a mere mouth-to-mouth

imputation; it is formal and public. I may charge a man with a crime between myself and him, but if I accuse him of it, I make the charge more or less a matter of publicity. It is also more strict and technical than CHARGE. I charge a person with anything that he has wrongly committed or omitted. The subject of accusation is commonly a distinct offence, bearing a distinct name; as, theft, slander, murder. CRIMINATE (Lat. *crīmĭnāre*, and *-ri*) is yet stronger. It is to bring against another a charge in such a way that he finds himself compelled to deal with the matter as personal and imminent. Circumstances may criminate, while only persons charge or accuse. CRIMINATE has a stronger relation to the state of the person. A man criminated feels himself placed in the position of a grave offender.

"Their thoughts the meanwhile *accusing* or else *excusing* one another."—*Bible.*

"To *criminate* with the heavy and ungrounded charge of disloyalty and disaffection an uncorrupt, independent, and reforming parliament."—BURKE.

IMPEACH and ARRAIGN rather imply than express an accusation or charge. IMPEACH (O. Fr. *empescher*, prob. Lat. *impĕdĭcare, to fetter:* but see LITTRÉ) is officially to charge with misbehaviour in office, and may relate to anything which is of the nature of an offence considering the office held. ARRAIGN (O. Fr. *aranier*, L. Lat. *arrātiōnāre*) is to call to account, and is characteristically employed of the exercise of personal power of judgment. It is to call personally to account in a specific and summary manner, and may be directed against a course of conduct in an individual as well as specific matters of misdemeanour; but ARRAIGN more commonly relates to an act, IMPEACH to a series of acts. IMPEACH is formal and official, ARRAIGN is informal and personal. ARRAIGN involves a decisive act of power in a superior, of boldness in an equal or inferior; for inasmuch as the essence of the word is only to cite in a summary manner to give an account, this may be either by an equal or inferior before a superior, or by a superior before himself. He who arraigns, judges also and decides. This is not the case with IMPEACH. In England the House of Commons impeach, and the House of Lords determine the impeachment.

"Censure, which *arraigns* the public actions and the private motives of princes, has ascribed to envy a conduct which might be attributed to the prudence and moderation of Hadrian."—GIBBON.

"Of these the representatives of the people, or House of Commons, cannot properly judge, because their constituents are the parties injured, and can therefore only *impeach*. But before what court shall this impeachment be tried? Not before the ordinary tribunals, which would naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser. Reason, therefore, will suggest that this branch of the legislature, which represents the people, must bring its charge against the other branch, which consists of the nobility, who have neither the same interests nor the same passions as popular assemblies."—BLACKSTONE.

"An *indictment* is a written accusation of one or more persons of a crime or misdemeanour preferred to and presented upon oath by a grand jury."—*Ibid.*

INDICT (Lat. *indīcĕre*, part. *indictus*) is a term regulated by the form of process and nature of the offence. In law, it is the peculiar province of a grand jury to *indict*, as it is of a hous of representatives to *impeach*.

CHARGE. CARE. MANAGEMENT. ADMINISTRATION. CONTROL. GOVERNMENT.

CHARGE in this sense denotes *delegated* care under circumstances of responsibility. CARE denotes no more than time bestowed upon an object with personal labour or attention. To take care of a child is to keep him out of harm's way. It is the work of solicitude and affection, as CHARGE is of responsibility and duty. To take charge of him is to do everything in connexion with him which another would require. For we take care of what is our own; we take charge of what is another's.

"I can never believe that the repugnance with which Tiberius took the *charge* of the government upon him was wholly feigned."—CUMBERLAND.

MANAGEMENT (Fr. *ménage, housekeeping*, L. Lat. *mansiōnātĭcum*) is the concurrent control which regulates what has progression in itself, so that it may operate in the way in which it

is designed; as, we speak of the management of a house, a garden, a steam-engine, a horse, a matter. It implies subjection where persons are concerned, as in the management of a school. ADMINISTRATION (Lat. *administrationem*) relates to offices of power and responsibility. Administration takes effect on men, management may belong only to machines; administration is executive, management may be manipulative. Administration, however, is always ministerial, that is, consists in putting the will or power of another in force; while GOVERNMENT (Lat. *gŭbernāre, to steer*) involves every exercise of authority, political, civil, or domestic. The government of a country, when the term is not used of persons, is an abiding and perpetual power; the administration belongs to the persons who may be in office from time to time. The character of the term is seen in its etymology. Government is literally the office of him who *holds the helm*. Its common acceptation is the machine of political rule, but in its wider sense it exists wherever there is authority on one side and dependence on the other. Administration in things political deals with matters of the highest importance; as, Justice, Finance, and general order. CONTROL is literally, to verify a roll by a *duplicate roll* (O. Fr. *contre-rôle*), hence to govern in movement and action where an independent will and power exist. Machines are managed; men, their acts, wills, desires, are controlled.

"I think myself indebted to you beyond all expression of gratitude for your *care* of my dear mother."—JOHNSON.

"Scripture gives something more than obscure intimations that the holy angels are employed upon extraordinary occasions in the affairs of men and the *management* of this sublunary world."—HORSLEY.

"He (the Earl of Clarendon) was a good chancellor, only a little too rough, but very impartial in the *administration* of justice."—BURNET.

"That which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And that is that, and that only, which did or could give any beginning to any lawful *government* in the world."—LOCKE.

"If the seeds of piety and virtue be but carefully sown at first, very much may be done by this means, even in the most depraved natures, towards the altering and changing of them, however to the checking and *controlling* of our vicious inclinations."—TILLOTSON.

CHARLATAN. QUACK. MOUNTEBANK. EMPIRIC.

Etymologically the CHARLATAN (Fr. *charlatan*) from the Italian *ciarlare, to prate*, is a prater. The QUACK, a shorter form of the older QUACKSALVER, is a noisy advertiser of his medicine. The MOUNTEBANK is one who does the same thing upon a bench in public, from the Italian *montimbanco, montare in banco, to mount on a bench*. The EMPIRIC, as here used, means one whose skill or knowledge depends on EXPERIENCE (Gr. ἡ ἐμπειρική, *practice*) without scientific principle. They express only different aspects of the character of the pretender to skill and knowledge. The charlatan is full of self-assurance; the quack is likely to be an impostor; the mountebank is the most demonstrative, and the empiric the most venturesome. The charlatan deserves humiliation; the quack exposure; the mountebank ridicule, which yet he does not dread; the empiric to be taught that exact knowledge is, in his case, not to be disregarded without injury and injustice. (*Empiricism*, however, is also used sometimes in a sense not unfavourable, to mean knowledge which, although knowledge—as *e.g.* the effect of some medicines—has not yet been shown to rest upon a scientific basis; and it is the only one word which expresses this.)

CHASE. HUNT. PURSUE.

To HUNT (A. S. *huntian*) is to seek by close pursuit, by a search for objects *not within sight*. CHASE (Fr. *chasser*, Lat. *captiare*) is a pursuit of objects which *are within sight*. The fox is hunted in the cover, and chased when he leaves it. This distinction is often lost sight of; and we speak of a boy hunting a butterfly, instead of chasing it. To PURSUE (Fr. *poursuivre*), like HUNT, includes the idea of following after what is not within sight. A wild animal is pursued by

the track which he leaves; when he catches sight of his pursuers, he probably flies, and is then chased. Thus CHASE involves more simply than PURSUE the notion of driving an object before one. PURSUE, as it denotes primarily the following of a continuous course, is directly applicable to the course itself, as to pursue a line of conduct. One pursues when one follows after an object, in spite of danger, difficulties, and obstacles, with sustained effort and energy.

"Now therefore let not my blood fall to the earth before the face of the Lord; for the King of Israel is come out to seek a flea; as when one doth *hunt* a partridge in the mountains."—*Bible.*

"The glare did not continue long before it rained again, and kept us from sight of each other; but if they had seen and *chased* us, we were resolved to run our bark and canoes ashore, and take ourselves to the mountains."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages.*

"Impell'd with steps unceasing to *pursue*
Some fleeting good that mocks me with the view,
That, like the circle bounding earth and skies,
Allures from far, yet, as I follow, flies."
GOLDSMITH.

CHASTEN. CHASTISE. PURIFY. PUNISH. CORRECT. DISCIPLINE.

Of these the two first are formed from the Latin *castus, chaste, pure,* and the last from *pūrĭfĭcāre, to make pure.* The term PURIFY is applicable to the removal of what is noxious or impure in a moral, physical, or even ceremonial sense. To CHASTEN is to purify morally and spiritually by the providential visitation of distress and affliction; or, generally, to purify from errors or faults, as the effect of discipline. It implies imperfection, but not guilt.

"Oh, gently on thy suppliant's head,
Dread goddess, lay thy *chastening* hand;
Not in thy Gorgon terrors clad,
Nor circled with the vengeful band,
As by the impious thou art seen."
GRAY, *Hymn to Adversity.*

"He *chastises* and *corrects* as to Him seems best in His deep, unsearchable, and secret judgment, and all for our good."—BURTON, *Anatomy of Melancholy.*

"It was a received opinion in the ancient world that human nature had contracted a stain or pollution, and that not only particular *purifyings*, but also some general sanctification was necessary to put man in a capacity of being restored to the favour of the Deity."—WARBURTON.

"Yet these, receiving grafts of other kind,
Or thence transplanted, change their savage mind,
Their wildness lose, and quitting Nature's part,
Obey the rules and *discipline* of art."
DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

"O Lord, *correct* me, but with judgment; not in Thine anger, lest Thou bring me to nothing."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

CHASTISE, on the other hand, implies specific guilt or some offence. To PUNISH (Lat. *pūnire*) differs from CHASTISE in the object aimed at. In the former, it is to visit the offence upon the individual offender for his own good in correction and reformation; in the latter, it is to satisfy public justice upon a member of a community. It is to be observed that punishment is often used of the consequences of wrong, irrespectively of any personal authority exercised.

"I proceed in the next place to consider the general nature of *punishments* which are evils or inconveniences consequent upon crimes and misdemeanours, being devised, denounced, and inflicted by human laws in consequence of disobedience or misbehaviour in those to regulate whose conduct such laws were respectively made."—BLACKSTONE.

To CORRECT (Lat. *corrĭgĕre*, sup. *correctum*) is, literally, to set right. As used of punishment, correction looks no further than to the individual fault.

DISCIPLINE (Lat. *disciplina*) has for its object the amelioration of the whole character, and the *prevention* of offences, nor does it imply necessarily that any have been committed. The purest and best natures recognize the need of discipline in themselves. Discipline aims at the removal of bad habits, and the substitution of good ones, especially those of order, regularity, and obedience.

CHASTITY. CONTINENCE, or CONTINENCY.

CHASTITY (Lat. *castĭtātem*) is the regulation of the sexual desires, as by marriage, and all practical rules or modes of life which tend to it.

CONTINENCE (Lat. *continentia*) is

the absolute refraining from all such indulgences under interdiction. Chastity is enjoined upon all Christians. Continence is enjoined, for instance, on the Romish clergy. Chastity extends to thoughts, conversation, reading, attitude, movements, society. It is accordingly possible to be chaste and not continent, continent and not chaste. Chastity is a virtue suitable to all ages and states, continence is a rule of celibacy.

"It was then that some gallant spirits, struck with a generous indignation at the tyranny of these miscreants, blessed solemnly by the bishop, and followed by the praises and vows of the people, sallied forth to vindicate the *chastity* of women, and to redress the wrongs of travellers and peaceable men."—BURKE, *Abridgment of English History.*

"Such persons as have not the gift of *continency*."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

CHEAT. DEFRAUD. TRICK.

CHEAT (a corruption of *escheat*, as reflecting upon the character of the escheator) respects primarily the gain *to yourself* resulting from fraudulent practice upon another.

DEFRAUD (Lat. *defraudāre*) respects the *loss to him.* CHEAT is only applied to appropriations of minor value; DEFRAUD to those of the largest amount. DEFRAUD hence regards matters of value generally, as rights and privileges. CHEAT usually regards possessions. Cheating implies knavery; defrauding a settled plan or plot against another's interests.

"But since it is not so much worth our labour to know how deep the pit is into which we are fallen as how to come out of it, hear rather, I beseech you, for a conclusion, how we may avoid the deceit of heart; even just so as we would prevent the nimble feats of some *cheating* juggler—search him, watch him, trust him not."—BISHOP HALL.

A man may be cheated out of that which he is aiming at obtaining; he is only defrauded of what he can claim as actually his. In games of chance or competition men often cheat; they do not defraud.

"The statute mentions only fraudulent gifts to third persons, and procuring them to be seized by sham process, in order to *defraud* creditors."—BLACKSTONE.

To TRICK (Fr. *tricher*) is adroitly to deceive another, and implies more ingenuity than cheating. It does not of necessity involve any appropriation to one's self, or any loss to another, but may be dictated by mischievous as well as dishonest motives.

CHEER. ANIMATE. ENCOURAGE. ENLIVEN. EXHILARATE. COMFORT. CONSOLE. SOLACE.

To CHEER (Fr. *chère, countenance, mien*) is to put into good or better spirits. It respects a previous state of mental depression or despondency, and a change to a sober and quiet satisfaction at an improved state of circumstances.

"The Christian is justly *cheered* by the assurance he has that there will come a time when oppressed and disfigured innocency shall shine forth and triumph, and his good name, as well as his body, shall have a glorious resurrection even in the sight of his accusers and enemies, and all those whom their slanders did either prevail with or startle."—BOYLE.

To ANIMATE (Lat. *ănĭmāre*) is to put life, vitality, or vivacity into; and respects a previous state of dulness, slowness, indifference, or inertness. It has an influence on the looks, words, and movements, as when an orator in the course of his oration becomes more animated. Reflexion cheers, passion animates.

"Wherever we are formed by Nature to any active purpose, the passion which *animates* us to it is attended with delight or a pleasure of some kind."—BURKE.

ENCOURAGE (Fr. *encourager*) is to give *heart;* and so respects a previous state of comparative diffidence or irresolution. It implies something proposed as an aim of action, either by the words of another, or by the mind reflecting on some external event.

"Plato would have women follow the camp, to be spectators and *encouragers* of noble actions."—BURTON.

ENLIVEN is the English equivalent of *animate;* but it is not so grave a word, and relates to the minor matters of feeling and manner. It has also the meaning of to quicken what was previously less lively, and may be

employed of purely physical energies; as, to enliven a fire, that is, to make it burn more brightly. It is also directly applicable to works of art and descriptions or narratives.

"By this means I was enabled to *enliven* the poems by various touches of partial description."—MASON.

EXHILARATE (Lat. *exhilārāre*) denotes such cheering as has a combined effect on the spirits and the bodily frame. It may come of a primary influence on either, as to be exhilarated by good wine or good news. It denotes an effect upon the nervous system, and is thus exclusively applicable to persons.

"The truth is that this remedy, like strong drink to a nervous body, enlivens for a while by an unnatural *exhilaration*."—KNOX.

COMFORT (Lat. *confortāre, to make strong*) and CONSOLE (Lat. *consōlāri*) both relate to relief brought from previous trouble of mind through the aid of admonition or reflexion; but COMFORT denotes the actual substitution of *happy* thoughts; while CONSOLE denotes only the removal or diminution of *the unhappy*. Comfort and consolation address themselves to the intellectual nature.

"*Consolation* or *comfort* are words which in their proper acceptation signify some alleviation to that pain to which it is not in our power to afford the proper and adequate remedy. They imply rather an augmentation of the power of bearing than a diminution of the burden. To that grief which arises from a great loss he only brings the true remedy who makes his friend's condition the same as before; but he may be properly termed a *comforter* who, by persuasion, extenuates the pain of poverty, and shows, in the style of Hesiod, that half is more than the whole."—*Rambler*.

SOLACE (Lat. *sōlatium*) differs from COMFORT and CONSOLE in being never applied absolutely to human agents. A solace is a continuous consolation accruing from *something impersonal*, as certain modes or means of occupation, such as reflexions, employments, books, or a person regarded as a blessing or possesion.

"The ingenious biographer of the poet Gray has informed us that the most approved productions of his friend were brought forth soon after the death of one whom the poet loved. Sorrow led him to seek for *solace* of the muse."—KNOX, *Essays*.

CHEERFUL. MERRY. SPRIGHTLY. GAY. MIRTHFUL. JOVIAL. LIVELY. VIVACIOUS. SPORTIVE. BLITHE. BUXOM.

CHEERFUL (*see* CHEER) is used both of that which possesses, and that which promotes good spirits; as, a cheerful disposition, cheerful tidings. As applied to persons, CHEERFUL denotes an habitual state of mind, the natural happiness of an even and contented disposition.

MERRY points to an occasional and transient elevation of spirits. *Mirth*, which is the cognate noun to MERRY, is less tranquil than cheerfulness; it requires the companionship of others to feed upon—social excitement and the noise of jests and laughter are needful for mirth.

"Whoever has passed an evening with serious, melancholy people, and has observed how suddenly the conversation was animated, and what sprightliness diffused itself over the countenance, discourse, and behaviour of every one on the accession of a good-humoured, lively companion, such a one will easily allow that *cheerfulness* carries great weight with it, and naturally conciliates the good will of mankind."—HUME.

SPRIGHTLY (= *spirited*, from *spright*, a form of the word *spirit*) is purely a personal epithet. Sprightliness is a constitutional buoyancy and briskness of mind which shows itself in the bodily movements. It is in this extended sense only becoming in youth, and as associated with beauty. A sprightly damsel, or a sprightly dame.

"Parents and schoolmasters may not be displeased at unlucky tricks played by their lads, as showing a sagacity and *sprightliness* they delight to behold. Yet they will not suffer them to pass with impunity, lest it should generate idleness and other mischiefs."—SEARCH.

GAY (Fr. *gai*) is a term which denotes less of animal spirits, and expresses the brightness which appears outside, in the appearance or the aspect of things external; as, a gay countenance, a gay dress, gay plumage, a gay scene. It combines the ideas of cheerfulness and showiness. As cheerfulness is unruffled,

mirth tumultuous, sprightliness buoyant, so gaiety is characteristically self-indulgent. The lover of gaiety despises, dislikes, and avoids the responsibilities, duties, and sobrieties of existence, and would, if possible, ignore its troubles altogether.

"Profane men stick not, in the *gaiety* of their hearts, to say that a strict piety is good for nothing but to make the owners of it troublesome to themselves and useless to the rest of the world."—ATTERBURY.

MIRTHFUL is, as we have seen, only another form of merry; but it points more specifically to the laughter and the jest and the fun which are always *ready to appear* in the merry. MIRTHFUL is more demonstrative than MERRY, and involves objects or subjects of it; while MERRY denotes no more than a condition of the spirits. The merry are gay, the mirthful are jocose also.

"If great crimes and great miseries be made the matter of our *mirth*, what can be the argument of our sorrow?"—SOUTH.

JOVIAL is a term expressive of a constitutional habit of mind and body. It meant, literally, born under the genial influence of the planet Jupiter, and was opposed to *Saturnine*. It denotes a tendency to sensual merriment, and a contempt for the cares and anxieties of life.

"In pure good will I took this *jovial* spark
Of Oxford, he—a most egregious clerk."
POPE.

LIVELY is exhibiting *life* as contrary to dull or lifeless. It denotes an energetic action of the vital principle, whether of the sense or understanding, without of necessity implying merriment or gaiety. A lively child is the opposite to a dull child, brisk, bright, intelligent, observant. Lively conversation, lively movements, lively descriptions.

"Every person knows how faint the conception is which we form of anything with our eyes open in comparison of what we can form with our eyes shut, and that in proportion as we can suspend the exercise of our other senses, the *liveliness* of our conception increases."—STEWART.

VIVACIOUS (Lat. *vīvācem*) denotes matured liveliness, when those faculties which are developed by after years are seen to partake of the same liveliness of youth. It indicates a power as well as an activity of life, a capacity of keen appreciation of external things, which by no means implies perpetual merriment, but is as ready to express dissatisfaction as pleasure from the objects and experiences of life. The vivacious person lives, as it were, faster and more fully than his opposite, and experiences more, and more varied, sensations. Indeed, in Old English the word meant *long-lived*, or having a tenacity to life.

"He had great *vivacity* in his fancy, as may appear by his inclination to poetry and the lively illustrations and many tender strains in his contemplations."—BURNET, *Life of Hale*.

SPORTIVE is tending to *sport*, which is practical merriment in this case; so that the word contains an element of something bordering on mockery or amusement at the expense of others, or of heedlessness. It carries with it an air of unregulated play of mind and speech, though not amounting to wantonness; but is more innocent when applied, as it often is, to the natural playfulness of dumb and especially young animals.

"If a history so circumstantiated as that is shall be resolved into fable or parable, no history whatever can stand secure, but a wide door will be opened to the ravings of *sportive* wit or wanton fancy."—WATERLAND.

BLITHE (A. S. *blithe, happy*) is a beautiful and expressive word combining goodness and joyousness of nature.

BUXOM (E. Eng. *buh-sum, pliable, obedient*) is a more complicated word, for it has wandered far from its primary intention. It meant at first compliant, obedient, whether in regard to men or women.

"*Buxum* to the law."—*Piers Ploughman*.

When it came to be applied to women, it expressed first their gentleness; and thence seems to have included by association other qualities little connected with it, but attractive in other ways—as liveliness, healthfulness, and bloom.

"A parcel of *buxom* bonny dames, that were laughing, singing, dancing, and as merry as the day was long."—*Tatler*.

CHERISH. NOURISH. NURTURE. FOSTER. FEED. FOMENT.

To CHERISH (Fr. *chérir*, from *cher*, *dear*) is to treat as *dear*, or to hold *dear*; hence, to keep faithfully or constantly. It is to treat with all the care and affection of which the nature of the thing cherished is capable. The cherished child receives from its parent all that it can need—food, warmth, shelter, clothing, education, advice, help. The cherished hope is kept, as it were, closely and faithfully, and guarded against all influences and considerations that might tend to weaken or destroy it. Alas, in this sense we cherish also prejudices, errors, and illusions. To cherish is to love with tenderness and predilection. The cherished object is precious to us. We feel it to be necessary to our happiness, perhaps our existence. We cherish with affection and tenderness. The man in his ardour loves, the woman in her tenderness cherishes.

"He that comforts my wife is the *cherisher* of my flesh and blood."—SHAKESPEARE.

To NOURISH (Fr. *nourrir*, Lat. *nūtrīre*) is to supply what is needful to the physical necessities of any growing body, as a child or a plant, thus differing from FEED (A. S. *fēdan*), which is strictly used only of animals (though, analogously also, we speak of feeding a fire), and means no more than to give food, whether in sufficient or insufficient quantities. In feeding there is no idea beyond that of supplying with what is necessary to support life, being assimilated into the substance of a growing body. In nourishing, the idea is that of furnishing an organized and growing body with what is congenial to it, and with what it requires, not merely for subsistence and growth, but for luxuriance and well-being.

"The chyle being mixed herewith (the lymphia), partly for its better conversion into blood by a liquor of a middle nature between them both, and partly for its more ready adhesion to all the *nourishable* parts."—GREW

"When, with the flocks, their *feeders* sought the shade."—PHILIPS.

To NURTURE (from the same root as *nourish*) is to train up with fostering care, and so implies more than the giving what is needed for the mere development of the organization. To nurture, however, is, after all, only a physical act, while to cherish is moral, and involves the action of the affections. We nurture plants, but we do not cherish them, unless as associated with persons or scenes, which give them an analogous place to that of children in our affections. We nourish children by bodily food; we nurture them by mental food also.

"Understande, therefore, in thyn hert that as a man *nourtereth* his sonne, even so the Lord thy God *nourtereth* the."—*Bible*, 1551.

FOSTER (A. S. *fóstrian*) is to supply with everything necessary for the life and growth. As in the case of the *foster*-parent, we foster things which are in some measure alien to ourselves, though we are interested in them; for instance, how marked the difference between fostering a hope and cherishing a hope! When we cherish it, we hold it as closely dear to us. We would not for the world, perhaps, part with it. We allow all weight to what strengthens, we turn a deaf ear to what would deprive us of it. To lose it would be to part with some portion of ourselves. But when we foster a hope, it is because we regard the good of the thing hoped for. We foster objects of pride and ambition, because we want to get them. We foster a feeling of anger when it suits our humour; we cherish it when we lie in wait for the time of revenge. We cherish, not only from self-love, but out of affection or interest. We foster for our own sake alone. We cherish in order to preserve. We foster in order to promote, increase, or strengthen. So foster is often used in an unfavourable way; as we say that flattery fosters pride.

"Stage plays serve for nothing else but either to draw men on by degrees to idleness, or to *foster*, to foment them in it."—PRYNNE.

FOMENT. (Lat. *fōmentare*) is to cherish by excitement, and so to keep alive an existing force or vitality. It is seldom used but in a bad sense, or of evil influences. Men foment by contributing little by little what tends to keep up an energy of ill.

"Exciting and *fomenting* a religious rebellion."—SOUTHEY.

CHIEF. MAIN. PRINCIPAL. LEADING. CARDINAL. CAPITAL.

CHIEF (Fr. *chef*, Lat. *căput, a head*) retains its etymological force, and denotes priority in rank, order, or consideration. The chief men of a city are the highest in rank and influence. The chief topics of a discourse are opposed to those which are of minor moment.

"What is man
If his *chief* good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? a beast—no more." SHAKESPEARE.

MAIN (A. S. *mægen, power, force*) refers to that which is the more potent or extensive, and is thus applicable, as chief is not, to superiority in quantity or size; as, the main bulk of the army, the main pipes of an organ. Practically, the terms CHIEF and MAIN are often interchangeable; so we might speak of the chief inducements, or the main inducements to a certain line of conduct; only the chief would be those to which are assigned a foremost place in our consideration; the main would be those which exercised the greatest influence on us, or impressed us most with their power. MAIN is a less exact term than CHIEF, not indicating so close a process of comparison or the result of an appreciation so strict and technical. So we speak of the main points in a speech, in a general sense. The main denotes what belongs to the centre or mass, as distinguished from parts which are exterior or in detail.

"There is scarce any instance of the history of the same person being written by four different contemporary historians, all perfectly agreeing in the *main* articles, and differing only in a few minute particulars of no moment."—PORTEUS.

PRINCIPAL (Lat. *principālis*) denotes the most prominent in any way, and that which would naturally strike the attention first on any account whatever. The principal cities of a country are the most prominent; such are London, Manchester, Oxford, Cambridge, Bristol, Brighton, and others, for very different reasons. Hence it does not follow that the chief cities of a country are the principal, for they may have a rank assigned them from various causes by no means proportioned to their present and actual influence or importance.

"Thanketh the maister of grace which of that good and al other is authour and *principal* doer."—CHAUCER.

LEADING is simply taking the *lead*. The term, therefore, is only employed when the things to which it applies can by the mind be regarded as motive, operative, and influential; as, the leading points of a case. We say, the leading men in a community, but not the leading cities of a country, as the mere notion of priority in series does not express the force of leading.

"He left his mother a countess by patent, which was a new *leading* example."—WOTTON.

CARDINAL (Lat. *cardĭnālis*, from *cardĭnem, a hinge*), literally denoting that on which a thing *hinges*, expresses the combined ideas of prominence and importance; but is a term technically restricted to certain subjects, as cardinal virtues, numbers, points of the compass, and signs of astronomy, or signs of the Zodiac. The term denotes primary importance in a class of similar things.

"Conscience and alle cristene and *cardinale* vertues."—*Piers Ploughman.*

CAPITAL (Lat. *căpĭtālis*, from *căput*) is etymologically equivalent to *chief*, but, like cardinal, is technically restricted. It denotes what belongs to the head and life, and so is essential. The term is not now of frequent use in this sense, but is common in the sense of excellent of its kind. An indication of the old sense of the term survives in the phrase "capital letter."

"*Cappitall* enemies unto his grace both in heart and in deed."—BARNES.

CHIEFLY. PRINCIPALLY. ESPECIALLY. PARTICULARLY. PRIMARILY.

Of these, CHIEFLY and PRINCIPALLY

are terms of relation in regard to a number or gradation, and therefore have a comparative force. ESPECIALLY, PARTICULARLY, and PRIMARILY are terms of relation in regard to individuals, and therefore have a superlative force. If I say, "Robberies happen chiefly by night," I mean that of the number which take place, the majority are by night. If I say, "Such a word is used principally in such a sense," I mean that of the number of cases in which it is used, the majority have this signification. If I say, "Men are but too ready to listen to adverse rumours, *especially* where they concern their enemies," I single out the foremost case. So is it in the following instances:—"Water is everywhere a blessing, *particularly* in hot climates;" "The building was intended *primarily* for a magazine."

"Search through this garden, leave unsearch'd no nook,
But *chiefly* where these two fair creatures lodge." MILTON.

"They mistake the nature of criticism who think its business is *principally* to find fault."—DRYDEN.

"More *especially* at this time, since it is the proper work of the day."—SHARP.

"This exact propriety of Virgil I *particularly* regarded as a great part of his character."—DRYDEN.

"Surely from all these places it is very evident that it was *primarily* the counsel and the will of God, that even they who would not turn, would not repent and accept of salvation, should have repented and have been made partakers of it."—WHITBY.

CHILDISH. PUERILE.

Both these terms are employed in an unfavourable sense; that is, in reference to cases where the weakness of the child or the character of the *boy* (Lat. *puer*) are out of place. No such disparagement belongs to the words *childlike* and *boyish*. CHILDISH is used of ideas, character, and conduct; as, childish fancies, childish behaviour: PUERILE of modes of thought and judgment; as, puerile objections in argument. The one indicates the trifling of the child, the other the immature weakness of the boy, as contrasted with the weight and wisdom of the man. As CHILDISH expresses the intellectual poverty, so *childlike* expresses the moral simplicity of a child.

"We cannot be so *childish* as to imagine that ambition is local, and that no other can be infected with it but those who rule within certain parallels of latitude and longitude."—BURKE.

Piers Ploughman used the term in the sense of childlike:—

"Charitie is a *childish* thing, as holi churche witnesseth."

As at present employed, that which is simply and absolutely weak or silly is called childish; that which, though such, aims at the character of the contrary, or is employed with gravity of purpose, is called puerile.

"The French have been notorious for generations for their *puerile* affectation of Roman forms, models, and historic precedents."—DE QUINCEY.

CHIMERICAL. IMAGINARY.

The CHIMERICAL (Gr. χίμαιρα, *a she-goat*, a name given to a fire-breathing monster killed by Bellerophon) is inconsistent with truth; the IMAGINARY (Lat. *imāgĭnārius*) supersedes it. The imaginary, though it be not according to truth of fact, is often studiously framed according to principles of probability; the chimerical is a heterogeneous aggregate of things impossible or improbable. An active imagination creates the imaginary, a morbid imagination the chimerical. Men of learning and imaginative power have framed imaginary conversations between the great men of past times. The search after the philosopher's stone was a chimerical project.

CHOICE. OPTION. PREFERENCE. SELECTION. ELECTION. ALTERNATIVE.

CHOICE (Fr. *choix*) denotes the act and the power of *choosing* out of a number, with the sense, sometimes, of judgment in choice, as when we say to show choice. Every act of choice is determined by some motive or final purpose.

"This might have been avoided by anchoring more to the west, but I made *choice* of my situation for two reasons; first to be near the island we intended to land upon, and secondly, to be able to get to sea with any wind."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

OPTION (Lat. *optiōnem, optāre, to choose*) is the right or power of choice, or freedom from constraint in the act of choosing. It does not necessarily imply numbers; so we say it is at my option to act or not. The optional is opposed to the compulsory.

"The difference between the employment of language in such cases (in our speculations concerning individuals) and in our speculations concerning classes or genera, is, that in the former case the use of words is in a great measure *optional*, whereas in the latter it is essentially necessary."—DUGALD STEWART.

PREFERENCE (Fr. *préférence*, Lat. *præferre, to prefer*) is the specific exercise of choice in reference to one or more objects of choice.

"I trust it will be allowed by all that in every act of will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a *preference*, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul at that instant is out of a state of perfect indifference with respect to the direct object of the volition."—EDWARDS, *On the Will*.

SELECTION (Lat. *sēlectiōnem, sēlĭgĕre, to choose out*) means much the same as PREFERENCE; but preference may express only a feeling, and always implies personal feeling. Selection is an act of taking one or more out of a number upon some principle of choice connected or not with personal feeling.

"And sure no little merit I may boast,
When such a man *selects* from such a host."
DRYDEN.

ELECTION (Lat. *ēlectionem, ēlĭgĕre, to select*) is selection with a view to privilege or office, and is, therefore, applicable only to persons, while both things and persons may be selected. The object in election is practically so much more important than the source, that the term *elect* is employed where only one person is concerned, and where, therefore, no choice was possible, as "only one candidate presented himself, and was unanimously elected."

"Experience overturns these airy fabrics, and teaches us that in a large society the *election* of a monarch can never devolve to the wisest or to the most numerous part of the people."—GIBBON.

AN ALTERNATIVE (Lat. *alternāre, to do by turns*) is a contingent object of choice, that is, a thing which may be chosen in the event of another being rejected or not chosen. In the simplest sense of the term, the term alternative is applied to two things only; yet it is possible to regard that as an alternative which, as being possible or eligible, is set over against many other things regarded *collectively*. The alternative is commensurate with the choice, which may be one of appropriation, action, or opinion. When two or more things offer the choice of one only, the term alternative is applicable to the things in general, and also to the one chosen—to the former in the sense of a thing possible to choose, and to the latter in the sense of a thing desirable to choose.

"There is something else than the mere *alternative* of absolute destruction or unreformed existence."—BURKE.

CHOKE. SUFFOCATE. SMOTHER. STIFLE. STRANGLE.

CHOKE (probably an *imitative* word) is a general term, expressive of the stopping up of anything through which a free passage or current ought to exist; so, a garden or a river may be choked with weeds, or the pipe of a drain may be choked. As used of the human body, it means to stop the passages of respiration by the introduction of foreign substances.

"Whose banks received the blood of many a thousand men,
On sad Palm Sunday slain; that Towton field we call,
Whose channel quite was *choked* with those that there did fall."
DRAYTON.

SUFFOCATE is from the Lat. *suffŏcare* (from *sub, under*, and pl. *fauces, the gullet*). It is, therefore, only applicable, properly, to living beings. A fire may be *metaphorically* said to be suffocated, that is, deprived of free air, which it requires, after the likeness of living beings; but, at least, the river, though choked, is not said to be suffocated with weeds.

"Think of that, I that am as subject to heat as butter, a man of continual dissolution and thaw, it was a miracle to scape *suffocation*."—SHAKESPEARE.

TO STIFLE (connected with Gr. στύφω, Lat, *stīpo, to compress*; Fr. *étouffer*, &c.) is commonly employed of the less gross substances, as smoke,

dust, malaria, introduced into the respiratory organs, and interfering with their action in other ways than by mechanical obstruction. This is not, however, its exclusive use. In the following passage it is used in the sense of smother:—

"So he wrapped them, and entangled them, keeping down the feather-bed and pillows hard unto their mouths, that within a while, *smored* and *stifled*, their breath failing, they gave up to God their innocent souls, into the joys of heaven."—SIR T. MORE.

To STRANGLE (Lat. *strangŭlare, to choke*) is to stop the circulation of air in the respiratory organs by purely external and mechanical compression.

"First he (Tyndall) was with a halter *strangled* by the hangman, and afterwards consumed with fire."—FOX, *Life of Tyndall.*

SMOTHER (allied to obs. *smoor*, A. S. *smorian, to suffocate*) is used of such stoppage of air as is produced by an overwhelming mass from without, being so far like STRANGLE, and unlike CHOKE and SUFFOCATE; but, from the nature of the case, there is no local application of force; as when a person is covered by an avalanche, and so smothered to death.

"She, *smothered* with so monstrous a weight, did sink down under it to the earth."—SIDNEY'S *Arcadia.*

CHOOSE. PREFER.

To CHOOSE (Fr. *choisir*) is to take one thing rather than another; to PREFER (Lat. *præferre*) is to put one thing above another. One chooses a thing for the purpose of making use of it; as, a book to read, a lodging to occupy, a profession to exercise, a master to instruct us. One prefers the book which is the most instructive or entertaining, or best meets our wants at the time, the most convenient lodging, the most suitable profession, the most competent master, to other persons or things of their kind which are less good in their ways. One chooses with a practical object, one prefers as an exercise of speculative judgment. Accordingly, choice is good or bad, preference just or unjust. A good choice is to one's own benefit, a right preference is just to the things or person preferred. Choice is a more external act than preference. Hence we sometimes choose what in our hearts we do not prefer, or, which is the same thing, prefer what we do not choose; that is, inclination is overborne by circumstances and practical necessity. Choice implies deliberation and a finding in the object of that quality of which we are in search. Preference implies formal comparison and a recognition or supposition of superior excellence. We make a choice, and give the preference. In preference a kind of favour is bestowed upon the object, in choice we seek to be ourselves benefited.

CHURLISH. BOORISH.

Both these terms express such defects of disposition and manners as are dependent upon or analogous to the character and behaviour of the low-born and rude. The CHURL (A. S. *ceorl*) was a freeman of the lowest rank. The BOOR (A. S. *Gebúr*) is literally a *countryman* or *farmer*. The churlish disposition is the more objectionable morally, the boorish the more offensive socially. The churlish person is niggardly, selfish, hard, sour, and as a consequence of this is wanting in kindness and courtesy. The boorish person is unacquainted with other ways than those of the farm, the cattle-yard, or the plough. He is awkward, illiterate, and rude, but rather from want of a trained sensibility than from any unkindliness of feeling.

CIRCUMSCRIBE. INCLOSE. LIMIT. BOUND. RESTRICT. INCLUDE. ENVIRON. SURROUND. RESTRAIN. ENCIRCLE. ENCOMPASS. CONFINE.

To CIRCUMSCRIBE (Lat. *circumscribĕre*) is to inclose within a certain limit; but the term could only be very pedantically used of mere superficial extent. It denotes rather limitation of range, movement, action, play; as "his ambition was circumscribed by his poverty."

"Nor *circumscribed* alone
Their growing virtues, but their crimes confined,
Forbade to wade through slaughter to a throne,
And shut the gates of mercy on mankind."
GRAY.

To INCLOSE (Lat. *inclūdĕre*, part. *inclūsus*) is, on the other hand, purely physical, as a town within walls, a letter in a cover, lands within a fence. The thing inclosed is hidden or defended by its inclosure.

"Shall one, and he *inclosed* within your wall,
One rash imprison'd warrior, vanquish all?" PITT'S *Virgil*.

To LIMIT (Lat. *līmĭtare*, *līmĭtem*, *a limit*) bears specific reference to movements or tendencies which are likely to pass beyond a certain number or extent.

"Nothing can be more evident than the necessity of *limiting* the field of our exertion if we are to benefit society by our labours." —STEWART.

To BOUND denotes not restriction of action or by external influence, so much as the cessation of extension; so, England is bounded on all sides by the ocean. The sphere of action is bounded; actions themselves are limited.

"Ye good distrest!
Ye noble few! who here unbending stand
Beneath life's pressure, yet bear up awhile,
And what your *bounded* view, which only saw
A little part, deem'd evil, is no more."
THOMSON.

On the other hand RESTRICT (Lat. *restringĕre*, part. *restrictus*) implies the confinement within certain limits or to a certain number or extent of that which has a tendency to exceed them. But RESTRICT differs both from LIMIT and RESTRAIN (another form of Restrict). To restrict is relative, and restrain is absolute. We restrain a person from running when we compel him to walk, or, generally, we restrain him when we hold him from doing anything he may be inclined to do; but we restrict him to a certain pace, or to certain limits which he must not pass, or to the use of certain things specified.

"The common law of England indeed is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more *restricted* there than in any other European monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"Nor is the hand of the painter more *restrainable* than the pen of the poet."—BROWN, *Vulgar Errors*.

For CONFINE, *see* CAPTIVITY. To ENCOMPASS (L. Lat. *compassus*, *a circle*) is to circumscribe a given space or locality, so as closely to surround it; while SURROUND itself (Fr. *surronder*) does not necessarily imply this closeness. A city may be encompassed with an army, so that all ingress and egress is prevented; this is not implied in saying that it is *surrounded*, as, for instance, by hills. A question may be encompassed with difficulty.

"Entirely *encompassed* the enemy's body of foot."—LUDLOW'S *Memoirs*.

"But cloud instead, and ever-during dark,
Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men
Cut off." MILTON.

INCLUDE (Lat. *inclūdĕre*) is as invariably metaphysical as INCLOSE is physical. "We will include you in our party," means, we will regard you as forming one of ourselves. A number, a designation, a definition, and the like, are the terms of inclusion.

"Our mayster Christ showeth that in fulfilling two of these commaundements bee all workes *included*."—BARNES.

To ENVIRON (O. Fr. *environner*) is a French word, which is as nearly as possible the equivalent of the English *surround*, but it presupposes some degree of magnitude, dignity, or importance in the surrounding things. We say the plain is environed by mountains, but we should not say, the table is environed by chairs. Of SURROUND and ENVIRON, we may observe, that they do not denote of necessity any *restrictive* inclosure; for instance, a mere circular pattern or design might be said to surround, as the centre is surrounded by a flowing border. Nor does ENVIRON imply a close, but rather a distant surrounding.

"Into that forest far they thence him led.
Where was their dwelling in a pleasant glade,
With mountains round about *environed*,
And mighty woods, which did the valley shade." SPENSER.

To ENCIRCLE, as its name designates, implies a surrounding with something which is exactly or approximates to a mathematical *circle*, as "a diadem encircled her brow"

It involves limitation or circumscription, but not coercion or restriction.

"Young Hermes next, a close-contriving god,
Her brows *encircled* with his serpent rod,
Then plots and fair excuses filled her brain."
PARNELL, *Hesiod.*

CIRCUMSTANCE. SITUATION. INCIDENT. FACT. EVENT. OCCURRENCE.

CIRCUMSTANCE (Fr. *circonstance*) is literally the condition of things *surrounding* an event; from which it passed to mean one of the things themselves, and so generally a fact, particular, or incident. A circumstance is a distinctive accessary to the principal fact or event. The circumstance occasionally reacts with great force on the main fact or event, or, on the other hand, is so trivial as to be practically of no moment. An unforeseen circumstance in a campaign may lead to the loss of a battle. Circumstances alter cases and opinions.

"We are now at the close of our review of the three simple forms of artificial society, and we have shown them, however they may differ in name or in some slight *circumstances*, to be all alike in effect—in effect to be all tyrannies."—BURKE.

It is in the plural, CIRCUMSTANCES, that it has the character of a synonym with SITUATION (Lat. *situs*); many relative circumstances making a situation. (Circumstances, in modern English, has the peculiar meaning of *situation as to worldly goods.*) "He found himself in such circumstances," and "He found himself in such a situation," would be nearly equivalent expressions, for the situation or the case is the sum of the circumstances. But SITUATION points to a fixed state, CIRCUMSTANCES may accompany the varying condition of the thing or person. "He was in a situation of great danger," would be equivalent to "He was in circumstances of great danger;" but we could hardly say, "He pursued his journey in a situation of great danger:" in this case we should be compelled to say, "under circumstances of great danger."

"Nor did the shores and woods appear less destitute of wild fowl: so that we hoped to enjoy with ease what in our *situation* might be called the luxuries of life."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

CIRCUMSTANCE, INCIDENT, and FACT are also related in meaning. So we might say, the circumstances, the incidents, or the facts of the case; but CIRCUMSTANCE relates to what is accessary to fact, and forms a part or detail of it. A murder is a fact, the circumstances of it are the parts of the fact—the incidents of the deed, the details of its commission, or anything remotely connected with the fact as such. An INCIDENT (Fr. *incident*, Lat. *incidĕre, to happen*) is no more than a befalment, something which happens upon another thing, and is not necessarily connected with the fact *as such*, but has merely occurred along with it. A circumstance of the murder is essentially connected with it; an incident of it may be such as to have no practical value in regard to it—no close relationship—as, for instance, that a bright rainbow seemed suddenly to break forth at the moment—a thing which might affect the imagination, but not the evidence.

"Thy *incidents* perhaps too thick are sown,
But too much plenty is thy fault alone."
DRYDEN.

A FACT (Lat. *factum, a thing done*) is a thing which has truly taken place, and may be of a complicated nature, as being conceived in the aggregate. So the fact of a murder is not a simple, but a very complicated thing, involving all the numerous particulars of the so-called fact, and the necessity of exact truth in all the particulars so as to form an exact conception of the fact.

"It would have been absurd to allege in preaching to unbelievers a *fact* which itself presupposed the truth of Christ's mission, and which could not have been proved without first taking for granted the truth of that very doctrine in proof of which this *fact* was to have been alleged."—CLARKE.

The term fact has the different senses of—1, that which has been done or has taken place; 2, truth in the abstract, as in the phrase, "in fact;" and 3, the representation of a fact in the first sense, irrespectively of the actual truth of it, as when a pleader is eloquent on his case, but wrong in his facts.

An EVENT (Lat. *eventus, ēvĕnire, to*

come forth) is a fact or occurrence regarded as a *result* or product of other things; hence we speak of watching the event, or waiting for the progress of events. The term denotes some degree of importance.

"Such kind of things or *events*, whether good or evil, as will certainly come to pass may fall under computation, and be estimated as to their several degrees, as well as things present."—WILKINS.

An OCCURRENCE, on the other hand (Lat. *occurrĕre, to meet*), has no reference to any antecedents, but simply denotes what *meets us* in the course of our lives by chance or Providence. It ought, however, to be added that these terms may be often used interchangeably, according to the point of view from which things are regarded. For instance, a shower of rain is an *event*, regarded simply as a meteorological result. It is *a fact*, as regards any question as to whether it actually fell or not. It would be an *incident* in the account of a day's sport. It is a *circumstance*, of perhaps vital importance, to a crop, and an untoward *occurrence* to any one who, having taken no precautions against it, was wetted through by it. We speak of the facts and events of history, and of the occurrences of eve v day.

"When fear does not in sudden or hazardous *occurrences* discompose his mind, set his body a trembling, and make him unfit for action, or run away from it, he has then the courage of a rational creature."—LOCKE.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL. PARTICULAR. MINUTE.

These terms diminish in force in the above order. A CIRCUMSTANTIAL account would be one which gave the *leading* circumstances, PARTICULAR, *all* the circumstances, and MINUTE (Lat. *mĭnūtus*, from *minuere, to lessen*) the most *trivial* as well as the most important.

"I conceived myself obliged to set down somewhat *circumstantially* not only the events but the manner of my trials."—BOYLE.

"Now will we speak *particularly* of all, and first of the first, which he calleth by the first month's name, January."—SPENSER.

"Vandyck had a peculiar genius for portraits; his draperies are finished with a *minuteness* of truth not to be demanded in historic compositions."—WALPOLE.

CIVIL. CIVIC. MUNICIPAL.

CIVIL (Lat. *cīvilis*) is a term which relates to the citizen in his personal capacity; CIVIC (Lat. *cīvĭcus*) as he is a member of a municipal body, or stands related to its jurisdiction. Civil rights are those which he possesses and exercises as a member of the community at large. Such are the rights of marriage, of will and bequest, of inheritance. Civil war is waged by one class or section of the community against another. Civic honours and dignities are frequently the reward of commercial industry.

MUNICIPAL (Lat. *mūnĭcĭpālis*), a designation of Italian towns possessing the right of Roman citizenship, but governed by their own laws, is a term associated, not like CIVIC with the city generally, but rather with its privileges and administration. Hence, such an idea as that of civic architecture, *i.e.* the public buildings of a city, could not be rendered by such a phrase as municipal architecture. The term civic expresses the character and relation of all that is connected with the body of free citizens; municipal, that which is connected with the civic authorities and the corporation or governing body of the town. Civic hospitality, honours, and dignities. Municipal rights, authorities, government, privileges, jurisdiction.

CIVIL. POLITE. OBLIGING. ACCOMMODATING. COURTEOUS. COMPLAISANT. CONSIDERATE.

The CIVIL man was originally the *cīvilis*, or one who fulfilled the duties of a *civis* or citizen. It means now him who is observant of the slight external courtesies of intercourse between man and man. True civility is seen in the demeanour of those who respect others because they respect themselves, and is as far removed from condescension on the one side, as from servility on the other.

"The people behaved very *civilly*, showing us everything that we expressed a desire to see."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

The POLITE man (Lat. *pŏlītus*, from *pŏlire, to polish*) is *polished* in such

courtesies, and is of higher training. The courtier is polite, but even the rustic may be civil. Civility is confined to no class or grade of society. It is that every-day kind of deference which befits all, whether equals or unequals. Politeness is between equals, and that in the society of the better-born and educated. The civil man is not necessarily polite. The polite is civil, and something more. Civility consists in the saying and doing certain things and the avoidance of the saying and doing of other things according to conventional rules, which differ according to time, place, circumstance, and the relation of persons to each other. Politeness consists in saying and doing nothing that can displease others, in saying and doing all that may please them, and that with a certain nobility, ease, and delicacy of manner and of speech. Civility promotes mutual respect and good-will. Both civility and politeness are the expression or the affectation of social virtues, according as they are true or false. Yet politeness may flatter the vices of others, which civility is too simple to do.

"What but custom could make those salutations *polite* in Muscovy which are ridiculous in France or England?"—WATTS.

The OBLIGING man (Lat. *obligāre, to bind* or *oblige*) is he who is ready with more than the mere courtesies of demeanour, and takes pleasure in doing some actual service.

"Gay, modest, artless, beautiful, and young,
Slow to resolve, in resolution strong,
To all *obliging*, yet reserved to all."
WALSH.

The ACCOMMODATING person (*see* ACCOMMODATE) is ready to be obliging, not in the way of granting favours generally, like the OBLIGING, but in meeting the particular or specific requirements of the time and occasion in favour of others, even at the cost of a little personal inconvenience. Though the epithet is modern and conversational, the radical force of it may be seen in the following:—

"It is an old observation which has been made of politicians who would rather ingratiate themselves with their sovereign than promote his real service, that they *accommodate* their counsels to his inclinations."—ADDISON.

(For COURTEOUS *see* AFFABLE.) COMPLAISANT (Fr. *complaisant*) occupies a position midway between POLITE and COURTEOUS—which are merely external—and OBLIGING—which implies actual kindness of nature. Complaisance is a deportment indicative of a desire to please, and therefore best befits those who have superiority or power on their side.

"As for our Saviour, He was a person so far from being morose or reserved in His carriage or a lover of singularity, so far from setting up a way of conversation of His own making, distinct from the way He found in the world, that He was the most free, obliging, and civil, and, if I durst use the word, I would say *complaisant* person that ever perhaps appeared in the world."—SHARP.

A more praiseworthy character is that of the CONSIDERATE (Lat. *considĕrāre, to observe closely*), who meets the wants of others, or relieves them of trouble by placing himself thoughtfully in their place and circumstances. Formerly, CONSIDERATE meant thoughtful or deliberate.

"The wisest and most *considerate* men in the world."—SHARP'S *Sermons*.

It bears now the usual meaning of having thought *for others*—what would please them or what is due to them. This general character is expressed in the following use of the noun consideration:—

"Moses, having his mind fixed upon Him who is invisible, acted more from the *consideration* of Him whom he could not see than of him whom he saw to be highly displeased with him, not fearing the wrath of the king, for he saw Him who is invisible."—STILLINGFLEET.

"Æneas is patient, *considerate*, and careful of his people."—DRYDEN.

CLAIM. DEMAND. RIGHT. PRETENSION. PRIVILEGE. PREROGATIVE. REQUISITION.

CLAIM (O. Fr. *clamer, claimer*; Lat. *clāmare, to call out*) is an advance upon DEMAND (Fr. *demander*, Lat. *demandāre*), being the assertion of a right to demand. The highwayman demands the surrender of the traveller's purse, on which he has no

claim. The poor man claims equal rights of liberty with the rich in a free State. CLAIM supposes an unacknowledged right, DEMAND either a disputed right or the absence of all right, and a simple determination to have.

"They were told, in answer to their *claim* to the bread earned with their blood, that their services had not been rendered to the country which now exists."—BURKE.

"If we seriously do weigh the case, we shall find that to require faith without reason is to *demand* an impossibility, for faith is an effect of persuasion, and persuasion is nothing else but the application of some reason to the mind apt to draw forth its assent."—BARROW.

RIGHT (A. S. *riht*, Lat. *rectus*) is not, like CLAIM and DEMAND, developed, but lies, as it were, dormant. It is the latent power to claim or demand upon occasion.

"Although there be, according to the opinion of some very great and judicious men, a kind of natural *right* in the noble, wise, and virtuous to govern them which are of servile disposition, nevertheless for manifestation of this their *right* and men's more peaceable contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be governed seemeth necessary."—HOOKER

PRETENSION (Lat. *prætendĕre, to allege*) is the *holding out* the appearance of right or possession, without directly urging it. This indirectness is so much an attribute of pretension, that pretension sometimes speaks altogether for itself, as if we should say, "He has some pretensions to be considered one of the best writers of the day," the pretensions being, in this case, the actual merits. Nevertheless, a man's pretensions always rest upon his estimate of himself, or in the broadest sense, the estimate generally entertained of him: his claims are not thus matters of opinion, but questions of right and of fact.

"You see that an opinion of merit is discouraged even in those who had the best *pretensions*, if any pretensions were good."—PALEY.

PRIVILEGE (Lat. *privĭlĕgium*) is a right, immunity, or advantage possessed by some, but not enjoyed by others.

"*Privilege* in Roman jurisprudence means the exemption of one individual from the operation of a law."—MACKINTOSH.

"As this liberty is not indulged in any other government, either republican or monarchical, in Holland and Venice more than in France or Spain, it may very naturally give occasion to the question how it happens that Great Britain enjoys this peculiar *privilege*."—HUME.

PREROGATIVE (Lat. *trĭbus prærŏgātīva, the tribe which voted first in the Comitia*) denotes a right of precedence, or of doing certain acts, or enjoying certain privileges, to the exclusion of others. In short, prerogative is political peculiarity of privilege, and analogously such privilege as is confined to one or a few. Prerogative belongs to personal honours and preferments. Privilege regards some advantage of interest or function, and comes from the accordance of persons in power, or from the arrangements of society.

"The kings of these realms enjoy several powers wherein the laws have not interposed. So they can make war and peace without the consent of Parliament, and this is a great *prerogative*."—SWIFT.

A REQUISITION (Lat. *rĕquīrĕre*, part. *rĕquīsītus*) is a formal demand; commonly, therefore, in writing. It is not so much a demand of justice as one based upon the authority, influence, respectability, or number of those who make it; so, a number of inhabitants in a district may forward a requisition to a certain person in office to call a public meeting, or one State may make a requisition to another to surrender a fugitive from justice.

"Provided the same *requisition* be seasonably made, not upon rash or precipitate advice."—*Reliquiæ*, WOTTON.

CLAMOUR. CRY. OUTCRY. UPROAR. EXCLAMATION. ACCLAMATION. VOCIFERATION. SHOUTING. BAWLING. TUMULT.

CLAMOUR (Lat. *clāmōrem*) is a noisy use of the voice in continuous or reiterated pronunciation. In this sense, we might speak of the clamour of the streets; but it is commonly employed of the simultaneous use of the tongue by a collection of persons calling out each for himself, and trying to be heard on his own account, above the voices of others; as when the crew, on the eve of mutiny, clamorously state their grievances.

"We may much more easily think to *clamour* the sun and stars out of their courses than to word the great Creator of them out of the steady purposes of His own will by all the vehemence and loudness of our petitions."—SOUTH.

CRY (Fr. *crier*) is the sound of voices in articulate or inarticulate sounds; as, the cry of a bird, the cry of the salesman, the cry of joy or of pain. It is to the inarticulate, especially, that the word CRY belongs; while clamour consists necessarily of words.

"The voice of one *crying* in the wilderness."—*Bible.*

OUTCRY is an expressive and unanimous aggregate of cries in opposition or protest, as hoots and yells. It is confined to human beings, and is allowed to include words. Clamour often asserts, but outcry always protests.

"When they cannot out-reason the conscience they will *out-cry* it."—SOUTH.

UPROAR (A. S. *rârian, to roar*) denotes the mass of confused sound which proceeds from a number of persons giving vent to feelings of strong opposition.

"We are in danger to be called in question for this day's *uproar*, there being no cause whereby we may give an account of this concourse."—*Bible.*

EXCLAMATION (Lat. *exclāmātionem*) is no more than the sudden expression of sound or words, and is indicative of joy, grief, surprise, or any such emotion, in one or more.

"These holy groves
Permit no *exclamation* 'gainst Heaven's will
To violate their echoes." MASON.

ACCLAMATION (Lat. *acclāmātionem*) is loud and unanimous exclamation in favour, and is opposed to OUTCRY in being expressive of approval, as OUTCRY of protest.

"An amiable, accomplished prince ascends the throne under the happiest of all auspices, the *acclamations* and united affections of his subjects."—JUNIUS.

VOCIFERATION (Lat. *vōcĭfĕrātionem*) is any vehement and strained use of the voice, and relates to continuous and articulate sounds; while BAWL (Icel. *baula, to bellow*) relates to inarticulate. When we say, "He bawled out his speech," we mean that it had the effect of an inarticulate bellowing.

"The judges of the Areopagus considered action and *vociferation* as a foolish appeal to the external senses, and unworthy to be practised before those who had no desire of idle amusement, and whose only pleasure was to discover right."—*Idler.*

"But this is got by casting pearls to hogs
That *bawl* for freedom in their senseless mood." MILTON.

SHOUTING (*shout*, "a parallel form with *hoot*:" WEDGWOOD) is to vociferate for the sake of the effect produced by the sound, as to shout for joy, or to shout in derision. It commonly refers to articulate sounds, which are not necessarily words, but are formed as sonorous media for the shouting, as "hip, hurrah!"

"The rest of the Grecians advanced with eager haste and fury, and in the beginning of their onset gave a general *shout*, to encourage and animate themselves and strike terror into their enemies."—POTTER'S *Antiquities.*

TUMULT (Lat. *tŭmultus*) is primarily commotion, then the noise and disturbance resulting from it. It involves numerous forces working together to produce it; as, the tumult of the elements, of a multitude, of the passions. Tumult is not identical with clamour, neither does it exclude clamour. It is the confused aggregate of sounds produced by a multitudinous expression of discontent.

"Till in loud *tumult* all the Greeks arose." POPE.

CLASH. COLLISION.

CLASH is probably onomatopoetic; compare the Ger. *klatschen*. The word is formed to express a discordant, noisy, or contradictory COLLISION (Lat. *collidere, to dash together*). Interests, views, purposes, clash or come into collision. CLASH is a purely rhetorical and conversational term. The language of science would admit such a phrase as the collision of two moving bodies; their clashing would be colloquial and descriptive.

CLASP. EMBRACE. HUG.

CLASP (O. Eng. *clapsen*, connected with A. S. *clyppan, to embrace*) is a union formed by a partial closing of one object upon another. EMBRACE

(Fr. *embrasser*, *en-*, *in*, and *bras*, *an arm*, of which the earlier form was *brace*) is to surround, and so hold. EMBRACE is only used of objects of the certain size: the hands clasp, the arms embrace. CLASP is never used but in a physical sense; EMBRACE is used in a secondary or moral. Natural philosophy embraces many sciences. "I embrace," that is gladly avail myself of and accept "these conditions:" SHAKESPEARE. The idea of close pressure is more expressed in CLASP; that of large inclusion, in EMBRACE: that of sudden and somewhat violent pressure in HUG (probably the same as *to hedge*, which is the A. S. *hegian*); the mother hugs the lost child, when found. Yet, in the metaphorical use of HUG there is less of violent, and more of close and continuous pressure. One hugs some cherished belief: and in self-gratulation we are said to hug ourselves.

"Age makes us most fondly *hug* and retain the good things of life."—ATTERBURY.

CLASS. ORDER. RANK. DEGREE. CLASSIFICATION. GRADE.

CLASS (Lat. *classis*) is a group of individuals (both things and persons) associated as having common characteristics. No priority or posteriority of rank is denoted by the term CLASS, though such difference of rank may coexist with it, as in the classes of a school. Such are "the labouring class," "the agricultural class," "the mercantile class."

"Now God Almighty, by the inexhaustible fecundity of His creative power, may have made innumerable *orders* and *classes* of rational minds, some in their natural perfection higher than human souls, others inferior."—BENTLEY.

An ORDER (Fr. *ordre*, Lat. *ordĭnem*) differs from a class in having peculiar inter-related connexions or interests. The term is applied both to persons, as the order of Knights Templars; to natural productions; and to architecture, as, the Corinthian order. In botany, the ORDER is a group of allied individuals, more comprehensive than a *genus*. In zoology, the order is a well-marked division of a class, including in itself families and genera. RANK (Fr. *rang*, *a row*, *rank*), when taken for more than a line of things or persons *arranged*, is the relative position of individuals or classes in regard to superiority and inferiority in social or any other distinction; as, an officer of high rank, an author of high or low rank, a man of rank. DEGREE (Fr. *degré*) is one of a series of steps in a graduated scale, and is of as various application as the scale itself; as when we speak of social or literary rank, or of size, number, quality, excellence, goodness, badness, and so on. It is an assignable point or line in any subject-matter which admits of higher or lower, or of more or less within itself. Class and order primarily express persons; rank and degree primarily express distinctions.

"These are all virtues of a meaner *rank*."—ADDISON.

"Take but *degree* away, untwine that string,
And hark what discord follows; each thing meets
In mere oppugnancy." SHAKESPEARE.

CLASSIFICATION (Lat. *classis*, *a class*, and *făcĕre*, *to make*) is the art or result of distribution into groups, according to some common relations or affinities. It may be artificial, that is, based on principles adopted without reference to natural relations, and possibly without the knowledge of them; or it may be natural, that is, coincidently with a system of nature.

"It is for this reason that Montesquieu observed very justly that in their *classification* of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity made the greatest display of their powers, and even soared above themselves."—BURKE.

GRADE (Lat. *grădus*) is the root of the word *degree*, and has become almost identical with it in meaning, but not so widely applicable. It implies intergraduation, which degree does not. DEGREE is an index of amount; GRADE a place or point of relative position. The degree of crime would be the amount of its inherent criminality, the grade of crime would be the order and character of it.

CLEAN. CLEANLY. PURE.

CLEAN (A. S. *clæne*) is free from what is foul. It sometimes means free from what is obstructive, dirt being always obstruction, as "to make

a clean way for himself through a mob." It is used in a moral sense, as "to make a clean breast," and in old Scriptural English, as "clean hands" and "a pure heart."

"Every sin, every moral irregularity, does as really imprint an indelible stain upon the soul as a blot falling upon the *cleanest* paper."—SOUTH.

CLEANLY expresses a disposition to the physically clean.

"And this hath so intoxicated some
That (to appear incorrigibly mad)
They *cleanliness* and company renounce
For lunacy beyond the cure of art,
With a long beard and ten long dirty nails
Pass current for Apollo's livery."
ROSCOMMON, *Horace.*

PURE (Lat. *pūrus*) is used of the more refined substances in nature, and of things moral. As CLEAN means unsoiled, so PURE means uncontaminated, that is, free from heterogeneous matter, especially from what pollutes or vitiates; as, pure metal, water, air; hence it has sometimes the meaning simply of uncompounded, as pure sand, that is, sand and nothing else; pure good-nature, pure mathematics, as distinguished from applied.

"To the *pure* all things are *pure*."—*Bible.*

CLEAR. EXPLAIN. DEVELOP.

We CLEAR (Lat. *clārus*) what was obscure, owing to the bad way in which ideas were presented. We EXPLAIN (Lat. *explānare; plānus, plain, level*) what was difficult to understand, inasmuch as the ideas were not deduced the one from the other with sufficient directness. We DEVELOP (*see* DEVELOP) what contains many ideas which are expressed, but so wrapped up as not to be seen at a glance. The need of the first commonly comes from an unskilled exhibition of language or subject-matter. The second is supplied by connecting the thing not understood with principles already received. The third is best performed by elucidating all that is comprised in a complete definition. The first throws light, the second facilitates comprehension, the third extends knowledge.

CLEAVE. STICK. ADHERE.

CLEAVE (A. S. *clifan*) is to adhere at all parts of an extended surface. It was of more frequent use formerly than at present; being now more commonly employed in a moral sense of personal attachments, or to the persistent *entertainment* of hopes and opinions.

"As creeping ivy clings to wood or stone,
And hides the ruin that it feeds upon,
So Sophistry *cleaves* close to and protects
Sin's rotten trunk, concealing its defects."
COWPER.

ADHERE (Lat. *adhærēre*) is used of a close and persistent *maintenance* of the same matters. In its physical sense, it implies such superficial contact as tends naturally, or by the inherent properties of the substances themselves, to unite them, as wax adheres to the fingers.

"It would be difficult to prove that God may not in certain circumstances have greater reasons for varying from His stated rules of acting than for *adhering* to them."—FARMER.

STICK (A. S. *stican*) is the most familiar and comprehensive of the three, and is used as the others are, that is, of both material and moral subjects. In their secondary meanings, as CLEAVE expresses persistency of affection, and ADHERE persistency of principle, so STICK belongs to mental application and resolve

"I have *stuck* unto Thy testimonies."—*Book of Psalms.*

CLOAK. MASK. BLIND. VEIL.

These are all figurative expressions for means employed to conceal something from the knowledge of others. A CLOAK (L. Lat. *cloca, a bell*, and from the resemblance, *a cape*), being a garment, indicates something continually worn, as it were, so as to conceal what is of the nature of a habit or practice. So religion may be employed as a cloak for dishonesty.

"When the severity of manners is hypocritical, and assumed as a *cloak* to secret indulgence, it is one of the worst prostitutions of religion."—BLAIR.

MASK (Fr. *masque*, L. Lat. *mascha, a witch*) is that which hides the feelings and motives, as the cloak conceals the conduct; but a mask does more than conceal. It has an expression of its own. It is in this way that malignant feelings are sometimes masked under a courteous demeanour, treacherous words, and smiles.

"Thou art no ruffian, who beneath the *mask*
Of social commerce com'st to rob their wealth." THOMSON.

BLIND (A. S. adj. *blind*, connected with *blend*, i.e. *confuse*) denotes that which shall so mislead others as to permit certain practices to be carried on unobserved, by presenting to their attention what is calculated to preclude the idea or suspicion of them.

"Those who are bountiful to crimes will be rigid to merit, and penurious to service. Their penury is even held out as a *blind* and cover to their prodigality."—BURKE.

VEIL (Lat. *velum, a veil*) is oftener used of what deceives *one's self*, or obscures *one's own* vision; as we speak of the veil which hides futurity from view, the mists and veils which rise and are spread before the vision of the prejudiced. But VEIL and CLOAK differ from MASK in that they are in themselves real, though employed to conceal something else.

"As soon as that mysterious *veil* which covers futurity should be lifted up, all the gaiety of life would disappear."—BLAIR.

CLOG. ENCUMBER. IMPEDE. OBSTRUCT. EMBARRASS. FETTER. RETARD. PREVENT. SHACKLE. HINDER.

To CLOG, an Old English word, is literally to fasten a clog on to the feet of animals, to prevent them from straying; hence to impede movements generally, whether of the limbs or the mind. It denotes the presence of something heterogeneous, obstructive, or against freedom of action.

"It was said that the king was alienated from the Church of England, and weary of supporting Episcopacy in Scotland, and so was resolved not to *clog* his government any longer with it."—BURNET.

ENCUMBER (Fr. *encombrer*, Lat. *cŭmŭlus, a heap*) denotes that which retards by being superfluous, and is more or less extraneous to the individual. An estate is encumbered by its own debts; and as a man's movements may be encumbered by any kind of useless weight, even that of his own garments, so a mind may be encumbered by useless learning.

"Knowledge, a rude unprofitable mass,
The mere materials with which wisdom builds,
Till smoothed and squared and fitted to its place,
Does but *encumber* whom it seems t' enrich." COWPER.

IMPEDE (Lat. *impĕdire*, lit. *to entangle the feet, pedes*) refers not so much to mere movement as to continuous and systematic movement or progress; as to impede the advance of an army, the growth of a plant, the progress of education. It implies some end or goal which is thereby set farther off.

"Some error has been committed in not rightly computing and subducting the contrary or *impeding* force which arises from the resistance of fluids to bodies moving any way, and from the continual contrary action of gravitation upon bodies thrown upwards."—CLARKE.

OBSTRUCT (Lat. *obstruere*, part. *obstructus*) is purely external. It is not, therefore, employed directly of persons, but of their progress, or of roads, passages, and the like. The progress of a vessel is impeded by contrary winds; it is yet worse if the entrance into the harbour at the end of the voyage is obstructed by rocks.

"'Tis he th' *obstructed* paths of sound shall clear,
And bid new music charm th' unfolding ear." POPE.

EMBARRASS (Fr. *embarrasser*) is properly used only of *mental* impediments or obstructions; that is, of such doubts, perplexities, or difficulties in general as impede the exercise of thought, speech, or action.

"You will have the goodness to excuse me if my real unaffected *embarrassment* prevents me from expressing my gratitude to you as I ought."—BURKE.

FETTER (literally, *a chain for the feet*) has commonly the meaning of restrictive influence or power, which admits a certain freedom of movement, but limits it at certain points; as, to be fettered by system. "He received permission fettered by certain conditions."

"And truly when they are balanced together, this order seemeth more an infranchising than a *fettering* of our nature, which without it seemeth rather bound than free in revenge; such is the dominion of our irritated passions."—MONTAGUE, *Essays*.

SHACKLE (A. S. *sceacul, a clog*) denotes such fettering as redounds to the discomfort of the person, to ungainliness of movement, and deprivation of grace in the thing itself. If we said, "The tenure of that fine estate is shackled by some antiquated condi-

tions,' we should mean that it was much deteriorated in value, and as it were deformed by them. Commonly speaking, persons are fettered by restrictions, and things are shackled by conditions.

"And it is great
To do that thing that ends all other deeds,
That *shackles* accidents, and bolts up change." SHAKESPEARE.

HINDER is to cause to be *behind*.

"I shall distinguish such as I esteem to be *hinderers* of reformation into three sorts: 1, antiquitarians (for so I had rather call them than antiquaries, whose labours are useful and laudable); 2, libertines; 3, politicians."—MILTON.

RETARD (Lat. *rĕtardāre*) is to cause to be slow or slower.

"Metaphysics not only succeeded physics and mythology in the manner here observed, and became as great a fund of superstition, but they were carried still farther, and corrupted all real knowledge, as well as *retarded* the progress of it."—BOLINGBROKE.

PREVENT (Lat. *prævĕnire*) is to *go before*, as if for the purpose of stopping. The difference between these three is, that to hinder is to stop entirely, but only temporarily; to retard is to stop, but not entirely; and to prevent is to stop entirely. RETARD necessarily refers to a thing begun; that which is HINDERED or PREVENTED may not have been yet begun. It will sometimes require the interpretation of after-events to know whether a thing be a hindrance or a prevention. For instance, "I was hindered from going out of the house yesterday till the evening by torrents of rain." Had the rain lasted all day he would have had to say, "I was prevented yesterday by the rain from leaving the house." All three are applicable both to personal and impersonal influences, and all three both directly to persons and their acts, as also to the progress of either.

"It is much easier to keep ourselves void of resentment than to restrain it from excess when it has gained admission. To use the illustration of an excellent author, we can *prevent* the beginnings of some things, whose progress afterwards we cannot *hinder*."—HOLLAND.

CLOSE. CONCLUSION. TERMINATION. CESSATION. END. ENDING. EXTREMITY. EXTREME.

Of all these synonyms, the simplest and most generic is END (A. S. *ende*), of which the rest may be regarded as modifications. End is applicable to the extreme point of a line, or anything which is regarded as linear, progressive, or continuous, as the end of a cord, of a book, of a story, of a life. No remoteness is implied in this beyond the intrinsic remoteness from the centre; as, to tie two ends of a string together. It is also used to express the idea of result or of a final point, as produced by antecedent causes, as "the end of these things is death," or that which is the thing aimed at, or the purpose for which something else is done, in which sense it is equivalent to object or final cause, as "he did it for private ends." In short, END expresses both objective and subjective finality.

"The harvest is the *end* of the world."—*Bible*.

CLOSE (Fr. adj. *clos, closed*; Lat. *claudĕre*, part. *clausus, to shut*) is the kind of end to which a thing is regarded as naturally tending or bringing itself. The close of a book or a story seems brought about by the story or the book itself, hence such phrases as "coming to a close," "drawing to a close."

"We have it, it seems, in our power, by the exercise of one particular virtue, to secure a pardon to ourselves for neglecting all the rest, and can blot out the remembrance of an ill-spent life by a few acts of charity at the *close* of it."—ATTERBURY.

A CONCLUSION (Lat. *conclūsiōnem*) is etymologically of the same origin. A conclusion is a superimposed *close*, anticipated or drawn as the result of a previous course of action or argument. The conclusion of a contest is in those efforts which bring it to an end; the conclusion of an argument is that which is necessarily drawn from its premises.

"I will *conclude* this part with the speech of a counsellor of state."—BACON.

TERMINATION (Lat. *termĭnātionem, a bounding*) is that kind of end which presupposes a previous course, whether of view, of thought, of words, of action or movement, which proceeds till it is stopped by such a limit or boundary. It belongs both to

space and time, and refers to any kind of intervention; as, human agency or natural arrangements.

"I had a mind to know how each of these roads *terminated*."—ADDISON.

CESSATION (Lat. *cessatiōnem*) refers to action as limited or stopped by some inherent will, power, or influence, and thus differs from TERMINATION, which depends on external causes; as, "I listened till the sound ceased."

"A *cessation* of all hostilities was to begin within two months, and to continue till all was concluded by a complete treaty and ratified, provided the Spanish monarchy was then entirely restored."—BURNET.

ENDING is an imposed end, or the end of something artificial or variable. For instance, we speak of the ending of a sentence or a word; not of the ending, but the end of human life. A termination is a fixed ending, as an ending is a variable termination.

"A perfect kingdom and glorious that shall never have *ending*."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

EXTREMITY (Lat. *extrēmitatem*) is the remotest part of anything which has configuration, or is regarded mentally as having a definite area or extent. It differs from END in involving this remoteness. So we speak of the end of the street, but the extremity of the town, or the extremities of the human body. The extremity of distress is a supposed boundary line to the extent of such endurance. The end stands related to another end or to the beginning; the extremity to the centre. End presupposes length and continuity; extremity, internal arrangement and relative situation of parts.

"No less man than St. Augustine was doubtful whether the *extremity* of bodily pain were not the greatest evil that human nature was capable of suffering."—RAY.

EXTREME denotes a strained, exaggerated, undue, or unnecessary distance or departure from the mean or centre. It is remarkable that the word tends to this unfavourable force, though etymologically it is equally applicable to favourable applications. We speak often enough of "extreme folly," but not of "extreme wisdom." It conveys a sort of censure to say of any one that he holds "extreme opinions." Extreme, however, may qualify *state* without this tendency which it has in the case of habits. Thus we say extreme happiness, but not extreme virtue.

"For though innovations which appear very plausible may be found, when examined, very dangerous, and therefore love of change is by no means to be encouraged, yet aversion to it may be carried to an *extreme* also."—SECKER.

COALESCE. AMALGAMATE. UNITE. COHERE. JOIN.

COALESCE (Lat. *coalescĕre, to grow together*) is hardly used except as a scientific term in its purely physical sense, which is to grow together, so that the particles of two organizations shall become compact and one. *Coalition* has now a political meaning, and denotes the combination of different persons, parties, or states, having different views or interests, for a temporary purpose.

"No *coalition*, which under the specious name of independency carries in its bosom the unreconciled principles of the original discord of parties, ever was or will be an healing *coalition*."—BURKE.

AMALGAMATE (Eng. *amalgam, a compound of mercury with some other metal*) denotes the interpenetration of inorganic particles, as COALESCE of organic. Amalgamation is the mixing of things in themselves foreign, but which are found to have in them sufficient properties in common to allow of their union into one mass.

"Ingratitude is indeed their four cardinal virtues compacted and *amalgamated* into one."—BURKE.

UNITE (Lat. *ūnīre*) is said of two or more things which are so joined as to present the appearance of a sensible or visible whole; if the union is absolute, then the individuality of the parts or separate unities is lost; as, the union of two regiments in the field. Things of the same nature, or which can be brought under the same class, are united though they may have strong individual differences. Men and women (as human beings) are united in marriage. "He was prompted to the undertaking by united duty and interest" (as motives).

"We were ignorant that the time drew near when the squadron would be separated never to *unite* again, and that this day of our passage was the last cheerful day that

the greatest part of us would ever live to enjoy."—ANSON.

COHERE (Lat. *cohærēre*) denotes the internal adherence of parts reciprocally, as *adherence* is an external sticking together of whole bodies or substances. In its metaphysical sense, COHERE means consistently to hang together in subordination to one principle or purpose; as the several parts of a speech, or a theory, are said to cohere.

"Of all things there is the greatest difficulty in retaining numbers. They are like grains of sand which will not *cohere* in the order in which we place them."—PRIESTLEY.

JOIN (Fr. *joindre*, Lat. *jungĕre*) denotes a union formed by external association or attachment, which in no way detracts from the separate individuality of the things joined. Such joining may be permanent or temporary. Thus many are joined in marriage who are not united in heart. Sometimes the process of joining precedes that of uniting. Clouds join when they touch; they are united when their masses are confounded. Persons join for the sake of companionship, or community of interests. The simplest sense of JOIN is to approach near enough to touch, as two houses may be said to join.

"There were reports that the Emperor and the French King were in a treaty, and that in conclusion they would *join* to make war upon the King."—BURNET.

COARSE is only another form of "course," as it was originally written, so meaning *in course*, or such as is commonly to be met with. According as it is used in the literal or the metaphysical sense, it associates itself with two distinct sets of synonyms, as follows:—

COARSE. ROUGH. RUDE. GROSS.

That is COARSE which is composed of relatively large particles, whether naturally, as a coarse kind of stone, or artificially, as a coarse kind of linen. In this sense it is opposed to fine, that in which nature or art has produced a subtler texture.

"For habit it was anciently sackcloth and ashes: by the *courseness* of the sackcloth they ranked themselves as it were amongst the meanest and lowest of men; by ashes and sometimes earth upon their heads they made themselves lower than the lowest of the creatures of God."—MEDE.

ROUGH (A. S. *hrúh*) is that of which the particles have sufficient inequality to be conspicuous to the eye or palpable to the touch: a rough sea, a rough plank. In this sense it is opposed to smooth.

"While yet the *roughness* of the stone remains,
Without the rising muscles and the veins."
DRYDEN, *Ovid.*

RUDE (Lat. *rŭdis*) denotes such a sort of roughness as belongs to unskilled implements or productions.

"Is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? The shallowest understanding, the *rudest* hand is more than equal to that task."—BURKE.

GROSS (Fr. *gros*, L. Lat. *grossus*, *thick*) differs from COARSE in not relating to the particles of a substance, but to the effect produced by the whole of it. It has the meaning of coarsely bulky, combining thickness of texture with unwieldiness.

"The element immediately next the earth in *grossness* is water."—DIGBY, *On Bodies.*

COARSE. ROUGH. RUDE. GROSS. UNCOUTH. BLUNT.

As applied to the mind and the manners, COARSE denotes that natural savagery which comes of movements and expressions unchecked and unremoved by the training and restrictions of refined society. It comes of such selfishness of demeanour as civilization tends to suppress. In this sense it is opposed to *refined*.

"Already there appears a poverty of conception, a *coarseness* and vulgarity in all the proceedings of the assembly and of all their instructors."—BURKE.

ROUGH is applied only to the manners and the speech. As coarseness comes of the absence of mental refinement, so roughness comes of the want of polite training, except in the case of rough speech or words, which may come from the most polite on occasions of excitement. Hence roughness is compatible, as coarseness is not, with much mental refinement and purity of heart. Where, however, this latter is palpably the case, a better epithet is BLUNT.

"A plain, *blunt* man."
SHAKESPEARE.

"*Roughness* in the grain
Of British natures." COWPER.

RUDE has the meaning of being personally offensive to others from roughness of manner. This may be unintentional, in which case it amounts to no more than omission of what polite intercourse requires; or intentional, in which case it is the disregard or violation of it in contempt or active insult.

"My censures of some reputed virtuosi that live in it are written with as harmless and friendly designs as was the seeming *rudeness* of the angel to St. Peter when he struck him on the side, and hastily roused him."—BOYLE.

GROSS refers not to social but moral and mental subjects. The gross person is he in whom the sensual in any way predominates; as, a gross eater. It is opposed to *delicate*, and denotes an unrestrained exhibition or expression of the animal part of human nature.

"Bleached and purified from the *grossness* and pollution of their ideas."—WARBURTON.

UNCOUTH (A. S. *uncúth; uncouth, unknown*). *See* AWKWARD.

COAST. BANK. SHORE.

The COAST (O. Fr. *coste*, Lat. *costa*, *a rib, side*) had of old the meaning of a natural line limiting a territory, not being of necessity a sea-line. After the miracle of the healing of the demoniac, the people of Gadara besought Jesus that he would depart out of their coasts, that is, borders. As now employed of the sea-line of a country, it is a geographical term, while SHORE is a physical term. It is from the A. S. *scéran, sciran, to divide*, and is connected with *shear, shire, shard, shred*, &c. &c. The shore is the strip of land washed by the sea; the coast is the line of rocky indentations laid down on the navigator's chart. The shore is that on which seafarers land; it is barren, flat, or rocky, covered with sand or sea-weed; the coast is characteristic of the country, it is iron-bound or affording natural harbours, and is the field of the marine explorer. BANK (perhaps an A.S. *banc*, cf. *bench*, but this, though a probable form, is not supported: SKEAT, Etym. Dict.) is a mound or ridge of earth, raised above the surrounding level; whether contiguous to water, as a river, lake, sea, or not. It is seldom applied to the land adjacent to the ocean, because it seldom presents this appearance; but in a nautical sense is received to denote the flat, shoal, or shallow, partially or entirely covered by the sea; as, the banks of Newfoundland.

COEVAL. CONTEMPORARY. SYNCHRONOUS. COMMENSURATE.

The difference of force between these terms is sufficiently indicated by their derivations; COEVAL being compounded of Lat. *ævum, an age*, and CONTEMPORARY of *tempus, time*. As the age is of long duration, the term coeval is employed when the sense is existing in the same age, especially if it be remote as well as long, as, "Silence coeval with eternity," "The building of such a pyramid was coeval with such a dynasty of Egyptian kings." But, *tempus* meaning strictly a *portion* of time, a period, we employ the term contemporary for synchronous periods that are shorter. Such are the lives of men. "He was contemporary (it would be absurd to say coeval) with me at college.'

"The history of redemption is *coeval* with that of the globe itself, has run through every stage of its existence, and will outlast its utmost duration."—BISHOP HURD.

"This king (Henry VIII.) was *contemporary* with the greatest monarchs of Europe, namely the Emperor, the kings of Spain and France."—STRYPE.

Although SYNCHRONOUS (*σύγχρονος, contemporaneous*) is only the Greek equivalent of the Latin *contemporary*, it is a convenient term to use when nothing more is intended than the simultaneity of two occurrences as a matter of history.

"Sensations are impressed either at the same instant of time, or in contiguous successive instants. Hence it follows that the corresponding associations are either *synchronous* or successive."—BELSHAM.

The term COMMENSURATE (Lat. *commensūrātus, mensūra, a measure*) may be analogously employed when the meaning is that two *durations* synchronize. (*See* ADEQUATE.)

"We can, I think, have no positive idea of any space or duration which is not made

up and *commensurate* to repeated numbers of feet or yards, or days and years which are the common measures, whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness of these sorts of quantities."—LOCKE.

COGNATE. ALLIED.

As ALLIED (Fr. *allier*, Lat. *alligāre*, *to bind together*) means bound by almost any union or connexion of interests, as by marriage, compact, treaty, league, descent; so COGNATE means allied by virtue of a common *descent*. Both terms are extended beyond the primary application to human relationships. In the group of Indo-European languages, the Welsh, for instance, and the Latin are allied. Single words are said to be cognate which may be derived from the same root. That is cognate which is allied in origin.

COHERENT. CONSISTENT.

That is COHERENT (Lat. *cŏhærēre*, *to stick together*) which is connected by some relation or agreement of form, order, sequence, and the like. That is CONSISTENT (Lat. *consistĕre*, *to stand together*) which is in harmony with something external to itself, with which it is compared. An incoherent account is one which does not hang together, one in which some statements seem out of character with others, so that such statements do not seem to harmonize among themselves, but to be possessed of forces which do not coincide with the main drift of what is said. An inconsistent account is one which contradicts itself. Words are said to be incoherent, actions inconsistent. The coherent presupposes what is analogous to organic unity; the consistent presupposes a unity of character, sentiment, or principle. A man's reasoning is incoherent from want of logical power; it is inconsistent when he allows himself to give expression to different opinions or sentiments in succession. That which is inconsistent is incongruous and incompatible. That which is incoherent is dislocated, rambling, loose, and ready to fall to pieces. Coherence is especially necessary in narration and discourse; consistency in giving evidence, in didactic exhortation, and in the conduct of daily life.

COLD. FRIGID. GELID. COOL.

Of these, COLD (A. S. *ceald*) simply expresses the absence of heat in any degree, whether physically or in a metaphorical sense of the mental feelings or passions. FRIGID (Lat. *frigĭdus*, *frigus*, *cold*) denotes that which is by nature relatively cold, as the Frigid Zone. COOL (A. S. *cōl*) denotes the lesser degrees of cold, and GELID (Lat. *gĕlĭdus*, *gĕlu*, *frost*) is applicable only to conditions of natural substances, the earth and the atmosphere. A cold nature is wanting in zeal and warm-heartedness, reserved, unswayed by passion or ardour of sentiment. A frigid nature communicates its coldness by a distant, unsympathizing manner. A frigid style of speaking or writing is one which neither conveys nor excites warmth of feeling or brightness of thought. COOL is employed not so much of temperament (like COLD and FRIGID) as of the state of mind under certain circumstances, and is associated with the praiseworthy, as cold with the contrary. So we say, "cold calculation," "cold indifference," but "cool determination or courage." When coolness has an unfavourable sense, it refers to specific demeanour towards others, as "cool impudence."

"It is in vain that we would *coldly* gaze
On such as smile upon us; the heart must
Leap kindly back to kindness." BYRON.

"Then, crushed by rules, and weakened as refined,
For years the power of Tragedy declined.
From bard to bard the *frigid* caution crept,
Till Declamation roared while Passion slept." JOHNSON.

"To what cool cave shall I descend,
Or to what *gelid* fountain bend?"
MARVEL.

"To say the truth, when the matter comes to be considered impartially and *coolly*, their faults of whatever kind will admit of much alleviation."—BISHOP HURD.

COLLATE. COMPARE.

To COMPARE (Lat. *compārare*) is the generic term. To COLLATE (Lat. *conferre*, part. *collātus*) is specific. Collation is a particular kind of comparison not entirely confined to matters of literary criticism, though mostly relating to these, but to all close comparisons of which the object is to note, not general resemblance or dissimi

larity, but specific points of agreement and disagreement.

COLLECT. ASSEMBLE. MUSTER. GATHER.

To COLLECT (Lat. *collĭgĕre*, part. *collectus*) is to gather from different places into one body or place.

"Some ritualists say the collects are prayers made among the people *collected* or gathered together."—COMBER.

To ASSEMBLE (O. Fr. *assembler*, L. Lat. *assimŭlare, to bring together*) differs from COLLECT in being applicable only to persons, and not to things.

"Thither he *assembled* all his train."
MILTON.

The transitive use of the verb has become uncommon. It then means to cause to meet in the same place.

To MUSTER (lit. to hold an inspection of troops; Fr. *monstre, monstrée*; Lat. *monstrāre, to show*) is to bring by effort or by authority to a certain place or occasion. It differs from COLLECT and ASSEMBLE in being applicable to one as well as many, hence, metaphorically, "to muster courage," and from ASSEMBLE also, in being applicable both to persons and things.

"Prone on the lonely grave of the dear man
He drops, whilst busy meddling memory
In barbarous successions *musters* up
The past endearments of their softer hours."
BLAIR.

GATHER (A. S. *gaderian*) has the senses of collect and assemble, and others of its own. As MUSTER implies the point to, so GATHER the source from, which the taking is; hence simply to gather a flower, which expresses no collection at all.

"Not that fair field
Of Enna, where Proserpin, *gathering* flowers,
Herself a fairer flower, by gloomy Dis
Was *gathered*, which cost Ceres all that pain
To seek her through the world."
MILTON.

The term, like COLLECT, is used in the sense of deduction or inference. "I gather," that is, I infer, "so and so from what you say." The expression of the English Liturgy, "When two or three are gathered together," has been censured as tautology; it is plainly not so. All gathering is not collective, as we have seen.

COLOUR. DYE. TINGE. STAIN. PAINT.

To COLOUR (Lat. *cŏlōrāre*) is simply to impart a hue, whether superficially or substantially, or both, as to colour the outside of a house; Nature colours the grass with green. It may denote an artificial process, or a process of nature.

"Vain is the hope by *colouring* to display
The bright effulgence of the noon-tide ray,
Or paint the full-orbed ruler of the skies
With pencils dipt in dull terrestrial dyes."
MASON.

DYE (A. S. *deágian*) denotes a purely artificial process, by which either the surface or the entire texture may be coloured; as, an ivory ball, which may be dyed red, or a silken fabric.

"Weaving was the invention of the Egyptians, and *dyeing* wool of the Lydians."—HOLLAND, *Pliny*.

To TINGE (Lat. *tingĕre*) is applied to both natural and artificial processes, but implies a subordinate degree of colouring; as, a red colour may be tinged with blue, the maiden's cheek is tinged with red.

"There is constantly a cheerful grey sky just sufficient to screen the sun, and to mitigate the violence of its perpendicular rays, without obscuring the air or *tingeing* the daylight with an unpleasant or melancholy hue."—ANSON'S *Voyages*.

To STAIN, which is abbreviated from *distain* (Fr. *desteindre*, Lat. *dis -tinguĕre, to decorate*), is, properly, to colour with a heterogeneous colour, or to discolour, as "stain the pure white with accidental spots." From the application or involuntary contact of foreign colouring matter, or the idea of adornment in *distinguĕre*, the term stain has come to mean a certain kind of dyeing. In this way, as PAINT (Fr. *peindre*, Lat. *pingĕre*) denotes the covering of the surface with a pigment, so STAIN and DYE indicate the colouring of the substance itself; and STAIN is said chiefly of solids, as ivory, wood, glass; and DYE of fibrous substances and textile fabrics. STAIN is often used for the accidental marring of one colour by another.

"See what reward the grateful senate yield
For the lost blood which *stains* yon northern field." ROWE'S *Lucan.*

"True poetry the *painter's* power displays;
True *painting* emulates the poet's lays." MASON.

COME. ARRIVE.

To COME (A.S. *cuman*) expresses no more than to reach up to some point, state, or condition.

"If the good man of the house had known at what hour the thief would *come*, he would have watched."—*Bible.*

To ARRIVE (Fr. *arriver*, L. Lat. *arrīpare, to come to shore, ad rīpam*) is to come to a *given* destination. Periods of time, tidings, and events, as well as moving persons or bodies, are said to arrive.

"In the Epistles of St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. James, we find frequent mention of the *coming* of our Lord in terms which, like those of the text, may at first seem to imply an expectation in those writers of His speedy *arrival*."—HORSLEY.

COMELY. GRACEFUL. ELEGANT.

COMELY (A. S. *cymlic*) expresses more than becoming. A very cheap thing may, on account of colour, shape, and the like, be becoming; but COMELY denotes some degree of intrinsic value. COMELY is either applied directly to the personal appearance, as a comely face or figure; or to something closely connected with it by way of dress, of personal decoration, or attendant circumstance. But this latter is now well-nigh obsolete.

"A happier and more *comely* tune." SHAKESPEARE.

Rather the difference between COMELY and BECOMING at present seems to be that comely qualifies only the person; becoming qualifies something which bears relation to the person.

"A *comely* creature." *Piers Ploughman.*

GRACEFUL, on the other hand, is independent both of personal relationship and of intrinsic value. It denotes simply an elegance and *charm* (Lat. *grātia*) of outline or movement. The pendent flower, the statue of the Apollo Belvedere, the action of the accomplished orator, are graceful.

"*Gracefulness* is an idea not very different from beauty. It consists in much the same things. *Gracefulness* is an idea belonging to posture and motion."—BURKE.

ELEGANT (Lat. *ēlĕgans*) denotes acquired grace, or such grace as indicates the touch of artificial refinement. The peasant girl may be comely and graceful by nature, but not elegant, save so far as nature gives to some what it requires art to develop in others. It is only reflexively that we speak of "elegant furniture," or an "elegant classic."

"The natural progress of the works of men is from rudeness to convenience, from convenience to *elegance*, and from *elegance* to nicety."—JOHNSON.

COMMAND. ORDER. INJUNCTION. PRECEPT.

COMMAND (Fr. *commander*) is the most general of these terms. It generally indicates a person of higher station. We speak of the Divine commands, and commandments of the Divine law. The noun *commandment* has now this restricted application. The command flows from one who is in permanent authority, jurisdiction, station, office.

"How commandatory the apostolical authority was, is best discernible by the Apostle's mandates unto the churches upon several occasions, as to the Thessalonians, 'We *command* the brethren.'"—BISHOP MORTON.

ORDER (Fr. *ordre*, Lat. *ordĭnem*) comes from a person less removed in rank. The general gives commands, the inferior officers order. The master orders, not commands, his servant. In COMMAND there is more of power and dignity; in ORDER, more of specific energy or peremptoriness. A command may be held permanently, an order is given to be executed for the occasion. The command or commandment is more general than the order. He who governs, commands; he who causes another to carry into execution, orders. The general commands the army and orders an assault. Orders are given in some cases where no power or authority of command exists, as when a physician orders a certain medicine to be taken by his patient. Force may order, superiority commands. To command may be latent, to order is active. A citadel commands a town, that is, could reduce or demolish it if necessary. A

point of view is called commanding which has elevation and extent, and so seems to give the spectator a superiority over it.

"A step-dame, too, I have, a cursed she,
Who rules my henpecked sire, and *orders* me."
DRYDEN.

As command and order relate to specific acts, so INJUNCTION (Lat. *injunctiōnem*) relates rather to general conduct; as, an injunction of secrecy, an injunction to be careful. It has more of the moral and less of the official about it. So that, as COMMAND and ORDER are for one's own sake, so INJUNCTION may be entirely for the sake of the other, as the father enjoins his son to be diligent.

"Though all duties expressly enjoined are by virtue of such *injunction* equally necessary, yet it follows not that they are in themselves equally excellent."—SOUTH.

PRECEPT (Lat. *præceptum*) is commonly not addressed to individuals, but has a moral or didactic force, which flows not simply, or, perhaps, not at all, from the authority of the person, but from the inherent wisdom of the thing itself. A command, an order, or an injunction may be old or new upon the occasion; a precept refers always to that which is old and established, or at least meant to become so as a thing of lasting obligation.

"*Precepts* are short—necessarily must be so—take up but little room, and for that reason do not always strike with the force or leave the impression which they ought to do."—PALEY.

COMMERCIAL. MERCANTILE.

COMMERCIAL (*see* COMMERCE) is the widest term, being sometimes made to embrace MERCANTILE (Lat. *mercāri, to traffic; mercem, merchandize*). In that sense it extends to the whole theory and practice of commerce; as, a commercial speculation, a commercial education, a commercial people. MERCANTILE respects the actual transaction of business; and, as COMMERCIAL relates strictly to the exchange of commodities, so MERCANTILE relates to their sale when brought to market.

"Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a *commercial* society."—ADAM SMITH.

"Such is the happiness, the hope of which seduced me from the duties and pleasures of a *mercantile* life."—JOHNSON.

COMMIT. INTRUST. CONSIGN. CONFIDE.

These words have in common the idea of transferring from one's self to the care and custody of another. COMMIT is the widest term, and expresses no more than generally the delivery into another's charge; as, to commit a case to an attorney, or a felon to prison. It is used in the general sense of placing a thing in permanent juxtaposition, connexion, or relation to another; as, to commit words to memory or thoughts to paper.

"The Lord Chancellor, upon petition or information, grants a commission to inquire into the party's state of mind, and if he be found non compos, he usually *commits* the care of his person, with a suitable allowance for his maintenance, to some friend, who is then called his committee."—BLACKSTONE.

To INTRUST is to put *in trust*, and denotes a higher degree of confidence; as, to intrust a child to the care of a friend, or the friend himself with the care of the child. Unlike COMMIT, it is applicable only to personal charge.

"The joy of our Lord and Master, which they only are admitted to who are careful to improve the talents they are *intrusted* withal."—WILKINS.

To CONSIGN (Lat. *consignāre, to sign or seal*) is a more formal act, implying abandonment at least of present responsibility, and a more complete merging in the keeping of another, or a more complete change of state; as, to consign goods into the hands of an agent; and, yet more strongly, though metaphorically, to consign a body to the grave. It is only objects, not duties or responsibilities as in the case of COMMIT, which are consigned. So we commit either individuals, or the care and management of them, to others, but we consign the individuals only.

"Atrides, parting for the Trojan war,
Consigned the youthful consort to his care."
POPE.

To CONFIDE (Lat. *confīdĕre*) combines the transfer of responsibility implied in CONSIGN with the assurance implied in TRUST. In the phrase, "to confide a secret," the responsibility is

rather shared than transferred. INTRUST regards matters of action, CONFIDE of knowledge also. It is because I confide in him that I intrust him with this business. To confide is to feel as well as to act; to intrust is only to act.

"Congress may under the constitution *confide* to the Circuit Court jurisdiction of all offences against the United States."—STORY.

COMMIT. PERPETRATE.

As it relates to the doing of deeds, COMMIT is used only in an unfavourable and bad sense; as, to commit an error, a fault, or a crime. Good deeds are never committed.

PERPETRATE (Lat. *perpĕtrare, to achieve*, in a good sense or in a bad sense) is in the same way restricted, but has only reference to grosser errors or crimes. So we might say, "I committed a slight mistake;" but the terms *slight* and *mistake* would be incompatible with PERPETRATE. The term is, however, used of lighter matters; as, to perpetrate a blunder, or a gross fault in manners, as we say when we wish sarcastically to exaggerate.

"Lands and tenements *commit* no treason." DRYDEN.

"What great advancement hast thou hereby won,
By being the instrument to *perpetrate*
So foul a deed?" DANIEL.

COMMON. ORDINARY. VULGAR.

COMMON (Lat. *communis*), from its primary sense of *general, frequent*, has naturally come to signify that which is *cheap* from its frequent occurrence, and of no high or refined kind. The term expresses rather a negative idea than any positive defect or objectionableness. A common-looking person is one who has nothing to distinguish him from the mass of people about him. The word often means no more than generality or frequency, as in the following:—

"The *commonness* and general long reception of a doctrine is not a sufficient argument of the truth of it."—SOUTH.

As that is common in which many persons partake, so that is ORDINARY (*Fr. ordinaire*) which is apt to meet us in the common *order* or succession of things, as "an ordinary face." Hence it takes its character for praise or blame, according to the subject with which it is associated. No such character belongs to the phrase, "the ordinary forms of law." "Men of ordinary judgment," would mean whose judgment would make them fit judges, as being of an average goodness. On the other hand, to say of a book that it was an ordinary performance, would express disparagement. In this disparaging sense, it indicates what is not likely to attract or interest.

"Nature bestowed upon Pythagoras a form and person more than *ordinarily* comely."—*Observer*.

VULGAR (Lat. *vulgāris; vulgus, the common people*), though it had not originally this decidedly unfavourable sense, as in the old phrase "vulgar," that is, common, "tongue," is always now employed with some tinge of depreciation, if not of actual dispraise. Vulgar reports are such as are circulated among people, and such as may be supposed to interest them in particular. In a stronger sense, vulgar indicates depravation of taste and manners. In its unfavourable sense, VULGAR is far stronger than COMMON or ORDINARY, because it means what is *distinctively* seen in common people. It belongs exclusively to the minds and manners of men; while COMMON and ORDINARY are applicable also to the course or nature of events. We may say, generally, that which is ordinary has in it nothing distinguished; that which is common, nothing refined; that which is vulgar, nothing noble.

"Verses which a few years past were thought worthy the attention of children only, or of the lowest and rudest orders, are now admired for that artless simplicity which once obtained the name of coarseness and *vulgarity*."—KNOX.

COMPANION. ASSOCIATE. COMRADE. COLLEAGUE. MATE. PARTNER.

COMPANION (L. Lat. *com-pānionem*, from *pānis, bread*, originally meaning *a messmate:* see BRACHET, s. v. *compagne*) is a term which may be applied to any person who keeps company with another for a longer or shorter time without such connexion being habitual, or even of necessity an equality between the two. "All through my

travels my dog was my faithful companion." There must be some degree of sympathy in pleasure or pain.

"Alas! my soul, thou pleasing *companion* of this body, thou fleeting thing that art now deserting it, whither art thou flying?" —*Tatler*.

ASSOCIATE (Lat. *associāre, to make a companion of*) denotes habitual and voluntary companionship on the ground of personal community of feeling.

"The Apostles, and their *associates*."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

COMRADE (Fr. *camarade*, Lat. *cămĕra, a chamber*) is used of companionship in certain of the lighter relations of society, dependent upon and subordinate to a common rule of life. So a comrade is an associate who is not so purely by personal choice. Playfellows at school, or soldiers of the same regiment are comrades. The comrade *lives* with us, the companion *goes* with us. The comrade is more intimate than the companion, who may be lightly joined and lightly left.

"In the meantime the other two squadrons were calm spectators of the rout of their *comrades*."—ANSON'S *Voyages*.

MATE (etym. doubtful; see WEDGWOOD) is to the graver relations of life what COMRADE is to the lighter, and denotes a common employment in which each takes a part. It is applicable to the relation between two persons, while comrade always implies a number.

"I
Will way me to some wither'd bough, and there
My *mate*, that's never to be found again,
Lament till I am lost." SHAKESPEARE.

COLLEAGUE (Fr. *collègue*, Lat. *collēga*) is one who is united with another in the tenure of an office, or the discharge of an official duty.

"Being yet very young, says Plutarch, I was joined in commission with another in an embassy to the proconsul, and my *colleague*, falling sick, was forced to stay behind, so that the whole business was transacted by me alone."—DRYDEN.

PARTNER is commonly one who takes *part* in a social community of interest, whether grave or gay; as, a partner in business, a partner in the dance, a partner for life.

"No faith, no trust, no friendship, shall be known
Among the jealous *partners* of a throne;
But he who reigns shall strive to reign alone." ROWE'S *Lucan*.

COMPARATIVELY. RELATIVELY.

COMPARATIVELY means according to estimate made by comparison; RELATIVELY, according to a relation to something else. The former is opposed to positively, the latter to absolutely. Comparatively regards an average, relatively a standard or requirement. There were relatively few persons present, that is, in regard to the matter that had brought them together. There were comparatively few, that is, considering the generality of such occasions.

COMPARTMENT. DEPARTMENT.

These words, derivatives of the Lat. *partīri, to part off*, express, the former only material divisions, the latter divisions of an abstract kind, as mental, intellectual, literary, conventional.

COMPENSATION. REMUNERATION. RECOMPENSE. AMENDS. SATISFACTION. REQUITAL. REWARD. MEED. GUERDON.

To COMPENSATE is to furnish an equivalent for anything lost or parted with by another (Lat. *compensāre, to counterbalance, to compensate*). It commonly supposes that the loss has been in favour, or, in some way, in the cause of the person making the compensation; but this is not essential. So one might, as an act of charity, give to a poor person as a compensation for a loss which he had unfortunately sustained.

"Not having any certain knowledge of a future state of reward (though the wisest of them did indeed hope for it, and think it highly probable), they were forced, that they might be consistent with their own principles, to suppose the practice of virtue a sufficient reward to itself in all cases, and a full *compensation* for all the sufferings of the world."—CLARKE.

REMUNERATION (Lat. *rĕmūnĕrātionem*) is commonly taken in the specific sense of compensation for personal services done to the remunerator.

"Human legislators have for the most part chosen to make the sanction of their laws rather vindicatory than *remuneratory*, or to consist rather in punishments than in actual particular rewards."—BLACKSTONE.

RECOMPENSE and REWARD stand to each other in this relation, that recompense (Fr. *récompense*) is a reward equivalent to the thing done. REWARD is, literally, that which *regards* or is related to the thing (Fr. *regarder, to keep in view*). An industrious boy at school is rewarded, not recompensed, by a prize. On the other hand, if the boy were to set his reward against the efforts and self-denial he had made and exercised in order to gain his prize, he might say, "I am well recompensed for all I have done." Reward follows upon action or conduct, and may be for good or bad conduct. In the former case it is opposed to punishment, in the latter it is identical with it. Recompense is wide, and more varied on the grounds of its bestowal. It has less regard to the simple merits and demerits of the action, and more to the whole sum of what it cost, in time, effort, and the like. Yet recompense is, generally speaking, the return due to merit, of which the nature and amount are to be determined by equitable considerations and custom. Remuneration is for service, recompense for long, assiduous, meritorious service.

"Thou who hast taught me to forgive the ill,
And *recompense* as friends the good misled,
If mercy be a precept of Thy will,
Return that mercy on Thy servant's head."
DRYDEN.

"Which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending an observance or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is what we call *reward* and punishment."—LOCKE.

MEED (A. S. *méd, merit, reward*) is not a term of familiar use. It is a reward which we fairly earn by our own exertions; something bestowed or rendered in consideration of merit, and which does not, like REWARD, imply any substantial value, as the "meed of praise," but rather something which derives its value from its honourable character.

"As he pronounces lastly on each deed,
Of so much fame in heaven expect thy *meed*."
MILTON.

GUERDON is a French word, and combines the two notions of a voluntary gift and a reward, being a hybrid L. Lat. *wider-donum;* made up of O. H. G. *wider, back again;* and the Lat. *dōnum, a gift: see* LITTRÉ. It is that which is received and recognized as a recompense from one who was not absolutely bound to recognize the thing done, and it may or may not be of intrinsic value.

"Verse, like the laurel, its immortal *meed*,
Should be the *guerdon* of a noble deed."
COWPER.

AMENDS and SATISFACTION both belong to cases in which the person *complains* of loss. *Amends* (Fr. *amende*) relates rather to the thing, *satisfaction* (Lat. *sătisfactiōnem*) to the person. AMENDS restores the balance of deprivation, SATISFACTION the balance of discontent. So we may make amends not only to persons, but abstractedly; as we speak of making amends for idleness by increased efforts afterwards; but satisfaction is purely personal.

"Then let us seek
Some safer resolution, which, methinks,
I have in view, calling to mind with heed
Part of our sentence—that thy seed shall bruise
The Serpent's head—piteous *amends*."
MILTON.

"For the transgressions of man, man ought to make *satisfaction*, but he could not."—SHERIDAN, *Sermons*.

REQUITAL, which, like *quit* and *acquit*, is originally from Lat. *quies, rest* (something given to set the mind of the debtor *at rest*), is simply the giving of something in return for something done towards ourselves. This may be anything but a reward or a recompense. It is dictated simply by gratitude, and is not conferred. The requital is of the fullest possible value in the case of the truly grateful. It is mean or even injurious in the absolutely ungrateful. It is a matter of evil for evil in the vindictive. It is simple punishment in cases where it consists of deserved suffering coming from those who have a right to inflict it.

"Every receiver is debtor to his benefactor; he owes him all the good he receives from him, and is always obliged to

thankful acknowledgment, and, whenever he hath opportunity, to an equivalent *requital*."—SCOTT, *Christian Life*.

COMPETITION. EMULATION. RIVALRY. AMBITION.

COMPETITION (Lat. *compĕtĕre, to meet together; compĕtītor, a rival*) is not a matter of feeling, but of action. It is the attempt to gain something desirable with or against others who are aiming at the same thing, especially in matters of interest and honour.

"But they ought to consider that when these two parts of religion come in *competition*, devotion is to give way to charity, mercy being better than sacrifice."—TILLOTSON.

EMULATION (Lat. *æmŭlātiōnem*) is a matter of feeling, which often prompts to competition. It is a desire of excelling, and a natural tendency to make efforts in that direction. It is always relative to others, whom the emulous person desires to equal, imitate, or excel. And in this way it differs from AMBITION, which is not relative directly to others (Lat. *ambĭtiōnem*, from *ambīre, to go about canvassing for office*). The emulous person is thinking of others who are running the same course; the ambitious person thinks only of the goal and the prize, and not, except indirectly, of others who have to be passed in the course.

A noble *emulation* prevailed among the companions to obtain the first place in the esteem of their chiefs, among the chiefs to acquire the greatest number of valiant companions."—GIBBON.

"Cromwell, I charge thee fling away *ambition*:
By that sin fell the angels.'
SHAKESPEARE.

RIVALRY (Lat. *rīvālis, one who uses a brook, rivus, in common with another*) has always a selfish object. It consists in trying to get something for one's self which is of the nature of a possession, against one or more others who are trying for the same thing. It does not aim at excellence except as a means to acquisition. EMULATION denotes concurrence, RIVALRY denotes conflict. Men love those whom they emulate, but entertain different feelings towards those whom they rival. There is generosity in emulation, and selfishness in rivalry. Emulation seeks to merit success, rivalry to obtain it. The emulous desires to surpass, the rival would gladly supplant. Yet rivalry may be generous, that is, when two or more persons generously and honourably strive after the same gain.

"Keen contentions and eager *rivalries*."—JEFFREY.

COMPLAIN. MURMUR. REPINE. REGRET.

COMPLAIN (O. Fr. *complaindre*, Lat. *plangĕre, to beat, strike the breast*) is to find fault sadly. More generally, to complain is to express dissatisfaction. It is plain that this may be either with the course of things themselves, or with the conduct of other persons. A complaint in either case is expressed openly, and implies that what has befallen one has been undeserved or unjust, from whatever quarter it may have come. When it relates to the conduct of another, it comes from a superior, or from one who is sufficiently on an equality to have a right to complain to some superior.

"Save where from yonder ivy-mantled tower
The moping owl doth to the moon *complain*
Of such as, wandering near her secret bower,
Molest her ancient solitary reign."
GRAY.

MURMUR (Lat. *murmŭrare*) is the suppressed expression of discontent against a superior power or the irresistible force of circumstances.

"What if God, willing to show the riches of His mercy, calls and accepts of some at the very last hour of the day, and rewards them equally with those that came in at first; have we anything to reply against such a proceeding, or to carp at His justice or *murmur* at our brother's felicity?"—SOUTH.

REPINE. Unlike COMPLAIN and MURMUR, REPINE (prob. the Fr. *repoindre, to prick again*: WEDGWOOD and LATHAM) implies no outward expression, but an inward discontent which preys on the spirits, and relates to the general lot or condition.

"*Repining* is sorrow united with a degree of resentment against some superior agent, where the mind dares not to break forth into strong expressions of anger."—COGAN.

REGRET (Fr. *regretter*) regards matters of fact, and denotes sorrow that something should have happened

as it has, and a wish that it should have been otherwise. It is used, like LAMENT, to express a modified complaint of another, but it is equally applicable to one's self. One may regret one's own conduct, as well as that of another. The essential idea of regret is that of looking back with dissatisfaction. If it be on what has occurred without ourselves, then regret is sorrow; if it be connected with our own acts, then regret is repentance.

"Alike *regretted* in the dust he lies,
Who yields ignobly or who bravely dies."
POPE'S *Homer*

REMONSTRATE (L. Lat. *rĕmonstrare, to show again*) and EXPOSTULATE (Lat. *expostŭlare, to require urgently*).

These two much resemble each other, inasmuch as they denote the complaint of another's conduct, which is expanded into reasoning with him; but REMONSTRATE is the milder term of the two. The person who remonstrates with another is more on an equality with him than the expostulator, who is in a superior position, reasons less, and dictates more. Remonstrances and expostulations may be made either before the act by way of dissuasion, or after it. In the latter case the object is to produce an impression of dissatisfaction or repentance. There seems to be a further difference in nature of the force employed in each case. Expostulation is a more direct appeal to the person himself, and therefore includes the employment of any means which may influence him. Remonstrance is rather an appeal to the case, and indirectly to the person's sense of its injustice, impropriety, or the like. They refer exclusively to matters of right and wrong, not to matters of truth and falsehood, except so far as they are associated with or flow out of moral causes. We do not expostulate or remonstrate against ignorance or false opinions, though we might do so against persons for neglecting opportunities of fuller or exacter knowledge, and against the results of this neglect.

"We must use *expostulation* kindly."
SHAKESPEARE.

"It is the proper business of a divine to state cases of conscience, and to *remonstrate* against any growing corruptions in practice and especially in principles."—WATERLAND.

COMPLEXITY. COMPLICATION INTRICACY. COMPOUNDING. COMPOSITENESS.

COMPLEXITY and COMPLICATION are both derived from the Lat. *complĭcare*, to fold together. INTRICACY is from *tricæ, trifles, hindrances*. Complexity is the effect produced by complication, whether on the bodily eye or on the eye of the understanding. Complication is a confused involution of things. Intricacy represents the difficulty of finding a definite line of thought or movement on account of the complexity or complication of things. In a wood, in consequence of the complication of the foliage, the task is one of complexity, and it is an intricate matter, to find the right path. COMPLICATION is oftener used of words and circumstances, as "complicated sentences," "his affairs are in a complicated state;" COMPLEXITY, of ideas, as a complex proposition; INTRICATE, of matters which have to be investigated, mastered, or understood, as "an intricate point of law." Complexity is a more abstract term than complication, which is more specific. So COMPLEXITY is employed of the inherent tendency of things to become complicated, as by Burke:—

"Men are every now and then put by *complexity* of human affairs into strange situations."

"A *complication* of diseases."—MACAULAY.

"Many who toil through the *intricacy* of complicated systems are insuperably embarrassed with the least perplexity in common affairs."—*Rambler*.

COMPOUNDING (Lat. *compōnĕre, to put together*) denotes the physical amalgamation of homogeneous substances, and is not a moral term; except so far as COMPOUND has also the sense of the Latin *compōnĕre*, to *allay* (strife), to compound a difference (*compōnĕre litem*).

"There was likeness enough in the features of each manner to favour Lucian's attempt in *compounding* his new dialogue."

COMPOSITE (Lat. *compōnĕre, compositus, to put together*) is a more artistic term than compound. That is COMPOUND which *consists* of more than one substance, ingredient, or element; that is COMPOSITE into which they have been imported so as to constitute it as the result of design. In the compound more than one thing meets. In the composite more than one principle of combination is exemplified. The Composite order of architecture combines the Ionic and the Corinthian. A compound building might be made partly of brick and partly of marble.

"In this we shall follow the order that we have above laid down, first dividing speech as a whole into its constituent parts, then resolving it as a *composite* into its matter and form."—HARRIS, *Hermes*.

COMPOSITION. MIXTURE. CONGLOMERATION. AMALGAMATION.

Of these the simplest and most comprehensive is MIXTURE (Lat. *mixtūra*). It expresses the interfusion of particles of a different nature into one mass, solid or liquid, or of soluble with liquid; and may be the result of chance or design, and in proportioned quantities or not. It is used physically and analogously. COMPOSITION (Lat. *compŏsĭtiōnem*) is the forming a whole (or the whole so formed) by a collocation or association of parts, elements, or ingredients, designedly and according to proportion. Where the ingredients are material, the term commonly used is COMPOUND, although we speak *in the abstract* of the composition of a physical whole, as for instance an organized body. A CONGLOMERATION (Lat. *conglŏmĕrationem, a rolling together; glŏmus, glŏmĕris, a ball*, as of *wool*) is literally a collection into a round mass; while AMALGAMATION, from *amalgam* (Lat. *mălagma*; Gr. μάλαγμα, *a soft substance*, from μαλάσσω *to make soft*, a compound of mercury with some other metal) points to the compounding of various solid particles into one lump. Thus in MIXTURE the leading idea is that of the variety or unlikeness of the components. In COMPOSITION the skill and judgment of the composer. In CONGLOMERATION the forced unity of the mass. In AMALGAMATION the homogeneous nature of the unions.

COMPOUND. COMPLEX. (*See* COMPLEXITY.)

As compared with each other, these two adjectives differ in that, while COMPLEX denotes involution, COMPOUND only denotes a more external kind of amalgamation or combination. A grammatical form may be compound (the word "compound" is an instance of it), but it is not complex. This is reserved for metaphorical use, as in the subjoined employment of it by Locke.

"But the opinion of Buchanan is more probable, that the town now called Dundy is a *compound* word of Down and Tay."—SPOTSWOOD.

"As these simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea, and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together I call *complex*, such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe."—LOCKE.

COMPOUND. COMPOSE.

These two words, formed from the same root (Lat. *compōnĕre*), serve to represent, the first the physical, the second the metaphysical process. The words are often used interchangeably, yet this distinction holds good. "Of what is this pudding composed?" is a question which would carry the mind to the receipt for it, and the intention of the person who made it; "Of what is it compounded?" to the actual ingredients only. So an artist composes his subject, and compounds his colours.

"In like manner, if by knowing that colours are nothing else but various mixtures of light and of darkness in bodies, our discourse assures us that by several *compoundings* of these extremes, reds, blues, yellows, greens, and all other intermediate colours may be generated."—DIGBY.

"Let me *compose*
Something in verse as well as prose."
POPE.

COMPRISE. CONTAIN. COMPREHEND. INCLUDE. EMBRACE. INVOLVE. IMPLY.

COMPRISE (Fr. *compris*, from Lat. *com-prensus*, part. *comprĕhendĕre*) is

always used metaphysically, that is, expresses comprehensiveness or inclusiveness as appreciated by the mind. It is a term commonly applicable to the individual objects included under an abstract or collective noun, that is to say, to COMPRISE is to include by the metaphysical force of a term. For instance, we could not say, "Six trees are *comprised* in that field," but we might say, "Those six trees comprise all the timber on my estate." If we meant to say that Walter Scott's works were part of the library of an acquaintance, we might say, "The library contains or comprises Scott's works;" but we should not mean quite the same thing. In the former case, we simply state that in this particular whole is contained something as a part. In the latter, we predicate of the library an extensiveness, which in this case has proved *adequate* to *include* those particular works. The term COMPRISE adds to the idea of inclusion that of adequate or commensurate including.

"Whatever was by them decreed either in the declaration of Christian belief or refutation of heresy, may all be *comprised*, as judicious Hooker well noteth, in four words, 'truly, perfectly, indivisibly, distinctly,' truly God, perfectly man, indivisibly one person, distinctly two natures."—BISHOP HORNE.

If we meant to enumerate all that was involved in the term library, we might say a library comprises bookshelves as well as books; or, that book in particular is comprised in the list. CONTAIN (Lat. *contĕnere*) denotes what is within another thing as a simple matter of fact, and not of inference or implication; as, the vessel contains oil, that man's writings contain many original ideas. There is, however, commonly a specific relationship or community between the thing contained and that which contains it. This appears in the term *contents*, which is not the case with COMPRISE or INCLUDE; for these latter may relate to things which in use and nature are entirely foreign among themselves. Yet CONTAIN is generic, and may be taken as the universal term, of which the rest are modifications.

"And when he (Cranmer) came to the last part of his task, he boldly owned his books, avowing the truths in them *contained*, and disclaimed the Roman doctrine."—STRYPE.

COMPREHEND (Lat. *comprĕhendĕre*), like COMPRISE, and unlike CONTAIN, can only be used metaphysically; but it denotes the extent of an imposed term, not an inherent or spontaneous force. Comprehension is the result of purpose; while comprisal flows from the nature of the thing comprising. Rules comprehend particular instances, laws comprehend certain cases, a word comprehends several meanings. The character of CONTAIN is physical, of COMPRISE metaphysical, of COMPREHEND geometrical and analogous.

"The virtues required in the heroic poem, and, indeed, in all writings published, are *comprehended* all in this one word, discretion."—HOBBES.

INCLUDE (Lat. *includĕre*) is metaphysical, while the physical meaning is expressed by another form of the same word, *inclose*. It is to CONTAIN in the relation of the logical whole to the parts, that is, of the universal to the particular.

"Our Master Christ showeth that in fulfilling two of these commandments he all works *included*."—BARNES.

EMBRACE (Fr. *embrasser*; *bras*, *the arm*) is a metaphorical term, meaning to inclose as if *in the arms*. It is a livelier term than INCLUDE, and commonly denotes a distant, indirect, or unexpected including.

"Not that my song, in such a scanty space,
So large a subject fully can *embrace*."
DRYDEN.

INVOLVE and IMPLY are commonly used of one particular only. Involve (Lat. *involvĕre*, *to enwrap*) denotes that which exercises such a force upon another thing as to draw it after itself of necessity. "Such a scheme involves the necessity of a large expenditure of money." Imply (Lat. *implicare*, *to enfold*) relates only to the force of words or the virtue of ideas, as INVOLVE to the necessities of things. IMPLY is opposed to *express*. An implied promise is one fairly to be understood or inferred from the

words used, though not reducible to a distinct statement. In a definition which includes a certain number of ideas, the term defined implies any one because all of the included ideas. Thus murder implies killing, because killing, together with other ideas, enters into the definition of murder. Travelling involves fatigue as well as pleasure. An involved promise is one which is necessitated by what has been said *or done*. Generally speaking, words imply, and circumstances involve. If one thing involves another, it so contains it that the two must go together by an indissoluble connexion. War involves the expenditure of blood and treasure. The premises of a syllogism involve the conclusion, which, on the other hand, is *evolved* from them.

"We cannot demonstrate these things so as to show that the contrary necessarily *involves* a contradiction."—TILLOTSON.

"Where a malicious act is proved, a malicious intention is *implied*."—SHERLOCK.

CONCILIATE. RECONCILE. PROPITIATE.

To CONCILIATE (Lat. *concĭlĭāre*) is to gain the affections or goodwill of another for one's self. To RECONCILE (from the same root) is to restore others to goodwill. RECONCILE has also the peculiar sense of bringing a person into acquiescence with that which is distasteful. RECONCILE is used of persons, while CONCILIATE may be applied to qualities; as, to conciliate regard and esteem. To conciliate amounts, in some cases, to reconciling to one's self, for to conciliate is to gain over, and this may be one who was previously either indifferent or an enemy. There is an analogous use of RECONCILE in which it is employed in the sense of proving congruous or compatible; as, to reconcile conduct with principles, to reconcile statements or differences. PROPITIATE (Lat. *prōpĭtiāre*) is nearly identical with CONCILIATE. But CONCILIATE is to bring to a harmony of sentiment, PROPITIATE to render actively favourable, especially by appeasing wrath or ill-will. We conciliate equals and propitiate superiors, especially those of great influence and power. We conciliate the judgment and opinions, we propitiate the feelings and inclinations, of another. When we have conciliated him he thinks better of us, when we have propitiated him he feels less harshly towards us.

"The rapacity of his father's administration had excited such universal discontent, that it was found expedient to *conciliate* the nation."—HALLAM.

"First be *reconciled* to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."—*Bible.*

"With such a sacrifice God is made favourable, or God is *propitiate*, if we shall make new Englishe."—BISHOP GARDINER.

CONCISE. SUCCINCT. CONDENSED. SENTENTIOUS.

CONCISE (Lat. *concīdĕre, to cut off short*, part. *concīsus*) is used of style in speaking or writing, and means the expression of much in a few words.

"To tell you the truth, I was once inclined to be somewhat angry at the shortness of your letters; but I am now so well reconciled to your *concise* manner, that I condemn my own as downright loquacity, and shall make your epistles the models of mine."—MELMOTH, *Cicero.*

SUCCINCT (Lat. *succingĕre*, part. *succinctus, to gird* or *tuck up*) has the same signification, but is applied more frequently to the subject-matter, while CONCISE belongs to the phraseology; so we should say, a concise expression, and a succinct narrative or style.

"A strict and *succinct* style is that where you can take away nothing without losse, and that losse to be manifest."—B. JONSON.

CONDENSED (Lat. *condensāre*, from *densus, close*) relates rather to the mode of treatment by which a matter is brought, and, as it were, compressed into a smaller space than it *might* have occupied.

"The secret course pursued at Brussels and at Madrid may be *condensed* into the usual formula—dissimulation, procrastination, and again dissimulation."—MOTLEY.

The term SENTENTIOUS (Lat. *sententĭa*) marks the style which aims at being short, pithy, and weighty at the same time, as if every sentence were a maxim. The term formerly was indicative of more praise than now belongs to it, when it would probably be used in the ironical sense

of oracular—that is, pompously terse, or magisterially didactic. Perhaps this element would naturally underlie the term from the beginning, for who is competent to speak thus without turgidity or self-conceit? So Addison writes, "ambitiously sententious." On the other hand, the term is one of pure praise in the following:—

"The style is clear and strong, short and *sententious*, abounding with antitheses, elegant turns, and manly strokes of wit."—WATERLAND.

CONCLUSIVE. FINAL. DECISIVE. ULTIMATE.

These terms agree in expressing that character of what is said or done which leaves no room for subsequent modification or procedure. CONCLUSIVE (Lat. *concludĕre, to shut up*) is commonly used of that which terminates argument or debate by its overwhelming or irresistible force; as, a conclusive proof, conclusive evidence.

"But this objection, when thoroughly examined, will not be found by any means so pressing or *conclusive* as at first sight it seems."—HOBBES.

FINAL (Lat. *fīnālis, fīnis, an end*) is that which brings with it an *intentional* end. The term FINAL is most commonly found associated with the end or purpose of intelligent beings, or as recognized by them; the final being generally that on which the mind dwells as the end. Hence, especially, words, decisions, resolves, and the like, are final, as shutting up further thought, speech, or action. A conclusive answer leaves no room for question. A final answer is followed by a determined silence.

"Neither with us in England hath there been till very lately any *final* determination upon the right of authors at the common law."—BLACKSTONE.

DECISIVE (Lat. *dēcīdĕre, to determine*) is that which has the power of prompt and summary determination; as, a decisive proof, a decisive victory. The decisive terminates action, as the conclusive terminates argument.

"A *decisive*, irrevocable doom."—BATE'S *Sermons*.

ULTIMATE (Lat. *ultĭmāre, to come to an end, ultĭmus, last*) denotes that beyond which nothing is contemplated or attempted; as the ultimate triumph of truth; so, an ultimate concession is one which there is no probability of seeing extended; ultimate truths are truths which must be taken as axioms, being incapable of further analysis.

"Whence comes it (the mind) by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience; on that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it *ultimately* derives itself."—LOCKE.

CONCORD. HARMONY. UNISON. CONCERT.

CONCORD (Lat. *concordia*) denotes the union of wills and affections.

"Love quarrels oft in pleasing *concord* end." MILTON.

HARMONY (Gr. *ἁρμονία, a fitting together, musical harmony*) is a continuous concord or state of such agreement manifesting itself externally. A united family, by the concord which subsists among its members, lives a life of domestic harmony.

"In us both one soul,
Harmony to behold in wedded pair,
More grateful than harmonious sounds to the ear." MILTON.

UNISON (Lat. *ūnīsŏnus*; from *ūnus, one*, and *sŏnus, sound*) relates to such congeniality as may exist in the less grave matters of feeling and taste.

"A work which warms our passions, and hurries us on with the rapid vehemence of its style, may be read once or twice with pleasure; but it is the more tranquil style which is most frequently in *unison* with our minds."—KNOX, *Essays*.

CONCERT (Lat. *consĕrĕre, to join together*, part. *consertus*) applies also to designs and actions, which are the carrying out of such designs:—

"It was *concerted* to begin the siege in March."—BURNET.

It should be mentioned that CONCERT came afterwards to be confounded with *consort*. So Spenser—

"For all that pleasing is to living ear
Was there *consorted* in one harmony."

CONDUCE. CONTRIBUTE. TEND.

TEND (Lat. *tendĕre*) is used of anything likely to bring about a result different from, yet cognate to, itself;

as, idleness tends to poverty. It denotes a relation between cause and effect, not invariable, but variable and probable, or such as partially, if not completely, effects a certain end.

"The laws of our religion *tend* to the universal happiness of mankind."—TILLOTSON.

CONDUCE (Lat. *condūcĕre, to profit, to serve*) expresses more distinctly than TEND the separate existence of cause and effect. We say a thing is apt to tend to something else, but we do not say, apt to conduce. It either does conduce or not.

"All agree that Moses' main end was the abolition of idolatry and preservation of the unity. The institution of the Sabbath is shown by Spenser and others to be, of all the ceremonials, the very rite most *conducive* to this end."—WARBURTON.

The term CONDUCE is employed of that which leads to a favourable or desirable end, not to the contrary. We speak of things as conducive to happiness, not to misery.

CONTRIBUTE (Lat. *contribŭĕre*) denotes partial causation, which is shared with other things of like tendency, while one thing alone may conduce to bring about a result. But CONDUCE and CONTRIBUTE differ, in that CONDUCE takes effect upon a possible, CONTRIBUTE also upon an actual and present end. That which conduces to happiness makes happiness so far probable. That which contributes to happiness adds to the actual sum or amount of it.

"Quoth she, I grant it is in vain
For one that's basted to feel pain:
Because the pangs his bones endure
Contribute nothing to the cure."
Hudibras.

CONFEDERATE. ALLY.

CONFEDERATE (Lat. *confœdĕrāre, to join by a league*) is used of individuals in a bad sense.

"He is the freeman whom the truth makes free,
And all are slaves besides. There's not a chain
That hellish foes *confederate* for his harm
Can wind around him, but he casts it off
With as much ease as Samson his green withes."
COWPER.

A *confederate* State or Power differs from an ALLY (Fr. *allier*, Lat. *allīgāre, to bind*), in that confederation may be permanent, while alliance is temporary. We speak of the "German Confederation," and of the alliance between the English and French in the Crimean war. An ally is not used of individuals except in a jocose way, or on a great scale; as, one monarch may be an ally of another.

"By this extraordinary and unexpected success of his *ally* (Gustavus), Charles failed of the purpose for which he framed the *alliance*."—HUME.

CONFIRM. CORROBORATE.

The idea of giving additional strength is common to both these terms, and that in other than the physical sense, but they differ in their mode of application.

CONFIRM (Lat. *confirmāre*) is used both of the minds of persons and of the subjects; CORROBORATE, only of the subjects themselves. My statement has been confirmed, or I am confirmed in my belief. Facts, opinions, statements are CORROBORATED (Lat. *corrŏbŏrāre, to make very strong*). Generally speaking, to confirm is to make more sure, to corroborate is to make more strong. When a statement is doubtful, it may be confirmed; when testimony is weak, it may be corroborated. I am confirmed in what is internal or relative to myself; in an opinion, a conviction, a resolution, or even a suspicion. That is corroborated which I put forth before others, and advance as liable to doubt or gainsaying.

"That treaty so prejudicial ought to have been remitted rather than *confirmed*."—SWIFT.

"The concurrence of all *corroborates* the same truth."—TAYLOR.

CONFLICT. CONTEST.

CONFLICT (Lat. *conflictus, a striking together*) is used of any two opposing forces in sustained collision, as the "conflict of the elements," "conflicting hosts."

CONTEST (Fr. *contester*, and Lat. *contestāri, to call to witness*) is an open and premeditated struggle on the part of man for some proposed prize or victory. It may be intellectual, while a conflict is physical, except when it is used in a metaphorical sense; as, a

conflict of opposite emotions or opinions. A contest is a strife for a common object. A conflict is a violent meeting of two forces or individuals. A contest may be, and often has been, decided by a conflict. In the Wars of the Roses the houses of York and Lancaster were the contending parties, and the battles in which they engaged were conflicts. A man may be defeated in a contest, but he may perish in a conflict.

"And whenever the patrons of liberty shall give this advantage to the enemies of it, as much of that popularity which the first lose the others will gain, and so, the *contest* becoming more equal, force alone must decide."—WARBURTON.

"The starry cope
Of heaven, perhaps, or all the elements
All least had gone to rack, disturb'd and torn
With violence of this *conflict*."
MILTON.

CONFOUND. CONFUSE. MIX. BLEND. MINGLE.

These two, CONFOUND and CONFUSE, may be regarded as modes of the third, to MIX. To MIX (Lat. *miscēre*) is to produce or exhibit an entire interpenetration of many parts or particles, whether homogeneous or not. In the mixture the parts may absolutely lose their individuality, as in liquid substances, or not absolutely, as in mixing different kinds of seeds. The term MIX is hardly employed in any other than a purely, or almost purely physical sense.

MINGLE is a variation of *mix*, and denotes that kind of mixture in which the individuals or parts retain their individuality, or are still recognizable, as when persons mingle in the dance or the crowd.

BLEND (A. S. *blendan, to mix, confuse; to blind*) is to mix imperfectly yet harmoniously, so that the individuality, as in colours, is discernible, but under a modified form. But, except in the case of colours and sounds and flavours, BLEND is used of abstract qualities and ideas. CONFOUND (Lat. *confundĕre*, part. *confūsus*) and CONFUSE are derived from different parts of the same Latin verb, but used, the former of more things than one, the latter of one thing. They apply to the mind and ideas as well as to objects of vision. A person confuses an account when he gives inverted, vague, or contradictory relations, so making it obscure. He confounds one account or circumstance with another when he mixes into one details belonging to both. When we confuse we throw into indistinctness; when we confound we falsely identify. In the former we wrongly put one or more things *among* others; in the latter we substitute them wrongly *for* others. Things may mix or be mixed in almost any proportion; but things mingled with others are comparatively few, or of smaller quantity.

"Our critic *confounds* the nature and order of things."—WARBURTON.

"But as he wrote at second-hand and from hearsay only of things which he himself had not seen, he is observed to have jumbled his facts together more *confusedly*, and to describe them more inaccurately, than the rest, who related them from their own knowledge."—MIDDLETON.

The following from Bishop Horsley may show that the term MIX is not happily employed but of material compounds:—

"Who is he that shall determine in what proportions the attributes of justice and mercy, forbearance and severity, ought to be *mixed* up in the character of the Supreme Governor of the universe?"

"Curiosity *blends* itself more or less with all our passions."—BURKE.

"Fire *mingled* with the hail."—*Bible*.

CONFRONT. FACE.

To CONFRONT (Fr. *confronter*; prob. from *con, together, front-em, the forehead*) is usually personal, implying two persons at least; as, to confront one witness with another; or, he was confronted by several witnesses; or the witnesses were confronted with one another. To FACE (Lat. *fācies, a face*) is said of one person or one party which is ready to encounter some specific difficulty, danger, or object of fear, not necessarily personal; as to face the enemy or the storm. CONFRONT is also a more energetic and positive term than FACE. He who faces danger is ready to meet its consequences. He who confronts it has shown signs of opposition, and, in some sense, begun the attack.

"We four, indeed, *confronted* here with four
In Russian habit." SHAKESPEARE.

It may be observed that CONFRONT has a force which does not belong to FACE, namely, to *bring* face to face.

"A lie *faces* God and shrinks from men." —BACON.

CONFUSION. DISORDER. DISTURBANCE. COMMOTION. PERTURBATION.

CONFUSION (Lat. *confūsiōnem*) denotes that abnormal state in which things which ought to be separate or distinct are tumultuously, irregularly, or obscurely mixed together. It can only apply, therefore, to matters in which the individuals, parts, or particles ought to be distinctly separate; as, to the confusion of voices in a mob, or of a man's affairs, confusion of thought, confusion of papers.

DISORDER (Fr. *désordre*) is the violation of *order* or arrangement, and so takes place in matters where position, location, or adjustment are needed; as in the tumultuous march of armies, in a disorderly crowd, a disordered dress. Confusion necessarily involves disorder; but there may be disorder without confusion. Confusion is of the whole. Disorder may be of the whole or only some of the parts. Confusion stands to distinctness as disorder to arrangement. So a thing may be disordered in the sense of disarranged, without any such wrong intermixture of separate parts as belongs to confusion. The hair of the head may be in disorder, not in confusion. Confusion is the extreme of disorder. It is that point where disorder takes effect upon the mental faculties. Things may be disordered yet distinctly recognizable as being out of place; but when things are in confusion, they are such that the mind cannot take distinct cognizance of them. An army in disorder has lost its ranks. When confusion reigns in it the soldiers cannot hear the voice of their commanders, which, if heard and obeyed, might put an end to the disorder. Disorder is more external than confusion, so that oftentimes the former is the result and manifestation of the latter. In the councils of a government confusion may reign for some time before public disorder (which must sooner or later be the case) manifests itself as the consequence. The term CONFUSION is utterly opposed to every principle, moral, mental, or artistic. We never could bring the term into contact with anything otherwise than faulty.

"If we unbroke
Sustain their onset, little skill'd in war,
To wheel, to rally, and renew the charge,
Confusion, havoc, and dismay will seize
The astonish'd rout." SMOLLETT.

"When you behold a man's affairs through negligence and misconduct involved in *disorder*, you naturally conclude that his ruin approaches."—BLAIR.

"We have seen that inordinate passions are the great *disturbers* of life."—*Ibid.*

DISTURBANCE (Lat. *disturbāre, to throw into disorder*) is the violation of peace or quiet, physical or otherwise; so, the sea is often disturbed violently, but can never be thrown into confusion or disorder, having no distinctness or sequence of parts. Disturbance is of those things which, presumably or desirably, are in tranquillity. COMMOTION (Lat. *commōtionem*) differs from DISTURBANCE in denoting the action of a multitude of individuals or parts; while disturbance may be of one, as, "My occupation was disturbed," "By a violent commotion of the elements the stillness of the night was disturbed." Commotion adds the influence of excitement to the force of disturbance.

PERTURBATION (Lat. *perturbatiōnem*) not employed directly of physical commotion, is a state of grievous mental commotion or disquiet. He whose bodily rest is broken is disturbed, he whose tranquillity is destroyed is perturbed. Communities, like individuals, may be thrown into perturbation. It is a confused excitement of mind where composure is right or usual.

"If the main fault be in the affections through some sudden passion and *perturbance* of mind, either blinding, or corrupting, or outrunning the judgment, as, for instance, fear, anger, desire, or the like, the sin arising from hence, though perhaps joined with some ignorance and wilfulness

withal, yet is properly a sin of infirmity."—SHARP.

CONFUTE. REFUTE. OPPUGN. IMPUGN. DISPROVE.

To CONFUTE (Lat. *confūtare*) applies both to the arguer and the argument. It is to *overwhelm* by decisive argument. REFUTE (Lat. *rĕ-fūtare, to repel, rebut;* not connected with *confūtare*) is to *repel* by the same kind of argument, and so applies to what is personally alleged against one, as charges, calumnies, and the like, to which CONFUTE is not applied in the same sense. When a thing is confuted, it is reduced to an absurdity, neutralized, and, as it were, annihilated. When it is refuted, it remains where it was, but its *application* is invalidated. Confutation deprives of force and of truth. Refutation does not weaken or destroy, but repels effectually. Opinions, statements, arguments, paradoxes, fallacies are confuted by being, as it were, melted down to nothing. Charges, accusations, insinuations, slander, are refuted by proving their *relative* untruth. DISPROVE is now never used of persons, but only of statements, suppositions, and the like. An argument is confuted by showing its fallacy. Calumny is refuted by proving the innocence of the calumniated person. A fact or the assertion of it is disproved by showing it to be untrue. OPPUGN and IMPUGN, from Lat. *oppugnāre* and *impugnāre*, both denote a hostile attitude in argument. They both fall short of the rest, in that they denote only reasoning, not *conclusive* reasoning. To oppugn is to exercise hostile reasoning against a person or his statements; while to impugn is rather to call in question the truth of what he states. So we might perhaps better say, "He was publicly oppugned in the senate," and, "The truth of his statements was impugned." To OPPUGN is a term of stronger force than IMPUGN, and denotes a determined and total opposition, while IMPUGN is applicable to questions of detail and lesser moment. "I have no desire to oppugn the statements you have just made, but pardon me if I impugn the accuracy of one observation in particular."

"They only read the gazettes of their own writers, so that everything which is called an answer is with them a *confutation*."—DRYDEN.

"Some of his blunders seem rather to deserve a flogging than a *refutation*."—MACAULAY.

"They said the manner of their impeachment they could not but conceive did *oppugn* the rights of Parliament."—CLARENDON.

"Unless you grant some fundamental and eternal truths, I see not how it is possible for us to confute divers theological errors of Pagans and other infidels, whose rejection of the authority of the Scriptures does not allow us without indiscretion to *impugn* them with arguments from them."—BOYLE.

"That false supposition I advanced in order to *disprove* it."—ATTERBURY.

CONGRATULATE. FELICITATE.

FELICITATE (Lat. *fēlicĭtātem, happiness*) had, of old, the sense of to *make* happy, as well as to consider or call happy. The former force it has since lost. It differs from CONGRATULATE (*congratŭlari*) mainly in the degree of force and sincerity. CONGRATULATE is, therefore, rapidly taking the place of FELICITATE, inasmuch as we naturally tend to give ourselves credit for genuineness of motive. FELICITATE is a word of formal politeness. CONGRATULATE implies *a sharing* of the joy produced by another's good fortune. Good manners felicitate, a good heart or true friendship congratulates. We do not demand the same warmth in felicitations. On the other hand, a cold congratulation must be a forced one.

"That fawning villain's forced *congratulations*."—JOHNSON.

As felicitations are manifestations of politeness, they may be offered where congratulations might seem to presume an equality of condition.

"I sincerely rejoiced to hear of your advancement to the purple; yet on these occasions I did not think myself warranted to break in upon you either with my acknowledgments or *felicitations*."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson.*

CONJURE. ADJURE.

These are compounds of the Latin verb *jūrāre, to swear.* To CONJURE is to entreat with solemn earnestness, to ADJURE is to appeal in the same way. One conjures for one's own sake. One adjures for the sake of God. When

Christ was brought before the High Priest, the latter adjured him by the living God, that is, threw such solemnity into his appeal as to give to the answer the character of being made upon oath. When remonstrance and anger have proved fruitless, the father conjures his rebellious son to have regard to himself for his parents' sake. In ordinary conversation we more commonly adjure persons to do something, and conjure them not to do it. One conjures God or man. One adjures man in the name of God or of justice, honour, pity, home, country, and the like. He who conjures may be a superior, but he places himself in a position of inferiority by his very prayer. He who adjures may be inferior, but he fortifies himself by the external support of that to which he appeals.

"Earnest entreaties and serious *conjurements*." MILTON.

"Caiaphas was not more malicious than crafty. What was in vain attempted by witnesses shall be drawn out of Christ's own mouth. What an accusation could not effect, an *adjuration* shall. "I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ the Son of God."—BISHOP HALL.

CONNECT. COMBINE. ATTACH. UNITE.

CONNECT (Lat. *connectĕre, to fasten together*) commonly implies a third thing as a medium whereby two others are joined; as two houses are connected by a covered way, leading from one to the other, so we speak of things as closely or distantly, directly or indirectly connected. In this respect it differs from UNITE (Lat. *ūnire*, part. *ūnitus*), where, if the individuality of the united objects is not, as it sometimes is, lost, there is at least a disregard of the connecting medium. ATTACH (Fr. *attacher*), except when used of affection, commonly implies the fastening of the smaller, lighter, more movable, or less important, to the fixed and immovable, or at least the heavier, less movable, and more important. So the seal is attached to the watch, not the watch to the seal. COMBINE (Lat. *combīnāre; con-, together, bini, two each*) is not used in a physical sense. It denotes the union or comprehension of two or more things in some common principle, or under some common object or purpose; as, to combine exercise with recreation in a country walk.

"A right opinion is that which *connects* distant truths by the shortest train of intermediate propositions."—JOHNSON.

"Few painters have obliged us with finer scenes, or have possessed the art of *combining* woods, lakes, and rocks into more agreeable pictures than G. Poussin."—HURD, *On Horace*.

"As our nature is at present constituted, *attached* by so many strong connexions to the world of sense, and enjoying a communication so feeble and distant with the world of spirits, we need fear no danger from cultivating intercourse with the latter as much as possible."—BLAIR.

"This was the cause of men's *uniting* themselves at the first in politic societies, which societies could not be without government, nor government without a distinct kind of law from that which hath been already declared."—HOOKER.

CONQUER. SUBDUE. VANQUISH. OVERCOME. SURMOUNT. SUBJUGATE.

CONQUER (Fr. *conquérir, to acquire*) is applied to persons, to countries, and to things expressive of difficulty or opposition, or to subjects in which such difficulty or opposition is implied; as David conquered Goliath; William I. conquered England; to conquer resistance, to conquer evil passions. It denotes the placing under one's own power or control after a series of efforts or systematic resistance. SUBDUE (Lat. *subdūcĕre*) is much the same, but points not so much to the struggles of the victor as to the state of the conquered in a final and surer reduction. It applies also to the inner spirit. To CONQUER is sometimes employed in the simple sense of getting the better of; as, to conquer one's own prejudices or passions, aversion, and the like. Julius Cæsar conquered the armies of Britain, but the country was not in his time finally subdued by the Romans. I subdue a strong desire or an inveterate habit; I may conquer a rising inclination, such as the inclination to give vent to a sarcastic or angry expression.

"It has been observed of Greece, that when it was subdued by the Romans, itself *subdued* its *conquerors*, softened their savage

temper, and refined their manners; and afterwards, of the Romans themselves, that wherever they conquered they in some degree civilized the world."—LAW, *Theory of Religion.*

VANQUISH (Fr. *vaincre*, Lat. *vincĕre, to conquer*) is used commonly of combats with a *personal* enemy.

"Shall a stripling David gloriously triumph over giants, while I basely am *vanquished* by dwarfs?"—BARROW.

SUBJUGATE (Lat. *subjŭgāre*) is to *bring under the yoke*, that is, to conquer and retain under continued pressure. Poland is subjugated by Russia, while its spirit remains unsubdued. OVERCOME and SURMOUNT (Fr. *surmonter*) are employed of continued resistance from impersonal adversaries, though OVERCOME is used of personal resistance as well. OVERCOME is applied, not only directly to difficulties and obstacles, but to things which have the nature of difficulties and obstacles, as scruples, prejudices; SURMOUNT, directly to the difficulties and obstacles themselves. It is possible to overcome by stratagem as by force, but we surmount by persevering effort.

"To work in close design by fraud or guile
What force effected not; that he no less
At length from us may find, who *overcomes*
By force hath *overcome* but half his foe."
MILTON.

"Finding difficulties which his reason cannot *surmount*, he becomes contemptuous and sceptical."—GILPIN'S *Sermons.*

"Could we view our own species from a distance, or regard mankind with the same sort of observation with which we read the natural history or remark the manners of any other animal, there is nothing in the human character which would more surprise us than the almost universal *subjugation* of strength to weakness."—PALEY.

CONQUEROR. VICTOR.

Every CONQUEROR is a VICTOR (Lat. *victor*), but every victor is not a conqueror, inasmuch as the term VICTOR is employed of other struggles than those of war or personal antagonism, as, for instance, of competition. The victors in the Olympic games were not conquerors, for they did not make themselves masters of the persons or territories of men. An old form of the word was *conquereur*, which meant much the same as the present term *annexer*, as appears from the following from Blackstone:—

"What we call purchase, *perquisitio*, the feudists called conquests, *conquestus* or *conquisitio;* both denoting any means of acquiring an estate out of the common course of inheritance; and this is still the proper phrase in the law of Scotland, as it was among the Norman jurists, who styled the first purchaser (that is, he who brought the estate into the family who at present owns it) the conqueror or conquereur, which seems to be all that was meant by the appellation which was given to William the Norman."—BLACKSTONE.

(It may be well to warn the reader, in case Blackstone should have meant to derive *purchase* from *perquisitio*—which seems only too probable—that there is no etymological connexion between these words, *purchase* being the French *pourchasser*, to chase or seek after, afterwards, specifically to procure by money.) In addition to the difference observed above, it may be remarked, that a victor vanquishes in a single strife or contest, a conqueror gains a complete success and subdues his opponent. Alexander was victor at Arbela, and the conqueror of Asia and Darius.

"In love the *victors* from the vanquished fly;
They fly that wound, and they pursue that die."
WALLER.

CONSCIENTIOUS. SCRUPULOUS.

SCRUPULOUS (Lat. *scrūpŭlosus; scrūpŭlus, a grit*, or *little stone*, which gives pain in walking, or makes the path sharp; and so *anxiety, scruple*) is in one way more comprehensive than CONSCIENTIOUS (Lat. *conscientia, conscience*), and in another less so. If a person were found scrupulous in all things, it might then be said, that conscientiousness is one form or aspect of scrupulousness; but the fact is, that scrupulousness is often of a different character from conscientiousness. It leads men sometimes to be exact in one direction, and to attend to minute matters, omitting weightier; as the Pharisees, according to the representations of the Gospel, must have been exceedingly scrupulous, and yet unconscientious also. The scrupulous man may be nice from other motives than conscience, as, for instance, from politeness. Where scrupulousness

springs from conscience, it denotes excessive sensibility of conscience exercised on unimportant matters. It is a morbid respect for the details and minutiæ of conduct. The conscientious man trusts his conscience, the scrupulous man distrusts it. At least such is the extreme of scrupulousness.

"Let us consider the world therefore as God's great family, and ourselves as servants in that family, as acting immediately, whatever our situations are, under our great Master, and of discharging the several offices which He hath assigned with a *conscientious* regard to our duty."—GILPIN.

"The *scrupulousness* of the parents or friends of the deceased persons deprives us oftentimes of the opportunities of anatomizing the bodies of men."—BOYLE.

CONSECRATE. DEDICATE. DEVOTE. HALLOW. VOW. ADDICT.

Of these, the three former relate to a specific object or purpose; the last is general or abstract. To HALLOW is to regard as *holy*, or to keep as holy; as the name of God is hallowed, and certain days are hallowed. An object of sacred recollection in the mind is hallowed, as "hallowed memories" of the dead. Of old, the erm HALLOW was used in the sense of the modern CONSECRATE by forma rite.

"To dedicate and *halowe* the monastery of Seynt Denys."—FABYAN.

It denotes now the consecration by the mind of the individual

"*Hallowed* be Thy name."—*Lord's Prayer.*

To CONSECRATE (Lat. *consecrare*) is to hallow in a formal manner and with a purpose, being sometimes followed by the preposition *to*. It commonly denotes a religious act and ceremony; but, by analogy, is extended to the force of associations, as, "The spot is consecrated to me by the memory of a deceased friend," or to reverential appropriation, as the following:—

"Think with yourselves whether it is not really a great mercy and kindness to all of us, that one day in the week is by a public law *consecrated* to a holy rest."—SHARP.

In the primary sense of the term things are consecrated only to God.

DEDICATE (Lat. *dedicare*) is to offer for specific acceptance, or, in a specific manner, for a certain use or to a certain person. It is a less sacred term than CONSECRATE; as, to dedicate a book to an illustrious person, to dedicate one's life to literature.

"The feast of the *dedication* of churches was to be held every year on the first Sunday in October; but the feast of the patron of the Church was to be no more observed."—BURNET.

To DEVOTE (Lat. *dēvŏvēre*, part. *dēvōtus*) is earnestly or exclusively to give for a certain use or purpose, and so implies a *continuous* dedication. It implies also a final surrender away from one's self. This sense sometimes rises prominently to the surface, so that we say, to devote to destruction, or the flames.

"Gilbert West settled himself in a very pleasant house at Wickham, in Kent, where he *devoted* himself to piety."—JOHNSON.

In dedicating, the uppermost idea is that of the person to whose honour or use the thing is dedicated; in devoting, the surrender of the thing or person devoted. To devote carries the idea of giving without reserve, with zeal and fervour, into the possession or for the use and service of another.

To VOW (Fr. *vouer*) is to promise, declare, or engage in a permanent and irrevocable manner, with strong desire and fixed purpose of the will. One vows eternal love or gratitude. Unlike the rest, the action of vowing regards the future, and not only the present time. ADDICT was formerly used, like Lat. *addictus*, in a good or indifferent sense. It now expresses in its participle *addicted* (the only part of the verb in common use) the process of an evil habituation.

"But vowing to do what there is no use of doing is trifling with our Creator; making unlawful vows is directly telling him we shall disobey."—SECKER.

"Since his *addiction* was to courses vain."
SHAKESPEARE.

CONSEQUENTLY. ACCORDINGLY. THEREFORE. WHEREFORE. THEN. HENCE. THENCE. SINCE. BECAUSE. AS. SO.

These words all mark the drawing of a conclusion from something which has been said as premises. They are called in grammar *illative* particles, as marking an *inference*, which they do in different ways. THEREFORE and WHEREFORE, equivalent to *for that*,

and *for which, cause*, are nearly alike; their difference flows simply from their grammatical formation. THEREFORE points farther back than WHEREFORE, which, being relative, refers rather to what has just been said, than to anything more remote. We might say, "I find the proposal attended by this difficulty, and that, and the other. I cannot therefore accede to it." Again, "I feared his intentions, wherefore I refused to accompany him." THEN is a less emphatic word for *therefore*; and As or So less emphatic words for BECAUSE, expressing the relation of cause and effect in a less marked manner. THEREFORE and BECAUSE are more emphatically expressions of reasoning, and would, of necessity, occur in syllogisms and mathematical propositions; As and THEN are more colloquial. HENCE and THENCE indicate antecedent reasons; in the former case less remotely, in the latter more remotely, expressed. (Grammatically HENCE in oratio recta becomes THENCE in oratio obliqua: as, He said "the sun shines: hence I infer a fine day;" He said that the sun shone; and that thence he inferred a fine day.) THEREFORE and ACCORDINGLY differ, in that the former is applicable both to inference and proof, or, in other words, both to physical causation and to the conclusions of argument. So we might say, "It rained last night, therefore the ground is wet;" or, "The ground is wet, therefore it rained last night." ACCORDINGLY could not well be used in this latter way. ACCORDINGLY is often used to express a congruity of action or proceeding, while HENCE and THENCE belong to the rigorous necessities of nature and logic; as, "I found a letter at home urging me to write at once to Paris. I wrote *accordingly*." CONSEQUENTLY expresses a definite conclusion, but is seldom used of logical inferences. It rather relates to practical proceedings or decisions; as, "My pocket has been picked, consequently I have no money." BECAUSE (*by cause*) had originally a stricter reference to physical causation. It now represents the correlative of the question *why*; and denotes physical sequence, logical sequence, and final causation or purpose. For instance, "Why are the shadows of the afternoon longer than those of mid-day?" "Why is this line equal to that?" "Why did you leave the house?" SINCE is less formal than BECAUSE, and in its grammatical position at the beginning of the sentence, anticipates the statement of the premise or premises of the argument.

CONSIDERATION. REGARD. ACCOUNT.

There is a common force belonging to these words, according to which they express a thoughtful way of dealing, for the satisfaction of others rather than one's own. We show REGARD (Fr. *regarder, to look*) from a sense of propriety or a feeling of esteem. We show CONSIDERATION (*see* CONSIDERATE) to external qualities in others; as, some condition or distinction, to which it is a duty to exhibit respect, and the absence of which respect would indicate in us a want of right feeling or politeness, or a rude ignorance of the usages of good society. There are cases in which we are bound to show consideration though we cannot feel regard. Consideration is due not only to the great, dignified, and powerful, but also to the weak and feeble. ACCOUNT is a word of less clearly defined force, and needs the addition of an epithet to qualify it. A matter is of little account, or of great account; but not of account, simply; whereas we are said to show consideration, or regard, absolutely. Moreover, CONSIDERATION and REGARD have to do generally with persons, exceptionally with things: ACCOUNT has to do generally with things, exceptionally with persons.

CONSIDERATIONS. OBSERVATIONS. REFLEXIONS. THOUGHTS.

CONSIDERATIONS (Lat. *considĕrare*) is a term of wide meaning. It denotes that action of the mind which takes account of an object under one, or under more, or under all the aspects which it presents. OBSERVATIONS (Lat. *observāre*) are the remarks which one makes in society upon circumstances, proceedings, sayings, or works. RE-

FLEXION (Lat. *reflectĕre*, part. *reflexus*) turns commonly on what concerns morals and the conduct of life. THOUGHTS are more general and vague, and include in the broadest way impressions, judgment, and collateral suggestions. If they are worth anything, observations are penetrating and profound. Observations are sagacious and sh ewd. Reflexions are practical and apt. Thoughts are true, lively, sound, pertinent. Considerations owe their excellence to the mind which originates them. Observations are good in proportion as they bring to light what otherwise might have escaped us, reject what is unworthy, and select what is worthy of remark; reflexions, in proportion as they proceed upon sure and sound principles, and are at the same time fine and just. Thoughts may partake of the merits of all the others, as they may be themselves the matter out of which considerations, observations, and reflexions are drawn or on which they are based.

CONSISTENT. COMPATIBLE. CONSONANT. ACCORDANT.

CONSISTENT (Lat. *consistĕre, to stand firmly*) denotes one or more of the following points:—1, harmony, internal, of the several parts of a thing, which accordingly cohere well; as, a consistent course of conduct: 2, harmony of a thing with another thing; as, tranquillity is consistent with happiness: and, 3, harmony with itself at different times; as, a consistent adherence to principles.

"Show me one that has it in his power
To act *consistent* with himself one hour."
POPE.

COMPATIBLE (Lat. *compătior, to suffer with*) denotes an extraneous relation of one thing to another, or of two to each other. That thing is compatible with another which may exist under similar conditions, and, therefore, may share with it probability as a matter of supposition. In cases where consistency or compatibility might be denied of a thing, it is more to say that a matter is not compatible, than that it is not consistent. "Such a supposition is not consistent with a belief in the man's innocence," would mean that the belief militated against the supposition; not compatible with, would mean that of the two one must give way.

"Our poets have joined together such qualities as are by nature the most *compatible*."—BROOME.

CONSONANT (Lat. *consŏnans, having the same sound, suitable*) denotes a harmony of general character, independent of any minute analysis or exact comparison. It is accordingly used not of things sharply defined, but of the drift of statements, sentiments, expressions, general representations, states of feeling, views, and the like; as, "Such an expression is consonant with all that I have heard of his character and behaviour."

"They all plead Scripture for what they say, and each one pretends that his opinion . . . . is *consonant* to the words there used."—BEVERIDGE.

ACCORDANT (L. Lat. *accordāre*, as it *to bring to one heart*, *ad* unum *cor*) is commonly used of consistency in specific matters of statement, evidence, or testimony; as, "His evidence entirely accords with that of the other witness." But beyond this, ACCORDANT follows the various aspects of the verb to *accord*, which expresses agreement in representation, statement, taste, opinion, feeling, sentiment, desire, principle, aim, belief, and moral conduct; but is not applicable to purely physical form, action, or force.

"The difference of good and evil in actions is not founded on arbitrary opinions or institutions, but in the nature of things and the nature of man. It *accords* with the universal sense of the human mind."—BLAIR.

CONSTANCY. STEADINESS. FIRMNESS. FIDELITY. STABILITY. PERMANENCE. STEADFASTNESS. REGULARITY.

CONSTANCY (Lat. *constantia*) is tha character which is opposed to change ableness. It is a steady adherence in matters of taste and liking. The constant man is not drawn off by new objects of attraction, but follows an inclination which acts upon him uniformly. Weakness and pusillanimity are not inconsistent with constancy. There is in constancy a kind of obstinacy of attachment, as in the constancy of martyrs. The constant

man is capable of sustained preference. It is not employed of mere immobility, but of moving or acting bodies, or natures which are controlled by some fixed principle amid such movements. It implies a centre to which movements, physical or moral, are uniformly referred. Mechanical regularity and uniformity of will both come under the idea of constancy. We do not speak of the constancy of the rock or the mountain, but of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and the affections of men. It is opposed to variableness in the one case, and to fickleness in the other. It is fixedness, not of tendency, purpose, location, but of principle or law.

"Whilst thou livest, dear Kate, take a fellow of plain, uncoined *constancy*; for he perforce must do thee right."—SHAKESPEARE.

STEADINESS (A. S. *stede, a place or station*), unlike CONSTANCY, admits the idea of fixedness of station as well as fixedness of motion. In the one case it is opposed to tottering, in the other to deviating; as, "to stand steady," "the ship kept a steady course," "to keep steadily to work or business," "a man of steady character." STEADINESS, unlike CONSTANCY, is not related to recurrence, but to continuity. The constant may suffer occasional eclipse; the steady is continuously seen or felt. The lamp which is kept constantly burning may yet burn with a steady or unsteady light.

"*Steadiness* is a point of prudence as well as of courage."—L'ESTRANGE.

FIRMNESS (Lat. *firmus, firm*) is a more active form of STEADINESS. The steady man resists temptations to wander from the line of his duties and avocations, for his character is opposed to that of levity, as constancy is opposed to fickleness; but the firm man can be steady under opposition, and in cases where strength of will is specifically needed. Firmness is the resolute abiding by principles of action. Firmness is a resolute courage to adhere to one's own reason and purposes. He has chosen a part from which he is not to be seduced or deterred by hope or fear, by pleasure or pain. Reason is to the firm man what affection is to the constant man. It implies, as constancy does not of necessity imply, force of character. Levity and a facile disposition are opposed to constancy; a frail and feeble character to firmness. Firmness is honourably distinguished from obstinacy. The firm man adheres to, maintains, and carries out with energy and resolution that which on examination he believes to be true, reasonable, right, or his particular duty. The obstinate man does not examine at all. His opinion is his law. Firmness is a result of wisdom; obstinacy a form of vanity. Without firmness a man has no character. "Without *constancy*," says Addison, "there is neither love, friendship, nor virtue in the world."

FIDELITY (Lat. *fidelitatem*) is the steadfastness to persons, causes, or principles, which flows either from a sense of honour or personal attachment, or both. Constancy does not imply actual engagement; fidelity does. We are constant in our tastes and affections; we are faithful, or have fidelity, to our word, promise, allegiance, and the like. Constancy belongs more to sentiments, faithfulness to states and acts. The fidelity of martyrs to the religion which they professed led to their constancy under suffering.

"The best security for the *fidelity* of men is to make interest coincide with duty."—HAMILTON.

STABILITY (Lat. *stabilitatem*) is that local or moral fixedness which resists efforts to shake or move or overturn the object. Stability prevents variableness, and resists temptations to levity or curiosity consequent upon the variety of objects or influences.

"The king-becoming graces,
As justice, verity, temperance, *stableness*,
Bounty, perseverance, mercy, lowliness,
Devotion, courage, patience, fortitude,
I have no relish for them."
SHAKESPEARE.

PERMANENCE (Lat. *permanere, to endure*) is not a moral quality at all. It denotes no more than the quality of exemption from removal or alteration, in spite of external influences of every kind. Operations, as well as states, which endure, may be called perma-

nent, as "the permanent laws of nature." It is opposed to alterable and transient. STEADFASTNESS, another form of *steadiness*, is applied particularly to the human will, and is opposed to the abandonment of, or deviation from, the objects and purposes of life; as, "to adhere steadfastly to a resolution."

"But when strong passion or weak fleshliness
Would from the right way seek to draw him wide,
He would, through temperance and *steadfastness*,
Teach him the weak to strengthen, and the strong suppress." SPENSER.

REGULARITY (Lat. *rĕgŭla, a rule*) is conformity to rule, law, or principle, to a prescribed mode or a customary form; as distinguished from that which is liable to unknown, unexplained, or capricious variation. Regularity may be either in movement or in position and reciprocal arrangement; according as the rule is one of recurrence, order, or progression.

"They would have us believe that amongst these infinite worlds, all of them fortuitously made, there is not one of a thousand, or perhaps of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, continuity, and harmony in it as this world that we chanced to emerge in."—CUDWORTH.

CONSTITUENT. COMPONENT. INGREDIENT.

The same kind of difference exists between a CONSTITUENT (Lat. *constĭtŭĕre, to constitute*) and COMPONENT (Lat. *compōnĕre, to put together*) as between an element or ingredient and a part or portion. There is in CONSTITUENT an active or operative force which does not belong to *component*. The noun *constituent* means a person or thing which establishes, determines, or constructs. The constituent parts go to make up the thing, the component parts are those of which it is made up. In this active sense the term constituent is used politically, as signifying one who assists to elect a representative to an office.

INGREDIENT (Lat. *ingrĕdior, I enter*) is very nearly the same as CONSTITUENT; the difference between them, such as it is, being evident from their etymology. An ingredient is simply one of the different materials which *enter into* the compounded body, as a fact, as we speak of the ingredients of a pudding: a constituent is one of similar materials, by the composition of which and not otherwise, the result is *constituted;* as, the constituent elements of government.

CONSTITUTE. APPOINT.

The exercise of authority in relation to the tenure of office, or the bestowal of a certain formal character, is the idea common to these terms; but APPOINT (O.Fr. *apointer, to arrange*) is a less forcible term. Appointment is commonly the act of an individual. CONSTITUTE (Lat. *constĭtŭere*, part. *constĭtūtus*) involves the convergence of several authorities and powers. APPOINT has an external, CONSTITUTE a virtual or inherent force. Almost all bishops in Roman Catholic countries are *appointed* by the Pope, who is *constituted* the supreme earthly head of that Church.

"That which *constitutes* the nature of man, and doth formally difference and distinguish him from all other animals, is not so much the power of reason as the capacity of being religious."—SHARP.

"God desires that in His Church, knowledge and piety, peace and charity and good order, should grow and flourish; to which purposes He hath *appointed* teachers to instruct, and governors to watch over His people."—BARROW.

CONSULT. DELIBERATE.

These terms denote the same process differently carried on. We CONSULT (Lat. *consŭlĕre*, part. *consultus*) with others; we DELIBERATE (Lat. *dēlibĕrāre, libra, a scale*) within our own minds.

"That the law hath been fined (defined) by grave and learned men, meaning professors of the law, is manifestly untrue; for all the laws of England have been made by the kings of England, *consulting* with the nobility and commons in Parliament, of which not one in twenty was a learned lawyer."—HOBBES.

"I would not indeed refer a prince for maxims of equity and government to Puffendorf and Grotius, the dull and unfeeling *deliberators* of questions on which a good heart and understanding can intuitively decide."—KNOX, *Essays.*

CONSUME. DESTROY.

To CONSUME (Lat. *consūmĕre*) is to destroy by absorption, and as a natural process, whether such ab-

corption be regular or violent. To consume is by no means always to waste; as, for instance, an army of such a number will consume, on an average, so much food. The same idea is kept up when we say the fire consumed the stubble. To DESTROY (Lat. *dēstrŭĕre, to pull down*) is a process always of violence, and contradiction of the purpose of the thing destroyed, and, generally speaking, a reversion of natural or artificial processes, or an abnormal exhibition of them. The philosophical idea of destruction never amounts to annihilation, but is that of a violent discerption of the forms and proportions under which bodies exist.

> "It is as if the dead could feel
> The icy worm around them steal,
> And shudder as the reptiles creep
> To revel on their rotting sleep,
> Without the power to scare away
> The cold *consumers* of their clay."
> BYRON.

"Whatsoever is in the world is but ὕλη τοῖς ἔχουσα, matter so and so modified or qualified, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature *destroyable*, and the matter itself (as the basis of them is not necessarily determined to this or that accident) is the only ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, the only necessary existent."—CUDWORTH.

CONSUMMATION. COMPLETION.

COMPLETION (Lat. *complēre, to fill*) is the *filling up* of a design or purpose. A work is completed when the plan of it is realized. CONSUMMATION (Lat. *consummātionem, a summing up*) is applied to matters which must reach a certain degree or extent to make them complete. In completion an outline is filled up; in consummation a point is reached. Hence consummation may be the point at which many antecedent things, converging, meet, and is therefore a plural result; while completion is a single result; as, the consummation of all our hopes, desires, and efforts. Completion is more external, consummation more internal, being the fulfilment of the idea or definition. It is also used in the sense of a gathering up in one of many things; as the event of to-day is the consummation of the hopes of many years.

"It is not to be doubted but it was a constant practice of all that is praiseworthy which made her capable of beholding death, not as the dissolution, but as the *consummation* of life."—STEELE.

"He makes it the *completion* of an ill character, to bear a malevolence to the best of men."—POPE.

In this last example CONSUMMATION might have been employed instead of COMPLETION, but the idea would have been different. The completion of an ill character would have been that which gave, as it were, the finishing touch to it. The consummation of an ill character would have been that which would be regarded as necessarily involving all particulars, and so summing it up.

CONTAGION. INFECTION.

CONTAGION (Lat. *contāgiōnem*) operates by mutual contact, INFECTION (Lat. *infectiōnem, inficĕre, to dye*) by an influence common to its subjects, or by other media than contact. This distinction is adhered to in the moral use of the terms; as, "the contagion of bad example," and "the infection of error." In the term infection the uppermost idea is the evil nature or influence; in contagion, its communicative and spreading character. We dread infection, and we shun contagion.

"Their propensity to recount the wonderful exceeds all imagination. Neither their learning, judgment, nor integrity could secure them against the general *contagion*."—WARBURTON.

"It is necessary for the polishing of manners to have breathed that air (of the court); but it is *infectious* even to the best morals to live always in it."—DRYDEN.

CONTAIN. HOLD.

Although these words are respectively Latin and A. S. equivalents (Lat. *contĭnere* and A. S. *healdan, to hold*), they are differently employed. Setting aside other meanings of HOLD (as, to retain in the grasp, to possess, and the like), in speaking of mere capacity there are differences. To HOLD is in this sense purely physical, as a vessel holds water, or a certain quantity of it; but CONTAIN is used of abstract quantity; as, that field contains (*i. e.*, consists of) so many acres. Again, CONTAIN does not imply, as is implied by HOLD, the extreme limit of physical contents. When we say a

coach holds six persons, we mean that it is capable of holding so many, and not more. If we said it contains six, we should mean that there happen to be six inside it. It might have contained three. That cask holds water, might mean that it is watertight, or, at least retains it. That cask contains water, could only mean water is inside it, and nothing else.

"Among artificial substances the ship (*navis navis*) is feminine, as being so eminently a receiver and *container* of various things, of men, arms, provisions, goods, &c."—HARRIS.

"Death only this mysterious truth unfolds,
The mighty soul how small a body *holds*."
DRYDEN.

CONTAMINATE. DEFILE. POLLUTE. TAINT. CORRUPT. DEBAUCH. VITIATE.

To CONTAMINATE (Lat. *contāmĭnāre*, probably connected with *tango*) is a stronger term than TAINT (which comes from *tingĕre*, Fr. *teindre, to dye*), but not so strong as DEFILE (of which "the *force* is due to the Eng. 'foul'; but the *form* was suggested by O. F. *defouler, to trample under foot:*" SKEAT, Etym. Dict.), or POLLUTE (Lat. *pollŭĕre*, part. *pollūtus*). They all indicate a partial, while CORRUPT (Lat. *corrumpĕre*, part. *corruptus*) marks a deeper and more permanent spoiling. Some of these synonyms tend more strongly than others to a purely moral application. To contaminate is to soil by defiling contact. Contamination, therefore, may be best employed in cases where such external communication with what is bad may be supposed; as improper conversation, impure literature, vicious society, or bad example. DEFILE denotes such contamination as passes permanently into the inner nature, so as to render unclean. POLLUTE, like DEFILE, has a ceremonial and moral bearing. It denotes the defilement of the springs of thought and action, the befoulment of the character and very soul, as the sources of a stream are poisoned, and the waters which flow therefrom are infected thereby. Yet some affection of the senses is the means by which this is done. TAINT denotes a partial colouring of evil, which has not yet spoilt the character or the judgment. It applies to what is false as well as to what is foul; as we say, his mind is tainted with prejudice, he is tainted with the opinions of such and such a school. It is a milder form of CONTAMINATE. CORRUPT is an analogous term, conveying the idea of an effect upon the mind similar to that of the breaking up of organized bodies. It is of very general application, and denotes the extreme of unsoundness; as, a corrupt taste, a corrupt life, a corrupt judge. In all the other synonyms the character or principles are regarded as spoilt by external communication. CORRUPT regards the case at the point when the evil has taken root in the system. Persons themselves are said to be contaminated, defiled, and polluted; their purity tainted, their morals, principles, honesty, and integrity to be corrupted. The hands or the mind may be defiled, but the mind only is polluted. Corrupt principles and practices are to the pure and upright what the exhalations of a corpse are to those whose senses are healthy. Corruption comes not so much from the allurements of sense as from the perversion of reason. The great instrument of corruption is sophistry. DEBAUCH (Fr. *bauche, a line of bricks*; hence, to *debauch* is, probably, to lead away *from the right line*, to corrupt, seduce; or, perhaps, to *take away the support* of a building) is to practice what CORRUPT is to principle and taste. To debauch is to lead into habits of intemperance and unchastity, and the grosser forms of self-indulgence. The mind is corrupted, the morals and manners debauched. VITIATE (Lat. *vĭtiare*) has a wider meaning. It is to spoil by introducing a marring defect, either moral or logical. That which may be vitiated is principle, character, conduct, taste, and practical validity.

"Learning not *debauched* by ambition."
—BURKE.

"A will *vitiated*, and grown out of love with the truth disposes the understanding to error and delusion."—SOUTH.

"Even when the nobility, which represented the more permanent landed interest, united themselves by marriage, which was

sometimes the case, with the other description, the wealth which saved the family from ruin was supposed to *contaminate* and degrade it."—BURKE.

"Poltroons that fling dirt
Do but *defile*, and cannot hurt."
Hudibras.

"And can any, then, behold or act these gross abominations with delight, the very relation of which is sufficient to *pollute* the ears that hear them, the common air that receives them, yea, the breath that utters them, and yet be innocent, be *untainted* by them?"—PRYNNE.

"That epidemical *taint* wherewith King James infected the minds of men continued upon us —BOLINGBROKE.

"He (Cato the Elder) procured in the senate that Carneades, the Academic, and Diogenes, the Stoic, ambassadors from Athens, should immediately be dismissed, that they might not *corrupt* the youth."—BENTLEY.

CONTENTMENT. SATISFACTION.

CONTENTMENT (Fr. *content*) is less strong than SATISFACTION (Lat. *sătisfactiōnem*). Satisfaction is a full measure coming from without. Contentment is from within, implying such a measure as we are willing to regard as full. But contentment, from this internal character, tends to become a habit, which satisfaction, relating to things external, does not become. Where one man is not satisfied, another under the same circumstances is contented. It deserves to be remarked that in matters which are independent of our own efforts and actions, contentment is higher than satisfaction, as implying a better moral state. In matters which depend upon our own efforts and actions, it is better to endeavour to satisfy ourselves, and not be contented with a little. Both contentment and satisfaction denote tranquillity of mind in regard to the object of one's desires. Contentment is more in the heart, satisfaction in the passions. The first is a feeling which always renders the mind quiet; the latter is an issue which sometimes throws it into trouble, although it is no longer disquieted as to the object of its desire. A restless or timid man is never content; an avaricious or ambitious man is never satisfied. One is content when one wishes for nothing more, though one is not always satisfied when one has procured what one wished. Satisfaction has in it an element of uncertainty. It is no surety for its own continuance. The fullest satisfaction is not necessarily accompanied by a proportionate contentment. One is satisfied when one has obtained what one wished, one is content when one wishes for nothing more.

"*Contentment* expresses the acquiescence of the mind in the portion of good which we possess."—COGAN.

"The word *satisfaction* is frequently employed to express the full accomplishment of some particular desire, which always communicates a temporary pleasure, whatever may be the nature of that desire."—*Ibid.*

CONTIGUOUS. ADJACENT. ADJOINING.

What is CONTIGUOUS (Lat. *contĭguus*) touches on one side, at least to some extent, if not entirely. What is ADJOINING (O. Fr. *adjoindre*, Lat. *adjungere, to join to*) needs touch only at a single point. What is ADJACENT (Lat. *adjăcēre, to lie near*) may be near without touching at all. It is remarkable that these words adhere to the physical or primary, and have not lent themselves to a secondary or moral meaning, though they may be used analogously, as in the following:—

"To me there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, resemblance, *contiguity* in time or place, and cause or effect."—HUME.

"Now, touching that proportion of ground that the Christians have on the habitable earth, I find that all Europe, with her *adjacent* isles, is peopled with Christians, except that ruthful country of Lapland, where idolaters yet inhabit."—HOWELL, *Letters.*

"Every man's land is, in the eye of the law, enclosed and set apart from his neighbour's; and that, either by a visible and material fence, as one field is divided from another by a hedge, or by an ideal invisible boundary, existing only in the contemplation of law, as when one man's land *adjoins* to another's in the same field."—BLACKSTONE.

CONTINUAL. CONTINUOUS. PERPETUAL. INCESSANT.

CONTINUAL (Lat. *contĭnuus, uninterrupted*) admits the idea of interrup-

tion, intermission, or occasional cessation; CONTINUOUS excludes this. "It has been raining continually for the last four months," admits of fine days, though comparatively few and far between; continuous rain for such a period would produce a deluge.

What is CONTINUAL (Lat. *continuare, to make continuous*, Lat. *continuus*) admits of no interruption in time, though it admits of *intervals*, as continual showers through the month. What is CONTINUOUS admits of no interruption in space, or what is analogously conceived as having extent, as continuous employment. What is PERPETUAL (Lat. *perpĕtuus*) admits of no termination, being in its very nature lasting. INCESSANT (Lat. *incessans*) denotes what does not cease as a matter of fact. The nouns *continuance* and *continuity* follow the same distinction. The proper meanings of the adverbs *continually, perpetually*, and *incessantly*, are much obscured by a way of using these terms hyperbolically, as a talkative person is said to be continually, perpetually, or incessantly talking.

"After this He sends prophets in a *continual* succession for several ages, who do more clearly discover God's will to them." —SHARP.

"Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connexion, consolidate sentences into one *continuous* whole." —HARRIS.

"Amusements and diversions succeed in a *perpetual* round."—BLAIR.

"The frosty north wind blows a thick cold sleet,
That dazzles eyes, flakes after flakes *incessantly* descending."
CHAPMAN, *Homer*.

CONTINUATION. CONTINUANCE. DURATION. CONTINUITY.

CONTINUATION is an artificial or contrived continuance, as the continuation of a history to a particular period. CONTINUANCE and DURATION (Lat. *dūrāre, to last*) are both employed of time; but continuance is active, duration is passive, and is not inherent in the thing itself, but refers simply to the accident of time. Continuance is inherent extension, of which duration is the external measure.

"The great wisdom of the Divine Creator appears in that there is pleasure annexed to those actions that are necessary for the support and preservation of the individuum, and the *continuation* and propagation of the species; and not only so, but pain to the neglect or forbearance of them." —RAY.

"But, alas, the honeymoon of a new ministry is always of short *continuance* in England."—HOADLY.

"That we have our notion of succession and *duration* from this original, namely, from the reflexion on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of *duration* but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings."—LOCKE.

CONTINUITY is unbroken extension of space, or of anything which is conceived as analogous to such extension. The continuity of a bone is destroyed by a fracture. The continuation of my thought is the prolongation of the subject of which I was thinking; the continuance of my thought is the fact that I did not cease thinking; the continuity of my thought is the unbroken following out of the line of meditation.

"The sight would be tired if it were attracted by a *continuity* of glittering objects." —DRYDEN.

CONTRADICT. DENY.

CONTRADICT (Lat. *contrādicĕre*, part. *contradictus, to speak against*) denotes an opposing force of statement, but not necessarily an intention of the speaker. The force may lie either in the purpose of the speaker, or in the inherent nature of the terms employed, as in propositions called "contradictory" by the logicians. To DENY (Fr. *dénier*, Lat. *denĕgare*) is purely a personal act. Moreover, contradiction is positive, denial only negative. I contradict a statement by stating something else in its stead; I deny it simply by refusing to admit the truth of it. Hence, to deny is employed of charges, imputations, and the like, in which we are concerned, not with making any statements of our own, but simply invalidating those of others; and of requests, in which sense it is synonymous with *refuse*. Deny is not used

in this sense directly of persons, like contradict, but only of their statements, or the truth and force of them.

"The pulpit is a sacred place,
Where none dare *contradict* you to your face." DODSLEY.

As CONTRADICT is opposite to countenance or corroborate, so DENY is opposed to allow or admit.

"That the variation may be found with a share of accuracy more than sufficient to determine the ship's course is allowed; but that it can be found so exactly as to fix the longitude within a degree of sixty miles, I absolutely *deny*."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

CONTRIVE. DEVISE. INVENT. CONCERT. MANAGE.

To CONTRIVE (orig. and properly "*controve*;" O. Fr. *controver*; *trover*, now *trouver*, *to find*) denotes an effort, or a series of efforts, of inventiveness. It is to form, find, or adapt means to an end by the exercise of practical ingenuity.

"The machine which we are inspecting demonstrates by its construction *contrivance* and design. *Contrivance* must have had a *contriver*."—PALEY.

DEVISE (Fr. *deviser*) expresses the more theoretical aspect of CONTRIVE, and implies not so much the finding ways of using means, as finding the means themselves. We contrive ways of doing things when to some extent the materials are at hand. We devise schemes and plans, and bring them into existence by the device.

"He (God) hath not prevented all exceptions or cavils *devisable* by curious and captious wits against it."—BARROW.

INVENT (Lat. *invĕnire*, part. *inventus*, *to find*) represents the practical aspect of CONTRIVE; the invention being the more perfect in proportion to the lasting character of the contrivance, and its enabling us to contrive at will, as in the case of the invention of gunpowder, or the steam-engine. Invention, in its fullest sense, is the discovery of a mode in which the laws of nature may be made serviceable, or suppositious facts treated as natural, as in the invention of a romance. In its lowest sense it is the finding out of a sufficient mode of doing a thing. Imagination and fecundity of genius give rise to inventors.

"The mind of man discovers every day some craving want in a body which really wants but very little. It every day *invents* some artificial rule to guide that nature which, if left to itself, were the best and surest guide."—BURKE.

CONCERT (Lat. *consĕrĕre*, *to join together*, part. *consertus*), unlike the former, commonly implies the joint assistance of others. It implies conference or consultation, and is almost exclusively employed of matters of action, not of pure invention in the scientific sense; as, to concert a plan or scheme. Yet Burke uses it of a single person in the following:—

"Furious in their adversity, tyrannical in their successes, a commander had more trouble to *concert* his defence before the people than to plan the operations of the campaign."

MANAGE (Fr. *ménager*, Lat. *mănus*, *the hand*) denotes rather a judicious or ready employment of means extemporized on the occasion; such contrivance as gives to the course of things the kind of turn which we desire for compassing our end.

"Ofttimes nothing profits more
Than self-esteem grounded on just right
Well *managed*" MILTON.

CONTROVERT. DISPUTE. GAINSAY.

Of these, GAINSAY (A. S. *gegn*, *against*, and *say*) denotes no more than contradict, or call in question, whether by simple denial and opposition, or by more or less of reasoning accompanying it.

"To convince any forward *gainsayer*."—BARROW.

CONTROVERT (Lat. *contra*, *against*, and *vĕrtere*, *to turn*) is to make matter of controversy; that is, lengthened argument in opposition, entering point by point into the dispute.

"This was the great proposition that was then *controverted* concerning Jesus of Nazareth, whether He was the Messiah or no, and the assent to that was that which distinguished believers from unbelievers."—LOCKE.

DISPUTE (Lat. *disputāre*) is against a personal competitor, as CONTROVERT refers directly to the matter, and only indirectly to the person; hence DISPUTE may apply to more than ar-

gument as such, and to anything brought forward by another against oneself; that is, to such things as claims, possessions, titles, rights, and the like.

"Therefore *disputed* He in the synagogue with the Jews."—*Bible.*

In controversy there is more of opposition, in dispute more of doubt. In order to controvert, exact knowledge is wanted; but we often dispute where we have a general and undefined persuasion that what we dispute is not sound or true.

CONVENE. CONVOKE.

The idea of collecting persons to one place is common to these two terms; but CONVENE (Lat. *convĕnīre, to come together*) is commonly applied to such assemblies as are got together for some public purpose in a special manner; as, to convene a meeting of shareholders in consequence of special news. To CONVOKE (Lat. *convŏcāre, to call together*) is an act of authority on the part of one whose official relation to the body enables or requires him to call it together. Hence, where the power is lodged equally in the hands of many, CONVENE seems the more suitable term; and CONVOKE when peculiar power of summoning is lodged in the hands of a single person. CONVOKE and *convocation* have acquired an ecclesiastical, as CONVENE a political and generally deliberative force.

"The Parliament of Scotland now *convened*."—BAKER.

"At this time the Cardinal, by his power legative, dissolved his *convocation* at Paul's, convoked by the Archbishop of Canterbury, calling him and all the clergy to the *convocation* at Canterbury."—BAKER.

CONVENIENT. COMMODIOUS. HANDY.

CONVENIENT (Lat. *convĕniens, suitable*) has lost its old meaning of decent or becoming, and has come to mean little more than *handy*. We use the term HANDY (when not employed of the person in the sense of dexterous, but of the thing) in the senses of manageable and close *at hand*. The former is the old meaning, the latter is modern. A weapon is handy which may be used easily and effectively; a house is handy which is close by and easily reached. CONVENIENT denotes what suits the requirements of persons. COMMODIOUS (Lat. *commŏdus, advantageous*) joins the two, and denotes what is convenient, inasmuch as it is suitable. It is peculiarly applicable to localities intended for the carrying on of common business or private matters. A house, a chair, a room, are commodious. It thus naturally conveys the notion of sufficiency of space, which, however, is a meaning which has flowed out of the other. Handy has a more external character than convenient, which is also applied to more general ideas. A specific thing or object is handy; arrangements, times, and seasons are convenient.

"For he that strains too far a vow,
Will break it like an o'er-bent bow;
And he that made and forced it broke it,
Not he that for *convenience* took it."
HUDIBRAS.

Camden uses the word COMMODIOUS in its primary meaning, when he says that "Britain is walled and guarded with the ocean most *commodious* for traffick to all parts of the world."

"Each is *handy* in her way."—DRYDEN.

CONVENT. ABBEY. CLOISTER. NUNNERY. MONASTERY. PRIORY.

Of these, ABBEY and PRIORY are no more than religious houses or monasteries, so called as being governed by an abbot or a prior. They would differ, not in their religious character, but in their state and privileges. The NUNNERY is a CONVENT (Lat. *conventus, an assembly*) of females, and in modern parlance is identical with CONVENT, which is a religious house of nuns, as a MONASTERY (Gr. μοναστήριον, Lat. *mŏnastĕrium*, of which the root is the Greek μόνος, *alone*) is a religious house of monks. The CLOISTER (Lat. *claustrum, claudĕre, to shut*) is, strictly, that part of the religious house which was enclosed as a place of exercise and conversation. It is in their general use that the difference between the terms cloister, convent, and monastery deserves notice. The distinctive idea of CLOISTER is seclusion, or inviolable retirement; that of CONVENT community of living; that of a MONASTERY soli-

tude. One is shut up in the cloister; one goes into a convent; one retires to a monastery. In the cloister liberty is sacrificed; in the convent ancient habits are renounced, and those of a certain society adopted; in the monastery one has vowed a kind of exile, and men live only for their souls' sake. In the ancient and true monasteries the religious divided their time between contemplation and work. They were pioneers in the work of settlement, and in the civilization of new and wild countries. The term convent is less imposing than that of monastery. The continental towns abound in convents within the walls; while here and there are seen the ruins of ancient monasteries standing alone in the fields, yet manifesting even in their decay their former grandeur, influence, and importance.

CONVERSE. OBVERSE. REVERSE. INVERSION.

The CONVERSE (Lat. *convertĕre*, part. *conversus*, *to turn*) is an altered sequence. The term belongs to logic, and amounts to the inverted state of a proposition, when the relative positions of its subject and predicate have been exchanged. All men are animals: the converse of this is that all animals are men, and the proposition is not true. No vice is virtue has for its converse no virtue is vice, and the proposition is true. The latter is a convertible proposition, the other not so, except by modification, as some animals are men. The subject-matter may be mathematical, but the logical idea of conversion is still retained, as in the mathematical proposition. "If two sides of a triangle are equal, the angles opposite the sides are equal." This is true, and its converse is equally true. The OBVERSE (Lat. *obvertĕre*, part. *obversus*) is, literally, that which is turned over *against* something; the obverse side of a coin is that which is primarily held before the eyes as distinguished from the reverse. In a more general sense it means a necessary correlative truth. In this sense the truth and its obverse stand to each other as positive and negative,—the fact that all men are mortal being the obverse of the other, that there is no such thing on earth as immortality. The REVERSE (Lat. *revertĕre*, part. *reversus*, *to turn back*) is that aspect of a thing which appears after the former aspect has been turned *back*—the side opposite to that which was before visible or is commonly visible; and morally, a contrary representation or statement of opinion or fact, or that which is contrary in nature and character, or circumstances. INVERSION (Lat. *inversiōnem*) is not an object, a subject, or a state, but a process; such a turning as gives the opposite position or order; as, to invert a common, natural, or received order, or to invert the common or natural position of a thing by turning it upside down, or upsetting it. Hence that which is inverted is not in most cases in its right or normal condition, and the term involves the idea of wrong or disorderly position, arrangement, or sequence.

CONVERSANT. FAMILIAR.

CONVERSANT (Lat. *conversāri*, *con-*, and *versāri*, *to live with*) relates only to persons; FAMILIAR (Lat. *fămĭliaris*, belonging to the *fămĭlia* or *household*) both to persons and to objects. As regards persons, to be familiar with anything is simply to have seen a thing so often as to know it well. In its simplest sense, therefore, it applies to no more than ocular recognition. Conversant denotes, in addition, the knowledge of skill necessarily. This may sometimes also be expressed by FAMILIAR. In such cases, to be conversant implies more markedly the knowledge of principles; and to be familiar the knowledge of facts and processes. So we may better say, "It is one thing to be *conversant* with the principles of the British constitution; it is another to be *familiar* with the facts of English history."

"He uses the different dialects as one who had been *conversant* with them all."
—POPE.

"That war or peace may be
As things acquainted and *familiar* to us."
SHAKESPEARE.

CONVERSATION. COLLOQUY. CONFERENCE. DIALOGUE. DISCOURSE. CONFABULATION.

CONVERSATION. (*see* CONVERSANT)

is verbal intercourse of an unpremeditated kind, in which any number of persons may take a part. It is indefinite as to the subject, which may be one or many. It may be more or less desultory, and spring altogether from accident. It naturally supposes some equality of social position in those engaged in it.

"The influence exercised by his (Johnson) *conversation* directly upon those with whom he lived, and indirectly upon the whole literary world, was altogether without a parallel."—MACAULAY.

COLLOQUY (Lat. *colloquium*) is a species of dialogue indefinite as to number, but restricted as to subject, in which each person present contributes remarks pertinent to the matter in hand, without the rigidity of a public meeting. It commonly supposes authorized deputation for the purpose of discussion and coming to agreement.

"In 1540 he (Simon Gryne) was joined as an assistant to Ph. Melancthon, Martin Bucer, John Calvin, &c., when they went to Wormes to the *colloquy* there about religion."—WOOD, *Athenæ Oxon.*

CONFERENCE (Fr. *conférence*, Lat. *conferre, to bring together*) has more of form, being a colloquy on urgent or public and national affairs, where some line of action has to be taken, or some expression of opinion published authoritatively.

"The Hampton Court *Conference*."—*English History.*

DIALOGUE (Gr. διάλογος) is commonly, though not necessarily, restricted to two speakers. It is a sort of literary conversation, in which the things said are made subservient by art to certain main topics. It is therefore commonly recorded, and so framed as to be worth reading.

"Aurungzebe is written in rhyme, and has the appearance of being the most elaborate of all Dryden's plays. The personages are imperial, but the *dialogue* is often domestic, and therefore susceptible of sentiments accommodated to familiar incidents."
JOHNSON.

DISCOURSE (Fr. *discours*, Lat. *discursus*) is consecutive speech, whether of one or more persons, upon a given line of thought. It differs from the others in the particular that it may have been primarily written, while they imply speaking without writing; and in being applicable to the continuous exposition of a single person.

"The word *discourse* is derived from a Latin verb, which signifies to run about, and by the motion of our legs and the agitation of our whole body to traverse many different grounds, or the same ground many different ways. Now the application of this corporeal image to what passes in the mind, or to the action of the mind when we meditate on various subjects, or on many distinct parts of the same subject, and when we communicate these thoughts to one another, sometimes with greater, and sometimes with less agitation and rapidity, is obvious."—BOLINGBROKE.

CONFABULATION (Lat. *confābŭlāri, to talk together, to chat*) is easy conversation; chat familiar, unformal, and unrestrained.

"Friends' *confabulations* are comfortable at all times, as fire in winter, shade in summer, 'quale sopor fessis in gramine,' meat and drink to him that is hungry or athirst."—BURTON, *Anatomy of Melancholy*

CONVERT. PROSELYTE. NEOPHYTE. PERVERT.

CONVERT (Lat. *convertĕre, to change*) is one who turns from one set of opinions to another; not necessarily, though commonly supposed to be, of a religious character.

"A believer may be excused by the most hardened atheist for endeavouring to make him a *convert*, because he does it with an eye to both their interests."—ADDISON.

PROSELYTE (Gr. προσήλῦτος, πρός, *to*, and ἔρχομαι, *I come*) is one who has come or been brought over from one religion to another. The term has been metaphorically extended to embrace other creeds than those of religion. The difference between the terms seems to be that CONVERT regards the internal aspect of the change, PROSELYTE the external; or, in other words, the proselyte is simply one who has been brought over by external persuasion to another set of opinions; the convert is one who has essentially changed his views, perhaps as much through the exercise of his own reflexion and reason as from any power or influence from without.

"False teachers commonly make use of base, and low, and temporal considerations, of little tricks and devices, to make disciples and gain *proselytes*."—TILLOTSON.

NEOPHYTE (Gr. νεόφυτος) expresses no more than one who has recently entered upon a profession, whether this has involved any change of previous views or not.

PERVERT is a term of recent invention to express a *mistaken* conversion.

"Nay, in effects of grace which exceed far the effects of nature, we see St. Paul makes a difference between those he calls *neophytes*, that is, newly grafted into Christianity, and those that are brought up in the faith."—BACON.

CONVICT. DETECT. CONVINCE. PERSUADE.

These terms all denote the bringing home of something to another. To CONVICT (Lat. *convincĕre*, part. *convictus, to convict, to prove conclusively*) is to bring his guilt or error home to another by evidence. It is never used in any but an unfavourable sense. Such conviction may be more or less formal and public. DETECT (Lat. *detĕgere*, part. *detectus, to uncover*) relates to acts only, not, as CONVICT, both to acts and their motives. It resembles CONVICT in applying only to falsehood and wrong. To CONVINCE is another form of the word *convict;* but relates to the inner belief of the individual, and not to the external result of acquainting others. So I may be convinced in my own mind of the innocence of a convicted person. To PERSUADE (Lat. *persuadĕre*) has much in common with CONVINCE; but conviction is the result of the understanding, persuasion of the will. Conviction is a necessity of the mind; persuasion an acquiescence of the inclination. Logic convinces; rhetoric persuades. In action or matter of practice they are often combined. The man who is persuaded feels convinced that he is rightly so; the man who is convinced has not set himself against the process of persuasion. Conviction, being mental, is the less active; persuasion, being moral, is the more active outwardly. We are convinced of truths and facts. We are persuaded to act and to behave. So strong is this difference, that the two may be in opposition, and we may (from by-motives and considerations of self-interest and the like) be persuaded to act *against* our conviction. A persuasive manner, convincing proofs.

"Wise men desire to see the several parts of it so far cleared up and made consistent with each other, and upon the whole to discover such evident marks of a superior wisdom, power, and goodness in the frame and texture of it, as may *convince* them that it is truly divine and worthy of the Supreme Mind to whom we ascribe it."—BISHOP HURD.

"But if the jury find him, the prisoner, guilty, he is then said to be *convicted* of the crime whereof he is indicted; which *conviction* may accrue two ways, either by his confessing the offence and pleading guilty, or by his being found so by the verdict of his country."—BLACKSTONE.

"For were not such miracles and oracles at last generally believed? or if several impostures were *detected*, does the author imagine that such *detection* would utterly sink the credit of all future miracles?"—BISHOP HURD.

"He that *persuades* a man to rob a house is guilty of the sin he *persuades* him to, but not in the same manner that he is who committed the robbery, for it was in his power, after all other *persuasions*, to have forborne the fact, and to have maintained his innocence."—SOUTH.

COPIOUS. ABUNDANT. AMPLE. PLENTIFUL. PLENTEOUS.

COPIOUS (Lat. *cōpiōsus; cōpia, plenty*) denotes the abundant giving forth, as from a fund, store, or resources; as a copious supply, a copious stream, a copious language. It relates to the richness of the source.

"The sense of the laws, I am sure, is on my side; which are by no means sparing of the orator's time. It is not brevity, but *copiousness*, a full representation of every circumstance, that they recommend."—MELMOTH, *Pliny*.

ABUNDANT (Lat. *ăbundāre, to flow abundantly; unda, a wave*) relates, not to the source, but the supply, which is large of *its kind;* as an abundance of grain, of words, of wit.

"He goes lightly that wants a load. If there be more pleasure in *abundance*, there is more security in a mean estate."—BISHOP HALL.

AMPLE (Lat. *amplus, spacious, full*) refers especially to what is variable in limit or quantity, and, in the instance under consideration, extends beyond the limits of what is sufficient or requisite.

"Now let us leave this earth, and lift our eye
To the large convex of yon azure sky,
Behold it like an *ample* curtain spread."
PRIOR.

PLENTIFUL and PLENTEOUS (Lat. *plēnĭtatem, fulness*) differ but little, but PLENTEOUS is more closely connected with the character of the giver, PLENTIFUL with the abundance of the gift. PLENTEOUS belongs also to a higher and more rhetorical style. But PLENTIFUL belongs more strictly than abundant to purely physical things. We might say a plenteous, plentiful, or abundant harvest, but we could only say abundant, not plentiful or plenteous, cause of gratitude for it.

"The very word *satura* signifies a dish *plentifully* stored with all variety of fruit and grains."—DRYDEN, *Juvenal.*

CORNER. ANGLE.

CORNER (Fr. *cornier*, adj. *that which is at an angle*) is formed by the meeting of solid bodies, ANGLE (Lat. *angŭlus*) by the meeting of mathematical lines. CORNER refers only to the point of meeting, ANGLE to the whole space included between the lines. Hence, CORNER has a metaphorical force, of which ANGLE does not partake; as, a quiet or remote corner of the world.

"A master cook! why he's the man of men
For a professor. He designs, he draws,
Makes citadels of curious fowl and fish,
Mounts marrow-bones; cuts fifty-*angled* custards."
B. JONSON.

"We learn from hence what is the true use and end of miracles. They are not private but public proofs, not things to be done in a *corner* for the sake of single persons, but before multitudes and in the face of the sun."—BISHOP ATTERBURY.

CORPORAL. BODILY. CORPOREAL. MATERIAL.

CORPORAL and CORPOREAL (Lat. *corpŏrālis, corpŏreus*) both mean relating to the body, but under different aspects of it; CORPORAL relating to the *substance*, CORPOREAL to the *nature* of the body; while BODILY denotes, more generally, connected with the body or with a body; hence corporal punishment, corporeal existence, bodily vigour, pains, or shape. MATERIAL (Lat. *mātĕrialis*) respects all bodies, inanimate as well as animate, as the material system, material substances.

"For truth, the greatest of intellectual goods, is the produce of undisturbed reason; and health, the greatest of the *corporeal*, is the blooming fruit of temperance; and yet we can be content to be deprived of both for the sordid pleasure of a riotous, unmeaning jollity."—WARBURTON.

"All *corporal* damages that chance to mortal men are by medicines healed, or by reason remedied, or by length of time cured, or else by death ended."—*Golden Book.*

"But in reality it arose from very different causes, sometimes from *bodily* pain, which he often felt when he did not own it."—PORTEUS, *Life of Secker.*

CORRECTION. AMENDMENT. REFORM.

The word CORRECTION (Lat. *cor rĭgĕre*, part. *correctus*) denotes the action of redressing some defect for the purpose of bringing back to order that which had departed from it.

AMENDMENT (Fr. *amende*, Lat. *ēmendare*) is a change brought about for the better in a vicious order of things.

REFORM (Lat. *rĕformāre, to form anew*) is the state of a thing re-established in the order in which it ought to be. The correction of faults may result in an amendment of character, which, if extensive, may be tantamount to a reform.

Correction may be complete or insufficient or even useless, according as the act has produced more or less effect, or none at all. Amendment may be complete or incomplete, according as the change may be more or less considerable. But reform is necessarily absolute. In their application to persons, correction belongs to faults and defects, amendment to any portion or the whole of the character, reform to the entire conduct and character.

COST. EXPENSE. PRICE. VALUE. WORTH.

The COST of a thing (O. Fr. *coster*, Lat. *constare, to cost*) in its extended sense, is all that has been laid out, or is to be laid out upon producing it. The EXPENSE (Lat. *expendere, to pay out*, part. *expensus*) relates rather to the person than the article; hence

expense often means continued cost, as whatever a carriage may cost there will be expense in keeping it up. The PRICE of a thing is that which represents its value to the owner (Fr. *prix*; Lat. *prĕtium*), and must be paid to procure it. The WORTH (A.S. *weorð*) is what it will fetch, and the VALUE (Fr. *valeur*; Lat. *vălĕre, to be worth*) is what it *ought* to fetch.

"The real *price* of everything, what everything really *costs* to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it."—ADAM SMITH.

'Already I am worn with cares and age,
And just abandoning the ungrateful stage.
Unprofitably kept at Heaven's *expense*,
I live, a rent charge on her Providence."
DRYDEN.

"Besides the ornaments that are thrust through the holes of the ears, many others are suspended to them by strings; such as chisels or bodkins made of green talc, upon which they set a high *value*. The nails and teeth of their deceased relations, the teeth of dogs, and everything else that they can get which they think either curious or *valuable*."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"But he, his wonted pride
Soon recollecting, with high words that bore
Semblance of *worth*, not substance, gently raised
Their fainting courage, and dispell'd their fears."
MILTON.

The intrinsic merit of a thing constitutes its value; the estimation in which it is held determines its price. The value of things is founded upon the use which we may make of them. That which has no use has no value. And as use is founded upon want, that has no value for which no demand exists. The value regulates the price, but only within certain limits. He is no connoisseur who can only judge of the value of an article by the price which is asked for it. Price bears reference to exchange, and only exists in that relation, but from the moment that we want a thing it has a value for us, and, if we possess it, it retains that value irrespectively of any such exchange.

COUNTERFEIT. SPURIOUS. SUPPOSITITIOUS. FICTITIOUS. ADULTERATED. SOPHISTICATED. BASTARD. FALSIFIED. GARBLED.

COUNTERFEIT (Fr. *contrefait*, from *contre-faire*) relates to such deception as consists in matters of exterior, the making a false thing wear the look of the true.

"Think freely on all the various pretences to revelation; compare the *counterfeit* Scriptures with the true."—BENTLEY.

SPURIOUS (Lat. *spŭrius, illegitimate*) denotes something not issuing from the true source, or the source pretended.

"I never could be imposed on to receive for yours what is written by any others, or to mistake your genuine poetry for their *spurious* productions."—DRYDEN.

SUPPOSITITIOUS (Lat. *suppŏsĭtĭcius, substituted, not genuine*) denotes that which is founded upon supposition instead of fact. This admits of varying degrees of falsehood or deception. The worst form is when that which is known to be not the true is *substituted* in its place. On the other hand, no intention to deceive is implied in a supposititious history, if the materials are the most authentic that could be procured. In such a case their necessarily supposititious character ought to be declared.

"We shall premise this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be some Orphick verses *supposititious* as well as there were Sibylline, they being counterfeited either by Christians or Jews."—CUDWORTH.

FICTITIOUS (Lat. *fictĭcius; fingere, to form or feign*) applies to anything which is put forth as having independent truth and reality, while it is the product of imagination or invention, whether there be an intention to deceive or not.

"Thus, some make comedy a representation of mean, and others of bad men. Some think that its essence consists in the unimportance, others, in the *fictitiousness*, of the transaction."—*Rambler*.

The two last epithets are applied to such substances as are not of pure composition and manufacture. That is ADULTERATED (Lat. *ădulterare*, which had the same secondary meaning) in which the article is made to contain less of the genuine by the substitution of other cheaper substances, with a view to obtaining the full price of it at less cost. That is SOPHISTICATED (Gr. σοφιστικός, Lat. *sŏphistĭcus, sophistical*) of which the genuine simplicity is de-

stroyed. It is a less mercantile term than adulterate, and applies to matters of the mind, belief, argument, judgment; as, to sophisticate the understanding—subjects to which ADULTERATE is also applied analogously; but we speak of persons as sophisticated, and systems or compounds as adulterated. Adulteration expresses rather the impurity or dishonesty, sophistication the corrupt ingenuity of the process.

"We have well proved that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and *adulterators* of the atomic philosophy."—CUDWORTH.

"He is rattling over the streets of London, and pursuing all the *sophisticated* joys which succeed to supply the place where nature is relinquished."—KNOX, *Essays*.

The origin of the word BASTARD is obscure. There is an old French phrase, *fils de bast*, which was transcribed into old English "born in bast." The word has been connected with the modern *bât*, a pack-saddle, as if bastard were one born among the pack-saddles of muleteers. It is employed in a secondary sense to denote that which looks genuine, but is inferior and corrupt in form, affecting the nature of the pure and authentic, but of corrupt origin and degenerate growth. It is specially applicable to vegetable productions of a coarse and wild character which resemble more wholesome and valuable plants, and to vicious developments in art and language. Bastard Latin, bastard architecture.

"Bastard self-love."—BARROW.

To FALSIFY (Lat. *falsificus*, *working deceit*) is to throw upon what is in itself authentic such a character as shall make it exhibit falsehood. It is to vitiate up to a certain point, that is, so far as may serve a specific purpose. That which has an expressive character or force is falsified when it is made to denote wrongly or inconsistently with its natural or proper significance. To GARBLE is a particular kind of falsification, probably from L. Lat. *garbellare*, *to sift*. It is to cleanse from dross and dust, and was used specially of spices; hence to garble is to separate and discard extraneous matter, and to pick and choose what is valuable and answers one's purpose—so to extract such quotations from a book or document as may foster a particular view by artful selection and collocation.

"We cannot, I fear, *falsify* the pedigree of this fierce people, and persuade them that they are not sprung from a nation in whose being the blood of freedom circulates."—BURKE.

"Among all the excesses into which the Tories ran in favour of the Crown, and in hopes of fixing dominion on their own party, their zeal to support the methods of *garbling* corporations was, in my opinion, that which threatened public liberty the most."—BOLINGBROKE.

COURSE. CURRENT.

The COURSE (Lat. *cursus*) of a river is the direction in which the water runs; the CURRENT (Lat. part. *currentem*, *running*) is the force of the water which follows that course. The course is straight or winding, the current is strong or slack.

COWARD. POLTROON. DASTARD CRAVEN.

The term COWARD (Ital. *codardo*) is derived from the Latin *cauda*, *a tail*, being like an animal that hangs down its tail, or shows tail in ready flight. It is the ordinary term for a person who lacks courage to meet danger. A POLTROON is a coward of peculiar meanness of spirit, of an arrant poverty of character, that is incapable of a generous idea or effort. DASTARD (*dast*, answering to Eng. *dazed*, and the common Fr. *suffix -ard*; SKEAT's *Etym. Dict.*) is one who, like the poltroon, meanly shrinks from danger, but from pure fear, while the poltroon is lazy and cowardly also. The CRAVEN, *i. e.* one begged off, was one who *craved* his life of the victor. The term belongs, therefore, to more honourable warfare. The mean man is a poltroon, the recreant knight is a craven. It is the difference between hiding out of the way of danger, and showing the white feather in the face of danger. As to the etymology of *poltroon*, Littré decides in favour of O. H. Ger. *polstar*, *bolstar* (Ger. *polster*; Eng. *bolster*), meaning *a bed*; the

Ital. *poltrone*, of which the suffix *-one* is intensive, would then be = a thoroughly lazy, spiritless man.

CREATE. CAUSE. OCCASION. MAKE. FORM. PRODUCE. CONSTITUTE.

It is hardly necessary to observe that CREATE (Lat. *creare*) is used in the metaphysical sense of producing out of nothing, as "the creation of the world." With this, which represents only an effort of the human mind to express the inconceivable, we have nothing to do in a work of this kind, which deals only with the ordinary use of language. The term create is often used in a kindred sense with CAUSE (Lat. *causa, a cause*), but it involves personal agency. It is to effect by the agency and under the laws of causation. This human agency, if not directly expressed, is indirectly implied; as busybodies are said to create mischief, or jealousies are created by unnecessary reserve. On the other hand, when the natural force and sequence of things is contemplated, we use CAUSE; as, the circumstance caused great surprise.

"The bad treatment of those who are suffered still to live in a society is the *creating* of so many malcontents, who at some time or other may make those who treat them ill feel their revenge."—BURNET.

"And the Lord God *caused* a deep sleep to fall upon Adam."—*Bible*.

To OCCASION (Lat. *occāsionem; occĭdĕre, to befall*) denotes the more indirect and less active kinds of causation; the occasion is the circumstance or set of circumstances which allow the cause to operate. Accordingly the verb OCCASION is often employed of something connected with the cause, or the cause viewed generally and indirectly. In travelling, we might say, the delay was occasioned by an accident, but it was caused by the breaking of an axle-tree. Generally speaking, the cause is more remote than the occasion, the occasion more specifically active than the cause. Thus, in the case of some crime committed, the temptation, the convenient circumstances, the solicitation, or the hope of gain, and the like, might be spoken of as the cause; but to a moralist these would rather constitute the occasion, while the cause would be deeper, namely, in the depravity of the man's nature. The following passage of Spenser shows how easily the two may be interchanged:—

"Madman, said then the palmer, that does seek
Occasion to wrath and *cause* of strife."

MAKE (A. S. *macian*) is the most generic of all. It has the sense of to bring about by any means or by any process, and is applicable both to physical and metaphysical results, in which latter sense it is synonymous with form and constitute; as, two and two *make* four, implying logical causation, but not agency.

"When the cause is extrinsical, and the effect produced by a sensible separation, or juxtaposition, of discernible parts, we call it *making;* and such are all artificial things."—LOCKE.

To FORM (Lat. *formāre*) is used in three main senses: 1, to give physical form or shape, as to form an image out of clay; 2, to produce in substantial shape, as the action of cold on water forms ice; 3, to give metaphysical shape, as to form an idea or notion. This does not imply distinct agency; as, we say six will form a majority, that is, will complete the *notion* as well as the *fact* of a majority; to which may be added 4, to give moral shape, that is, to mould; as, to form a habit of reflexion; circumstances form the character. This last is only an analogous application of the first.

"We are so wonderfully *formed*, that whilst we are creatures vehemently desirous of novelty, we are as strongly attached to habit and custom."—BURKE.

PRODUCE (Lat. *prōdūcĕre, to bring forward, produce*) is to bring about as the result of a lengthened effort or process, analogous to the bringing forth of plants from seeds, and the young of animals from the parent. It may or may not imply distinct purpose; as, to produce a work of literature or art on the one hand, or kind-

ness produces love, on the other. That which produces does so by an operative power inherent in its nature, by virtue of which it imparts somewhat of its own nature or substance to the thing produced.

"Trade, then, is necessary to the *producing* of riches, and money necessary to the carrying on of trade."—LOCKE.

CONSTITUTE (Lat. *constituĕre*) is purely mental, though the conception may be based upon a physical process. To constitute means to contribute all that is needed to make up a whole, whether physical or metaphysical. If many things are needed, the term applies to all; if one thing is sufficient, that alone constitutes; as, "That field constitutes, or those fields, trees, and hedges constitute, all my landed property."

"It is not more necessary to the *constituting* of a man that a human soul inhabit in a human body, than it is to the being a true Christian that the Holy Spirit of God inhabit in the soul and body of the man."—SHARP.

CRIME. VICE. SIN. GUILT. MISDEMEANOUR. OFFENCE. TRESPASS. TRANSGRESSION. MISDEED. WRONG. INIQUITY. WICKEDNESS. INJUSTICE. INJURY.

CRIME (Fr. *crime*; Lat. *crīmen, an accusation*) is always a deed, never a state. It is, strictly speaking, a deed violating a law, human or divine. Hence, we may speak of crimes against God, and crimes against society; but, according to present usage, a crime is generally understood to be against the State. Crime can only be used of moral and spiritual offences, when religion wears a political aspect, and God is recognized as a Supreme Ruler and Judge, whose laws have been infringed. In this way Spenser speaks of the "*crime* of our first father's fall." So Blackstone says—

"A *crime* or misdemeanour is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it."

And, again, that the discussion and admeasurement of the nature of crimes and punishments, "forms in every country the code of *criminal* law."

VICE (Lat. *vĭtium*) is a state, not a deed—a moral fault or failing, a departure from moral purity or integrity, implying more or less of defect, corruption, or wrong in the character itself. Vice is commonly an abuse or excess of what is in itself lawful if it be within bounds and according to rule, as the vice of drunkenness, which consists in excess, or unchastity, which is against rule. On the other hand, murder and forgery are crimes which no moderation could rectify, and spring from selfish passions. In its more general sense, vice is radical and inherent badness.

"That this is the common measure of virtue and *vice*, will appear to any one who considers that though that passes for *vice* in one country which is counted a virtue, or at least not a *vice*, in another, yet every where virtue and praise, *vice* and blame, go together."—LOCKE.

SIN (A. S. *syn*) is a departure from a Divine law, or any law regarded as of a Divine or sacred character. Sin comprehends both CRIME and VICE, by reason of the perfection of the Divine law; but there are many specific sins or acts of sin which are not vices, inasmuch as they consist *only* of acts, and are not habits or propensities; and there are many sins which, not being acts, are not crimes; such as sins of thought; or not violations of the law of the land, as lying. The following is the view of Hobbes:—

"All crimes are indeed *sins*, but not all *sins* crimes. A *sin* may be in the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which neither a judge, nor a witness, nor any man, can take notice; but a crime is such a *sin* as consists in an action against the law, of which action he can be accused and tried by a judge, and be convinced or cleared by witnesses. Farther, that which is no *sin* in itself, but indifferent, may be made sin by a positive law."—HOBBES, *On the Common Law of England*.

GUILT (A. S. *gylt*, meaning originally *a fine* or *payment*) is a state, the state of one who has infringed or violated any moral or political law, or, in the mildest sense, one to whom anything wrong, even as a matter of

taste or judgment, may be attributed; as, to be guilty of error, to be guilty of a piece of bad taste. Guilt is the impress of evil upon the individual, and is opposed to merit, as the impress of good in action.

"An involuntary act," says Blackstone, "as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any *guilt*."

MISDEMEANOUR (*mis-*, and O. Fr. *demener, to lead, manage*) is a minor crime, under the purely social aspect of crime. Any crime less than a felony, or any for which the law has not furnished a name, would be a misdemeanour. In common parlance it is used in the sense of misconduct.

"The consideration of this, that God takes a particular notice of our *misdemeanours*, should engage us to set about a particular amendment."—SOUTH.

OFFENCE (Lat. *offendĕre*, part. *offensus, to stumble against, to offend*) is indefinite. It implies a contradiction of will or a violation of law, without saying anything of the nature of the will or the law, which may be political or personal. Offence may be even against customs, where customs have the force of social laws or regulations; as, to offend against good taste and good manners.

"To *offend* originally signifies to impinge, that is, to stumble or hit dangerously upon something lying across our way, so as thereby to be cast down, or at least to be disordered in our posture and stopped in our progress, whence it is well transferred to denote our being, through an incident temptation, brought into sin, whereby a man is thrown down, or is bowed from his upright state, and interrupted from prosecuting a steady course of piety and virtue."—BARROW.

TRESPASS (O. Fr. *trespasser*, L. Lat. *transpassare, to pass across*) is an offence of which the essence consists in *going beyond* certain allowable or right limits. I trespass upon my neighbour's land, or, metaphorically, upon his patience.

TRANSGRESSION (Lat. *transgressionem, transgrĕdior, I step across*) differs from trespass in referring solely to law, moral or civil, while trespass is in reference to the rights or character of another. A trespass is a *personal* transgression against another. It is evident that a trespass may be of the nature of a transgression.

"This action of *trespass* or *transgression* on the case is our universal remedy given for all personal wrongs and injuries without fine."—BLACKSTONE.

MISDEED is a *deed* of *wrong*, and therefore of a private character. It stands to misconduct as a part to the whole. A misdeed is very often of the nature of a minor crime and misdemeanour, or an offence against the law; but this is accidental, not essential to the term.

"Like caitiff vile, that for *misdeed*
Rides with his face to rump of steed."
Hudibras.

INIQUITY (Lat. *iniquĭtatem, unfairness*), like VICE, is used both of the habit and the act. It commonly denotes a gross violation of the rights of others by fraud and circumvention. It is used also, however, of cases of open violence, as "iniquitous war." In its broadest sense iniquity is the violation of all that is right and just. It is in the language of Scripture, the contradiction and opposite of righteousness.

"All governments must frequently infringe the rules of justice to support themselves. Truth must give way to dissimulation, honesty to convenience, and humanity itself to the raging interest. The whole of this mystery of *iniquity* is called the reason of state."—BURKE.

INJUSTICE (Lat. *injustĭtia*) and INJURY (Lat. *injuria, wrong*) differ, in that the former relates to the actor, the latter to the object. Every injustice, therefore, is not an injury. For instance, if we speak ill or disparagingly of another without his deserving it, we do him an injustice but unless what we say has sufficient influence to affect his interests it will be no injury. It deserves to be remarked, that INJURY is used in two very different ways, though the notion of wrong lies at the bottom of both. We may act with violence or wrong upon insensible as well as sensible objects. Strictly speaking, it is only in reference to the latter that the term injury can be directly employed; but it is often used in respect to the former, in which case it is simply

tantamount to damage, as, for instance, injuries done to trees by a storm.

"The great, it seems, are privileged alone
To punish all *injustice* but their own."
DRYDEN.

"The former (private wrongs) are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are thereupon frequently termed civil *injuries*."—BLACKSTONE.

WRONG (connected with *wrung*, A. S. *wringan*, *to wring* or *wrest*; compare Fr. *tort*, from Lat. *tortus*, *twisted*) is a *distortion* of right, either in reference to ourselves or to others. In the former case, it is a crime or a misdeed, according to its character and extent; in the latter, it partakes both of injustice and injury, being such a violation of justice on the part of the agent as redounds to the detriment of the person acted upon. The wrong regards more particularly the goods and the reputation; the injustice regards the personal qualities, by imputing defects of character: the first hurts, the second offends. The imprudent zeal of a friend sometimes does more wrong than the anger of an enemy. The greatest injustice one can do to an honest man is to call his probity in question.

"The distinction of public *wrongs* from private, of crimes and misdemeanours from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this, that private *wrongs* or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; public *wrongs*, or crimes and misdemeanours, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community, considered as a community in its social aggregate capacity."—BLACKSTONE.

WICKEDNESS (etymology doubtful) is the disposition towards and practice of evil generally. It is a generic term, referring more directly to transgressions of the Divine law, and morality as included under it. In a milder sense it means ludicrous mischief.

"Our manifold sins and *wickedness*."—*English Book of Common Prayer*.

CRIMINAL. GUILTY.

CRIMINAL respects the character of the deed, GUILTY the simple fact of its commission. The criminality of an offence is a question of degree, to be determined by circumstances. Guilt is a question of fact, to be determined by evidence. It must be observed that criminal is an epithet only of things, guilty both of things and persons.

"The ends of drink are digestion of our meat, cheerfulness and refreshment of our spirits, or any end of health; besides which, if we go at any time beyond it, it is inordinate and *criminal*; it is the vice of drunkenness."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"One cannot but be astonished at the folly and impiety of pronouncing a man *guilty* unless he was cleared by a miracle, and of expecting that all the powers of Nature should be suspended by an immediate interposition of Providence to save the innocent whenever it was presumptuously required."—BLACKSTONE.

CRIMINAL. CULPRIT. FELON. MALEFACTOR. CONVICT.

These are terms denoting persons who have offended against the laws of the country. A CRIMINAL is one who stands indicted for a crime, or against whom a crime has been proved.

"Suppose a civil magistrate should have a *criminal* brought before him, accused, for instance, of murder, burglary, or the like, and the fact is proved, would you not have him in that case to pronounce the sentence that the law has awarded to all such malefactors?"—SHARP.

CULPRIT (probably Lat. *culpātus*, *accused*) is used in the same twofold force, but is a milder term, admitting of less grave applications—as when applied to boys in a school who have offended against morals or regulations.

"Like other *culprit* youths, he wanted grace,
But could have no self-interest in the case."
WHITEHEAD.

MALEFACTOR (Lat. *mălĕfactor*) expresses a criminal, who, though seized or condemned by the State, is regarded in reference to the moral instead of the political character of his offence.

"From every species of punishment that has hitherto been devised, from imprisonment and exile, from pain and infamy, *malefactors* return more hardened in their crimes and more instructed."—PALEY.

FELON (L. Lat. *felonem*, *a traitor*) denotes a criminal in regard to the

grade of his offence; that is, as having committed a crime which amounts to a felony. Originally, a felony was such a crime as included the forfeiture of goods for its penalty, but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared several specific crimes to be felonies.

"Yes, Leila sleeps beneath the wave,
But his shall be a redder grave;
Her spirit pointed well the steel
Which taught the *felon* heart to feel."
BYRON.

The CONVICT (Lat. *convĭncĕre*, part. *convictus, to refute*) is the criminal or felon regarded as sentenced, and undergoing the punishment to which he has been sentenced, more especially that of forced labour.

"Its garrison being in great measure unarmed, it was impossible that it could have opposed our force, or that its half-starved inhabitants, most of whom are *convicts*, banished thither from other parts, could have had any other thoughts than that of submitting."—ANSON'S *Voyages*.

CRISIS. CONJUNCTURE. EMERGENCY. EXIGENCY.

CRISIS (Gr. *κρῖσις, a separating, a decision*) denotes literally what *decides* or turns the scale. It is commonly used of a turning-point in affairs, before it is known whether the issue will be for better or worse; and generally of a precarious or high-wrought state of affairs. The difference seems to be that CONJUNCTURE (Lat. *conjungere*, part. *conjunctus, to join together*) denotes a compound crisis, or a state which results from the meeting of several external circumstances to form it; while CRISIS is applicable to the internal state alone; as, the crisis of a disease. A crisis is watched with anxiety; great results have accrued from taking advantage of a favourable conjuncture of circumstances. A crisis is anticipated, a conjuncture is unexpected.

EMERGENCY (Lat. *ēmergĕre, to emerge*) is an unforeseen occurrence or combination, which calls for immediate action.

EXIGENCY (Lat. *exĭgĕre, to exact*) is a minor emergency, having the character of an imperious requirement.

"It is observed in all those actions or passages which cause any great or notable change either in the mind or life of man, that they do not constantly operate at the same rate of efficacy, but that there is a certain *crisis* or particular season which strangely provokes and draws forth the activity and force of every agent, raising it to effects much greater and higher than the common measure of its actings is observed to carry it to."—SOUTH.

"But I will rather ostentatiously display my own endeavours to assist you in this *conjuncture*, nor dwell upon the unworthy treatment you have received from others."—MELMOTH, *Cicero*.

"On whom she might her doubts repose,
In all *emergencies* that rose." SWIFT.

"The total collective *exigencies* of the State."—BURKE.

CRITICISM. STRICTURE.

CRITICISM (Gr. *κριτικός, able to discern*) is a minute examination of any compound subject, as human conduct, dress, personal appearance, a literary production or work of art (but not a purely natural object, as, for instance, a landscape), with a view to ascertaining and manifesting merits and faults.

STRICTURE (Lat. *strictūra, a drawing tightly together*) is only employed of *adverse* criticism, and consists in the effort to expose defects, faults, or wrong in series. It is commonly employed in reference to works of art and literature and the conduct of public men.

"*Criticism*, though dignified from the earliest ages by the labours of men eminent for knowledge and sagacity, and, since the revival of polite literature, the favourite study of European scholars, has not yet attained the certainty and stability of science."—*Rambler*.

"To the end of most of the plays I have added short *strictures*, containing a general censure of faults or praise of excellence."—JOHNSON.

CROOKED. BENT. CURVED. AWRY.

CROOKED (connected with *cross*, Lat. *crux*, and many similar words in different languages) denotes that which might have been conceived as straight but is not; one deviation from the straight line, or more than one, may belong to a crooked object. It is a term of abruptness, and tends, in its secondary sense, to express that which is morally wrong or perverted

as contrasted with what is straight or right, as we speak of crooked ways or thoughts.

"And in one of the Snowdon lakes is found a variety of trout, which is naturally deformed, having a strange *crookedness* near the tail, resembling that of the perch before described."—PENNANT.

BENT (A. S. *bendan, to bend*) denotes the exercise of some power which has caused the deviation from straightness, whether exercised on purpose, or purely mechanical or involuntary; as, bent by art, or bent by the storm. It expresses such deviation as occurs only once in the subject. If it occurred oftener, we should use some term expressive of *frequent* bending, as "bent about." The word belongs to substantial matter, and not to mere lines. We say "crooked paths," not "bent paths."

"And yet these bows, being somewhat like the long bows in use amongst us, were *bent* only by a man's immediate strength."—WILKINS, *Mechanical Powers*.

CURVED (Lat. *curvus, crooked*) denotes equable and proportionate flexure, which is almost always the result of design, and may have grace for its object.

"They have no furniture except a few little blocks of wood, the upper side of which is hollowed into a *curve*, and which serve them for pillows."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

AWRY (properly an adverb, *on-wry*, M. E. *wryen, to twist*) denotes wrong or defective deviation or flexure. As the crooked is that which *might* be straight, and is not, so that which is awry *ought* to be straight, and is not.

"He may in some points be in error, he may in many points pursue the way which we may not think best; yet if he be a pious and good man, his path cannot possibly be much *awry*."—GILPIN'S *Sermons*.

CROWD. MULTITUDE. THRONG. SWARM. MOB. POPULACE.

CROWD (A. S. *croda*) denotes such a collection of persons as gives the impression of multitude without order; rarely used of *things*.

"Like his own Christian in the cage, Bunyan found protectors even among the *crowd* of Vanity Fair."—MACAULAY.

MULTITUDE (Lat. *multitudo*), is that which gives the impression of numerousness, and nothing else, and is not, like CROWD, restricted to human beings. The mind is sometimes occupied by a multitude of thoughts, and sometimes by a crowd of associations, or confusing sentiments. Crowd is sometimes used exaggeratively; *e.g.*, Italy contains a crowd of ancient monuments; as if the mind were embarrassed by the thought of seeing them all.

"It is a fault in a *multitude* of preachers that they utterly neglect method in their harangues."—WATTS.

THRONG (A. S. *thrang*) applies to human beings exclusively. It expresses a voluntary pressure of the individuals composing the collection; while CROWD rather expresses such as is inconvenient and involuntary. CROWD merely denotes a fact, THRONG supposes some common object of curiosity or interest.

"Not to know me argues yourself unknown,
The lowest of your *throng*." MILTON.

SWARM (A. S. *swearm*) is employed only of animate objects, whether human or otherwise, but of human beings only disparagingly. The specific idea of SWARM is that of multitudinous life and action, whether with or without a common purpose uniting them, as a swarm of busy bees, or a swarm of idle children.

"Every place *swarms* with soldiers."—SPENSER.

MOB (formerly *mŏbĭlĕ; i.e.* Lat. *mŏbĭlĕ vulgus, the fickle crowd*) and POPULACE (Lat. *pŏpŭlus*) stand closely related. As POPULACE is a word formed to include the masses of a country which have no distinction of rank, education, office, or profession; so MOB indicates a specific reunion of such persons exhibiting a characteristic coarseness or violence, more especially on such occasions of social or political interest as may have brought them together. A mob may be gathered and dispersed in an hour. The populace is a permanent portion of society. The concourse of many persons to the same place will result in a multitude which will probably partake of the nature of a crowd, the multitude being

the quantity of persons produced by the concourse. The flocking of human beings to the same spot is sometimes called *affluence*. When some inconvenience results, or we mean to speak disparagingly of the character of it, the multitude becomes a crowd. A multitude of persons may spread itself over ample space. On certain occasions there may be an affluence of strangers to a city. A crowd collects in the street where an accident has occurred. In continental towns the streets are sometimes thronged to see a religious procession.

"Kings are ambitious, the nobility haughty, and the *populace* tumultuous and ungovernable."—BURKE.

"He shrunk from the dangers which threatened him, and sacrificed his conscience and his duty to the menaces of a *mob*."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

CULPABLE. FAULTY.

Although these terms are very nearly related, CULPABLE being derived from the Latin *culpa, a fault* (Fr. *faute*, Lat. *fallĕre, to fail*), yet CULPABLE is always specific, while FAULTY is general.

FAULTY means generally defective, whether morally or otherwise, as a faulty character, a faulty composition. CULPABLE means guilty of a specific act or course of conduct which deserves blame. The term is also used of negative acts, as a culpable ignorance, a culpable negligence. Faulty is an epithet of things intellectual and artistic. Culpable is only of things moral.

"Every man in doubtful cases is left to his own discretion, and if he acts according to the best reason he hath, he is not *culpable*, though he be mistaken in his measures."—SHARP.

"Created once
So goodly and erect, though *faulty* since."
MILTON.

CULTIVATION. CULTURE. TILLAGE. HUSBANDRY. CIVILIZATION. REFINEMENT.

CULTIVATION (L. Lat. *cultīvare, to till*, L. *cŏlĕre*, part. *cultus*) is used in a physical and in a metaphorical sense. It denotes the use of art and labour and all things needful to the production of such things as grow out of the soil. The term, it may be observed, is employed both of the soil and of that which grows out of it. We cultivate fields, and we cultivate flax. The same force belongs to the metaphorical or moral use of the term, as in the cultivation of the mind, or of special habits, or of literature, or the arts.

"The mind of man hath need to be prepared for piety and virtue. It must be *cultivated* to that end, and ordered with great care and pains. But the vices are weeds that grow wild and spring up of themselves."—TILLOTSON.

CULTURE (Lat. *cultūra*) is commonly employed to denote the specific cultivation of some particular kind of production for the sake of its amelioration. In this sense the term is used of the culture of the human race or human mind (but not of moral habits), to indicate such civilization and training as results in the raising of the condition of the race.

"The mind that lies fallow but a single day sprouts up in follies that are only to be killed by a constant and assiduous *culture*."—*Spectator*.

CIVILIZATION (Lat. *cīvilis*, belonging to *civis, a citizen*), unlike CULTIVATION, is employed only of races of mankind, or, by a licence, of the countries which they inhabit. CIVILIZATION and REFINEMENT are respectively the first and the final stages of cultivation as regards the condition of men in their social capacity; the first meaning the mere redeeming from a state of barbarism; the second a high condition of intellectual culture in the liberal arts and social manners. A civilized people is one among whom industry, commerce, science, art, government have reached a high state, and are still in a condition of advancement. Persons or nations may be civilized without being refined in manners; which may be unpolished.

TILLAGE and HUSBANDRY, except by special design, convey no metaphorical meaning. Tillage (A. S. *tilian, to make an effort; to toil*) applies directly and solely to the soil in reference to its preparation for seed, and its preservation for the sake of

the crops which it is to produce, and not to the crops themselves. HUSBANDRY is of much wider meaning, comprising all the branches of agriculture, and even the theoretical science of it, while tillage is purely manual.

"Nothing is more certain than that our manners, our *civilization*, and all the good things which are connected with manners and with *civilization*, have in this European world of ours depended for ages upon two principles, and were indeed the result of both combined. I mean the spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religion."—BURKE.

"This refined taste is the consequence of education and habit. We are born only with a capacity of entertaining this *refinement*, as we are born with a disposition to receive and obey all the rules and regulations of society; and so far it may be said to be natural to us, and no farther."—REYNOLDS.

"The very ground you cultivate affords much instruction. Without proper *tillage* you know it will bear nothing; and the more it is cultivated the more it will produce."—GILPIN'S *Sermons*.

"*Husbandry* supplieth all things necessary for food."—SPENSER.

CURE. HEAL. REMEDY.

CURE (Lat. *cūrāre, to care for, to heal*) is employed of such deep-seated or internal ailments as need the indirect treatment of science; HEAL (A. S. *hælan, to make whole or hale*) of such external and tangible wounds, diseases, or injuries, as need the direct application of manual skill. Wounds and ulcers are healed. Diseases generally are cured. In their moral bearings, CURE is used of what is bad or unsound in the mental or moral nature; as, to cure prejudices, to cure vices, or vicious habits, or evil propensities; HEAL of external breaches and separations; as, to heal animosities, hatreds, rivalries, or anything which, like the lips of a social wound, needs bringing together.

REMEDY (Lat. *rĕmĕdium*) is more comprehensive, and denotes the specific counteractive setting right of anything that has gone wrong; as diseases, nuisances, evils, social injuries and wrongs, or even deficiencies and omissions. REMEDY, however, has commonly more to do with the result or fact, while CURE relates to the principles and origin of things requiring remedy. To remedy a disease is simply to remove it, to cure it is to remove the cause. The nouns *cure* and *remedy* follow the same distinction.

"The child was *cured* from that very hour."—*Bible*.

"But Vane opposed this with much zeal. He said, Would they *heal* the wound that they had given themselves which weakened them so much? The setting them at quiet could have no other effect but to *heal* and unite them in their opposition to authority."—BURNET.

"Now since all wrong may be considered as merely a privation of right, the plain natural *remedy* for every species of wrong is the being put in possession of that right whereof the party injured is deprived."—BLACKSTONE.

It may be observed that the verbs CURE and HEAL are employed both of the malady or evil, and of the subject in which it resides, while REMEDY is used only directly of the evil itself.

CURSE. MALEDICTION. IMPRECATION. EXECRATION. ANATHEMA.

CURSE (A. S. *cursian*, possibly connected with making the sign of the *cross*, Sw. *kors*) is a solemn or violent pronunciation or invocation of evil upon another. It is used in the independent sense of a uniform cause of harm. CURSE commonly implies the personal desire of evil accompanying its declaration. It is the generic term, and even applies to certain inanimate things, as the man in despair curses the day of his birth.

"When men in common conversation use *curses* and *imprecations* against their brethren, as passionate and profane men are frequently apt to do, it is either with an intention and desire that mischief might befall them, which is both malicious towards man, and also irreligiously thinking light of the *curse* of God; or else it is without any such desire or intention, and then it is profanely supposing God to have no regard to their behaviour."—CLARKE.

MALEDICTION (Lat. *mălĕdictiōnem, evil-speaking; a curse*) is a more formal term, and expresses generally the declaration of a curse. This may be

personal, or it may be purely official, as the maledictions of the Jewish law, that is, the solemn declaration of a curse as attached to certain acts, whoever they may be that commit them.

"*Imprecations* and *maledictions* were made, according to the custom of the Jews, against those who should presume to add or alter anything therein."—GREW.

IMPRECATION (Lat. *imprĕcātiōnem*) is a weaker form of cursing, which prays for evil upon another, and has in it more the wish than the feeling or belief of power.

EXECRATION (Lat. *exsĕcrātiōnem*) is a curse dictated by violent personal feeling of hatred. So distinctive is this element, that the word sometimes means simply such hatred, without any idea of cursing, as we speak of holding certain deeds in execration.

"I mean the Epicureans, who though in other respects they were persons of many excellent and sublime speculations, yet, because of their gross error in this kind, they have been in all ages looked upon with a kind of *execration*."—WILKINS.

ANATHEMA (Gr. *ἀνάθεμα, anything devoted or accursed*) was a term taken from the New Testament, and meant a ban or curse pronounced on religious grounds by ecclesiastical authority, and was accompanied by excommunication, so that the person was held up as an object of offence.

"*Anathema* signifies persons or things devoted to destruction and extermination. The Jewish nation were an *anathema*—destined to destruction. St. Paul, to express his affection to them, says he could wish, to save them from it, to become an *anathema*, and be destroyed himself."—LOCKE.

The imprecation is the expression of anger in the weak and oppressed. The malediction is an expression of outraged power and justice. The execration is an expression of religious horror, or in its milder form, of the strongest aversion.

CURSORY. DESULTORY. SUMMARY.

CURSORY (Lat. *cursōrius*, relating to *one who runs*) denotes such haste as implies of necessity the impossibility of more than momentary and superficial observation or comprehension of particulars. DESULTORY (Lat. *dĕsultōrius*, relating to *a horse-vaulter*, *dĕsultor*) is that which wants continuity and method, and indicates an impatience of applied thought. SUMMARY (Lat. *summārium*) denotes that which is rapidly gathered up into completion, and so saves time at the expense of attention to detail. We speak commonly of cursory glances, views, and observation; desultory studies, argument, remarks; and summary proceedings.

"It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals that their maxims have a plausible air, and on a *cursory* view appear equal to false principles."—BURKE.

"This makes my reading wild and *desultory*, and I seek refuge from the uneasiness of thought from any book, let it be what it will, that can engage my attention."—WARBURTON.

"Nor spend their time to show their reading,
She'd have a *summary* proceeding."
SWIFT.

CUSTOM. FASHION. MANNER. METHOD. PRACTICE. HABIT. USAGE. PRESCRIPTION. HABITUDE. VOGUE.

CUSTOM (Fr. *coutume*, Lat. *consuētūdĭnem*) is an habitual practice, whether of individuals, or communities. It differs from HABIT (Lat. *hăbĭtus, a condition, an acquired state*) in that HABIT is exclusively applicable to individuals, and denotes that the stage is reached when the custom is no longer purely involuntary, by a repetition of acts. In law, CUSTOM has the meaning of long-established practice or usage, having the force of unwritten law. Ordinarily speaking, custom respects things that are done by the majority, habit those which are done by individuals. We speak of national customs, and a man of active or indolent habits. In this way, it is a custom in England to repair to the seaside in the autumn months. To smoke tobacco or take snuff are habits. There will often be a close connexion between a habit and a custom; either may lead to the other. The custom of going to church may lead to a habit of devotion; or the personal habit of devotion may lead a person to the

custom of attending public worship. Those natural customs are the best which lead to good habits among the people.

"A *custom*
More honour'd in the breach than the observance." SHAKESPEARE.

Habit is the effect of custom, as custom is the effect of inclination. It is a good custom to rise early, as this will produce a habit of doing so.

"How use doth breed a *habit* in a man." SHAKESPEARE.

Custom makes objects familiar, habit makes doing easy. Uniformity is the life of the one, frequency of the other. We commonly speak of habits as good or bad, of customs as lately or long established.

FASHION (Fr. *façon*, Lat. *factionem*), besides its primary meaning of shape or manner, has the secondary meaning of *prevailing* manner. A fashion is a custom temporarily established, and refers commonly to matters of social usage, as style of dress.

"The innocent diversions in *fashion*."—LOCKE.

MANNER and METHOD are closely allied, the former, however (Fr. *manière*, from *mănus*, *the hand*, through Schol. Lat. *maneria*, BRACHET), denotes no more than the way of doing a thing; while in its more extended meaning, as expressed by the plural manners, it means the peculiar and characteristic mode of living and behaving. METHOD (Gr. μέθοδος) is scientific manner, as manner is natural method. When manner is scientifically regarded as a process capable of rules for its right and effective conducting, it becomes method. Fashion gives form to an action or a work, manner gives a particular turn to that action or work. Manner stands to fashion as manipulation to operation. One thing is made after the fashion of another, that is, in the same form, or with a similarity of character. We trace in a work the manner of the workman or artist, that is, his distinctive mode of operation. Fashion is more general, and determined by rule and custom; manner is more personal and distinctive, being determined by individual peculiarities. Fashion belongs more to the work, manner to the workman. Fashion is less capable of application to abstract performances. He discharged the commission in a satisfactory manner (not fashion).

"All *method* is a rational progress; a progress toward an end."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

"The temptations of prosperity insinuate themselves after a gentle but very powerful *manner*."—ATTERBURY.

PRACTICE (Fr. *pratique*, L. Lat. *practĭcus*) has the two senses of a regular doing, and the thing regularly done. It is closely allied to both habit and custom. Practice is customary action; if it be the result of repeated acts, it is so far a habit; but, unlike CUSTOM, it refers necessarily to the acts of individuals, either separately or in the aggregate, and not to communities as such. It often occurs that the same thing may be regarded as either a custom or a practice, that is, as a regular thing or a regular act in a person. Custom and practice must be based upon reason, but habit may be the result of instinct or training in irrational animals. Practice embodies more of the moral than is necessarily implied in custom, or even in habit. It denotes a distinct determination of purpose. A practice must be good or bad, wholesome or unwholesome, and can hardly be purely indifferent or formal. Indeed, practice is such conduct as manifests the disposition of the person. So gaming is a custom in those countries which are particularly addicted to it. It is a habit in those individuals who cannot resist it. It is a practice in those who deliberately indulge in it.

"He thought to have that by *practice* which he could not by prayer."—SIDNEY.

USAGE (Fr. *usage*) and PRESCRIPTION (Lat. *præscriptio*, *a preamble*, *a rule*, with limitation, *e.g.* as to time) are terms of a legal character. Custom is prolonged by usage till it confers rights of prescription. In its ordinary sense, as, for instance, "usage

determines the senses of words," usage is of many, while custom may be of one. Usage implies longer establishment than custom; hence we may speak of a new custom, but not a new usage. In the case of wishing to express a common mode lately adopted, we ought to say a new *use*—a new use of the word in that sense, or a new employment. *Technically*, custom differs from prescription in being *local*, while prescription is *personal*. Generally it is length of time that gives force to custom, and extent of practice to usage. There is more sense, reflexion, and reason in usage; more of mere repetition and habit in custom. Hence usage furnishes a stronger plea of justification than custom, which may have been adopted without inquiry, and continued without reason, or even against it.

HABITUDE (Fr. *habitude*, Lat. *hăbĭtūdo*) expresses the passive or quiescent side of habit. As habit involves a mode of acting, so habitude is a mode of being.

VOGUE (Fr. *vogue*) is the popular way or fashion at a particular time. The word is now obsolete except in the phrase "in vogue." To be in vogue is to be in popular acceptance, and combines the ideas of approval and general use.

"But considering these Sermons bore so great a *vogue* among the Papists, I will here give a taste of them."—STRYPE.

"Old Courtiers devoted by an *habitude* of slavery to the will of a master."—HURD.

"Of things once received and confirmed by use, long *usage* is a law sufficient."—HOOKER.

"The speeches on both sides indicated that profound reverence for law and *prescription* which has long been characteristic of Englishmen."—MACAULAY.

D

DAILY. DIURNAL.

These adjectives, which are both formed from the Lat. *dies, a day* (*diurnus, belonging to the day*), are the same in meaning, and only differ as a colloquial term differs from a more scientific one. So we speak of DAILY occurrences or daily newspapers, and of the DIURNAL motion of the earth upon its axis.

"Give us this day our *daily* bread."—*Lord's Prayer.*

"Half yet remains unsung but narrow bound,
Within the visible *diurnal* sphere."
MILTON.

DAINTY. DELICACY.

As applied to matters of the palate, DAINTY (O. Fr. *daintie, agreeableness*; Lat. *dignĭtātem*) may be considered to be a species of DELICACY (Lat. *dēlĭcātus, alluring, luxurious*). For DELICACY applies to anything which is exquisite, whether naturally so, as a fruit, or artificially, as a choice dish. A dainty is that which is uncommon and choice at the same time. DELICACY points to the niceness of the quality, DAINTY to the rarity of the supply.

"The *delicacies*,
I mean of taste, sight, smell, herbs, fruits, and flowers,
Walks, and the melody of birds."
MILTON.

"A table furnished plenteously with bread
And *dainties*, remnants of the last regale."
COWPER.

DAMP. MOIST. HUMID.

All these terms are employed to express the smallest degree of infusion or suffusion of liquid. Anything which is not dry must be in some degree damp, moist, or humid. But we use the term DAMP of that which has contracted a state of wet foreign to itself, as a damp house, damp clothes. When we say of a thing that it is damp, we almost always imply that it might better have been otherwise, unless we have damped it expressly (cf. Ger. *dampf, fog, steam, vapour*). MOIST (O. Fr. *moiste*, Lat. *musteus*) means normally and naturally damp, and therefore has not the unfavourable sense attached to damp. If we said the ground was moist, we should probably mean in a favourable condition for vegetation; if we said it was damp, we should probably mean that

we ought to be careful about walking upon it. HUMID (Lat. *hūmĭdus*) means both damp and moist, and is of more scientific application, as "the atmosphere of islands is more or less humid." The peculiar character of the adjective DAMP is developed in the verb *to damp*, which means to stifle or repress. As:

"Usury dulls and *damps* all industries, improvements, and new inventions."—BACON.

"Set such plants as require much *moisture* on sandy, dry grounds."—*Ibid.*

"Evening cloud or *humid* bow."
MILTON.

DAMSEL. GIRL. MAID. LASS.

DAMSEL is the O. Fr. *damoisel*, Lat. *dŏmĭnĭcellus*. Both damsel and GIRL (O. Low Ger. *gör*, *a child*) were at one time ambisexual, or used to designate children without distinction.

MAID (cf. A. S. *mægden*), is a word of which the root-meaning is not very clear, and LASS is the feminine form of *lad*, and a contraction of *Laddess*. The DAMSEL is of some pretension to birth and distinction. The GIRL is no more than the correlative of boy, the MAID is the chaste or unmarried girl, and the LASS, like lad, has no pretension of rank.

DANGER. PERIL. HAZARD. RISK. JEOPARDY. VENTURE.

DANGER (Fr. *danger*) is the liability or exposure to evil of any kind. Danger is general and contingent, and may be remote. It is the generic term.

"Such men as he be never at heart's ease
Whilst they behold a greater than themselves,
And therefore are they very *dangerous*."
SHAKESPEARE.

PERIL (Fr. *péril*, Lat. *pĕrīcŭlum*) is always immediate and personal. A man is in danger of his property and in peril of his life.

O sacred source of ever-living light,
Conduct the weary wand'rer in her flight,
Direct her onward to that peaceful shore
Where *peril*, pain, and death prevail no more."
FALCONER.

DANGER denotes a *thing*, PERIL a *condition*. That which is in peril is on the way to be destroyed, that which is in danger is on the way to be lost, forfeited, or taken away.

HAZARD (Fr. *hasard*, *risk*, orig. *game of dice*) is the condition of any good possessed and exposed to danger of destruction or loss. It is the risk of entire deprivation of the thing hazarded, and applies only to things, not persons. Hence people hazard their lives, their property, their reputation; but they do not hazard, but endanger or imperil, themselves.

"Hence passionate and unreasonable men call it courage to *hazard* their lives in their own private quarrels, where contempt of danger is, on the contrary, neither reasonable nor just; because neither is the danger at all needful to be run into, nor is the benefit proposed to be obtained by it in any manner equal to the evil hazarded."—CLARKE, *Sermons*.

The essence of HAZARD is in its fortuitous character, so that sometimes this predominates to the exclusion of all others, and we speak of the "hazard of the die" as implying the chance of gain as well as loss. This is not the case with either PERIL or DANGER.

RISK (Fr. *risque*, *a risk*; Sp. *risco*—1, *a reef*; 2, *risk*: BRACHET) is hazard of loss only. We run the risk of losing, but we never speak of the risk, but of the chance of winning.

"How often, whether wrong or right,
Must he in jest or earnest fight,
Risking for those both life and limb,
Who would not *risk* one groat for him."
CHURCHILL.

JEOPARDY (Fr. *jeu parti*, *a divided game*, one in which the chances were equal on both sides) may exclude all voluntary agency, which is implied in HAZARD and RISK, and, unlike PERIL, is applicable to things of value as well as to persons. A man's property, or life, or himself, may be in jeopardy.

"But by the way there is a great quicksand
And a whirlpool of hidden *jeopardice*;
Therefore, Sir Palmer, keep an even hand,
For twixt them both the narrow way doth lie."
SPENSER.

VENTURE (for *adventure*, orig. *aventure*; Fr. *aventure*) is *purely voluntary*, and denotes a meeting of hazard,

peril, jeopardy, or risk, with the hope that chance may be in one's favour.

"Wise *venturing* is the most commendable part of human providence."—HALIFAX.

DANGEROUS. PERILOUS.

For the etymology, *see* DANGER. Both terms denote exposure to evil, with this difference:—DANGEROUS expresses what evidently exposes to ill without modification, or any alternative but that of escape; PERILOUS what exposes to peril, that is, to danger which is great of its kind, but not certain, and which may even lead to the gaining of some great success or good. So a malady is simply dangerous, not perilous. A dangerous undertaking had better be avoided at once. A perilous undertaking falls to the lot of the brave or the audacious, and they may possibly reap from it honour, reward, or substantial gain. Dangerous relates principally to the pernicious nature of the result, perilous to the complicated nature of the state or the undertaking. In proportion to the dangerous the evil augments, in proportion to the perilous the chances multiply.

DARE. VENTURE.

We DARE (A. S. *ic dear, I dare*) as against danger; we VENTURE (for *adventure*) as against risk. The bold man dares, the hopeful man ventures, the rash man may do either.

DARK. OBSCURE. DIM. GLOOMY. OPAQUE.

Of these, the most comprehensive is DARK (A. S. *deorc*), which denotes any degree of absence of light or colouring, with metaphorical meanings in addition; as, unintelligible, mysterious, difficult, unhopeful, degraded or ignorant, iniquitous, and the like.

"For as that which sees does not cease to exist when in the *dark* all objects are removed, so that which perceives does not necessarily cease to exist when by death all objects of perception are removed."—CLARKE.

OBSCURE (Lat. *obscūrus*) denotes any degree or kind of darkness which interferes with the distinct perception of objects. It is opposed to what is *clear*, as dark is opposed to what is *light*. In its secondary sense, as darkness stands for ignorance, so obscurity for uncertain knowledge.

"When all the instruments of knowledge are forbid to do their office, ignorance and *obscurity* must needs be upon the whole soul."—SOUTH.

DIM (A. S. *dim*) denotes lack of brightness in something capable or supposed capable of it, and is opposed to bright. DIM, unlike DARK, is not applicable to locality, but, on the other hand, is applicable as an epithet to light itself. Dimness stands to obscurity as the cause to the effect.

"Shedding a *dim* religious light."
MILTON

GLOOMY (A. S. *glôm, twilight*) is a purely subjective term, denoting what has no existence but in ourselves. Any *oppressive* kind or degree of darkness is gloom.

"His Holy Spirit doth in our religious intercourse with Him insinuate a lightsome serenity of mind, doth kindle sweet and kindly affections, and doth scatter the *gloomy* clouds of sadness."—BARROW.

OPAQUE (Fr. *opaque*, Lat. *ŏpācus*) is a scientific term, denoting that kind of substance which resists the transmission of rays of light, and is opposed to translucent and transparent.

"Through this *opaque* of Nature and of soul,
This double night, transmit one pitying ray,
To lighten and to cheer." YOUNG.

DATE. PERIOD. ERA. EPOCH. TIME. AGE. GENERATION.

Of these, the most general is TIME (A. S. *tíma*), which means unmeasured duration, or any specific measure or point of it.

"This consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and marked by certain measures or epochs, is that I think which most properly we call *time*."—LOCKE.

DATE (Fr. *date*, L. Lat. *dătă*; Lat. *dătum, a thing given, sent forth written*; as *dătum Rōmæ, written at Rome*; from *dăre, to give*) is a point, and not a duration of time, bearing reference to the whole historic course of time within which it occurs.

"Any writer, therefore, who mentions the rising or setting of any star, at any particular *time* of the year with respect to the sun, furnishes us with *data* sufficient to determine the time in which he wrote."—PRIESTLEY.

"For precious friends hid in death's dateless night." SHAKESPEARE.

PERIOD (Gr. περίοδος) is, properly, a recurrent portion of time, or such a portion as is measured by some recurrent phenomenon, as a revolution of one of the heavenly bodies. Hence, more generally, an interval, definite or indefinite, and sometimes the end or limit of such an interval. A period is, as it were, an expanded point of time, or a stage in history, which may itself be included among other stages.

"The particular *periods* into which the whole *period* should be divided, in my opinion, are these: 1. From the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century. 2. From thence to the Pyrenean treaty. 3. From thence down to the present time."—BOLINGBROKE.

ERA (Lat. *æra*, sing.; and this from plur. *æra, items* in an account) is used both for a fixed point of time, and for a succession of years dating from that point. It is conventional, and indicates a mode of computing time peculiar to some community or body of persons.

"I incline to this opinion, that from the evening ushering in the first day of the world to that midnight which began the first day of the Christian era there was 4003 years seventy days and six temporary hours, and that the true nativity of our Saviour was full five years before the beginning of the vulgar Christian *æra*, as is demonstrable by the time of Herod's death."—USHER.

EPOCH (Gr. ἐποχή, *a pause*; and, from an astronomical use of the word, *an epoch*) is an era constituted by the inherent importance of an event, while an era may be arbitrary. Hence epoch is less formal than era. The capture of Constantinople is an epoch in the history of Mahometanism; but the Flight of Mahomet is its era. It is obvious that an epoch might be constituted an era. AGE (Fr. *âge*) and GENERATION (Lat. *gĕnĕrātionem, a begetting*) have nearly the same meaning; but AGE is taken broadly for such periods as coincide with the *joint* lives of human beings, and so is extended to mean a century, while GENERATION rather refers to the average duration of individual life, and frequently means thirty years.

"In divers ages and nations divers *epochs* of time were used."—USHER.

"Ancient learning may be distinguished into three periods. Its commencement, or the *age* of poets; its maturity, or the *age* of philosophers; and its decline, or the *age* of critics."—GOLDSMITH.

"For behold from henceforth all *generations* shall call me blessed."—*Bible*.

DAUB. SMEAR.

DAUB (Fr. *dauber*, in the sense of "*to plaster;*" and this from Lat. *dealbāre*—SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.* But see also LITTRÉ and BRACHET) denotes the process of applying moist matter, or, in an unfavourable sense, unseemly colouring matter, to several points of the surface *in succession*. SMEAR (A. S. *smérian*) is to cover *continuously* and over a considerable space with unctuous or other like matter. A badly-painted landscape or portrait is said to be daubed; a badly-painted door might be said to be smeared.

"Another *daubed* it with untempered mortar."—*Bible*.

"But if that honest license now you take,
If into rogues omnipotent you rake,
Death is your doom; impaled upon a stake,
Smeared o'er with wax, and set on blaze, to light
The streets, and make a dreadful fire by night." DRYDEN'S *Juvenal*.

DEAD. LIFELESS. INANIMATE. DEFUNCT.

Taking these words in reference solely to their physical application, their characteristic differences are as follows: DEAD (A. S. *deád*) denotes the absence of life from bodies, *both capable and incapable of it*, as a dead man, dead matter.

"Seek him with candle, bring him *dead* or living."—SHAKESPEARE.

LIFELESS (or wanting life) from bodies *capable* of it, as a "lifeless corpse."

"Nor can his *lifeless* nostril please
With the once ravishing smell."
COWLEY.

INANIMATE (Lat. *ĭnănĭmātus*—*in-, not*, and *ănĭma, life*) from bodies *in-*

capable of it; as, "Trees and rocks, and other portions of the inanimate creation."

"We may in some sort be said to have a society even with the *inanimate* world."—BURKE.

DEFUNCT (Lat. *dĕfungi*, part. *defunctus, to discharge*) is by its inherent signification, namely, one who has discharged the offices of life, applicable to those only in whom the endowment of life exists in its higher forms.

"Seeing the soul of man is permanent, and subsists after the death of the body, and yet the body also belongs essentially to the constitution of man, when the body is *defunct*, either the soul must remain perpetually in a state of separation and, as it were, of widowhood, or the body must be recalled to life, and again united to it."—BISHOP BULL.

DEADLY. MORTAL. FATAL.

Using these terms, not in any metaphorical, but in their literal and physical meanings, the distinctions are as follow:—DEADLY means capable of producing death.

"Gods! I behold a prodigy. My spear
Lies at my foot; and he at whom I cast
The weapon with such *deadly* force is gone."
COWPER'S *Iliad*.

MORTAL (Lat. *mortālis, mortem, death*) denotes that which is liable to produce or suffer death. Hence it is used as a strong epithet of feelings. A mortal hatred is literally one which would kill its object.

"Louis XIII. *mortally* hated the Cardinal de Richelieu; but his support of that minister against his rivals was the source of all the glory of his reign, and solid foundation of his throne itself."—BURKE.

FATAL (Lat. *fātālis, fātum, fate*) means actually productive of death. A poisoned arrow is a deadly weapon, even while it remains in its quiver. Men are mortal, or receive mortal wounds, as being or having what tends to death. A blow is fatal on which death follows inevitably.

"Where's the large comet now whose raging flame
So *fatal* to our monarchy became,
Which o'er our heads in such proud horror stood,
Insatiate with our ruin and our blood?"
COWLEY.

DEATH. DEPARTURE. DECEASE. DEMISE.

DEATH signifies the act of dying or the state of the dead. DEPARTURE is the Fr. *départ, the quitting life*. DECEASE (Lat. *dĕcessus, dĕcēdĕre, to depart*) is etymologically the same. DEMISE (Lat. *dimittĕre*, part. *dimissus, to discharge, release*) is the laying down or resigning of life and possessions. DEATH is the simplest and broadest, being applicable to the extinction of life both in animals and plants, to which the others are inapplicable. It may be calm or violent, natural, or self-inflicted. DEPARTURE is a term under which lies the idea of social life, and, in spirits of the highest faith, indicates the hope of re-union, as well as a point of arrival, or future state beyond the grave. The suicide and the aged, or the sick calmly awaiting their end, depart; not those who die on the scaffold or in battle. DECEASE is the term we use when we think of the death of another as an epoch of his existence, or of our own, and in connexion with personal events preceding, accompanying, or following it; yet a violent death is not called a decease. DEMISE is employed of the death of illustrious persons, as peculiarly of royalty, in reference to the bequeathing of titles or estates to successors and heirs.

"Happy to whom this glorious *death* arrives,
More to be valued than a thousand lives,
On such a theatre as this to *die*,
For such a cause, and such a witness by."
WALLER.

"Although when the Divine Providence does itself offer us a just occasion of leaving this world (as when a man chooses to suffer death rather than commit wickedness), a wise man will then indeed *depart* joyfully, as out of a place of sorrow and darkness into light; yet he will not be in such haste as to break his prison contrary to law, but will go when God calls him, as a prisoner when dismissed by the magistrate or lawful power."—CLARKE.

"The Romans had the custom to deify and adore their emperors, most of them after their *decease*, and some of them during their lives, even though they were the vilest of mankind."—JORTIN.

"So tender is the law of supposing even a possibility of his (the king's) death, that his natural dissolution is generally called his *demise*, demissio regis vel coronæ, an expression which signifies merely a transfer of property."—BLACKSTONE.

DEBAR. DEPRIVE. HINDER. PROHIBIT. DISQUALIFY. EXCLUDE. PRECLUDE. FORBID. DISALLOW. INHIBIT. INTERDICT.

DEBAR (a hybrid word; Lat. *de-, from*, and Eng. *bar*) is to shut out. It applies only to persons in reference to things rightful, desirable, or desired; as, to be debarred from privileges, possessions, rights, or an attempt to procure them. To debar indicates merely an act of preventive power in reference to those things which may be exercised upon us by ourselves, by others, or by circumstances.

"Hereby the apostle not only *debarred* women from prophesying, but from any public function in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction."—STRYPE.

DEPRIVE (L. Lat. *dēprīvāre, to degrade*) denotes the coercive taking away of what one possesses either in fact or in prospect, while DEBAR relates to what one does not as a fact possess or attain to.

"Thus a punishment of this kind was inflicted on the rebellious Israelites. They were *deprived* of the extraordinary Providence, and were yet held subject to the Theocracy."—WARBURTON.

To HINDER (A. S. *hindrian, to keep behind*) is to debar either temporarily or entirely from some act or occupation to which one was seeking to devote one's self.

"Sore let and *hindered* in running the race that is set before us."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

PROHIBIT (Lat. *prohĭbēre*, part. *prohĭbĭtum*) and FORBID (A. S. *forbeódan, to bid a thing away; see* WEDGWOOD, under FOR-) have the force of interdiction by authority, or debarring by the use of words of command. FORBID is less formal than PROHIBIT, is used in the commoner matters of life, and is more direct. A father forbids his child to go out of the house. We are prohibited from promiscuous revenge not only by the Divine law, but by many considerations besides. PROHIBIT and FORBID almost universally relate to some kind of action which is kept in check. FORBID seems to relate primarily to the wrong nature of the thing; PROHIBIT to the coercive authority of the person.

"To this day in France the exportation of corn is almost always *prohibited;* in order, as they say, to prevent famines, though it is evident that nothing contributes more to the frequent famines which so much distress that fertile country."—HUME.

"Heaven is high,
High and remote to see from thence distinct
Each thing on earth; and other care perhaps
May have diverted from continual watch
Our great *forbidder.*" MILTON.

DISQUALIFY (Lat. *dis-, apart;* and *qualify, quālis, such as*, and *făcĕre, to make*) is to debar by attaching personal and *inherent* prohibition from some privilege, office, or dignity.

"Men are not *disqualified* by their engagements in trade from being received in high society."—SOUTHEY.

EXCLUDE (Lat. *exclūdĕre*) is formally to shut out, and may be an act of law and regulation by arbitrary power or inherent conditions. It relates to the participation of things desired or desirable, and is the generic term under which disqualification is contained as a species of exclusion.

"None but such from mercy I *exclude.*" MILTON.

PRECLUDE (Lat. *præclūdĕre, to close to any one*) is to exclude by indirect means. It is to shut out by anticipation, or to prevent by necessary consequence. It is applicable not only to persons, but to such things also as are merely conceivable or possible.

"The valves *preclude* the blood from entering the veins."—DARWIN.

INTERDICT (Lat. *interdictum, the prætor's interdict; 2, a judge's decree, 3, an eccles. interdict; inter* and *dicĕre, to speak*) is opposed to positive, being a kind of negative, command, and is commonly employed of formal or public kinds of prohibition. INTERDICT closely resembles PROHIBIT, but points to the stopping or debarring of what was already in course of being done or enjoyed. I prohibit where I see, perhaps, no more than a probable cause for the prohibition; interdict what if I were silent would certainly be done or assumed, or what is actually in pe-

formance or enjoyment. INTERDICT is peculiarly associated with the last. We prohibit from actions generally, we interdict from those which are accompanied with pleasure, or involve the enjoyment of privilege. So an interdict in the ecclesiastical sense involved a stopping of the grace and benefits of the ordinances of the Church.

"The *interdicted* tree."
MILTON.

To INHIBIT (Lat. *inhibēre*, part. *inhibĭtus*) is coercively to prohibit. While prohibition lies in words only, inhibition is backed up by a power to enforce restraint. To hinder may be the effect of circumstances, and is only partial; to inhibit is the act of authority, and is total. In DISALLOW (*see* ALLOW) is involved a formal expression of judgment which, although the form be negative, may have a positive and prohibitive effect. It is to refuse to allow, permit, sanction, authorize. This, in cases where allowance is essential, is tantamount to the extinction of the thing proposed. Generally speaking, proceedings are inhibited and results disallowed.

"All men were *inhibited* by proclamation at the dissolution so much as to mention a Parliament."—CLARENDON.

We also inhibit things from being done, and disallow them when they *are* done.

"A living stone *disallowed* indeed of men, but chosen of God."—*Eng. Bible.*

DEBATE. ARGUE. DISPUTE. DELIBERATE. DISCUSS. CONTEND.

DEBATE (Fr. *débattre*) is formally to sift by argument for and against. It supposes a number of opinions in every way related to the question in hand, including every shade, from the strongest affirmation to absolute denial, being brought into comparison and collision. The legitimate *object* of debate is to bring together the expression of various opinions for the purpose of accepting, rejecting, or modifying the matter in hand. The *subject* of debate may be purely theoretical, as the abstract truth of a proposition, or purely practical, as how best to compass an object, or both. There is, or ought to be, no personal antagonism in debate, truth and right being things of common interest; nor is there any reason why debate should not be among friends, and carried on in harmony and unanimity of purpose. And the process of debate is, according to its etymology, to strive to conquer or refute (literally, *beat down*) the wrong and false, for the purpose of setting up the truth and right.

"As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all *debating* it in an adverse line, I hope I may be excused in another observation."—BURKE.

To ARGUE (Lat. *arguĕre, to make clear, to accuse*) is to say all that can be said for or against a proposition or a case. It may be the process of one or of more persons.

"When we peruse those authors who defend our own settled sentiments, we should not take all their *arguings* for just and solid."—WATTS.

To DISPUTE (Lat. *disputāre, to discuss*) is always antagonistic. It is to argue against something as held or maintained by another, and extends, not only to his statements, but to what may be claimed or upheld by him in any way, as his claims, rights, or pretensions. CONTEND (Lat. *contendĕre, to strive*) is the opposite to DISPUTE; for, as DISPUTE is to attack and endeavour to shake what is held or advanced by another, so CONTEND is to argue urgently in favour and support of something held by one's self.

"It is very strange that those who *contend* so much for the Scriptures being a perfect rule of all things pertaining to worship and discipline, should be able to produce nothing in so necessary a point."—STILLINGFLEET.

DELIBERATE (Lat. *deliberāre, to weigh well; libra, a balance*) has reference never to questions of abstract truth, but always to a course of action to be adopted or pursued.

"If there be a real surprise, that is, that the person is not aware, or hath not time to consider what he is to do, he that hath a mind well resolved may be betrayed into what he would never have done, if he had time to *deliberate* about it."—STILLINGFLEET.

DISCUSS (Lat. *discŭtĕre*, in a post-class. sense, *to discuss*) very closely

resembles DEBATE, but differs in the two following points:—1, DISCUSS is more commonly applied to matters of opinion, while DEBATE belongs rather to action or proceedings; but, 2, DISCUSS is used of cases in which the process of consideration is argumentative, but the object or subject is not a matter of argument at all, but only amounts to a varied expression of feeling or opinion. To discuss a point of theology, for instance, does not *of necessity* imply either contending or disputing. It may be no more than a collation of what is said and argued upon that point, without giving in an adhesion to any conclusion or view whatever. Debate supposes more warmth, discussion more reflexion. One debates a point which one wishes to carry; one discusses a point which one wishes to clear up. Debate belongs to matters of personal interest; discussion to things of scientific or general interest. Men debate warmly; it is well when they discuss accurately.

"Pride and humility are two opposite habits or dispositions of the mind; and therefore the *discussion* and examination of the latter will of itself give us a discovery of the former."—HALE.

DECAY. DECLINE. DIE. PERISH. EBB.

To DECAY (O. Fr. *decaer, dechaoir;* SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.;* Lat. *de, down, cădĕre, to fall, dĕcĭdĕre, to fall down, to die*) is to depart from a state of soundness, and denotes a tendency to the state of disorganization and dissolution; as the decay of the body in old age, the decay of the mind by the same cause, the decay of states and constitutions political.

"Throughout the whole vegetable, sensible, and rational world, whatever makes progress towards maturity, as soon as it has passed that point, begins to verge towards *decay*."—BLAIR.

DECLINE (Lat. *dĕclināre, to bend away from*) is downward tendency or movement, without any such disruption or disorganization, as "the declining years of life," "the declining sun."

"The strength of the frontiers, which had always consisted in arms rather than fortifications, was insensibly undermined, and the fairest provinces were left exposed to the rapaciousness or ambition of the barbarians, who soon discovered the *decline* of the Roman empire."—GIBBON.

Decline is often preparatory to decay. The prop declines when it bends, and decays when it rots. The progressive debility of the Roman empire was its decline. The actual dissolution of the fabric commenced with its decay. One speaks of the decay of an edifice, of fortune, of letters, of empire; in short, of all things expcsed to vicissitudes of growth and dissolution; of the decline of those things which may be supposed to run a course, and weaken towards their end, as of the day, of human life, of power and empire. Decay betokens the eve of ruin, decline of expiration and extinction. In decay, beauty and vigour are lost—in decline, power and influence are on the wane.

DIE (Iceland. *deyja, to die*) is simply to cease to live.

"Wise men *die*, as well as the ignorant and foolish."—*Bible*.

PERISH (Lat. *pĕrīre*) is used when something connected with the extinction of life is meant to be emphatically dwelt upon, as its completeness, or the unhappy or violent circumstances of it. So men often die happily, but they never perish happily. We say "perish miserably," "perish utterly," and the like.

"Yet one doubt
Pursues me still, least all I cannot die.
Least that pure breath of life, the spirit of man,
Which God inspired, cannot together *perish*
With this corporeal clod." MILTON.

DECEIVE. DELUDE. MISLEAD. BEGUILE. BETRAY. DUPE.

DECEIVE (Fr. *décevoir*, Lat. *dĕcĭpĕre*) is generally to lead into error by causing to believe what is false, or to disbelieve what is true. The plausible, the specious, the *apparently* right, true, or desirable, is that which exercises over us the power of deception, which being one thing, looks, or is made to look, like another by mis representation in objects or in words.

"But what account shall a man give of himself for living perpetually in disguise; for *deceiving* all about him, and using the

speech which God gave him for better purposes, to impose on the weakness and folly of mankind?"—SHERLOCK.

To DELUDE (Lat. *dēlūdĕre, to mock*) is to deceive in the particular matters of the desirable or good. Delusion combines disappointment with deceit. I deceive my neighbour if I simply tell him a falsehood, which he believes. I delude him by any kind of misrepresentation in matters connected with his feelings, hopes, or interests, as by holding out to him a hope of his gaining what I know to be impossible for him ever to attain.

"This pure metal
So innocent is, and faithful to the mistress
Or master that possesses it, that rather
Than hold one drop that's venomous, of itself
It flies in pieces and *deludes* the traitor."
MASSINGER.

I MISLEAD him when I draw him off from the line of right judgment or action. To DELUDE, when used of persons, implies *an intention* to deceive; but MISLEAD may be *unintentional*, as when I give my neighbour what I believed at the time to be true information, but which I have since discovered to be erroneous. We are deceived in our judgment, deluded in our desires, misled in our actions.

"My thoughtless youth was wing'd with vain desires,
My mankind, long *misled* by wand'ring fires,
Followed false lights." DRYDEN.

BEGUILE (Eng. *be-*, and O. Fr. *guile, guile;* the same word as *wile*) is to place another in a false position, to induce him to believe something to be true, and to leave him to the consequences of his error, especially by seductive arts. It is intentionally and maliciously to mislead another to his privation or detriment. The term BEGUILE frequently wears this *privative* sense, meaning to cheat a person *out* of something, whether this be the simple possession of truth as such, or of some other moral or mental benefit. It is not employed directly of material possessions or property.

BETRAY (Eng. *be-*, and Fr. *trahir;* Lat. *trādĕre, to give up*) is more than to deceive. It is to deceive another, or treacherously to lead him to harm, in return for some confidence reposed in us; to make use of the relation in which we stand to another as the means of his injury and the promotion of our own ends.

To DUPE (Fr. *dupe, a hoopoe, silly bird;* like *goose* and *gull*, LITTRÉ) is to deceive another by imposing upon his credulity, being so far a kind of minor treachery, but having neither its malignant aims nor its disastrous consequences.

"Lo he is at hand that doth *betray* me."
—*English Bible.*

"That man must smart at last whose puzzled sight
Mistakes in life false colours for the right;
As the poor *dupe* is sure his loss to rue,
Who takes a pinchbeck guinea for a true."
PITT, *Horace.*

"And the woman said, The serpent *beguiled* me, and I did eat."—*Bible.*

DECEPTION. DECEIT. ILLUSION. DELUSION.

DECEPTION (Lat. *dēcĭpĕre, to deceive*) is used of individual instances or acts of one who deceives; DECEIT, rather of the acts as appertaining to habit or quality of mind; as "a course of deceit," "an act of deception." Hence DECEPTION is more external, and is applicable to cases in which the guilt of deceit has no part; as, an optical deception.

ILLUSION (Lat. *illūsiōnem, a mocking*) and DELUSION express, the former, something which is presented before our mental or bodily view, but which has no substantial and independent existence, the latter something which really exists, but not under the conditions which we attribute to it. The same distinction prevails in regard to matters purely intellectual. In history, for example, to believe that some great personage, such as Thomas à Becket or Henry VIII., acted uniformly from pure and disinterested motives, would be a delusion. To believe in the historical existence of Don Quixote would be an illusion.

"A fanatic, either religious or political, is the object of strong *delusions;* while the term *illusion* is applied solely to the visions of an uncontrolled imagination, the chimerical ideas of one blinded by hope, passion, or credulity, or, lastly, to spectral and other

optical deceptions, to which the word *delusion* is never applied."—WHATELY.

DECIDE. DETERMINE. RESOLVE. To DECIDE (Lat. *dēcidĕre*) expresses an intellectual result.

DETERMINE (Lat. *dēterminare, to fix limits, settle*) and RESOLVE (Lat. *rĕsolvĕre, to unbind, set free*), express moral results. I decide according to my judgment. I determine according to my purpose. I resolve as combining the two, and implying a sort of pledge given to myself to carry out with determination what I have decided upon. Resolution betokens a choice made between action and inaction, and is opposed to doubt, reluctance, or inaction. Determination betokens a choice made between motives, and is opposed to vacillation, uncertainty. Decision is a final and irrevocable act of the will or judgment, and is opposed to indecision or hesitation.

"And it is, indeed, but fit there should be some *dernier ressort*, the absolute *decider* of all controversies."—*Spectator*.

"By *determining* the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended causing that the act of the will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise; and the will is said to be *determined* when in consequence of some action or influence its choice is directed to, or fixed upon a particular object."—EDWARDS, *Freedom of the Will*.

"I am *resolved* what to do, that when I am put out of the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses."—*Bible*.

DECIDE. JUDGE. DETERMINE. One DECIDES (Lat. *dēcidĕre, to cut off, decide*) a contest or a question; one JUDGES (Lat. *jūdĭcāre*) a person, an act, a performance, a work. JUDGE is more authoritative than DECIDE. Private persons, and umpires or critics, decide; magistrates and rulers judge. It is only the mind of man that judges. Circumstances sometimes decide persons to adopt one course rather than another, or action rather than inaction. To judge is speculative, to decide practical. We often judge for another; we decide for ourselves.

To DETERMINE (Lat. *dēterminare*) is to decide by limitation or conclusion. A matter is decided when it is practically settled; it is determined when it has been shown what it theoretically amounts to. Decision stops further argument; determination renders it superfluous. Judgment embodies and enforces it. Judgment often precedes decision, in which case decision is judgment put into action. We judge which of two courses is better to be adopted before deciding on adopting it.

DECLAIM. INVEIGH. Of these, DECLAIM (Lat. *dēclāmāre*) does not of necessity imply antagonism of speech. We may declaim *upon* as well as *against*. It is in the latter use in which the term is synonymous with INVEIGH (Lat. *invĕhĕre, to carry against, to inveigh*). To declaim is to speak. Declamation is speech in which the rhetorical is more considered than the logical. It sacrifices accuracy, refinement, and consecutiveness to effect. To inveigh is specific declamation against character, conduct, manners, customs, and morals Invective may be written, declamation is always spoken. In declamation against a thing or person, the uppermost idea is fluency in adverse expression of opinion; in invective, the personal dislike and opposition of the speaker. Hence we are more commonly said to declaim against wrongs and injuries, and to inveigh against vices and abuses. Eloquent declamation, bitter invectives.

"Grenville seized the opportunity to *declaim* on the repeal of the Stamp Act."—BANCROFT.

"All men *inveighed* against him, all men except court vassals opposed him. —MILTON.

DECORUM. DECENCY. PROPRIETY. These, though both derived from the same word (Lat. *dĕcēre, to be becoming*) are employed, the former in reference to social behaviour, the latter to moral conduct also. Indecorous behaviour offends against order, good manners, and good taste. Indecent behaviour indicates a corrupt state of morals. DECENCY regulates externals according to pure morals. Decorum is that character of gracefulness in speech and act, which arises

out of suitableness of place, time, character, and circumstances.

PROPRIETY (Lat. *prŏprietātem, a peculiar quality*) is the expression of moral fitness. It regulates our actions according to the conventional standard of decency. It varies according to the state of the individual. Elders may, in some cases, do with decorum what youngers could not do without impropriety. Propriety has necessary rules. Decency has rigid laws. Decorum has inherent recommendations. Decency is due to society, as dignity is due to one's station, and gravity to one's self.

"Negligent of the duties and *decorums* of his station."—HALLAM.

"Those thousand *decencies* that daily flow
From all our words and actions."
MILTON.

DECREE. EDICT. PROCLAMATION. LAW. STATUTE. REGULATION. RULE.

DECREE (Fr. *decret*, Lat. *dĕcrētum*) may come from one or more, from a sovereign, or a senate, or a council. It is commonly an authoritative order addressed to persons under jurisdiction, being in its nature specific and occasional, not permanent or of continuous operation.

An EDICT (Lat. *ēdictum*) does not issue from a body of men. It is the public expression of a will of an *individual* in political power. In DECREE, the leading idea is absolute obligation; in EDICT, absolute authority. Hence DECREE is used largely of binding power; as, the decrees of faith. Where the decree is constitutional it is subject to, and dependent upon, law for its verification. It is also most commonly the result of law, that is, the particular enforcement of some principle already recognized by the law. And being the application of that principle to a specific occasion, it involves the formation of opinion, and the exercise of discretionary power.

"Therefore I make a *decree* that every people, nation, and language which speak anything amiss against the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego shall be cut in pieces, and their houses shall be made a dunghill, because there is no other God that can deliver after this sort."—*Bible.*

"The silence or ambiguity of the laws was supplied by the occasional *edicts* of those magistrates who were invested with the honours of the State."—GIBBON.

PROCLAMATION (Lat. *proclāmātiōnem, a calling out*) is a published order emanating from the sovereign or supreme magistrate, and bears reference to specific occasions, as determined upon in council, and not provided for by the law of the land. An edict savours of despotic government; a proclamation of more constitutional power.

"These *proclamations* have then a binding force when (as Sir Edward Coke observes) they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm."—BLACKSTONE.

LAW (A. S. *laga*), in its widest sense, is the authoritative expression of will on the part of any rightful governing power, and, in its political sense, permanently controls every department of the State.

"That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a *law*."—HOOKER.

STATUTE (Lat. *stătūtum*) is commonly applied to the acts of a legislative body composed of representatives of the people, and stands with ourselves distinguished from civil law, canon law, and common law.

"The oldest of these now extant and printed in our *statute* books is the famous Magna Charta, as confirmed in Parliament 9 Henry III."—BLACKSTONE.

REGULATION (Lat. *rĕgŭlāre, to direct*) is a governing direction of a State, department, institution, or an association for a specific purpose, and may be only of a temporary character. Such, for instance, are the arrangements for preserving order on great occasions of public interest, and the rules by which voluntary societies are managed. We often find "rules and regulations" combined. In such cases the difference is slight.

RULE (Fr. *règle*), however, points rather to authoritative enactments as such; REGULATION to the place of such rules in the working of the system or institution. In a school, a refractory boy might be reprimanded for break-

ing the rules. It would be a regulation that the school should open and close every day at certain hours. One submits to a rule; one conforms to a regulation. Rule seems a higher and more abstract thing than regulation. Regulation is, in one sense, the practical embodiment and application of the principle of rule. The regulation of one's conduct is the determination of it according to rule. A rule is a test, a regulation is a guide. In an institution it may be a rule that none shall be idle. Certain regulations are made for the purpose of ensuring this.

"'Tis against the *rule* of nature."
SHAKESPEARE.

"It never was the work of philosophy to assemble multitudes, but to *regulate* only and govern them when they were assembled."—COWLEY.

DECRY. DEPRECIATE. DISPARAGE.

The idea common to all these terms is that of lowering the current value of something by the manner in which we speak of it. DECRY (Fr. *décrier*) relates primarily to the inherent value of the thing itself, DEPRECIATE (Lat. *dēprĕtiare, to undervalue, disregard*) to the estimate of it as formed or expressed by one's self, DISPARAGE (O. Fr. *desparager*, L. Lat. *paragium, equality of condition or birth*) to the estimate of it as formed by others.

"What an insufferable impudence then are they guilty of who nowadays *decry* all reading, study, and learning, and rely only on enthusiasm and immediate inspiration!"—BISHOP BULL.

"Others are so unhappily attentive to party considerations or personal prejudices, that if a design ever so valuable comes from a wrong quarter, instead of being ambitious to share the merit and the honour of it, they set themselves immediately to *depreciate* it, and suggest mischievous intentions in it."—SECKER.

"Nothing hath wrought more prejudice to religion, or has brought more *disparagement* upon truth, than boisterous and unseasonable zeal."—BARROW.

I decry a thing or person when I wish to bring it down in the actual or possible regard of others. This may be from the purest motives; as, to decry the architecture of a public building, when believing it to be radically defective, inconsistent with its purpose, or in itself bad. I depreciate it when I have some personal motive connected with myself (as lowering its abstract estimation). I disparage it to or before others, in order that certain persons whom I desire to think less highly of it may be led to do so. To decry expresses a more sustained process than the others, and a fuller entering on the demerits of the object. All the terms apply to moral and intellectual subject-matter; and to material things, only as they depend upon human effort or estimation, or in any way challenge regard on account of their excellence.

DEDUCTION. SUBTRACTION. ABATEMENT.

These terms all express diminution of some quantity, and differ as follows: SUBTRACTION (Lat. *subtractiōnem, subtrăhĕre, to draw away from under*) applies to number and quantity, and is general and abstract. It simply denotes the removal of a part from the whole.

DEDUCTION (Lat. *dēductiōnem, a diminution*) is such subtraction as is performed with the purpose, or result, of lowering the aggregate or capital sum or quantity. A tradesman subtracts a certain sum from the total of his account, in consequence of my representations to him that he ought, in fairness, to make certain deductions. So subtraction may be theoretical; deduction has always a practical purpose.

ABATEMENT (Fr. *abattre, to beat down*) refers not, like DEDUCTION and SUBSTRACTION, to the parts, but to the whole, of which the amount is in any way diminished, as to make an abatement of a claim. *See* ABATE.

"The late king had also agreed that two and a half per cent. should be *deducted* out of the pay of the foreign troops, which amounted to fifteen thousand pounds."—BURNET.

"That universals are nothing else but names or words by which singular bodies are called, and consequently that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate, at least, is universal), we do but add or *subtract*, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies."—CUDWORTH.

Old writers, as Shakespeare, used the form *substract*.

"They are scoundrels and *substractors* that say so of him." SHAKESPEARE.

"A great *abatement* of kindness." *Ibid.*

DEFACE. DISFIGURE. DEFORM. The formations of these words explain themselves—to injure the *face*, the *figure*, the *form*. DEFACE is always a purposed act, denoting a superficial injury to the extent of spoiling or destroying. It may be done by the injury of the substance, or by the application of some other substance externally, so as to smear, erase, or obliterate. DISFIGURE and DEFORM do not necessarily imply *the desire* to injure or deteriorate. DISFIGURE denotes the marring of the general appearance by some defect or injury which is sufficient to interfere with the effect produced by the whole. DEFORM implies something which is detrimental to the character, shape, or organization of the entire thing. For instance, a building may be defaced by scrawling upon its walls, disfigured by a roof, of which the colour is out of harmony with the walls, deformed by an unsightly cupola surmounting it. DEFACE is never used of living animals, which can only be disfigured or deformed. Of human beings, deformity is predicated as to the body and limbs, disfigurement of the face. The face of the veteran soldier might be disfigured, not defaced, by wounds. The face might be said to be deformed in the sense of being monstrously out of shape as to its features, or disfigured by some one blemish.

"With these honourable qualifications, and the decisive advantage of situation, low craft and falsehood are all the abilities that are wanting to destroy the wisdom of ages, and to *deface* the noblest monument that human policy has erected. I know such a man."—JUNIUS.

"Nor would his slaughter'd army now have lain
On Afric's sands *disfigured* with their wounds." ADDISON.

"Monsters, on the contrary, or what is perfectly *deformed*, are always most singular and odd, and have the least resemblance to the generality of that species to which they belong.' —SMITH, *Moral Sentiments*.

DEFALCATION. EMBEZZLEMENT. PECULATION. MALVERSATION. These are all terms of official dishonesty. DEFALCATION (O. Fr. *defalquer*; L. Lat. *diffalcare, to abate, to cut as it were with a sickle*, Lat. *falcem*) is a diminution or deduction in regard to a sum of money. This is not of necessity and in all cases furtive or surreptitious. So Burke: "One would have thought the natural method in a plan of reformation would be to take the present existing estimates as they stand, and then to show what may be practically and safely *defalcated* from them." Defalcation is, as it were, a pruning of a sum, account, or expenditure.

EMBEZZLEMENT (etym. not known) is primarily to squander, now to filch from a sum or an account. It is in its present use essentially fraudulent. It has gone through the stages successively of lavish expenditure, then, which is a common concomitant, appropriation of what belongs to others, and finally settles into the meaning of this last, done in an underhanded way.

PECULATION (Lat. *pĕcŭlari, to peculate*) is primarily the appropriation to private use of *public* money. As embezzlement is fraudulent, so peculation may be rapacious also, and may be the result of false claims and pretences, without the secrecy of embezzlement.

MALVERSATION (Fr. *malverser*) is literally *ill conversation* or behaviour in office, of which fraudulent dealing may or may not be the distinctive feature, and which may also consist in violence and corruption, or iniquitous practices of any kind.

DEFECTIVE. DEFICIENT. IMPERFECT. These words both imply failing (Lat. *dēfĭcĕre, to fail*); but defective relates to incompleteness of quantity or quality, deficient to incompleteness of action or power in reference to some purpose. DEFECTIVE is specific. It presupposes some standard of sufficiency, or some definite aggregate of parts constituting a whole, which

in the present case is not reached or forthcoming. DEFICIENT is general and indefinite, supposing an undefined standard of sufficiency in force or operation. A book is defective as to its substance, when out of its complement of pages, one or more, or even a portion of a page, is wanting. It is defective as to its matter when it is inadequately planned, or omits what is needful or important. It is deficient when it fails of its character and use, either by the defectiveness of its parts, or any weakness of style, or want of knowledge in the writer. So DEFECTIVE belongs rather to the nature of things, DEFICIENT to the requirements of persons. A speaker is deficient who is defective in his speech. A difference is to be noted between DEFECTIVE and IMPERFECT. DEFECTIVE marks a specific case and positive degree of imperfection. That is defective which falls short of the *ordinary* or *average* standard. That is IMPERFECT which does not come up to perfection. So man and his every faculty is imperfect in regard to an ideal standard of perfection, by reason of the infirmity of his nature; but he is only defective in any such faculty when he does not possess it as the bulk of mankind do.

"All of them (philosophers), as has been before shown, were very *imperfect and deficient*."—CLARKE.

"And after all, the rules of religion and virtue which were drawn up by these philosophers have been very *imperfect and defective*."—WATTS.

DEFEND. PROTECT. GUARD.

To DEFEND (Lat. *dēfendĕre*) implies an active repelling of some adverse influence or power, PROTECT (Lat. *protĕgĕre*, part. *prōtectum, to cover in front*) a passive placing of something between the object and the power. A fortress is defended by its guns, and protected by its walls. A defence is successful or unsuccessful. A protection is adequate or inadequate. In some cases of a somewhat metaphorical character we use the words interchangeably. So we say, to defend or protect plants from frost; but in the one case we look upon the power we have to resist; in the other, upon the objects which we have to guard. One defends what is attacked, one protects what is weak. Defence therefore supposes an actual and pressing danger, protection only that feebleness which exposes to it. It is well if we can find defenders in time of assault, it is well to assure protectors at all times. Both defend and protect may be applied to ourselves. We defend ourselves by meeting force with counter-force. We protect ourselves by measures of precaution, and by the interposition of what may counteract adverse influences. GUARD (Fr. *garder*) partakes of the nature of both. It is the exercise of vigilant care of the object protected, with a readiness to defend it if necessary.

"God *defend* the right."
SHAKESPEARE.

"The stately-sailing swan
Gives out his snowy plumage to the gale,
And arching proud his neck, with oary feet
Bears forward fierce, and *guards* his osier isle,
Protective of his young." THOMSON.

"For heaven still *guards* the right."
SHAKESPEARE.

DEFER. DELAY. POSTPONE. PROCRASTINATE. PROLONG. PROTRACT.

To DELAY (Fr. *délai, delay*) is simply to place an indefinite term between the present and the commencement of the thing delayed. This may be either a voluntary act or the result of circumstances. In this point DEFER (Lat. *differre*) differs from DELAY, expressing always a voluntary act. DEFER is more specific; DELAY more indefinite. I may delay to do that which I have no will to do, and would fain see left undone. I defer that which I desire to be done, but not at the present moment. Hence DEFER is often followed by some term specifying a point of time, such as "till" or "to." It should be noted that DEFER, in the sense of *to give away, submit*, is really a different word, being the Lat. *dē ferre*.

"*Defer* the spoil of the city till night."
SHAKESPEARE.

"My lord *delayeth* his coming."—*Bible.*

POSTPONE (Lat. *postpōnĕre, to place after*) implies more strongly what de-

fer implies less strongly, and DELAY hardly implies at all, namely, a definite intention to resume what for the present is put off. Hence it is more formal, and applies better to official meetings for business. "The meeting," we might say, "was *postponed* for a month, and, when it met, the consideration of that question was *deferred*. Some regarded this as an unseemly and unnecessary *delay*."

"These *postponers* never enter upon religion at all in earnest or effectually."—PALEY.

The idea of POSTPONE includes that of something to which the thing postponed is rendered subordinate, whether an event, a circumstance, or a period. Hence the word sometimes means, to regard as of inferior moment, as in the following:—

"Nor can that rationally be said to be despised by any, or *postponed* to any other thing, which never was proposed to them as their option, and which it never was in their power to choose or to embrace."—WHITBY.

PROCRASTINATE (Lat. *procrastĭnāre, cras, to-morrow*) is, literally, to put *off till to-morrow* what might better have been done to-day. It is to delay, defer, or postpone through indolence or general unwillingness to commence action.

"*Procrastination* is the thief of time.
Year after year it steals till all are fled,
And to the mercies of a moment leaves
The vast concerns of an eternal scene."
YOUNG.

PROLONG (Lat. *prōlongāre*) and PROTRACT (Lat. *prōtrahere*, part. *prōtractus*) differ from the former in implying something actually commenced, as a period or a transaction. There is very little difference between them; but we commonly use PROTRACT in the sense of *contriving* to lengthen. So to prolong a speech is simply to extend it; to protract it would be to talk against time. PROLONG applies better to what is begun, but not concluded; PROTRACT better to what is not yet begun, as I prolong my stay, I protract my departure. To prolong is to put off the end, to procrastinate is to put off the beginning, to protract may be taken in either sense.

"To what purpose should I take pains for a livelihood, or so much as be at the trouble of putting meat to my mouth for the *prolongation* of my life?"—SHARP.

"The other manager very complaisantly received it again, and had recourse to the old mystery of *protraction*, which he exercised with such success that the season was almost consumed before he could afford it a reading."—SMOLLETT.

DEFERENCE. REVERENCE. RESPECT. REGARD.

DEFERENCE to another (Fr. *déférence*) marks a readiness to yield to him in matters of choice or judgment, rather than to enforce one's own wishes or opinions. It is grounded upon age, rank, dignity, or personal merit.

"*Deference* to the authority of thoughtful and sagacious men."—WHEWELL.

RESPECT (Lat. subst. *respectus*) is to hold in high estimation for moral or intellectual qualities, or both. It is due peculiarly to the wise and good. It is not so strong a term as the others, and in its mildest force is not necessarily based even upon merit. There is a respect due to all men as such, and on the ground of those claims to consideration which in some degree all possess. Hence it is applicable to what is due to one's self. The truly civil man, for instance, is he who respects others because he respects himself. As regards others there is in respect some degree of submission. There is piety in veneration, and self-denial in deference.

"We pass by common objects or persons without noticing them, whereas we turn back to look again at those which deserve our admiration, our regard, our *respect*. This was the original meaning of *respect* and *respectable*."—M. MULLER.

REVERENCE (Lat. *rĕvĕrentia*) is a profounder respect, not unmingled with fear.

"Great *reverencers* of crowned heads."—SWIFT.

REGARD (Fr. *regard*) differs from the former in being the feeling of an equal or a superior, not an inferior. It is the feeling of all right-minded persons toward those whose qualities are estimable.

"He should advanced be to high *regard*,
And have our lady's love for his reward."
SPENSER.

DEFILE. GORGE. PASS.

DEFILE (Fr. *défiler, fil, a thread*) is literally what can be passed by a number of men only *in file*, that is, marching in line, long but narrow. It is a military term. In wooded, marshy, or mountainous countries, there are defiles where troops cannot deploy. It is a place important from a strategic point of view—a place to be guarded. It is guarded easily. It is serious to engage in it, and perilous to be caught in it. The general is glad to surprise the enemy there.

GORGE (Fr. *gorge, the throat*) is a natural feature. It is the narrow passage between hills, cliffs, or mountains.

PASS (Fr. *pas*, Lat. *passus, a step*) is literally a place through or along which one *passes*; but difficulty is connected with the pass. It is dangerous, or narrow, or precipitous, or easily guarded. But it is not long, like the defile. It is, as it were, but a step, though a critical one.

DEFINITE. DEFINITIVE. DETERMINATE.

These terms express, the one the passive, the other the active sense of the Latin *dēfīnīre, to define or limit*, from *finis, an end*. DEFINITE denotes a state or character; DEFINITIVE a force or tendency. That is definite of which the limits are determinate or the outlines distinct. A definite extent may be exactly measured, a definite period is a portion of time distinctly determined. A definite idea is so clear that it cannot be confused by others, or confounded with vague impressions. That is definitive which tends to bring about these things as results. A definitive scheme of reconciliation is one which distinctly and unmistakably lays down its conditions. If I say I cannot speak definitely, I mean that my knowledge is not exact upon the matter. If I say I cannot speak definitively, I mean I cannot say what will be conclusive and final upon it. I may conceive a definite design, yet I may be unable to say definitively whether or not I shall undertake it all, or, if so, at what time. Hence it follows that DEFINITE is usually found in connexion with matters of conception, DEFINITIVE with matters of determination. DEFINITIVE is not applicable, as DEFINITE is, to physical objects. A material form or phenomenon may be definite, that is, present itself to the eye in sharp outlines of separation from other objects. When such is the case the reason can pronounce positively, that is, definitively upon its nature. If I see on a distant hill something which for any characteristics that I can perceive, might be either a living animal or a tree, I cannot say definitively what the object is, inasmuch as it is not definite enough.

DETERMINATE (Fr. *déterminer*, Lat. *determĭnare, to limit, settle*) has a moral aspect, having reference to the will, as DEFINITE has to the apprehension. The resolve has become a determined one, which was set going by some motive power within, and is now to be certainly taken in hand: it may long before this have been definite enough in character, scope, details; but some removal of difficulty, or stirring up of the will, or increased desire to attain one thing or to avoid another, was needed to make a definite plan the subject of determinate action

DEFINITE. POSITIVE.

In the cases in which these terms have the character of synonyms, DEFINITE (Lat. *dēfīnire*, part. *dēfīnītus, to limit, to define*) relates to the thing, POSITIVE (*pŏsĭtivus, settled by agreement*, from *pōnĕre, to place or lay down*) to the mind of the person. A definite account of a thing would be one that was clear and sufficient; a positive account one which was given with plainness of speech, and with an air of conviction and assurance by the speaker.

"To be *definitely* in a place is to be in it so as to be there and nowhere else."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"*Positively* to foretell is to profess to foreknow, or to declare positive foreknowledge."—EDWARDS *On the Will*.

DEFINITION. EXPLANATION

DEFINITION in its strict sense is that which gives the logical essence of a

thing, as its genus and specific difference, or, less scientifically, enumerates its accidents and properties.

EXPLANATION (Lat. *explanātiōnem; explānāre, to make smooth, to explain*) is a more popular process, consisting in bringing home something to the understanding of a nature difficult to comprehend, by the media of other things with which the mind of the person is more familiar. Definition rather belongs to words and ideas, explanation to facts and statements.

"*Definition* being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for, a *definition* is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined."—LOCKE.

"*Explanations* of the doctrine of the Trinity."—BURNET.

DEFRAY. DISCHARGE. LIQUIDATE. PAY.

To PAY (Fr. *payer*) is the generic term here. The rest are modes of payment.

To DEFRAY is from the Fr. *défrayer*. Anything which provides for and covers the expenses of a transaction defrays it. It is the meeting by a general sum of many and divers details of expense.

DISCHARGE (O. Fr. *descharger*) is to relieve a pecuniary obligation, whether a debt of long standing or not. It is to do away with the burden and pressure of a claim.

LIQUIDATE (L. Lat. *liquĭdare, to make clear*) is used only of debts. It is literally to clear off, and so to diminish or lessen. The debt which in common parlance is cleared off, in finer language is liquidated.

DEJECTION. DEPRESSION. DESPONDENCY. MELANCHOLY.

DEJECTION (Lat. *dējectionem, a casting down*) and DEPRESSION (Lat. *dēpressiōnem, a pressing down*) both refer to the spirits. Dejection is such a state of sadness or sorrow as affects the countenance and demeanour, giving a downcast look. Depression is simply a lowness of spirits, and is more purely constitutional. Dejection implies some *source* of sorrow, privation, or disappointment; but depression may be produced by atmospheric causes.

DESPONDENCY (Lat. *ănĭmum dēspondēre, to lose courage*), points to a state of mind, the result of sad or disheartening reflexions; as, upon a loss which cannot be recovered, or a failure which cannot be retrieved, or a hope which is likely to be frustrated, or an unfavourable aspect of personal affairs.

MELANCHOLY (Gr. μελαγχολία, literally *black bile*) denotes such dejection or depression as is either constitutional or chronic in the individual, and often results from a number of impressions which cannot be resolved into any one direct cause of grief or sadness. It is commonly accompanied, where it is a settled disposition, with tenderness, and is an ingredient in the romantic spirit. In this way it often exists in youth, and is cured by advancing years.

"I have had no dignities; thou hast withheld them, and I have not thought them even worthy of a wish. Didst thou see me sad and *dejected* on these accounts?" —JORTIN.

"Lambert, in great *depression* of spirit, twice prayed to let him escape."—BAKER, *Charles II.*

"This (sincerity and integrity of heart) enables a man to look back without horror, to look about him without shame, to look within without confusion, and to look forward without *despondency*."—STILLINGFLEET.

"When the mind is very deeply impressed with a sense of calamity for a continuance, and the attention cannot by any means be diverted from it, the subject is in a state of *melancholy*. This affection manifests itself by dejection of spirits, debility of mind and body, obstinate and insuperable love of solitude, universal apathy, and a confirmed listlessness, which emaciate the corporeal system, and not unfrequently trouble the brain."—COGAN.

DELICATE. FINE. NICE.

These terms are all employed both of the character of objects and of the faculties which perceive and treat them. As to the quality of objects, that is DELICATE (Fr. *délicat*) which

is refinedly agreeable, or likely to please a highly-cultivated taste, though it might have no gratification for minds or tastes not trained to perceive the beauty of what is not conspicuous, or the agreeableness of what does not force itself strongly upon the senses. When used of persons in a moral sense, the term expresses an appreciation of what is *extrinsically* delicate, a shrinking from harshness and coarseness, a considerateness for others, and an appreciation of the less prominent beauties and graces of things. As in delicacy there is a natural susceptibility of injury, the term is sometimes used purely in this sense, as a delicate constitution, delicate health.

"An air of robustness and strength is very prejudicial to beauty. An appearance of *delicacy*, and even of fragility, is almost essential to it."—BURKE.

FINE (Fr. *fin*) has, singularly enough, taken to itself a meaning quite opposed to the weakness of delicacy, though it is nearly identical with it in its other sense of requiring minuteness of discrimination, or exhibiting discriminative power, as a "fine distinction." There would appear at first sight to be almost a contradiction between such uses of the term as "fine cambric" and a "fine child;" the former pointing to delicacy of texture, the latter to robustness of constitution; but fine, as opposed to coarse (which is the same as "course," *i.e.* ordinary), and so meaning *choice of its kind*, will admit of such seemingly contrariant applications. A fine child is a child of *no common* form and growth; fine cambric is of *no common* texture; a fine taste is a taste of *no common* power of discrimination. The FINE is that which combines delicacy and power or grandeur, as a fine speech, a fine landscape. That which is fine, as an expression, a thought, or a work of art, may raise more admiration by repetition or study. That which is delicate, if it be not appreciated at once will hardly be so at all. A fine eulogy strikes by its boldness, elevation of sentiment, and warmth of expression. Delicate praise is sensitive also, and is less easily appreciated, for it owes its excellence to negative qualities, and tact in refraining, and in a measure not only to what is uttered, but to what is elegantly suppressed. It may be observed that all these uses of the word FINE grow out of its root-meaning, *i.e. finished, perfected;* the Fr. *fin* being the Lat. *finitus*, which first becoming *finitus*, dropped, afterwards, the two unaccented syllables; *see* BRACHET, S.V.

"The character of his Majesty's bluff haughtiness (Henry VIII. by Holbein) is well represented, and all the heads are *finely* executed."—WALPOLE.

NICE (said to be from Fr. *nice, foolish, simple;* Lat. *nescius, ignorant*, but possibly a distinct word: *see* WEDGEWOOD), when applied to objects, is not a word of high meaning. It indicates such a degree of excellence or agreeableness as people in general would approve or enjoy. When used of persons and their powers of discrimination, it seems to combine exactness of knowledge with a certain fastidiousness of requirement. A distinction is said to be nice which tends to over-refinement. A person with a nice taste in music is not easily pleased with what he hears. The old meaning of *nice*—silly, ignorant—appears in the following:—

"For he was *nyce* and knowthe no wisdom."—R. GLOUCESTER.

"By his own *nicety* of observation he had already formed such a system of metrical harmony as he never afterwards much needed or much endeavoured to improve. —JOHNSON, *Life of Waller*.

DELIGHTFUL. DELICIOUS. CHARMING.

Of these, DELIGHTFUL relates to the state of mind, DELICIOUS to the specific gratification of the senses, and CHARMING to the gratification of the mind through the senses. Anything is delightful which produces gladness of mind. Hence delight is not caused simply by external objects of sense. Good news, for instance, may be delightful. A delightful country, delightful music, and so on, are such as to produce pleasurable excitement of the mind. The term ill accords with purely physical enjoyment, as a delightful dish. DELICIOUS is almost confined to matters of taste, touch, and

smell. It expresses that which very sensibly excites pleasure in these matters. CHARMING is used in a wider sense of that which delights and engages the whole nature, and commonly denotes that state of mental enjoyment which is produced through the senses. A charming landscape is one which we linger to enjoy. A charming person is one in whose society and conversation we feel continual delight. It generally implies an aggregate of attractions, while delightful and delicious refer to some one point of attractiveness or enjoyment.

"The situation was *delightful*. In front was the sea and the ships at anchor, behind and on each side were plantations, in which were some of the richest productions of nature."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"They are like Dives, whose portion was in this life, who went in fine linen, and fared *deliciously* every day."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"This is a most majestic vision and
Harmonious *charmingly*."
SHAKESPEARE.

DELIVER. RESCUE. LIBERATE. RELEASE. FREE.

DELIVER (Fr. *délivrer*, L. Lat. *dēlīberāre, to set free*) has various senses, according to the various applications of the main idea; as to set free, and so release; to set free from one's self, and so surrender; to cause to go forth free; and so to disburden. In the sense of setting free, DELIVER means to rid of any kind of coercive power, which in any sense or any way interferes with the freedom of the person, as to deliver one person from another, or from the power of another. It is even extended to what is oppressive, painful, or irksome; as, to deliver from the fear of death, or from a painful necessity.

"*Deliver* us from evil."—*Lord's Prayer*.

RESCUE (O. Fr. *rescourre*, It. *riscuotere, to fetch out of pawn*, Lat. *re-excŭtere*: WEDGEWOOD) denotes that kind of removal both of persons and things from the power and possession of another, which is the result of energetic interference and personal effort. It is possible to deliver and to rescue from danger, that is, from *impending*, not actual evil. LIBERATE, on the other hand, involves an *actual* restraint, confinement, or coercion.

"Nineveh was *rescued* from the brink of destruction."—STILLINGFLEET.

LIBERATE and RELEASE (the former of the same root as DELIVER; the latter from O. Fr. *relaisser, to rest on one's journey*) are very closely related in meaning; so that in many cases they might be used indifferently, as to release or to liberate a prisoner from confinement; but LIBERATE refers only to *restraint* in the most direct sense of the term, though the metaphorical use of it is common; as, to liberate the mind from prejudices, where prejudices are regarded as restraining influences interfering with the mind's free action. RELEASE is more widely applied to any kind of *force*, as, for instance, that which oppresses, pains, or compels. So we speak not only of releasing from prison, but from an obligation, debt, or bond, from torture or sickness, and, in death, from sorrow, pain, and evil

"That the public revenue of Great Britain can ever be completely *liberated*, or even that any considerable progress can ever be made towards that *liberation*, while the surplus of that revenue, or what is over and above defraying the annual expense of the peace establishment, is so very small, it seems altogether in vain to expect."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"So I may say I am but a prisoner still, notwithstanding the *releasement* of so many."—HOWELL.

FREE (A. S. *freó*) is the simplest, and the generic term. One may be freed from subjection, thraldom, pain, confinement, duty, obligation, servitude, cares, anxieties, or troubles, prejudices and errors, or misconceptions, promises or engagements; and in short, from anything that interferes with liberty of action and enjoyment. To FREE commonly indicates some amount of authoritative interference and effort, as DELIVER involves address. One frees a slave by one's own authority and power. One delivers another from the hand of the enemy in the best way one can.

"He that is dead is *freed* from sin."—*Eng. Bible*.

DELIVER. SURRENDER. TRANSFER.

I DELIVER (*see* above) a thing to another when I place it in his hands, so as to part with my own personal responsibility and control. It is a formal act, performed either on my own or some one else's account, as when I sign, seal, and deliver a bond, or when I deliver to its intended owner or keeper a parcel with which I have been entrusted. The act is at least voluntary, if not willing. The difference in meaning between this force of the verb DELIVER and that last noticed corresponds with the difference between the nouns deliverance and delivery.

"The investitures of bishops and abbots, which had been originally given by the *delivery* of the pastoral ring and staff."—BURNET.

SURRENDER (O. Fr. *surrender*) is applied to matters of right or possession, with which we part in favour of another under coercion or compulsion; as, to surrender a fortress, or an expressed opinion in argument, or a claim, or to surrender one's self to any influence or power, as to vice, grief, despair, idleness, sleep.

"If we do not *surrender* our wills to the overtures of His goodness, we must submit our backs to the strokes of His anger."—BARROW.

TRANSFER (Lat. *transferre*) is simply to convey from one person or place to another, with or without personal interest, property, or control on our own part, and is applicable to moral things, as well as to material substances, as to transfer one's affection.

"*Transferring* the honour which was due to God alone unto saints and to feigned miracles."—UDAL.

DELIVER. PRONOUNCE. UTTER.

Of these UTTER (*to put forth or out*) is the simplest. To utter a speech is simply to sound it with the voice, as so many words. So the word utterance is applied to mere inarticulate sound, as to utter a sigh or a moan.

PRONOUNCE (Lat. *pronunciāre, to proclaim, to pronounce*) is syllabically, distinctly, and in some cases with formality and solemnity, to utter, as to pronounce judgment.

To DELIVER (*see* above) denotes a careful and sustained pronouncing of what requires to be conveyed in many words. To deliver a speech would imply not only the words, but the manner of it. So we might say "The substance was eloquent, but the words were indistinctly pronounced;" or, "The speech was good in itself, but badly delivered."

"He (Vertue) was simple, modest, and scrupulous, so scrupulous that it gave a peculiar slowness to his *delivery*. He never *uttered* his opinion hastily, nor hastily assented to others."—WALPOLE.

"In order to be fully and easily understood, the four chief requisites are, a due degree of loudness of voice, distinctness, slowness, and propriety of *pronunciation*"—BLAIR, *Lectures*.

DELIVERY. DELIVERANCE.

These two forms of the same word (*see* above) differ in mainly regarding, the former, the point whither, the latter, the point whence the action proceeds. DELIVERY means a delivering *to*, DELIVERANCE a delivering *from*. So "The holiday was concluded by the delivery of prizes to the successful competitors;" "A Te Deum was celebrated for the nation's deliverance."

"The investitures of bishops and abbots, which had been originally given by the *delivery* of the pastoral ring and staff by the king of England, were, after some opposition, wrung out of their hands."—BURNET.

"As for the Presbyterians, they were so apprehensive of the fury of the Commonwealth party that they thought it a *deliverance* to be rescued out of their hands"—BURNET.

DELUGE. INUNDATE. OVERFLOW. SUBMERGE.

To DELUGE (Fr. *déluge*, Lat. *dīlŭvium*) implies the pouring of a vast body of water coming from above; as, a deluge of rain.

"And as, when stormy winds encountering loud,
Burst with rude violence the bellowing cloud,
Precipitate to earth the tempest pours,
The vexing hailstones thick in sounding showers,

The *deluged* plains then every ploughman flies,
And every hind and traveller sheltered lies." HAMILTON'S *Virgil.*

INUNDATE (Lat. *inundāre; unda, a wave*) implies an horizontal movement of the same body spreading itself laterally. An inundation may result from a deluge. As deluge primarily regards the water which pours or covers, so inundation primarily regards the land which is covered or submerged.

"Nonnus reports in the history of his embassy, that during the period when the Nile *inundates* Egypt there are very violent storms in the different parts of Ethiopia." —BELOE, *Herodotus.*

OVERFLOW is an inundation caused by excess of fluid in some specific place or channel. So, "a deluge of rain fell, the river overflowed its banks, and the country far and wide was inundated, so that it remained for some weeks submerged."

"Poets that lasting marble seek
Must carve in Latin or in Greek.
We write in sand, our language grows,
And like the tide our work *o'erflows.*"
WALLER.

SUBMERGE (Lat. *submergĕre*) denotes that the inundation has entirely drowned the land. It deserves, however, to be remarked that, while the others indicate the specific action of water, SUBMERGE is also applied to cases in which the primary action is not on the part of the water, as, when in a quantity of water a large body is purposely placed so as to be entirely covered, it is said to be submerged. The element overflows and inundates. Man may deluge and submerge.

"Some of our own countrymen have given credit to the *submersion* of swallows." —PENNANT.

DEMOLISH. DESTROY.

To DESTROY (Lat. *destruĕre*) is violently to put an end to anything that existed in life or shape, or even to the life itself. Hence destroy is the generic word. It is to put an end to what we desire no longer to exist.

DEMOLISH (Fr. *demolir*, Lat. *demōliri*) is the specific destruction of an organized body or a structural mass. To this latter it is most commonly applied; as, to demolish the walls of a castle. Demolition is opposed to construction. DESTROY may or may not involve violence, as a noxious vapour or a violent blow might destroy life; DEMOLISH involves violence. Destruction may be sudden or gradual; demolition is commonly rapid and decisive. DESTROY is equally applicable to things moral and physical, as to destroy hope, beauty, effect. DEMOLISH could not be so employed, except in the way of formal metaphor. DEMOLISH does not convey so strongly as destroy the idea of *hostile* operation. The walls of a fortification are destroyed by the enemy's artillery. They may be demolished for the simple purpose of rebuilding and making them stronger.

"O come hither, and behold the works of the Lord, what *destructions* He hath brought upon the earth."—*Bible*, 1551.

"On their coming into administration, they found the *demolition* of Dunkirk entirely at a stand. Instead of *demolition* they found construction; for the French were then at work on the repairs of the jetties."—BURKE.

DEMUR. HESITATE. SCRUPLE. WAVER. FLUCTUATE. OBJECT.

To HESITATE (Lat. *hæsĭtāre, to stick fast*) is literally to *stick* at doing something, whether mentally or practically. It may proceed from a variety of causes; as, prudence, fear, doubt, generosity, cowardice.

"In an age of darkness he (Gregory VII.) had not all the knowledge that was requisite to regulate his zeal; and taking false appearances for solid truths, he without *hesitation* deduced from them the most dangerous consequences."—JORTIN.

To DEMUR (Old Fr. *demourer*, Lat *dēmŏrāri, to retard*) is a specific kind of hesitation. It is to suspend action or judgment in view of a doubt or difficulty. When we say, "I demur to that statement of yours," we mean to arrest the argument of the speaker on a point to which we are prepared to make objection.

"A *demurrer* denies that by the law arising upon these facts, any injury is done to the plaintiff, or that the defendant has made out a legitimate excuse, according to the party which first *demurs* (demoratur), rests or abides upon the point in question." —BLACKSTONE.

SCRUPLE (Lat. *scrūpŭlus, a grit or sharp stone in the path, uneasiness*) is a kind of internal demur, that is, when the process of thought or action arrested is not that of another but our own, and this in consequence of a doubt or difficulty suggested either by some other, or by our own minds or feelings. A scruple is dictated by a sense of impropriety, intellectual or moral.

"I *scruple* not to rest it on reason rather than on passion."—GILPIN'S *Sermons.*

WAVER (A. S. *wafian*, connected with *wave;* as it were, *to fluctuate*) refers to an antecedent opinion or resolution of our own, which we have *actually formed* and distrust. As DEMUR and SCRUPLE are applicable to that which is proposed to be said or done, so WAVER applies to what *has* been said or done.

FLUCTUATE (Lat. *fluctuāre, to be in waves; to fluctuate in mind*) resembles WAVER in expressing motion and change of mind, but differs from it in implying more than one point. We waver upon one consideration. We fluctuate between two or more, which we are inclined to adopt successively. WAVER is only applied to matters of intellectual decision, but FLUCTUATE to states of feeling. We fluctuate not only between one opinion and another, but between joy and sorrow, gladness and depression, hope and despair, and the like.

"Liberty of will is like the motion of a magnetic needle toward the north: full of trembling and uncertainty till it were fixed in the beloved point. It *wavers* as long as it is free, and is at rest when it can choose no more."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"Teach me how I came by such an opinion of worth and virtue; what it is which at one time raises it so high, and at another time reduces it to nothing; how these disturbances and *fluctuations* happen."—SHAFTESBURY.

OBJECT (Lat. *objĭcĕre*, part. *objectus, to cast against*) is to offer in opposition. We object to what we believe erroneous, unjust, undesirable, and in some cases to what is personally displeasing to ourselves. The verb is often used intransitively and followed by to; but in such cases something is always implied as put forward against the thing objected to, such as a countervailing fact, or a consideration of truth, fairness, convenience, or personal preference.

"There was this single fault that Erasmus, though an enemy, could *object* to him."—ATTERBURY.

DENIAL. ABNEGATION.

DENIAL (Fr. *dénier*, Lat. *dēnĕgāre*) is logical and practical. ABNEGATION is not logical, but only practical. DENIAL may stand opposed either to affirmation or to indulgence. ABNEGATION only to the latter, in the sense of renunciation of self, or of anything else.

"You ought to converse with so much sincerity that your bare affirmation or *denial* may be sufficient."—STILLINGFLEET.

"*Denying* ungodliness and worldly lusts"—*Bible.*

"*Abnegation* of God, of His honour, of His religion."—KNOX.

DEPENDENCE. RELIANCE. AFFIANCE.

DEPENDENCE (Lat. *dēpendēre, to hang from, to depend upon*) expresses a fact, RELIANCE (prob. Fr. *se relier, to be attached to*, Lat. *rĕligare*) expresses our consciousness or feeling of that fact. Dependence is conditioned existence, a result contingent upon a cause. Reliance is trust upon a living will. The child depends upon his parent for all that he requires; but it is not till he has grown to be conscious of his own dependence in this way that he can rely upon his parent's willingness to grant him what he needs.

AFFIANCE (O. Fr. *afiance*, L. Lat. *fidantia, a pledge*) is characteristic of *religious feeling.*

"The absolute stoical *depender* upon fate may starve for want of industry, die for want of physic, and be damned for want of repentance."—HAMMOND.

"The Saviour effecting everything by His power is represented under the image of a great champion in the field, who is prompted by his own courage, and a *reliance* on his own strength and skill, to attempt what might seem impracticable."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"That she (the Queen) may evermore have *affiance* in Thee and ever seek Thy honour and glory."—*Eng. Liturgy.*

DEPRAVITY. DEPRAVATION. CORRUPTION.

DEPRAVITY and DEPRAVATION (Lat. *dēprāvāre, to prevent, vitiate*) stand to each other as the process and the result; DEPRAVITY is the state of being depraved, DEPRAVATION the action of making depraved, or the state of having been made so. There is in human nature, we believe, an inborn depravity. This is made far worse where defective education and evil company have tended to the worse depravation of the individual. The same twofold meaning belongs to CORRUPTION (Lat. *corruptiōnem*) which expresses both the state of being, and the process of making corrupt. Differences must be noted between DEPRAVITY and CORRUPTION. These may be illustrated by the difference between a depraved person and a corrupt person. The depraved man has been brought to a certain condition of evil practice; the corrupt man to a certain condition of evil principle. CORRUPTION relates to the source of action, DEPRAVITY to the actions themselves. A corrupt judge is not a person of depravity of character necessarily in any other way than that of the principle of integrity, which is wanting or has been destroyed in him. Or, again, a person may have a corrupt taste in art or literature without being a person of corrupt life. This shows corruption to be a *specific* badness or depravity of principle, while depravity is *general*, and affects the entire character. When we speak of a person of depraved taste, we, of course, confine the assertion to the matter of taste, without saying anything of the moral character. A corrupt taste and a depraved taste would be practically the same; but in the former case we take account of the want of true principle to decide, in the latter of the influence of bad training to pervert. Corrupt taste would rather belong to the artist, depraved taste to the spectator.

"If refinement does not lead directly to purity of manners, it obviates at least their greatest *depravation*."—REYNOLDS.

"A mad and desperate *depravity*."—SHAFTESBURY

"As though all the false religion that ever was among the heathen was not a *corrupting* and *depravation* of the true religion of God."—CALVIN.

DEPTH. PROFUNDITY.

These words supply a good illustration of a large class of synonyms, and of the general difference of character between words of Saxon and words of classic formation to express the same thing. DEPTH (A. S. *deop, deep*) expresses no more than the physical property of perpendicular measurement downward from a surface; or, metaphorically, what is like this, as depth of mind, or thought, or meaning, which is such as has the properties of natural depth; not lying on the surface; more or less difficult to reach; more or less dark when reached; not meeting the eye of those who regard only the surface of things, and the like; but PROFUNDITY (Lat. *prŏfunditātem*) expresses the abstract idea of depth, or the scientific measurement of it. It is the same thing under a more refined, abstract, and scientific view. Words of the former class are physical and metaphorical, of the latter scientific and metaphysical.

"A dreadful *depth*, how *deep* no man can tell." SPENSER.

"In one (Ben Jonson) we may respect the *profundity* of learning, in the other (Shakespeare) we must admire the sublimity of genius."—*Observer*.

DERANGE. DISORDER.

DERANGE (Fr. *déranger, rang, rank or order*) and DISORDER (Fr. *désordre*, Lat. *ordĭnem, rank, order*) are so much alike that they may often be used interchangeably, as a mass of papers may be disordered or deranged. But from other illustrations it would be seen that DERANGE is commonly applied to matters of mental or internal, DISORDER to matters of physical or external, arrangement. It is only an extension of this to say that disorder bears reference to the fact, derangement to the intention, of order. A defeat of a general will, at the same time that it throws his army into disorder, derange more or less his own plans. This distinction is not destroyed by the fact that things of *the mind* are often viewed metaphori-

cally, that is, after the analogy of things of sense. Thus, "a disordered imagination" is one in which the faculties, as in a machine, have lost their just disposition, after the analogy of such disturbance of the bodily functions as accompanies or creates disease.

"Whether this folly (expensiveness of dress) may not produce many other follies, an entire *derangement* of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of duties, bad mothers, a general corruption of both sexes."—BERKELEY.

"In wildest numbers and *disorder'ed* verse."
LYTTELTON.

DERIVE. TRACE. DEDUCE.

Of these, TRACE (Fr. *tracer*) is generic, meaning *to draw a line* (L. Lat. *tractiāre*), or to prosecute a given line, whether materially or mentally, as to trace a river from its source to its mouth, or from its mouth to its source, to trace a line of march.

DERIVE (Lat. *dērīvare, to lead away water, rivus*) and DEDUCE (Lat. *dēdūcĕre, to lead down* or *away*) indicate a tracing in one direction, that is, from the source or origin downwards. To derive is to trace, and so to refer to the physical cause; to deduce is to trace, and so refer to the logical cause or reason. A river derives its waters from a certain source; a word is derived from a certain grammatical root; a nation derives its origin from one or more historic causes, as a victory, a migration, and the like. We deduce inferences from statements, and conclusions from premises.

"But this kind of writing, which seems to be reformed, which is, that writing should be consonant to speaking, is a branch of unprofitable subtleties; for pronunciation itself every day increases and alters the fashion; and the *derivation* of words, especially from foreign languages, are utterly defaced and extinguished."—BACON, *Advancement of Learning*.

"From the words of Moses cited by our Saviour, the doctrine of a future state may as clearly be *deduced* as from any single text which can be produced out of any one of the prophets."—JORTIN.

"In this chart I have laid down no land nor *traced* out any shore but what I saw myself."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

DEROGATE. DETRACT.

These words are in meaning very closely allied, and may in many cases be used indifferently; but DEROGATION refers to *intrinsic* goodness, DETRACTION (Lat. *dētractionem, a taking away*) to the *estimation* in which a thing is held. Etymologically considered, DEROGATE (Lat. *dērŏgare, to repeal part of a law*) is a term of legislation. Derogation is partial and indirect abrogation. When a subsequent law lessens the force and application of an older law, the character of the former is technically said to be derogatory. Derogation takes place when a thing that is estimable suffers deterioration; detraction when a thing that is esteemed, or is capable of being esteemed, is lessened or cheapened in the estimation of others. Hence DEROGATE belongs to the influence of circumstances, while DETRACTION is exclusively the act of persons. For instance, we might say, "His warmth of temper derogates much from a character otherwise worthy of high respect;" or, again, "The speaker, in speaking of such an one, detracted much from his reputation by ascribing to him ill-temper, and other such derogatory qualities."

"I hope it is no *derogation* to the Christian religion to say that the fundamentals of it, that is, all that is necessary to be believed in it by all men, is easy to be understood by all men."—LOCKE.

"I know it has been the fashion to *detract* both from the moral and literary character of Cicero; and indeed neither his life nor his writings are without the characteristics of humanity."—KNOX.

DESCRIBE. DEPICT. CHARACTERIZE.

DESCRIBE (Lat. *dēscrībĕre*) is to *write down* an account, hence to give an account, whether in writing or spoken words. True description is the giving in words of an account analogous to that of ocular representation; only DESCRIBE goes further, and gives a representation of complex objects or moral events, as well as visible forms or transactions; as, to describe the circumstances under which such an event took place. Description belongs to the external manifestations of things, and ought to be full and clear, that is, it should enumerate all particulars, and represent them accurately and vividly.

"How shall frail pen *describe* her heavenly face,
For fear, through want of skill, her beauty to disgrace!" SPENSER.

DEPICT (Lat. *dēpingĕre*, part. *dēpictus*, *to portray, describe*) refers to the vivid description of anything which may be brought with more or less distinctness before the mind's eye. Both DESCRIBE and DEPICT involve the representation of every detail connected with the subject described or depicted.

"An idea of figure *depicted* on the choroides or retina of the eye."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson.*

CHARACTERIZE (Gr. χαρακτήρ, *an impression*) is employed in moral description of what represents the subject by its leading feature or features. Hence a whole course of conduct, or a whole class of character in men, may be said to be characterized by some *one* strong and *distinctive* epithet, for instance, which, without delineating in detail, sets a peculiar mark and stamp upon it.

"Richard Martin was worthily *characterized* by the virtuous and learned men of his time to be princeps amorum."—WOOD, *Athenæ Oxon.*

DESCRY. ESPY. DISCOVER. DETECT. DISCERN. DISTINGUISH.

To DESCRY (O. Fr. *decrire*, Lat. *dēscrībĕre*, *to describe*) is to discover by the eye objects difficult of discernment by reason of distance or dimness. When the difficulty arises from other causes, as confusion among a number of similar objects, partial concealment, or the like, we employ ESPY (O. Fr. *espier*). As DESCRY denotes discriminative penetration of the bodily vision, so ESPY implies acuteness of vision or observation.

DISCOVER (O. Fr. *descouvrir*) points to the bringing to light of what was concealed or unknown. This may be either accidental or the result of specific research.

To DETECT (Lat. *dētĕgĕre*, part. *dētectus*, *to uncover*) is to remove what concealed from one's view, and had been in most cases purposely so placed; as to detect a criminal or a crime. Such a purpose of concealment, however, is not essential to the term, as we speak of detecting an error in a calculation, or a fallacy in an argument; only what is detected is never a matter of merit, but always an error, fault, or crime.

DISCERN (Lat. *discernĕre*, *to separate, to settle*) is to perceive with the inherent power of the faculty of bodily or mental identification, while DESCRY is always physical. From this power of exact vision comes the faculty of seeing differences in objects; and this identification of an object by setting aside its differences, or other objects which differ from it, is *discernment*, whether in the physical or intellectual sense.

DISTINGUISH (Lat. *distinguĕre*, *to prick off*) physically implies not only an acquaintance with the object, but a sufficient distinctness to enable the observer to recognize its specific features and characteristics, and so to avoid confusion with other objects. The moral application is analogous to this. When the next step is taken, and, on the ground of this accurate perception, the object is parted off from other objects—this is discernment. The one sees clearly, the other sees separatively.

"The first *descrieing* of the enemy's approach."—HOLINSHED.

"Secure, unnoted Conrad's prow passed by,
And anchored where his ambush meant to lie,
Screened from *espial* by the jutting cape
That rears on high its rude fantastic shape." BYRON.

"The distinction of a first *discoverer* made us cheerfully encounter every danger, and submit to every inconvenience."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"The Romans were plagued with a set of public officers belonging to the emperor's court called Curiosi and Imperatoris oculi, part of whose employment was to go about as *detectors* of frauds and misdemeanours."—JORTIN.

"A *discerner* of the thoughts and intents of the heart."—*Bible.*

"No more can you *distinguish* of a man
Than of his outward show."
SHAKESPEARE.

DESIGN. PURPOSE. INTEND. MEAN.

These terms all refer to the condition of the mind antecedent to action, and relative to it.

MEAN (A. S. *mœnan*; cf. *mind*, *mentem*, and many similar words), being of Saxon origin, is the most comprehensive and colloquial, and is employed of matters of any degree of importance, signifying simply to have a *mind* to do a thing or to say it, as, "What do you mean by saying that?" or, "What do you mean to do this morning?" It is used also of the significance of circumstances, events, or actions in the sense of denote, as, "What does that shouting in the streets mean?" Meaning relates to purpose in speech and in action.

"Thei wondred what she wolde *mene*."—GOWER.

To DESIGN (Lat. *dēsignāre*, *to mark out*) denotes an object of attainment placed before the mind, with a calculation of the steps necessary for it. It is a *complicated intention* carried into action, or proposed for it. I had no design to hurt you, means it was not a part of my aim or plan to do so.

"Ask of politicians the end for which laws were originally *designed*, and they will answer that the laws were *designed* as a protection for the poor and weak against the oppression of the rich and powerful."—BURKE.

To INTEND (Lat. *intendĕre*, *to stretch towards*, *to be intent upon*) points to no more than the general setting of the mind upon doing a thing. I did not intend to hurt you, means that it was accidental; and intention is commonly opposed to accident. It denotes no more than the presence or action of the will as distinguished from its absence. The intention is a movement or inclination of the mind in regard to a distant object, which causes it to stretch forward toward that object. The design is an idea chosen and adopted, which implies method and meditation. An intention is pure or otherwise; a design is suddenly or deliberately formed, and may be good or bad, but is seldom entirely good. One may be mistaken in one's intentions, and thwarted in one's designs.

"They that do me good, and know not of it, are causes of my benefit, though I do not owe them my thanks, and I will rather bless them as instruments, than condemn them as not *intenders*."—FELTHAM.

To PURPOSE (with some the Fr. *pour penser*; with others Lat. *propŏsĭtum*) is stronger than to intend, indicating a permanent resolution, to be carried out in such a way that circumstances must be made subservient to it. I purposed to hurt you, would imply that I had been watching my opportunity, and managed matters accordingly. The difference between intention and purpose is that between incipient and decisive volition. Intentions may be remote, purposes are immediate. The intention is weaker than the purpose.

"Steadfastly *purposing* to lead a new life."—*Church Catechism.*

DESOLATE. DESERT. SOLITARY.

These terms express under modifications the idea of local solitude. A place is DESOLATE (Lat. *dēsōlātus*, *left solitary*, part. of *dēsōlāre*) in reference to human occupation and use. A desolate country is one which gives the impression of no inhabitants to till or inhabit it. A desolate house or room one which shows no signs of occupation, or seems, as it were, half occupied. It will be observed that, like the word gloomy, DESOLATE is a subjective rather than an objective term, that is, it expresses not so much facts or appearances of nature as their impressions upon our own minds. Hence it is sometimes employed exclusively of the state of the person.

"Have mercy on me, for I am *desolate*."—*Psalms.*

"How is Babylon become a *desolation* among the nations!"—*Bible.*

DESERT (Lat. *dēsĕrĕre*, part. *dēsertus*, *to abandon*) denotes natural unfitness for occupation, and applies only to natural localities. A desert island is without inhabitants, because it is without the natural means of supporting them. A desolate place may or may not have been at one time

occupied, and may be partly occupied at present.

"Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the *desert* air."
GRAY.

SOLITARY (Lat. *sōlĭtārius*) denotes no more than removed from the haunts and occupation of human beings. The depth of a South American forest, though peopled with animals of many kinds, would be terribly solitary to a man. Solitary is applicable to persons as well as localities, in the sense of removed from others of the kind.

"It hath been disputed which is a state of greater perfection, the social or the *solitary*."—ATTERBURY.

DESPAIR. DESPONDENCY. DESPERATION.

DESPONDENCY (Lat. *dĭmum dēspondēre, to lose courage*) is the least violent, but often the more lasting of the three. It is a low state of the feelings which leads to an unhopeful view of things.

"He found his Indian friend leaning his head against a post, in an attitude of the utmost languor and *despondency*."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

Between DESPAIR and DESPERATION (O. Fr. *desperer*, Lat. *d. spērare*) there is a practical difference, in that one is a passive, the other an energetic hopelessness. This is expressed in common language. Men fall into despair, and are worked up to desperation. Desperation seizes the weapon. Despair sits with folded hands.

"*Despair* is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men's minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency."—LOCKE.

DESPAIR is, however, more comprehensive than this. "It is," says Cogan, "a permanent fear of losing some valuable good, of suffering some dreadful evil, or remaining in a state of actual misery, without any mixture of hope."

"Daughters of Eve, whom *desperation*, the effect of their first false step, hath driven to the lowest walks of vulgar prostitution."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

DESTINATION. DESTINY.

These two words (formed from the Lat. *dēstĭnare, to destine*) differ as the human and controllable from the superhuman and uncontrollable or providential. DESTINY is used of individuals and the final point of their personal history. DESTINATION of things as well as persons, and denotes no more than the end at which a person or thing is intended to arrive, or the purpose to which a thing is put.

"Which of us in setting out upon a visit, a diversion, or an affair of business, apprehends a possibility of not arriving at his place of *destination*, yet at the same time does not apprehend himself at liberty to alter his course in any part of his progress?"—SEARCH, *Light of Nature*.

"Thus the Pagans had the same notion with that which is mentioned in Scripture of a double *destiny* depending upon human choice."—JORTIN.

DESTINY. FATE. LOT. DOOM.

DESTINY (*see* above) is used both of the end to which a person or thing is fore appointed, and of the course of things which brings them to it. The idea of destiny involves elements of greatness and immutability. It is not applicable to common things or persons or the details of life, but to its apparent purpose and consummation. One may struggle against one's lot, or recover from what it may be one's fate to suffer; but destiny is final and irresistible. Any one might speak of his fate or his lot; only those who run important careers could speak of their destiny.

"But who can turn the stream of *destiny*,
Or break the chain of strong necessity,
Which fast is tied to Jove's eternal seat?"
SPENSER.

FATE stands to DESTINY as an item to a sum (Lat. *fātum*, *fate*), and is employed, as destiny never is, of the *details* of life. It is seldom used in a favourable sense, as, "In travelling it is almost always my fate to meet with delays." So far as a man's condition has resulted from unconscious causes, as the laws of the material world, we speak of his fate. So far as we attribute it to the ordainment of more powerful beings, we speak of his destiny. Fate is blind; destiny

has foresight. The theist speaks of destiny, the atheist of fate.

"I would not have that *fate* light upon you which useth to befall some, who from golden students become silver bachelors and leaden masters."—HOWELL.

LOT (Fr. *lot, share*) commonly refers to something connected with the whole course of life, which gives it a distinctive character for good or for ill, as, "Trouble is the common lot of men."

"To labour is the *lot* of man below;
And when Jove gave us life he gave us woe." POPE.

DOOM (*deem, to judge*) is the final close of life, regarded as a matter foreordained, and is never used in a happy sense. It is sometimes used, like lot, of the details of life itself, when it is at once unhappy and continuous, as, "I was doomed to spend many years of my early life in exile from my home."

"Ere Hector meets his *doom*."—POPE.

DESTITUTE. DEVOID. VOID.

Of these, VOID (Lat. *vĭduus*) has a physical application, although the word *empty* is at present a more common substitute for it, as—

"The *void* helmet."—COWPER'S *Iliad*.

DEVOID is reserved for the *morally* empty. There is very little difference of meaning between it and DESTITUTE (Lat. *destĭtuere*, part. *destĭtūtus, to forsake*), but DEVOID partakes rather of the nature of a purely negative, DESTITUTE of a privative epithet; or, in other words, to be destitute is to be devoid of what might naturally be expected to belong, or where it might be requisite; as beasts are devoid of speech, which nature has simply denied them. A man is destitute of learning when we think of his capability of acquiring it, devoid of it when we think of the simple fact that he does not possess it. Destitute is, therefore, commonly employed of the absence of the common requirements or necessaries of life; as, destitute of daily food or of clothing, where we should not employ devoid. Devoid thus seems to have a more abstract usage, as we might still say, devoid of all means of subsistence. We are devoid of faculties, and destitute of means or possessions. But a yet stronger difference lies in the fact that DESTITUTE involves the non-possession of what is in some way necessary or *desirable* to possess; while DEVOID is more neutral, and may be used of the absence of faulty or culpable qualities.

"*Devoid* of pride certaine she was."
CHAUCER.

"This faire lady on this wise *destitute*
Of all comfort and consolation."
Ibid.

DESTRUCTIVE. RUINOUS. PERNICIOUS.

We use the term DESTRUCTIVE (Lat. *dēstruĕre, to pull down something built*) when we simply think of the tendency to effect permanent termination to what had form, life, beauty, power, and the like.

"Loaded with gold, he sent his darling far
From noise and tumults and *destructive* war." DRYDEN.

We use the term RUINOUS (Lat. *ruīnōsus, going to ruin*) when we think of the *value* of that which is so destroyed, for ruin is destruction visible. Ruined reputation, blighted hopes, and the like, are terms recalling the fairness of what is lost, and not the mere loss or destruction. A destructive agency simply takes away, and may be so far good if the thing that is destroyed be noxious; but ruinous implies the taking away in a sad and fatal way of what we should desire to live and last.

"Of all these expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who engage in them, there is none perhaps more perfectly *ruinous* than the search after new silver and gold mines."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

PERNICIOUS (Lat. *pernĭcĭōsus, destructive*) is employed of what harms man's inner powers; as, of life, health, morals, interfering, as the word etymologically implies, with the vital force of things (*pernĕcāre, to kill outright*), and obstructive of wholesome energies, physical or moral. But it is not so strong a term as DESTRUCTIVE or RUINOUS. That which is destructive removes what exists, that which

is ruinous spoils what exists, that which is pernicious mars it. Destructive and ruinous influences are absolute and final, pernicious influence may be counteracted or removed.

"He who has vented a *pernicious* doctrine or published an ill book must know that his guilt and his life determine not together."—SOUTH.

DESUETUDE. DISUSE.

DISUSE is simply the cessation of customary or common use. DESUETUDE (Lat. *dēsuetūdo*) is the cessation of custom, fashion, or practice. In regard to the present fashion of dress in our own country as compared with that of the last century, the rapier has fallen into disuse, the wearing of it into desuetude.

DETAIL. DETAILS.

Derived from the French *detailler, to cut up*, hence to deal with severally or in particular. These words are respectively subjective and objective in their character. The verb *to detail* has the force of the former. It is to enumerate several things, or to describe a complex thing according to the several particulars which compose it. In this case, as in some others, the singular and the plural have different meanings, as in the case of Ruin and Ruins. We make the detail and find the details; the one is the manner in which the thing is represented, the other the items of which it is composed. Every complex transaction in life has its manifold details of which an account may from time to time be given in detail.

DETER. DISCOURAGE. DISHEARTEN.

DETER (Lat. *dēterrēre, to frighten from*) is to prevent from action by fear of consequences, or of the difficulty, imprudence, or risk of the attempt.

To DISCOURAGE (O. Fr. *descourager*) is to prevent from action, or to lessen energy in action by such representations as affect the spirit of the person contemplating or making the attempt. DISCOURAGE admits of degrees, but DETER is absolute. Circumstances, as well as the representations of individuals, may deter, discourage, or dishearten. Persons are discouraged *in* their undertakings, and deterred *from* them.

"So that, upon consideration of the whole matter, there is no reason why any man should be *deterred* from a holy and virtuous life for fear of the labour and pains of it. Because every one that is wicked takes more pains in another way and is more industrious, only to a worse purpose."—TILLOTSON.

"A slight perusal of the innumerable letters by which the wits of France have signalized their names, will prove that other nations need not be *discouraged* from the like attempts by the consciousness of inability."—*Rambler*.

DISHEARTEN is in English what DISCOURAGE is as a word of French and Latin formation (*cœur*, Lat. *cor, the heart*); but DISCOURAGE may apply to the case in which the action is intended only. DISHEARTENED implies that it is actually undertaken. One is deterred from beginning; discouraged in beginning or in proceeding; disheartened in proceeding. DISHEARTENED applies only to persons, DISCOURAGE both to persons and their efforts.

"His astonished and *disheartened* colleagues."—BANCROFT.

DETER and DISCOURAGE denote generally the action of the judgment, DISHEARTEN an influence upon the spirits. One is deterred by formidable difficulty or opposition, discouraged by the representations of advisers, or a calm estimate of the nature of the case; disheartened by anything that robs us of spirit, energy, or hope.

DETERIORATE. DEGENERATE.

The idea of growing worse is common to these terms. That is said to DETERIORATE (Lat. *dēterĭōrare, to make worse*) of which the *intrinsic goodness* is impaired. The term is applicable to that which is good and excellent in a moral as well as a physical sense. That is said to DEGENERATE (Lat. *degĕnĕrare, to make, or to grow worse*) which deteriorates so as to receive new properties, and these, generally, inferior or worse; or to depart from so as to fall short of a collective standard. Courage deteriorates when it simply diminishes, it degenerates into cruelty or rashness. In deterioration the leading idea is the impaired state arrived at, in degeneration the noble state departed from. Individuals,

aces, and moral qualities or character may deteriorate or degenerate. Physical qualities or character may deteriorate, not degenerate, except when they belong to persons.

"When wit transgresseth decency it *degenerates* into insolence and impiety."—TILLOTSON.

"The art of war was greatly *deteriorated*."—SOUTHEY.

DEVELOP. UNFOLD. UNRAVEL.

To DEVELOP is to open out what was contained in another thing, or in the thing itself (Fr. *développer*). In DEVELOP these *two* ideas are inherent; viz., the gradual opening of the whole containing, and the gradual exhibition of the particular contained. So we might say, "Time developed his character," or "Circumstances developed the cruelty which was latent in his character." Unlike UNFOLD, DEVELOP is not used of purely physical processes. We speak of the development of plans, plots, ideas, the mind; and also of the development of one species from another, of the development of the body in growth; but these are scientific terms involving other ideas, as, *e.g.*, of the vital functions in growth. We should never speak of the development of a flag or a table-cloth. In other words, it is not used of manual or mechanical unfolding. On the other hand, in the sense of the mechanical process of gradually opening, UNFOLD is used as well as in the other; but in this latter DEVELOP expresses far more than UNFOLD, and relates to the laws of expansion by which a thing unfolds in definite sequence of expansion, and in conformity with principles which conserve the type developed. Hence we speak of a true and a vicious development. But UNFOLD when used of immaterial things means little more than to exhibit or declare in order; as to unfold a tale. Principles, plots, or plans are developed, circumstances unfolded, difficulties and mysteries unravelled. When DEVELOP is used of intellectual subject-matter, it denotes the opening out of what contained many ideas really expressed, but in a manner so close and latent as not to strike the observation or come home to the understanding. A good definition sums up a matter so completely, that no more is necessary than to develop that definition to give all that has to be known concerning it.

To UNRAVEL (O. Germ. *reffen, to pluck*) is purely a mechanical effort of separating what is complicated, whether naturally or accidentally, and expresses simple disentanglement, not growth or expansion. As the former indicate ordinary processes of nature or art, so the latter indicates extraordinary and counteractive processes, and often implies the abnormal state of that which needs to be unravelled.

"Then take him to *develop* if you can,
And hew the block off and get out the man."
POPE.

"Several pieces of cloth, the largest we had seen being fifty yards long, which they *unfolded* and displayed so as to make the greatest show possible."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"What riddle's this? *Unfold* yourself, dear Robin."—BEN JONSON.

"That great chain of causes which, linking one to another, even to the throne of God Himself, can never be *unravelled* by any industry of ours."—BURKE.

DEVOUT. PIOUS. RELIGIOUS. HOLY.

Of these the two former are applicable only to persons, the last in the general sense of connected with or relating to religion, to things, as religious edifices, meetings, books, &c., holy places, and the like. The DEVOUT man (Fr. *dévot*) is he whose mind is given to religious feeling, and is apt in the exercise of prayer, divine praise, and spiritual meditation. The PIOUS man (Lat. *pius*) has reverence and love toward the Supreme Being. As DEVOUT points to the external observances of religion, so PIOUS points to its moral sentiments.

RELIGIOUS (Lat. *religio, reverence for God*) is a wider term, and denotes one who, in a general sense, is under the influence of religion, and is opposed to irreligious or worldly, as the pious man is opposed to the impious or profane, and the devout to the indifferent or irreverent.

HOLY (A. S. *hálig*), when used of persons, is employed to denote men of

especial saintliness or purity and integrity of life, the result of the continued influence of religion upon their nature.

"Thus we see the *devoutness* of His mind in His frequent retirement to solitary prayer, in His habitual giving of thanks, in His reference of the beauties and operations of nature to the bounty of Providence, in His earnest addresses to His Father, more particularly that short but solemn one before raising Lazarus from the dead, and in the deep piety of His behaviour in the garden on the last evening of His life."—PALEY.

"Our whole duty is made up but of three things, that a man live soberly with respect to himself, righteously with respect to his neighbours, and *piously* with respect to God."—SHARP.

"The first requisite in religion is seriousness; no impression can be made without it. An orderly life so far as others are able to observe us is now and then produced by prudential motives or by dint of habit; but without seriousness there can be no *religious* principle at the bottom, no course of conduct from *religious* motives; in a word, there can be no religion."—PALEY.

"Ye distant spires, ye antique towers
That crown the watery glade
Where grateful science still adores
Her Henry's *holy* shade." GRAY.

DEXTERITY. ADDRESS. ADROITNESS.

These terms are employed in a physical and moral sense, that is, are applied analogously to moral things.

ADDRESS (Fr. *adresse*) is more mental than physical in any case. It denotes skill practically applied, so as entirely to meet a certain end, especially one proposed on short notice. It is more comprehensive than DEXTERITY (Lat. *dextĕritatem, dextĕra, the right hand*), or ADROITNESS (Fr. *adroit, dexterous, shrewd*). Dexterity is that kind of cleverness which comes of being a perfect master by practice or experience of the means or instrument employed. Address may be shown in improving advantages; dexterity and adroitness, which is a sharp and sudden exhibition of dexterity, rather denote the skilful avoidance of danger, or escape from difficulty. Address is a species of manners, that is, manners as specifically exhibited towards certain persons. Lounging, inattention, whistling in company indicate bad manners. Hesitation, shyness, stammering, a want of self-possession, or too much of it, show a bad address. Dexterity relates primarily to the manner of executing things, address also to the means. Dexterity is more fully dependent on practice and use, address on natural qualities. Dexterity gives an air of ease and consequent grace in action; address adds an air of fineness and art. Dexterity is manual address, as address is mental dexterity. Small matters may be conducted with dexterity. Address is shown not in trivial but in important things.

"Whatever good from clear understanding, deliberate advice, sagacious foresight, stable resolution, dexterous *address*, right intention, and orderly proceeding doth naturally result, wisdom confers."—BARROW.

"The *dexterity* of hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be acquired without much practice and experience."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"The stoic and the libertine, the sinner and the saint, are equally *adroit* in the application of the telescope and the quadrant."—HORSLEY.

DIADEM. CROWN. CORONET.

The CROWN (Lat. *cŏrōna*) is the simplest and most comprehensive of these terms. It is applicable to almost anything that encircles the head, being of a solid and ornamental character.

The DIADEM (Gr. διάδημα, *a band, or fillet*) was, as its name expresses, an ornamental head-band or fillet worn as an emblem of royalty. The CORONET is a slighter kind of crown. The crown is the symbol of royal authority and dignity, the diadem of imperial splendour, the coronet of titled nobility.

DICTATE. PRESCRIBE. SUGGEST.

To DICTATE (Lat. *dictāre*, part. *dictātus*) is to issue a command in such a way as that it shall appear to be based upon the will of the commander; which deems nothing too minute to be the subject of such command, as when a powerful party, being offended, dictates the terms on which the apology shall be made. To dictate is more authoritative, arbitrary, and minute than PRESCRIBE (Lat. *præscribĕre*), and has to do with the words and terms and minutiæ of

things; while PRESCRIBE has to do rather with rules and general modes of dealing, as partaking less of the nature of command and more of direction or counsel. Prescribing is commonly the expression of superior wisdom, dictation of superior power only, or the assumption of it.

SUGGEST (Lat. *suggĕrĕre*) is less authoritative than either, being a holding out of partial truth or the indirect exhibition of counsel or command, in faith that the object of it will himself supply what is practically needed to complete it. All three are used of internal as well as external promptings, as we speak of the dictates of nature, of what is prescribed by reason and common sense, and of the suggestions of prudence. Of the three, it may be said, that for their force, dictation depends on the power of the person dictating, prescription on the wisdom of the thing prescribed, and suggestion on the sense of the person to whom the suggestion is made.

"I hope God hath given to me to be master of my own passion, and endowed me with that reason that will *dictate* unto me what is for my own good and benefit."—*State Trials.*

"*Prescribe* not us our duties."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Arthur, they say, is killed to-night,
On your *suggestion*." *Ibid.*

"Nothing certainly being so tyrannical as ignorance, where time and possession enable it to *prescribe*."—SOUTH.

DICTIONARY. VOCABULARY. GLOSSARY. LEXICON. ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

DICTIONARY (Fr. *dictionnaire*) is a list of words commonly arranged in alphabetical order, or which belong to a system, whether of language or any other, as a dictionary of botany, medicine, biography. It admits of every degree of copiousness in explanation of the terms from a line to an article.

LEXICON (λεξικόν) is only the same word in Greek as *dictionary* in English, and is especially applied to dictionaries of the learned languages of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.

A VOCABULARY (Lat. *vŏcābulum, a vocable, or word*) is a list of terms, like dictionary, connected with some system, but not professing to be exhaustive; as, *e.g.* a French vocabulary of words most commonly used in conversation. It gives the meaning but not the explanation of words. It sometimes means any person's stock of words.

A GLOSSARY (Lat. *glossārium*, Gr. γλῶσσα, *a tongue*) is an *explanatory* vocabulary, in which certain words are selected and arranged for consideration in detail. It commonly consists of peculiar words, unfamiliar or unknown.

An ENCYCLOPÆDIA (Gr. ἐγκυκλοπαιδεία, a somewhat barbarous substitute for ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία; literally, *circular instruction*, i.e., instruction in the circle of arts and sciences, the professional education of Greek youths), unlike the preceding, is not restricted to any system or province, but embraces the whole sphere of human knowledge, and explains not merely the meaning of words, but the branches of knowledge which they represent.

"The laws of God and of Nature are safe, but Salmasius' *Dictionary* is undone."—MILTON.

"His *vocabulary* seems to have been no larger than was necessary for the transaction of business."—MACAULAY.

"In the glossarial index of former editions (of Shakespeare), the reader has merely been presented with a long list of words and references to the passages where they occur, often with very different meanings, and is thus called upon to roam over many volumes in order to form a *glossary* for himself."—BOSWELL.

"The *lexicons* of ancient tongues."—JOHNSON.

"This *encyclopædia* and round of knowledge."—SIR T. BROWN.

DIET. FOOD. REGIMEN.

As FOOD expresses generally anything on which a living animal *feeds*, so DIET (Gr. δίαιτα, *manner of living*) and REGIMEN (Lat. *rĕgĭmen, guidance, government*) are employed only of human beings. Diet is ordinary and systematic food, whether prescribed for health's sake or in any other way. Black broth was part of the diet of the ancient Spartans. Regimen differs from diet, first in relating to quantity as well as quality of food prescribed, and, secondly, in relating to other

matters appertaining to the way of living, even to fasting, or the abstinence from food.

"Their failure as remedies may be reasonably attributed to the alterations which the human frame is found to undergo in the revolution of ages by a general change of *tietetic regimen*."—KNOX, *Essays*.

DIFFERENCE. VARIETY. VARIATION. CONTRAST. DIVERSITY. DISTINCTION. CONTRARIETY. DISAGREEMENT.

DIFFERENCE (Lat. *differentia*) denotes no more than the state of being unlike; and inasmuch as Nature never exactly repeats herself, the term is employed to denote the mere absence of identity, as, "It is a different person," which is equivalent to, "It is not the same person." The term DIFFERENT has to be distinguished from *various* on the one hand, and *unlike* on the other. DIFFERENT shows the unlikeness as existing in general; VARIOUS marks the dissimilarity of the species. We might say that things are infinitely various, but not infinitely different, for this latter word relates not to abstract but to specific unlikeness. The flowers of a rose-bush will be of various sizes and shades of colour, and, if the kind be red, will be different from the white kinds. Different people think differently. VARIOUS is thus seen to be of less intensity than DIFFERENT. On the other hand, DIFFERENT stands to UNLIKE as the positive to the negative. Two things, in so far as they are merely two, may be different without being unlike. Between two things that are different we may still draw a comparison; but unlikeness tends to exclude comparison. Different belongs to the inherent nature of things, unlike to the effect which they produce upon us. Blue is different from green; a circle is unlike a square.

Difference implies a comparison instituted by the mind, with a view to obviate confusion by precision of ideas. Difference goes no farther than to exclude identity. The difference is that peculiarity of quality or form which belongs to one thing exclusively of another.

"Intellectual *differences* shall shortly cease, and then moral *differences* shall take place. One moment shall equal the learned and the unlearned. The knowing and ignorant person shall at last stand upon equal ground; but the good and bad men shall be differenced for ever."—BATES.

DISTINCTION (Lat. *distinctiōnem*) is sharply-defined or palpably-apparent difference. Such distinction may be natural, scientific, practical, or scientific and natural at the same time. "A binary constellation, which, under a telescope of low power, looks like a single star, under one of greater power, resolves itself into two *distinct* stars." This is a purely physical distinction. The distinction between *contrary* and *contradictory* propositions in logic is technical or scientific. The distinction between the animal and vegetable departments of nature is both scientific and natural. In the common phrase, "A distinction without a difference," the term is used in the sense of a mental or scientific distinction, which the phrase denotes as being sought to be made, while no corresponding difference exists in fact or nature. To murder all without distinction of sex or age, means to do so without recognizing these natural differences; the phrase *without distinction* being here equivalent to without making or observing a distinction. Distinction is applied to *delicate* variations, diversity to *glaring* differences, difference to *hostile* unlikeness.

"Men, women, maids without *distinction* fall." SHAKESPEARE.

As DIFFERENCE and DISTINCTION are absolute, so VARIETY, VARIATION, and DIVERSITY are relative. They imply at least some common idea to which the objects are referred, if not some common nature to which they belong.

VARIETY (Lat. *vărietātem*) denotes difference of such a nature as strikes the observation in any aggregate of things, or in one thing as regards the aggregate or class to which it is referred, as a variety of objects in a landscape, a variety of the species. Variety is an ordinance of nature for relieving the effect of too great uniformity. The mind takes cognizance of variety, as the taste of diversity and the perception of difference.

VARIATION (Lat. *vărĭatiōnem*) ex-

presses a process, as variety expresses a result; and therefore may mean a purposed inducing of variety as well as that which is without design. Variety can only be between two or more things or parts of the same thing; but variation may be of one entire thing. So we might say, "There is great variety of colour in this single flower," but we should mean in different parts of it. Or, again, the flower, that is, the whole of it, has undergone great variation from change of soil.

DIVERSITY (Lat. *diversĭtātem*) is internal, essential, or natural difference. This may be between two only or many, while VARIETY is of many. Yet diversity falls short of CONTRARIETY (L. Lat. *contrārietatem*), which is repugnant diversity. Diversity is that difference among things of which the taste takes cognizance, and by the novelty of which it is surprised and pleased. A diversity is a striking difference either in the properties or appearance of the same object, or among more than one object contemplated simultaneously. As difference supposes resemblance, so diversity supposes opposition and contrast, which the taste seeks in things, and which gratifies it when found.

"And all *variety* or difference of existence must needs arise from some external cause, and be dependent upon it, and proportionable to the efficiency of that cause, whatsoever it be."—CLARKE.

"The essences of things are conceived not capable of such *variation*."—LOCKE.

"They cannot be divided, but they will prove opposite, and not resting in a bare *diversity*, rise into a *contrariety*."—SOUTH.

CONTRAST (Fr. *contraste*) is strongly-marked opposition. This implies not necessarily similarity of nature in the things contrasted, but a capability at least of being viewed together, otherwise there would be no room for contrast. Any two or more things which in juxtaposition exhibit different properties or excite different feelings or impressions in the mind, may form a contrast.

DISAGREEMENT (*see* AGREE) is such contrariety as exists between things which ought to be at one, or between which an unity is sought to be established. It is used not only of matters of the human will, but in the general sense of being unsuited or at variance, as two narratives may disagree.

"*Contrasts* and resemblances of the seasons."—WHEWELL.

CONTRAST can only be employed of objects or subjects which have something in common in their nature or relations. There is no contrast between a man and a dog or a tree, but between a tall tree and a stunted shrub.

"The second act of the mind is putting together such single objects in order to our comparing of the agreement or *disagreement* between them, by which we make propositions, which we call judging."—WILKINS.

DIFFICULTY. OBSTACLE. IMPEDIMENT. OBSTRUCTION.

DIFFICULTIES (Lat. *difficultātem*) are generally complicated, OBSTACLES (Lat. *obstăculum, a hindrance*), and IMPEDIMENTS (Lat. *impedimentum*) usually simple. Difficulties are not usually surmounted by vigour, energy, resolution, hardihood, and the like, but by patience, skill, and perseverance. The cutting of the Gordian knot was an escape from, not a solution of the difficulty. In marching through a foreign country, the difficulties of the general lie in many incidental things—the badness of the roads, the nature of the climate, the disposition of the natives, the scarcity or remoteness of provisions. A precipitous valley suddenly yawning under the feet of the soldiers would be an obstacle, that is, a barrier, to their progress, to be surmounted as best it might. As an obstacle is always external, so impediment is commonly internal, and operates continually, having the effect of retarding progress, while an obstacle checks it altogether till it is removed. A river might be an obstacle, a heavy cloak an impediment to the traveller. In common parlance, difficulties are met and solved, obstacles surmounted, impediments removed. It is obvious that the same thing may be sometimes all three, according to the point of view from which it is regarded. The

eloquence of Demosthenes was to Philip of Macedon a difficulty to be met with his best resources, an obstacle to his own ambition, and an impediment in his political career. Difficulties perplex, impediments embarrass, obstacles deter or retard. Difficulties commonly arise out of the inherent nature and character of the matter in hand. Obstacles come from foreign causes. Impediments come from some established law or superior force. In deliberative meetings, great difficulties are sometimes raised by factious spirits. The objection of the parents is commonly a serious obstacle in the way of a proposed marriage. That it should fall within the prohibited degrees of affinity would present such an impediment as it might be impossible to remove. The difficulty embarrasses, and no more. The obstacle hinders, but it may be surmounted. The impediment is fatal; the only hope lies in removing it.

The OBSTRUCTION (Lat. *obstructiōnem*) is not so strong as OBSTACLE, which latter has also a more abstract sense. We surmount obstacles, and remove obstructions. An obstacle may be moral and internal, as indolence is an obstacle to success. Obstruction is external, and lies in the path. An obstacle for the time checks, an obstruction retards.

"'Tis he th' *obstructed* paths of sound shall clear,
And bid new music charm th' unfolding ear." POPE.

"Was ever anything *difficult* or glorious achieved by a sudden cast of a thought, a flying stricture of the imagination?"—SOUTH.

"The want of this (a life conformable to the religion which we profess) hath been an *impediment* to the progress of Christianity, and a stumbling-block in the way of unbelievers."—JORTIN.

"Because an *obstacle* by nature earthly and foul doth not receive the pure clearness of light."—RALEGH.

DIFFIDENCE. DISTRUST. MISTRUST. MISGIVING. SUSPICION.

Of these, the first, DIFFIDENCE (Lat. *diffidentia*), if the word stands alone, is only used of ourselves. It is a distrust of our own powers, or a slowness to give ourselves credit for having any. It may be with or without sufficient grounds. DISTRUST is want of trust both as regards ourselves and others. It relates not only to the power but to the will, and to schemes, efforts, and the like. MISTRUST relates not to the power but only to the will, and hence can only be properly used of animate beings. To distrust is *to doubt the sufficiency*, mistrust, *to doubt the integrity*. If I send a messenger on a confidential errand, and then say I distrust him, I mean, or ought to mean, I distrust his powers, and fear that he will not carry out successfully what I have confided to him. If I say I mistrust him, I mean, I fear that he will intentionally play me false. To distrust is to feel *absence* of trust. To mistrust is to have a feeling of *wrong* trust. Distrust is more nearly related to diffidence, mistrust to suspicion. MISGIVING is entirely internal or reflexive. It is the spontaneous suggestion of distrust, when the shadow of doubt is, as it were, cast back upon a former conviction, resolution, or act.

SUSPICION (Lat. *suspiciōnem*) relates to something external to ourselves, or, at least, something of which we have no direct cognizance. It is the tendency to believe without adequate proof in the existence of something which is, by usage, unfavourable, hurtful, or wrong. We do not commonly suspect good. Yet this sense is not to be absolutely excluded, for both the verb "suspect" and the noun "suspicion" are sometimes taken in the general way of imagining to exist under circumstances of concealment, as, "Judging from the roughness of his manner, one would little suspect the real tenderness of his disposition."

"There were some essays made faintly, *diffidently*, and occasionally at first like those of men who, emerging out of darkness, were dazzled as well as enlightened."—BOLINGBROKE.

"It appears evidently that God's moving David, or Satan's provoking him, or his own *distrustful* heart tempting him, to number the people, are all phrases that have [illegible] and the same meaning."—CLARKE.

"Next stood *Mistrust*, with frequent sigh,
Disordered look, and squinting eye,
While meagre Envy claimed a place,
And Jealousy, with jaundiced face."
COTTON.

"No man should reckon every doubting or *misgiving* of his heart about the safety of his spiritual estate inconsistent with that confidence toward God which is here spoken of."—SOUTH.

"*Suspicion* may be excited by some kind of accusation not supported by evidence sufficient for conviction, but sufficient to trouble the repose of confidence."—COGAN.

DIFFUSE. DISCURSIVE. PROLIX. COPIOUS.

Of these, as epithets applied to styles of speaking or writing, DIFFUSE (Lat. *diffundĕre*, part. *diffūsus*, *to pour in different directions*) rather relates to the language, DISCURSIVE (Lat. *discurrĕre*, *to run about*, part. *discursus*) to the treatment of the subject, and PROLIX (Lat. *prōlixus*, *stretched far out*) to the effect of both in combination. A diffuse writer or speaker is not sparing of time or space. He employs sentences which might have been condensed into fewer words, and expands into imagery, illustration, and amplification of all sorts. Diffuseness is the extreme of which COPIOUSNESS (Lat. *cōpiōsus*, *well supplied*, *eloquent*) is the mean, and may be the result either of wealth of thought or language, or simply of the contrary, and an inability to compress. DISCURSIVE denotes the absence of unity, system, method, and sequence. It belongs to a mind, which does not estimate the relative bearings of different portions of the subject-matter upon the central point, and treats them in undigested series. PROLIX denotes any sort of protraction of discourse which imparts the sense of weariness, and of superfluous minuteness or tedious length in the treatment of the subject.

"A sentiment which, expressed *diffusely*, will barely be admitted to be just, expressed concisely, will be admired as spirited."—BLAIR.

It is remarkable that the unfavourable sense of the term DISCURSIVE is of recent growth. In the older English writers the word is employed as the adjective corresponding to *discourse*—the Latin *discursus*, *reasoning*—as in the following:—

"Rational and *discursive* methods are fit only to be made use of in philosophers, men of deep reason, and improved minds. The generality of mankind would be utterly insensible of their force."—ATTERBURY.

"But flie we now *prolixitie* best is."—CHAUCER.

"The sense of the laws, I am sure, is on my side, which are by no means sparing of the orator's time. It is not brevity, but *copiousness*, a full representation of every circumstance, which they recommend."—MELMOTH, *Pliny*.

DIGNITY. LOFTINESS. HAUGHTINESS.

DIGNITY (Lat. *dignĭtātem*) is used in the different senses of excellence or importance, high station, and loftiness of demeanour. In this latter sense it is the honourable mean of which the others are vicious extremes. Dignity, in its best sense, is that elevation of soul without pride which shows itself in the manners and in demeanour toward others. It flows from a proper consciousness of what is due to oneself, combined with a recognition of the claims of others.

LOFTINESS (*loft*, *an upper room*; prop. meaning, *air*; A. S. *lyft*, Ger *luft*) is such an air as seems to indicate a vague sense of personal superiority, which, in ordinary persons, is pitiable and ridiculous, and graceful not even in the highest of rank.

HAUGHTINESS (a corr. of O. Eng. *hautein-ness*, O. Fr. *hautain*, from *haut*, *high*) is more offensive than loftiness, because it is the result of comparison of self with others, resulting in the persuasion that they ought to be treated as inferiors. Dignity unlike the others, conveys the idea grace of manner.

"Taller, indeed,
I may perceive than he, but with these eyes
Saw never yet such *dignity* and grace."
COWPER, *Iliad*.

It may be observed that LOFTINESS is often used as a term of praise, when not applied to persons and demeanour, as in the following:—

"The *loftiness* of his fancy, the richness of his vein, and the elegancy of his style."—BARROW.

"As many more can discover that a man is richer than that he is wiser than themselves, superiority of understanding is not so readily acknowledged as that of fortune; nor is that *haughtiness* which the consciousness of great abilities incites borne with the same submission as the tyranny of affluence."—JOHNSON.

DILATE. EXPAND. EXTEND. ENLARGE. DISTEND.

To DILATE, to DISTEND, and to EXPAND differ from to EXTEND and to ENLARGE, in denoting an increase of bulk or space wrought on all sides, or, at least, on more than one; while the latter may be by increase only in one direction. Again, DILATE (Lat. *dilātāre*, act. and neut., *to spread out*) and DISTEND (Lat. *distendĕre*, *to stretch asunder*) only apply to hollow bodies or space enclosed within confines. EXPAND (Lat. *expandĕre*), EXTEND (Lat. *extendĕre*), and ENLARGE (Fr. *large*, Lat. *largus*, *large*, *extensive*) are applicable to superficial measure, and EXTEND and ENLARGE also to number. A thing is dilated when the hollow of its centre is made wider. It is expanded when it is made to occupy more space. It is extended when its bulk or length is prolonged or increased in any one direction. It is enlarged when it is in any way, but especially by external addition, made larger. It is distended when it is dilated by the elasticity of its parts. In dilating, expanding, and distending there is no addition of substance, which is the case in extending and enlarging.

"Here, by the by, we take notice of the wonderful *dilatability* or extensiveness of the throats and gullets of serpents. I myself have taken two entire adult mice out of the stomach of an adder whose neck was not bigger than my little finger."—RAY.

"Then with *expanded* wings he steers his flight,
Aloft incumbent on the dusky air
That felt unusual weight, till on dry land
He lights, if it were land that ever burned
With solid, as the lake with liquid fire."
MILTON.

"The *extenders* of empire are admired and commended, howsoever they do it, although with cruel wars, or by any unjust means."—BARROW.

"He that is in such a condition as doth place him above contempt and below envy cannot by any *enlargement* of his fortune be made really more rich or more happy than he is."—WILKINS.

"It is not nature's abhorrency of a vacuum, but the *distension* of the water, that breaks glasses when the contained liquors come to be congealed."—BOYLE.

DILATORY. PROCRASTINATING.

These words very closely resemble each other, and seem to express the same thing from different points of view. The PROCRASTINATING man (Lat. *prōcrastĭnare*, *to put off till tomorrow*, *cras*) is regarded in his habits as a man tending to postpone acting when he might or ought to have begun.

The DILATORY man (Lat. *dīlātorius*) is regarded in his acts, which he does tardily and after time, the result of previous procrastination. It may be observed, also, that procrastination refers to the whole of any act, while dilatoriness belongs to the details of it as well. In the execution of his work, the procrastinating man, when he has once begun, has ceased to procrastinate, but the dilatory man may be dilatory while he works. There are persons who are given to procrastination, but who are singularly undilatory when once they have begun to work.

"The king of Spain, indeed, delayed to comply with our proposals, and our armament was made necessary by unsatisfactory answers and *dilatory* debates."—JOHNSON.

"The enemy of mankind hath furnished thee with an evasion. For that he may make smooth the way to perdition, he will tell the *procrastinator* that the thief upon the cross was heard by our Saviour at the last hour."—JUNIUS.

Men only are procrastinating; both men and measures may be dilatory.

DILIGENT. ACTIVE. ASSIDUOUS. INDUSTRIOUS. LABORIOUS. SEDULOUS. EXPEDITIOUS. PROMPT.

The DILIGENT man (Fr. *diligent*) is he who gives sustained attention to any matter which admits of perseverance and interest. This may be a matter of habit with things in general, or with some one occupation in particular, or it may be occasional without being habitual. It denotes a specific pursuit. In this respect it differs from INDUSTRIOUS (Lat. *indus-*

triōsus) which denotes a nature which loves work for its own sake. Diligence signifies the attention we pay to any particular object out of preference to others. Industry is the habit of laying up for ourselves a store, whether of knowledge or worldly goods. Diligence often produces industry, which may be employed on many various objects. The man who gleans information from many different sources is industrious; he who studies a particular subject with attention is diligent. Hence the quality of diligence is not attributed to the inferior animals, while the bee and the ant are termed industrious. Diligence is a combination of activity and order. The diligent man does not lose a moment, but employs and fills up all his time. It is a high and valuable quality, yet belonging rather to secondary than to the highest minds. It is the indispensable requisite of all *ordinary* success, especially because, to the diligent man, work is not irksome.

The ACTIVE man (Fr. *actif*) loves employment, and is uneasy when he has nothing to do. He has not necessarily the specific aim of the diligent, or the love of grave study or hard work which belongs to the industrious, but his constitution recoils from indolence or long repose.

LABORIOUS (Lat. *lăbōriōsus*) is employed both of the agent and the work, and is a stronger form of INDUSTRIOUS, as applied to persons. The laborious man does not grudge hard effort where needed, especially in compensating for his own deficiencies.

ASSIDUOUS (Lat. *assĭduus, assĭdēre, to sit near, to sit down*) and SEDULOUS (Lat. *sĕdŭlus*) both express steady and persevering attention to an occupation or pursuit; but SEDULOUS denotes that it is natural or habitual, ASSIDUOUS only denotes the fact, which may be casual without implying a habit. The assiduous person is constantly attentive, the sedulous constantly busy. SEDULOUS belongs rather to the quiet matters of common occupation, and is a term of a quieter character than ASSIDUOUS. Moreover SEDULOUS expresses continuity of *employment*, assiduity continuity of *purpose*. One may be assiduous in making efforts periodically, or when occasion offers; but he who is sedulous sticks to his task without intermission.

"*Diligence* and accuracy are the only merits which an historical writer may ascribe to himself, if any merit indeed can be assumed from the performance of an indispensable duty."—GIBBON.

"The soul, being an *active* nature, is always propending to the exercising of one faculty or other."—GLANVILL.

"A scholar is *industrious* who doth *assiduously* bend his mind to study for getting knowledge."—BARROW.

"Whence labour or pain is commonly reckoned an ingredient of industry, and *laboriousness* is a name signifying it."—*Ibid.*

"Be *sedulous* to discharge thy trust. Be zealous for souls, and careless of money." BISHOP TAYLOR.

He who is diligent loses no time at his work, which he performs assiduously. He who is EXPEDITIOUS (Lat. *expĕdīre, to expedite*, part. *expeditus*) performs it with rapidity, which may be the result of diligence or ability or both.

He who is PROMPT (Lat. *promptus, ready*) is quick to undertake, as well as to execute and discharge, his task with that expedition which comes from a willing mind. One should be diligent in the task which one has to do, expeditious in that which requires to be brought to a speedy termination, prompt in executing the orders one has received. Diligence is never wrong in itself, though it may, of course, be in a bad cause. Expedition, on the other hand, may be excessive, and promptitude misplaced.

DIRECT. CONDUCT. REGULATE. To DIRECT (Lat. *dirĭgĕre*, part. *directus*), as applied to the administration of affairs, is more authoritative than CONDUCT (Lat. *conducĕre*, part. *conductus, to lead together*), while CONDUCT is more active or operative. We direct by ordering others in the way to a certain end, as to direct the movements of an army. We conduct by actually taking a practical part, as

we speak of conducting an important or lucrative business.

REGULATE (Lat. *rēgŭlāre*) stands midway between, with less of the command of DIRECT, and less of the activity of CONDUCT; as, to regulate the proceedings of a public meeting.

"And, to prevent all dangers and all disorder, there should always be two of the scholars with them, as witnesses and *directors* of their actions."—COWLEY.

"If the Jews under his *conduct* should endeavour to recover their liberties, and fail in it, they knew that the nation would be severely punished by the Romans."—JORTIN.

"Knowledge without its *regulator*, temperance."—WARBURTON.

DIRECT. RIGHT. STRAIGHT.

RIGHT (Lat. *rectus*) and STRAIGHT (O. Fr. *estroit*, Lat. *strictus*), as employed of lines or lines of movement, differ as the technical from the natural. A right line is a line mathematically straight. DIRECT has more than a physical meaning, and denotes that which goes to the point intended with as much straightforwardness as possible. In this sense we speak of a direct answer to a question. A direct road to a town is one which conducts to it at once without leading elsewhere; this it may do without being straight, or represented by a right line upon paper. STRAIGHT has the purely physical meaning of not crooked, and may be employed of physical objects, as a straight stick; a mode in which neither right nor direct can be employed.

"Sounds do not require to be conveyed to the sense in a *right* line as visibles do, but may be arched, though it be true they move strongest in a *right* line, which nevertheless is not caused by the rightness of the line, but by the shortness of the distance."—BACON.

"Truth is the shortest and nearest way to our end, carrying us thither in a *straight* line."—TILLOTSON.

"There be that are in nature faithful and sincere, and plain and *direct*, not crafty and involved."—BACON.

DIRECTION. ADDRESS. ORDER.

Of these the former more strictly relates to things and places, the latter to persons; the DIRECTION of a letter is the place to which it is to be sent. The ADDRESS includes the person to whom it is to be sent.

"There could not be a greater chance than that which brought to light the powder treason, when Providence as it were snatched a king and kingdom out of the very jaws of death only by the mistake of a word in the *direction* of a letter."—SOUTH.

"The Kinges highnes *addressed* his gracious letters to the maior and comonaltie of the citie."—HALL, *Henry VIII.*

As distinguished from ORDER, DIRECTION conveys more prominently the idea of instruction, while ORDER conveys that of authority. A master may give DIRECTIONS to his servant, or a friend may give directions to another how he is to proceed in certain cases, as, for instance, how he is to find a certain locality in a large town; but ORDER is always authoritative.

"Wisdom is profitable to *direct*."—*English Bible.*

"To execute laws is a royal office, to execute *orders* is not to be a King."—BURKE.

DIRECTLY. IMMEDIATELY. INSTANTLY. INSTANTANEOUSLY. FORTHWITH. INCONTINENTLY.

DIRECTLY refers more especially to the actions of men, IMMEDIATELY (Lat. *immĕdiatus, not having anything in the middle*, a logical term) to the course of time.

INSTANTLY (Lat. *instans, present*) is formed to express an interval so small as to be inappreciable. INSTANTANEOUSLY has the same meaning, but with the specific reference to the interval between the cause and its effect. "I desired him to go, and he went directly." IMMEDIATELY has a negative, INSTANTLY a positive force. "I went immediately," would mean that I allowed nothing to intervene between the present moment and my going. It commonly follows something to which it refers, as to a sort of date or starting-point. INSTANTLY commonly relates to the actions of intelligent agents, INSTANTANEOUSLY to physical causation as appreciated by the senses, as "The explosion was instantaneous;" "In

stantly upon seeing the accident I ran to the spot."

FORTHWITH is a word formed to express immediateness of procedure, or unbroken continuity of effect. INCONTINENTLY (Fr. *incontinent*) expresses the same idea negatively, that of the absence of any restraint or detention. The word is somewhat antiquated.

"*Immediately* he sent word to Athens that he would *incontinently* come hither with a host of men."—GOLDYNG.

"*Immediately* there fell from his eyes as it had been scales, and he received sight *forthwith*."—*English Bible.*

"*Directly* he stopped, the coffin was removed by four men."—DICKENS.

Straight in poetry, and *straightway* in older English are used in the same sense.

"I know thy generous temper well:
Fling but the appearance of dishonour on it,
It *straight* takes fire and mounts into a blaze." ADDISON.

"Sleep *instantly* fell on me."
MILTON.

"Sometimes the bull drops down dead *instantaneously*."—SWINBURNE, *Spain.*

DISABILITY. INABILITY. DISQUALIFICATION.

DISABILITY (Lat. *prefix dis-*, and O. Fr. *habile*, Eng. *able*, Lat. *hăbĭlis*) is privative; INABILITY is *negative*. DISABILITY expresses the absence of power or fitness, physical, moral, intellectual, or social, in a subject capable of it. INABILITY expresses its absence in a subject incapable of it. In this way inability is irremediable, disability may be sometimes removed by giving, or giving back, the qualifications.

DISQUALIFICATION (Lat. *dis-*, and *qualify*) differs from DISABILITY in being more general, while DISABILITY is commonly used of specific social privileges.

"For they will be freed from that terrene concretion and remains of the carnal part bringing on the inconveniences, *disabilities*, pains, and mental disorders spoken of in the last section."—SEARCH.

"It is not from *inability* to discover what they ought to do that men err in practice."—BLAIR.

"We often pretend, and sometimes really wish, to sympathize with the joys of others when by that disagreeable sentiment (envy) we are *disqualified* from doing so."—SMITH, *Moral Sentiments.*

DISADVANTAGE. DETRIMENT.

The former relates to the possible, the latter to the actual. A DISADVANTAGE (*see* ADVANTAGE) is that which hinders from the amount of good which otherwise might have been attained. A DETRIMENT (Lat. *detrimentum, loss, damage, dĕtĕrĕre, to rub away*) diminishes the amount of good actually existing. Disadvantage commonly refers to the actions and well-being of intelligent agents, detriment to anything of the nature of a valuable possession, or which ought to be preserved in integrity.

"Besides, it plainly proveth the properness of their parts and tallness of their industry who thereby, and by God's blessing thereon, reached so high preferment, though *disadvantaged* by standing on so low ground of their extraction."—FULLER.

"Though every man hath a property in his goods, yet he must not use them in *detriment* of the commonwealth."—*State Trials*, HAMPDEN.

DISAFFECTION. DISLOYALTY.

The former is a wider term than the latter. It denotes, generally, alienation or want of goodwill. DISLOYALTY (O. Fr. *disloyal, disloyal; loi, law*) does not necessarily imply disaffection, as in England, to a monarchical head, or form of government, but may be to any superior, and especially to the form of government under which one lives. All disloyalty is, of course, disaffection; but all disaffection is not disloyalty. If the disaffection be against an usurped government, it may spring from loyal attachment to that which is the rightful form.

"Cordelia at length arrives; an opiate is administered to the king to calm the agonies and agitations of his mind, and a most interesting interview ensues between this daughter that was so unjustly suspected of *disaffection* and the rash and mistaken father."—*Adventurer.*

"The devil and his ministers, wicked seedsmen, sowed in you darnel and cockle, treason and *disloyalty*. They have made you forget your duty to your natural prince and country."—*State Trials.*

DISAPPOINT. BALK. (*See* BAFFLE.)

These terms both imply the depriving another of something which he had anticipated; but DISAPPOINT (Fr. *désapointer*, see APPOINT) refers commonly to what is hoped, desired, or expected, BALK (O. E. *balk*, meaning a *beam*, or an unploughed *ridge* or *strip* between two furrows) to what is planned or devised. Hence BALK is hardly used but of such things as are done on purpose, while DISAPPOINT is employed of any untoward influence. The farmer is disappointed by heavy rains in harvest time. The term BALK is commonly used of the stopping of discreditable rather than of honourable designs.

"By the inward overpowering influences of His Spirit a man's desires shall become cold and dead to those things which before were so extremely apt to captivate and command them, than which there cannot be a greater *balk* to the tempter, nor a more effectual defeat to all his temptations."—SOUTH.

"Cut off even in the blossom of my sin,
Unhouzled, *disappointed*, unaneled."
SHAKESPEARE.

DISAPPROBATION. DISAPPROVAL.

Although these words have the same root (Lat. *appröbare, to approve*) they are employed in a different way. DISAPPROBATION is the feeling, DISAPPROVAL is the expression of it. Hence disapproval is the more public and formal. To disapprove is therefore sometimes used in the sense of formally refusing a sanction, or annulling, in consequence of the feeling of disapprobation. As, "The acts of the provincial governor were disapproved by the government at home;" or, "His acts met with the disapprobation of the senate."

"Now the chief gentlemen of all countries travelled to him to tender their service, which implied a *disapprobation* at least, if not a contempt of the two houses' carriage towards him."—CLARENDON.

"I *disapprove* alike
The host whose assiduity extreme
Distresses, and whose negligence offends."
COWPER'S *Homer*.

DISAVOW. DENY. DISOWN. REPUDIATE. DISCLAIM.

To DISAVOW (O. Fr. *désavouer*) is to refuse to acknowledge in a strong manner, with some solemnity, and in general terms.

"A solemn promise made and *disavowed*."—DRYDEN'S *Virgil*.

To DENY (O. Fr. *denier*, Lat. *dĕnĕgāre*) is to contradict specifically. A disavowal is commonly volunteered; a denial follows upon a specific imputation. We disavow facts or charges in which we are said to be personally implicated. We deny assertions and requests of others as well. Denial has the broadest possible application, being employed of anything which in any sense might be *affirmed*.

"And thus to rack the sacred writings, to force them, whether they will or no, to bring evidence to our opinions, is an affront to our authority which is next to the *denying* on't."—GLANVILL.

To DISOWN is, as the term implies, to disavow or deny, as connected with *one's self* personally, to refuse to acknowledge personal interest, authorship, or relationship generally.

"But when you say it is impossible for you upon the sudden and without the advice of counsel to own or *disown* books, you seem very dark to me. I cannot dive into your meaning."—*State Trials*.

REPUDIATE (Lat. *rĕpŭdiare, to divorce, to repudiate*) is to force away from one's self what some other person or some external power would connect with us, as a gift, claim, or responsibility. The term was of old employed in the technical sense of divorce, but with a difference, as follows:—

"There is this difference between a divorce and a *repudiation*, that a divorce is made by a mutual consent occasioned by a mutual antipathy, while a *repudiation* is made by the will and for the advantage of one of the two parties, independently of the will and advantage of the other."—MONTESQUIEU.

To DISCLAIM (Lat. pref. *dis-*, and *claim*) is the opposite of *claim*, to waive, as a claim, to deny ownership or responsibility, right, merit, or pretension.

"To tell you the truth, my dear sir, I think the honour of our nation to be somewhat concerned in the *disclaimer* of the

proceedings of this society of the Old Jewry and the London Tavern."—BURKE.

DISBELIEF. UNBELIEF. INCREDULITY. INFIDELITY.

DISBELIEF and UNBELIEF (A. S. *gelyfan, to believe*) are thus differenced: unbelief is negative, disbelief is positive. One may have unbelief from want of knowledge, but disbelief rejects as false. Unbelief is the absence, disbelief the refusal of credit.

"There have been doubtless in all ages such as have *disbelieved* the existence of anything but what was sensible."—CUDWORTH.

"For the mind doth by every degree of affected *unbelief* contract more and more of a general indisposition towards believing."—ATTERBURY.

INCREDULITY (Fr. *incredulité*, Lat. *incredŭlitatem*) and INFIDELITY (Fr. *infidelité*, Lat. *infĭdelitatem*) are used, the former to signify absence of belief where it is *possible*, the latter absence of belief where belief is *right*. Incredulity may be, therefore, right where it denotes a rightful reluctance of assent to what ought not to be easily believed, or not believed at all. Infidelity is by the force of the term wrong. It has the further sense of a breach of faith in matters not of belief, but practice—where those matters depend upon contract or promise.

"There is nothing so wild and extravagant to which men may not expose themselves by such a kind of nice and scrupulous *incredulity*."—WILKINS.

"The uncertainty of princes, the caprices of fortune, the corruption of ministers, the violence of factions, the unsteadiness of counsels, and the *infidelity* of friends."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

DISCARD. DISMISS. DISCHARGE.

Of these, DISCHARGE (O. Fr. *descharger, charger, to load, charge*) has applications in which it is not synonymous with the other two; as, to a load or cargo, a missile, an office, duty, or obligation, in the sense not of disregarding, but performing it. It is here equivalent to a removal from personal connexion with one's self. To DISCARD (Lat. *dis-*, and L. Lat. *carta, a card*) is, literally, to throw out of the hand as an *useless card*. It has, therefore, the force of rejection of the person or thing so disposed of as useless or of comparatively little value; while DISCHARGE is capable both of an honourable and dishonourable sense. DISMISS (Lat. *dis-, apart, missus, sent*) is simply to send away or get rid of, and takes its colouring from the character of the dismissal. A servant may be dismissed for bad conduct, an untenable charge dismissed by a magistrate; an officer, arraigned before a court-martial, may be dismissed without any stain upon his character, or, on the other hand, dismissed the service. It has, when applied to things of the mind, a meaning closely resembling DISCARD, that is, to abandon as worthless or insignificant; as, you may dismiss that idea as fictitious, that fear as groundless, that hope as vain. In this sense, however, DISCARD is used of habits, as to discard the follies and vices of youth, where we should not use DISMISS. As applied to persons, DISMISS has less than DISCHARGE the idea of inferiority in the person sent away; and, on the other hand, it has more of the force of *peremptory* sending away. A king might dismiss his refractory ministers; but he would not be said to discharge any but his menial servants

"A man *discards* the follies of boyhood.—I. TAYLOR.

"Before he came in sight the crafty god
His wings *dismissed*, but still retained his rod." DRYDEN'S *Ovid*.

"Death is the *discharger* of all griefs and miseries."—SIR T. ELYOT.

The last quotation illustrates the wide meaning of DISCHARGE. It is, in short, to relieve of a charge or burden, which may be of many kinds, as of a trust, an obligation, servitude, a criminal accusation, a responsibility, and the like.

DISCERNMENT. PENETRATION. DISCRIMINATION. JUDGMENT. DISCRETION.

All these terms relate to the practical intellect. DISCERNMENT (Lat. *discernĕre*, part. *discrētum, to separate, distinguish*) is combined keenness and accuracy of mental vision. It sees character, deeds, actions, in their

differences, their peculiar motives, their true nature. It is first penetrative, then discriminative. The discerning man is not easily misled, because he is not imposed upon by appearances, nor takes one thing for another.

"Syrena is for ever in extremes,
And with a vengeance she commends or blames.
Conscious of her *discernment*, which is good,
She strains too much to make it understood." YOUNG.

PENETRATION (Lat. *pĕnĕtrare, to penetrate*) is the power of seeing deeply into things, and is that faculty, which, when habitually exercised upon different objects, constitutes great discernment; for discernment is general, penetration is in detail; and, while discernment is commonly spoken of character, penetration is used of specific acts, thoughts, intentions, or motives. As the man of discernment does not confound, so the man of penetration does not overlook, nor is easily deceived. The faculty of penetration is more energetic than discernment. Discernment is exercised upon the common differences and relations of human character, penetration upon those which challenge peculiar powers of insight. Discernment sees and judges. Penetration sees and detects. Discernment reads the countenance. Penetration pierces the mask.

"The drawing of Sir Thomas More at Kensington has a freedom, a boldness of thought, and acuteness of *penetration* that attest the sincerity of the resemblance."—WALPOLE.

DISCRIMINATION (Lat. *discrīmĭnāre, to separate, distinguish*) is a more directly practical term. It is discernment in minute particulars, and of such a kind as leads to the acting upon the differences observed. Discernment shows a man the nature of the end to be aimed at; discrimination will guide him in his selection of the means to attain it.

"The sculptors of the last age, from not attending sufficiently to this *discrimination* of the different styles of painting, have been led into many errors."—SIR J. REYNOLDS.

JUDGMENT (Lat. *jŭdĭcem, a judge*) is the faculty of deciding in practical matters with wisdom, truly, skilfully, or accurately. It has to do not so much with actualities, like discernment and penetration, but with possibilities. It is the faculty of weighing the issues of things, and of deciding aright in reference to them; and is that virtue in general of which prudence is the special application. The two fold idea of judgment, as expressing first a faculty of the mind, and, secondly, the good use of that faculty to practical purposes, may be realized by collating the two following passages from Stewart and Locke respectively:—

"For wit lies most in the assemblage of ideas and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherever can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; *judgment*, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating ideas one from another wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another."—LOCKE.

"When we give our assent to a mathematical axiom, or when after perusing the demonstration of a theorem, we assent to the conclusion; or in general when we pronounce concerning the truth or falsity of any proposition, or the probability or improbability of any event, the power by which we are enabled to perceive what is true or false, probable or improbable, is called by logicians the faculty of *judgment*."—STEWART.

As DISCERNMENT regards not things themselves so much as their differences, so JUDGMENT is concerned with things themselves. The former distinguishes, the latter pronounces. The first distinguishes between the true and the false, excellence and defect, the genuine and the counterfeit, the motive and the pretext. The second relates to matters of conduct and their practical consequences. It is the character of discernment to be clear, it is the character of judgment to be wise. If we wish advice on the beauty or goodness of a thing we go to persons of discernment, if we wish for advice on the prudence or propriety of a step to be taken we go to persons of judgment. Discernment may be

quickened by experience, but is to a great extent a natural gift. Judgment for its accuracy is more largely indebted to experience, but is nearly related also to tact and taste.

DISCRETION (Lat. *discrētionem, separation, distinction*) is, etymologically, another form of *discernment*. It is *cautious* discernment, and has for its result the avoidance of such errors as come from want of self-control or want of judgment in matters of speech and action. It is discernment referred back to the standard of propriety in matters of self-control. It is a kind of prudence and moderation, and involves discernment. It is like reserve, but more difficult of attainment, inasmuch as it is not so difficult to be silent as to say only what one ought. One may be too reserved, but not too discreet. Indeed, reserve itself needs discretion or it will become rudeness. Discretion is only a virtue when it regards the interests of others. When confined to ourselves it is a social instinct of self-preservation. Reserve may be said to represent the negative and passive side of discretion, for reserve knows only what *not* to do and say, discretion knows also how to act and speak.

"The second thing that naturally shows itself in paucity of words is *discretion*, and particularly that prime and eminent part of it that consists in a care of offending."—SOUTH.

DISCHARGE. ACQUITTAL.

The DISCHARGE is a judgment upon an accused person found guilty, because the law has not exactly provided for the offence (O. Fr. *descharger, charge, a charge, or burden*). The ACQUITTAL (Fr. *acquitter*, Lat. *adquĭtāre*) recognizes his innocence. There is then between these terms all the difference that there is between a guilty person and an innocent one. In the former case the law is powerless to punish, in the latter powerful to absolve.

DISCLOSE. DIVULGE. REVEAL. DISCOVER. TELL.

DISCLOSE (O. Fr. *desclos, disclosed*), is to expose to view or knowledge anything which before was secret, hidden, or concealed.

DIVULGE (Lat. *dīvulgāre, to publish abroad; vulgus, the common people*) is to communicate what had been before kept or confided as a secret, or known to but one or a few.

REVEAL (Lat. *rĕvĕlāre, re-, back*, and *vēlum, a veil*) is to make known that which has been unknown or concealed. This may be purposely or designedly; with or without breach of faith. It differs from DISCLOSE, as applying only to matters of knowledge, while DISCLOSE is applicable to physical objects of sight. The matter revealed is supposed to be of value or interest to him to whom it is revealed. It may be to one or a few, while DIVULGE is to many.

DISCOVER (O. Fr. *descouvrir*) is simply to remove what hid from view, and so to bring an object to light. This may be spontaneous. In this way the term is employed of such manifestations as are not the result of specific design, the knowledge of which, therefore, was not antecedently in the possession of the discoverer. It is a sudden, unexpected, bringing before the eyes, not of others, but one's own.

TELL (A. S. *tellan*) denotes an intention to give information in successive detail, and expresses such only as is communicated by words, except when used metaphorically. To tell is to declare things purposely, with a design to inform the listener. Disclosure may be accidental. To reveal is to make known what is concealed by withdrawing what covered it. To divulge often follows upon revealing, being a spreading abroad of the knowledge of what is revealed. The term REVEAL conveys a favourable, as DIVULGE an unfavourable, impression. We reveal under a sense of duty or for the benefit of another, we divulge to his injury in betrayal of a trust.

"When stormy winds *disclose* the dark profound." POPE'S *Homer*.

"Secrets which perhaps the confidence of friend has made known to the treacherous *divulger* of them."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"The doctrines thus delivered we call the *revealed* or Divine law, and they are to be found only in the Holy Scriptures."—BLACKSTONE.

"It is idle to say that a future state had been *discovered* already. It had been *discovered* as the Copernican system was; it was one guess among many. He alone *discovers* who proves."—PALEY.

"Who can *tell* how oft he offendeth?"—*English Psalms*.

DISCOVERY. INVENTION.

Both DISCOVERY (in O. Fr. *descouvrir, to discover, des-*, and *couvrir, to cover*) and INVENTION (Lat. *inventionem, a devising*) denote generally something new that is found out in the arts and sciences. But the term DISCOVERY involves in the thing discovered not merely novelty, but curiosity, utility, difficulty, and consequently some degree of importance. All this is less strongly involved in INVENTION. But there are yet wider differences. One can only discover what has in its integrity existed before the discovery, while invention brings a thing into existence. America was discovered. Printing was invented. Fresh discoveries in science often lead to new inventions in the industrial arts. Indeed, discovery belongs more to science, invention to art. Invention increases the store of our practical resources, and is the fruit of search. Discovery extends the sphere of our knowledge, and has often been made by accident.

DISCREDIT. DISHONOUR. DISGRACE. DISFAVOUR.

These words, which are the negations of certain opposites, are best understood by the opposites which they negative. DISCREDIT interferes with a man's credit or respectability. DISGRACE marks him as a conspicuous object of another's disapproval. DISHONOUR is the treatment with positive disrespect. DISFAVOUR is the becoming a cause of offence. A man may, therefore, discredit or disgrace himself, but he can only be dishonoured by others. This may be deserved or not, as a foolish young king may dishonour a venerable minister. He who falls in social estimation incurs discredit; he who loses the respect of society or a personal superior is disgraced. He who is treated as unworthy in the sight of others is dishonoured. He who has forfeited or lost the good opinion or kindly feeling of another is in disfavour. This may be unmerited, and of itself carries no idea of blameworthiness. Disfavour is often the result of caprice. It may be momentary. If not it is the prelude of disgrace.

"I think good to deliver it (learning) from the *discredits* and disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally disguised, appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politicians, and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves."—BACON.

"No vow the god, no hecatomb unpaid,
But the *dishonour* of his priest resents,
Whom Agamemnon menaced, and refused
His daughter's freedom at the richest price."
COWPER'S *Homer*.

"Till the proud king and the Achaian race
Shall heap with honours him they now *disgrace*."
POPE'S *Homer*.

DISFAVOUR is the mildest in meaning. It is simply the state of not being in favour. *See* FAVOUR.

"Many a good acquaintance has been lost from a general prepossession in his *disfavour*, and a severe aspect has often had under it a very agreeable companion."—*Tatler*.

DISDAINFUL. SCORNFUL. CONTEMPTUOUS. SUPERCILIOUS.

DISDAINFUL (exhibiting *disdain*, O. Fr. *desdein*) denotes that kind of look or manner—for it is commonly confined to demeanour, and not to pure thought or judgment—which is the result of a depreciation or disregard of what is due to others, and a vague habit of regarding others as beneath one's self. It has in it more of affectation than of reason, and is often accompanied by weakness and silliness of character. It is the indiscriminate exhibition of a notion of personal superiority without ground or occasion.

"Let not ambition mock their useful toil,
Their homely joys and destiny obscure;

Nor grandeur hear with a *disdainful* smile
The short and simple annals of the poor."
GRAY.

SCORNFUL (*see* SCORN) is an energetic form of this, and a positive expression of the ill-desert or utter meanness of others; while disdainful expresses little more than the habitual sense of one's own superiority. Scorn may be unmerited and misplaced, but unlike DISDAIN it has its distinct reasons.

"All but themselves they looked on with a very *scornful* piety, and thought that God hated them because they did."—STILLINGFLEET.

CONTEMPTUOUS (Lat. *contemnĕre*, part. *contemptus*, *to despise*) is more elaborately disdainful, and refers to words or actions; while DISDAINFUL hardly goes beyond the look, and is far less direct. A disdainful expression, air, smile; a scornful look; a contemptuous epithet or remark or behaviour towards another.

"This posture signifying a proud, *contemptuous* behaviour, whilst the Publican stood crouching humbly, tremblingly behind."—HAMMOND.

SUPERCILIOUS (Lat. *sŭpercĭliosus*, *sŭpercĭlium*, *the eyebrow*) is an epithet of the expression of the face and manner. Superciliousness is a lazy contemptuousness. It is that haughtiness which disdains the pains of inspection and inquiry.

"*Superciliousness* and laziness too frequent in schools."—BOYLE.

DISEASE. SICKNESS. MALADY. COMPLAINT. AILMENT. DISORDER. DISTEMPER.

DISEASE (O. Fr. *desaise*, the opposite of *aise*, *ease*, cf. *disorder*; and *malady*) is the most strictly technical of these terms, being applied in medical science to such morbid conditions of the body, or of parts of it, as admit of diagnosis, and is commonly of prolonged duration. It is specific, local, and organic, as a disease of the heart or the skin.

"Though all afflictions are evils in themselves, yet they are good for us because they discover to us our *disease* and tend to our cure."—TILLOTSON.

SICKNESS (A. S. *seóc*, *sick*) is an unscientific term, to denote the deranged condition of the constitution generally, without specifying its character.

"Sorrow, need, *sickness*, or any other adversity."—*English Liturgy*.

A MALADY (Fr. *malade*, Lat. *malèaptus*, as we say, *indisposed*) is a lingering and deep-seated disorder, which debilitates without immediately jeopardizing the vital functions. Both SICKNESS and MALADY are general; while DISEASE is specific.

"O, wist a man how many *maladies*
Folwen of excess and of glotonies,
He wolde ben the more mesurable
Of his diete, sitting at his table."
CHAUCER.

COMPLAINT (Fr. *complainte*, from O. Fr. *complaindre*, *to complain*) is commonly applied to the less violent though continuous kinds of disorder. COMPLAINT is not in this sense a term of Old English literature, but bears the sense of an expression of pain or trouble.

DISORDER (Fr. *désordre*) is a disturbance of the functions of the animal economy, and differs thus from disease, which is organic.

"The following lines upon delirious dreams may appear very extravagant to a reader who never experienced the *disorders* which sickness causes in the brain."—THOMPSON *on Sickness*.

AILMENT (*ail*, *to suffer*; A. S. *eglan*, *to pain*, *grieve*) is the lightest form of complaint, yet may be of a chronic as well as of a passing character.

"For little *ailments* oft attend the fair."
LANSDOWNE, *Cure for the Vapours*.

DISTEMPER (O. F. *destemprer*, *to derange*) is a morbid state of the animal system. It is used of the human race commonly in the sense of mental ailment, and in its physical meaning purely is spoken of the lower animals. In a secondary sense, we speak of a diseased mind, a disordered intellect or imagination, mental maladies. Though the human subject is not said to labour under such and such a particular distemper, there

is an abstract and general sense in which the word is so applicable, as in the following:—

"Peradventure it will be replied, that there are many sinners who escape all these calamities, and neither labour under any shame or disrepute, any unquietness of condition, or more than ordinary *distemper* of body, but pass their days with as great a portion of honour, ease, and health as any other man whatsoever."—SOUTH.

DISENGAGE. DISENTANGLE. EXTRICATE. DETACH.

DISENGAGE (O. Fr. *desengager*) is the simple opposite to *engage*, and, therefore, relates to one detaining or engrossing force or influence at a time.

DISENTANGLE (etym. doubtful, said to be allied to the Gothic *tagl, hair*) is to release from a condition of being *intricately* involved. DISENTANGLE differs from DISENGAGE in applying both to subject and object. We may disentangle the difficulty as well as the person involved in it.

EXTRICATE (Lat. *extricare, to get rid of tricæ, trifles, impediments*) is to liberate from complicated detention or conditions of difficulty, and relates to persons, and not things, except in a few scientific terms, as the extrication of heat or moisture.

DETACH (Fr. *détacher, to unfasten*) relates to such simple connexions as unite one thing to another, or to several others. To detach is literally to make not to touch. Its force is intermediate between separate and disjoin. Things are detached which meet at one point only. We may be disengaged from an oath or an occupation; disentangled from pecuniary difficulties, or embarrassing claims and connexions; extricated from imminent peril, where it comes from multiplied difficulties of escape; and detached from a party to which we have hitherto adhered. It is in the purely physical sense that DETACH is commonly employed, as to detach a seal from the chain to which it was suspended. "We are disengaged from what binds us; disentangled from what implicates us; extricated from what embarrasses us, and detached from what embraces us.

"We should also beforehand *disengage* our mind from other things, that we may the more effectually attend to the new object which we wish to remember."—BEATTIE.

"In the *disentanglement* of this distressful tale (the 'Nut-brown Mayde') we are happy to find that all his cruelty was tenderness, and his inconstancy the most invariable truth; his levity an ingenious artifice, and his perversity the friendly disguise of the firmest affection."—WARTON.

"His treasures were now exhausted, his subjects were highly irritated, the ministry were all frighted, being exposed to the anger and justice of the Parliament, so that he had brought himself into great distress, but had not the dexterity to *extricate* himself from it."—BURNET.

"They are, in short, instruments in the hands of our Maker to improve our minds, to rectify our failings, to *detach* us from the present scene, to fix our affections on things above."—PORTEUS.

DISGUISE. DISSEMBLE.

DISGUISE (O. Fr. *desguiser, guise, manner, fashion*) is to hide by a counterfeit appearance, or in any manner to cloak by what is fitted to mislead.

DISSEMBLE (Lat. pref. *dis-*, and Fr. *sembler, to seem*; Lat. *simulare, to simulate*) has much the same meaning; but the terms are a little differently employed. DISGUISE relates rather to the false or altered condition of the subject of the disguise; DISSEMBLE to the false impression produced upon other persons. Disguise is general, dissimulation specific. We may disguise negatively by preventing another from knowing what is in us; but we dissemble when we lead him to believe that we have something which we have not. An enemy may disguise his hatred of another by an air of indifference. He dissembles when he assumes an air of friendship. Disguise is a matter of appearance, dissimulation a matter of action. A prince might disguise himself as a beggar; but unless he held such communications with others as to practically deceive them, he would not be dissembling.

"When we are touched with some important ill,
How vainly silence would our grief conceal.

Sorrow nor joy can be *disguised* by arts,
Our foreheads blab the secrets of our hearts." DRYDEN, *Juvenal.*

"With him, *Dissemblance* went, his paramour,
Whose painted face might hardly be detected;
Arms of offence he seld' or never wore,
Lest thence his close designs might be suspected;
But clasping close his foe, so loth to part,
He steals his dagger with false-smiling art,
And sheathes the traitorous steel in his own master's heart."
FLETCHER, *Purple Island.*

DISGUST. DISLIKE. AVERSION. DISTASTE. DISINCLINATION.

These terms not only differ in point of force, but are differently applied. DISLIKE (Lat. *dis-*, *apart*, and *like*) is to have a feeling of positive and usually permanent avoidance, though not necessarily strong in degree. We have a dislike to what is simply unpleasant to us from an inherent uncongeniality with our taste, feelings, or sentiments.

"To show any *dislike* to those who were the favourites of that infamous emperor (Domitian), was construed by him into an act of treason against himself."—MELMOTH, *Pliny.*

DISGUST (O. Fr. *desgouster, to dislike*; Lat. *gustus, taste*) is said primarily of what is offensive to the organs of taste; then analogously of anything repugnant to the moral taste or higher sensibilities of our nature.

DISTASTE, though verbally equivalent to DISGUST, is far less strong. It expresses natural uncongeniality, which is often gradually superinduced by the alienating force of habit. Disgust is the strongest but most transient, being excited by something *suddenly* presented to the experience or observation.

"The king (Henry VIII.) loved to raise mean persons, and upon the least *distaste* to throw them down."—BURNET.

"For day by day themselves,
My parents, urge my nuptials, and my son
(Of age to note it) with *disgust* observes
His wealth consumed." COWPER, *Homer.*

AVERSION (Lat. *āversionem, a turning away*) denotes a fixed internal dislike or distaste, and is stronger than either, almost amounting to hatred. Aversion is founded less on feeling, and more on sentiment and judgment. The just and humane man has an aversion to committing, no less than witnessing, an act of cruelty. It is a stronger and more definable form of disinclination.

"Strictly speaking, *aversion* is no other than a modification of desire—a desire of being liberated from whatever appears to be injurious to well-being."—COGAN.

We are disgusted with occasional exhibitions, as with acts of cruelty. If disgust is not physical, it results from the actions of men. Dislike is felt of persons and things, which is also the case with aversion; while distaste is not often applied to persons, but most commonly to what is habitually associated with ourselves, as employments, pursuits, modes of life.

DISINCLINATION (Lat. *dis-*, and *incline*) is an indisposition or dislike to the adoption of an act, a course of conduct, a policy, or mode of life, and may either be constitutional or the result of circumstances and considerations. It refers, unlike the rest, as much to our own will as to circumstances external to us.

"Whenever they found any person of quality inclined to the king, or but *disinclined* to them, they immediately seized upon his person, and sent him in great triumph to the Parliament, who committed him to prison with all circumstances of cruelty and inhumanity."—CLARENDON.

DISMAL. DULL. DREARY.

DISMAL (O. Fr. *dismal*, etym. not known). A dismal object not only produces an unenlivening, but a kind of foreboding effect. It carries on the mind to think of other matters over which that which is dismal casts a shade, being depressing to the feelings, and inducing gloom in the mind. The dismal is that which produces a constant sense of meagreness and insufficiency of light and life. A dismal day is one in which the light struggles with the darkness, and is well-nigh overpowered. A dismal tale is not acutely sorrowful, but one in which joy and hope seem in vain contending with their contraries, and the result is the gloom of continued depression.

Archbishop Trench (Select Glossary) thinks that the usage of the word has been affected by the fanciful derivation of the word from *dies mălus*.

"I trow it was in the *dismall*."
CHAUCER.

"An ugly fiend more foul than *dismal* day."
SPENSER.

"A *dismal* description of our English November."—SOUTHEY.

DULL (A. S. *dol, stupid*) is simply not sharp, bright, or quick; hence furnishing little delight, or, subjectively, not feeling it, and is not so strong as DISMAL. In its secondary application DISMAL is commonly positive; DULL may be little more than negative. A dismal description is one that impresses the mind with the sadness of actual occurrences; a dull description is no more than heavy and uninteresting. DULL, as an epithet of character, expresses such torpor of soul as is inconsistent with mental activity, and implies an innate deficiency of moral sensibility or mental power.

"In eldest times ere mortals writ or read,
Ere Pallas issued from the Thunderer's head,
Dulness o'er all possessed her ancient right,
Daughter of Chaos and Eternal Night.
Fate in their dotage this fair idiot gave,
Gross as her sire, and as her mother grave,
Laborious, heavy, busy, bold, and blind,
She ruled, in native anarchy, the mind."
POPE.

DREARY (A. S. *dreórig, sorrowful*, literally *bloody, dreór, blood*) conveys the idea of tedious, monotonous, long-drawn-out dulness. It belongs to an extent of time or space unrelieved by gladsome interval and change, as a dreary time, a dreary journey, a dreary waste of country.

"His heart was *drear*, his hope was crossed,
'Twas late, 'twas far—the path was lost
That reached the neighbour town."
PARNELL.

DISMAY. DAUNT. APPAL.

DISMAY (Lat. *dis-*, and O. Fr. *esmayer, to strike with dismay*; and this from Lat. *ex-, out of*, and O. H. G. *magan, to have power*. For fuller account, *see* SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*), true to its derivation, denotes the inspiring of a fear which interferes with action, destroying the spirit of energy and enterprize; as the traveller may be dismayed by what he hears of the perils incident to a particular route. It involves a state of gloomy apprehension.

DAUNT (O. Fr. *donter*, Lat. *dŏmĭtare, to tame*) is stronger than DISMAY, commonly implying not only the feeling of terror, but the abandonment of the undertaking in consequence of the sudden manifestation of the difficult or dangerous.

APPAL (Lat. *ad-*, and Welsh *pall, weakness, loss of power*) expresses a temporary check produced by the action of sudden fear strong enough to overwhelm the faculties. He who is dismayed suffers great mental perturbation. He who is daunted abandons his enterprize. He who is appalled is unable to act.

"So flies a herd of beeves, that hears, *dismayed*,
The lions roaring through the midnight shade."
POPE.

"No fear could *daunt*, nor earth nor hell control."
Ibid.

"Smiling ferocious, with impatient haste
Striding, and brandishing his massy spear,
Him (Ajax) viewed the Greeks exulting, with *appal*
The Trojans, and with palpitating heart
Even Hector."
COWPER, *Iliad*.

DISPARITY. INEQUALITY.

Of these, DISPARITY (Fr. *disparité*) is a species of INEQUALITY (Lat. *inæquālĭtātem*). Inequality is general or absolute; disparity is relative and specific. Disparity is inequality in reference to a common standard, while inequality does not of necessity imply this. There is an inequality of age between an old man and a youth, but no disparity. But let some common measure be introduced, as, for instance, the running a race, and there would be, in reference to their common state or undertaking, a disparity. Thus inequality involves, as it were, two terms, disparity three. It must be added, however, that DISPARITY is sometimes used in the sense of a difference of *quality*, as INEQUALITY means difference of degree.

"Notwithstanding which *inequality* of number, it was unanimously resolved, in a council of war, to fight the Dutch fleet."—LUDLOW.

"But the *disparity* of years and strength
Between you and your son duly considered,
We would not so expose you."
MASSINGER.

DISPASSIONATE. UNIMPASSIONED.

The term DISPASSIONATE relates to the mind and the judgment, as not being warped, prejudiced, or in any way swerved or carried away by passion or feeling (Lat. *passiōnem*, a translation of the Gr. *πάθος, passion, affection*). UNIMPASSIONED relates to the manner, gesture, voice, or speech, as not affected by or exhibiting strong feeling. A calm and dispassionate view of a personal question is needful to a right judgment upon it. An unimpassioned style of speaking in an orator can only be compensated for by great felicity of diction and closeness of reasoning.

"Whereas reason requires a calm and *dispassionate* situation of the mind to form her judgments aright, she wants the whole attention to look round upon every circumstance, and places her objects in all the lights wherein they are capable of standing."—SEARCH.

"The day that by their consent the seat of regicide has its place among the thrones of Europe, there is no longer a motive for zeal in their favour. It will at best be cold, *unimpassioned*, dejected, melancholy duty."—BURKE.

DISPEL. DISPERSE. (*See* SCATTER.)

DISPEL (Lat. *dispellĕre, to scatter*) is to separate in such a way as to cause to vanish, or to drive away, at the same time. It denotes some point from which the objects dispelled are thrust away. Accordingly, things dispelled commonly cease to be visible, or to exist.

DISPERSE (Lat. *dispergĕre*, part. *dispersus, to scatter in different directions*), on the other hand, means no more than to scatter abroad. By the providence of God the Jews, dispelled from their own land, are now dispersed among the nations. DISPEL commonly relates to the involuntary, as to dispel illusions from the mind; DISPERSE may be purely voluntary, in the sense of to scatter systematically, as in a garden flowers of a certain colour may be dispersed or interspersed, or religious tracts are dispersed among the poor. DISPEL is, therefore, more intensive than DISPERSE, or may be said to express what is expressed by DISPERSE and something more. DISPEL and DISPERSE both imply many objects, for the cloud can only be dispelled by separation into fragments.

"And when the king of lightnings, Jove, *dispels*
From some huge eminence a gloomy cloud,
The groves, the mountain-tops, the headland heights,
Shine all illumined from the boundless heaven." COWPER, *Iliad*.

"As when two lions in the still dark night
A herd of beeves *disperse*, or numerous flock,
Suddenly in the absence of their guard,
So fled the heartless Greeks." *Ibid.*

DISPENSE. DISTRIBUTE.

Of these, the former (Lat. *dispensāre, to weigh out*) bears no reference to any rule of number or quantity, which is the case with the latter (Lat. *distribŭĕre*), implying that in a certain number of shares the whole of a certain thing was given away. A number of *different* things would not be DISTRIBUTED, or at least some common nature would belong to them all, for we distribute what is divided or capable of division. So we might read, "Every morning at the castle gate to all the poor of the neighbourhood who might present themselves for the purpose, bread, with other provisions and money, were dispensed;" but if a certain quantity of one article were given to a certain number of persons, we might read, "Bread to the amount of a hundred loaves was distributed among the persons present." The uppermost idea in DISPENSE is varied and liberal giving; in DISTRIBUTE numerous and apportioned giving. Nature is said to dispense, but not to distribute her bounties. A dispensary issues its medicines, but in no equalized portions among any set number.

"In every benefaction between man and man, man is only the *dispenser*, but God the benefactor."—SOUTH.

"He will pass sentence on the evil angels; He will raise up the dead, and will *distribute* rewards and punishments to all proportionably to their behaviour in the days of their mortality."—JORTIN.

DISPLEASURE. DISSATISFACTION (*see* DISAPPROBATION). ANNOYANCE.

DISPLEASURE (O. Fr. *desplaisir, to displease*) is a modified anger produced invariably by the actions or conduct of men, and not by any other cause, as opposing desire or command. It is commonly applied to superiors in position, as a father is displeased with his son, a master with his servant.

DISSATISFACTION (Lat. *dis-*, and *satisfaction, sătisfăcĕre, to satisfy*) may spring from any source of disappointed wishes or expectations. We may be even dissatisfied with ourselves. Displeasure commonly implies too much done, dissatisfaction too little.

To ANNOY (O. Fr. *anoyer*, from Lat. *in ŏdio esse, to cause dislike*) is to inflict sustained personal vexation and irritation by influences reiterated, which tease, incommode, or molest us.

"My youth's first hope, my manhood's treasure,
My prattling innocent, attend,
Nor fear rebuke, nor sour *displeasure;*
A father's loveliest name is friend."
COOPER.

"To be deprived of some good which by a proper conduct might have been secured and obtained, if it be attended with *dissatisfaction* or regret, is certainly a punishment, and if it always lasts, an eternal punishment."—JORTIN.

"Common nuisances are such inconvenient and troublesome offences as *annoy* the whole community in general, and not merely some particular person."—BLACKSTONE.

DISPOSITION. CHARACTER. TEMPER.

The DISPOSITION (Fr. *disposition*) is the prevailing spirit of mind, resulting from constitution. It is the aptitude or tendency of character.

CHARACTER (Gr. χαρακτήρ, *a stamp, an impress*) is used in a variety of senses (*see* CHARACTER). As a synonym with DISPOSITION, it is the whole moral nature, of which the disposition is a manifestation. Character is often used in the sense of the social estimate formed of a man, his reputation for good or ill.

TEMPER (Lat. *tempĕries, a due mixture, temper; tempĕrāre, to combine duly*) commonly denotes the disposition or constitution of the mind in regard to the passions and affections, or the more purely emotional part of our nature. Both disposition and character are permanent. Temper is variable, unless we use the term in the sense of temperament or composition—according to the old supposition that the human individual was composed of an *admixture* of humours, and that his peculiar conformation lay in the predominance of one or more of these humours.

"There is not, there cannot be a stronger proof that pride was not designed for man than that the most excellent of the human race thought it not a proper *temper* and *disposition* of mind for Him to appear in."—PEARCE, *Sermons.*

"Remember with what mild
And gracious *temper* he both heard and judged." MILTON.

"A man of dull intellect and thoroughly subservient *character*."—MOTLEY.

DISSENT. DISAGREEMENT. VARIANCE. DIFFERENCE.

As relating to the conflict of opinions these words have their distinctions.

DIFFERENCE (Lat. *differentia*) is the simplest, and admits of degrees from the smallest to the widest variation.

DISSENT (Lat. *dissentīre, to feel differently*), unlike the rest, is employed only of persons, and not of their opinions. It commonly denotes the expression of non-agreement, without of necessity implying any opinion of one's own. I express dissent when I simply refuse to adopt something propounded by another; but a difference of opinion would imply that I held a distinct opinion of my own.

DISAGREEMENT (Lat. *dis-*, and *agree*) and VARIANCE (Lat. *vărĭare, to alter*) also imply the same thing, and commonly denote a difference on some practical, and not merely an abstract matter of opinion. Persons are said

to disagree who might be expected to act together, and to be at variance where they might be expected to exhibit harmony; they are said to differ simply as a matter of fact. DISAGREEMENT, VARIANCE, and DIFFERENCE may be used generally of interrelated numbers of persons or opinions; DISSENT expresses the specific disagreement between a person or set of persons on the one hand, and an opinion or body of opinions on the other.

"He (St. Cyprian) disavoweth the practice of one bishop excluding another from communion for *dissent* in opinion about disputable points."—BARROW.

"United thus, we will hereafter use
Mutual concession, and the gods, induced
By our accord, shall *disagree* no more."
COWPER, *Iliad.*

"Because that King Lucius was dead, and had left no issue to succeed him, the Britons, as before ye have heard, were at *variance* amongst themselves."—HOLINSHED.

"What was the *difference?*
It was a contention in public."
SHAKESPEARE.

DISSOLUTE. LICENTIOUS. (*See* ABANDONED.)

There is much in common between these two terms. Yet the LICENTIOUS man (Lat. *licentiosus*) is not necessarily DISSOLUTE (Lat. *dissŏlutus*, part. of *dissolvĕre, to let loose*), as one may take much licence of self-indulgence in one way without that universal laxity and reckless indifference to all self-restraint which is implied in the term DISSOLUTE. Licentious points rather to the indulgence of self-will or vicious pleasures, dissolute to the wanton disregard of everything that stands in the way of, or might restrain sensual enjoyment.

"Abstain from wanton and *dissolute* laughter."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

As DISSOLUTE relates invariably to sensual indulgence, so LICENTIOUS has the further meaning of exhibiting an abuse of freedom, or an excessive liberty, as in the following:—

"Courtiers, my lord, are too polite to reprove one another; the only place where they can meet with any just reproof is a free though not a *licentious* stage."—CHESTERFIELD.

DISSONANT. DISCORDANT.

A sound is DISSONANT (Lat. *dissŏnāre*) when it is harsh in itself; it is DISCORDANT (Lat. *discordāre, to be at variance*) when it is out of harmony with other sounds, though DISCORDANT is often loosely used in the sense of harsh or unmelodious. In their secondary uses DISSONANT relates more to the reason and judgment; DISCORDANT to the feelings and actions. A dissonance in principle, a discordance in practice. A dissonance is a more refined and abstract, a discordance a more palpable and practical diversity.

DISTANT. FAR. REMOTE.

Of these the Saxon monosyllable FAR (A. S. *feor*) is the simplest, denoting separation by a wide space or interval in any direction. FAR is employed physically and metaphorically.

"If, therefore, there be any who, under colour of the blessed name of Christ, subvert His doctrine, annihilate His authority and our salvation, it is so *far* from being our duty to unite ourselves to them, that, on the contrary, we are obliged to part with them."—DAILLÉ, *Apology for the Reformed Churches.*

DISTANT (Lat. *distāre, to be apart*) is a more refined term, and is employed in scientific phraseology, as "The sun is about ninety-one millions of miles distant from the earth." It is also used of difference in matters of conception, as a distant relation, a distant period of history. It may be observed that, grammatically, the part of a complete adjective can only be performed by DISTANT, not by FAR, which only occurs as the predicate of a subject. The star is far, or far off; a *distant* star—but not a *far* star. This adjectival force is attempted in a few cases only, as the far side of the river. As an adverb far is often employed in connexion with distant—far distant. Thus far implies some amount of distance; while distance might be great or small, according to the following definition:—

"This space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called *distance.*"—LOCKE.

REMOTE (Lat. *rĕmŏvere*, part. *rĕ-*

mōtus, to move back) is distant in reference to a specific starting-point, standard, presence, or purpose. As DISTANT is opposed to near, so REMOTE is opposed to immediate; as, "The accident was the remote, not the immediate cause of his death." Things are remote not only physically, but as regards our need or use of them, or the relation they bear to us, or the impression they produce on us; as a remote notion, connexion, cause, resemblance, effect. Thus REMOTE superadds to distant another idea, that of the effect caused by such distance on the condition of the distant subject. A distant spot is simply one that is far off; a remote spot is solitary, inconvenient, difficult to reach, not likely to be well known, and the like.

"Whenever the mind places itself by any thought either amongst or *remote* from all bodies."—LOCKE.

DISTINGUISH. DISCRIMINATE. ABSTRACT.

In the sense in which DISTINGUISH is a synonym with DISCRIMINATE, it is used additionally in regard to physical objects, while DISCRIMINATE is only used of moral things. We DISTINGUISH (Lat. *distinguĕre*) by the eye or the mental perception; we DISCRIMINATE (*discrīmĭnare, to separate, distinguish*) by the judgment alone. We distinguish broadly; we discriminate nicely. We distinguish best when we show *great* differences; we discriminate best when we show *slight* differences, or dissimilarities in detail under a general resemblance. The object of distinguishing is commonly practical, that of discriminating speculative. We distinguish in order to separate or keep things apart which might otherwise be confounded. We discriminate with the further view of showing wherein their differences consist. Hence discrimination must always be nice, particular, and exact, dissecting, as it were, the things discriminated. Distinction may be exact or not, minute or rough, broad or nice.

"He was in logic a great critic,
Profoundly skilled in analytic;
He could *distinguish* and divide
A hair twixt south and south-west side."
Hudibras.

"On the other side, there be a sort of men that place the greatest stress, and *discriminating* point of Christian religion, in opposing and decrying all instituted ceremonies, though innocent, decent, and without any the least touch of superstition in them."—HALE.

We ABSTRACT (Lat. *abstrăhĕre*, part. *abstractus, to draw off*) in this sense when we contemplate some property of a thing exclusively of the rest, or of the thing itself in which it resides. The logical theory of abstraction is, that it is the process by which the mind in this way prepares itself for generalization, which is the result of abstraction, and is expressed by a common noun. I abstract from a number of different objects the common quality, for instance, of whiteness.

"*Abstraction*, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind."—LOCKE.

DISTRACT. DIVERT.

These terms are both employed of that which draws or turns aside the mind from the object of its contemplation.

DISTRACT (Lat. *distrăhĕre*, part. *distractus, to draw aside*) is never used of physical things; DIVERT (Lat. *divertĕre, to turn aside*) is so employed. The mind only is distracted. A stream may be diverted from its course. DIVERT indicates a weaker force employed than DISTRACT, but the effect is more decided. We are distracted by what draws aside our attention and dissipates our thoughts in spite of ourselves. One is diverted entirely from one's purpose. A light cause diverts, a strong cause distracts. Yet the mind which is naturally light and inconstant may be easily distracted. A remarkable object or a loud sound distracts, or a curious, interesting, and attractive object diverts. Persons are distracted from close thoughts, diverted from serious or melancholy thoughts or earnest intentions.

DISTRACTION. ABSTRACTION.

Both these words (Lat. *distractiōnem, a drawing asunder; abstractiōnem, a drawing away*) convey the idea of a want of attention, but with

this difference, that it is our own ideas that make us ABSTRACTED by occupying us so strongly as to make us incapable of attending to anything but what they present to our minds; while it is one or more external objects which make us DISTRACTED so as to draw off our thoughts from that to which they have been given or ought to be given. One is abstracted who regards some other object than the one proposed, or is so occupied with his own thoughts as not to hear what is said by others. Persons accustomed to deep study, or to be engaged in important business, or who are strong in their passions and their aims, are likely to fall into abstraction; young persons and frivolous persons whose minds are untrained to patient and consecutive thought are most likely to be distracted. The merest trifles will divert or draw them away.

DISTRICT. TRACT. REGION. QUARTER. PROVINCE.

DISTRICT (L. Lat. *districtus*) was originally a portion of country over which the lord of the manor had the right to *distrain* (Lat. *distringĕre*) goods. It is so far true to its etymology that it now means a portion of land as included in some kind of administration, as a civil, municipal, ecclesiastical district.

"Even the decrees of general councils bind not but as they are accepted by the several churches in their respective *districts* and dioceses."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

A TRACT (Lat. *tractus, a drawing out, a district*) is literally something drawn out and extended. It commonly denotes such a space of country as can be taken in by the eye, or such as is distinguished by some natural characteristic, as a tract of marsh land, or forest. It is used with perfect accuracy in the following:—

"A high mountain joined to the mainland by a narrow *tract* of earth."—ADDISON.

REGION (Lat. *rĕgiōnem*) is a term of wider extent, and denotes a large tract lying about some specific centre or vicinity. In a sense yet broader REGION is used of extensive tracts lying under some great influence, as the arctic or ethereal regions, the regions of the tropics, &c.

"If thence he scape into whatever land,
Or unknown *region*." MILTON.

QUARTER (Fr. *quartier*), though not meaning necessarily *a fourth part*, or a part coincident with the quarter of the compass, carries with it, nevertheless, something of both these elements, and means a district in a particular direction as regards the whole of which it forms a part, but vague as to the *exact* direction or the *exact* extent. It is a term often manifesting either looseness of information, or an avowed generality and purposed disregard of precision in specifying locality.

"Swift to their several *quarters* hasted then
The cumbrous elements." MILTON.

PROVINCE is the Lat. *prōvincia*, an outlying conquered territory of the Roman empire, hence a region dependent on a distant authority, or a district remote from the capital; out of this flowed the idea of a territory over which a person had special jurisdiction, as the province of a proconsul, and in after-times of an archbishop; whence finally a man's peculiar business, the specific limits of a function in some wider economy and administration, a department within which action is at once a right and a duty.

"The woman's *province* is to be careful in her economy, and chaste in her affection."—*Tatler*.

DIVE. PLUNGE.

TO DIVE (A. S. *dufian*) is purposely to penetrate beneath the surface of water, and therefore may be done after the diver has entered it.

PLUNGE (Fr. *plonger*) is to throw one's self into a body of water; hence we may plunge without diving, and dive (as ducks) without plunging. In the metaphorical application of these terms, this distinction is preserved. We dive into mysteries, curiosities, and the like; we plunge into debt, difficulties, embarrassments, danger. It is the effort of penetration

which is expressed by diving, the hardihood or recklessness of action by plunging.

"*Divers* in the deep of Providence."
MONTAGUE.

"As he (Callius) had no great stock of argument, and but small forecast, anything at a *plunge* would be received which came to his relief."—WARBURTON.

DIVERS. DIFFERENT. SEVERAL. SUNDRY. VARIOUS. MANIFOLD. MULTIFARIOUS.

Of all these terms DIFFERENT is the most indefinite. It is equally applicable to few and to many; and, inasmuch as its primary force is to designate *quality*, it is applicable to any number, even to as few as two; as "they are not the same, but two different persons or things." SEVERAL (O. Fr. *several, sevrer, to sever*; from Lat. *sēpărare, to separate*) indicates more than two, but not very many, the exact number being unknown or not taken account of. SUNDRY (A. S. *sundrig, sundry, sundrian, to separate*) is very like it, but indicates disconnectedness as well as plurality. If I say there were several persons present, I refer only to number; if I say, sundry persons were present, or persons of sundry professions, I draw attention to an absence of internal relation, or to diversity of character. DIVERS and VARIOUS are more strong still, indicating a diversity and variety of kind over and above plurality. SUNDRY implies, primarily, separation, which *may* be without of necessity implying an internal difference of nature, as, "at sundry times;" DIVERS *does* imply this, as, "in divers manners." VARIOUS applies to time and to character, as "various dresses," "various periods," "various colours." There seems a very slight difference between DIVERS (Fr. *divers*) and VARIOUS; but DIVERS rather refers to a marked diversity of character or nature, VARIOUS to such differences as the eye takes cognizance of, or as strike the observation, without so strong a distinction between them. So we might say, "divers colours," and, "various shades of the same colour."

"To Sisera a prey of *divers* colours, a prey of *divers* colours of needlework, of *divers* colours of needlework on both sides, meet for the necks of them that take the spoil."—*Bible*.

"Black and white and every other colour, is caused by *different* motions made upon the eye by objects *differently* modified."—CUDWORTH.

"Like kings, we lose the conquests gained before,
By vain ambition still to make them more;
Each might his *several* province well command,
Would all but stoop to what they understand."
POPE.

"Here I had ended; but experience finds
That *sundry* women are of *sundry* minds;
With *various* crotchets filled, and hard to please,
They therefore must be caught by *various* ways."
DRYDEN, *Ovid*.

It deserves to be noted that there is a sense of VARIOUS, namely, exhibiting variety of state or appearance, in which the term is applicable to a single object, as in the following:—

"The principle (of religion) lies in a narrow compass, but the activity and energy of it is diffusive and *various*."—BISHOP HALL.

MANIFOLD (Eng. *many* and *fold*) is the English equivalent of the Latin *multiplex*. It is applicable both to single objects and to a plurality; but in the latter case the diversity is in relation to some one object or subject which exists, appears, or acts in numerous and divers ways. It thus differs from MULTIFARIOUS (Lat. *multifārius*), in which the different things have less the appearance of a common nature and inter-relation. Multifariousness stands to the manifold as diversity to difference. As manifold is a term of harmonious variety, multifarious falls only a little short of incongruity and discordance. Unity in plurality belongs to the manifold, to which the multifarious adds diversity in plurality.

"O Lord how *manifold* are Thy works, in wisdom hast Thou made them all."—*English Psalms*.

"The generic words which abound in language, assort, and, if I may use the expression, pack up under a comparatively small number of comprehensive terms the *multifarious* objects of human knowledge."—STEWART.

DIVINER. Prophet.

The Diviner (Lat. *dīvināre, to judge of things by divine or heavenly prognostication*) discovers what is hidden; the Prophet (Gr. προφήτης), as restricted to its modern conversational sense, predicts that which shall come to pass. In times when supernatural powers and processes have ceased, a practised acquaintance with the relation which externals bear to mind, character, and sentiment is the only instrument of divination. A knowledge of the way in which certain principles involve certain consequences, and an observation of the way in which like causes produce like effects are the only afflatus constituting a prophet.

DO. Act.

One Does (A. S. *don, to do*) a thing; one Acts (Lat. *ăgĕre*, part. *actus*) for the sake of doing it. Do supposes an object which terminates the action and is its effect. Action terminates in itself and may be the object of doing. Wisdom dictates that in all we do we should act with reflexion.

DOCILE. Tractable. Amenable. Facile.

Docile (Lat. *dŏcĭlis, easily taught*) implies more than Tractable (Lat. *tractābĭlis, that may be handled, yielding*). Tractable denotes no more than the absence of refractoriness, Docile the actual quality of meekness. A tractable animal may go in the right path when led; a docile animal is *easily* led; or, again, he may be made tractable by severe training, but if naturally docile he will not require this.

Amenable (Fr. *amener, to lead to*) is commonly used of human beings who are *willing* to be guided by persuasion, entreaty, and reason, without requiring coercion. It must be admitted that this is a modern and conversational use of the term. The older application appears in the example. As Docile means easy to teach, it is only by analogy that it can be applied to irrational animals. But the analogy is the more easy by reason of the fact that intellectual aptitude, as in the Old English word *docible*, so far as it ever belonged to the term, has entirely departed from it. The elephant is at once docible and docile. Docility is a quality at once passive, and, to a certain extent, by implication, active. The docile person first receives the impulse of another and then follows it voluntarily.

"The Persians are not wholly void of martial spirit, and if they are not naturally brave, they are at least extremely *docile*, and might, with proper discipline, be made excellent soldiers."—Sir W. Jones.

"Indeed, the common men, I presume, were not less *tractable* for want of spirituous liquors."—Anson's *Voyages*.

"The sovereign of this country is not *amenable* to any form of trial known to the laws."—Junius.

The docile is easily taught or led, the tractable easily managed, the amenable easily governed and persuaded.

Facile (Lat. *făcĭlis, easy*) expresses the weak and excessive aspect of amenable. The facile is ductile to a fault, yielding to those who though strong enough to ask are too weak to guide or advise, or whose craft would make others their dupes and tools. The word meant at the first easy to be performed, thence easy to be surmounted or mastered, next easy to be approached or treated with, and finally easy to persuade.

"Since Adam and his *facile* consort Eve
Lost Paradise deceived by me."
Milton.

DOCTRINE. Dogma. Tenet. Principle.

Doctrine (Lat. *doctrīna, instruction, learning*) means any speculative truth recommended by a teacher or a school of thinkers, whether in religion, science, or philosophy.

"It is by an evident abuse and perversion of Mr. Locke's *doctrine* that Dr. Reid pretends that it is favourable to Bishop Berkeley's notion of there being no material world, when in reality our author's own principles are much more favourable to that notion than Mr. Locke's."—Priestley.

Dogma (Gr. δόγμα. *an opinion, a philosophic dogma*) is at present employed of such doctrine as is put

forth authoritatively under a rigid definition, and especially in theology.

"Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldæans likewise to have asserted this *dogma* of the world's eternity. The Chaldæans affirm the nature of the world to be that it was neither generated from the beginning, nor will ever admit corruption."—CUDWORTH.

TENET (Lat. *tĕnĕre, to hold*, meaning *he holds;* formerly *tenent, they hold*) is a matter of philosophy or religion, which, as resting on its own intrinsic merits, is firmly held as true. The term expresses doctrine in its peculiarity and distinctiveness. There is a milder force in TENET than in DOCTRINE, which latter is graver and more important, or in DOGMA, which is more energetic and authoritative.

"In recommending the doctrine which this book particularly enforces, I know that I am justified by the Holy Scriptures, by the Church, by the *tenets* of the most learned and virtuous of the dissenters, and the greatest divines of this country, who have displayed their abilities either by the press or the pulpit."—KNOX, *Christian Philosophy.*

A PRINCIPLE is a central or representative truth in philosophy, science, art, religion, or morals, which is fundamental and general, and out of which other matters of a speculative or practical character flow, and become its practical illustrations (Fr. *principe*, Lat. *principium*).

"He who fixes upon false *principles* treads upon infirm ground, and so sinks; and he who fails in his deductions from right *principles* stumbles upon firm ground, and so falls."—SOUTH.

DOCUMENT. MUNIMENT.

In the sense in which these words are synonymous they represent the same thing under different views. The DOCUMENT (Lat. *dŏcŭmentum, a proof*) serves the purpose of evidence, the MUNIMENT (Lat. *mūnimentum, a defence*) the purpose of proving possession in particular. The first is for proof, the other for protection. Documents which prove a man's title to his estates, or those which are kept by public bodies, as charters, grants, and the like, proving their property or privileges, are called muniments.

DOLE. PITTANCE.

DOLE, connected with *deal*, is portion distributed. PITTANCE (Fr. *pitance, pittance*, of much disputed origin; there is a L. Lat. *pietantia, see* LITTRÉ). The pietantia of the middle ages was the zest or relish given to make the bulk of the fare more palatable, till the word came to mean, as with us, the whole allowance of a donation in any form, but small in amount. In the DOLE the leading idea is the contracted liberality of the giver, in PITTANCE the scant measure of the receiver.

DOLEFUL. RUEFUL. PITEOUS. WOEFUL.

DOLEFUL (O. Fr. *dol, grief*, with termination *-ful*) is exciting or expressing sadness, and is applicable to anything which has that effect, as a doleful sight or sound. RUEFUL (A. S. *hreów, grief, repentance*) is at present more commonly used in the sense of expressing misery in the countenance. PITEOUS is expressing sorrow or misery in such a way as to excite pity. WOEFUL means not so much exciting or expressing woe or misery as accompanied by it. In the phrase, a woeful visage, it bears the former meaning, but in the phrase, a woeful day or woeful time, it signifies the latter. A doleful countenance, sound, sight, story. A rueful visage. A piteous tale, sight, cry. A woeful narrative or event.

"How *dolefully* this *dole* thou dost rehearse." SPENSER.

"*Ruefully* dismayed." DRYDEN.

Formerly PITEOUS had almost universally the sense only of feeling, not exciting, pity, in which it is still sometimes employed, as in Thomson:—

"Him, *piteous* of his youth, and the short space
He has enjoyed the vital light of heaven,
Soft disengage, and back into the stream
The speckled captive throw."

Though Spenser has—

"That *piteous* strained voice."

"It is a *woful* inheritance that makes men heirs of the vengeance of God."—Bp. Hall.

DOMESTIC. Servant. Menial.

The first is one species of the second. Menial (O. Fr. *maisnier, one of the household, mesnée*) is one who performs inferior offices of service, which the term, however, does not define. A Domestic (Lat. *dŏmestĭcus, one of a family*) is a servant actually employed in the house. A Servant (Fr. *servant*) is a paid attendant of any kind. A farm servant or a gardener is not, strictly speaking, a domestic.

"A *servant* dwells remote from all knowledge of his lord's purposes; he lives as a kind of foreigner under the same roof, a *domestic*, and yet a stranger too."—South.

"The women servants perform only the most *menial* offices."—Swift.

DORMANCY. Abeyance. Expectancy.

These are used of powers, privileges, possessions, and claims not in action, enjoyment, or exercise. That is Dormant (Fr. *dormir*, part. *dormant, to sleep*) which possesses an inherent activity, vitality, and power, but is as yet quiescent; as, dormant claims, titles, powers, passions.

That is in Abeyance (Fr. *abéiance, bayer, to gape*, connected with the English *bay*, as when a savage beast stands at *bay*, that is, open-mouthed; hence *abeyance*, open-mouthed expectation) which the law contemplates as of the nature of an unvested inheritance, which thus wants, as it were, to be vested. Abeyance is thus, in its general application, dormancy, with expectation of revival.

Expectancy (Lat. *expectāre, to wait*) regards the same things from the other side, that is, the side not of the possession or privilege but of the person anticipating them. As dormancy is temporary extinction of power, so abeyance is temporary extinction of possession, while expectancy is active, and has reference to the future, the past, or the present.

DOUBT. Hesitation.

Doubt (O. Fr. *douter*, Lat. *dŭbĭtāre, to doubt*) relates both to matters of belief and to matters of conduct, Hesitation (Lat. *hæsĭtare, to stick fast, to be at a loss*) only to matters of conduct. We doubt about entertaining opinions; we sometimes hesitate to express them. We doubt for want of scientific evidence. We hesitate for want of practical knowledge. We doubt through ignorance. We hesitate through fear, caution, misgiving. Doubt is uncertain about principles, hesitation about consequences.

"Modest *doubt* is called
The beacon of the wise."
Shakespeare.

"But in an age of darkness he (Gregory VII.) had not all the knowledge that was requisite to regulate his zeal; and taking false appearances for solid truths, he, without *hesitation*, deduced from them the most dangerous consequences."—Jortin.

DOUBTFUL. Dubious. Uncertain.

Doubtful (*see* Doubt) is used in all the senses of entertaining doubt, exhibiting doubt, admitting of doubt, characterized by doubt; but Dubious is never used in the abstract, but only in the concrete. So we might say, "It is doubtful whether such is really the case." We could not say, "It is dubious." We speak of doubtful facts of history, not of dubious facts, except in the sense of facts about which persons are dubious; but we might say, "The most eminent historians are dubious as to the fact."

Uncertain (Lat. *incertus*) differs from Doubtful and Dubious, as not necessarily implying any tendency to discredit, but simply expressing lack of knowledge sufficient to decide; hence it may be used of matters of which the motive cause lies in ourselves, while doubt refers to matters beyond our control. "I doubt that it is so," would mean, "I am inclined to think it is or may not be so." "I am uncertain," would mean only, "I am not sure whether it is so or not." "Do you purpose to leave town tomorrow?" "I am uncertain." Not, "I doubt." "Doubt," says Taylor, "has not studied, uncertainty has not judged. Doubt is the hesitation of ignorance, uncertainty of irresolution. Doubt is open to inquiry, uncertainty to conviction." And so it may be said that doubtful ex-

presses a positive, uncertain a negative state of mind. Regarding the term UNCERTAIN objectively and not subjectively, that is, as belonging to the thing and not the person, the uncertain is that which might be combatted, not having in it incontrovertible truth. When a thing is uncertain, it is because as yet sufficient reasons have not been produced for believing it. As uncertainty is opposed to conviction, so doubt is opposed to belief. We are in doubt how to act; we are uncertain whether we will act or not. Of the two, DOUBTFUL and DUBIOUS, doubtful is the more objective, dubious the more subjective. The former denotes what in its nature is inadequately evidenced, the latter what tends to make *us* doubt. When Milton speaks of "dubious light," he means such as makes those halt who walk in it; and so Swift, "Persons of great fame but dubious existence." The direct use would seem to be that of Pope in the example below.

"The wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof, taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the *doubtfulness* and *uncertainty* of law."—BACON.

"She (Minerva) speaks with the *dubiousness* of a man, not the certainty of a goddess."—POPE.

DOWER. JOINTURE.

These terms express the property of the wife under different aspects. The JOINTURE (Fr. *jointure, joindre*; Lat. *jungĕre, to join*) is the estate settled on the wife to be enjoyed by her after her husband's decease.

The DOWRY or DOWER (Fr. *douaire*, Lat. *dōtārium*) is the money, goods, or estate which a woman brings to her husband on her marriage, as well as that portion of a man's real estate which his widow enjoys during her life, or to which the wife is entitled at the death of her husband. The jointure regards the woman as a wife, the dower as a widow also.

DRAIN. EXHAUST.

To DRAIN (A. S. *drehnigean*) is to draw off so as to leave empty or dry.

EXHAUST (Lat. *exhaurire*, part. *exhaustus*) is much the same; but there is a slight difference in their application. DRAIN is used in a physical and analogous sense, as to drain a field, or a country of its resources; but EXHAUST is used also in a more purely metaphysical way of abstract things; as, to exhaust efforts, speculation, conjecture, strength, patience. To exhaust also points more strongly to an original limitation of the supply, and its subsequent coming to an end. Hence DRAIN commonly refers to some involuntariness of expenditure, while EXHAUST may refer to what has all along been spent *purposely*. As, "The country was drained of its resources by a protracted and expensive war." "I brought with me twenty pounds from home, but I have exhausted my supply." The terms are used together in the following:

"He himself, through terror, permitted those of Rome to *exhaust* and *drain* the wealth of England."—CAMDEN.

DRAMA. PLAY.

PLAY (A. S. *plega*) is always particular or specific.

DRAMA (Gr. δρᾶμα) is general, though capable of individual application. The play is a dramatic composition, tragic or comic, in which characters are represented with dialogue and action under a common plan, or with a view to the development of a result. The drama comprises the whole theatrical system and literature, of which the play is a sample or particular exhibition.

DRAW. PULL. DRAG. HAWL. TUG. PLUCK.

To DRAW, a later form of *draw* (A. S. *dragan*) is to cause to move by force employed in the direction of one's self or in the line of one's own movements. It varies in degree from drawing a heavy load or a tight cork to a hair trigger. But, light or heavy, it is commonly implied that some kind of aptitude or provision exists for drawing. In this respect, draw differs from DRAG, which implies a natural *inaptitude* for drawing, or positive resistance, as a heavy box without wheels, or a captive struggling with his captor.

To PULL (A. S. *pullian*) is applied

to such cases of drawing as do not admit of continuous draught, or indefinite change of place, but where the draught is checked and limited; as, to pull a bell, a door, or the oar of a boat.

HAWL, HAUL, or HALE (A.S. *holian, to get*) is to pull or draw with force and sustained effort, so as to transport from one place to another.

TUG (A. S. *teogan, to pull*) is to pull with great effort, as in a boat to pull *with* the stream, and to tug *against* it.

PLUCK (A. S. *pluccian*) is to pull with sudden force or effort, commonly resulting, but not necessarily, in the detaching of the thing plucked from that to which it was united, as feathers, fruits, flowers.

"He cast him down to ground, and all along
Drew him through dirt and mire without remorse,
And foully battered his comely corse."
SPENSER.

"He would make the rigours of the Sabbath give way to the *pulling* of an ox or a sheep out of the ditch."—SOUTH.

"For six long years immured the captive knight
Had *drag'd* his chains, and scarcely seen the light." DRYDEN.

"While romp-loving miss
Is *haul'd* about in gallantry robust."
THOMSON.

"Must either pay his fine for his presumption,
Which is six hundred ducats, or for six years *Tug* at an oar i' the gallies."
BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

"Industrious Moll with many a *pluck*
Unwings the plumage of each duck."
SMART.

DREADFUL. FEARFUL. FRIGHTFUL. TERRIBLE. TREMENDOUS. TERRIFIC. HORRIBLE. HORRID. FORMIDABLE. AWFUL. DIRE.

DREADFUL (A. S. *dræd, drædan, to fear*), like awful, has lost its original sense of *feeling dread*, or *awe* (*see* AWE), and means now only *inspiring* dread; but dread is not exactly the same as fear, and so dreadful may mean inspiring a mixed feeling of fear and reverence, or of the dangerous and the sublime, as a dreadful thunderstorm

FEARFUL would denote no more than a sense of personal danger. DREADFUL seems to convey more than FEARFUL; for FEARFUL is rather that which inspires fear by its impression upon the senses, DREADFUL by what we know or suspect as belonging to its nature or powers. So we may speak of "dreadful accounts of a foreign war," but not "fearful accounts." On the other hand, the news of a large army attacking our own country would be a fearful report.

"For this reason (that man may repent) it is that He hath annexed so many *dreadful* threatenings against the breakers of His law, and so many gracious promises to them that keep it."—BEVERIDGE.

FRIGHTFUL (A. S. *fyrhtu, fear*) is said of anything which causes vivid alarm by sudden impression upon the senses in sight or sound, but especially the former. There is a suddenness in FRIGHTFUL which does not belong to either FEARFUL or DREADFUL.

"One cannot conceive so *frightful* a state of a nation. A maritime country without a marine and without commerce, a continental country without a frontier, and for a thousand miles surrounded by powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbours."—BURKE.

TERRIBLE (Lat. *terribilis, terrere, to frighten*) denotes what is to be dreaded for its effects upon us, though there may be in it nothing frightful. Death by accident is a frightful thing to witness; but there are many to whom death, in its calmest aspects and happiest circumstances, is still terrible. The terrible excites apprehension. That which is terrible affects us by pressing upon us a realization of some danger without actually involving us in it. The lion's roar is still terrible, though we know that he is caged.

"How shall they be able to abide His presence at that day when the gloriousness and majesty and *terribleness* of His appearance will infinitely exceed all that the tongue of man can express or the heart of man conceive?"—SOUTH.

TERRIBLE is a far graver word than FRIGHTFUL. The former never lends itself to a light meaning. Whereas FRIGHTFUL is sometimes employed in

the sense of exciting a fantastic fear by ugliness of aspect.

TREMENDOUS (Lat. *trĕmendus, that is to be trembled at, trĕmĕre, to tremble*) denotes rather what is fitted by its nature or appearance to inspire a kind of fear, without implying that we ourselves have any cause to fear it, as "a tremendous cataract," "a tremendous wind," "a tremendous noise," "a tremendous size." The tremendous occupies a position midway between the awful and the terrible, with more of power than the first and less of dread than the second.

"If anything could raise his passion, it was the nonsensical discourses of deists and Christian infidels; and he thought he might be justly angry with such wretches that, like the giants of old, durst make war upon *tremendous* Omnipotence."—GLANVILL.

TERRIFIC (Lat. *terrĭfĭcus, causing terror*) is only a more learned or rhetorical form of TERRIBLE, used as a term of greater dignity.

"The serpent, subtlest beast of all the field,
Of huge extent sometimes, with brazen eyes,
Terrific." MILTON.

HORRIBLE and HORRID (Lat. *horrĭbĭlis, horrĭdus, horrēre, to shudder at*) differ as the possible from the actual: "a horrible supposition," "a horrible alternative," "horrid scenes," "horrid deeds;" but HORRIBLE is often used in the latter sense. The idea of horror is a recoiling of the whole nature, such as makes the countenance rigid, or expresses itself in the look or posture. The HORRIBLE is more in the imagination, the HORRID in experience and observation.

"Swift in her walk, more swift her winged haste,
A monstrous phantom, *horrible* and vast,
As many plumes as raise her lofty flight,
So many piercing eyes enlarge her sight."
DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

"Thus, when black clouds draw down the neighbouring skies,
Ere yet abroad the winged thunder flies,
An *horrid* stillness first invades the ear,
And in that silence we the tempest fear."
DRYDEN.

FORMIDABLE (Lat. *formīdābĭlis, formīdare, to dread*) relates to contingent and not necessary fear. Things are formidable only when we are compelled or perhaps go out of our way to encounter them; as, "a formidable undertaking," "a formidable foe," or when we think of what *might* be if we did encounter them,

"Before the gates they sate
On either side, a *formidable* shape."
MILTON.

AWFUL commonly excludes or hardly admits the idea of a sense of personal peril, though it implies a vague dread. It is closely linked with the exercise of the imagination and the belief in unseen presences and powers. An awful solitude is one in which the mind is left to its own fancies, when it feels itself alone, and is inclined to people the blank with vague creations of its own. The awful is to the imagination what the frightful is to the eye or the ear, and the fearful to the understanding.

"A subject bears a reverential fear to his prince from the sense of his majesty and grandeur, and thus much more the majesty and greatness of Almighty God excites reverence and *awfulness*, though there were no other ingredient in that fear."—HALE.

It should be observed that of these synonyms some are capable of a good sense, others not; to the latter kind belong FRIGHTFUL, HORRIBLE, and HORRID. On the other hand it might be said that the majesty of God is dreadful, His justice fearful, His presence terrible, His might tremendous, His material manifestations of Himself have been terrific, and His holiness is awful, while His power being irresistible and perfect could never receive so weak an epithet as formidable.

DIRE (Lat. *dīrus*) expresses the evil or the terrible as actually existing or endured, and not only as an object of dread. The dire is more immediate, active, and operative than the dreadful or the terrible. Lat. *diræ* (*res* understood) meant, 1, portents, 2, imprecations.

DREGS. DROSS. SEDIMENT. SCUM. REFUSE.

The distinctive differences between such synonyms as these are only important as regulating their moral or metaphorical application.

DREGS (Icel. *dregg*) was used formerly in the singular by Shakespeare and Spenser. It is corrupt matter pre-

cipitated or separated from a liquid, especially in process of manufacture, and, for the immediate purpose, useless and valueless. With the exception of SEDIMENT, which is never employed in any secondary sense, we find all the rest so employed. The more usual applications of the term dregs are two: 1, "To drain to the dregs," that is, to exhaust in the endurance of labour, pain, punishment, and the like—an ancient Hebrew image; and, 2, "The dregs of society or the people," signifying the very lowest and vilest orders. The following is a little peculiar and original :—

"This manner, however, of drawing off a subject or a peculiar mode of writing to the *dregs*, effectually precludes a revival of that subject or manner for some time for the future. The sated reader turns from it with a kind of literary nausea."—GOLDSMITH.

DROSS is the refuse matter which, as it were, falls (A. S. *dros*, *drēosan*, *to fall*) from metals in smelting the ore; sometimes used of their oxidation or rust. It is a symbol of worthlessness.

"'I know, O Lord, that Thy judgments are right,' says the Psalmist, 'and that Thou in faithfulness hast afflicted me;' the furnace of affliction being meant but to refine us from our earthly *drossiness*, and soften us for the impression of God's own stamp and image."—BOYLE.

SEDIMENT (Lat. *sĕdĭmentum*, *a settling down*, from *sĕdēre*, *to settle*) is the matter in a liquid compound which subsides to the bottom, and which therefore, unless it be heterogeneous, is unlike the former in not being refuse, except as to the insoluble or undissolved portions of it.

"There is also a sort of water of which there is only one small pond upon the island, as far distant as the lake, and to appearance very good, with a yellow *sediment* at the bottom."—*Cook's Voyages*.

SCUM (O. Fr. *escume*, O. H. G. *scûm*, *foam*) is the extraneous impurities which rise to the surface of liquids in boiling or fermentation. It is a symbol of contemptible worthlessness and impurity.

"The great and the innocent are insulted by the *scum* and *refuse* of the people."—ADDISON.

REFUSE (Fr. *refus*, *refuser*, *to refuse*) means no more than waste or rejected matter, which, whether valuable or not, or available for *other* purposes or not, is not required for the purpose in hand. REFUSE is often used also in an analogous sense of anything which has simply done its part, and has become superfluous, without involving any strong idea of worthlessness or impurity.

DRENCH. SOAK. STEEP. IMBRUE. SATURATE. IMBUE.

To DRENCH (A. S. *drencan*, *to give to drink*, *to drench*) is to saturate with moisture or liquid by pouring it upon the object.

To SOAK (A. S. *socian*) is to cause to lie in a fluid till the substance has imbibed what it is capable of containing.

To STEEP (compare Germ. *stippen*, *to dip*) is to immerse something commonly for the purpose of causing some alteration in it, or applying it to a specific purpose after it has been so immersed, but not necessarily soaking it, of which the texture may possibly render it incapable. It is often used to express the abeyance of the faculties of the mind in sleep or forgetfulness.

"Mars driven from the dreadful field
That he had *drenched* with blood."
COWPER, *Iliad*.

"When they appear it is not unlikely but that they *soak* their vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous moisture or other, that they may become visible to us at a more easy rate."—MORE, *Immortality of the Soul*.

"The prudent sibyl had before prepared
A sop in honey *steeped*, to charm the guard."
DRYDEN, *Virgil*.

SATURATE (Lat. *sătŭrāre*, *to fill*) bears reference to the structure or texture of a substance, and means to supply with as much moisture as it will naturally absorb.

"Innumerable flocks and herds covered that vast expanse of emerald meadow *saturated* with the moisture of the Atlantic."—MACAULAY.

IMBRUE is from an old Eng. *brue*, from the Italian *bevere*, and the Lat. *bĭbĕre*, *to drink*. It differs from IMBUE (Lat. *imbuĕre*), as to IMBRUE is to wet, to IMBUE is to wet or moisten with some particular liquid, and for some particular purpose, as that of staining.

IMBRUE is almost confined to the moistening with tears and with blood. This is a matter of usage. IMBUE has the secondary sense of tinging with a certain character, or affecting with certain principles, views, doctrines, and the like.

"The stream with blood of Scots *imbrued*."
MILTON.

"Thy words with grace divine *imbued*,
Bring to their sweetness no satiety."
MILTON.

DRESS. ATTIRE. APPAREL. ARRAY. COSTUME. HABIT. CLOTHES. CLOTHING. GARMENT. VESTURE. VESTMENT. RAIMENT. HABILIMENT.

DRESS (O. Fr. *dresser, to set up*, originally from Lat. *direct-us, upright, to arrange*) is used generically of what is employed to cover the body, regarded *as a whole*, though it be of more articles than one, and of a more or less careful arrangement and elaborate character. The dress is well or ill fashioned and carelessly worn or carefully arranged, costly or inexpensive, simple or complicated, with or without ornaments, and in its extended idea includes far more than what is merely necessary to clothe the body. Hence the term DRESS readily lends itself to a secondary meaning, that of aspect or character, as it impresses the sight or judgment, as in the following:

"Christianity is that very religion itself (natural religion) in a better *dress*."—PEARCE, *Sermons*.

CLOTHES (A. S. *cláth, a cloth*) are *articles* of dress. And yet they are restricted to those which are *directly* so, that is, to what is worn simply to cover the body or protect it from the weather.

"And Jacob rent his *clothes*."—*Bible*.

CLOTHING is dress divested of the idea of ornament, and regarded simply in its material, as a savage might be clothed in the skins of beasts, or a rich man in purple and fine linen. It is a broader term than CLOTHES, and would include what were not in themselves clothes. A magazine of articles of clothing would contain laces, buttons, &c. It has a very generic and abstract meaning.

"With him the *clothing* is neither woollen, nor linen, nor silk, satin, or velvet. It is drapery. It is nothing more."—SIR J. REYNOLDS.

Nearly allied is RAIMENT (O. Fr. *rai, order*, from which O. Fr. *arrai, preparation*, &c.), which is the representative name for dress when regarded as one of the necessaries of life, as to be provided with shelter, food, and raiment.

"Having food and *raiment*, let us be therewith content."—*Bible*.

ATTIRE (O. Fr. *atirer, to adorn*) denotes highly ornamental or official dress, as, "gorgeously attired," "meanly clad."

"Earth in her rich *attire*." MILTON.

APPAREL (Fr. *appareiller, to match things, pareil* being Lat. *păriculus*, from *par, equal*) is clothing regarded as a luxury of life, as RAIMENT is a necessary. So we might say, "Wealth in the East often consists in the possession of costly apparel and stuffs."

"Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy,
But not expressed in fancy, rich, not gaudy,
For the *apparel* oft proclaims the man."
SHAKESPEARE.

ARRAY (*see* RAIMENT) gives the idea of *various* articles of dress and ornament, not called so till ranged in order upon the person, and would include such ornaments as are not articles of apparel or clothing, as, for instance, rings on the fingers, or decorations for the head.

"Dry up your tears, and stick your rosemary
On this fair corse, and as the custom is,
And in her best *array*, bear her to church."
SHAKESPEARE.

COSTUME (Fr. *coutume*, Lat. *consuetudinem*) is a doublet of the word *custom*, and is to national dress what HABIT (Fr. *habit, a fashion, dress*, Lat. *habitum*) is to the dress of sections or orders of men, as we speak of the costume of a period, the habit of an ecclesiastic.

"Sergius Paulus wears a crown of laurel. This is hardly reconcilable to strict propriety and the *costume*, of which Raffaele was in general a good observer."—SIR J. REYNOLDS.

HABIT is commonly of a plain and

more or less flowing character. We do not speak of the habit of a soldier, but of a monk, or a lady's riding-habit.

"*Habited* like a juryman."
CHURCHILL.

VESTURE (Lat. *vestīre, to clothe*) conveys the idea of a costly garment of a flowing character; while VESTMENT is an official vesture, especially of ministers of religion.

"Upon My *vesture* shall they cast lots."—*Bible.*

"Bring forth *vestments* for all the worshippers of Baal; and they brought them forth *vestments*."—*Ibid.*

GARMENT, which is an abbreviated form of *garnement* (O. Fr. *garnement, garnir, to furnish*) is any article of clothing of a main character, and connected with the trunk of the body. Hats, laces, boots, and the like, though articles of clothing, would hardly be called garments.

"All thy *garments* smell of myrrh, aloes, and cassia."—*English Psalms.*

HABILIMENT (Fr. *habillement, habiller, to dress*), more commonly used in the plural, is much the same as GARMENT, having a more formal force; but not so much so as VESTMENT. Official robes might suitably be termed habiliments. Speed speaks of "kingly habiliments," and Knox (Essays) of the "habiliments of a soldier."

DRIFT. TENDENCY. GRAVITATION.

DRIFT (*i.e. driven*) is commonly employed of the argumentative meaning or purpose of connected words, as in a speech or written composition, though not confined to this.

TENDENCY (Lat. *tendĕre, to stretch, to tend in any direction*) is applied to subjects; as, the tendency of certain principles; and means not the mental aim, but the moral and practical issue or consequence. "I could hardly make out the drift of his speech, but it seemed to me to have a revolutionary tendency."

"But so strangely perverse is his commentator, that he will suppose him to mean anything rather than what the obvious *drift* of his argument requires."—WARBURTON.

"This truth, Philosophy, though eagle-eyed
In Nature's *tendencies*, oft overlooks."
COWPER.

GRAVITATE (Lat. *grăvĭtātem, heaviness*) is employed of the general tenor both of speech and action which tends to a certain point or direction with or without any conscious or intended bias.

"To act with any people with any degree of comfort, I believe we must contrive a little to assimilate to their character; we must *gravitate* towards them if we would keep in the same system or expect that they should approach to us."—BURKE.

DRINK. DRAUGHT. BEVERAGE. POTION.

A DRINK (A. S. *drencan, to drink*) is commonly a compound for refreshment or health.

A DRAUGHT is a long-drawn drink either of water or artificially compounded liquid, medicinal or otherwise.

BEVERAGE (O. Fr. *bovraige, drink*, and *boivre, to drink*, Lat. *bĭbĕre*) is a compound not otherwise than pleasant.

POTION (Lat. *pōtiōnem*) is usually a liquid medicine; but the word is more literary than conversational. It is the origin of the word *poison*.

DROLL. LUDICROUS. RIDICULOUS. COMICAL. LAUGHABLE.

Of these, LAUGHABLE, exciting or worthy of laughter, may be regarded as the generic term, the others expressing different modifications of the laughable.

"Nature hath framed strange fellows in her time,
Some that will evermore peep through their eyes,
And laugh like parrots at a bagpiper;
And other of such vinegar aspect
That they'll not show their teeth in the way of smile,
Though Nestor swear the jest be *laughable*."
SHAKESPEARE.

DROLL (Fr. *drôle*, Icel. *troll, hobgoblin*) denotes the combination of the laughable with the unfamiliar or odd. A droll person is an oddity; a droll story is not simply funny, but amusing from a disconnectedness and unexpected combination of incidents.

"This never transported him to anything which looked like malignancy; yet in the

little rubs and vexations of life 'twas apt to show itself in a *drollish* and witty kind of peevishness."—STERNE

LUDICROUS (Lat. *ludĭcer*, or *ludĭcrus*, *done in sport*) denotes that which is personally laughable, but without any *necessary* admixture of contempt or pity, in this differing from RIDICULOUS (Lat. *rĭdĭcŭlus*, *causing laughter*), which conveys the idea of the contemptible in things and the humiliating in persons, or the petty and trifling, where some degree of gravity is claimed.

"According to that hypothesis it would follow that every, the smallest and most contemptible animal that could see the sun had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it than the sun itself. A thing *ridiculously* absurd."—CUDWORTH.

"He has therefore in his whole volume nothing burlesque, and seldom anything *ludicrous* or familiar."—JOHNSON, *Life of Waller*.

COMICAL (Gr. κωμῐκός, *comic*, κῶμος, a *revel*) denotes what is demonstratively and, as it were, dramatically laughable, admitting of surrounding incidents or circumstances, as "to be in a comical position," "a book with comical illustrations."

"He (Daniel Whitby) was suspended, and at length made a pretended recantation, which cost him nothing but the pleasure of out-witting his governors by a part acted in a *comicall* way."—WOOD, *Athenæ Oxon.*

DROOP. LANGUISH. FLAG. PINE.

DROOP is allied to *drop*, and is applied to anything which occupies a less erect position than ordinary. The snowdrop, as its name implies, droops, that is, hangs down its head more than the generality of flowers. The flag droops when there is not sufficient force of wind to unfold it horizontally. The human head or form droops under sorrow or sickness. LANGUISH (Lat. *languēre*, *to be weak*, *faint*) is only applicable to things possessing some kind of vital energy, which has become dull or weak under a softening, depressing, or sickly influence. To FLAG (cf. Icel. *flaka*, *to droop*) commonly bears reference to growth, movement, progress, or efforts; while PINE (A. S. *pīnan*) is only used of sentient beings, and means to languish under certain causes, as distress, anxiety, disappointment, captivity, desire, longing, desertion, or solitude. The plant does not pine, though it may droop and languish.

"Upon her face there was the tint of grief,
The settled shadow of an inward strife,
And an unquiet *drooping* of the eye,
As if its lid were charged with unshed tears." BYRON.

"If this harmonical temperature of the whole body be distributed and put out of tune, weakness and *languishing* will immediately seize upon it."—CUDWORTH.

"The wounded bird, ere yet she breathed her last,
With *flagging* wings alighted on the mast,
A moment hung, and spread her pinions there,
Then sudden dropt, and left her life in air."
POPE, *Iliad.*

"Loathing from racks of husky straw he turns,
And *pining* for the verdant pasture mourns."
ROWE, *Lucan.*

DROP. FALL. SINK. TUMBLE.

DROP (A. S. *dropian*) has more than one sense; as, to distil or fall in globules; or, again, to descend suddenly, abruptly, and, in some cases, on purpose. To FALL (A. S. *feallan*, cf. Lat. *fallĕre*, *to deceive*) is involuntary or mechanical, except in the phrase to fall down in worship, or at the feet of any one. It may be more or less rapid or sudden, as the apple falls from the tree, the river falls into the sea, the tide falls, or the mercury in the barometer. To SINK (A. S. *sincan*) is to fall *gradually* and comparatively slowly. It is metaphorically used in the sense of being overwhelmed or depressed, declining, decaying, and decreasing in bulk. To TUMBLE (Fr. *tomber*) is to fall awkwardly or without design, so losing the centre of gravity. There are many analogous applications in which these distinctions are preserved, as, for instance: Words drop from the lips, or an observation is dropped accidentally; a subject is dropped. To fall from a high estate. Words sink into the heart, or great men sink in public estimation. To tumble from the seat of power; the cataract tumbles over the rocks.

"When the sound of *dropping* nuts is heard." BRYANT.

"He rushed into the field and foremost fighting *fell*." BYRON.

"The stone *sunk* into his forehead."—*English Bible*.

"He who *tumbles* from a tower surely has a greater blow than he who slides from a mole-hill."—SOUTH.

DROWSY. SLEEPY. LETHARGIC.

DROWSY (A. S. *drusian, to be sluggish*) and SLEEPY, or inclined to sleep (A. S. *slǽp, sleep*), are almost identical; but drowsiness is a heavy, and often abnormal sleepiness. Persons complain of drowsiness when they wish to keep awake, and say they feel sleepy when it is time to go to rest for the night. An artificial heaviness, produced, for instance, by drugs or an intoxicating draught, would be called drowsiness rather than sleepiness.

LETHARGIC, from *lethargy* (Gr. λήθαργία) is always abnormal, supposing some foreign influence, whether used physically of an involuntary and strong tendency to sleep morbidly; or morally, in the sense of insensateness and invincible sluggishness, oblivion, indolence, or indifference.

"Above is perpetual gloom. The sun is not seen, nor the breeze felt. The air stagnates, and pestilential vapours diffuse *drowsiness*, lassitude, and anxiety."—*Adventurer*.

"I rather choose to endure the wounds of those darts which envy casteth at novelty, than to go on safely and *sleepily* in the easy ways of ancient undertakings."—RALEIGH.

"Does Lear walk thus? speak thus? Either his notion weakens, or his discernings are *letharqied*."—SHAKESPEARE.

DRUNKENNESS. INTOXICATION. INEBRIATION. INEBRIETY.

DRUNKENNESS is specifically the becoming intoxicated by strong drink, and is used to express both the casual state and the habit.

INTOXICATION (Lat. *toxĭcum, poison*, Gr. τοξικόν, a poison in which *arrows*, τόξα, were dipped) includes cases in which the same effect is produced by other causes than drinking, as, for instance, the fumes of tobacco.

INEBRIATION (Lat. *inēbriare, to make drunk*) differs from intoxication in being confined to the results of drinking, and from drunkenness, in denoting the process or the state, but not the habit. INEBRIETY expresses the state and the habit, but not the process. INTOXICATE lends itself most easily of all to a secondary application; so that a man is said to be intoxicated with success, pleasure, and the like.

"The dissolution and *drunkenness* of that night was so great and scandalous, in a nation which had not been acquainted with such disorders for many years past, that the King, who still stood in need of the Presbyterian party, which had betrayed all into his hands, for their satisfaction caused a proclamation to be published forbidding the *drinking* of healths."—LUDLOW, *Memoirs*.

"King was a name too proud for man to bear
With modesty and meekness; and the crown,
So dazzling in their eyes who set it on,
Was sure to *intoxicate* the brows it bound."
COWPER.

"That 'tis good to be drunk once a month, is a common flattery of sensuality, supporting itself upon physick and the healthful effects of *inebriation*."—BROWN, *Vulgar Errors*.

"Paroxysms of *inebriety*."—DARWIN.

DUMB. MUTE. SPEECHLESS. SILENT. VOICELESS. NOISELESS.

DUMB (A. S. *dumb, mute*) commonly signifies *unable* to speak, whether from temporary or permanent and natural causes, as "dumb brutes," "struck dumb with amazement."

"In the first case the demoniac or madman was *dumb*; and his *dumbness* probably arose from the natural turn of his disorder, which was that species of madness called melancholy, of which taciturnity or *dumbness* is a very common effect."—FARMER.

MUTE (Lat. *mūtus, dumb*) is commonly employed of the human race, and refers to articulate speech, which for some peculiar reason is temporarily suspended, as, "Mute in astonishment," "In spite of all interrogations he remained mute." Many are mute by nature who are not, strictly speaking, dumb; that is, they have no imperfection of the vocal organs; but, being without the sense of hearing, they have no notion of the sounds which they ought to utter. Poetically, MUTE is used in the sense of dumb, as "mute fishes."

"Hail native Language, that by sinews weak
Didst move my first endeavouring tongue to speak,
And midst imperfect words with childish trips
Half unpronounced, slide through my infant lips,
Driving dumb silence from the portal door
Where he had *mutely* sat two years before."
MILTON.

SPEECHLESS (A. S. *spǽc, speech*) relates only to articulate sounds, and means destitute or deprived, whether permanently or for a time, of the faculty of speech.

"From his slack hand the garland wreath'd for Eve
Down drop'd, and all the faded roses shed.
Speechless he stood and pale, till thus at length,
First to himself, he inward silence broke."
MILTON.

SILENT (Lat. *sīlēre, to be silent*) is very general, and relates to anything characterized by the absence, temporary or permanent, of speech or sound. It is applicable not only to living beings, but to anything producing sound, as "a musical instrument," or even to localities, as "the silent woods."

"But man is frail, and can but ill sustain
A long immunity from grief and pain.
And after all the joys that plenty leads
With tiptoe step vice *silently* succeeds."
COWPER.

"The VOICELESS woods" (Fr. *voix*, Lat. *vōcem, a voice*) would mean the absence of animal sounds, "The NOISELESS woods" (O. Fr. *noise, a quarrel*, Lat. *nausea, disgust, annoyance*, BRACHET) the absence of all sounds, whether vocal or otherwise.

"The Niobe of nations, there she stands,
Childless and crownless in her *voiceless* woe,
An empty urn within her withered hands,
Whose holy dust was scattered long ago."
BYRON.

"For her, O sleep, thy balmy sweets prepare;
The peace I lose for her to her transfer;
Hush'd as the falling dews whose *noiseless* showers
Impearl the folded leaves of evening flowers,
Steal on her brow." CONGREVE.

DUPLICITY. DOUBLE-DEALING. (*See* DECEPTION.)

The former relates to character (Lat. *duplex, duplĭcis, double*), the latter to action. DUPLICITY (Lat. *dūplĭcĭtātem, a being double, doubtfulness*) of character may lead to DOUBLE-DEALING in particular cases. Duplicity is that sustained form of deception which consists in entertaining one set of feelings, and acting as if influenced by another. Double-dealing is acting in such a way as to have a double line of conduct, and commonly to give the impression of consulting the wishes or interests of others, while one is really following one's own.

"I find in you no false *duplicity*."—CHAUCER.

"Maskwell in the 'Double-dealer,' discloses by soliloquy that his motive for *double-dealing* was his passion for Cynthia."—CUMBERLAND.

DURABLE. LASTING. PERMANENT. ENDURING. PERSISTENT.

Of these, LASTING (A. S. *lǽstan*, "to observe, perform, last, remain": SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) is the most general—remaining longer in existence, and, by an extension of meaning, remaining long unimpaired. LASTING and DURABLE seem to share between them the moral and physical import of endurance. Durable stone. A lasting friendship. The former too resists wear, the latter survives the lapse of time.

"The ancients depicted friendship in the bearings and strength of a young man, bareheaded, rudely clothed, to signify its activity and *lastingness*, readiness of action and aptness to do service."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

DURABLE (Lat. *dūrābilis, dūrāre*, act. and neut., *to harden*) is lasting, with specific reference to physical influences; as a "durable material" is one which will bear wear and tear, weather, and the like. That which is not durable perishes quickly.

"A Gothic cathedral raises ideas of grandeur in our minds by its size, its height, its awful obscurity, its strength, its antiquity, and its *durability*."—BLAIR.

PERMANENT (Lat. *permănēre, to stay to the end*) combines the two ideas of absence of internal and of external change. A permanent monument is not only durable, but it is established so as to remain unmoved. It lasts both *in time and place*. The opposite to PERMANENT is temporary.

"The earth, great mother of us all,
That only seems unmoved and *permanent*."
SPENSER.

ENDURING (*see* DURABLE) is employed of what resists moral influences of deterioration or destruction, as "enduring happiness," "an enduring friendship." It involves such ideas as remaining firm under trial, suffering, perhaps, without resistance, but at least without yielding.

"Ye have in heaven a better and an *enduring* substance."—*Bible.*

PERSISTENT (Lat. *persistĕre, to remain steadfastly*) means lasting through native tenacity, and so continuing or lasting in spite of influences which might have been sufficient to destroy natures changeable or less tough. It has a physical character, as a botanical term, in the sense of not falling off until the part which bears it is wholly matured; *e.g.* the leaves of evergreen plants. In the following it indicates a sustaining will or purpose, as reflected in the expression of the eye itself:—

"Modred's narrow foxy face,
Heart-hiding smile, and grey, *persistent* eye."
TENNYSON.

DUTY. OBLIGATION.

The distinction commonly made between these is that DUTY (literally, what is *due*) rises out of permanent relationships between persons, while OBLIGATION (Lat. *obligātionem, obligāre, to bind*) flows from the application of moral principles to particular cases. Obligations in this way would often be duties, while duties would often be based upon obligations. An obligation in its broadest sense is anything which constrains us to act; as, a vow, promise, oath, contract; but is hardly applicable to the coercive power of law, or to such matters as flow from natural piety, as the duty of parents and of children. DUTY is a graver term than OBLIGATION. A duty hardly exists to perform *trivial* things; but there may be an obligation to do them. It is the duty of peers to attend the queen at the opening of parliament. We should hardly say that to attend in their robes was a duty, though they are obliged to do this. Law and conscience dictate to a man what is his duty, and the neglect of it is a violation of right or virtue. OBLIGATION is more practical, and is dictated rather by usage and propriety. OBLIGATION has also very often the sense of the power that binds, while DUTY is the thing enforced. A duty never can be against reason; an obligation may be even absurd, as depending upon custom. Obligation is defined by the extent of the power which obliges; duty by the ability of the subject who performs.

"As the will of God is our rule, to inquire what is our *duty*, or what we are obliged to do, in any instance, is in effect to inquire what is the will of God in that instance, which constantly becomes the whole business of morality."—PALEY.

"The various *duties* which have now been considered all agree with each other in one common quality, that of being *obligatory* upon rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same authority, the authority of conscience."—STEWART, *Outlines of Moral Philosophy.*

E.

EAGER. EARNEST.

EAGER (O. Fr. *aigre*, Lat. *ācrem, sharp, active*) denotes an excited desire or longing, and an intentness upon pursuit of some object; as, hounds eager in the chase. He who is eager seeks to gain or enjoy with the least possible delay, and is proportionately stimulated to action. The term may relate to what is praiseworthy or the contrary.

"The insect youth are on the wing,
Eager to taste the honied spring,
And float amid the liquid noon."
GRAY.

EARNEST, orig. a substantive (A. S. *eornost, earnestness*), is always used in a good sense; and though earnestness may grow into specific eagerness, it by no means implies this. Eagerness relates to the object, earnestness to the occupation, the state or habit. Earnestness is a combination of sincerity and energy. We should say equally of the hypocrite and of the sluggard that he was not in earnest in religion.

"And we may learn hence that the greatest gift of prayer, and *earnestness* and frequency in it, is no good mark of godli

ness, except it be attended with sincere, constant, and virtuous endeavours."—GLANVILL.

EAGERNESS. AVIDITY. GREEDINESS. ACQUISITIVENESS.

EAGERNESS (*see* above) differs from AVIDITY (Lat. *āvidĭtātem*, *āvĭdus*, *greedy*), in that the latter implies more of appetite and desire of possession, and is not employed of anything besides matters of enjoyment and such possession; whereas EAGERNESS is applicable to an excited desire to gain ends of other kinds; as, for instance, the young soldier may be eager for opportunities of distinguishing himself, or accept the post of danger with eagerness, where the term AVIDITY would be wholly out of place.

GREEDINESS (A. S. *grǽdig*) is a low, animal, or selfish form of desire. Eagerness, as we have seen, may in certain cases be praiseworthy; but AVIDITY and GREEDINESS are always used in an unfavourable sense, though this in some cases is slight, as to seize an opportunity with avidity. It never reaches the coarseness of greediness.

"For him, ye gods, for Crastinus, whose spear
With impious *eagerness* began the war,
Some more than common punishment prepare." ROWE, *Lucan.*

"In all which we may see an infinite *avidity*, and such as cannot be satisfied with any finite object."—FOTHERBY, *Atheomastix.*

"To work all uncleanness with *greediness*."—*Bible.*

ACQUISITIVENESS (Lat. *acquīrĕre*, part. *acquīsītus*, *to acquire*) is an active but milder form of greediness. It is a propensity of which the nature is a love of gain. It does not despise even small gains. It is an animal instinct and may be seen in some animals, as the magpie and the monkey. It is commonly unscrupulous and leads to theft, peculation, and fraud. It is a kind of spurious and unprincipled industry. The older force of the word was passive, not active.

"He died not in his *acquisitive*, but in his native soil."—WOTTON.

EARLY. SOON. BETIMES.

EARLY (A. S. *ærliche*) is used as an adjective as well as an adverb. It is essentially relative, and implies some ordinary or fixed point of time, in advance of which something else takes place, as "to rise early," "an early spring."

SOON (A. S. *sona*) indicates always a short interval posterior to any given moment or the present moment, as "soon after sunrise," "I will go soon."

BETIMES (*be* or *bi*, and *time*, the having been added afterwards, *i.e.*, *by time*) denotes some space in the early part of which something else is done. It has a practical force, and commonly means in good time for all needful purposes, or for some specific object.

"Samuel began his acquaintance with God *early*, and continued it long. He began it in his long coats, and continued it to his grey hairs."—BISHOP HALL.

"'Tis *sooner* past, 'tis *sooner* done,
Than summer's rain or winter's sun;
Most fleeting when it is most dear,
'Tis gone while we but say 'tis here."
CAREW.

"When the first rays their cheering crimson shed,
We'll rise *betimes* to see the vineyard spread." PARNELL.

EARNEST. PLEDGE.

EARNEST (Welsh *ernes*) is a word of very uncertain history; so is also PLEDGE (Fr. *pleige*). As used figuratively, there is some distinction between them. EARNEST is less strong than PLEDGE. After a pledge we expect by personal right; after an earnest we expect by natural sequence. A pledge is some kind of security actually given for the future. An earnest often involves no more security than that of a high probability. If I say, "I pledge my word that it shall be so," I leave, as it were, a deposit in honour that I will do what I say. If I say, "His early school successes were an earnest of his brilliant career in after life," I mean no more than that they raised expectations which were afterwards fulfilled.

"They (afflictions) may be testimonies or *earnests* of God's favour; for whom He loves He rebukes and chastens, even as a father a son in whom he delighteth."—WILKINS.

"If a pawnbroker receives plate or jewels as a *pledge* or security for the repayment of

money lent thereon at a day certain, he has them upon the express contract or condition to restore them if the *pledger* performs his part by redeeming them in due time."—BLACKSTONE.

EASE. QUIET. REST. REPOSE.

EASE (Fr. *aise*) means the absence of any cause of trouble. This may be either internally as regards oneself, or externally as regards what one has to do. Hence the twofold meaning into which the word runs out, of *quiet* and *facility*. In the former application EASE is freedom from trouble, pain, or restraint from without or from within. We speak of ease of body or ease of mind; in the latter freedom from difficulty or opposition.

QUIET (Lat. *quiētem*) denotes the absence of a disturbing cause, as, *e.g.* harassing thoughts or noises, and is inapplicable to the bodies of men.

REST (A. S. *restan, to stay, remain;* cf. Ger. *rasten*) denotes primarily the cessation of motion, and, as a particular application of this, the cessation from active or laborious movement.

As a synonym with REPOSE (Fr. *repos*, from *reposer, to rest*), it may mean any cessation which is a relief from exertion. We may rest, for instance, in a standing posture; but repose implies the placing of *all parts* of the body in a posture of rest.

"What joy within these sunless groves,
Where lonely Contemplation roves,
To rest in fearless *ease!*" LANGHORNE.

"Secure the sacred *quiet* of thy mind."
DRYDEN, *Ovid.*

"So forth she rode, without *repose* or *rest*."
SPENSER.

EASE. EASINESS. FACILITY.

In the sense in which it is a synonym with these, EASE commonly refers to specific action, EASINESS to inherent quality. "He lifted the heavy weight *with ease*, being apparently assured beforehand of the *easiness* of the task."

FACILITY (Lat. *făcĭlĭtātem*) is less objective, and more subjective. We speak of ease in reference to the task, of facility in reference to a person's power of performing it; so that by practice and natural strength a man may perform with comparative facility a task in itself by no means easy. EASE is also more applicable to purely physical undertakings, FACILITY to mental. Ease is opposed to effort, facility to difficulty. The intelligent man solves a problem with facility; the strong man lifts a weight with ease.

"It must be likewise shown that these parts stand in such a relation to each other that the comparison between them may be *easily* made, and that the affection of the mind may result from it."—BURKE.

"Refrain to-night,
And that shall lend a kind of *easiness*
To the next abstinence."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Some gentlemen are not terrified by the *facility* with which government has been overturned in France."—BURKE.

EBULLITION. EFFERVESCENCE. FERMENTATION. FERMENT.

EBULLITION (Lat. *ēbullire, to boil up*) is the process of boiling, or the agitation of a liquid owing to the escape of bubbles caused by the conversion of a part of the liquid into vapour.

EFFERVESCENCE (Lat. *effervescĕre, to boil up or over*) is caused by the escape from a fluid of gas, as in the mixture of carbonated alkali and acid.

FERMENT (Lat. *fermentum*) is the *state*, FERMENTATION the *process* of fermenting. When used metaphorically, EBULLITION is employed of sudden bursts of anger or ill-temper. EFFERVESCENCE is used less commonly, but employed of the natural exhibition of liveliness and good spirits. FERMENTATION and FERMENT, of a state of ill-suppressed discontent or impatience, and especially among a number of persons. But FERMENT is commonly appropriated to the emotional, and FERMENTATION to the material. A hive of working bees is in a state of fermentation. It is dangerous to approach if some exciting cause has thrown them into a ferment.

"There are many young members in the House (such of late has been the rapid succession of public men) who never saw that prodigy Charles Townshend, nor of course know what a *ferment* he was able to excite in everything by the violent *ebullition* of his mixed virtues and failings."—BURKE.

"The wild gas, the fixed air is plainly

broke loose, but we ought to suspend our judgment until the first *effervescence* is a little subsided, till the liquor is cleared, and until we see something deeper than the agitation of a troubled and frothy surface." —BURKE.

"The nation is in too high a *ferment* for me to expect either fair war or even fair quarter from a reader of the opposite party." —DRYDEN.

"It is not a *fermentative* process, for the solution begins at the surface and proceeds towards the centre, contrary to the order in which *fermentation* acts and spreads."—PALEY.

ECCENTRIC. SINGULAR. STRANGE. ODD. GROTESQUE.

ECCENTRIC (L. Lat. *eccentrĭcus, out of the centre,* Gr. ἔκκεντρος) is only employed of persons, and, again, only of what meets the observation in reference to conduct, as the appearance, dress, and the behaviour. No peculiarity of countenance or form, however striking, would be called eccentric; for eccentricity implies a will, nature, or habits, which, as it were, move in a different orbit from those of other people.

SINGULAR (Lat. *singŭlāris, one at a time, alone of its kind*), on the other hand, is applied to the whole person or to any aspect of his character, to his ideas, to his whole life, or to any particular act, as standing by itself out of the common course, and even to phenomena, circumstances, or occurrences. Singularity is less demonstrative than eccentricity, and, unlike eccentricity, may be restricted in some persons to matters which do not meet the eye. So one may be singular, that is, unlike his neighbours or the generality of people in the opinions which he holds; or the singularity may appear in some one feature of his character only, or in some one solitary act, as in some determination which he makes.

STRANGE (O. Fr. *estrange*, Lat. *extrāneus*) is of equally comprehensive application, but bears reference to the experience of the witness, to which it is foreign and alien; so that what seems strange to one person may not be so to another, who can better interpret it, or has by a larger experience been made familiar with it. It is a graver word than SINGULAR. It is the difficulty of comprehension or interpretation which constitutes the STRANGE, whence the word STRANGE is often coupled with mysterious, and is usually associated with the undesirable.

ODD (N. *odde*, from *oddr, a point; i.e. not even*, level, but having a unit on one side higher than on the other; see WEDGWOOD) implies disharmony, incongruity, or unevenness. An odd thing or person is an exception to general rules of calculation and procedure, or expectation and common experience. Like SINGULAR and STRANGE, it has a very wide application, and is not restricted to what is purely of a personal nature. It is less grave than STRANGE, and denotes an impression not so much of surprise or bewilderment as of incongruity, as strangeness does of unfamiliarity, singularity of isolation, and eccentricity of irregularity.

"Genius, a bustling lad of parts,
Who all things did by fits and starts;
Nothing above him or below him,
Who'd make a riot or a poem,
From *eccentricity* of thought
Not always do the thing he ought."
LLOYD

"Though, according to the common course and practice of the world, it be somewhat *singular* for men thoroughly to live up to the principles of religion, yet *singularity* in this matter is so far from being a reflection upon any man's prudence, that it is a *singular* commendation of it."—TILLOTSON.

"Though the common experience, says he, and the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men to make them give or refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief, yet there is one case wherein the *strangeness* of the facts lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given to it."—WARBURTON.

"But oh, how *oddly* will it sound, that I
Must ask my child forgiveness."
SHAKESPEARE.

The GROTESQUE (literally the character of the strange figures which serve to ornament *grottoes*) belongs only to matters of representation, expression or action. The grotesque is a combination of force with strangeness. It is truth in grimace, a natural thing put forth in an unnatural way, or an incident with a curious jumble of surroundings. The grotesque con-

tains the elements of the wild, the incongruous, the whimsical, the uncouth.

"*Grotesque* painting is the just resemblance of this; and Horace begins his Art of Poetry by describing such a figure with a man's head, a horse's neck, the wings of a bird, and a fish's tail, parts of different species jumbled together according to the mad imagination of the dauber."—DRYDEN.

ECONOMICAL. SAVING. FRUGAL. THRIFTY. PARSIMONIOUS. SPARING. PENURIOUS.

Of these, SAVING (*safe*, Fr. *sauf*, Lat. *salvus*) means avoiding unnecessary expenses, whether it be with or against the natural inclination, whether as a habit or for a particular purpose, whether with or without sufficient reason; but it has accumulation for its object.

ECONOMICAL (Gr. οἰκονομικός, *good at managing a household*) implies a good deal more, as not only saving of waste and unnecessary expense, but careful and frugal management and prudence in expenditure. The economical person not only abstains from extravagance and waste, but spends judiciously and well. ECONOMY is a term susceptible of the highest applications. It is the prudent, just, and advantageous employment of the parts of a whole or system, hence we speak of the economy of nature, providence, religion, of time and talents. It is suitable to the largest fortunes, and runs up into the highest forms of administration. It deals with large expenditures, and constitutes the wealth of a state. Economy is the whole and extended form of that of which management is a part and lower form.

FRUGAL (Lat. *frūgālis*, *thrifty*) relates more specifically to matters of consumption. So that one may be frugal even of time. It is opposed to lavish, and belongs especially to matters of food and dress. It conveys the idea of not using or spending superfluously, and when used of matters of consumption points to a simplicity of manners.

THRIFTY (connected with *thrive*, Dan. *thrif*, *good luck*) connects the ideas of frugality and industry, or such careful expenditure as comes of a knowledge of the value of money, and results in the competent possession of it, and in prosperity in general.

PARSIMONIOUS (Lat. *parsĭmōnia*, *parcère*, *to spare*) is commonly employed in a bad sense of *excessive* economy, and a closeness bordering upon niggardliness, or, at least, of continuous *effort* at saving. Parsimony is exercised in small matters, and is the retrenchments of trivial expenses. It is minute and rigorous. It levies taxes on small outgoings, and is the way by which the poor grow rich.

SPARING (A. S. *spárian*, *to spare*) has, like PARSIMONIOUS, a somewhat unfavourable sense, indicating a reluctance to spend where spending is necessary, or would be at least more graceful. It is more specific, as PARSIMONIOUS is more general and habitual. It commonly implies ampler means than the possessor is inclined to make use of. One speaks of being economical of time and sparing of time and trouble. As economy gains by judicious spending, parsimony gains by scrupulous spending, and sparing by not spending, or not till a cheap opportunity has been found. Economy suits large fortunes, parsimony small fortunes, sparing uncertain fortunes.

The PENURIOUS (Lat. *pēnūria*, *want*, *need*) is one who suffers want in the extremity of his sparing.

"The charitable few are chiefly they
Whom Fortune places in the middle way,
Just rich enough, with *economic* care,
To save a pittance, and a pittance spare,
Just poor enough to feel the poor man's moan,
Or share those sufferings which may prove their own." HARTE.

"He was not hitherto a *saver*."—SWIFT.

"The father was more given to *frugalitye*, and the sonne to ryotousnesse."—GOLDYNG.

"Domestic industry and economy, or the qualities distinguished by the homely titles of *thriftiness* and good housewifery, were always till the present century deemed honourable."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"*Parsimony*, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital. Industry indeed provides the subject which *parsimony* accumulates; but whatever industry might acquire, if *parsimony* did not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"And taught at schools much mythologic stuff,
But sound religion *sparingly* enough."
COWPER.

"I ever held a scanty and *penurious* justice to partake of the nature of a wrong."—BURKE.

ECSTASY. RAPTURE. TRANSPORT. FRENZY.

ECSTASY (Gr. ἔκστασις) is, literally, *a standing* or being *apart*, as if the soul left the body for a time, according to the ancient notion; a state in which the mind is carried away beyond the reach of ordinary impressions. It is now commonly used only of excessive and overpowering *joy*. An ecstasy of delight, and sometimes an ecstasy of grief. It is a passive state.

RAPTURE (Lat. *răpĕre*, part. *raptus*, *to seize*), on the other hand, is energetic and active, when the thoughts and feelings are keenly alive and intensified, and is never associated with the painful.

TRANSPORT (Lat. *transportāre*, *to carry across*) is not so strong a term, and is more variously applied. ECSTASY and RAPTURE are states of delight. TRANSPORT relates to vehement emotion of any kind, as grief, joy, rage, astonishment.

FRENZY (Fr. *frénésie*, originally from φρένησις, *inflammation of the brain*, *phrĕnītis*) is stronger than TRANSPORT, and is applied to all that transport relates to, and to the higher spiritual emotions besides; as the frenzy of poetry, or of inspiration; the frenzy of genius, when a more than common or human influence enraptures the mind; and the frenzy of wrath. In all the rest the individual is master of his own acts. In frenzy he is supposed to be himself acted upon by some power, which makes him an instrument, and carries him into subjection.

'What! are you dreaming, son? with eyes cast upwards
Like a mad prophet in an *ecstasie*."
DRYDEN.

"The latent Damon drew
Such maddening draughts of beauty to his soul,
As for a while o'erwhelmed his *raptured* thought
With luxury too daring." THOMSON.

"With *transport* views the airy realm his own,
And swells on an imaginary throne."
POPE.

"What *frenzy*, shepherd, has thy soul possessed?
The vineyard lies half pruned and half undressed." DRYDEN, *Virgil*.

EDIFICE. BUILDING. STRUCTURE. FABRIC. CONSTRUCTION.

An EDIFICE (Lat. *ædĭfĭcium*, *a building of any kind*) is commonly applied to *inhabited* buildings of some size and pretension, or to such as are at least from time to time *occupied*, as a palace or a cathedral; not an obelisk.

"Should I go to church,
And see the holy *edifice* of stone,
And not bethink me straight of dangerous rocks,
Which touching but my gentle vessel's side,
Would scatter all her spices on the stream,
Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks?"
SHAKESPEARE.

BUILDING (O. Sw. *bylja*, *to build*; the A. S. *byldan being to em-bold-en*) is used in an indeterminate way, when no characteristic idea is attached; as a mass of building, public and private buildings.

"And Jesus answered and sayde unto hym, Seyst thou these great *byldinges*?"—*Bible*, 1551.

STRUCTURE (Lat. *structūra*, *a fitting together*, *a structure*) is used of almost anything which is regarded as made of parts or particles put together, whether natural or artificial, and has the sense of composition, or mode of putting together, or formation; as the structure of the globe, the structure of a natural rock, the structure of a poem or a discourse. When used in a sense more closely synonymous with BUILDING, it draws the attention to the internal putting together of the parts rather than to any purpose of it. A curious structure, a lofty structure, an insecure structure. It would be incongruous to say, "The citizens needed some public structure in which to hold municipal meetings." Here EDIFICE or BUILDING would be used; but it might be added, "The plans of an eminent architect

were adopted, and the result is a commodious and handsome structure."

"But this is yet a weak piece of *structure*, because the supporters are subject to much impulsion, especially if the line be long."—*Reliquiæ Wottonianæ.*

FABRIC (Fr. *fabrique*, Lat. *fabrĭca*, *any artistic production*) is used not only of structures in the sense just given, but also of textile substances. In the architectural sense, FABRIC denotes more art and design, STRUCTURE more care and orderly arrangement.

"The baseless *fabric* of a vision."
SHAKESPEARE.

CONSTRUCTION (Lat. *constructiōnem*) does not imply that unity of form or plan which is expressed by both FABRIC and STRUCTURE. York Minster is a marvellous fabric or structure. A Roman mosaic pavement, or London Bridge, is an elaborate fabric. The Dutch dykes are other constructions on which the lives of thousands depend. The term CONSTRUCTION is the abstract of which STRUCTURE is the concrete. It is also the process of which structure is the result.

"From the raft or canoe which first served to carry a savage over the river, to the *construction* of a vessel capable of conveying a numerous crew in safety to a distant coast, the progress in improvement is immense."—ROBERTSON.

EDUCATION. INSTRUCTION. BREEDING. TRAINING. EDIFICATION.

INSTRUCTION (Lat. *instructionem, a constructing*) and *education* are as parts to the whole. Instruction is mental, education is moral as well as mental.

EDUCATION (Lat. *edŭcātiōnem, ēdŭcare, to rear, educate*) is more applicable to the younger portion of life, when the mind and the moral nature are unstocked and undeveloped; while instruction may be given or received on specific points or departments of knowledge at all periods. Instruction makes men wiser; education ought to make them wiser and better; and BREEDING (A. S *brédan, to nourish*) will make them more polished and agreeable.

TRAINING (Fr. *trainer, to drag, draw*) is development by instruction, exercise, and discipline, and is applicable to the whole nature of a man, or, specifically, to the faculties which he possesses. It denotes no more than a process of purposed habituation, and is equally applicable to the physical and mental powers, so that it may include both at the same time.

EDIFICATION (Lat. *ædĭfĭcātiōnem, a constructing, an edifice*) is an improvement in a moral or religious sense. It is, unlike the rest, applicable to the effect of a single cause, without continuous or sustained influence: one may be edified by a casual remark of another. He who is edified is conscious of an accession to his stock of practical knowledge, and an increase of his moral strength.

"Out of these magazines I shall supply the town with what may tend to their *edification*."—ADDISON.

The following is Hooker's account:—

"Now men are *edified* when either their understanding is taught somewhat whereof in such actions it behoveth all men to consider, or when their hearts are moved with any affection suitable thereto, when their minds are in any sort stirred up into that reverence, devotion, attention, and due regard which in these cases seemeth requisite."

"If what I have said in the beginning of this discourse be true, as I do not doubt but it is, namely, that the difference to be found in the manner and abilities of men is owing more to their *education* than anything else, we have reason to conclude that great care is to be had of the forming children's minds, and giving them that seasoning early, which shall influence their minds always after."—LOCKE.

"The coldness of passion seems to be the natural ground of ability and honesty among men, as the government or moderation of them the great end of philosophical and moral *instructions*."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

"I shall also be bold enough to affirm that among the ancients there was not much delicacy of *breeding*, or that polite deference and respect which civility obliges us either to express or counterfeit towards the persons with whom we converse."—BURKE.

"So to his steed he gott, and gan to ride
As one unfitt therefore, that all might see
He had not *trayned* been in chevalree."
SPENSER.

EDUCE. EXTRACT. ELICIT. ELIMINATE. ENUCLEATE. EVOLVE.

All these terms stand for processes

of exhibition of one thing out of another. But they have their distinct characteristics.

We EDUCE (Lat. *ēdūcĕre, to draw out*) not material but moral results; and this as against some counter-agency or influence of a contrary tendency, or a result unlike in character to the quarter or source from which it is drawn. As Pope—

"The eternal art *educes* good from ill."

We EXTRACT (Lat. *extrahĕre*, part. *extractus, to draw out*) simply as against the natural tendency of things or substances to retain. The term is applicable both morally and physically.

We ELICIT (Lat. *ēlĭcere*, part. *elĭcĭtus, to entice*) only moral things, and by moral means. It is to bring truth to light by indirect means, and, as it were, coax it out. Argument and inquiry are the common means of eliciting; but the force of circumstances also is said to have the same effect. In the case of the thing elicited there is presumed to be an inherent tendency to keep the fact or truth in reserve which will not yield to direct force, but only to influence operating indirectly.

ELIMINATE and ENUCLEATE stand closely related; but their purpose is in the main different. We eliminate a thing (Lat. *elīmĭnare, to turn out of doors*) by turning it, as it were, *out of doors*, separating and excluding it from the matter in hand, as in algebra we eliminate an unknown quantity, that is, cause it to disappear from an equation; hence, sometimes, elimination is the act of obtaining by separation.

We ENUCLEATE (Lat. *ēnucleāre, to take out the kernel*) for the opposite purpose, that is, not to exclude, but to obtain and expose, though we may afterwards dispose in any way of the thing so obtained or disposed.

To EVOLVE (Lat. *ēvolvĕre, to unrol*) expresses nearly the same thing as ENUCLEATE, but implies a more continuous and elaborate process. It is, moreover, used both of the thing unfolded, and of the thing brought to light out of that which is so unfolded. We educe by tact and contrivance. We extract by method. We elicit by management and ingenuity. We eliminate with a practical view of clearing what is superfluous to consideration. We enucleate the little germ of what is valuable from the husk of what is worthless. We evolve by pains that which we desire to take to ourselves as wrapt up in much for which we have no use or regard.

EFFACE. OBLITERATE. EXPUNGE. ERASE. CANCEL.

All these terms apply to characters impressed or inscribed.

EFFACE (Fr. *effacer*) is to render illegible or indiscernible, as the letters from a monument, or the effigy and letters from a coin, or any representation upon a surface. It is also used metaphorically in the sense of removing traces, as "to efface recollections from the mind." But the term implies nothing of mode or purpose; so that things may be purposely effaced, or effaced by the lapse of time, corroding influences, and the like. Such effacing may come short of the entire removal of the thing.

OBLITERATE (Lat. *oblĭtĕrāre, to blot out; lĭtĕra, a letter*) only applies to what conveys a symbolical meaning; *e.g.* letters. A fresco painting, for instance, would be a direct representation, and so might be effaced, but not obliterated; but the term is used analogously to the effacing of letters. So we might say, not indeed, "The painting itself," but "every trace of it was obliterated."

EXPUNGE (Lat. *expungĕre, to prick out, to erase from a list by points, set above or below*) is to strike out with the point of the pen, and is always *designedly* done; while obliteration, like effacement, may be the result of undesigned influences.

ERASE is to scratch out (Lat. *ērādĕre*); while CANCEL (Lat. *cancelli, lattice work*) is to draw lines diagonally across writing, so as practically to remove it, without actually erasing, expunging, or obliterating it. Cancelled writing loses its force, but not its legibility. It is in their metaphorical applications that the distinc-

tions of these words are more clearly prominent. Memories and impressions are effaced; traces, vestiges are obliterated; offences and injuries are expunged; gratitude, good and kindly thoughts, are erased; obligations, necessity, favours, debts, are cancelled.

"Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth often die before us, and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching, where, though brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are *effaced* by time, and the imagery moulders away."—LOCKE.

"The sin of Judah is said to be writ upon the table of their hearts, as if their memory of and affection to it could scarce be *obliterated*."—WHITBY.

"Is every word in the declaration from Downing Street, concerning their conduct, and concerning ours and that of our allies, so obviously false, that it is necessary to give some new-invented proofs of our good faith, in order to *expunge* the memory of this perfidy?"—BURKE.

"A king is ever surrounded by a crowd of infamous flatterers, who find their account by keeping him from the least light of reason, till all ideas of rectitude and justice are *erased* from his mind."—*Ibid.*

"The handwriting against him may be *cancelled* in the court of heaven, and yet the enditement run on in the court of conscience."—SOUTH.

EFFICIENT. EFFECTIVE. EFFECTUAL. EFFICACIOUS.

EFFICIENT (Lat. *effĭcĕre, to effect*) means actively operative, and is used of persons, of things, and of causes in a philosophical sense, as an efficient cause, an efficient officer. An efficient cause is the motive principle, as distinguished from the final cause or design, the material, and the formal cause. EFFICIENT is peculiarly applicable to persons.

EFFECTIVE means producing a decided effect, as an effective remedy, an effective picture, an effective speech. It is not a quality of persons. EFFECTUAL is *finally* effective, or producing, not effect generally, but the desired effect in such a way as to leave nothing to be done. An effectual remedy is one which needs not to be repeated.

EFFICACIOUS (Lat. *effĭcācem*) means possessing the *quality* of being effective, which is latent in the thing until it is put into operation. It is not employed of persons. An efficacious remedy is had recourse to, and proves effective if it does decided good, effectual if it does *all* the good desired.

"The Church was not impaired. Her estates, her majesty, her splendour, her orders and gradations continued the same. She was preserved in her full *efficiency*, and cleared only of a certain intolerance which was her weakness and disgrace."—BURKE.

"The House of Commons will lose that independent character which, inseparably connecting the honour and reputation with the acts of this House, enables us to afford a real, substantial, and *effective* support to his Government."—*Ibid.*

"The extreme dishonour and even peril of this situation roused her old age at length to the resolution of taking some *effectual* measures."—BISHOP HURD.

"Rules themselves are indeed nothing else but an appeal to experience; conclusions drawn from wide and general observation of the aptness and *efficacy* of certain means to produce those impressions."—*Ibid.*

EFFIGY. IMAGE. FIGURE. PORTRAIT.

The EFFIGY (Lat. *effĭgies; e, out of*, and *fingĕre, to form*) is intended not only to represent, but to take the actual place of the thing.

The IMAGE (Lat. *ĭmāginem*) is simply to represent it.

The FIGURE (Lat. *fĭgūra*) shows its attitude and design or occupation. The effigy is commonly popular; the image architectural or commemorative; the figure symbolical or expressive. Effigies of obnoxious rulers. Images of saints. Heraldic, equestrian, weeping figures.

We speak of PORTRAITS (Fr. *portrait*, Lat. *prōtrăhere*, in mediæval Lat. *to draw*) of illustrious persons. Portrait conveys the idea of an exact resemblance, the verb *portray* being used in the sense of drawing a likeness or description, and employed not only of persons but of scenes, transactions, characters, and the like. IMAGE and FIGURE are used of mental and rhetorical similitudes.

EFFORT. ATTEMPT. ENDEAVOUR. ESSAY. TRIAL. EXERTION. EXPERIMENT. EXPERIENCE.

EFFORT (Fr. *s'efforcer, to make an*

effort, force, strength) is a specific putting forth of strength, whether physical or mental, in performing an act, or aiming at an object. It implies external hardness or difficulty. Its opposite is ease.

An ATTEMPT (O. Fr. *atempter*, Lat. *attentāre, to attempt*) is a trying to do something in particular. It may be a trial of skill or strength; as, to attempt to scale a wall, or to untie a knot, or comprehend an expression. Efforts are strong or weak; attempts are successful or unsuccessful, and often need fortune as well as strength. Where the word ATTEMPT is employed, without anything to qualify it, it implies that the thing attempted was not achieved.

ENDEAVOUR (Fr. *en devoir, in duty, se mettre en devoir, to make it one's duty*) is of wider meaning than both EFFORT and ATTEMPT, and, indeed, comprehends both. It is to use all available means and resources in one's power to bring about an object. It is labour directed to some specific end. Effort is energetic or laborious endeavour. Endeavour is continuous and sustained attempt.

ESSAY (Fr. *essayer, to try*; Lat. *exāgium, a standard weight*) is commonly connected with one's own natural powers, of which some trial is made, as to essay to write, to speak, to sing. When spoken of matters wholly extraneous to one's self, it has the meaning of to test or try the strength, value, or purity; and in matters of effort implies some degree of the ineffectual.

TRIAL is the *trying* (Fr. *trier, to sort*; Lat. *tritāre, to break* (grain) *small*) or testing in any manner, as by experiment, by experience, by examination, and is applicable to one's own strength or powers and qualities, or the qualities of things external to ourselves.

EXERTION (Lat. *exsĕrĕre, to thrust forth*) is the active exercise of any power or faculty of which we may be possessed; as, to exert the mind, the limbs, or one's powers generally, as *e.g.* one's interest on behalf of another. It admits all degrees of effort, and even natural action without effort.

EXPERIMENT (Lat. *expĕrimentum*) is a process instituted for the sake of arriving at the knowledge of a general principle or truth. Experiment is to the general law what test is to the particular case. Less strictly it is a trial made to test one's own powers or something else, and conducted by reason and the light of nature.

"From whence it seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond which the mind, whatever *efforts* it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas."—LOCKE.

"I am afraid they have awaked.
And 'tis not done. The *attempt* and not the deed
Confounds us." SHAKESPEARE.

"It ought to be the first *endeavour* of a writer to distinguish nature from custom, or that which is established because it is right from that which is right because it is established."—*Rambler*.

"Yet such a tongue alike in vain *essays*
To blot with censure or exalt with praise."
HOOLE.

"To bring it to the *trial* will you dare?
Our pipes, our skill, our voices to compare?"
DRYDEN.

"*Exertings* of the senses of seeing and hearing."—HALE.

"These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections of *experiments*, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects by the *experiments* which he forms concerning them."—HUME.

EXPERIENCE (Lat. *expĕrientia, expĕrīri, to try*) is practical acquaintance, by personal observation, trial, or feeling of effects. In a fuller sense it is repeated trial, varied observation, and prolonged acquaintance. It includes also the condition of the person as the possessor of the sum and substance of the facts, feelings, or truths so acquired.

"And so for the evidence of *experience*, I am by that to a great degree assured of the succession of night and day, winter and summer, and have no such reason to doubt whether the house wherein now I am shall the next minute fall upon me, or the earth open and swallow it up, as to be in continual fear of such accidents."—WILKINS, *Natural Religion*.

EGOTISTICAL. OPINIONATED. SELFISH. CONCEITED.

The EGOTISTICAL man (Fr. *egöisme*, Lat. *ĕgo*, I) is full of himself *in talk*, as the SELFISH man is full of self in *plans, wishes, and desires*. The egotistical man acts out of self-conceit. He is a centre of interest and importance in his own estimation.

The OPINIONATED (Lat. *ŏpīnionem, opinion*) man is self-conceited on the particular point of his own judgment, and obstinately tenacious of his own opinions. Both the egotistical and opinionated man are innocent in comparison with the selfish, who is ready not only to think of himself first on all occasions, but even to gratify his desires at the expense of others.

The CONCEITED (Eng. *conceit, an idea, a conception*; Fr. *concevoir, to conceive*) man, full of *conceit* or estimation of himself, overrates his own capacity or recommendations. This may be in some things, and not in others, in which he may form a just or even too low an estimate.

"The gentlemen of Port Royal, who were more eminent for their learning and their humility than any other in France, banished the way of speaking in the first person out of all their works, as rising from vain-glory and self-conceit. To show their particular aversion to it, they branded this form of writing with the name of an *egotism*, a figure not to be found among the ancient rhetoricians."—*Spectator*.

"People of clear heads are what the world calls *opinionated*."—SHENSTONE.

"But men are led into this mistake by laying too much stress upon etymology. For, *selfishness* being derived from self, they learnedly infer that whatever is done to please one's own inclination must fall under that appellation, not considering that derivatives do not always retain the full latitude of their roots."—SEARCH.

The old force of the term *conceit*, that is, a conception or thought, and thence a forced thought, as a verbal conceit, or play on words, and afterwards a false or undue conception of one's own attractions or powers, appears in the following:—

"That groom that *conceited* himself an emperor thought all as irrational as disoyal that did not acknowledge him."—GLANVILL.

ELDER. SENIOR. OLDER.

ELDER (A. S. *yldra*, compar. of *eald, old*) and SENIOR (Lat. *sĕnior, older*) are used both as adjectives and substantives, OLDER only as a comparative adjective, in the sense of older persons. As adjectives, ELDER and SENIOR relate only to persons, ELDER signifying more advanced age, and SENIOR implying also that priority or precedence which such advancement confers or has brought with it. OLDER is applicable to any person or thing which has existed comparatively long; as this man, this house, this infant is older than the other.

"Hereof it came that the word (*elder*) was always used both for the magistrate and for those of age and gravity, the same bearing one signification almost in all languages."—RALEIGH.

"The names of lord, signior, seigneur, sennor, in the Italian, French, and Spanish languages, seem to have at first imported only *elder* men, who thereby were grown into authority among the several governments and nations which seated themselves into those countries upon the fall of the Roman Empire."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

"The melancholy news that we grow *old*."
YOUNG.

ELEVATION. HEIGHT. ALTITUDE.

ELEVATION (Lat. *ēlĕvātionem, lĕvis, light*) is the situation of an object raised above others. HEIGHT is the comparative measure of the elevation. Such and such a degree of elevation indicates the specific height of an object. But height is the more general term; elevation is always *considerable* height. The least degree of elevation is height. A plant may have a stem three inches in height (not elevation). ELEVATION, unlike HEIGHT, is used to denote a moral quality. Elevation of mind is above low or vulgar sentiments and aims.

ALTITUDE lends itself (Lat. *altĭtūdĭnem, height; altus, high*) to physical as elevation to moral associations. Altitude is height in elevation accurately measured. It is the degree of space extended upwards from a given level. Physical geography gives the altitude of mountains above the level of the sea. In astronomy altitude is measured by the degrees on the arc of a vertical circle.

ELIGIBLE. DESIRABLE PREFERABLE.

ELIGIBLE (Lat. *ēlĭgĕre, to select*) means primarily worthy of being chosen, or qualified to be chosen. It denotes, therefore, an alternative—that of choosing something else, or not choosing this.

DESIRABLE (Fr. *désir*, Lat. *dēsīdĕrium*) is of wider application, and conveys no idea of comparison or selection. It relates to any kind of choice, not only, for instance, of possession, like ELIGIBLE, but of conduct, as *e. g.* action, or the abstaining from action; and, in short, of anything that is to be wished, as a desirable residence, a desirable measure, a desirable abstinence from food.

PREFERABLE (Lat. *præferre, to prefer*) is that which is *comparatively* desirable or specifically eligible, as eligible is *singularly* desirable.

"A life of virtue and religion will, notwithstanding, to a considering man be far more easy and far more *eligible* than the contrary way of living."—SHARP.

"O, wherefore did God grant me my request,
And as a blessing with such pomp adorned?
Why are His gifts *desirable*, to tempt
Our earnest prayers, then, given with solemn hand
As graces, draw a scorpion's tail behind?"
MILTON.

The older form is *preferrible*.

"Which hypothesis, if it appear but probable to an impartial inquiry, will even on that account be *preferrible* to both the former, which we have seen to be desperate."—GLANVILL.

ELOCUTION. ELOQUENCE. ORATORY. RHETORIC.

ELOCUTION (Lat. *ēlŏcūtionem, ēlŏqui, to speak forth*) turns more upon the accessory graces of speaking in public, as intonation, gesture, and delivery in general; ELOQUENCE, on the matter and the natural gifts or attainments of the speaker. The actor must practise elocution; but, as his words are found him, he cannot be eloquent. The orator needs eloquence as a natural gift, which may be enhanced and rendered more effective by a studied elocution.

ORATORY (Lat. *ōrātor, an orator*) comprehends both the art and the practice of the orator, and, in an extended sense, the combined productions of orators; as, the oratory of Greece and Rome.

RHETORIC (Gr. ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη) is strictly the theory or science of which oratory is the practice. It is only by a kind of poetic licence that ELOQUENCE is used in the sense of expressiveness: as, the silent eloquence of a look, for instance. Rhetoric is commonly employed, like the adjective rhetorical, in the sense of a particular figure of rhetoric, or of a phrase which illustrates it, and is intended to be rather effective than literally and exactly true.

"Soft *elocution* does thy style renown,
And the soft accents of the peaceful gown."
DRYDEN.

"If I mistake not, our modern *eloquence* is of the same style or species with that which ancient critics denominated Attic eloquence; that is, calm, elegant, and subtle, which instructed the reason more than affected the passions, and never raised its tone above argument or common discourse."—HUME.

"Their *orators* thou then extoll'st as those
The top of eloquence, statists indeed,
And lovers of their country, as may seem;
But herein to our prophets much beneath,
As men divinely taught, and better teaching
The solid rules of civil government
In their majestic unaffected style
Than all the *oratory* of Greece and Rome."
MILTON.

"The power of eloquence having after the days of Pericles become an object of greater consequence than ever, this gave birth to a set of men till then unknown called Rhetoricians, and sometimes Sophists, who arose in multitudes during the Peloponnesian war, such as Protagoras, Prodicus, Thrasymus, and one who was more eminent than all the rest, Gorgias of Leontium. The Sophists joined to their art of *rhetoric* a subtle logic, and were generally a sort of metaphysical sceptics."—BLAIR.

EMANCIPATION. MANUMISSION.

Both these terms are framed in consonance with certain usages of the ancient Roman law in regard to slaves set at liberty. The former (Lat. *ēmancĭpātiōnem*) is from the preposition *e, out*, and *mancĭpium*, a *formal purchase*, in which the buyer laid his hand on the thing bought—*mănus, the hand*, and *căpĕre, to take*. Hence emancipation was the voluntary setting free from the condition of such servitude

as had made the slave the property of his master. It is used metaphorically of a moral liberation from what may be conceived to exercise a personal power over a man and to bring him into a subjection. Such, for instance, is the power of ignorance, prejudice, or error.

MANUMISSION (Lat. *mănūmissionem, mănū mittĕre, to send away by hand*) has no such moral association, and denotes simply the formal giving of a slave his liberty, unless it be employed rhetorically.

EMBLEM. SIGN. SYMBOL. SIGNAL. DEVICE.

Of these, SIGN (Lat. *signum*) is the most generic, the others being species of signs. Sign has the manifold meanings of a mark inscribed, as the sign of the cross; a token, as a sign of peace; an indication, as a sign of a man's intentions; or a proof, as a sign that it rained last night. The sign is natural or artificial, the signal is always conventional.

Unlike sign, EMBLEM (Lat. *emblĕma*, Gr. ἔμβλημα, *a raised*, strictly speaking, *a movable, ornament*) is always visible to the eye—an object representing or symbolizing another object or an idea by natural aptness, or by association: as a circle, the emblem of eternity; a sceptre, the emblem of power.

"A SYMBOL," says Coleridge (Lat. *symbŏlum*, Gr. σύμβολον) "is a sign included in the idea which it represents—an actual part taken to represent the whole, or a lower form or species used as the representative of a higher in the same kind;" as the lion is the symbol of courage, the lamb of meekness.

SIGNAL is a specific sign either conventionally agreed upon, or illustrating something else by a pre-established connexion in the mind. Tears are generally a sign of grief. The firing of a gun is in some places the signal of sunset.

DEVICE (Fr. *devise*) is an emblematic mark, figure, or ornament, like EMBLEM in being illustrative, but unlike it in relating not to natural connexions, but to arbitrary associations; as an heraldic device. Unlike EMBLEM also is DEVICE, in including words and characters as well as figures or objects of representation; as, for instance, in the form of a motto. A DEVICE is often an emblematic metaphor; and it is commonly personal, while an emblem is more general.

"Why may he not be *emblem'd* by the cozening fig-tree that our Saviour cursed?" —FELTHAM.

"We come now to the signatures of plants. I demand whether it be not a very easy and genuine inference from the observing that several herbs are marked with some mark or *sign* that intimates their virtue, what they are good for, and there being such a creature as man in the world that can read and understand these *signs* and characters, hence to collect that the Author both of man and them knew the nature of them both?"—SIR T. MORE.

An emblem is always of something simple. A symbol may be of something complex, as of a transaction which another and inferior transaction may be made to symbolize.

"His laying his hand upon the head of his sacrifice was a *symbolical* action, by which he solemnly acknowledged to God that he had justly deserved to suffer that death himself which his sacrifice was suffering for him."—SCOTT, *Christian Life*.

It will be observed that in consequence we do not speak of actions as emblematic.

"God and thou know'st with what a heavy heart
I took my farewell when I should depart,
And being shipp'd, gave *signal* with my hand
Up to the cliff where I did see thee stand."
DRAYTON.

A signal, unlike the rest, is always a thing *specifically* given or made.

"A banner with this strange *device*,
Excelsior." LONGFELLOW.

EMBRYO. FŒTUS.

EMBRYO (Gr. ἔμβρυον, *fœtus*) is the rudimental state of the young, whether of plants or animals.

FŒTUS (Lat. *fœtus*) is not used, like EMBRYO, of plants, but of animals only, and is the development of the embryo. It is used both of viviparous and oviparous animals. The embryo becomes the fœtus when it has acquired form and lineaments.

"Many of these trees produce the *embryos* of the leaves and flowers in one year, and bring them to perfection the following. These tender *embryos* are wrapped up with a compactness which no art can imitate, in which state they compose what we call the bud."—PALEY.

"Flies, caterpillars, and worms being ripened to *fœtation* by the heat of the sun, they live upon leaves and grass, and take their food without the care or assistance of those parents that produced them."—HALE.

EMINENT. ILLUSTRIOUS. DISTINGUISHED. PROMINENT.

EMINENT (Lat. *ēmĭnēre, to stand out*) is only employed of persons: when things stand out conspicuously, they are called PROMINENT. So the eminent characters of history, and the prominent events. Persons are eminent who stand above their fellows. This may be by the accident of birth, by merit, by high station, by talent, by virtue, and even by vices, if they be conspicuous enough. Therefore as a social term it is plain, as a moral one it is dubious.

"While others fondly feed ambition's fire,
And to the top of human state aspire,
That from their airy *eminence* they may
With pride and scorn the inferior world survey." HUGHES.

ILLUSTRIOUS (Lat. *illustris*) is used strictly only of persons, inasmuch as human acts or character can alone make things illustrious, as being the agents or the recipients of what is illustrious. Thus, we speak of illustrious heroes, illustrious nobles, illustrious titles. If we speak of illustrious deeds or events, it is as being done or brought about by human agency. The State or the historian render deeds or men illustrious. A striking object of Nature, for instance, might be famous, but never illustrious. The illustrious adds to the idea of celebrated that of a striking character for greatness, wisdom, or goodness. It involves some degree of esteem.

"Comparisons should be taken from *illustrious* noted objects, which most of the readers have either seen or can strongly conceive."—BLAIR.

DISTINGUISHED (Lat. *distinguĕre, to distinguish*), in like manner, directly relates to persons and to deeds, and to persons for the sake of their deeds.

DISTINGUISHED conveys the idea of social eminence or prominence as the result of public services rendered, or merit publicly exhibited.

"Few are formed with abilities to discover new possibilities of excellence, and to *distinguish* themselves by means never tried before."—*Rambler*.

A thing or person is prominent by position, eminent by station, distinguished by peculiarities of good or ill, and illustrious by the testimony and consent of others.

"Lady Macbeth's walking in her sleep is an incident so full of tragic horror that it stands out as a *prominent* feature in the most sublime drama in the world."—CUMBERLAND.

EMIT. EXHALE.

EMIT (Lat. *ēmittĕre, to send forth*) is the wider term, as it includes the more and the less substantial. To EMIT is, however, not commonly used of heavy and dense substances; in that case we use *discharge*. The cannon emits smoke, but does not emit shot. We speak of water, flame, gas, smoke, light, steam, smell, and the like, as emitted.

EXHALE (Lat. *exhālāre, to breathe out*) is used only of the lightest even of these; as to exhale odours, vapours, effluvia. Strictly, both EMIT and EXHALE relate to the propulsion of natural, not artificial things. It is only in poetry, for instance, that the bow emits the arrow.

"Lest, wrathful, the far-shooting god
Emit his fatal arrows." PRIOR.

"Is there not as much reason that the vapours which are *exhaled* out of the earth should be carried down to the sea, as that those raised out of the sea be brought up upon the dry land?"—RAY.

EMPIRE. KINGDOM. DOMINION. (*See* REALM.)

EMPIRE (Fr. *empire*, Lat. *impĕrium*) carries with it the idea of a vast and complicated government, varying in its relationship and degree of power in regard to the many subordinate and independent sovereignties or communities included under it.

KINGDOM (*king*, A. S. *cyning*; *cyn*, *tribe*, *-ing*, *son of*, or *belonging to*) is more definitely the territory subject to a king or queen; while DOMINION

(Lat. *dŏmĭnus, a lord*) has the vague meaning of political subjection or subordination *of any kind*, whether at home or abroad, and is even applicable to the lordship which man exercises over the brute creation. In their figurative uses the parallel distinctions are observed: as the empire of mind or reason; the kingdoms of animal, mineral, and vegetable nature; the dominion of the passions.

"If vice had once an ill name in the world, was once generally stigmatized with reproach and ignominy, it would quickly lose its *empire*, and thousands that are now slaves of it would become proselytes to virtue."—SHARP.

"The great and rich *kingdom* of Granada."—BACON.

"The safety, honour, and welfare of our sovereign and her *dominions*."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

EMPIRE. REIGN. KINGDOM.

EMPIRE (Lat. *impĕrium*) stands to States as REIGN (Lat. *regnum*) to persons and dynasties. The most glorious epoch of the Babylonian Empire was the reign of Nebuchadnezzar; of the Persian Empire, the reign of Cyrus; of that of the Greeks, the reign of Alexander; of the Roman Empire, the reign of Augustus. A reign is short or long, glorious or inglorious. An empire is lasting or ephemeral, and more or less extensive. EMPIRE and KINGDOM (Eng. *king*, and termination *-dom*, signifying *condition*) are differenced most obviously by being subject in the former case to an emperor, in the latter to a king. But this is not the sole difference. An empire denotes a State, extensive, and composed of many different peoples; a kingdom, one more limited, and more strongly marked by the unity of its people. In kingdoms there is a marked uniformity of fundamental laws, while varieties of customs do not affect the unity of political administration. The unity of an empire depends on the submission of certain chiefs, or the recognition of a universal head. The earliest portions of the Roman history belong to the history of a kingdom—that is, of one people, one by origin or incorporation. Its latest portions constitute a history of an empire—that is, of several nations which were one in submission to the central power, but not in absolute uniformity of laws. The royal government is narrower, and it is more exact and minute. The imperial government is wider and slighter, contenting itself in some senses with receiving the homage of princes on behalf of their subjects. Political advantages for the people and for the ruler go to constitute and preserve kingdoms. Empires are founded by ambition, and are seldom supported but by force of arms.

EMPLOY. USE.

EMPLOY (Fr. *employer*, Lat. *implĭcare*, in mediæval documents used to mean "to employ for some one's profit:" BRACHET;) and USE (Fr. *user*, Lat. *ūti*, part. *ūsus*) are somewhat differenced in usage. We always employ when we use; but we do not always use when we employ. Yet the difference is very slight. USE implies more entire assumption into our service than EMPLOY. As regards things, the terms are well-nigh interchangeable. We use or employ means; we use or employ violence; but as regards persons, we employ agents, and we use instruments. We do not use persons, except in some low sense, as machines or tools. Such respect is due to others when performing our behests. So a monarch negotiating with a foreign court would employ, not use, an ambassador. The more moral and dignified uses are expressed by EMPLOY. USE expresses the action of making use of a thing according to the right or the liberty which one has of disposing of it at will, or for one's advantage. To employ expresses the *application* which one makes of a thing according to its own properties, and the power one has of turning it to particular ends. One employs things, persons, means, resources, as one thinks fit, in regard to the object which one has to accomplish; and one employs well or ill according as the things employed are or are not suited to their office, and to the effect which one desires, and to the result one wishes to obtain. USE is applicable to things moral, as to use threats, per-

suasion, artifice, exaggeration. EMPLOY is used also in the sense of putting into activity as regards persons, that is, giving them employment.

"Had Jesus, on the contrary, made choice of the great and learned for this *employment*, they had discredited their own success. It might have been then objected that the Gospel had made its way by the aid of human power or sophistry."—WARBURTON.

"I would, my son, that thou would'st *use* the power
Which thy discretion gives thee, to control
And manage all." COWPER.

It may be added that USE has a general and abstract force, which is never apparent in EMPLOY. We may use simply; we never employ but for a specific purpose. A man uses, or has the use of, his hands when he simply exercises a natural power. He employs them for purposes which by the inferior animals are effected in other ways.

EMPLOYMENT. BUSINESS. AVOCATION. OCCUPATION. ENGAGEMENT. VOCATION.

EMPLOYMENT (*see* EMPLOY) is used in the twofold sense of employing and being employed. The same remark holds good of occupation and engagement. In the passive sense, EMPLOYMENT is any fixed way of passing the time, whether in duty or pleasure, or ways more indifferent. It may be active or meditative, specific, or habitual.

"Poets we prize, when in their verse we find
Some great *employment* of a worthy mind."
WALLER.

BUSINESS (A. S. *bysig*, *busy*) is more active employment, which at the time engrosses the time and attention as of primary importance; as in the common phrase, "I will make it my business to attend to it." Business is responsible employment. We choose our employments; our business claims *us*.

"It seldom happens that men of a studious turn acquire any degree of reputation for their knowledge of *business*."—PORTEUS.

AVOCATION (Lat. *āvŏcātionem*, *a calling off*, *interruption*, *diversion*). The term is commonly used of the minor affairs of life, less prominent and engrossing than BUSINESS, and of such calls as are beside the man's duty or business of life. It very commonly, therefore, occurs in the plural number, as "multifarious avocations," "employments of every degree of urgency and responsibility."

"In the time of health visits, businesses, cards, and I know not how many other *avocations*, which they justly style diversions, do succeed one another so thick, that in the day there is no time left for the distracted person to converse with his own thoughts."—BOYLE.

OCCUPATION (Lat. *occŭpātionem*) is used of such employment as has become, or tends to become, habitual as a favourite occupation, which may be one of seriousness or sport; an occupation in life, meaning a trade or calling.

"These were their learned speculations,
And all their constant *occupations*,
To measure wind and weigh the air,
And turn a circle to a square."
BUTLER.

ENGAGEMENT (Fr. *engager*, *to bind*, lit. *by a pledge*, Fr. *gage*) is an engrossing occupation, not compulsory nor systematic, but casual, yet at the time leaving little or no room for other employments.

"Portia, go in a while,
And by and by thy bosom shall partake
The secrets of my heart.
All my *engagements* I will construe to thee." SHAKESPEARE.

VOCATION (Fr. *vocation*) is literally a *calling*. It conveys the idea of systematic employment in an occupation appropriate to the person employed. It implies specific aptitude in the person, the result of training.

"If wit or wisdom be the head, if honesty be the heart, industry is the right hand of every *vocation*, without which the shrewdest insight and the best intention can execute nothing."—BARROW.

EMPOWER. *See* AUTHORIZE.

EMPTY. VACANT. HOLLOW. VOID. BLANK.

EMPTY (A. S. *æmtig*) has reference to foreign or dissimilar substances; while HOLLOW (A. S. *holh*, *an empty space*) has reference to internal discontinuity of substance; as an empty purse, a hollow beech.

VACANT (Lat. *vācāre*, *to be empty*)

belongs to what might be filled, or is intended to be filled or occupied, but at present is not so; as a vacant chair, a vacant office.

VOID (Lat. *vĭduus, bereaved*) denotes some place so surrounded as to be unoccupied. A plot of ground, for instance, in the middle of a city unbuilt upon might be called void; it is the absence of filling up in other than a purely geometrical sense. An empty place would be in an exceptional or casual state. A void place might be intended to be always void, in the sense of provisionally unoccupied. That which is void conveys an impression of want or emptiness which may be felt.

When VOID is followed by of, it is a predication which amounts to a strong privative expression, signifying the utter lack of something in an object capable of containing it, or which might naturally be expected to contain it, as void of understanding.

"All *empty* is the tonne" (barrel).
CHAUCER.

"The pope had accursed the English people because they suffered the bishops' sees to be *vacant* so long a time."—HOLINSHED.

VACANT is used in an abstract and a metaphorical, not a purely physical application. A vacant space, or a vacant office; but not a vacant vessel.

"Yet it has been noted that many old trees, quite decayed with an inward *hollowness*, have borne as full burdens and constantly as the very soundest."—EVELYN.

"And the *void* helmet followed as he pulled." COWPER, *Iliad*.

BLANK (Fr. *blanc, white*) relates only to superficial nakedness in a uniform substance. The unprepared surface is blank. The blank paper is unwritten upon; the blank wall is uncoloured or undecorated. Blankness affects the vision, and presents to the eye an impression of monotonous incompleteness, without a touch of relief. It is vacancy made visible. Poets and rhetoricians speak of blank astonishment, dismay, disappointment, despair. Udal, on St. Mark, speaks of the Sadducees as "put to a foyle and *blanked*." But BLANK, as it has the idea of vacancy unfilled, suggests sometimes that of vacancy that may be filled. A blank paper and a blank lottery ticket represent these two aspects.

"These touched by Reynolds, a dull *blank* becomes
A lucid mirror in which nature sees
All her reflected features." COWPER.

ENACTMENT. MANDATE. ORDINANCE.

ENACTMENT (Fr. *en-*, and *act, to put into act*) is the making a thing into a law, the giving to it legal validity and authority. This may be the act of one or many, according as the source of authority is personal or collective. The latter is in modern times so far the most common principle of legislation that the term usually expresses that last step in the process of legislation, by which a Bill passes into law.

A MANDATE (Lat. *mandāre*, part. *mandātus, to command*) is an official or authoritative command, but not applied to the acts of collective legislation. The source of a mandate is always personal.

An ORDINANCE (Lat. *ordĭnare, ordĭnem, order*) is a rule of action permanently established by authority. Any statute, law, edict, decree, or rescript may be called an ordinance when it is regarded in this light. The ordinance is always a thing of wide establishment, and is not applicable to matters of domestic management, or connected with the administration of minor associations. An ordinance is an operative act of sovereign power.

ENCROACH. INTRENCH. INTRUDE. INFRINGE.

ENCROACH (Fr. *en, in, croc, a hook*) is to come gradually, insensibly, or imperceptibly upon another's land, or, metaphorically, upon his rights. It is this silence and indirectness which characterize ENCROACHMENT, so that the trespass is made, and the footing established before the process was heeded.

"Disobedience, if complied with, is infinitely *encroaching*; and having gained one degree of liberty upon indulgence will demand another upon claim."—SOUTH.

INTRENCH (*i.e. entrench*, Fr. *en*, in, and Eng. *trench*; Fr. *trancher, to cut*

is an old term of feudal history, literally meaning to push forward the *trench* of fortified line, and so to trespass on another's territory, as when the king intrenched upon the nobles, or the nobles upon the king. The term, unlike ENCROACH, denotes a direct and decisive act, though it may be an indirect result rather than a direct purpose, as if by performing a certain act, or claiming a certain privilege, a noble entrenched on a prerogative of the crown. Men encroach gradually; they intrench presumptuously.

"It is not easily apprehended to be the portion of her care to give it spiritual milk; and therefore it *intrenches* very much upon impiety and positive relinquishing the education of their children."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

To INTRUDE (Lat. *intrūdĕre, to thrust into*) is to thrust one's self in an abrupt or unwelcome manner upon the presence or society of another; while to INVADE (Lat. *invādĕre, to enter upon, to attack*) denotes a direct, positive, and open violation of another's rights. Men often encroach when they would hesitate to invade. Invasion carries with it the idea of an overt act of hostility; often done suddenly and without warning, but always as the commencement of such hostilities.

INFRINGE (Lat. *infringĕre, to break into, to break against*) is positively to violate, or negatively to disregard a direct law, treaty, obligation, or right.

"Others have ceased their curiosity, and consider every man who fills the mouth of report with a new name as an *intruder* upon their retreat, and disturber of their repose."—*Rambler*.

"The Philistines have *invaded* the land."—*Eng. Bible*.

"We scarce ever had a Prince who, by fraud or violence, had not made some *infringement* on the Constitution."—BURKE.

ENDLESS. ETERNAL. EVERLASTING.

ENDLESS (A. S. *ende*, and privative termination *-less*) is applicable to the idea of infinity of space and of time, EVERLASTING only to infinite duration of time, ETERNAL to chronic period without either beginning or end (O. Fr. *eternel*, Lat. *æternus*, for *ævĭternus*, *ævum, age*). ENDLESS admits the idea of intermediate though not of final cessation. That might be called endless which is perpetually recurrent, as endless disputes. EVERLASTING, on the other hand, implies no intermission as well as no end.

ENDOW. ENDUE. INVEST.

ENDOW (Fr. *endouer, to endow*; Lat. *dōtāre*) retains its etymological force, and in its metaphorical use signifies to furnish with something which is of the nature of a gift. "Man is endowed with reason," implies that reason is regarded as a faculty in the nature of a gift bestowed characteristically upon him by his Maker.

ENDUE, another form of ENDOW, has a similar, yet less forcible, meaning; possibly a confusion between Endue (O. Fr. *endoer, endouer*) and the Lat. *induere, to clothe with, to deck*—a weaker metaphor than that of dowry—may have contributed to this result.

INVEST (Lat. *investīre, to clothe*) is more external than ENDUE. We may say a lover's imagination endues or invests his mistress with every grace; but when the idea is that of clothing with office or authority, we use the term INVEST.

We are commonly said to endow with privileges or substantial benefits, to endue with moral qualities, and to invest with dignity, authority, and power.

"And yet I do not take humility in man to consist in disowning or denying any gift or ability that is in him, but in a just valuation of such gifts and *endowments*, yet rather thinking too meanly than too highly of them."—RAY.

"Now an unintelligent being, 'tis evident, cannot be *endued* with all the perfections of all things in the world, because intelligence is one of those perfections."—CLARKE.

"And what were all his most rightful honours but the people's gift, and the *investment* of that lustre, majesty, and honour which for the public good, and no otherwise, redounds from a whole nation into one person?"—MILTON.

ENDOWMENT. GIFT. PRESENT. BENEFACTION.

In their simplest signification the distinction between these is obvious.

An ENDOWMENT is a gift in perpetuity, of which the usufruct is continually accruing; as to give a sum of money, of which the interest may serve to endow a public institution.

A GIFT is usually from one who is in some sense a superior, and intended to benefit the person to whom it is given.

A PRESENT (Lat. *præsentāre, to place before, to present*) is commonly from an equal or an inferior, as a mark of affection or respect, or from a desire to please or to gain favour. Of these, GIFT is the most generic, endowments and presents being forms of gifts. One selects *useful* things for gifts, *agreeable* things for presents. As they relate to moral and intellectual things, gifts and endowments differ in that a gift commonly ends as it were with itself, while an endowment gives the power of other things; and so GIFT is the more specific, ENDOWMENT more general. The gift of speech, the gift of eloquence; the endowments of the understanding. Accordingly, endowment contains the idea of something to be improved by exertion, which gift does not. The powers of the early church, such as the performance of miracles, the power of tongues, and the like, were both gifts and endowments—gifts of the Spirit when regarded as supernaturally given, endowments when regarded as faculties which might be exercised as occasions presented themselves. Anything is a gift which is parted with to another gratuitously and without recompense. An endowment has great and permanent value, a gift has some considerable value, a present may have a costly character or not. It is sometimes of trifling value, the motive being regard or politeness.

A BENEFACTION (Lat. *bĕnĕfactionem*) is a gift sufficiently important to be of lasting value, but not like ENDOWMENT, amounting to a maintenance of the institution or the individual on which it is conferred. (*See* ENDOW.)

"Such a stock of industry as will do them more real service than any other kind of *benefaction*, if they will but make use of it and improve it."—ATTERBURY

ENDURANCE. PATIENCE. RESIGNATION. FORTITUDE.

ENDURANCE (O. Fr. *endurer, to endure*) is, as the term expresses, the power or act of enduring, that is, of suffering without sinking, and may be a physical or mental quality. It implies a continual pressure of a harassing nature on the one hand, and a competent constitutional power of passive resistance on the other.

"When she with hard *endurance* had
Heard to the end." SPENSER.

PATIENCE (Lat. *pătientia, păti, to suffer*) is endurance which is morally acquiescent. The opposite to endurance is simply exhaustion, the opposite to patience is repining, or irritability and impatience. I may endure impatiently. The qualities of patience are gentleness and serenity in bearing that which, without being agonizing, is wearing or vexatious, whether internally or from the conduct of others. There is a sense in which patience is active, or, at least, more than purely passive, as in the patient teacher of dull or inattentive pupils. Fortitude, on the other hand, is purely passive. He is truly enduring who suffers with constancy any hardships, injustice, contradictions, persecutions, on the part of men. He is patient who suffers with moderation, with sweetness, without murmuring, without resistance. Men are sometimes patient under some forms of evil and not others; as for instance, they will bear resignedly what comes in the course of circumstances, not the ill-treatment of men. Job in his sufferings was patient, David under the curses of Shimei was enduring. The martyr endures with an admirable patience. The enduring man may suffer and be in exasperation, the patient man suffers and is calm.

"In the New Testament it is sometimes expressed by the word ὑπομονή, which signifies God's forbearance and patient waiting for our repentance; sometimes by the word ἀνοχή, which signifies holding in His wrath, and restraining Himself from punishing, and sometimes by μακροθυμία, which signifies the extent of His *patience*, His long-suffering and forbearing for a long time the punishment due to sinners."—TILLOTSON.

Still PATIENCE applies only to evils actually hanging over us; while RE-

SIGNATION (Lat. *rĕsignare, to give back, resign*) extends to *the possible* as well as *the actual*, and is unresisting, unmurmuring acquiescence in the issue of circumstances or the exercise of the will of another. Resignation is more like to patience than to fortitude, inasmuch as it implies non-resistance; but, on the other hand, it is always passive. It applies not to passing pains or evils, but afflictions of a severe, prolonged, and seemingly hopeless character. It is a religious submission extending to the giving up of earthly hope. Fortitude and patience may be stoical or constitutional; resignation is always on principle.

"*Resignation* superadds to patience a submissive disposition respecting the intelligent cause of our uneasiness. It acknowledges both the power and the right of a superior to afflict."—COGAN.

FORTITUDE (Lat. *fortĭtūdĭnem*) is a more energetic quality, and might be defined as passive courage or resolute endurance. It not only bears up against the present, and is resigned to what may be in the future, but it looks as it were the future in the face, and is prepared for yet worse things.

"*Fortitude* expresses that firmness of mind which resists dangers and sufferings."—COGAN.

ENEMY. ADVERSARY. ANTAGONIST. OPPONENT. FOE.

ENEMY (O. Fr. *enemi*, Lat. *ĭnĭmĭcus*) is one who is actuated by unfriendly feelings, and in consequence attempting or desiring the injury of another. An enemy may be open or secret, collective or personal. The term is employed of man's relationship to things as well as persons, as an enemy to truth, an enemy to falsehood.

A FOE (A. S. *fáh*) is a personal enemy, one who bears a more energetic and specific hatred than ENEMY.

"He who does a man an injury generally becomes the rancorous *enemy* of the injured man."—MICKLE.

"Curst be the verse, how well soe'er it flow,
That tends to make one worthy man my *foe*."
POPE.

ADVERSARY, ANTAGONIST, and OPPONENT denote primarily personal *opposition*, and only secondarily personal *ill-will*, which in some cases may not exist at all; as in the case of an adversary at fence, an antagonist at chess, and a political opponent. ADVERSARY, ANTAGONIST, and OPPONENT are never, like ENEMY and FOE, used collectively, as of a hostile army. An adversary (Lat. *adversārius*) is one who takes an opposite part, which he sustains, or a side on which he enlists himself, whether singly or with others, and on behalf of which he strives for victory. An antagonist (Gr. *ἀντᾰγωνιστής, an opponent, rival*) is purely personal; in the case of antagonists, it is person against person, not party against party, or cause against cause. An opponent (Lat. *opponens*, part. of *oppōnĕre, to oppose*) is simply one who thwarts another, or seeks to stop his proceedings, without of necessity coming into conflict with him, but seeking to neutralize his acts or measures. The term, however, has an almost technical sense—that of an adversary in argument; where words are the weapons, we employ the term OPPONENT. The enemy makes war and desires to destroy, and would wound the very person. The adversary contends for the possession of something of which he would deprive his competitor; the antagonist tries to stop, to disarm, to defeat. Some nations seem instinctively to be natural enemies to each other. A man who has the power and the will to bribe, is often the most formidable of adversaries. The Duke of Wellington and Napoleon were illustrious antagonists.

"Truth seems to be considered by all mankind as something fixed, unchangeable, and eternal. It may therefore be thought that to vindicate the permanency of truth is to dispute without an *adversary*."—BEATTIE.

"The race
Of Satan, for I glory in the name,
Antagonist of heaven's Almighty King."
MILTON.

"The leading views of the earliest and most enlightened patrons of the economical system have, in my opinion, been not more misrepresented by its *opponents* than misapprehended by some who have adopted its conclusions."—STEWART.

ENERGY. ACTIVITY. POWER. FORCE. VIGOUR. STRENGTH.

ENERGY (Gr. *ἐνέργεια, action, operation*

tion). An energy may lie dormant, as "the dormant energies of nature." From this the word passes to signify power forcibly exerted, as energy of manner or of utterance. It is the manifestation of *living* power. In this sense it is only used of beings possessing will; so vital energy, not mechanical energy.

"The great *energies* of nature are known to us only by their effects; the substances which produce them are as much concealed from our senses as the Divine essence itself."—PALEY.

ACTIVITY (Lat. *actīvus, active*) means no more than vigorous operation, or the faculty of it. This is not necessarily attended by great power, nor is it restricted to the vital energies, or an exhibition of the will, or a working in any one given direction. It may be intellectual, physical, instinctive, chemical, mechanical. Activity is not so much power or energy as a mode in which a certain degree of power or energy is manifested.

"*Orl.* He is simply the most *active* gentleman in France.

"*Const.* Doing is *activity*, and he will still be doing."—SHAKESPEARE, *Hen. V.*

POWER (Fr. *pouvoir, to be able*), in its primary meaning, is ability to act, regarded as latent, and thence ability, regarded as manifest or exerted. It is also capable of a passive signification. Power may be predicated of the mind of man, of intelligent beings, of natural forces, or mechanical agents, or conventional qualifications; legal power is authority in superiors, and freedom in equals, and right in all. The following extract relates to power in its metaphysical or psychological sense.

"*Power* then is active and passive. Faculty is active *power* or capacity; capacity is passive *power*."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

Mechanically, POWER commonly relates to the work to be effected, as FORCE to that which is directly exerted by the machine. The force of an engine relates to the pressure exercised upon the rails, the power to the quantity or weight of the load drawn.

FORCE (Fr. *force*, Lat. *fortis, strong*) is active power specifically exerted. In mechanics it is the name given to whatever produces or may produce motion. In its other applications, it still relates to some external effect produced. So we might say of an orator, that he combined force of reasoning with energy of expression.

"Thy tears are of no *force*
To mollify this flinty man."
HAYWARD.

STRENGTH (A. S. *streng, strong*) is the quality of being *strong*, which may be active or passive, while FORCE is always active. Strength is often used in the sense of power to resist force, as the strength of a rope or a castle. It has also the meaning of measurement of force, as the strength of an army or an alcohol. It may be said generally that force is strength exerted. An argument, for instance, is strong when the consideration which it involves is of weight; but it has no force till it is applied. A man collects his strength in order to strike with force. Strength is powerful in resistance, force in attack.

"More huge in *strength* than wise in works he was." SPENSER.

VIGOUR (Lat. *vĭgōrem*) is that mental or physical strength which results from a sound natural condition, as the vigour of intellect, the vigour of an arm, the vigour of a plant, the vigour of an administration. Vigour, like activity, is rather a mode of power than power itself. It is the passive, as activity is the energetic condition of vital power. It is applicable to the exhibition of physical strength, as "the vigour of his arm," or intellectual, as of his mind, or even to a sound and healthy state of animal or vegetative life. VIGOUR, and its derivatives, however, when directly associated with power, commonly imply active strength, or the power of action and exertion, in distinction to passive strength, or power of endurance. Men act or move, but do not suffer with vigour.

"The *vigour* of this arm was never vain."
DRYDEN.

ENERVATE. ENFEEBLE. DEBILITATE. WEAKEN.

Of these, WEAKEN (A. S. *wāc, weak, pliant*) is the generic term,

predicable of any case of lessened power, force, or strength. ENERVATE, ENFEEBLE, and DEBILITATE are only employed of human powers. ENERVATE (Lat. *ē-nervāre, to take out the sinews, to weaken*) is to impair the moral powers, as DEBILITATE may be more specifically applied to the physical, and ENFEEBLE to the intellectual and physical. *Debility* (Lat. *debilitatem, a disabled condition*) is that weakness which comes from a chronically morbid state of the functions; while persons may be enfeebled by the effect of age alone, or as the temporary effect of sickness.

"In a word, we ought to act in party with all the moderation which does not absolutely *enervate* that vigour, and quench that fervency of spirit without which the best wishes for the public good must evaporate in empty speculation."—BURKE.

ENFEEBLE does not express so strongly as DEBILITATE an organic cause of corporeal weakness. Disease debilitates, fear enfeebles.

"Abject fear, which views some tremendous evil impending from which it cannot possibly escape, as it depresses the spirits, so it *enfeebles* the corporeal frame, and it renders the victim an easy prey to the evil he dreads."—COGAN.

"Sometimes the body in full strength we find,
While various ails *debilitate* the mind."
JENYNS.

"That the power, and consequently the security, of the monarchy may not be *weakened* by diversion, it must descend entire to one of the children."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

ENFORCE. URGE.

URGE (Lat. *urgere*) is only by poets employed directly of physical substances, as Gray:—

"To chase the rolling circles' speed
Or *urge* the flying ball."

It is commonly used of moral pressure upon individuals, and of the subject itself which is so pressed; as, to urge an argument, or petition, or the subject-matter of it, as the expediency or necessity of a particular line of conduct.

To ENFORCE (O. Fr. *enforcer*, Mod. Fr. *enforcir*, Lat. *fortis, strong*) is to endue with *force*, or to bring into operation that which has a force of its own; as, to enforce a command of one's own, or to enforce the law or obedience to it. It is never, except by poets, used of physical propulsion, as by Shakespeare—

"Stones enforced from the old Assyrian slings."

URGE has a more purely moral character than ENFORCE. It has more of argument, persuasion, entreaty, expostulation; ENFORCE more of authority and power. We urge persons by endeavouring to bring them to see objects in the same light as ourselves. We do not enforce persons, but that which has a binding or compelling power against them.

ENLIGHTEN. ILLUMINE. ILLUMINATE.

To ENLIGHTEN is to throw *light* upon and, more commonly, metaphorically, the light of truth and knowledge.

ILLUMINE (Lat. *illūmĭnāre*) is so to enlighten as to penetrate the substance.

ILLUMINATE is to throw light upon in the sense of enlighten, and also in the sense of to light up, whether by light itself, as in the festive illuminations of a city, or by rich colouring, as an illuminated manuscript. It is to be remarked that while enlightened is used as an epithet—an enlightened person or enlightened society—we do not employ illumined or illuminated in this way, but borrow the Italian word *illuminati*, the *enlightened*.

"The light itself became darkness; and then was a proper season for the great *Enlightener* of the world to appear."—SECKER

"*Illumine* with perpetual light
The dulness of our blinded sight."
Church Hymn.

"That need no sun t' *illuminate* their spheres." SPENSER.

In old English writers, however, the verbs illume, illumine, and illuminate were used interchangeably.

ENSURE. SECURE.

SURE is from the French *sûr*, and this from the Lat. *sēcūrus, without care*, and, reflexively, beyond the need of care, that is, safe. These words therefore have the same etymological

basis. That which is secure is safe from danger, intact, not liable to be altered or removed. That which is ensured is free from uncertainty, fixed, not liable to prevention, frustration, defeat. Things actual and present are secured, things future or contingent are ensured. That which is secured to us is ours, and will remain so; that which is ensured will become so. We secure by exercising a power to retain; we ensure by controlling means which will confer. He who secures knows how to preserve; he who ensures knows how to acquire.

ENTANGLE. IMPLICATE. INVOLVE.

ENTANGLE (etym. doubtful) is so to involve as to render extrication a matter of bewildering difficulty. It is used both physically and metaphorically.

IMPLICATE (Lat. *implĭcāre, to enfold*) and INVOLVE (Lat. *involvĕre, to enwrap*) are used only in the metaphorical sense. The difference lies rather in the customary applications of these terms than in any essential unlikeness of meaning. We are entangled in difficulties or difficult relationships, as untoward alliances and acquaintanceships; we are implicated in blame, faults, crime, transactions, the term being always employed in an unfavourable sense. We are involved in things external which take strong effect upon us, as in debt, in ruin, in the untoward consequences of conduct or actions. The term is used also of things, while implicate is confined to persons, as we say the subject is involved in doubt, difficulty, mystery, obscurity; or, this involves, that is, implies, or draws after it, the necessity of something else.

"It (integrity) is much plainer and easier, much the safer and more secure way of dealing in the world; it has less of trouble and difficulty, of *entanglement* and perplexity, of danger and hazard in it."—*Spectator.*

"He is much too deeply *implicated* to make the presence or absence of these notes of the least consequence to him."—*State Trials.*

"The kings of Syria and of Egypt, the kings of Pergamus and Macedon, without intermission worried each other for above two hundred years, until at last a strong power arising in the west rushed upon them and silenced their tumults by *involving* all the contending parties in the same destruction."—BURKE.

ENTERTAIN. HARBOUR.

These terms are sometimes used metaphorically of the thoughts, and of some sentiments, as hopes, friendship, enmity, and the like.

In such cases, ENTERTAIN (Fr. *entretenir*) is less voluntary than HARBOUR (O. H. G. *herberga, camp, lodging*, Fr. *auberge*). To entertain an unfavourable opinion of another may be the result of calm judgment and unhappy experience; to harbour such thoughts rather implies that their soundness has not been proved, but that we readily lend ourselves to the supposition with some hope that it may be true, finding, as it were, a place for it in our minds. We entertain charitable, we harbour uncharitable thoughts.

"The not *entertaining* a sincere love and affection for the duties of religion does both naturally, and by the just judgment of God besides, dispose men to errors and deceptions about the great truths of religion."—SOUTH.

The unfavourable sense of HARBOUR in regard to thoughts has no doubt sprung from its older use in regard to obnoxious persons, as seen in the following:—

"They judged that all men who suspected any to have been in the rebellion were bound to discover such their suspicions and to give no *harbour* to such persons; that the bare suspicion made it treason to *harbour* the person suspected, whether he was guilty or not."—BURNET.

ENTHUSIAST. FANATIC. VISIONARY. ZEALOT. BIGOT.

ENTHUSIAST (ἐνθουσιάζω, *I am inspired*, ἔνθεος, ἔνθους,) is one who is influenced by a peculiar fervour of mind. Enthusiasm is at present employed in the sense of an overweening attachment, not necessarily irrational—in certain limits even admirable—for some cause or subject; as, an enthusiastic lover of music. Enthusiasm then begins to be blameworthy and perilous when the feelings have overmastered the judgment. In re-

ligion, enthusiasm is often taken to mean the influence of spirit as superseding the ordinary processes of revelation by instruction. In that sense it is spoken of in the following:—

"*Enthusiasm* is that temper of mind in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this disordered state of things, *enthusiasm*, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes *fanaticism*."—WARBURTON.

"From the consequences of the genius of Henry, Duke of Visco, did the British American empire arise; an empire which, unless retarded by the illiberal and inhuman spirit of religious *fanaticism*, will in a few centuries perhaps be the glory of the world."—MICKLE.

FANATIC (Lat. *fānāticus, fānum, a temple*) is employed to designate one whose overheated imagination has wild and extravagant notions, especially upon the subject of religion, which render him incapable of using his judgment and dangerous to others. For enthusiasm is a solitary, fanaticism a social passion.

A VISIONARY, as the term expresses, is one who is moved by *visions*, and influences of the imagination, mistaken for realities. He forms, therefore, impracticable schemes, and creates for himself a present or future state of things, which persons of calm judgment know to be incapable of realization.

"I know not whether the French did not derive their ideas of teaching things instead of words from some celebrated writers of our own country, who, with all their good sense and genius, were *visionaries* on the subject of education."—KNOX.

ZEALOT (Gr. *ζηλωτής, a rival, a zealot*) and BIGOT (a word of unknown origin, of which more than one possible account has been given; but the *meaning* of which has probably been affected by confusion with the word *beguin*, or more commonly, fem. *beguine*, begging devotees of Flanders, early in the 13th cent.) represent, the one actively, the superstitious partizan, the other, more passively, the superstitious believer and adherent.

"A furious *zealot* may think that he does God service by persecuting one of a different sect. St. Paul thought so, but he confesses he acted sinfully notwithstanding he acted ignorantly."—GILPIN.

A zealot is in action what a bigot is in opinion.

"They are terribly afraid of being called *bigots* and enthusiasts, but think there is no danger of falling into the opposite extreme of lukewarmness and impiety."—PORTEUS.

ENTICE. ALLURE. DECOY. SEDUCE. TEMPT.

ENTICE (O. Fr. *enticer*) is to draw on or instigate by means of a feeling *internal* to one's self, as hope or desire.

ALLURE (Fr. *à leurre, to the bait*, for animals) is to do the same thing by means of something *external* to one's self, as prospect of gain.

DECOY (Lat. *de*, and the O. Fr *coi*, or *coy*, Lat. *quietus, quiet*) is to lead on quietly into the snare, as opposed to violent and noisy modes of capture. As the decoy was a term employed for the bird, or likeness of one, used to lead the others into the snare, the verb to decoy has the force of leading on gradually into a snare from which there is eventually no escape, as "to decoy troops into an ambush."

TO SEDUCE (Lat. *sēdūcĕre, to lead aside*) is to draw aside from the path of duty, integrity, or chastity by false or alluring representations.

TO TEMPT (Lat. *tentāre, to try, to put to the test*) is to bring an influence, commonly no creditable one, to bear upon another to induce him to do something. TEMPT is stronger than either ENTICE or ALLURE, and needs moral effort at resistance. It will be observed that ENTICE, TEMPT, and ALLURE do not absolutely imply *the success* of the means used, which, however, is the case with SEDUCE and DECOY.

"My son, if sinners *entice thee*, consent thou not."—*Book of Proverbs.*

"Among the Athenians, the Areopagites expressly forbade all *allurements* of eloquence."—HUME.

"Man is to man all kind of beasts, a fawning dog, a roaring lion, a thieving fox, a robbing wolf, a dissembling crocodile, a treacherous *decoy*, a rapacious vulture."—COWLEY.

"An ingenuous young man takes up the book from the laudable motive of improving his mind with historical knowledge, but as he reads he finds himself *seduced* and cheated

into irreligion and libertinism."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"Adam also was *tempted* and overcomed; Chryste beeyng *tempted*, overcame the *temptour*."—UDAL, *St. Luke*.

ENTIRE. WHOLE. COMPLETE. TOTAL. INTEGRAL. PERFECT.

ENTIRE (O. Fr. *entier*, Lat. *intĕger*) and WHOLE (A. S. *hál*, *healthy*, *whole*) are very nicely distinguished. In most cases the words are simply interchangeable. The entire house and the whole house are the same thing. But WHOLE relates to what is made up of parts, and a whole thing is a thing in which no part is wanting. ENTIRE does not relate to any idea of parts, but simply to perfect and undiminished unity. So that in cases in which the idea is not resolvable into parts ENTIRE is used where WHOLE could not be. So we say, a whole orange, a whole number, the whole quantity. But, "His character or disposition was marked by an entire absence of selfishness," "entire ignorance," "entire confidence," "entire control," and the like. In a word, WHOLE means geometrical unity unbroken; ENTIRE also points to moral indeficiency.

"Christ, the bridegroom, praises the bride, His Church, for her beauty, for her *entireness*."—BISHOP HALL.

"Upon this question, what supported or kept up this chain, would it be a sufficient answer to say that the first or lowest link hung upon a second, or that next above it, the second, or rather the first and second together, upon the third, and so on *ad infinitum*, for what holds up the *whole?*"—WOOLASTON.

COMPLETE (Lat. *complēre*, part. *complētus*, *to fill up*) denotes the possession of all that is needful to constitute a thing, or to fulfil a purpose or a definition. A thing is entire which is not broken, or mutilated, nor divided; it is complete when it wants nothing. ENTIRE relates rather to what implies a thing in its integrity, COMPLETE to what implies a thing in its perfection.

"These discourses which I have written concerning perception, judgment, reasoning, and disposition, are the four *integral* parts of logic. This sort of parts goes to make up the *completeness* of any subject."—WATTS.

TOTAL (Lat. *tōtus*, *whole*) means complete in amount, so that in matter which do not relate to mere quantity we cannot use the term. We say, a complete house, meaning one furnished with every requirement of a house; an entire house, meaning the whole and not a part of it; but we could not say a total house; but the total sum, amount, total darkness, because the mere perfection of quantity is all that is regarded.

INTEGRAL (Lat. *intĕger*, *whole*, *entire*), like ENTIRE, does not convey any idea of parts, but the simple absence of detraction or diminution, and is applicable both to abstract ideas and to the physical conformation of things. That is integral which is essential, complete, and whole, and yet itself bears relation to a larger whole, of which it is a part so truly that it could not be wanting without deficiency in that larger whole.

PERFECT (Lat. *perfectus*, part. of *perfĭcĕre*, *to make thoroughly*) is a more comprehensive word, relating not only to quantity but also to quality. A perfect thing is not only complete in all its parts, but they are in the best condition and of the best kind. The term embraces the ideas of the utmost possible excellency, physical and moral also.

"God made thee *perfect*, not immaculate."—MILTON.

ENTRANCE. INGRESS.

The ENTRANCE (Fr. *entrer*, *to enter*) has the manifold application of the act, the way, the place, and sometimes the right of entering.

INGRESS (Lat. *ingressiōnem*) shares only the first of these and the last. Nor is it, like ENTRANCE, ever used of mental but only of physical subjects. We cannot, for instance, speak of the ingress as of the entrance of a thought into the mind. Ingress is a material entrance of a formal or systematic character.

ENTRAP. INVEIGLE. ENSNARE.

To ENTRAP (originally from O. H. G. *trapo*, *a trap*, *snare*, whence O. Fr. *entraper*) and ENSNARE (Icel. *snara*, *a cord*, *snare*) seem to be thus differenced in their moral application: men are entrapped when they fall suddenly

and unawares victims to the designs of others; they are ensnared whenever, under false impressions of their own, they have found their way into difficulties, as, for instance, by their own passions, prejudices, or ignorance.

To INVEIGLE (possibly a corruption of O. Fr. *aveugler, to blind*) implies the process of *gradual deception*, or luring on by little and little by any arts calculated to win over to the purpose of another. As ENTRAP and ENSNARE point more directly to the result, so INVEIGLE expresses more immediately the process, which may be by any sort of enticement, as, for example, false views of what is to the interest of the party, coloured representations, coaxing, flattery, and the like.

"The Pharisees and Herodians, as we find in the fifteenth verse of this chapter, had taken counsel together how they might *entrap* our Saviour in His talk, and for that end they put several *ensnaring* questions to Him."—SHARP.

"A sergeant made use of me to *inveigle* country fellows and list them in the service of the Parliament."—*Tatler.*

"I have an *entrapping* question or two more
To put unto him, a cross interrogatory,
And I shall catch him." BEN JONSON.

ENUNCIATION. EXPRESSION.

To ENUNCIATE (Lat. *ēnuntiare*) is to make known, to bring forward, or bring out.

To EXPRESS (Lat. *exprĭmĕre*, part. *expressus, to press forth*) is to represent a thing in its natural form or features. One enunciates that it may be thoroughly intelligible, one expresses that it may be clearly perceived. The features and gestures combine to express the movements of the mind. Silence is sometimes more expressive than speech. Enunciation should be distinct, expression lively. The merit of enunciation lies in clear and choice language and in appropriate diction. Expression is given in many ways, but demands, especially, the suitableness of the terms to the ideas, and a warmth and energy of words.

ENVIOUS. INVIDIOUS. JEALOUS. SUSPICIOUS.

ENVIOUS (Fr. *envie*, Lat. *invĭdia, envy*) denotes the feeling of unhappiness or uneasiness produced by the contemplation of any good belonging to another.

"*Envy* is a certain grief of mind conceived upon the sight of another's felicity, whether real or supposed, so that we see that it consists partly of hatred, and partly of grief."—SOUTH.

INVIDIOUS, though coming from the same root, has a different meaning, and shows that the closest synonyms are not always those which are etymologically cognate. It is used now, not of persons but things, and not in the sense of *possessing* but of *provoking* envy, or, by an extension of meaning, ill-will. An invidious task or office is one which cannot be exercised without causing discontent, or which requires tact to avoid such a result.

"Pythagoras was the first who abated of the *invidiousness* of the name, and from σοφός brought it down to φιλόσοφος from a master to a lover of wisdom, from a professor to a candidate."—SOUTH.

JEALOUS (L. Lat. *zēlōsus*, from Gr. ζῆλος; meaning *emulation* and sometimes *jealousy*) is a feeling of envy mixed with rivalry. I am jealous of another when he stands in some relation to a third person which I should desire to occupy myself. It is this kind of personality which mainly causes envy to differ from jealousy. As ENVIOUS relates to states or possessions merely, and JEALOUS to the same things in further relation to persons, it follows that the subject-matter of jealousy is less definable. We are jealous, not only of the actual but the possible, whence the alliance between jealousy and suspicion.

SUSPICION (Lat *suspīcionem*) is more general. It denotes an inclination to believe in the existence of something which, nevertheless, does not rest upon anything worthy to be called evidence. This may relate simply to matters of fact as such, as a physician might say, "I suspect the existence of organic disease;" but it relates more commonly to thoughts of the charac-

ter, conduct, and designs of other persons, and wears an inauspicious or unfavourable air. Jealousy is a painful apprehension of rivalry; suspicion of wrong or harm.

"*Jelousie,*
Of whiche, if I the propertie,
Shall telle after the nicetee,
So as it worcheth on a man,
A fever it is cotidian." GOWER.

"*Suspicion* may be excited by some kind of accusation, not supported by evidence sufficient for conviction, but sufficient to trouble the repose of confidence."—COGAN.

It may be added that jealousy is therefore in some sense just and reasonable, inasmuch as it tends to preserve a good which belongs to us or which we claim, while envy is a madness which cannot permit the good of others. Nations, like individuals, may be jealous of each other. It belongs to the rivalry of their position as regards commerce and the arts, or power and prosperity generally.

When the terms apply to what is possessed by others, ENVY is a stronger term than JEALOUSY. The first belongs to the character, the second may be a passing feeling. One may be occasionally jealous without being naturally envious.

EPICURE. GOURMAND. VOLUPTUARY. SENSUALIST.

An EPICURE (*Epĭcūrus*, the Greek philosopher who assumed pleasure, not merely sensual, but the most refined, to be the highest good) is one who is devoted to sensual enjoyments, but most especially the luxuries of the table. With him the quality and not the quantity of things is their recommendation.

The GOURMAND (Fr. *gourmand*), on the other hand, is a greedy and ravenous eater. As the epicure is to the gourmand, so is the VOLUPTUARY (Lat. *vŏluptārĭus*, and *-tuarius*, *vŏluptas*, *pleasure*) to the SENSUALIST (Lat. *sensualis*, *sensitive*, *sensual*). As the voluptuary lives for pleasure, but is nice in his tastes, so the sensualist gratifies his animal propensities with little discrimination. He is a coarse voluptuary.

"The truth is, their very fasts and humiliations have been observed to be nothing else but a religious *epicurism*, and a neat contrivance of luxury."—SOUTH.

"That great *gourmond*, fat Apicius."
BEN JONSON.

"In vain doth the scornful *voluptuary* ask for an account of it (the peace which passeth all understanding), which can never be given him, for it hath no alliance with any of the pleasures of sense in which he delights; nor hath he any ideas by which the perception of it may be conveyed to him."—BISHOP ATTERBURY.

"The beggar who behind the hedge divides his offals with his dog, has often more of the real *sensualist* than he who dines at an elegant table."—MICKLE.

EPIDEMIC. SPORADIC. ENDEMIC. EPIZOOTIC.

These terms are distinguished in their medical application.

An EPIDEMIC disease (Gr. ἐπιδήμιος, *among the people*) is one of which the cause acts upon a large number at the same time by reason of its wide diffusion.

A SPORADIC disease (Gr. σποραδικός, *scattered*) is a disease which occurs in isolated cases without any concatenating influence.

An ENDEMIC disease (ἔνδημος, *dwelling at home*) is a disease peculiar to a nation or a number of people, and is an epidemic having its origin in or connected with the local or personal peculiarities of those among whom it prevails. An EPIZOOTIC disease is an epidemic among *cattle* (ἐπί, *upon*, ζῷον, *an animal*).

"A *sporadical* disease is what, in a particular season, affects but few people."—ARBUTHNOT.

"A traveller on his way to Italy, found himself in a country where the inhabitants had each a large excrescence depending from the chin, a deformity which as it was *endemic*, and the people little used to strangers, it had been the custom time immemorial to look upon it as the greatest beauty."—GOLDSMITH.

"We have seen no traces of those dreadful exterminating *epidemics* which, in consequence of scanty and unwholesome food in former times, not unfrequently wasted whole nations."—BURKE.

EPISODE. DIGRESSION.

The first is a species of the second. A DIGRESSION (Lat. *dĭgressiōnem*) is

in this connexion a deviation from the straight line of narrative or argument.

An EPISODE (Gr. ἐπεἰσοδος) is such a digression as constitutes in itself a separate though subordinate incident, action, or story. A digression may be voluntary or involuntary. It may be made for the purpose of giving variety, or it may be the result of inexactness and inconsecutiveness of treatment. An episode is always designed. It is like a place of halting and refreshment on the main road of travel, to which the mind turns aside for new pleasures. It is commonly also of inferior dignity to the main argument, and delights by touches of simplicity or humbler manners.

EPISTLE. LETTER.

The LETTER (Lat. pl. *lĭtĕræ*) is an ordinary written communication on ordinary topics.

The EPISTLE (Gr. ἐπιστολή, *a message, spoken or written*) is a more formal, and often public, communication of the kind: as the letters of Madame de Sévigny, the epistles of Horace or St. Paul. When letters, from the interest of their style and subjects, have passed into the public literature, there is a tendency to give them the name of epistles. Epistles are sometimes in verse. Whatever may form the subject of conversation may form the subject of a letter.

"I answer, that the *Epistles* were written upon several occasions, and he that will read them as he ought must observe what 'tis in them is principally aimed at, find what is the argument in hand, and how managed, if he will understand them aright and profit by them."—LOCKE.

"You have frequently pressed me to make a collection of my *letters* (if in truth there be any that deserve a preference) and give them to the public."—MELMOTH, *Pliny*.

EPITHET. ADJECTIVE.

An EPITHET (Gr. ἐπίθετον, lit. *a thing added*, from ἐπιτίθεναι, *to add*) is nearly equivalent, etymologically, to ADJECTIVE (Lat. *adjectīvus*, from *adjĭcĕre*, *to add*). It used to be employed of any qualifying term, whether substantive or adjective, as, 'He applied to me the epithet of liar." But, of late, there has been a tendency among rhetoricians to limit the term to adjectives, and yet further, to such adjectives as express *inherent* and *not adventitious* qualities; so green is an epithet of grass, because grass is, presumably, always green; but short would not be an epithet of grass, because it is sometimes long. The meaning of adjective is well known. EPITHET belongs to rhetoric, ADJECTIVE to grammar. The use of an adjective is to complete the just idea or representation of a thing. That of an epithet is to give life and force. Take away the adjective and the sense is incomplete or different, take away the epithet and it is comparatively feeble. A good man is merciful to his beast: strike out the adjective good and the sense is destroyed. Pale death visits all. Strike out the epithet pale and the sense is as good, but the image less lively.

"The character of Bajazet, the son and successor of Amurath, is strongly expressed in his surname of Ilderim, or the lightning, and he might glory in an *epithet* which was drawn from the fiery energy of his soul, and the rapidity of his destructive march."—GIBBON.

"The true genuine sense of a noun *adjective* will be found to consist in this, that it imparts the general sense of pertaining to, or being affected with."—WILKINS.

EQUAL. EVEN. EQUABLE. LIKE. ALIKE. UNIFORM. LEVEL.

EQUAL (Lat. *æquālis*) is applied to number, degree, and measurement, and any subject that admits of them, as, "Things of equal size," "Equal in degree," "This is equal to that," "I am not equal to the task." It is applicable, not only to two or more things, but to one and the same, in the sense of fair, equable, but an external standard of comparison is always supposed.

"In sober silence, we can but admire
Beauty with temper, taste and sense combined.
The body only *equall'd* by the mind."
WARTON.

EVEN (A. S. *efen*) is superficial equality or sameness of level. An even balance is when one scale is not

higher or lower than another; an even road is one which has no superficial elevations and depressions; an even temper is not unduly excited or depressed; an even number, as opposed to odd, is one that being divisible by two does not rise higher in one division than the other. It will be seen that, as EQUAL is almost always applied to more than one thing, so EVEN is commonly said of one.

"And shall lay thee *even* with the ground."—*Bible.*

EQUABLE (Lat. *æquābĭlis, equal* and *similar*) denotes the equality of continuous proportion; a vessel sails at an equable rate when it makes as much in one hour as in the preceding. As EQUAL and EVEN denote modes of the fixed, so EQUABLE belongs to action, operation, or movement.

"If bodies move *equably* in concentric circles, and the squares of their periodical times be as the cubes of their distances from the common centre, their centripetal forces will be reciprocally as the squares of the distances."—CHEYNE.

LIKE (A. S. *lic*) always denotes two or more things. It expresses all that is expressed by EQUAL, with the additional signification of resemblance.

ALIKE (pref. *a-, i.e.* A. S. *on-*, and *like*) expresses *reciprocal* resemblance between two or more. In the term LIKE, the resemblance is with *an external* object. John is like James, or John and James are alike, or these six are like those six, or the twelve are alike.

"The darkness and light to Thee are both *alike*."—*Bible.*

"Can any distinction be assigned between the two cases, between the producing watch and the producing planet, both passive unconscious substances; both by the organization which was given them producing their *like* without understanding or design—both, that is, instruments?"—PALEY.

UNIFORM (Lat. *ūnĭformis, unus, one*, and *forma, form*) is, in many cases, an interchangeable word with EQUABLE. Equable motion is uniform motion; but uniformity is more widely applicable than equability, as it is predicable, not only of continuous equality, but of what, on successive trials of observation or experience, strikes us as continuous identity of object, as, "The uniformity of a man's opinions."

"Analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature and its several parts explained that is, reduced to general rules, which rules, grounded on the analogy and *uniformness* observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable, and sought after by the mind."—BERKELEY.

LEVEL (O. Fr. *livel*, Lat. *lĭbella*, dim. of *lĭbra, a level-line*) is, in its strict geometrical sense, coincident with the plane of the horizon. As EVEN relates to the quality of the surface *per se*, so LEVEL relates to it as a plane and to its horizontal line. A level plank on a level floor is itself level, but it is even if it have a well-polished surface, though it be set up on end.

"And when along the *level* seas they flew,
Scarce on the surface curled the briny dew." POPE.

EQUITY. JUSTICE.

JUSTICE (Lat. *justĭtia, justus, just*) and EQUITY (*æquĭtatem, justice, courtesy*) are intrinsically the same; but, in the technical sense, equity is the moral redressing of what is legal, where, owing to the imperfection of human laws, what is legal is not exactly just. A court of equity is also sometimes styled a court of justice.

The following remarks may serve to illustrate the difference generally between the two. Justice is chiefly concerned with personal rights, and rights of property between man and man. Equity is concerned chiefly with man himself. Our life, faculties, work, the fruits of our work, our fortune, reputation, honour, are exclusively our own. Justice forbids violence to be done against these, and compensates for it if done. Our wants, miseries, errors, faults, wrongs, are not ours exclusively; they come of the weakness of humanity. Equity compassionates these things, and binds one to do good to another, if it be in his power. Justice in a manner isolates us one from another, and guards against the occasion which may make us enemies. Equity unites us, regarding us as members of the same body. Wrong not another, and recompense whom you have wronged, is the language of justice. Do to that other as you would be done by, is the language of equity.

Justice ensures to individuals all that law accords to them, and so implies communities living under positive rule. Equity is based upon natural law, and is an expression of human sentiment, rather than political enactment. Justice is the inflexible guardian of the public safety, and being inflexible regards nothing but the fact, whereas equity will consider motives and intentions, and modify its decisions accordingly. I have received injury, justice grants me redress, but if the offence have been in any degree by error, or if the penalty which I have the right to enforce should involve the ruin of the other, equity suggests the question, "ought I to pursue the case?" All that the law declares is just. It belongs to equity to temper the rigour of its decrees.

"From this method of interpreting laws by the reason of them, arises what we call *equity*, which is thus defined by Grotius:—'The correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient.'"—BLACKSTONE.

It should be observed that this definition, which goes to the root of the matter, is Aristotle's definition of *equity*—ἐπιείκεια, Bk. V. N. Ethics.

"*Justice* is twofold, namely, general or strict justice, which consists in observing the laws, and the aim of which is public good; and particular justice, or *equity*, which aims at the good of individuals, and is then observed when one obtains no more good, and suffers no more evil than is agreeable to humanity and common sense."—BEATTIE.

EQUIVALENT. EQUAL. TANTAMOUNT.

The most generic of these is EQUAL (Lat. *æquālis*) of which the others may be regarded as specific modifications. EQUAL expresses the fact that two things agree in anything which is capable of degree, *e.g.* in quantity, quality, value, bulk, number, proportion, rate, rank, and the like.

EQUIVALENT (*æquīvălens*, part.) is *equal* in such properties as *affect ourselves* or *the use which we make of things*, such as value, force, power, effect, impact, and the like.

TANTAMOUNT (Fr. *tant, so much*, and O. Fr. *amonter, to amount to*) expresses such equivalence as is restricted to questions of *our own estimation*. EQUAL is absolute, EQUIVALENT relative, TANTAMOUNT more relative still, or more exclusively so.

EQUIVOCATE. PREVARICATE.

To EQUIVOCATE (Lat. *æquīvŏcus, ambiguous*) is, strictly, to make use of expressions which do not necessarily violate truth, because they may be taken in more senses than one; the equivocating person giving himself the benefit of this ambiguity, in the hope that the other party may take his expressions in the sense favourable to the speaker.

To PREVARICATE (Lat. *prævārĭcari, to straddle, to walk crookedly*) is applied often to an advocate guilty of collusion with the opposite party. In its modern and familiar use, as EQUIVOCATE relates to the management of *words*, so PREVARICATE relates to the management of the *matter*. To prevaricate is to deal with the subject in a loose, evasive way, shuffling or quibbling so as to avoid disclosing the truth.

"Tresham, a little before his death in the Tower, subscribed his own hand that he had not seen Garnett in sixteen years before, when it was evidently proved, and Garnett confessed, they had been together the summer before; and all that Garnett had to say for him was, that he supposed he meant to *equivocate*."—STILLINGFLEET.

The following quotation explains the legal origin of the term PREVARICATE:—

"There lay an action of *prevarication* when the accuser, instead of urging the crime home, seemed rather to hide or extenuate the guilt. Hence the civilians define a *prevaricator* to be one that betrays his cause to the adversary, and turns on the criminal's side, whom he ought to prosecute."—KENNET, *Rom. Antiq.*

ERADICATE. EXTIRPATE. EXTERMINATE.

ERADICATE (Lat. *ērādīcāre*) literally, *to pluck up by the root*, and EXTIRPATE (Lat. *exstirpare, to pull up by the stem, stirpem*) are in their ideas very similar, nor is EXTERMINATE very different (Lat. *extermĭnāre, ex, out*, and *terminus, a border, to remove utterly out of bounds*). Their difference lies in their application. We eradicate for the sake of destroying the thing eradi-

cated; we extirpate for the sake of the bettering of what is left behind. We eradicate what has taken strong hold, and as it were deep root. So we speak of eradicating vices, extirpating heresies or sects, and exterminating bodies of living individuals, as a colony, a race, a tribe.

"Hence an attempt to *eradicate* religious fears may be destructive to a principle of action which is not only natural in itself, but has proved highly beneficial. What is the proper inference? That it is the province of true philosophy to give these principles a right direction and a due influence, and it will then rejoice that a total *eradication* has not been accomplished."—COGAN.

"The vicious are the disorderly members of a moral state; and were not the Supreme Governor more mild than His representatives, they would be immediately *extirpated* from the society they offend and insult."—*Ibid.*

"The Spaniards, in order to preserve the possession of America, resolved to *exterminate* the inhabitants."—ROBERTSON.

ERRAND. MESSAGE.

ERRAND (A. S. *ærende, a message*) is an object for which one goes somewhere, or is sent by another. If the object be to communicate with another in words, then the errand is so far a message. But the errand may be not of this kind, as an errand to buy something at the market.

A MESSAGE (Fr. *message*, L. Lat. *missāticum*) is a verbal communication sent from one person to another, whether orally or in writing. An errand is an act; a message is a thing of words.

"He would understand men's true *errand* as soon as they had opened their mouths and began their story in appearance to another purpose."—LOCKE, *Memoirs of the Earl of Shaftesbury.*

"His winged *messengers*,
On *errands* of supernal grâce."
MILTON.

"To verify that solemn *message*, late
On which I sent thee to the Virgin pure,
In Galilee, that she should bear a Son,
Great in renown, and called the Son of God." *Ibid.*

ERROR. MISTAKE. BLUNDER. HALLUCINATION.

An ERROR (Lat. *errōrem, errāre, to wander*) is any deviation from the standard or course of right, truth, justice, or accuracy, which is not intentional.

A MISTAKE (*prefix, mis-*, and *take, to take wrongly*) is an error committed under a misapprehension or misconception of the nature of a case. An error may be from the absence of knowledge; a mistake is from insufficient or false observation.

BLUNDER (Icel. *blunda, to doze, slumber*, with freq. suffix, *-eren*: SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) is a practical error of a peculiarly gross or awkward kind, committed through glaring ignorance, heedlessness, or awkwardness. A blunder is, perhaps, *cæteris paribus*, the most irretrievable; for an error may be overlooked or atoned for, a mistake may be rectified; but the shame or ridicule which is occasioned by a blunder, who can counteract? In the broadest sense of the term ERROR, it may be regarded as the generic term, under which mistake is included; so that a mistake might be defined an error of perception. To miss intellectual truth is error; to confound physical facts is mistake. To say that the Trojan war ended in the victory of the Trojans would be an error; to speak to a person in the street, thinking he was somebody else, would be a mistake. There is a metaphorical sense in which all error has been resolved into mistake, that is, upon the supposition that all knowledge is based upon the observation of external facts or objects. In that way, as all truth comes of right perception, so all error would be wrong perception or mistake. This is Locke's meaning when he says—

"Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain truth, *error* is not a fault of our knowledge, but a *mistake* of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true."

"For my part, as I was never distinguished for address, and have often even *blundered* in making my bow, such bodings as these had like totally to have repressed my ambition."—GOLDSMITH.

Strictly speaking the HALLUCINATION (Lat. *ālūcĭnāri, to wander in mind*) is an illusion of the perception, a phantasm of the imagination. The one comes of disordered vision, the

other of disordered imagination. It is extended in medical science to matters of sensation, where there is no corresponding cause to produce it. In its ordinary use it denotes an unaccountable error in judgment or fact; especially in one remarkable otherwise for accurate information and right decisions. It is an exceptional error or mistake in those otherwise not likely to be deceived.

"A few *hallucinations* about a subject to which the greatest clerks have been generally such strangers, may warrant us to dissent from his opinion without obliging us to be enemies to his reputation."—BOYLE.

Levity, inadvertence, and ignorance are the causes of errors, mistakes, and blunders. Persons of plain character, open manners, without reserve, but without reflexion, commit blunders. Error belongs to false principle, blunder to its false application. It is possible to blunder by mistake, and then there are two faults in one. Blunders are over when they are committed, and so are mistakes, though their consequences may be serious, but error may be perpetuated. When this is so, it is because they are diffused or supported by authority. A blunder is confusion of thought, leading to confusion of action; a mistake is a false choice; error is the practical contradiction of truth.

ERUPTION. EXPLOSION.

ERUPTION (Lat. *ĕruptiōnem, a breaking out*) is the breaking or bursting forth from inclosure or confinement. This is so often attended by sudden and loud noise that sound is commonly associated with it. On the other hand, many eruptions take place without much noise, indeed without any, as an eruption of armed men, an eruption of the skin.

EXPLOSION (Lat. *explōsionem*, lit., *a driving off by clapping*) is essentially the breaking out of a sudden and loud noise. This may be the effect of eruption or not. The eruptions of Vesuvius often occasion explosions; on the other hand, the explosion of gunpowder would never be called an eruption, however true it may be that there is an eruption of minute particles. EXPLOSION seems to have lent itself more readily to the moral in its metaphorical uses, and ERUPTION to the social, as we frequently speak of an explosion of anger, or even folly, and an eruption of political discontent.

"The confusion of things, the *eruptions* of barbarians, the straits of emperors, the contentions of princes, did all turn to account for him."—BARROW, *Pope's Supremacy*.

"When, to the startled eye, the sudden glance
Appears far south *eruptive* through the cloud,
And following slower, in *explosion* vast,
The thunder raises his tremendous voice."
THOMSON.

ESCAPE. ELUDE. EVADE. SHUN. AVOID. ESCHEW.

ESCAPE (O. Fr. *escaper*) is to obtain security from peril, danger, confinement, or evil of any form, whether threatened or inflicted, by persons or otherwise. Sometimes the term is used metaphorically in the sense of having been overlooked, as, we say the circumstance escaped my notice. In its common application, ESCAPE involves the idea of successful effort to avoid danger, or the power, coercion, or even observation of another.

"Sailors that *escaped* the wreck.
SHAKESPEARE.

TO ELUDE (Lat. *ēlūdĕre, to deceive, frustrate*) is to escape by artifice, vigilance, or dexterity, and implies some person or force at work, from which we escape; as to elude an officer, detection, an argument, a blow, inquiry, search, comprehension, analysis. In the last four examples, ELUDE, like ESCAPE, assumes, metaphorically, an active force in matters without action.

"The gentle Delia beckons from the plain,
Then hid in shades *eludes* her eager swain."
POPE.

TO EVADE (Lat. *ēvādĕre, to go forth, escape*) is to go out of the way or reach of a thing or person. It is commonly done by dexterity, ingenuity, or subterfuge, but, in its literal sense, and as said of one person in regard to another, it is sometimes used of voluntary avoidance or with-

drawal; as, "I wished to accost him, but he evaded me," that is, literally walked away.

"The heathen had a method more truly their own of *evading* the Christian miracles."—TRENCH.

SHUN (A. S. *scunian, to shun, avoid*) carries with it the notion of wary and often systematic avoidance, as of one knowing too well the nature of the object of avoidance, or holding it in personal dislike.

"It is not supposed that we should have power always to resist, unless we beforehand do what is in our power to *shun* temptation."—ATTERBURY.

AVOID (which originally meant *to empty*, Fr. *voider;* with prefix *a*, which is Fr. *es-*, Lat. *ex*, *out*) is a weaker term, meaning no more, literally, than to leave a *void* space between one's self and the object, to keep clear of it. AVOID admits of many degrees of force in the feeling which prompts the avoidance; we may avoid a thing as involving certain destruction, or we may avoid as a simple matter of prudence or taste, as to avoid giving offence. Caution and prudence, followed by ordinary steps or exertions, may enable us to avoid without the art implied in eluding or the repugnance implied in shunning.

"Nor can a man pray from his heart that God would not lead him into temptation, if he take no care of himself to *avoid* it."—MASON.

ESCHEW (connected with the German *scheuen, to avoid, scheu*, Eng. *shy*, as in the phrase, "to fight shy") is to avoid on the score of wrong, or a feeling of distaste or uncongeniality.

"Not only to *eschew* evil, but do good in the world."—BEVERIDGE.

ESSAY. TREATISE. DISSERTATION. TRACT. MONOGRAPH.

ESSAY (O. Fr. *essai, a trial;* Lat. *exāgium, trial by weight*) is a modest term to express an author's attempt to illustrate some point of knowledge or learning by general thoughts upon it. It is tentative rather than exhaustive or scientific. The completeness of the work often surpasses the tentative character of the title given to it, as in the case of Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding." A distinction between the treatise and the essay is drawn in the following:—

"To write just *treatises* requireth leisure in the writer and leisure in the reader, and therefore are not so fit neither in regard of your highnesses princely affairs nor in regard of my continual service; which is the cause that hath made me choose to write certain brief notes, set down rather significantly than curiously, which I have called *essays*. The word is late, but the thing is ancient. For Seneca's epistles to Lucilius, if you mark them well, are but *essays*, that is, dispersed meditations, though conveyed in the form of epistles."—BACON.

A TREATISE (Lat. *tractātum, treatment, a treatise*) is more formal and scientific than an essay. As an essay gives rather the thoughts and impressions of the writer, so a treatise gives rather what has been said in connexion with the subject, and is an accurate or learned exposition of it.

A DISSERTATION (Lat. *dissertātiōnem, dissertāre, to discuss*) is of an argumentative character, giving what *may* be said for and against, and involving views of the writer upon subject-matter capable of being regarded in different lights, as, "Newton's Dissertations on the Prophecies."

"Beside the repetition of the Augustan confession, before mentioned, concerning the Lord's Supper, the divines of Wittemburgh laboured other articles with the ambassadors, in single *dissertations*, drawn up by Melancthon, as it appeared."—STRYPE.

A TRACT (Lat. *tractātum, treatment, a treatise*) is of a simpler and shorter character, not argumentative, simply didactic, and commonly, as now used, of a religious nature. The old word was *tractate*.

"Most remarkable was his skill in mathematics, being accounted the Archimedes of that age, having written many *tractates* in that faculty, which carry with them a very good regard at this day."—FULLER, *Worthies*.

MONOGRAPH (Gr. *μόνος, one only*, and *γράφειν, to write*) is a treatise specially dedicated to the elucidation of one point or subject, upon which the object is to concentrate as much light as possible. The word is recent.

ESSENCE. SUBSTANCE.

Both are terms of the scholastic

philosophy. The ESSENCE (Lat. *essentia*) is the aggregate of notions which constitute a complex notion, the enumeration of which is its definition. This is called by logicians the Formal cause. It is the logical account of a thing. And 2nd, the term ESSENCE is employed to denote the constituent qualities which go to make up an object or class of objects without which they would not be what they are. Hence it denotes the character which belongs to the class or common nature as distinguished from the accidents or individual varieties in the members of that class; as *e.g.* the possession of reason is essential to man, but not the having white or black hair. From this primary force the term has wandered into other meanings, as with Milton, "Heavenly Essences," that is, beings; the extracted and refined qualities of a substance; as a plant, a drug, a perfume.

SUBSTANCE (Lat. *substantia*) denoted that which was the substratum of existence in a thing, whether material or spiritual,—that in which its properties and accidents were inherent, so that these might undergo modification or change, and yet the thing itself would remain unaltered. From this highly refined notion the term, like ESSENCE, has become materialized till, as has been remarked by Mr. J. S. Mill, essence has become "concrete enough to be put into a glass bottle," and SUBSTANCE has come to mean first the most important part of any matter of an intellectual kind, then material possession, and matter itself.

ESTABLISH. SETTLE. CONFIRM. FIX. INSTITUTE. FOUND. ERECT.

To ESTABLISH (O. Fr. *establir*, Lat. *stăbĭlīre*) is *to place firmly*, or *to make firm*, and is applicable both to what has been originally planted and to what is now planted for the first time. It is also applicable both to things and persons. It is used of position, opinions or belief, laws, customs, regulations, and institutions. But ESTABLISH is never used in a purely material sense. To establish is to accord a position and place of residence. It has reference to authority and civil government. It is to give "a local habitation and a name." An established fact, principle, or usage is one which has proof, duration, and public recognition in its favour.

"God, being the author and *establisher* of nature, and the continual sustainer of it by His free Providence, it is not likely that He will suffer the laws and cause thereof to be much violated, except upon occasions very considerable, and for very good purposes."—BARROW.

To SETTLE (A. S. *settan, to place, setlan, to take seat*) is to establish in reference to antecedent or anticipated uncertainty, movement, or agitation; as, to settle a person in life; to settle his affairs, that is, place them in a fixed and satisfactory state; to settle a colony; to settle the mind, or any question which agitates it; to settle an allowance, that is, to make it permanent and not variable; to settle an account or a dispute, as involving previous fluctuation and agitation; or to settle commotion, as a disturbance.

"On her (the Princess Sophia) therefore, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants, the remainder of the crown on the death of King William and Queen Ann without issue was *settled* by statute 12 and 13 of William III."—BLACKSTONE.

To CONFIRM (Lat. *confirmāre, to make firm, establish*) is to make strong what has been already set up or established; but it is not employed of physical, but of mental, moral, or civil strengthening—the health, not the body, is confirmed. So of other things, as order, truth, justice, determination, conviction, authority, office, suspicion, belief, treaty, law. The opposite to CONFIRM is to unsettle.

"According to the politician's creed, religion, being useful to the state, yet only a well-invented fiction, all experiments, that is, all inquiries into its truth, naturally tend not to *confirm* but to unsettle this necessary support of civil government."—WARBURTON.

FIX (Lat. *figĕre*, part *fixus*) is to establish in reference to antecedent or future variation or local alterableness. It is to external what SETTLE is to internal change. And it is, like SETTLE, used both as an intransitive and a transitive verb. It is to settle

definitely at one degree, or in one place, or in one form or condition.

"From this account of the causes or requisites of *fixity* may be deduced the following means of giving or adding *fixation* to a body that was before either volatile or less *fixed*."—BOYLE.

INSTITUTE (Lat. *instĭtŭĕre*, part. *institūtus*, to *set*, *place*, *institute*) is used only transitively. It does not apply to the purely physical setting up of material objects, but to such matters as laws, rules, orders, inquiries, processes or suits, and what are characteristically termed *institutions*, that is, things which are established so as to have permanent operation; as, a permanent mode or custom, or observance, or a building devoted to the permanent provision for some object, as an educational or charitable institution. As ESTABLISH stands to place, so does INSTITUTE to time. Any force or influence may establish, but authority only institutes. Time, for instance, which institutes nothing, establishes much. An institution is the carrying out of some one's ideas in particular, and giving them practical operation and permanence. So Christ instituted the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

"And did *institute*, and in His holy Gospel command us to continue a perpetual memory of that His precious death until His coming again."—*Book of Common Prayer*.

FOUND (O. Fr. *fonder*, Lat. *fundāre*, *to lay a foundation*), unlike INSTITUTE, is employed of the processes of material construction. Analogously, it is used of commencing by furnishing with some amount of *permanent support* capable of being afterwards extended; as, to found a fellowship in a university. To found is to take the first step or measures for building, erecting, or establishing. FOUND is the generic term. So we speak of founding an establishment, and in some senses an institution.

"It fell not, for it was *founded* on a rock."—*Bible*.

To ERECT (Lat. *ērĭgĕre*, part. *erectus*, *to set up*, *erect*) is used both of physical and analogous setting up of what is meant to remain standing; as, to erect a sign-post, a marble column, or a new commonwealth or diocese. It differs from FOUND, inasmuch as it means to set up, while FOUND means to lay down. So a house may be at the same time founded upon a rock and erected, but a throne or a flagstaff is not founded, but only erected. It always indicates a change of character, and, when applied to institutions or offices, implies an elevation of dignity, as when a province is erected into a kingdom.

"To *erect* a new commonwealth."—HOOKER.

ESTRANGEMENT. ALIENATION. ABSTRACTION.

These terms are synonymous in so far as they express in common the state of being drawn away from objects in mind or person.

ABSTRACTION (Lat. *abstractiōnem*, *a drawing away*) expresses no more than the being taken away from certain persons, influences, or occupations, whatever may be the feeling that withdraws us, or that which we entertain to what we leave behind; as, abstraction from the world, its cares, pleasures, and pursuits: only a sufficient force is implied, which is for the most part one of taste and feeling.

ESTRANGEMENT (O. Fr. *estranger*, *to estrange*) and ALIENATION (Lat. *ălĭēnātionem*, *a transferring of a thing*, *a separation*) denote a stronger and more personal feeling, which positively keeps us away through an altered state of affection. If there be any difference between them, it is such as flows from the words themselves, ALIENATION expressing an internal disharmony of feeling caused by some act, as, "His repeated offences have alienated my regard for him;" ESTRANGEMENT expressing the gradual operation of any circumstances that have caused separation of person or feeling, as, "I have been long estranged from him." A revulsion of feeling alienates; absence and distance may estrange. The distinctive force of ESTRANGEMENT and ALIENATION is shown by the following of Jeremy Taylor:—

"If excommunication be incurred ipso facto, he that is guilty of the fact deserving it, and is fallen into the sentence, is bound to submit to those *estrangements* and separations, those *alienations* of society and avoidings which he finds from the duty of others."

"A youthful passion for *abstracted* devotion should not be encouraged."—JOHNSON.

EVER. ALWAYS.

ALWAYS means at all times.

EVER has the additional meaning of *at any time*, in which it belongs peculiarly to negative and interrogative sentences, as "Who *ever* (at any time) heard the like of it?" "No man *ever* yet hated his own flesh." EVER expresses uniformity of continuance; ALWAYS expresses uniformity of repetition. So we might say, "He is ever at home," or, "He is always at home;" but we could not say, "I have called several times, and have ever found him at home," but always. On the other hand, we might say, "I have ever found him a true friend," that is, at any time when occasion has arisen, or continually.

"The *ever* never dying souls of wicked men." BP. TAYLOR.

"The always wind-obeying deep." SHAKESPEARE.

EVERY. EACH.

EVERY (*i.e. ever-each*, A. S. *æfre, ælc*), with which EACH is also connected, is collective, EACH is distributive. EVERY includes the whole class one by one, as *all* includes it in a mass. But EVERY supposes uniformity in detail, and excludes exceptions and differences; EACH, on the other hand, implies these. Every man has failings, this follows from the constitution of nature. Each man has his peculiar weakness, this follows from the diversity of human temperament. This distinction, however, is not so much in the force of the words as in the nature of the things.

EVIL. ILL.

An EVIL (A. S. *yfel*) is anything that causes harm or suffering.

ILL (Icel. *illr*, the same word, radically, as A. S. *yfel*) is commonly applied to minor evils, and to such as are incidental to particular states; while evil is often the result of our own actions. We should hardly speak of a trivial evil, but of a trivial ill, the ills of humanity. Sin is of the nature of an evil; misfortune is an ill.

"Thus, after having clambered with great labour from one step of argumentation to another, instead of rising into the light of knowledge, we are devolved back into dark ignorance, and all our effort ends in belief that for the *evils* of life there is some good, and in confession that the reason cannot be found."—JOHNSON.

"The *ills* that flesh is heir to." SHAKESPEARE.

EXACT. ACCURATE. CORRECT PRECISE. NICE. PARTICULAR. PUNCTUAL.

EXACT (Lat. *exigĕre*, part. *exactus* to *enforce*) is applicable both to persons, their habits or style, and to productions of men. Exactness is that kind of truth which consists in the conformity to an external standard or measure, or has an internal correspondence with external requirement. As an exact amount is that which is required, the exact time that which agrees with the sun or the clock, an exact man is he who conforms to the external requirements of time and rule. An exact statement accords with the facts to be expressed. Correctness applies to the style, exactness to the matter. He is an exact writer who attends to truth of fact and precision of ideas; he is a correct writer who conforms to the rules of grammar and the requirements of usage.

"The Parliament for divers reasons thought it not convenient to comply with the king's propositions, and in answer to the Scots, demanded of them an *exact* account of what was due to them, requiring them to withdraw their garrisons from such places as they possessed in England."—LUDLOW, *Memoirs*.

As EXACT refers to an external standard, so ACCURATE (Lat. *accurāre*, *to prepare with care*, part. *accūrātus*) to the attention which has been expended upon a thing, and the exactness which may be expected from it. Exactness may be fortuitous; ac-

curacy is always designed. Exactness is of one point, or one at a time; accuracy is of many.

"The knowledge of one action or one simple idea is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being an *accurate* collection of sundry ideas is necessary."—LOCKE.

CORRECT (Lat. *corrĭgĕre*, part. *correctus, to amend, to correct*) applies to what is conformable to a moral standard, as well as to truth generally, as "correct deportment." Otherwise it closely resembles EXACT, but is more subjective, EXACT more objective. An exact account means a true account; a correct account means an account truly given, that is, without error or omission on the part of the narrator. An exact drawing is one which represents with perfect fidelity, a correct drawing one which fulfils all the rules and requirements of the art without faults, an accurate drawing one which observation and pains have made exact.

"But in such lays as neither ebb nor flow,
Correctly cold and regularly low,
That, shunning faults, one quiet temper keep,
We cannot blame indeed, but we may sleep." POPE.

PRECISE (Fr. *précis*, Lat. *præcīsus, cut off, shortened*) denotes the quality of exact limitation, as distinguished from the vague, loose, doubtful, inaccurate; and, in its application to persons, means scrupulous. It has a peculiar application to words and expressions, as "The law is precise upon this point," where we could not have used any of the preceding terms. The idea of precision is that of casting aside the useless and the superfluous. PRECISE has a closer connexion than EXACT, ACCURATE, or CORRECT, with the way or manner of expressing what is true or right. Hence a person may be too precise; he could never be too exact, accurate, or correct. It is most desirable that men should be exact in duties and obligations, accurate in statements and representations, correct in conduct, and precise in the use of words.

"Many cases happen in which a man cannot *precisely* determine where it is that his lawful liberty ends, and where it is that it begins to be extravagant and excessive."—SHARP.

NICE (said to be from Fr. *nice, foolish, simple*; Lat. *nescius, ignorant*; but possibly a distinct word: see WEDGEWOOD) means delicate in operation or production, exact, fastidiously discriminating. NICE denotes an union of delicacy and exactness, as "a nice distinction," "a nice point."

"By his own *nicety* of observation he had already formed such a system of metrical harmony as he never afterwards much needed or much endeavoured to improve."—JOHNSON, *Life of Waller*.

PARTICULAR (Lat. *partĭcŭlāris, of or concerning a part*; gen. as opposed to *universal*), as applied to persons, means attentive to things singly or in detail, and so combines the exact in observation with the nice in feeling. It relates to the matters of ordinary life and every-day choice and preference. In this sense the term is of modern application. Having passed from the thing to the person, it is said of one who pays attention to details, whether in observation, duty, or taste, as distinguished from one who treats them generally, carelessly, indiscriminately, or, as it were, in the rough.

PUNCTUAL (Lat. *punctum, a point*) stands to the mode of doing things as PARTICULAR to the things themselves. The punctual man is prompt and exact, especially as to the time appointed. It had originally the sense of EXACT or ACCURATE, as Burnet, "punctual to tediousness in all he relates."

"The undeviating and *punctual* sun."
COWPER.

EXACT. EXTORT.

To EXACT (Lat. *exĭgĕre*, part. *exactus, to enforce*) and to EXTORT (*extorquēre*, part. *extortus, to twist out*) agree in expressing a forcible mode of requiring; but EXACT has commonly the sense of rigidly insisting upon what is due, while EXTORT relates to the unjust exaction of what is *not due*. Men exact tribute, obedience, demonstrations of respect; they extort money under exorbitant charges or false pretences. The term is also applied to the compulsory procuring or eliciting

of what others are unwilling to give, as to "extort a confession."

"'Tis no dishonour to confer your grace
On one descended from a royal race;
And were he less, yet years of service past
From grateful souls *exact* reward at last."
DRYDEN.

"*Extortion* is an abuse of the public justice, which consists in any officer's unlawfully taking by colour of his office from any man any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due."—BLACKSTONE.

EXAGGERATION. HYBERBOLE.

EXAGGERATION (literally *a heaping up*; Lat. *exaggĕrationem*) is any representation beyond the limits of truth, whether by language or in any other way, as, for instance, in pictorial exhibition.

HYPERBOLE (Gr. ὑπερβολή) is rhetorical exaggeration, a figure of speech in which the strict proportion of truth is exceeded under the influence of strong feeling, or to produce some impression. The hyperbole may be exaggerative in statements of the less and the more, as well as of the greater and better.

EXAMINATION. SEARCH. INQUIRY. RESEARCH. INVESTIGATION. SCRUTINY. EXPLORATION. EXPLOITATION. INSPECTION. INQUISITION.

All these terms agree in denoting some kind and degree of effort at the finding out of what is not known.

To EXAMINE (Lat. *exămĭnare, to weigh; exămen, the tongue of a balance*) is literally to test *by a balance*, and by an extension of meaning, in any appropriate or received method. The subject of examination is always present and known, and the object of it is to procure a fuller and deeper insight into it, or a closer observation of it; whether it be a material substance or composition, a fact, a reason, cause, motive, or claim, the truth of a statement, or the simple force and meaning of it, a theory, or anything which challenges inquiry, an offender in reference to his guilt, or a scholar for his attainments. Examination is a thing of detail, consisting of a complex inquiry or inspection of particulars, for the purpose of coming to a general conclusion or result as to the character or state of the object examined.

"The proper office of *examination*, inquiry, and ratiocination is, strictly speaking, confined to the production of a just discernment and an accurate discrimination."—COGAN.

On the other hand, in SEARCH (O. Fr. *sercher*, L. Lat. *circāre, to turn round*, in looking for something: see LITTRÉ, s.v. CHERCHER) implies the looking for something remote from present observation. In this way search may precede examination. The botanist or the entomologist, for instance, first searches for specimens, and then examines them. Search is more laborious, examination more close. One examines for the sake of information or knowledge; one searches for the sake of acquiring and possessing. Examination ought to be careful and accurate; search, active and industrious.

"She was well pleased, and forth her dam
zells sent
Through all the woods, to *search* from place
to place,
If any track of him or tidings they might
trace." SPENSER.

INQUIRY (Lat. *inquīrĕre, to seek after*) is the aiming at or discovery of truth by question, either formal, verbal interrogation, or a recourse to the proper means and sources of knowledge, when the object has been shaped into a question or problem for solution.

"And all that is wanting to the perfection of this art (medicine) will undoubtedly be found, if able men, and such as are instructed in the ancient rules, will make a further *inquiry* into it, and endeavour to arrive at that which is hitherto unknown by that which is already known."—DRYDEN.

RESEARCH is laborious and sustained *search* after objects, not of physical, but mental observation and knowledge. It is used in the sense of accumulated results as well as the process of such inquiry, as a "man of great research."

"Nature, the handmaid of God Almighty, doth nothing but with good advice, if we make *researches* into the true reason of things."—HOWELL.

INVESTIGATION (Lat. *investīgātionem; vestīgium, a footstep*) is not used of any physical tracking, but of the

patient inquiry into matters of science or knowledge along a strict path, and, as it were, step by step. The subject of investigation, like that of examination, and unlike that of search, is never absolutely unknown, but it is always partially so. Investigation commonly implies the inquiry into the more hidden connexions of something which is itself familiar; as *e.g.* into the causes of natural phenomena. Investigation is literally a mental tracking where facts or appearances, being successively observed and examined, lead the mind on to some complex truth or fact, which is the goal of the inquiry.

"Now all this that I have said is to show the force of diligence in the *investigation* of truth, and particularly of the noblest of all truths, which is that of religion."—SOUTH.

SCRUTINY (Lat. *scrūtĭnium, a search, inquiry; scrūtāri, to search*) involves nothing unknown in itself, and is confined to minute examination of what is known and present. It relates to other matters than mere physical substances. A microscopic examination of an insect, for instance, would not be called a scrutiny. "A scrutiny of voters, and their votes." When the object is purely material or physical, we call the process INSPECTION (Lat. *inspectionem, inspĭcĕre, to look into*), as "an inspection of a regiment," "an inspection of accounts." But inspection may be a single act; scrutiny is always a complex process.

"Thenceforth I thought thee worth my nearer view
And narrower *scrutiny*." MILTON.

"With narrow search, and with *inspection* deep,
Considered every creature." *Ibid.*

EXPLORATION (Lat. *explōrātiōnem*) is an inquiry ranging, or a search directed, over an extensive area, whether geographically or in a metaphorical sense, for the purpose of exacter knowledge of the whole area, or of finding some specific object of search comprised or supposed to be comprised in it.

"On the report of the cowardly *explorers* of the land they relapse again into their old delirium. 'Wherefore hath the Lord brought us into this land, to fall by the sword, that our wives and children should be a prey?'"—WARBURTON.

EXPLOITATION (Fr. *exploiter, to cultivate, to make the most of*; Lat. *explĭtāre*) is a French term used in reference to mining, and denotes such exploration as has for its object the making available of mines of metals and minerals; hence, secondarily, of investigation for the development of what is useful or valuable.

INQUISITION has the same origin and meaning as INQUIRY, but adds to it a peculiar exactness and searching closeness often the accompaniment of judicial rigour, or official minuteness. Its subject is the dealings of men.

"Let not search and *inquisition* fail
To bring again these foolish runaways."
SHAKESPEARE.

EXAMPLE. SAMPLE. PRECEDENT. INSTANCE. EXEMPLIFICATION. COPY. PATTERN. MODEL. ILLUSTRATION. CASE.

EXAMPLE (Lat. *exemplum, exĭmĕre, to take out as a sample*) is literally a portion taken out of a larger quantity, to show the nature of the whole—the sense in which we now use the word SAMPLE. By an extension of meaning, it is used to signify something to be imitated or followed, as a model, copy, pattern, or precedent; or, negatively, to be avoided as a caution, as, "to make an example of a person;" and, finally, an instance serving for illustration of a rule, precept, or principle of science.

The discrimination to be drawn between example and INSTANCE (Lat. *instantia*) is as follows: an example is a permanent instance; an instance is a specific example. An example, in the full sense of the term, is necessarily a complete setting forth of that to which it belongs. An example of injustice must contain nothing which is not referable to injustice. An instance of injustice may result from injustice and other things in combination besides. An example proves a rule; an instance does not, nor does it imply the existence of anything so methodical. EXAMPLE has an active, INSTANCE a passive, signification. An example may be a per-

son or a thing. An instance is always an occurrence or a thing done. An example instructs, an instance illustrates or represents. Men may be personally examples of virtue or vice, while their actions may be instances of virtue or vice. Yet INSTANCE enters more into the reason of things, while EXAMPLE belongs more to the nature of facts. We act upon or follow examples; we reflect upon instances. An example might do no more than show us what we should do, imitate, or avoid. An instance would involve the reason why.

"He copies from his master, Sylla, well,
And would the dire *example* far excel."
ROWE, *Lucan*.

"Whole troops of heroes Greece has yet to boast,
And sends thee one, a *sample* of her host.
Such as I am, I come to prove thy might."
POPE, *Iliad*.

"Most remarkable *instances* of suffering."—ATTERBURY.

An instance of suffering sets forth to our comprehension the nature of that suffering. An example of suffering would teach us how to suffer, or to be ready to incur suffering. We might say of a certain person, "He often does very mean things, and this is an instance of it;" where we could not correctly use the term EXAMPLE. We might use the term EXEMPLIFICATION; but this rather implies that we wanted to prove or establish to the understanding or conviction of another the meanness of which we speak. An exemplification is the evolution of an example, or the appending of it to certain principles already enunciated. This may be an exercise of creative ingenuity or adaptative reflexion.

When we do this in a vivid manner, it may be called an ILLUSTRATION (Lat. *illustrātionem*, in rhet. *a vivid representation, illustrāre, to make bright or clear*), which term is also generally applicable to the coming home to the common understanding of some general truth in a distinct and instructive way. The peculiarity of an illustration is that it may be not at all of the nature of a sample or instance, but a similar or analogous case put side by side of another for the purpose of explanation by correspondence; or it may be an embodiment in a more concrete and practical form of what has been expressed in more abstract terms. It deals with the fact as such, not in its cause or reason.

"A moral precept conveyed in words is only an account of truth in its effects; a moral picture is truth *exemplified;* and which is most likely to gain upon the affections it may not be difficult to determine."—LANGHORNE.

"While the storm was in its fury any allusion had been improper, for the poet could have compared it to nothing more impetuous than itself; consequently he could have made no *illustration*."—DRYDEN.

COPY, PATTERN, and MODEL stand in close relationship. A copy (Fr. *copie, cōpia, plenty, a multiplication of the original*) has the double meaning of a pattern and an imitation of it, or of the thing to be imitated and the thing imitating. A pattern (Fr. *patron, patron, master of a shop, &c.;* and so *model by which the workman is guided, pattern*) is anything proposed for imitation. It has sometimes the sense of SAMPLE, as a "pattern of cloth," and sometimes of design, as "an elegant pattern." MODEL (Fr. *modèle*), in addition to the meanings of pattern, has that of a perfect pattern, or the best of the kind. When employed in matters connected with imitative art, COPY is usually for delineation, PATTERN for embroidery or textile manufacture, MODEL for plastic or constructive purposes. In moral and secondary applications, to copy the conduct of another is no more than to imitate his doings. The term has no high moral signification, like PATTERN and MODEL; indeed, it is often used to depreciate an imitation as servile, or as one that ought not to have been made at all. In this application PATTERN is the more specific, MODEL the more general. PATTERN belongs to some department of conduct, MODEL to conduct and character generally or as a whole. PATTERN regards the guidance of others, MODEL the integrity and completeness of the thing or person in itself. A man may be a pattern of honesty, for instance, without being a model citizen.

"The Sorbonists were the original, and our schismatics in England were the *copiers* of rebellion. That Paris began and London followed."—DRYDEN.

"A housewife in bed, at table a slattern,
For all an *example*, for no one a *pattern*."
SWIFT.

"Socrates recommends to Alcibiades as the *model* of his devotions a short prayer which a Greek poet composed for the use of his friends."—ADDISON.

PRECEDENT (Lat. *præcĕdens, going before*, part. of *præcĕdĕre*) is something which comes down to us with the sanction of usage and common consent, as a guide to conduct or judgment, and, in the legal sense of the term, has force in other cases; while an example has no force beyond itself.

CASE (Lat. *cāsus, cădĕre, a falling out*) is used in a loose way of an occurrence of a certain general character, which, and not the law or principle of it, is all that occupies the mind, as a sad case, a case of fever (in medicine), a case of felony (in law). It is evident that a particular case may become a precedent.

"For much he knows, and just conclusions draws
From various *precedents* and various laws."
POPE.

"Yet on his way (no sign of grace,
For folks in fear are apt to pray)
To Phœbus he preferred his *case*,
And beg'd his aid that dreadful day."
GRAY.

EXASPERATE. AGGRAVATE. IRRITATE. PROVOKE. AGGRIEVE.

Both persons and feelings are said to be EXASPERATED, but more commonly the former (Lat. *exasperāre, to make rough* or *fierce, asper, rough*). It is to provoke bitter feeling, or to intensify it.

To AGGRAVATE (Lat. *aggrăvāre, to make heavier, to annoy*) is to make less tolerable or excusable, and is only properly applicable to evils or offences, though it has come to be used in the sense of IRRITATE and EXASPERATE. In this latter sense it is to be presumed that the idea is to make to feel a burden or a grievance.

IRRITATE (Lat. *irrĭtare*), unlike the others, is employable in a physical sense, as "to irritate the skin;" but there is always a relation to persons and their feelings, to both of which the term is directly applicable. To IRRITATE is less strong than the others, and denotes the excitement of slight resentment against the cause or object.

To PROVOKE (Lat. *prōvŏcare, to challenge, to stir up*) is stronger, and expresses the rousing of a feeling of decided anger and strong resentment by injury or insult, such as naturally tends to active retaliation. To EXASPERATE is stronger still, and denotes a provocation to unrestrained anger or resentment, based upon a determined resentment or ill-will. PROVOKE expresses a design on the part of the provoker to rouse the person provoked to defend himself. A troublesome person aggravates us by his importunities, a careless servant by his repeated acts of negligence or disobedience, a clever debater irritates his political opponent by his sarcasms, and would be glad if he could carry it on to exasperation. An enemy provokes by his insults. A repetition of disagreeable words, action, or events, irritates. AGGRIEVE (*see* GRIEF), is capable of a milder force, and bears the meaning of such hurt as accrues to the sense of dignity or of right. He is aggrieved who feels himself to have been treated differently from what he had a right to expect. It is by an unusual analogy that South employs the term of bodily pain.—

"Those pains that afflict the body are afflictive just so long as they actually possess the part that they *aggrieve*."

Susceptible persons and persons of nervous temperament are easily irritated. Proud persons, as over-estimating what is due to their ease, dignity, consideration, or comfort, are provoked. As irritation may come from circumstances, so provocation is the result of treatment, or supposed treatment, by other persons. Persons of ardent temperament, strong in their loves and hates, are most capable of being exasperated. PROVOKE differs from the rest in being applicable to

other feelings than those of personal annoyance. Persons are provoked to emulation and even to laughter.

"To *exasperate* you, to awaken your dormouse valour."—SHAKESPEARE.

"Cornelius Rufus is dead, and dead too by his own act! a circumstance of great *aggravation* to my affliction."—MELMOTH, *Pliny*.

"Dismiss the man, nor *irritate* the God.
Prevent the rage of Him who reigns above."
POPE.

"The reflection calculated above all others to allay the haughtiness of temper which is ever finding out *provocations*, and which renders anger so impetuous, is that which the Gospel proposes, namely, that we ourselves are, or shortly shall be, suppliants for mercy and pardon at the mercy-seat of God."—PALEY.

EXCEED. EXCEL. SURPASS. TRANSCEND. OUTDO.

To EXCEED (Lat. *excēdĕre, to go out* or *beyond*) is a relative term, implying some limit, measure, or quantity already existing, whether of bulk, stature, weight, distance, number, or power, moral, mental, or mechanical. It is also used intransitively and abstractedly, as "The temperate man will be careful not to exceed;" but even here the measure of sufficiency and sobriety is understood.

To EXCEL (Lat. *excellĕre*) is never employed but in an honourable sense. It is to go far in good qualities or laudable actions or acquirements, or, specifically, as a transitive verb, to go beyond others in such things.

To SURPASS (Fr. *surpasser*) is to go beyond another, or others, not being restricted, like EXCEL, to what is laudable, but being said of anything which admits of degree of power and movement in the human mind, character, and actions, especially in competition. It is used directly both of persons and the particulars above mentioned, and is used both subjectively and objectively; of things and our estimation of them.

TRANSCEND (Lat. *transcendĕre, to climb over, to surpass*) is to excel in a signal manner, soaring, as it were, aloft, and surmounting all barriers. It belongs less to persons than to qualities and subjects of thought.

To OUTDO is equivalent to the Latin or French *surpass*. It is accordingly a familiar term, with an application also familiar. Hence it has sometimes the undignified force of get the better of another in no very honourable way, as a synonym with *outwit*. To outdo is simply to do something better than another, and to reap some personal advantage by the fact. As excellence is always good, so *excess* is always evil, no matter what the nature of the case; but this force belongs to the noun only, the verb being applicable to both good and evil. To exceed the limits of truth, justice, propriety, or to exceed another in virtue or attainments. In short, exceed is a term of praise or dispraise, of favourable or unfavourable force, according to the nature of the case, by which the term has to be interpreted.

"*Excessive* lenity and indulgence are ultimately *excessive* rigour."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"Who all that time was thought *exceeding* wise,
Only for taking pains and telling lies."
DRYDEN.

"Though the comprehension of our understanding comes *exceeding* short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being."—LOCKE.

"To mark the matchless workings of the Power
That shuts within its seed the future flower,
Bids these in elegance of form *excel*,
In colour these, and those delight the smell."
COWPER.

"He soars at employment *surpassing* his ability to manage."—BARROW.

"Then let the firmament thy wonder raise,
'Twill raise thy wonder but *transcend* thy praise."
YOUNG.

"I grieve to be *outdone* by Gay."—SWIFT.

EXCELLENCE. SUPERIORITY.

EXCELLENCE is an absolute term, SUPERIORITY (Fr. *supériorité*, L. Lat. *sŭpĕrĭōrĭtatem*) is a relative term, denoting the being more excellent than others or another. But SUPERIORITY is also applicable to differences of social or official grade, while EXCELLENCE is

applicable only to physical, mental, and moral qualities. It may be observed that where no qualifying terms are added, superiority means intellectual excellence, and excellence means moral superiority. An excellent man is a very good man. A superior person is one of marked intelligence and attainments.

"Him whom Thou, profusely kind,
Adorn'st with every *excellence* refined."
BEATTIE.

"The sense of all which is to oblige us to treat all men as becomes us in the rank and station we are placed in, to honour those which are our *superiors* whether in place or virtue; to give that modest deference to their judgments, that reverence to their persons, that respect to their virtues, and homage to their desires and commands, which the degree or kind of their *superiority* requires."—SCOTT, *Christian Life.*

EXCEPT. BESIDES. UNLESS.

EXCEPT (O. Fr. *excepter, to except*) is exclusive, BESIDES (literally, *by the side*) is additive. "There was no one present except him," means, take him away, and nobody was there. "There was no one present besides him," means, he was there, and alongside of him was nobody.

EXCEPT and UNLESS (A.S. *on-lesan, to unloose, dismiss*) were formerly used interchangeably, but the distinction is now drawn as follows: EXCEPT relates to some general rule, fact, or case, to which it introduces an exception. UNLESS denotes a diminution, which being given something else takes place; for instance, "Unless we make haste, we shall be destroyed," is tantamount to,—our present case, minus making haste, equals destruction.

"God and His Son *except*,
Nought valued he nor feared."
MILTON.

"I am the first and I am the last, and *beside* Me there is no God."—*Eng. Bible.*

"Seeing then no man can plead eloquently *unless* he be able first to speak, it followeth that ability of speech is in this case a thing most necessary."—HOOKER.

EXCESS. SUPERFLUITY. REDUNDANCY.

EXCESS (Lat. *excessus, a standing out or beyond*) denotes what is beyond an average, or a fixed or a just amount.

"Since both the ill and good you do alike
my peace destroy,
That kills me with *excess* of grief, this with
excess of joy."
WALSH.

SUPERFLUITY (Lat. *sŭperfluitatem*) has reference to purposes and requirements. That is superfluous which is more than is wanted, or is rendered useless by its abundance. An excess of rain would be a fall of rain exceeding the average; a superfluity would be such a quantity as could not be put to account.

"How farre are they of from good scholers that can not finde in their hartes to depart with a title of the aboundaunce and *superfluitie* of their temporall goodes to helpe their neighbours neede."—TYNDALL.

REDUNDANCY (Lat. *rĕdundantia, an overflowing*) is superfluous abundance. It is, however, applied especially to certain matters of supply, as of natural supply; as we speak of a redundancy of bile; of one's copiousness of words or expressions; as, a redundancy of language. An exuberance *of supply* is redundancy.

"Wars seem to be in a manner a natural consequence of the over-plenitude and *redundancy* of the number of men in the world."—HALE.

EXCESSIVE. IMMODERATE. INTEMPERATE.

For the idea of EXCESS see EXCEED and EXCESS. It relates to mere amount, and is not necessarily connected with moral agents.

This *is* the case with IMMODERATE (Lat. *im-mŏdĕrātus, not measured,*) and INTEMPERATE (Lat. *intempĕratus, untempered*), which differ in that the former is applicable both to agents and quantities, the latter to agents alone. That is IMMODERATE which exceeds just, reasonable, or ordinary bounds generally; INTEMPERATE applies to the unrestrained indulgence of the desires, or undue licence given to the will, or the acting or speaking without self-control. IMMODERATE is statical, belonging to quantity, as immoderate ambition; INTEMPERATE is dynamical, belonging

to force and action; as, intemperate speech, enjoyment, licence of feeling or language.

"*Excessive* lenity and indulgence are ultimately *excessive* rigour."—KNOX, *Essays.*

In old-fashioned English IMMODERATE was used in the simple sense of excessive. "The *immoderateness* of cold or heat."

"Whence multitudes of reverend men and critics
Have got a kind of intellectual rickets,
And by th' *immoderate* excess of study
Have found the sickly head t' outgrow the body." BUTLER.

"The people at large, who behaved very unwisely and *intemperately* on that occasion."—BURKE.

EXCITE. ANIMATE. ENCOURAGE.

To EXCITE (Lat. *excĭtāre*) is to inspire desire or awaken passion.

To ANIMATE (Lat. *ănĭmāre*) is to push forward or instigate in an action already commenced for the purpose or with the effect of preventing a relaxation or remissness.

To ENCOURAGE (Fr. *encourager, cœur, the heart*) is to dissipate fear or misgiving by the hope of success, so that the motive of glory or interest shall prevail over the appearances of difficulty or danger.

EXCITE. AWAKEN. ROUSE *or* AROUSE. INCITE. STIMULATE.

To EXCITE (Lat. *excĭtāre, to summon, stimulate*) is to call out into greater activity what before existed in a calm or calmer state, or to rouse to an active state faculties or powers which before were dormant. The term is also used of purely physical action. We excite heat by friction.

AWAKEN (A.S. *áwacnan*) is to rouse from a state of sleep, or, analogously, to rouse anything that has lain quiet, and, as it were, dormant, as to awaken suspicion or love, and is applicable only to intelligent subjects. It denotes a gentler and more continuous or less abrupt influence than EXCITE, though the effect produced may be equally great. The passions generally are excited, as the stronger passions are provoked or roused, except when "provoked" has the sense of calling forth externally, as contempt, laughter, a smile.

ROUSE (A.S. *hriscian, to shake, vibrate*) is to awaken in a sudden or startling manner, so as to bring into an energetic state by a strong impulse.

To INCITE (Lat. *incĭtāre, to urge forward*) is to excite to a specific act or end which the inciter has in view.

To STIMULATE is to quicken into activity (Lat. *stĭmŭlare, stĭmŭlus, a goad*), and to a certain end. Men are excited when their passions, desires, or interest are roused; they are stimulated when they are induced to make greater exertions, as by a hope of reward or any other external impulse. They are awakened out of indifference, roused out of lethargy and torpor, incited by the designing influence of others, stimulated by new motives of action.

"Hope is the grand *exciter* of industry."—BARROW.

"When their consciences are thoroughly *awakened* by some great affliction, or the near approach of death and a lively sense of another world."—TILLOTSON.

"His present fears rather than any true penitence *roused* him up."—WATERLAND.

"The absence of Duke Robert, and the concurrence of many circumstances, altogether resembling those which had been so favourable to the late monarch, *incited* him to a similar attempt."—BURKE.

Men are incited to what otherwise they would not have given their efforts. They are commonly stimulated to something which they are pursuing, or intending to pursue, but with want of energy. There are some persons so hard-hearted that the greatest sufferings in others excite in them no feeling of generosity or even pity. Others again are so excitable by all that goes on around them, that they are always changing their moods according to the impressions made upon them by change of circumstances. One seeks to excite the man who is wanting in specific interest, or resolution, or who is acting lazily or languidly, or who halts or draws back.

One seeks to incite the man who seems to take an object too little to heart, and in whom no motive seems to exist strong enough to quicken his thoughts and movements.

"The nature of imperfect animals is such that they are apt to have but a dull and sluggish sense, a flat and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and *stimulated*, heightened and invigorated by being compared to the contrary evil."—CUDWORTH.

EXCUSE. PARDON. FORGIVE. CONDONE.

We EXCUSE (Lat. *excūsare, to release from a charge, to excuse*) whenever we exempt from the imputation of blame, or, by an extension of meaning, regard as not absolutely calling for blame, and so admitting of being viewed leniently. When used reflexively it sometimes means no more than to decline, or to take such exemption to one's self. Instances of these uses are as follows: "I excuse his conduct, considering the extraordinary provocation under which he acted." "I have received his invitation, but intend to excuse myself" (or to send an excuse), the force of the phrase being to relieve one's self from the blame of neglect by an apology.

We excuse a small fault, we PARDON (Fr. *pardonner*, L. Lat. *perdōnāre*) a great fault or a crime. We excuse commonly what relates to ourselves. We pardon offences against rule, law, morals. We excuse, ordinarily speaking, when the circumstances of the case are such that a kindly nature is justified in viewing them leniently. We pardon as a summary act of power, generosity, or mercy. Kings pardon criminals, and friends may excuse each other. Pardon is always from a superior. Excusing may come from a superior or an equal. We also excuse from obligations which are not moral, but only social, official, or conventional, as if the Queen should excuse the attendance on some particular occasion of an officer of state. We excuse an apparent fault, we pardon a real one. Tolerance excuses, indulgence pardons.

"Homicide in self-defence upon a sudden affray is also *excusable* rather than justifiable by the English law."—BLACKSTONE.

"His (the king's) power of *pardoning* was said by our Saxon ancestors to be derived a lege jure dignitatis; and it is declared in Parliament by Statute 27 Hen. VIII. that no other person hath power to *pardon* or remit any treason or felonies."—*Ibid.*

FORGIVE (A.S. *for-gefan, to give away*, and so, like Gr. ἀφιέναι, *to remit*) differs from both in relating only to offences against one's self. It means etymologically the same as PARDON, meaning to give in such a way as to forego, *i.e.*, the memory and the punishment of the offence. Omissions and neglects or slight commissions may be excused, graver offences and crimes pardoned, personal insults and injuries forgiven.

"*Forgive* us our trespasses, as we *forgive* them that trespass against us."—*Lord's Prayer.*

Kindness prompts to forgiveness, mercy to pardon. We are never hindered from forgiving; but the nature of an offence may be, in the eye of the law, such that we may have no power or authority to pardon it.

CONDONE (Lat. *condōnāre*) has a legal air, and denotes generally a constructive pardon, that is, such behaviour towards another as, without the formal expression of forgiveness, implies that the offence has been overlooked. In the ecclesiastical law it had the special meaning of a pardon express or implied on the part of the husband or the wife for a breach of the marriage vow.

"The same (sin) remaining in the soul of man in like manner as it did before, *condonation* is only taken away by a not imputation of the guilt."—MOUNTAGU.

EXECRABLE. ABOMINABLE. DETESTABLE.

That is EXECRABLE which raises a lively feeling of horror or indignation, as being worthy of reprobation (Lat. *exsecrari, to curse greatly*).

That is ABOMINABLE (*see* ABOMINATE) which excites a distinct feeling of personal desire of avoidance from any motive but fear, as an "abominable nuisance." Hatred and contempt combined make the abominable in persons. It is employed of things in the sense of intensely disagreeable.

DETESTABLE (Lat. *detestābilis, dētestari, to curse*, lit. *invoking the deity as a witness*) is properly used of such abstract properties, or persons in reference to them, as deserve *moral reprobation on principle;* as, detestable vices, cruelty, cowardice, tyranny, or tyrants. They rise in force in this order, abominable, detestable, execrable. The employment of these terms as hyperbolical expressions at random has tended much to confound their relative character. The terms are often employed of productions, performances, and works of art, but DETESTABLE and EXECRABLE might refer to the performance, ABOMINABLE to the subject represented, as in a painting.

"The object of a battle was no longer empty glory, but sordid lucre, or something still more *execrably* flagitious."—KNOX.

"Where all life dies, death lives, and nature breeds
Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,
Abominable, inutterable, and worse
Than fables yet have feigned or fear conceived,
Gorgons and hydras and chimeras dire."
MILTON.

"Under the strong image of the unfitness and *abominableness* and *detestableness* and profaneness of any uncleanness or impurity appearing in the Temple of God, the odiousness of all moral impurity, of all debauched practices whatsoever in any person who professes himself to be a worshipper of God, is set forth after a more lively and affecting manner."—CLARKE.

EXERCISE. PRACTISE. EXERT.

EXERCISE (Lat. *exercēre*) is actively to employ a power or property inherent in or belonging to ourselves, whether physical, mental, moral, or social; as to exercise one's self, one's arms or legs, patience or cruelty, authority or office, power or influence.

It is less sustained than PRACTISE (Fr. *pratiquer*) and more sustained than EXERT (Lat. *exsĕrĕre, to thrust forth*, part. *exsertum*). To exercise forbearance would imply a particular case, to practise forbearance would imply that it was natural, or exhibited habitually by way of self-discipline. We may be said to practise not only mental or moral qualities, but occupations, trades, arts. We exert force, strength, violence, ability, in the abstract, or anything within us which is of the nature of an active faculty, as the mind, the powers of invention or imagination, the faculty of reasoning, understanding, and the like: and this commonly with reference to some specific end or design. In order to exercise we must exert repeatedly. We exert the voice in order to be audible to those who are deaf or distant; we exercise it in order to attain power, flexibility, clearness of enunciation, and the like.

"But we learn from Scripture further that His providence extends even in the minutest instances to each of us in particular, and that not the smallest thing comes to pass but by His appointment or wise permission; that His continual superintendency may be ever *exercised* towards us for our good."—SECKER.

"Discourse on subjects of little or no importance is as necessary at times for the relaxation of our minds as exercise without business for the refreshment of our bodies. It is a proper *exertion* of that cheerfulness which God hath plainly designed us to show on small occasions as well as great."—SECKER.

The idea contained in PRACTISE is the active conformity to some established rule, law, method, or custom. It is therefore in its nature imitative, and a thing of discipline whether in morals, manners, calling, art, or science.

"As this advice ye *practise* or reject,
So hope success or dread the dire effect."
POPE, *Homer.*

EXHORT. PERSUADE.

EXHORTATION (Lat. *exhortātionem*) has for its end something practical either to be done or to be abstained from. It is ordinarily the act of a superior in wisdom or position.

PERSUASION (Lat. *persuāsionem*) is the act of an equal, or of one who for the occasion puts himself upon an equality. The power of persuasion, therefore, is more purely moral, having in it more of one's own assent and less of another's entreaty or impelling. Exhortation is commonly on sterner matters, as matters of necessity or duty; persuasion, on matters of self-interest: but persuasion is not of facts or of the abstract truth of propositions. This is expressed by the word *convince*. Yet where the subject-

matter is of a mixed nature, in which the evidence is partly moral and not simply logical or scientific, the term PERSUADE might be employed. If one thought that the moon was larger than the sun, astronomy would convince him to the contrary. If he thought that vice would lead to his happiness, morals would persuade him to the contrary. Formerly, persuade was used in the sense of inculcate by argument or expostulation, "Persuading the things concerning the kingdom of God." It is now only employed of such inculcation as is successful to move another.

"Every man that will make himself eminent in any virtue will be a light to the world; his life will be a constant sermon, and he will often prove as effectual a benefactor to those about him by his example as others are by their counsels and *exhortations*."—SHARP.

"We will *persuade* him, be it possible."—SHAKESPEARE.

EXIST. BE. SUBSIST. LIVE.

BE is called the substantive verb, as expressing substance or being. It is the A.S. *beón, to be*. Parts of what grammarians call the conjugation of the verb to be, are, in fact, radically different derivatives; *e.g.*, *as, is, was*. Analogous instances occur in other languages, as in Latin, *esse, fui*. This verb, except seldom, as in Shakespeare's, "To be, or not to be," is employed to express relative, modified, or concrete, and not abstract and independent, being, as, "To be happy," "I am miserable," "Hercules was a hero," "Three and two are five." Being thus subjective, the verb is applicable to what has no objective existence at all. Thus a thing very often *is* which does not exist, as "The philosopher's stone *is* a chimera," in other words, has no existence. The common use of the verb to be is that of a copula, or the logical link between subject and predicate.

In the way of a *mere* copula, the verb EXIST (Lat. *exsistĕre, to come forth, to exist*) is not used, but always has a force beyond it, even where it may seem that to BE might have been substituted for it, and denotes *being* in its totality, as a truth or fact, and not a mode or relationship. To exist is emphatically opposed to the imaginary, unreal, or pretended.

To SUBSIST (Lat. *subsistĕre, to stand still*) is a philosophical term, expressing existence as based upon its "formal cause;" this being the basis of its existence, as the "material cause" was the basis of our conception of that existence. So characteristic was this idea of a substratum, that the term is applied to the mere vegetative life of animals as *supported* by what tends to nourish them, as "Tigers subsist on flesh," &c. Hence SUBSIST is commonly used of relative or dependent existence. That which is not changed or destroyed still subsists. Man's life *is* uncertain. The phœnix does not *exist*. All that is of human appointment *subsists* but for a time.

To LIVE (A.S. *lybban*) is to exist with the functions of vitality, comprehending every grade from the lowest degree of mere sentience without reflexion, consciousness, or will, as in the plants, up to the creatures themselves endowed with these.

"Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I *am* hath sent me unto you."—*Bible*.

"Whatever *exists* has a cause, a reason, a ground of its existence, a foundation on which its existence relies, a ground of reason why it doth exist rather than not exist, either in the necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal, or in the will of some other being, and then that other being must at least in the order of nature and causality have existed before it."—CLARKE.

"Every person hath his own *subsistence*, which no other besides hath, although there be others beside that are of the same substance."—HOOKER.

"In Him we *live* and move and have our being."—*Bible*.

EXPECT. AWAIT.

To EXPECT (Lat. *exspectāre, to look out for*) is a mental act, to AWAIT (O. Fr. *awaiter*, orig. from Ger. *wahta, a watch*, from which mod. Ger. *wacht, guard, watch*) is a moral act. We expect when we have arrived at the conclusion that something future will really happen in all probability. We await it when we look upon it as

certain, and have prepared ourselves to meet it. We may expect what may or may not interest us personally; but we await that which, when it comes, will affect ourselves. The old man expects to die happy if he awaits death with serenity and hope.

"Though virtue is unquestionably worthy to be chosen for its own sake, even without any *expectation* of reward, yet it does not follow that it is therefore entirely self-sufficient, and able to support a man under all kind of sufferings, and even death itself, for its sake, without any prospect of future recompense."—CLARKE.

"Æneas heard, and for a space resigned
To tender pity all his manly mind,
Then rising in his rage, he burns to fight;
The Greek *awaits* him with collected might." POPE, *Homer.*

EXPEDIENT. RESOURCE. SHIFT. CONTRIVANCE.

EXPEDIENT (Lat. *expĕdit, it is expedient*), SHIFT (A.S. *scyftan, to divide, appoint*; or Ger. *schieben, to shove, shift*), and CONTRIVANCE (O. Fr. *controver, to find*) are internal and artificial; RESOURCE (Fr. *ressource, source*; being from *sourdre*, Lat. *surgere, to rise*) is, or may be, external and natural. A contrivance indicates mechanical ingenuity, or at least operative skill, which may or may not have been called for under special circumstances. It is used both of the act of contriving and the thing contrived. An expedient is a contrivance more or less adequate but irregular, and sought for by tact and adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is a kind of unauthorized substitute for more recognized modes of doing things. A shift is an expedient which does not profess to be more than temporary and very imperfect, a mere evasion of difficulty. A resource is often that on which the others are based. So it may be a test of skill in contrivance to find an adequate expedient in limited resources. SHIFT is in the commonest matters, and usually relates to objects trivial and external, CONTRIVANCE to matters of more importance, and EXPEDIENT to those even of the highest. Differences are especially to be noted between an expedient and a resource. In the first place, RESOURCE is much the graver term of the two. The expedient is a means for extricating one's self from an embarrassment, or for getting over a difficulty of any kind. The resource is a way of recovery from some serious fall, or a way out of great distress. The resource supposes an evil to be repaired, the expedient only an obstacle to be overcome. We have to make use of expedients every day of our lives; we have to seek resources when calamities befall us. Experience, industry, promptitude, cleverness, will furnish us with expedients; a strong brain, and a resolute will, genius, fortune, power, wealth, create resources. A man who is in debt sells off a portion of his property as an expedient to meet the demands of his creditors; when he has mortgaged or sold it all he has got to the end of his resources.

"Like tricks of state to stop a raging flood,
Or mollify a mad-brained senate's mood,
Of all *expedients* never one was good."
DRYDEN.

"Threatenings mixed with prayers, his last *resource*." *Ibid.*

"I'll find a thousand *shifts* to get away."—SHAKESPEARE.

"Government is a *contrivance* of human wisdom to provide for human wants."—BURKE.

EXPEDIENT. FIT.

EXPEDIENCY (*see* EXPEDIENT) is a kind of FITNESS (O. Fr. *faict, fait, wrought, for a purpose*: WEDGEWOOD; but SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*, better: Icel. *fitja, to knit together*), namely, that kind which is personally advantageous. That which is expedient is necessarily fit, for that cannot conduce to an advantageous end which is unsuitable or improper; but unless that which is fitting be required, and be conducive to the welfare or benefit of the person, then, however fitting it may be, it will answer no profitable end, and so will not be expedient. Fitness regards every kind of appropriateness, as moral fitness; expediency regards only adaptation to self-interest, or tendency to promote a proposed object.

"It is *expedient* for you that I go away."—*Bible.*

"He, and He only, is the competent,

proper, and unerring judge upon what persons and on what conditions it is *fit* for Him to bestow His favours."—CLARKE.

EXPERIMENT. TRIAL. PROOF.

EXPERIMENT (Lat. *expĕrīmentum, experīri, to try*) relates properly to the *truth* of things. It determines, clears, removes doubt and ignorance.

TRIAL (Fr. *trier, to pick or choose*) concerns particularly the *use* of things, and judges of what is suitable or unsuitable.

PROOF (Lat. *prŏbāre*) relates more to the quality of things, and determines whether a thing is good or bad, determines the better, and reassures under suspicion. The object of experiment is to know, of trial to choose, and of proof to be certain. By experiment we persuade ourselves that something exists or not, by trial we learn its qualities, and by proof whether it has the qualities we attributed to it. Experiment confirms our opinions. It is the handmaid, and in some cases, the mother of science. Trial corrects and guides our taste, proof establishes our confidence. It is our security against error and deception.

EXPERIMENTAL. TENTATIVE.

EXPERIMENTAL (Lat. *expĕrīmentum, a proof, trial*) is in its general sense pertaining to experiment, and in its specific use to some characteristic of experiment. So far as experiment means trial distinct from experience, EXPERIMENTAL means hazardous; so far as EXPERIMENT brings to light, experimental means ascertained. It is in the former sense that it appears as a synonym with TENTATIVE (Lat. *tentātivus, tentare, to try*). In this connexion the EXPERIMENTAL hazards results, the TENTATIVE hazards success. An experimental proceeding is entered upon to see what comes of it, a tentative proceeding with the hope of some good coming, even if the trials be frequent and the success only occasional. The miracles of the Christian apostles, according to Paley, were not tentative, that is, they did not succeed now and then out of a number of trials.

EXPIATION. ATONEMENT.

EXPIATION (Lat. *expiāre, to make atonement for*) is the extinction of guilt by suffering or penalty. ATONEMENT adds to this the idea of satisfaction or reparation to an injured party (atonement being the setting *at one*). The malefactor, for instance, expiates his crimes on the gallows. If this were spoken of as an atonement, it would be under the view of reparation being thus made, either to the parties he had injured, or to humanity, or to the State.

"It was a common and received doctrine among the Jews that for some sins a man was pardoned presently upon his repentance; that other sins were not pardoned till the solemn day of *expiation*, which came once a year; that other sins which were yet greater were not to be *expiated* but by some grievous temporal affliction."—SHARP.

"To *atone* or make him at one again with the offender."—BEVERIDGE.

EXPIRE. DIE.

To EXPIRE (Lat. *exspīrāre, to breathe out*) is appropriately used of animals which *breathe* the breath of life. Of these it may be said that they live and that they die or expire. All living things either die or expire. All things that die or expire are not necessarily living things, for to die is used analogously, as "to let a secret die within the breast," and oftener with the addition of the word out or away. Trees live and die, but do not expire. The flame of a candle, and the periods of time, neither live nor die, yet are said to expire.

"Oh why do wretched men so much desire
To draw their days unto the utmost date,
And do not rather wish them soon *expire*,
Knowing the misery of their estate?"
SPENSER.

"In the day that ye eat there of ye shall surely *die*."—*Bible*.

EXPLAIN. ELUCIDATE. ILLUSTRATE. EXEMPLIFY.

To EXPLAIN (Lat. *explānāre, to make plain* or *clear*) is simply to make intelligible by removing obscurity or misunderstanding.

To ELUCIDATE (*ēlūcidāre, to make clear; lūcem, light*) and ILLUSTRATE (*illustrare, to light up*) are to make

more fully intelligible. The field of explanation may be broad or narrow; as, to explain a word, or a chapter of the Bible, while explanation in itself is extended and minute. The field of elucidation is commonly broad. We do not speak of elucidating words, but subjects. Illustration is vivid elucidation by certain specific and effective means, as similitudes, comparisons, appropriate incidents or anecdotes, and the like, graphic representations and even artistic drawings. Explanation, however, depends as much on the mind and views of the explainer as upon the thing explained. A subject could only be elucidated or illustrated in one way, but it might be explained in different and even contrariant ways, according to the explainers. Explanation is a process by which the hard or uncomprehended becomes understood by assimilating it to the easy and familiar, or the more difficult is interpreted by the less difficult, through the means of principles already accepted and known. A proposition seems paradoxical so long as one does not see the link which connects it with such known and received principles; when this is shown we feel sometimes almost ashamed that we did not see the explanation. In works of systematic science it is a defect if explanation is needed, because each succeeding position ought so clearly to follow upon the preceding that no room for explanation shall exist.

We EXEMPLIFY (Lat. *exemplum, an example*, and *făcĕre, to make*) when we explain or illustrate by producing an example of the law or rule. (*See* EXAMPLE.)

"The observation that old people remember best those things which entered into their thoughts when their memories were in their full strength and vigour is very remarkably *exemplified* in this good lady and myself when we are in conversation."—*Guardian.*

"I demanded of him who was to *explain* them. The Papists, I told him, would *explain* some of them one way, and the Reformed another. The Remonstrants and Anti-remonstrants gave their different senses, and probably the Trinitarians and the Unitarians will profess that they understand not each other's explications."—LOCKE.

"Proof and further *elucidation* of the matters complained of."—BURKE.

"To prove him and *illustrate* his high worth."—SHAKESPEARE.

EXPLICIT. EXPRESS. EXPLANATORY. CATEGORICAL.

EXPLICIT (Lat. *explĭcĭtus*, '*disentangled*, part. of *explĭcāre*, *to unfold*) denotes the entire unfolding of a thing in detail of expression, and so as to meet every point and obviate the necessity of supplement.

EXPLANATORY is, on the other hand, essentially supplemental, and the necessity of explanation often arises from matters not having been made sufficiently explicit.

EXPRESS (Lat. *expressus, described*, especially in words, part. of *exprĭmĕre*) combines force with clearness and notice of detail. EXPLICIT calls attention to the comprehensiveness and pointedness of the particulars, EXPRESS to the force, directness, and plainness of the whole. An express declaration goes forcibly and directly to the point. An explicit declaration leaves nothing ambiguous. Philosophically, it is opposed to *implicit*.

"The baptismal creed, I say, must of necessity contain *explicitly* in it at least all the fundamentals of faith."—CLARKE.

"As to any other method more agreeable to them than a congress—an alternative *expressly* proposed to them—they did not condescend to signify their pleasure."—BURKE.

"Yet to such as are grounded in the true belief, these *explanatory* creeds, the Nicene and this of Athanasius, might perhaps be spared; for what is supernatural will always be a mystery in spite of exposition."—DRYDEN.

CATEGORICAL (Gr. κατηγορεῖν, *to predicate*) is a term which wears a logical air. A categorical proposition is distinguished from a hypothetical one; hence, that is categorical which is a straightforward expression or statement distinctly affirmative or negative, without doubt, hesitation, qualification, conditions, or contingencies, plain and to the point.

"They appointed that of the synod two should be chosen delegates who should immediately go to them, and in the name of the synod warn them to lay by all other

answers, and at the next session *categorically* answer whether they would exhibit their minds concerning the points in controversy or no."—HALE.

EXPLOIT. FEAT. ACHIEVEMENT.

EXPLOIT (Fr. *exploiter, to work, make the most of*, Lat. *explicitare*) is a term of chivalrous character, indicating a deed of which adventurousness and strength are the characteristics.

A FEAT (Fr. *fait*, Lat. *factum, a thing done, a deed*) is the same thing on a smaller scale, and admitting a larger admixture of the elements of skill or cleverness; as we might speak of the exploits of Alexander the Great, and of a feat of horsemanship.

ACHIEVEMENT (Fr. *achever, to bring to a head, chef, căput, a head*) points not only to the greatness of the deed but to the qualities which have led to it, which may have been less showy than force and skill, and have comprised perseverance, patience, and industry.

"The spirit-stirring form
Of Cæsar, raptured with the charm of rule
And boundless fame, impatient for *exploits*."
DYER.

"The warlike *feats* I have done."—SHAKESPEARE.

"But loving virtue, all *achievements* past,
Meets envy still to grapple with at last."
WALLER.

EXPOUND. INTERPRET.

EXPOUND (Lat. *expōnĕre, to set forth*) denotes sustained explanation; while a mere word or phrase may be explained, a whole work or parts of it may be expounded. Exposition is continuous critical explanation.

INTERPRET (Lat. *interprĕtāri*), beyond the mere sense of verbal translation from one language to another, conveys the idea of private or personal explanation of what is capable of more than one view. Hence interpretation is more arbitrary than exposition and more theoretical than explanation. EXPOUND relates only to words in series, INTERPRET is applicable also to anything of a symbolical character, as to interpret a dream or a prophecy. It has also, in common with *explain*, an application to anything which may be viewed in different lights, as the actions of men. In this way, to explain conduct would rather be to account for it; to interpret it would be to assign motives or significance to it. Explanation deals with facts, interpretation with causes also. I explain when I give the meaning of a thing, I interpret when I give *my view* of that meaning.

"The Pundits are the *expounders* of the Hindu law."—SIR W. JONES.

"Are there not many points, some needful sure
To saving faith, that Scripture leaves obscure?
Which every sect will wrest a several way,
For what one sect *interprets* all sects may."
DRYDEN.

EXPRESS. SIGNIFY. TESTIFY. INTIMATE.

All these terms are employed in the sense of communicating to others what is in one's own mind. Not only words, but gestures, movements, and the like may serve to EXPRESS, which is simply to manifest in a plain manner. Even silence is sometimes expressive. Expression is good when the idea is put forth in a just and life-like way with logical or descriptive force and accuracy of representation, or by any natural or artistic media of such manifestations. As EXPRESS is generally said of feelings and opinions, so SIGNIFY (Fr. *signifier*, Lat. *signĭfĭcāre*) is said of wishes, intentions, or desires; this also may be done in various ways, by looks, words, writing, or other acts; as, to signify assent by a nod. SIGNIFY implies more strongly than EXPRESS the existence of some person affected, while EXPRESS is more abstract, as, "His countenance expressed disappointment," that is, would have done so to any who might have witnessed it. Signified would have implied information personally conveyed.

TESTIFY (Lat. *testĭfĭcāri, to bear witness, to demonstrate*) is commonly employed of inner feeling as made evident to others; as, to testify joy, sorrow, approbation, one's sense of another's merit, and the like; "His countenance testified satisfaction," that is, generally, where SIGNIFIED would have implied some person or

persons on whom the expression took effect. To signify is in short a matter of communication, to testify of demonstration, to express of declaration.

To INTIMATE (Lat. *intĭmāre, to bring within, to publish*) is to express without fulness, but with sufficient aptitude and clearness, avoiding all superfluity of declaration. Hence the term is well employed of such manifestations of feeling as are indirect, as, "His courtly reception of the delegates seemed to intimate that he was not unfavourably inclined to the object of their mission." When one person intimates a thing to another, it is commonly something in which that other is personally interested.

"When St. John Baptist came preaching repentance unto Israel, the people asked him, saying, 'What shall we do?' meaning in what manner they should *express* their repentance."—SHARP.

"No one ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries *signify* to another, This is mine, That is yours, I am willing to give this for that."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"In vain Thy creatures *testify* of Thee,
Till Thou proclaim Thyself."
COWPER.

A demonstrative expression is commonly set over against some opposite feeling in another. TESTIFY, like PROTEST, wears an air of demonstration *against*; but this is accidental, not essential.

"Mr. Plott, who, as he since informed me, had prevailed with them to propose this treaty, earnestly pressed me to lay hold on the opportunity, *intimating* by his words and gestures that if I refused it I should not have another."—LUDLOW, *Memoirs.*

EXPRESSION. TERM. WORD.

WORD is the more general, but could not be called the generic expression here, because an expression may consist of more than one word. Word (A. S. *word*) is the spoken expression (which may be reduced to writing) of a conception or an idea.

A TERM (Lat. *terminus*), in its logical sense, is anything which may form the subject or predicate of a proposition, and called the term from the fact that it occupies a position at one or other *end* of it; as, "Every man is mortal;" here every man is the one term, and mortal the other. In reference to the practical distinction between these, WORD represents generally an utterance of our thoughts or feelings; TERM is the same thing viewed in connexion with a certain class of expressions or subjects, as "a scientific term," "a geographical term," and so on, implying that it has *a specific stamp*; so we say in reasoning, "It is above all things necessary to define the terms employed." On the other hand, it would be utterly superfluous to define all the *words*. In this way, TERM is restricted to the main parts of speech, nouns, verbs, and adjectives. In a looser way, it is simply synonymous with WORD.

EXPRESSION (Lat. *expressus, described*, especially in words; part. of *exprĭmĕre*) in this connexion means not so much a word or term, though it may mean this, as a *mode* of speech. Hence expressions are very often phrases or collocations of words. Any number of words which serve to convey an idea or statement, whether one or more, may be called an expression. Even an interjection, as giving utterance to a sentiment, emotion, or feeling, might be called an expression of it. In the choice of words is shown the purity of language, in the choice of terms the precision of speech; on the choice of expressions depend the brilliancy and effectiveness of style. WORD is a matter of simple speech, or the science of it—that is, grammar. Usage determines its meaning. TERM is a matter of subject; its force is determined by agreement. EXPRESSION is a matter of thought; its merit depends on the turn given to it.

"He (Charles II.) never read the Scriptures nor laid things together further than to turn them to a jest, or for some lively *expression*."—BURNET.

"The ideas the *terms* stand for."—LOCKE.

"Man had by nature his own organs so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate sounds which we call *words*."—*Ibid.*

EXTENSIVE. LARGE.

EXTENSIVE (Lat. *extensīvus, extendĕre, to stretch out*) only applies to superficial spreading.

LARGE (Fr. *large*, Lat. *largus*) is much more comprehensive and variously applicable: 1, to superficial extent, in which it is synonymous with extensive, as a large field or an extensive field; 2, of size or bulk, as a large stone; 3, of quantity, as a large supply; 4, number, as a large number, or assembly; 5, of cubic contents, as a large bag. Both LARGE and EXTENSIVE are employed in secondary senses; LARGE in that case denoting abundance of source or supply, EXTENSIVE denoting wideness of operation. A large heart, large bounty, extensive benevolence. Extensive learning or acquaintance with a subject in particular.

"One great cause of our insensibility to the goodness of the Creator is the very *extensiveness* of His bounty."—PALEY.

"Circles are praised not that abound
In *largeness*, but the exactly round.
So life we praise that does excel
Not in much time, but acting well."
WALLER.

EXTENT. LIMIT.

EXTENT is superficial spreading in one direction, or several, or all.

LIMIT (Lat. *līmĭtem*) is the bounding or restraining of such extent. The former term, therefore, is expansive in its force, the latter restrictive; the one partakes of the nature of a positive, the other of a negative idea.

"What antic notions form the human mind,
Perversely mad, and obstinately blind,
Life in its large *extent* is scarce a span,
Yet, wondrous frenzy, great designs we plan,
And shoot our thoughts beyond the date of man." COTTON.

"Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen who survey
The rich man's joys increase, the poor's decay,
'Tis yours to judge how wide the *limits* stand
Between a splendid and a happy land."
GOLDSMITH.

EXTENUATE. PALLIATE.

These terms are all applicable to moral conduct and the lessening of its guilt.

To EXTENUATE (Lat. *extĕnuāre, to draw out to fineness*, *ex* and *tĕnuis, thin*) is to diminish the conception of crime or guilt by the allegation of pleas or the consideration of attendant circumstances

To PALLIATE (Lat. *pallium, a coverlet, an upper garment*) is to seek to lower the intrinsic guilt or evil of the thing itself. It is an instance of the departure of a term from its etymological meaning; to palliate not signifying any longer to hide a crime by throwing a cloak over it, but to soften down the enormity of it. Wrong is extenuated by attendant circumstances; it is palliated by sophistry. Palliation is never the same thing with justice, but extenuation may be. Palliation is restricted to crime; extenuation is extended to guilt and punishment, and even to ills generally. When we speak of a palliation of evils, it is as opposed to lasting remedies.

"As to the other matters objected against me, which in their turn I shall mention to you, remember once more I do not mean to *extenuate* or excuse."—BURKE.

The original sense of PALLIATE occurs curiously in the following:—

"Horace had his Mæcenas, and Virgil his Augustus, and it is the accustomed manner of our modern writers always to *palliate* themselves under the protection of some worthy patron."—BOULTON, *Medicine*.

EXTERIOR. EXTERNAL. OUTWARD. EXTRANEOUS. EXTRINSIC. FOREIGN.

OUTWARD is strictly *toward* the outside, as "outward bound," and, by an extension of meaning, of or belonging to the outside. It is thus the generic term, and may mean on the surface or contiguous to it.

"He is not a Jew which is one *outwardly*."—*English Bible*.

EXTERIOR and EXTERNAL (Lat. *extra, externus, without*) both imply *connexion*, while EXTRANEOUS (Lat. *extrāneus*, from the same root) implies *no connexion* with, but detachment or remoteness from, the surface. Exterior is opposed to interior, external to internal. The skin is an exterior, the dress an external, covering. That which is external is connected closely with the outward parts; that which is exterior goes to constitute them. That is extraneous which affects us from a distance, as "extraneous aid." EXTRANEOUS is an epithet of qualities, not substances.

EXTRINSIC (Lat. *extrinsĕcus*, adverb,

from without) has the sense of EXTERNAL in such a way as to form no essential or inseparable part, as, "The intrinsic faculties of the mind may be improved in power by the extrinsic aids of mental training;" "The external need of dress is one thing, the extrinsic superfluity of ornament another."

FOREIGN (O. Fr. *forain*, L. Lat. *fŏrānens*) means wholly beside the mark, and has no connexion or relevancy at all. That is foreign which is inharmonious in character, spirit, or purpose.

"In speech of man the whispering which they call susurrus in Latin, whether it be louder or softer, is an interior sound, but the speaking out is an *exterior* sound."—BACON.

"The next circumstance to be remarked is that whilst the cavities of the body are so configurated as *externally* to exhibit the most exact correspondency of the opposite sides, the contents of these cavities have no such correspondency."—PALEY.

"'If the eye,' says He, 'be single, thy whole body shall be full of light.' That is, nothing *extraneous* must cleave to or join with the eye in the act of seeing, but it must be solely and entirely to itself and its bare object, as naked as truth, as pure, simple, and unmixed as sincerity."—SOUTH.

"More observe the characters of men than the order of things; to the one we are formed by nature and by that sympathy from which we are so strongly led to take part in the passions and manners of our fellow-men. The other is as it were *foreign* and *extrinsical*."—BURKE.

EXTRAORDINARY. REMARKABLE.

The EXTRAORDINARY (Lat. *extraordĭnarius*) is that which is out of the ordinary course, or exceeds ordinary limits. In those cases in which it is matter of specific observation, it is synonymous with REMARKABLE (Fr. *remarquer, to remark*); but where it does not excite such observation or remark, it is, of course, not remarkable. An extraordinary dress is remarkable; but this could not be said of an "extraordinary loan." The remarkable combines the extraordinary with the noticeable. It may be observed that there is a twofold sense of the extraordinary—that which is unlike the common course, law, or nature of the object, and that which is unlike the common course of our own observation. The one is extraordinary *in itself*, the other *to us*. The remarkable is the extraordinary to us. The dress of an Asiatic, while not extraordinary in itself, may be extraordinary, and therefore remarkable, to a European. In common parlance, that is extraordinary which excites surprise; that is remarkable which excites some degree of admiration also.

"They think to atone for their sins and neglects of this kind by showing some *extraordinary* bounty to the poor."—SHARP.

"Above all things this was *remarkable* and admirable in him, the arts he had to acquire the good opinion and kindnesses of all sorts of men."—COWLEY.

EXTRAVAGANT. PRODIGAL. LAVISH. PROFUSE.

EXTRAVAGANT (Lat. *extra, beyond*, and *vāgāri, to wander*) is by no means confined to modes of expenditure of money. Any person or thing which exceeds due bounds in thought, speech, or action, may be termed extravagant; as "extravagant in praise," "extravagant abuse," "extravagant compliment." As applied to manner of living, extravagance comes of allowing the habitual absence of self-restraint and reflection, a vague wandering of the thoughts and desires unrestrained by ideas of measurement and proportion. A man of small means may thus be very extravagant.

PRODIGAL (Lat. *prōdĭgĕre, to drive away, to squander*) denotes a love of large and excessive expenditure, which comes of want of recognizing the necessary limitation of *all* human resources, and is by its nature a vice of the rich. The poor man who may be extravagant is hindered by circumstances from being prodigal, though he may have the natural inclination to be so. EXTRAVAGANT and PRODIGAL are both terms expressive of character or habits, while LAVISH (O. Eng. *lave, to throw* or *pour out*) and PROFUSE (Lat. *prŏfūsus*, part. of *prŏfundĕre, to pour forth*) relate to specific actions. To lavish is to spend with superfluous and therefore foolish liberality, as the return or good is not in proportion to the expenditure or

effort. Men may be lavish of much besides money and treasure, as *e.g.* praise, censure, as we may be also prodigal of time, strength, and the like. PROFUSE is less strong than LAVISH, and denotes the giving forth in great abundance. This is so likely to be superfluous, that PROFUSE is often used in an unfavourable sense, as LAVISH always is. Yet this is not always so, as, "ornaments are profusely employed in the building," is not the same as if we said, "too profusely," and "profuse beneficence" is not dispraise. We are extravagant when we spend more than we can afford. We are profuse when we give away in great or excessive quantities. Profuseness, therefore, is a mode of extravagance, namely, an extravagant expenditure on other objects than ourselves. A man is extravagant, for instance, in household expenses, house, dress, plate, diet, luxuries of any kind. A man is extravagant in his praise or compliments when he exaggerates them, profuse when he deals too largely in them, lavish when he thinks nothing of reserving or moderating them.

"Upon which accounts it hath been that mankind hath been more *extravagantly* mad in many tenets about religion than in anything else whatsoever. For in other things the use of reason is permitted, but in religion it hath been almost universally denied."—GLANVILL.

"*Prodigality* is the devil's steward and purse-bearer, ministering to all sorts of vice; and it is hard, if not impossible, for a *prodigal* person to be guilty of no other vice but *prodigality*."—SOUTH.

"Tertullian very truly observeth, God is not a *lavisher*, but a dispenser of His blessings."—FOTHERBY.

"He who with a promiscuous, undistinguishing *profuseness* does not so much dispense as throw away what he has, proclaims himself a fool to all the intelligent world about him."—SOUTH.

EXULT. REJOICE.

EXULT, true to its etymology (Lat. *exsultāre, to spring up*), is more demonstrative and external than REJOICE (O. Fr. *rejoir*, N. Fr. *réjouir*; Lat. *gaudēre, to rejoice*), which is lively and pleasurable, but may be comparatively calm. It is possible to rejoice inwardly. We exult openly. We rejoice in the possession or at the accession of a good. We exult when it is of such a kind as to give us an advantage. The brave soldier rejoices in the victory. The savage warrior exults over his fallen foe.

F.

FABLE. FICTION. FABRICATION. PARABLE. ALLEGORY. NOVEL. ROMANCE.

FABLE (Lat. *fābŭla*, from *fāri, to speak*) is a feigned tale intended to convey some lesson of instruction, its proper sphere being that of prudential morality. Such being its object, it does not scruple to violate natural truth, and to introduce talking trees, or talking animals, or unhistoric and unreal personages. The fable is a sort of dramatic allegory in which the actions are probable and natural, while the agents may be unnatural.

"*Fables* were first begun and raised to the highest perfection in the eastern countries, where they wrote in signs and spoke in parables, and delivered the most useful precepts in delightful stories, which for their aptness were entertaining to the most judicious, and led the vulgar into understanding, by surprising them with their novelty."—PRIOR AND MONTAGUE.

FICTION (Lat. *fictionem, a fashioning, a feigning*) denotes any production of the imagination, whether dealing in the natural or unnatural. As a literary term it implies an end of amusement or instruction, or both. FICTION may be regarded as the generic term, of which the rest are species. It means, in its broadest sense, anything *feigned*. Fiction is opposed to what is real, as fabrication is opposed to what is true; the common end of the first is to entertain, of the second to mislead and deceive, either as to the contents of the work or the genuineness of its authorship.

"The *fiction* of these golden apples kept by a dragon."—RALEGH.

"Our books were not *fabricated* with an accommodation to prevailing usages."—PALEY.

A FABRICATION (Lat. *fābrĭcātiōnem, a framing, constructing*) differs from a

fiction in that the author, knowing it to be false, puts it forth as true.

A PARABLE (Gr. *παραβολή, παρά, alongside,* and *βάλλειν, to cast or place*) is an illustration of moral or spiritual truth through the vehicle of natural or secular processes or occurrences. Such at least are the parables of the New Testament, which assume laws in harmony between the natural and the spiritual world, so that the facts of the one may tend to explain the other. Unlike the fable, the parable teaches truth for itself, and not as being the interest of man only; and having this high and sacred end in view, it cannot stoop to such unnatural violations as the fable employs, being animated by a spirit of profounder reverence. There was a time, however, when the word parable was taken to mean almost anything allegorical in speech, especially if more or less hard to understand; as that which the English version of the Bible calls the parable of Jotham is strictly a fable, as that which it calls the Parable of the Vine is strictly an allegory. So in Ezekiel, "Ah, Lord God, doth he not speak parables?" the word here is equivalent to riddles.

"The Holy Scripture hath her figure and history, her mystery and verity, her *parable* and plain doctrine."—BALE.

An ALLEGORY (*ἀλληγορία, ἄλλος, other,* and *ἀγορεύω, I speak*) differs both from FABLE and PARABLE, in that the properties of persons are fictitiously represented as attached to things, to which they are as it were transferred. The allegory may be in any kind of artistic or verbal representation. A figure of Peace and Victory crowning some historical personage is an allegory. "I am the Vine, ye are the branches," is a spoken allegory. In the parable there is no transference of properties. The parable of the sower represents all things as according to their proper nature. In the allegory quoted above the properties of the vine and the relation of the branches are transferred to the person of Christ and His apostles and disciples. A parable worked out at great length, as the "Pilgrim's Progress," is called an allegory.

"Make no more *allegories* in Scripture than needs must; the fathers were too frequent in them; they, indeed, before they understood the literal sense, looked out for an *allegory.*"—SELDEN.

A NOVEL (Fr. *nouvelle, news, a tale*) is a fiction (as at present employed) with something of dramatic plot, designed to show the workings of human passion, and is such that in themselves there is no impossibility in the incidents of it. Novels in old English bore the sense of *news.*

"Some came of curiosity to hear some *novels.*"—LATIMER.

It then came to mean a tale especially of love and passion, which might be of the nature of a subordinate incident in a larger work, before it came to mean, as at present, a work complete in itself.

"The trifling *novels* which Ariosto inserted in his poems."—DRYDEN.

The ROMANCE (*see* quotation) is a novel which deals in surprising and adventurous incidents, in order to strike by means of the marvellous, without the historic probability of the novel of the present day. They were commonly metrical, and turned on chivalry, gallantry, and religion.

"The Latin tongue, as is observed by an ingenious writer, ceased to be spoken in France about the ninth century, and was succeeded by what was called the *romance* tongue, a mixture of the language of the Franks and bad Latin. As the songs of chivalry became the most popular compositions in that language, they were emphatically called *romans* or *romants,* though this name was at first given to any piece of poetry."—PERCY, *Reliques.*

FABRIC. MANUFACTURE.

The difference between the above is simply determined by usage, except that MANUFACTURE (Lat. *mănufactus, made by the hand*) denotes a process as well as a result, FABRIC the result alone.

FABRIC (Lat. *făbrĭca, a workshop, an artistic production*) applies to things constructed, and to things woven, MANUFACTURE to things produced by art from raw materials for personal use, but not, like FABRIC, to building. As MANUFACTURE expresses the process, it is possible to speak of the manufacture of certain fabrics.

FACE. FRONT.

Some confusion arises in the figurative use of these terms, from the *literal* meaning of them.

The FACE (Lat. *făcies*) is the countenance or features.

The FRONT (Lat. *frontem*) is the whole anterior side of the figure, and so the words might be supposed simply applicable according to this analogy. But the analogy is not easy, because the Latin *frons* means *forehead*, and so *face*. For instance, the face of a clock is analogous to the face of a man, but we should hardly say, the front of a picture, but the face, though it be more analogous to the whole front of a man. The face of a house is the surface of the anterior wall of it, as the posterior wall is the back. On the other hand, the front of a stage is strictly according to analogy. Again, other conceptions enter. The face of a thing is often taken for that part of it which is distinctively marked and, as it were, featured. It is probably in this way that we speak of the face of a watch.

"The whole *face* of the ground."—*English Bible.*

"A band of strong and sinewy bows,
Out of the army pick'd the *front* of all the field." DRAYTON.

FACE. COUNTENANCE. VISAGE.

The FACE is that which is anatomically composed of its features; and so the term is applicable to brutes and men.

The COUNTENANCE (Lat. *continentia*, in a later sense, *of holding, bearing, behaving one's self*) is the face as expressive of the soul, with its thoughts, reflexions, passions, or emotions, and so belongs only to human beings.

The VISAGE (Fr. *visage*) is the face regarded in a fixed aspect, and not in its emotional variations. So a laughing face, a laughing countenance, but we should hardly say a laughing visage. VISAGE is a term indicative of something marked and impressive in the face, as dignity, sternness, grimness. It is not employed of the lighter or more cheerful looks.

"While the men wore shoes so long and picked that they were forced to support the points by chains from their middle, the ladies erected such pyramids on their heads that the *face* became the centre of the body."—WALPOLE, *Anecdotes of Painting.*

"Even kept her *countenance* when the lid removed
Disclosed the heart unfortunately loved." DRYDEN.

"Get you gone!
Out on a most importunate aspect,
A *visage* of demand." SHAKESPEARE.

FACETIOUS. JOCOSE. JOCULAR. PLEASANT.

FACETIOUSNESS (Lat. *făcētiæ, witticisms*) is a kind of affected humour, to which it bears the same relation that a smirk does to a smile.

JOCOSE and JOCULAR (Lat. *jŏcōsus, jŏcŭlaris*) are derived from the Latin *jocus*, a joke, and *jŏcŭlus*, a little joke. The jocose pokes fun, the jocular insinuates it.

PLEASANTRY (Fr. *plaisanterie, plaisant, pleasant*) carries the notion, not of abstract joke, like facetious, but of a tendency to personal raillery, though of a kind the opposite to obtrusive. The facetious had formerly a higher meaning than at present, when it is hardly used but in modified disparagement, answering at one time to the Lat. *făcētus, elegantly humorous.* It denotes at present something like manufactured wit which has no heartiness of joke.

"B. answers very *facetiously*, I must own, that a command to lend hoping for nothing again, and a command to borrow without returning anything again, seem very different commands."—WATERLAND.

JOCOSE seems to be more general, and JOCULAR more specific. A man's disposition might be jocose, his demeanour on a particular occasion jocular. The jocose love jokes, the jocular make jokes. The jocular, too, is more demonstrative than the jocose.

"I had indeed the corporal punishment of what the gentlemen of the long robe are pleased *jocosely* to call mounting the rostrum for one hour."—POPE.

"At different times he appears as serious as a judge, and as *jocular* as a merry-andrew."—*Spectator.*

"People are not aware of the very great force which *pleasantry* in company has upon all those with whom a man of that talent converses."—*Ibid.*

FACTIOUS. SEDITIOUS.

FACTIOUS (Lat. *factiōsus, factio, a party, side, sect*) means appertaining to, or, as employed of persons addicted to, the raising of dissension and opposition, more especially for ends of private interest.

SEDITIOUS (Lat. *sēdĭtiōsus, sēdĭtio, dissension, strife*) means tending to excite disturbance in the State or community, short of insurrection. The terms seem at present differenced mainly by the scale on which they are used. Seditious relates to the manifestation of political principle or feeling; factious is used in connexion with minor affairs of administration. In a meeting of equals for the purpose of coming to resolutions in common, the conduct of individuals might betray factious opposition, that is to say, of a needless kind, and actuated by personal motives, where SEDITIOUS would be too grave and political a term. The factious man is troublesome, the seditious man dangerous. The factious man uses his power, influence, or money in furtherance of his own views; the seditious man, unless he be a demagogue, has probably none of these means to employ.

"Christianity is an humble, quiet, peaceable, and orderly religion, not noisy or ostentatious, not assuming or censorious, not *factious* or tumultuous."—WATERLAND.

"If anything pass in a religious meeting *seditiously*, and contrary to the public peace, it is to be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market."—LOCKE.

FACTOR. AGENT. BROKER.

There is little difference in these words themselves. A FACTOR (Lat. *factorem, a doer*) and AGENT (Lat. *ăgĕre, to act*) being persons who act on behalf of others; but an agent has more discretionary power, and represents his employer's interests more generally; a factor transacts business on commission. The factor differs from the BROKER (etym. uncertain), in that he is the consignee of goods, and buys and sells in his own name, while the broker is only a middleman and takes no possession.

"The house in Leadenhall Street is nothing more than a change for their *agents, factors*, and deputies to meet in, to take care of their affairs and to support their interests."—BURKE.

"My employment, which is that of a *broker*, leading me often into Taverns about the Exchange."—*Spectator*.

FACULTY. POWER.

FACULTY (Lat. *făcultatem, capability*, from *făcĕre, to do*) is active power, but it differs also from POWER (Fr. *pouvoir, to be able*), as applied to sentient beings. Power, as such, belongs to the individual, and is specifically exerted; the faculty is shared with the race. Thus, if we said of any one, "He has not the faculty of speech," we should mean, that he was born without that which with mankind is a natural endowment; if we said, "He has not the power of speech," we should mean that, from some physical cause, permanent or not, he was at the time incapable of articulate utterance.

"For man's natural *powers* and *faculties*, even as they were before the fall entire, were not sufficient or able of themselves to reach such a supernatural end, but needed the power of the Divine Spirit to strengthen, elevate, and raise them thereto."—BP. BULL.

FAILING. FAILURE. IMPERFECTION. WEAKNESS. FRAILTY. FOIBLE. INFIRMITY. FAULT.

FAILING (Fr. *faillir, to fail*; Lat. *fallĕre, to deceive*) is always moral and personal. It is the systematic moral falling short of moral agents in one particular; as, "Irascibility is his failing."

"I have *failings*, in common with every human being, besides my own peculiar *faults*; but of avarice I have generally held myself guiltless."—FOX.

"Our business is to show that objects of great dimensions are incompatible with beauty, the more incompatible because they are greater, whereas the small, if ever they fail of beauty, this *failure* is not to be attributed to their size."—BURKE.

FAILURE is the deficiency of supply or performance in any way. The former may or may not be connected with personal conduct, the latter necessarily is so; but in no case does failure express moral habit, but only the character of specific cases; as the failure of the crops, the failure of a promise, or of an individual to perform it.

IMPERFECTION (late Lat. *imperfectiōnem, imperfectus, incomplete*) is a more general term still, and is applicable to any defect of nature in natural productions or artificial. When employed of individuals it is not applied physically (in that case we use *blemish* or *defect*), but to any point in which human nature falls short of its ideal completeness or normal state, as imperfect sight or hearing. An imperfection is a slight defect.

WEAKNESS (A.S. *wǽc, weak*) may be used of physical and moral power. A weakness, morally, is that kind of failing which comes from insufficient energy or judgment to resist it, a propensity unrestrained, though acknowledged to be unwise.

"Go wiser thou, and in thy scale of sense
Weigh thy opinion against Providence;
Call *imperfection* what thou fancy'st such,
Say, Here He gives too little, there too much." POPE.

"Through the *weakness* of our mortal nature, we cannot always stand upright." —*English Prayer Book.*

FRAILTY (Fr. *frêle*, formerly *fraile*, Lat. *frăgĭlis, brittle, frail*) is the liability to weakness, as well as the fault proceeding from it, and also the liability to fall or offend from the influence of motives external to one's self overpowering the resolution, blinding the judgment, or exhausting patience and endurance.

"Or further seek his merits to disclose,
Or draw his *frailties* from their dread abode
(There they alike in trembling hope repose),
The bosom of his father and his God." GRAY.

FOIBLE (O. Fr. *foible, weak*) is commonly used in the sense of a slight or pardonable weakness, implying more of folly than wrong, and having its origin in constitutional defect of mind or character. Hence it often belongs to matters connected with a false estimate of self, a habit of imperfect action being a failing, a habit of imperfect self-knowledge a foible, such as self-conceit.

INFIRMITY (*in-, not*, and *firmus, strong*), like IMPERFECTION, is a general term, denoting innate and congenital weakness, a constitutional deficiency of physical or moral power.

"I confess my *foible* with regard to flattery. I am as fond of it as Voltaire can possibly be, but with this difference, that I love it only from a masterly hand."—CHESTERFIELD.

"Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thine often *infirmities*."—*Eng. Bible.*

FAULT, though connected etymologically with FAILING, is not, like it, negative, but positive and definite, being that which impairs excellence in a grave and conspicuous manner. an offence only less serious than a crime. Such, at least, is the force which it has come to assume. FAULT in the common acceptation of the word as it regards human beings, belongs to the weakness of human nature. It is a deviation from the rule of right and duty. Traces of its stricter etymological meaning appear in such phrases as, "I will take this in fault of a better," *i.e. failing* a better; or in the geological application of the term fault to the displacement of a stratum; or "The hounds are at fault," *i.e.* the track of the scent has failed them.

"For who is there among the sons of men that can pretend on every occasion throughout his own life to have preserved a *faultless* conduct?"—BLAIR.

FAINT. LANGUID.

FAINT (O. Fr. *feint*, part. of *feindre, to feign*) has several meanings analogous to this primary one, as lacking physical power, lacking spirit, lacking distinctness of form, delineation, or colouring, or of any other quality which is cognizable by the senses, as a faint smell, a faint sound. As applied to the condition of the human frame, FAINT denotes the absence of physical strength; LANGUOR (Lat. *languōrem*) the want of vital energy. Faintness in itself, though it may be great at the time, is less chronic than languor, and generally implies some casual cause, as to be faint from loss of blood, fatigue, hunger. Languor is a relaxed or listless state of body, caused by a continuously operating cause, as constitutional temperament,

want of rest, heat, or oppressiveness of weather.

"Methought I saw my late espoused saint
Brought to me like Alcestis from the grave,
Whom Jove's great son to her glad husband gave,
Rescued from death by force, though pale and *faint*." MILTON.

"Methinks the highest expressions that language, assisted with all its helps of metaphor and resemblance, can afford, are very *languid* and *faint* in comparison of what they strain to represent when the goodness of God towards them who love Him comes to be expressed."—BARROW.

FAIR. GOODLY.

FAIR (A. S. *fæger*) is primarily free from all that taints, befouls, obstructs, or blemishes; hence pleasing to the eye, light-coloured, cloudless, unobstructed, candid, or impartial, favourable, distinct, common, or ordinary. Fair weather is the opposite to foul or stormy.

As applied to persons and their appearance, FAIR denotes that which, being clear and unsullied, is pleasing to the eye. It expresses an attribute of the appearance only.

GOODLY is an epithet of the entire nature, and hence fair to look upon. That which is goodly is pleasant, agreeable, desirable; hence in most instances fair to look upon also. A fair woman is bright, beautiful; a goodly woman is a fine-grown one—a specimen of goodness in the external qualities of womanhood.

CLEAR (Fr. *clair*, Lat. *clārus*) is bright, undimmed, and so by analogy distinct, perspicuous, audible, pure, unclouded, untarnished, unobstructed. In speaking of the weather, that is fair which is not foul or stormy; so that the term admits of degrees, as, "Tolerably fair," "Very fair." CLEAR denotes the absence of cloud, haze, or fog, and the brightness of the heavenly bodies. We might, without impropriety, say, "We had fair weather for the voyage, but not many clear days, for we had a good deal of fog."

"When it is evening ye say, It will be *fair* weather, for the sky is red."—*English Bible.*

So foul a sky *clears* not without a storm."
SHAKESPEARE.

FAIR. JUST. EQUITABLE. REASONABLE. MODERATE. RIGHT.

All these terms are applicable to persons, their conduct, and their demands.

FAIR (*see* above) denotes an estimate in detail of what is reciprocally just; a fair price for an article is that which seems right considering the circumstances of buyer and seller and sale. Hence the common use of such expressions as, "Upon the whole that seems fair." So a fair man is he who is ready to look at others' interests as well as his own, and to view matters without partiality, prejudice, or self-seeking. As justice depends upon the due proportion of the thing, so fairness comes of due proportion of feeling in the person. That fitness enters into the essence of fairness may be seen in the fact mentioned by Skeat, *Etym. Dict.*, that the Goth. "*fagrs*" translates εὔθετον in Luke xiv. 35.

"I would call it *fair* play."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Would it become a *just* governor to permit his rebellious subjects, those who contemn his laws, to persecute such as were obedient to him?"—WILKINS.

JUST (Lat. *justus*) is more comprehensive, and implies the application of principles of retributive justice, where it is due, in antagonism to all else, as *e.g.* any temptation to partiality, or negligence in award. There is a dignity and sternness about the term just which does not belong to FAIR, as if it connected itself more directly with personal and responsible action. So prizes are said to be fairly won and justly awarded.

EQUITABLE (*see* EQUITY) is according to EQUITY, and so has the force of the noun itself, which is not mere fairness, but such justice as may serve to supplement the imperfections of law or rule. If justice belongs to the judge, equity should guide the decision of the umpire.

"Justice shalt thou have;
Nor shall an *equitable* claim depend
On such precarious issue."
SMOLLET.

REASONABLE (Fr. *raisonnable*, *raison*, Lat. *rātionem*, *reason*) denotes what is fair under another aspect.

As the fair is the right between man and man, the reasonable is the right in itself, as it would commend itself not only to the just but to the wise man. The reasonable, however, extends beyond the matters of intercourse between man and man, to the essential nature of things, which are in accordance with common sense or common experience. A reasonable prospect of success, for instance, is a prospect which circumstances render probable.

"Argument alone, though it might indeed evince the consistency and *reasonableness* of the doctrine, could never amount to a proof of its heavenly origin."—HORSLEY.

MODERATE (Lat. part. *mŏdĕrātus, restrained, regulated*), as commonly employed, denotes a marked absence of excess in demand; this may or may not flow from justice or fairness—the term states nothing but the fact. "I purchased the article at a moderate price," indicates nothing as to the intentions of the seller. Moderate measures may be, and very often are, the expressions of justice, but they may also originate in prudence, or be dictated by necessity.

"*Moderate* rain and showers."—*Book of Common Prayer.*

FAITHFUL. TRUSTY. CONFIDENTIAL.

These terms start, as it were, from opposite sides. The FAITHFUL (O. Fr. *fei*, Lat. *fĭdem, faith*) servant, for instance, is he who is full of faith, in the sense of fidelity to his master; the TRUSTY servant is he who is worthy of his master's trust. Hence TRUSTY is a more comprehensive term than FAITHFUL, which it includes, together with all other qualities which justify the reposing of confidence. The indiscreet servant, however he might love his master, would not be trusty, though we might not speak of him as unfaithful.

"*Faithful* found
Among the *faithless.*"
MILTON.

The shepherd last appears,
And with him all his patrimony bears;
His house and household gods, his trade of war,
His bow and quiver, and his *trusty* cur."
DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

CONFIDENTIAL (Lat. *confĭdĕre, to trust confidently*) expresses the simple relationship of trust, not the deserving of it. It has happened that masters have been robbed, betrayed, and murdered by their confidential servants.

"Against all rules, after we had met nothing but rebuffs in return to all our proposals, we made two *confidential* communications to those in whom we had no confidence, and who reposed no confidence in us."—BURKE.

FAITHLESS. TREACHEROUS. PERFIDIOUS.

FAITHLESS means no more than not keeping faith. The character of faithlessness may therefore vary in degree, and may or may not be accompanied by a desire to deceive or injure others. The sentinel who sleeps at his post is faithless to his duty.

TREACHERY (Fr. *tricherie, cheating, trickery*) and PERFIDY (Lat. *perfĭdia*) are peculiar kinds of faithlessness. Perfidy denotes the violation of some trust reposed and recognized or accepted by the other party. Treachery is the leading one to trust for the purpose of bringing to harm, or the readiness to break off a trust reposed to one's own benefit, and the injury of another. Treachery lures by deceitful appearances to ruin. Perfidy violates engagements from self-interest or inclination. Perfidy is a falsehood dark and deep. It is an abuse of trust founded on inviolable guarantees of humanity, good faith, laws, gratitude, friendship, natural relationship. The more sacred such rights and the more calm the trust reposed upon them, the more secret the perfidy; and the more established the relationship, the baser the perfidy which violates it.

"When the heart is sorely wounded by the ingratitude or *faithlessness* of those on whom it had leaned with the whole weight of affection, where shall it turn for relief?"—BLAIR.

"Thou 'st broke *perfidiously* thy oath,
And not performed thy plighted troth."
Hudibras.

"The promontory or peninsula which disjoins these two bays I call Traitor's Head, from the *treacherous* behaviour of its inhabitants."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

FALLACIOUS. SOPHISTICAL.

FALLACIOUS reasoning (Lat. *fallācem*, adj. *fallĕre, to deceive*) is that which seems to be fairly conducted and conclusive, but is not so by reason of some vitiating cause, called the *fallacy*, which lurks beneath it.

"This *fallacious* idea of liberty, whilst it presents a vain shadow of happiness to the subject, binds faster the chains of his subjection."—BURKE.

SOPHISTICAL reasoning (Gr. *σοφιστικός*, *σοφιστής*, *a sophist*) is that of which the nature is so subtle, that its faults cannot easily be detected and exposed, and it may be unanswerable without being convincing. Sophistical reasoning may silence and bewilder, but seldom persuades. By fallacious reasoning we may deceive others, and are continually deceiving ourselves, in those cases in which our own hearts give credence to the fallacy; but sophistical reasoning is felt at the time to be inconclusive.

"A set of men smitten not with the love of wisdom, but of fame and glory, men of great natural abilities, notable industry, and boldness, appeared in Greece, and assumed the name of *Sophists*."—SYDENHAM, *Plato*.

"Inconclusive and *sophistical*."—BOLINGBROKE.

FALSE. FABULOUS.

FALSE (Lat. *falsus*) is opposed to true.

FABULOUS (Lat. *fābŭlōsus*) expresses a mode of the false—the false in representation, description, or narrative. The fabulous is inventive falsehood. He who without invention, or believing it to be true, recounting what he has heard, states that which is not the fact, gives an account false as regards himself; fabulous also, if it be the concoction of another. On the other hand, the fabulous is often possible, though false in the particular case. A man gives a fabulous account who reports wonderful things as seen in his travels, which, in fact, he has not seen, though the things may really exist, and are so far not false. But though the things are not false in the sense of unreal, his statement is, in the sense of untrue. The idea of the false is much simpler than that of the fabulous. One may say what is false in a monosyllable. That which is fabulous implies order, arrangement, effort at probability, and the like. And yet, so far as mere appearance is concerned, the positively false may approach much nearer to probability than the fabulous. Where the false is probable the probability is inherent and essential. Where the fabulous is probable the probability is contrived. I say that I have been out for a walk, although I have not, this is false. I invent a reason, and say that a friend called to take me out, this is fabulous.

FALSEHOOD. FALSITY. UNTRUTH. LIE.

Of these terms LIE is the strongest (A. S. *leŏgan*). It is criminal falsehood, an untruth spoken for the purpose of deceiving, and, indeed, for the worst of all purposes.

An UNTRUTH is simply a statement which is not true, and may have been uttered without intention to deceive and through ignorance. "I must correct myself; I accidentally spoke an untruth." It is, however, often employed in cases where the term LIE seems harsh. So we should censure a little child for telling an untruth, as preferring to use a softer expression than lie, which comprises offences of much greater magnitude.

The term FALSEHOOD is somewhat hard to determine. Its ordinary use is that of *the statement* in cases in which FALSITY is *the quality*. I am convinced of the falsity of what is said, and so call the saying a falsehood; though the use of FALSEHOOD, in the sense of FALSITY, is not to be simply reprobated, as some have done; for as *likelihood* means the quality of being likely, so is *falsehood* the quality of being false. The difficulty, however, lies in determining whether FALSEHOOD denotes necessarily the violation of truth for purposes of deceit. There can be little doubt that, ordinarily speaking, this is so. Yet, philosophical untruth may be called falsehood, that is, philosophical falsehood. The distinction in this case seems to flow from the nature of the subject-

matter; an erroneous statement in any subject-matter which is variable or contingent could not be termed a falsehood; on the other hand, a violation of scientific truth, even unintentional, would be a falsehood. For instance, I say, "He is not in the house; he has started for a walk." It turns out that he has returned; but I was in error without any intention to deceive, therefore what I said was not a falsehood. But suppose that a philosopher in ancient times, judging only by natural observation, had said, "The diameter of the moon is greater than that of the sun;" this would have been a falsehood, though uttered with no intention to deceive, that is, a falsehood in science. Still a distinction may be well established between cases in which FALSEHOOD and FALSITY might appear capable of being employed indifferently. "I perceive the falsehood of your declaration," might be misconstrued into giving the lie where no such intention existed. This might have been avoided by using the term *falsity*.

"He put forth a satire against the wickedness of these men, revealing the *falsehood* and knavery that he was made privy to."—STRYPE, *Memorials*.

"The childish futility of some of these maxims, the gross and stupid absurdity, and the palpable *falsity* of others."—BURKE.

"A *lie* is a breach of promise, for whoever seriously addresses his discourse to another tacitly promises to speak the truth, because he knows that truth is expected."—PALEY.

"That which they have been reproved for is not because they did therein utter an *untruth*, but such a truth as was not sufficient to bear up the cause which they did thereby seek to maintain."—HOOKER.

FALTER. HESITATE.

These terms are employed of that which interferes with the freedom of speech, action, and thought.

FALTER (connected with *fault*) always comes from weakness, or ignorance.

HESITATE (Lat. *hæsĭtāre, to stick fast*) may be the result of prudence, and voluntary. Where it is used of involuntary hesitation of speech, the tongue falters through emotion, and hesitates through inaptitude of speech. He who falters proceeds but in a weak, unstable, uncertain manner; he who hesitates for the time suspends progress. Under that which distracts or oppresses us we falter; before that which discourages us, or places obstacles in our way, or disturbs our judgment, we hesitate.

"Twice she began, and stopp'd; again she tried;
The *faltering* tongue its office still denied."
DRYDEN, *Ovid*.

"Without doubt or *hesitancy*."—ATTERBURY.

FAME. REPUTATION. RENOWN. REPUTE.

FAME (Lat. *fāma*) may be applied to any object, good, bad, or indifferent, and may even be used of passing rumours.

REPUTATION (Lat. *rĕpŭtātiōnem, a reckoning, a pondering*) belongs essentially to persons, and not to the subject-matter of rumour. It implies some amount of publicity of character.

REPUTE differs from REPUTATION in applying to things as well as persons. He is a man of high reputation; or his character is in good or bad repute. Some articles were at one time valued in trade; but they are of little repute at present.

RENOWN (Fr. *renom*, from *renommer, to name again, to celebrate*) is employed of deeds and characters or persons. RENOWN is illustrious reputation, but is confined, as REPUTATION is not, to signal deeds. A man may have a high reputation for integrity, but he is renowned for striking deeds and high achievements, not for moral excellences, unless they are conspicuously exhibited. A good reputation is within the reach of all. It is the fruit of social virtues, and the consistent discharge of duty. Intellect, talent, genius, procure celebrity, which, if it reach a certain point, becomes RENOWN, which, though more extensive and brilliant than REPUTATION, may be less conducive to the good of others and one's own happiness. Renown comes from personal greatness; but this may have been acquired or inherited. A general may

be renowned for his valour and his victories; a monarch for the extent of his dominions. Renown is a far more stable thing than reputation, resting as it does upon great and acknowledged facts; reputation is more conventional, equivocal, and variable. It is quite possible to sacrifice reputation for renown. Reputation aims at the quality of recognition; fame and renown at the quantity. Yet reputation is sometimes very ill-founded, and a man has a reputation which it puzzles us to conjecture how he acquired. Such being the case, it is not astonishing that different kinds of reputation meet in the same person.

"*Fame* is a blessing only in relation to the qualities and the persons that give it; since otherwise the tormented Prince of Devils himself were as happy as he is miserable; and famousness unattended with endearing causes is a quality so undesirable, that even infamy and folly can confess it."—BOYLE.

"O father, first for prudence in *repute*,
Tell, with that eloquence so much thy own,
What thou hast heard."
DRYDEN, *Ovid.*

"*Reputation* is the greatest engine by which those who are possessed of power must make that power serviceable to the ends and uses of government."—ATTERBURY.

"A foreign son-in-law shall come from far
(Such is our doom), a chief *renowned* in war,
Whose race shall bear aloft the Latian name,
And through the conquered world diffuse our fame." DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

FAME. REPORT. RUMOUR.

In this connexion, FAME is a REPORT or RUMOUR which invests the subject of it with some degree of importance. It is the hearsay evidence of *remarkable* persons and events, as, "The fame of our Saviour's miracles went abroad."

REPORT (Fr. *rapport, rapporter, to bring back again*) is a bringing back of news, and may be authentic or unfounded, or partly true and partly false. The subject of a report, whatever may be the evidence for it, is definite.

The subject of a RUMOUR (Lat. *rūmōrem*) is indefinite and vague, inasmuch as it flies about from mouth to mouth in such a way that no reporters of it can be identified, or authority substantiated.

"And the *fame* thereof was noised abroad."—*Bible.*

"Or speak ye of *report*, or did ye see
Just cause of dread, that makes ye doubt so sore?" SPENSER.

"What then befel him little I relate,
For various tales are *rumoured* of his fate."
HOOLE, *Orlando Furioso.*

FAMILIAR. FREE.

FREE conduct (A. S. *freó*) is that which exceeds the due bounds of reserve or respect toward another.

"Satire has always shone among the rest,
And is the boldest way if not the best
To tell men *freely* of their foulest faults,
To laugh at their vain deeds and vainer thoughts." DRYDEN.

FAMILIAR (*fămĭlĭāris, of or belonging to a household, familia*) conduct is the same thing in the presence or toward the person of the other. FREE is a term of treatment generally; FAMILIAR, of personal demeanour. All familiarity is freedom; but all freedom is not familiarity. I use familiarity toward a superior if I demean myself towards him as an equal, or if I behave to a new acquaintance as if I had known him long and well. The same thing might also be called freedom; but it would be no less freedom if I were to ask a person high in office for a personal favour when I had no acquaintance with or claim upon him.

"The lawn-robed Prelate and plain Presbyter,
Erewhile that stood aloof as shy to meet,
Familiar may be here like sister streams
That some rude interposing rock had split."
BLAIR.

FAMOUS. CELEBRATED.

FAMOUS (Lat. *fāma, fame* or *report*) denotes what is extensively known and extensively talked about as something more than ordinary of its kind. It is used both in a favourable and unfavourable sense, though more commonly in the former. It is applicable both to persons and things.

CELEBRATED (Lat. *cĕlĕbrāre, to celebrate*) is that of which men have

spoken or written much, as worthy of interest or praise. It is not so forcible a word as *renowned* or *illustrious*, and indicates some merit or talent which, without conferring grandeur, confers nevertheless high honour on the subject of it. It is most frequently employed of intellectual character, of literary or scientific men.

"Men *famous* for their skill in polite literature."—MASON.

"Dr. Warburton had a name sufficient to confer *celebrity* on those who could exalt themselves into antagonists."—JOHNSON.

FANCY. IMAGINATION. CONCEPTION.

FANCY (corr. of *fantasy*, Fr. *fantaisie*, Gr. *φαντασία*) is that faculty which reproduces the impressions caused by external objects, combines and modifies them anew, and recalls them for purposes of mental delectation.

IMAGINATION (Lat. *imāginationem, an image, imāginari, to fancy*) is almost the same; but there is a difference, which, after all, depends more upon the subject-matter than on any distinctness of faculty. The same power which we should call FANCY, if employed on a production of a light nature, would be dignified with the title of IMAGINATION if shown on a larger scale. Imagination is a grander, graver exercise of mind than fancy. Its laws are more immediate, and its connexion with truth more marked. Imagination is more in earnest than fancy, which is governed by remoter associations, and may be arbitrary and capricious; which imagination, in the higher sense of the term, never is. The historical novels of Scott exhibit both fancy and imagination; fancy, where scenes are introduced which are not, or in all their details are not, historically true, but such as might have occurred; imagination, where, upon limited historical information, he completes the outline of a character or an event by the play of energetic but accurate creations.

CONCEPTION (Lat. *conceptiōnem, concĭpĕre, to conceive, imagine*) differs from both in being more creative, and having for its object the production of some reality, as the conceptions of the poet, the painter, and the sculptor Fancy may be wholly unreal. Imagination must be in part real. Conception is altogether real.

"Play with your *fancies*, and in them behold
Upon the hempen tackle ship-boys climbing,
Hear the shrill whistle which doth order give
To sounds confused. Behold the threaden sails,
Borne with th' invisible and creeping wind,
Draw the huge bottoms through the furrowed sea,
Breasting the lofty surge."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Poetry, however, in its ancient original condition, was perhaps more vigorous than it is in its modern state. It included then the whole burst of the human mind, the whole exertion of its *imaginative* faculties."—BLAIR.

"By sight we have a *conception* or image composed of colour and figure, which is all the notice and knowledge the object imparteth to us of its nature by the eye."—HOBBES.

FANTASTICAL. FANCIFUL.

It will be seen above that these words are of the same origin. The FANCIFUL, however, denotes an arbitrary and capricious exercise of imagination or invention. The FANTASTICAL violates order and propriety. It is fancifulness carried to a grotesque pitch. Both are applicable to persons and their thoughts, and even to objects, as in the quotation from Byron.

"And just as children are surprised with dread,
And tremble in the dark, so riper years,
Even in broad daylight, are possessed with fears,
And shake at shadows *fanciful* and vain
As those which in the breasts of children reign."
DRYDEN, *Lucretius*.

"'Twas sweet of yore to see it play,
And chase the sultriness of day,
As springing high the silver dew
In whirls *fantastically* flew,
And flung luxurious coolness round
The air, and verdure o'er the ground."
BYRON.

FARE. FOOD. PROVISIONS. VICTUALS.

FOOD (A. S. *fóda*) is the simplest, and expresses whatever properly supports animal life, whether in men or

other animals. The term is sometimes used of plants analogously, and, in a secondary sense, of anything which keeps up a required supply, as food for study.

"Who e'er on wing with open throats
Fly at debates, expresses, votes,
Just in the manner swallows use,
Catching the airy *food* of news."
GREEN, *The Spleen.*

FARE (v. *fare, to travel*, A. S. *faran*) is food regularly accruing, and commonly has associated with it some term expressive of its specific character, as good, substantial, poor, meagre. It is specific daily food.

"Yet labouring well his little spot of ground,
Some scattering pot-herbs here and there he found,
Which cultivated with his daily care,
And bruised with vervain, were his frugal *fare*."
DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

PROVISION or PROVISIONS (Lat. *prōvisionem, prōvidēre, to foresee, provide*) is suitable food for the procuring of which arrangements have been made.

"With that
Both table and *provision* vanished quite."
MILTON.

VICTUALS (Lat. *victus, mode of life, victuals*, from *vivĕre, to live*) is employed only of *human* food. Food and provisions may exist in a crude state, or unprepared for eating. Fare and victuals denote *prepared* food. Victuals would not now be applied to *uncooked* meat, flour, corn, and the like; nor is fare used of any but human beings.

"You had musty *victuals*,
And he hath holp to eat it."
SHAKESPEARE.

FARMER. HUSBANDMAN. AGRICULTURIST.

FARMER (Fr. *ferme, an agreement to let land, the land let*, L. Lat. *firma*) is one who cultivates land, whether as the freehold proprietor or tenant, for any purpose connected with agriculture.

HUSBANDMAN originally meant the master of a family, one who *dwells* in the *house*; Icel. *húsbóndi, búa, to dwell*: RICHARDSON. It afterwards dropped into the meaning of what in our day is commonly called farm-labourer—one who performed manual labour in tillage, whether on his own account or as a hired servant.

AGRICULTURIST (Lat. *agrĭcultūra, agriculture*) admits the idea of scientific or theoretical farming, and farther still, the science of farming without the practice of it.

"A *farmer*, firmarius, was one who held his lands upon payment of a rent or feorme, though at present, by a gradual departure from the original sense, the word farm is brought to signify the very estate or lands so held upon farm or rent."—BLACKSTONE.

"The bulk of every State may be divided into *husbandmen* and manufacturers."—HUME.

"The farmer is always a practitioner; the *agriculturist* may be a mere theorist."—CRABB.

FAST. FIRM.

FAST (A. S. *fæst*) and FIRM (Lat. *firmus*) may often be used interchangeably, as, "Hold firm," "Hold fast;" but there are other instances which show that FIRM is a subjective, FAST an objective term. A thing is firm in itself, fast by external fixture. Drive a nail fast into the wall, and it will be firm enough to hang a weight upon it. Hence FIRM is used of the internal qualities or substances of things, without reference to anything external, as firm flesh, firm ice, and the like. In their analogous applications the same corresponding ideas appear. A fast friend is one who remains steadfastly united and attached. A firm friend is one whose affection is not easily shaken.

"I know there is an order that keeps things *fast* in their place, it is made to us, and we to it."—BURKE.

"It is Jehovah that is merciful, and as Jehovah signifies *firmitude* of being, and is therefore compared to a rock, &c., so these his mercies are likened to things of longest duration, to those things which to us men are such in our account."—GOODWIN.

FAST. HARD.

There is a use of these as adverbs of motion. "It rains fast," or, "It rains hard." "To run fast," or, "To run hard." The momentum of a moving body is compounded of the velocity and the weight. So FAST (to rain fast) denotes the velocity; HARD (A. S. *heard*), to rain hard, denotes the

weight of the falling fluid. These are not two different things, but the same thing looked at from different points of view.

FASTEN. Fix.

These differ in the degree of proximity implied in that which is fastened or fixed to something else.

To Fix (Lat. *fīgĕre*, part. *fixus*) is to fasten with contact, in such a way that the thing fixed has no independent movement.

"This act
Shall bruise the head of Satan, crush his strength,
Defeating Sin and Death, his two main arms,
And *fix* far deeper in his head their stings,
Than temporal death shall bruise the victor's heel,
Or theirs whom it redeems." Milton.

To Fasten admits of some interval, and is not incompatible with limited independent movement. A horse is fastened to a gate; but the gate-post is fixed in the ground.

"But where the fancy wants the skill
Of fluent easy dress at will,
The thoughts are oft like colts which stray
From fertile meads, and lose their way,
Clapt up and *fastened* in the pound
Of measured rhyme and barren sound."
Lloyd.

FASTIDIOUS. Squeamish.

Fastidious (Lat. *fastīdiōsus, full of loathing, fastīdium*) denotes scrupulousness of *taste*, Squeamishness (which is another form of *qualmishness*) belongs to matters of propriety in conduct. The fastidious person is apt to think things defective, the squeamish to think them impermissible. The fastidious is hard to please, the squeamish hard to assure. One idea of the Lat. *fastīdium* is scorn, pride; hence fastidiousness is, literally, the pride which rejects as not good enough. It was also formerly used to denote the character of what was rejected from distaste or dislike; as,

"That thing for the which children be oftentimes beaten is to them after *fastidious*."—Sir T. Elyot.

A nearer approach to the modern use, yet preserving the radical idea of pride, is the following:—

"What was blameable in the Pharisees was not their bare using of some lawful, indifferent, or else good and commendable things not commanded by God, but their teaching such for doctrines, and laying them as burthens on others; and, what was consequent to this, their discriminating themselves proudly and *fastidiously* from other men upon this account."—Hammond.

"The thorough-paced politician must presently laugh at the *squeamishness* of his conscience."—South.

Where the term Squeamish is applied to matters of taste, it expresses overscrupulousness on minor points, an excessive and misplaced fastidiousness. As Squeamish is a weakening of the force of *qualmish*, so *qualmish* also, denoting sickly languor, has lost much of the force of A. S. *cwealm, pestilence, destruction*.

FATIGUE. Weariness. Lassitude.

Fatigue (Fr. *fatiguer*, Lat. *fătīgare, to weary*) is the result of sustained labour or exertion. It involves nothing abnormal. The soldier is fatigued by a long march; by food and rest he is refreshed. But if the march be such as to cause his spirits to flag in any way, as well as to weaken his physical powers, he then suffers Weariness (A. S. *wérig, weary*). Fatigue is applicable to the mental and physical, Weariness to the moral powers. Weariness of a war may demoralize an army.

Lassitude (Lat. *lassitūdĭnem, lassus, weary*) is chronic fatigue, owing to some continuously operating cause. It is very like languor; but languor is constitutional, and often might be thrown off by exertion; lassitude is actual weakness, by relaxation of the physical powers.

"The conqueror *fatigued* in war
With hot pursuit of enemies afar."
Parnell.

"*Weariness* and labour, and to eat in the sweat of his brows, and to turn to dust again."—Bishop Taylor.

"*Lassitude* is remedied by bathing, or anointing with oil and warm water."—Bacon.

FAVOUR. Grace.

Favour (Lat. *fāvōrem, goodwill*) is used for the quality of an act, or an

act of good will, as distinguished from one of obligative justice or compensation.

GRACE (Lat. *grātia*) is used in the same sense; but grace, unlike favour, stands over against something in the way of demerit. It is a favour in a sovereign to confer a title on a distinguished subject; it is an act of grace to pardon a criminal.

"He lived with all the pomp he could devise,
At tilts and tournaments obtained the prize,
But found no *favour* in his lady's eyes."
DRYDEN.

"But say I could repent, and could obtain
By act of *grace* my former state, how soon
Would height recall high thoughts?"
MILTON.

FEAR. APPREHENSION. DREAD.

The idea common to these words is the expectation of future evil. They rise in force in the following order. A faint emotion is expressed by APPREHEND, a stronger by FEAR, a stronger still by DREAD. I call on my friend; from the look of the house I apprehend he has gone out. I fear he is unwell; and after his severe illness I dread to hear of his death. APPREHEND denotes generally an anticipation, and sometimes an anticipation of evil. FEAR is a generic word. It is an inward feeling which may urge to action or inaction, as against a coming evil. Fear is sometimes an emotion, sometimes an intellectual consciousness of danger. It is also employed of possible as well as actual evil. It is of so many kinds as to require the addition of qualifying words to define it. Dread is more definite than fear, and more intense. Fear of God, or of the judgment of society, may be a wholesome principle of action within certain bounds. This could not be said of the dread of them. If we felt dread of these it would be from a consciousness that we had done something to deserve punishment. FEAR and DREAD are applicable not only to events, but directly to persons, which APPREHEND is not; the latter is of probable acts or coming events. To dread is commonly used of some impending evil from which we would gladly escape. Both fear and dread involve apprehension. Fear regarded as a passion or emotion is not, like apprehension, mental, and excited by an act of judgment, but a principle implanted in the animal nature as a means to self-preservation. It may be groundless like apprehension, so that we sometimes oppose the fear of evil to its reality.

"*Fear* is a painful sensation produced by the immediate *apprehension* of some impending evil."—COGAN.

"*Dread* is a degree of permanent fear, an habitual and painful *apprehension* of some tremendous event."—*Ibid.*

FEASIBLE. POSSIBLE. PRACTICABLE.

FEASIBLE (O.Fr. *faisable, faire, to do*, pres. part. *faisant*) denotes that which may be effected by human agency.

POSSIBLE (Fr. *possible*, Lat. *possibilis*) is of wider meaning, and means capable of existing or occurring. Thus many things may be possible which are not feasible; for feasible belongs to the province of action only, possible to that of thought and action also; as when we say, "It is possible, but not probable."

PRACTICABLE (Fr. *pratiquer, to practise*) is very like FEASIBLE; but PRACTICABLE refers to matters of moral practice, while FEASIBLE belongs to matters of physical action, or human plans and designs. For instance, we might say, "A feasible," or "A practicable scheme;" but we could only say, "A practicable," not a "feasible virtue." PRACTICABLE has the further sense of capable of being made use of; as, "The mountain roads at this season are practicable;" where FEASIBLE could not have been employed.

"So Charles VIII., King of France, finding the war of Britain, which afterwards was compounded by marriage, not so *feasible*, pursued his enterprise upon Naples, which he accomplished with wonderful facility and felicity."—BACON.

"*Possibilities* are as infinite as God's power."—SOUTH.

"The failure of the attempts hitherto made on this subject are not decisive against the *practicability* of such a project."—STEWART.

FEATURE. Lineament.

The Feature (O. Fr. *faiture*, Lat. *factūra, a making*), which is now a component part of the face, was at first the whole of it; the form and fashion of the visage, nay, even the entire figure of the man. Its plural use is now necessitated to make it equivalent to face.

Lineament (Lat. *lineāmentum, a line*) is still used in the sense of the lines of the whole body. The lineaments are the outlines which are filled up by the features.

FEEBLE. Weak. Infirm. Decrepit. Impotent.

As employed of men's states, Weak (A. S. *wāc*) is used of deficiency of physical, moral, and mental strength; Feeble (Fr. *faible*, Lat. *flebĭlis, doleful*) of the physical and the intellectual; Infirm (Lat. *infirmus*) of the physical and the moral. Of these Weak is the generic term; and feebleness and infirmity are manifestations of weakness. Feebleness is relative weakness; infirmity is chronic weakness. A man is in a feeble state when some cause has occurred to deprive him of his full strength. A feeble attempt is one which might conceivably have been much more effective. Infirmity is said of persons labouring under some form of weakness which has become habitual to them, and which there seems little likelihood of removing. A support, a means, an expedient, a beam, a wall, an argument, may be weak. We call anything weak which is deficient in *relative* force. Weak eyesight will not bear the broad daylight; a weak digestion is continually failing in its office, a weak apology breaks down under the weight of the charge. A weak mind is without play of imagination, power of comprehension, or resolution,or resistance to the influence of others.

"With continual pains, teaching the grammar school there and preaching, he changed this life for a better, in great *feebleness* of body more than of soul or mind."—Strype, *Memorials*.

"Through the *weakness* of our mortal nature we can do no good thing without Thee."—*Book of Common Prayer*.

"Vehement passion does not always indicate an *infirm* judgment. It often accompanies and actuates, and is even an auxiliary to, a powerful understanding."—Burke.

Decrepit is a significant word; it is the Lat. *decrĕpĭtus, noiseless*, creeping noiselessly about, like old people. It marks the period when the back is bowed, the limbs feeble, the gait tottering, and the body past its work.

"All ages from wailing infancy to querulous *decrepitness*, and all conditions from the careful sceptre to the painful spade, are fraught with many great inconveniences peculiar to each of them."—Barrow.

Impotent (Lat. *impŏtentem*) is deficient in natural power—animal, intellectual, or moral. The weakness may be congenital or acquired. The term is applicable to persons, and their efforts.

"O *impotence* of mind in body strong!"
Milton.

FEELING. Sensation. Perception. Sensibility. Susceptibility. Emotion. Passion. Sense. Consciousness. Reflexion.

Feeling (A. S. *félan, to feel*) is a term of very comprehensive application. It denotes the faculty of perceiving external objects or certain states of the body itself, the specific sense of touch, the faculty of self-consciousness, emotional capacity or states, or the manifestation of such emotion, and, lastly, even intellectual conviction. In one view it is one of what are called the five senses, the rest being the sight, the smell, the taste, and the hearing.

Sensation (Lat. *sensus, sensation, sentiment*) is the impression (or capacity of receiving it) produced upon the organization through the organs of sense, or derived from incorporeal objects, such as thoughts, announcements, and the like. It answers to one of the meanings of feeling—a feeling or sensation of cold, but is less colloquial.

Perception (Lat. *perceptiōnem*) is the conscious reference of sensation to the cause which produced it. Perception combines the internal with

the external. Sensation is internal only. *See* IDEA.

SENSIBILITY is the capacity of feeling or perception.

SUSCEPTIBILITY (Lat. *suscĭpĕre*, in the sense of *to undergo, suffer*) is commonly used in the sense of quick sensibility, or the capacity of it.

CONSCIOUSNESS (Lat. *conscius, conscious of*) is the faculty of regarding one's own mind and thoughts as object-matter of knowledge; while REFLEXION (Lat. *reflexionem, a bending back*) is the exercise of that faculty.

EMOTION and PASSION deserve to be differenced between themselves.

EMOTION (Fr. *émotion*, Lat. *ēmŏvēre, to stir up*, part. *ēmōtum*) is a strong excitement of feeling, tending to manifest itself by its effect upon the body.

PASSION (Lat. *passiōnem*, as a trans. of Gr. *πάθος*) denotes the state when any feeling or emotion masters the mind, which becomes, though energetically influenced, yet passive as regards the strong power which controls it. See the quotation.

SENSE (Lat. *sensus, sensation, sentiment*) is employed in the widest way to comprise the whole range of mental and physical sensation; as, "The things of time and sense." But there is a specific use of the word SENSE in which it belongs to what is mentally (as sensation to what is physically) perceived. A sensation of pain or pleasure, a sense of injury or kindness.

"*Perception* is only a special kind of knowledge, and *sensation* a special kind of feeling."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

"The true lawgiver ought to have a heart full of *sensibility*."—BURKE.

"He sheds on souls *susceptible* of light
The glorious dawn of an eternal day."
YOUNG.

"How different the *emotions* between departure and return!"—WASHINGTON IRVING.

"The primary idea annexed to the word *passion* is that of *passiveness*, or being impulsively acted upon."—COGAN.

"*Consciousness* is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind."—LOCKE.

"By *reflection*, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding."—*Ibid.*

FEIGN. PRETEND. SIMULATE. DISSEMBLE.

FEIGN (Fr. *feindre*, Lat. *fingĕre*) is to give fictitious existence, or to give an impression of something as actual or true which is not so. It is either positive or negative, and might be either in assumption or concealment.

To PRETEND (Lat. *prætendĕre, to stretch forth, to allege*) is to put forward what is unreal or untrue in such a way as that it may be accepted as true. Feigning commonly misleads the observation, pretence the understanding. Feigning puts out false appearances, pretence false facts also. I feign friendship for another in my outward demeanour and conduct. I pretend that I am his friend as a matter of fact by what I say to mislead the judgment. It will be observed, that what in FEIGN is the primary, in PRETEND is the secondary meaning. Delusion is the very essence of feigning; but to pretend is etymologically and in its oldest sense simply *to put forward*; then, derivatively, to put forward as an excuse, or with false purpose. We can only feign what is directly associated with ourselves; but we may pretend in matters of fact generally or as connected with others. I may pretend, for instance, that I enjoy the intimate acquaintance of many great personages; but I can only do this by misrepresentation of facts. It would be impossible for me to feign this without *exhibiting* something to lead to this belief.

To SIMULATE (Lat. *sĭmŭlāre, sĭmĭlis, like*) can, like FEIGN, be only employed of what is personal in one's self. To simulate is to put on and systematically exhibit what are the natural signs and indications of feelings, a character, or a part which do not really belong to one; to act a feigned part, to counterfeit in action or demeanour.

DISSIMULATION (Lat. *dissĭmŭlātiōnem*) is the feigned concealment of what really *exists* in one's character or

feeling; as simulation is the feigned exhibition of what does *not exist*. Simulation and Dissimulation may be joined in one act. So we may simulate laughter in order to dissemble disappointment.

"And much she marvelled that a youth so raw,
Nor felt, nor *feigned* at least, the oft-told flames,
Which, though sometimes they frown, yet rarely anger dames."
BYRON.

"Some, indeed, have *pretended* by art and physical applications to recover the dead; but the success has sufficiently upbraided the attempt."—SOUTH.

"*Simulation* and *dissimulation*, for instance, are the chief arts of cunning."—BOLINGBROKE.

FELLOWSHIP. SOCIETY.

FELLOWSHIP (*fellow* was formerly O. E. *felawe*, Icel. *felag*, *association*, "*feelaw*," *a laying together of property*: RICHARDSON and SKEAT) is expressive of close or continuous intercourse as it relates to men individually; SOCIETY (Lat. *sŏcietas*, *socius*, *a fellow*) as it relates to them collectively. I find myself in good or bad society generally. (The term FELLOWSHIP could not have been employed here.) And I am on terms of good fellowship with this or that person in particular. Moreover, FELLOWSHIP imports some degree of equality, which SOCIETY does not.

"Of *fellowship* I speak,
Such as I seek, fit to participate
All rational delight, wherein the brute
Cannot be human consort." MILTON.

As SOCIETY expresses community of presence, so FELLOWSHIP community of privileges, state, enjoyments, possessions, and the like.

"God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have *fellowship* with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the greater instrument and common tie of *society*."—LOCKE.

FEMALE. FEMININE. EFFEMINATE.

FEMALE (Lat. *fēmella*, diminutive of *fēmĭna*, *a woman*) is applied to the sex as opposed to male.

FEMININE (Lat. *fēmĭnĭnus*, *of the fem. gender*) is applied to the properties and characteristics of the sex as opposed to masculine. To matters distinctively related to women we apply the adjective FEMALE, as female dress. To matters which are appropriate to women, but not exclusively restricted to them, we apply the adjective FEMININE; as, feminine accomplishments. Feminine branches of learning are taught in female schools. To what belongs as a fact to men, but would belong more fitly to women, we apply the adjective EFFEMINATE.

"A wondrous monument of *female* wiles."—POPE.

"Nothing will be found of such extensive use for supplying the deficiencies of Chaucer's metre as the pronunciation of the *e feminine*."—TYRWHITT *on Chaucer*.

"An *effeminate* and unmanly foppery."—BISHOP HURD.

FEROCIOUS. FIERCE. SAVAGE. BARBAROUS.

The two former are equally applicable to men and the lower animals, the third more properly to men, the last exclusively to men.

FEROCIOUS (Lat. *fĕrōcem*) denotes the quality of fierceness. The hyæna is a ferocious animal even when asleep.

FIERCE (Lat. *fĕrus*) expresses the exhibition of ferocity in an energetic and wild way, which gives to the looks and the movements an expression of passionate eagerness to hurt or destroy. Yet ferocity is always inherent, fierceness may express in some cases a temporary excitement. Many an animal not habitually ferocious might become fierce if provoked to anger.

SAVAGE (Fr. *sauvage*, Lat. *silvāticus*, *silva*, *a wood*, as if grown up wild *in the woods*) denotes the absence of all that might tend to domesticate or soften, and the consequent presence of a native unrestrained licentiousness of nature.

BARBAROUS (Lat. *barbărus*, Gr. *βάρβαρος*, *foreign*) is employed of the way in which such dispositions manifest themselves. So we commonly speak of "a savage spirit" showing itself in "barbarous usage," or "treat-

ment.' The barbarous is the savage in manner, as the savage is the barbarous in disposition.

"The lion, a *fierce* and *ferocious* animal, hath young ones but seldom, and one at a time."—BROWN, *Vulgar Errors.*

"One of them fired a pistol at him (Archbishop Sharpe), which burnt his coat and gown, but did not go into his body. Upon this they fancied he had a magical secret to secure him against a shot; and they drew him out of his coach and murdered him *barbarously*, repeating their strokes till they were sure he was quite dead."—BURNET.

"There can be no true liberty where such licentiousness is suffered with impunity. This is part of the *savageness* of corrupt nature."—WATERLAND.

FERTILE. FRUITFUL. PROLIFIC. PRODUCTIVE.

FERTILE (Lat. *fertĭlis*, from *fero*, *I bear*) expresses that which has an inherent capacity of producing. It is applied properly to soil, and metaphorically or analogously to the mind or capacity of man; as, a fertile field, a fertile imagination, fertile in resources.

FRUITFUL (Lat. *fructus*, *fruit*) denotes that which produces of *its own* kind, and is opposed to barren, as fertile is opposed to waste. A tree is fruitful or unfruitful, as it bears, or not, of its own fruit. A field might be called either fertile or fruitful; fertile as regards the quality of the soil, fruitful as regards the abundance of the produce. But, generally speaking, the soil is fertile, the tree is fruitful.

PROLIFIC (Lat. *prolĭficus*, *prōles*, *offspring*, and *făcĕre*, *to make*) denotes the production of young in abundance, and is employed both of animals and fruit-bearing trees or vegetables. It also is used metaphorically, as "a measure prolific of evil consequences." The very abundantly and variously fruitful is the prolific.

PRODUCTIVE (Lat. *prōdŭcĕre*, part. *prōductus*, *to lead forth, to produce*) denotes no more than the fact of producing in tolerable quantity. This is not, therefore, a term, like FERTILE and PROLIFIC, expressive of a natural property of necessity. The naturally productive is identical with the fertile; but productiveness may be the result of art in tillage. So it might be said, "That field would grow nothing till I mixed a certain manure with the soil. It is now as productive as any on the estate."

"The quickness of the imagination is seen in the invention, the *fertility* in the fancy, and the accuracy in the expression."—DRYDEN.

"We curse not wine—the vile excess we blame,
More *fruitful* than the accumulated hoard
Of pain and misery." ARMSTRONG.

"Indeed it is usual in Scripture that covetousness, being so universal, so original a crime, such a *prolific* sin, be called by all the names of those sins by which it is either punished, or to which it tempts, or whereby it is nourished."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"There is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed; there is another which has no such effect. The former, as it produces a value, may be called *productive*, the latter unproductive, labour."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

FERVOUR. ARDOUR.

FERVOUR (Lat. *fervōrem*, *violent heat, vehemence*, *fervĕre*, very often, *to boil*) and ARDOUR (Lat. *ardōrem*, *a burning*, *an ardour*, *ardĕre*, *to be on fire*) seem, in their metaphorical, to keep up the distinction of their physical, meanings. The fervent boils over demonstratively, the ardent burns fiercely. The force of anger is fervent; the force of zeal, love, desire ardent. In their secondary applications, FERVOUR is associated with the motive cause, ARDOUR with the final cause; in other words, we feel with fervour, we pursue with ardour. There is more of principle in fervour, more of passion in ardour. In those cases, therefore, in which energy of desire or pursuit is directed to no high moral ends, we use the term ARDOUR; where this is so, FERVOUR. The fervour of the patriot. The ardour of a lover of the chase.

"A *fervent* faith and glowing zeal."—SEARCH.

"Moved on
In silence their bright legions to the sound
Of instrumental harmony that breathed
Heroic *ardour* to adventurous deeds."
MILTON.

FESTIVAL. FESTIVITY. HOLIDAY. FEAST.

In ecclesiastical language a FEAST

(Lat. *festum, a festival holiday*) is any day which (not being a fast) is observed with peculiar solemnity. The greater of these feasts are termed FESTIVALS (O. Fr. *festival*) as the Festival of the Nativity. The term FESTIVAL is employed of days of heathen celebration also more commonly than FEAST, which in this connexion would be more likely to mean a solemn banquet in honour of a god. HOLIDAY has well-nigh lost its original meaning of *holy day*, and is employed to express a time of vacation from study or labour.

FESTIVITY (Lat. *festīvĭtātem, festive gaiety, a festivity*) has no sacred or solemn force at all, and expresses only the gaiety and enjoyment of social entertainments.

"The morning trumpets *festival* proclaimed Through each high street." MILTON.

"Much the same may be observed of the Roman drama, which, we are told, had its rise in the unrestrained *festivity* of the rustic youth."—HURD.

"The same bell that called the great man to his table invited the neighbourhood all round, and proclaimed a *holyday*."—*Ibid.*

"Upon the *feastfull* day of Easter." FABYAN.

FIGURATIVE. METAPHORICAL. ANALOGOUS.

These agree in expressing a certain use of words which is not their proper or primary sense.

That is FIGURATIVE (Lat. *fĭgūrātīvus, a figure*) which is expressed by a rhetorical figure. Such a figure is a representation of abstract things by objects taken from the sensible world, as when the exercise of the imagination, for instance, is called soaring on the wing of fancy. As expressions are figurative, terms are METAPHORICAL. This is when a comparison is condensed into a similitude—that is, all signs of comparison being absent, the thing is spoken of under the very name of the other object to which it is compared. The disposition of Domitian resembled that of a tiger—this is similitude or comparison. Domitian was a tiger, this is a METAPHOR (Gr. *μεταφορά, a transferring, a metaphor*). The ANALOGOUS use of a term or expression (Gr. *ἀναλογία, proportion*) is when it represents ideal subject-matter under modes suggested by material resemblances, *e.g.*, swift thought, deep reasoning. So the verb *to draw* in the sense of *to attract* is used not so much metaphorically as analogously; that is, to denote a moral force acting like a physical one.

FIND. DISCOVER.

FIND (A.S. *findan*) is to light upon, whether unexpectedly or as the resul of specific search.

"Seek, and ye shall *find*."—*Bible.*

So unessential is purpose to finding, that the word is sometimes used as a synonym of feel or experience.

"I *find* you passing gentle."—SHAKESPEARE.

To DISCOVER (O. Fr. *descouvrir, des-, apart, couvrir, to cover*) is to find something which is of a new or strange character when found. I may find a piece of money as I walk along. On the other hand, "find out" is always the result of effort and search in reference to a distinct object to be aimed at, as a thief, a riddle, a mode of solving any difficulty. DISCOVER combines a general purpose with a specific chance. Discovery is the result of search, either direct or indirect. The existence of the thing discovered may have been previously either known or unknown, or known to others than the discoverer, who in that case becomes a discoverer to himself, and not to the world. That which is found may be trivial. That which is discovered is important, and hence the word is used of new countries, new truths, or facts in science. One often finds what one did not look for. Finding sometimes plays a part subordinate to discovery, as when new countries are discovered they are sometimes found to be uninhabited. One discovers what is hidden or secret, whether in the moral or the physical sense. One finds what has fallen, not through one's own act, under one's observation or knowledge. That which is discovered was not visible or apparent, that which is found was visible or apparent, but beyond reach, or out of one's own sight. One

discovers a gold mine, and finds a new botanical specimen. Secrets, plots, conspiracies are discovered. One finds one's friend at home, or what one requires in the market.

"The distinction of a first *discoverer* made us cheerfully encounter every danger, and submit to every inconvenience."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

FINE. DELICATE.

In the sense in which these terms are synonymous, and as belonging to things mental, both denote that which is commonly removed from vulgar apprehensions. Nevertheless it is sufficient to have an intellect to appreciate the fine; there must also be a taste to appreciate the delicate. If comparatively few can reach the fine, fewer still can be reached by the delicate. A fine discourse or passage is sometimes repeated with advantage, and its beauties and merits appreciated when pointed out; but that which is delicate, if not perceived at first sight, is not understood at all. The fine may be searched for, the delicate must be felt. Fine is capable of a favourable and unfavourable use, delicate is always favourable. Fine praise, fine satire. A delicate compliment, a delicate attention. FINE (Fr. *fin*) is the Lat. *finītus, finished*; DELICATE, the Lat. *dēlĭcātus, alluring, dainty*.

FINE. MULCT. PENALTY. FORFEIT. AMERCEMENT.

FINE (L. Lat. *finis*, a sum of money, the payment of which made *an end* of a transaction or a claim, a dispute, a trial), in the sense of a penalty, is always pecuniary.

MULCT (Lat. *mulcta, multa*) is also pecuniary. It is, however, a technical term, bearing the sense of a commutation for legal forfeiture, and was not only a punishment, but a compensation; as to be "mulcted (or multed) in half the amount."

PENALTY (Fr. *penalité*, Lat. *pœna, compensation, punishment*) in its technical and legal sense, is mostly applied to pecuniary punishment or forfeiture, but in its common use denotes any kind of punishment; as "to suffer the extreme penalty of the law."

FORFEIT (O. Fr. *forfait*, Lat. *fŏris factum*, which meant first the *transgression*, and then that which was paid for it) may be pecuniary or otherwise. A fine is imposed, a penalty inflicted, a forfeit incurred. A forfeit springs, as it were, out of the nature of the case, and is due *ipso facto* by pre-arrangement.

AMERCEMENT (O. Fr. *amercier, to fine*, L. Lat. *merciāmentum, penalty*) differed from FINE in being not fixed in amount, but assessed according to the nature of the offence, by a process which was called "affeering."

"So, two years after, Tracy's heirs sued him for it, and he was turned out of his office of Chancellor, and *fined* in four hundred pound."—BURNET.

"A *mulct* thy poverty could never pay,
Had not Eternal Wisdom found the way."
DRYDEN.

"But of the tree
Which, tasted, works knowledge of good and evil,
Thou may'st not; in the day thou eat'st thou diest:
Death is the *penalty* imposed."
MILTON.

"For so the holy sages once did sing,
That He our deadly *forfeit* should release,
And with His Father work us a perpetual peace." *Ibid.*

"The great charter also directs that the *amercement* which is always inflicted in general terms—sit in misericordia—shall be set or reduced to a certainty by the oath of good and lawful men of the neighbourhood."—BLACKSTONE.

The connexion suggested by some, and probably by Blackstone here, between Lat. *misericordia* and Fr. *merci* is, of course, a mistake.

FINISH. CLOSE. CONCLUDE. COMPLETE. TERMINATE. END.

Of these, the following three, END (A. S. *ende*), FINISH (Lat. *finire*), and COMPLETE (Lat. *complētus, filled up*, part. of *complēre, to fill up*), represent a rise in force or fulness of meaning in that order. To end is to discontinue by leaving off, without expressing anything of the state in which the thing ended is left, as, "He ended his speech by saying so and so." "The fortieth verse ends the chapter;" the verb being used both transitively and intransitively. Whatever begins must end; and whatever is begun must be

ended. The term is quite indefinite. Things may be ended with or without completeness or finish; and things may end prematurely or satisfactorily. To FINISH is to end working at a thing, to put the last required labour or touch to it, and is employed of action, forces, or influences. "He is finishing his painting," that is, he is employed in putting the final strokes or touches. "The last blow finished him," that is, rendered more blows superfluous. "He finished working, or he ended;" the one expresses final effort, the latter cessation. To complete is to bring finally that which fills up the plan, design, or proposed task. A dictionary is ended with the word "finis." It is finished with the letter Z. It is completed by revisions and interpolations. The world was finished on the last day of its creation; but it is not yet ended.

To TERMINATE (Lat. *terminare, to set bounds to*) is to bring to an end what has been protracted or continuous, and relates to some degree of space or time traversed in the preceding work or operation. A vista terminates in or with a certain object. A happy remark will sometimes terminate a tedious dispute. A short life ends, a long life terminates.

To CLOSE (O. Fr. *clos, shut in*, Lat. *clausus*) is physically to stop by bringing together the parts; as, "to close the mouth by bringing together the lips;" "to close a book by bringing together the leaves;" "to close the eyes;" "to close the ranks of an army." Analogously, to close is to shut up into a compact form what is regarded as having totality, as "to close a bargain;" "to close one's studies."

CONCLUDE (Lat. *concludere, to shut up, to conclude*) is a stronger term than CLOSE, more definite and positive, and means to close in such a way as to give the thing closed a formal, necessary, or appropriate termination. To CLOSE refers only to the act, CONCLUDE to the intention. I close my letter, in one sense, when I seal it; in another, when I write the last sentence. I conclude it when I subjoin something without which I should feel the communication to be incomplete.

"An eternal and happy life, a kingdom, a perfect kingdom and glorious, that shall never have *ending*."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"God is our 'light,' as He showeth us the state we are in, and the enemies we have to encounter; He is our 'strength,' as He enableth by His grace to cope with and overcome them; and He is our 'salvation,' as the author and *finisher* of our deliverance from sin, death, and Satan."—HORNE.

It will be seen by the following example that, while FINISH and END are intrinsic, COMPLETE takes in accessories also, which may be requisite to the completion of certain things. So a prophecy is not completed before it has been verified in all its historic facts and allusions.

"It was attested by miracles of all sorts, done in great variety and number, by the visible centering of the old prophecies in the person of Christ, and by the *completion* of those prophecies since which He Himself uttered."—ATTERBURY.

"A good commencement has ever been found by experience auspicious to a good progress and a happy *termination*."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"We have it, it seems, in our power, by the exercise of one particular virtue, to secure a pardon to ourselves for neglecting all the rest, and can blot out the remembrance of an ill spent life by a few acts of charity at the *close* of it."—ATTERBURY.

"Nor, indeed, do I know a text in the Bible that I would more willingly pitch upon to leave with you as the last advice I would give you, and as the sum and *conclusion* of my preaching among you, than these words of St. Paul I have now read to you (Philippians iv. 8)."—SHARP.

FINISHED. PERFECT. ELABORATE.

That which is not PERFECT (Lat. *perficere*, part. *perfectus, to complete*) has some defect which disfigures it. That which is not FINISHED (Lat. *finire, finis, an end*) may yet be made perfect, though at present incomplete. A sketch may be perfect, yet requires further work to make it into a finished picture. PERFECT is employed of the productions both of art and nature, FINISHED only of those of art. An unfinished circle is not drawn out, a perfect circle fulfils its mathematical definition. A perfect character is morally faultless, a finished character

is perfectly trained. A flower, as a production of nature, may be perfect, not finished. A finished drawing is one in which all artistic processes have been executed to the full, a perfect drawing is one in which the spectator can find no fault. We express commendation of that which is finished, and admiration of that which is perfect.

"A faultless sonnet *finished* thus would be
Worth tedious volumes of loose poetry."
DRYDEN.

"The French Revolution has this of wonderful in it, that it resembles what Lord Verulam says of the operations of Nature. It was *perfect*, not only in its elements and principles, but in its members and its organs from the very beginning."—BURKE.

The ELABORATE (Lat. *ēlăbōrāre, to take pains*) represents that which is finished with great and minute attention to parts and details. The elaborate is improved and refined by successive touches, alterations, improvements. That thing is the most elaborate in which the greatest amount of *labour* has been brought to bear upon the smallest space, and being comparatively small has signs of vast and varied effort. Perfect simplicity is compatible with high finish, but that which is elaborate is never simple.

"But I cannot think or persuade myself that God gave us eyes only that we may pluck them out, and brought us into the world with reason that being born men we might afterwards grow up and improve into brutes, and become *elaborately* irrational."—SOUTH.

FINITE. LIMITED.

It is a natural property of things to be FINITE, an artificial property to be LIMITED. Or, again, things are finite in reference to their own nature, limited in reference to power or capacity. Man's powers are limited, for he is himself a finite being.

"And all the difference or distinction there is betwixt them, is only in our different apprehensions of this one being, which acting severally upon several objects, we apprehend it as acting from several properties by reason of the *finiteness* of our understandings, which cannot conceive of an infinite being wholly, as it is in itself, but as it were by piecemeal, as it represents itself to us"—BEVERIDGE.

"Absolutely according to pleasure, or *limitedly* according to certain rules prescribed."—BARROW.

FIRE. FLAME. BLAZE. CONFLAGRATION. IGNITION. COMBUSTION.

FIRE (A. S. *fŷr*) is that kind of combustion which evolves light and heat.

FLAME (Lat. *flamma*) is the form under which such combustion is exhibited when the matter is gaseous.

A BLAZE (A. S. *blæse*) is a rapid evolution of light, whether accompanied or not with sensible heat, as the blaze of the sun, of lamps, of a meteor.

CONFLAGRATION (Lat. *conflăgrationem*) is the visible consumption by fire of masses of combustible materials.

IGNITION (Lat. *ignīre, to set on fire*, part. *ignītus*) is in modern phraseology opposed to COMBUSTION (Lat. *combustionem, combūrere, to burn up*) the former being commonly taken to mean the consumption by great heat, with manifestations of fire or flame, the latter without. The action, for instance, of the atmosphere upon the human skin produces an insensible combustion of its particles.

"Cloven tongues like as of *fire*."—*Eng. Bible.*

"As for living creatures it is certain their vital spirits are a substance compounded of an airy and *flamy* matter."—BANN.

"If of Dryden's fire the *blaze* is brighter, of Pope's the heat is more regular and constant."—JOHNSON.

"Then raise
From the *conflagrant* mass, purged and refined
New heavens, new earth.' MILTON.

"The heat, with a long set of fair weather, had even *ignited* the air."—EVELYN.

"When such flames break out, what *combustion* may we conceive within."—STILLINGFLEET.

FIT. ADAPT. SUIT.

TO FIT (Icel. *fitja, to knit together* · SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) is to make physically to tally, or to make proportionate or commensurate. Hence, analogously, to adapt, qualify, or suit. It is, then, the generic term, of which the others may be regarded as modifications.

To Adapt (Lat. *ădaptare, to adjust*) is to make fit for a purpose, and always supposes the requirement of an ulterior design.

To Suit (Fr. *suite, a following, a set*) is literally to cause to *follow* or fall in. It is more exclusively employed of the becoming and appropriate; as to "suit the action to the word;" Adapt, of the efficient. The suitable harmonizes; the adapted co-operates. We fit one object to another. We adapt means to an end. We suit an object to a quality; as, language to the taste or understanding of the hearers.

"Sowing the sandy gravelly land in Devonshire and Cornwall with French furze seed they reckon a great improver of their land, and a *fitter* of it for corn."—Mortimer *on Husbandry*.

There is more of judgment in fitting, more of taste in suiting, and more of contrivance in adaptation.

"Who could ever say or imagine such a body (as the atmosphere), so different from the globe it serves, could be made by chance, or be *adapted* so exactly to all these grand ends by any other efficient than by the power and wisdom of the infinite God?"—Derham.

"If, therefore, in the nature of things we can discover a world of mutual *suitabilities* of this to that, and of one thing to another, it will be a sufficient argument that they all proceed from some wise Cause that had an universal idea of their natures in His mind, and saw how such a thing would *suit* such a thing before ever He actually *adapted* them one to another."—Scott, *Christian Life*.

FLARE. Flash. Glare. Flicker. Coruscation.

A Flash is a sudden brilliancy instantaneously withdrawn or disappearing.

A Flare (of which the etym. is uncertain) is a dazzling, unsteady light, and may be illustrated by the burning of a torch, which alternately blazes brightly and is obscured by the smoke. *Flash* is probably closely allied to *flare*, and resembles it in meaning; but Flare is more continuous than Flash.

Glare (allied to the Latin *clarus*, one of many cognate words referred to a root "ghar," *to shine*) is a broad, steady, untempered, and, therefore, oppressive light.

Flicker (A. S. *flicerian*) is connected with *fly*. It expresses a light which is rapidly unsteady, a sort of fluttering flame which conveys the idea of waning or weakness, as the others do of energy, in the burning.

A Coruscation (Lat. *cŏruscationem, cŏruscāre, to vibrate, coruscate*) is a sudden flash accompanied by an afterplay of light.

"But, if I did press hard upon it with my finger, at the very instant that I drew it briskly off it would disclose a very vivid but exceeding short-lived splendour, not to call it a little *coruscation*."—Boyle.

"Like *flaring* tapers, brightening as they waste."
Goldsmith.

"Those sallies of jollity in the house of feasting are often forced from a troubled mind, like *flashes* from the black cloud, which, after a momentary effulgence, are succeeded by thicker darkness."—Blair.

"Strong perfumes and *glaring* light
Oft destroy both smell and sight."
Carew.

"Even as a flame unfed, which runs to waste
With its own *flickering*."
Byron.

FLAT. Level.

Flat (Icel. *flatr*, perhaps allied to Gr. πλατύς, *flat, wide*) is having a level surface, as opposed, for instance, to round.

Level (Lat. *libella, a level line*, dim. of *libra*) is having *uniform flatness*. Flat belongs to objects intrinsically level, as compared with the horizon or other objects. Hence an object of which a part is flat may be called flat, in the sense of characterized by flatness, as a flat head, or nose. If the latter were perfectly flat, it would be level with the face. The plane which is raised perpendicularly does not cease to be level. A line may be level; but it is only a plane or surface that can be flat.

"The ordinary shape of the fish's eye being in a much larger degree convex than that of land animals, a corresponding difference attends its muscular conformation namely, that it is throughout calculated for *flattening* the eye."—Paley.

"The setting sun now beams more mildly bright,
The shadows lengthening with the *level* light."
Beattie.

FLATTERY. COMPLIMENT. ADULATION. BLANDISHMENT.

Of these, the least strong is COMPLIMENT. In itself, and etymologically, it does not necessarily express praise at all. A compliment (Fr. *compliment*, from Italian *complemento*: BRACHET) is an expression *filling up* one's regard or duty to another. When this is done with a certain stretch of politeness, and the words express not only respect but admiration, the compliment develops into FLATTERY (Fr. *flatter*, *to flatter*, orig. unknown: BRACHET). Anything is flattery which expresses praise or admiration, not as being simply due and felt, but for the sake of gratifying vanity or gaining favour. Untimely as well as excessive praise is flattery. Flattery is the voluntary tribute of more praise than is due or called for.

ADULATION (Lat. *ădūlātionem*, *ădūlāri*, *to fawn*, as a dog upon his master) is excessive and exaggerative flattery, accompanied by a feigned subserviency, and is ready to express itself in hypocrisy and falsehood. Flattery improves upon existing excellences or merits; adulation invests its objects with such as are created on purpose. Compliments may be hollow but harmless, as being understood and accepted as conventional. They turn upon such matters as appearance or dress, or minor actions and performances, and are the better when they exhibit skill or taste. They suppose an equality. In flattery men place themselves on a lower level, and feign, as it were, to look up with admiration. In adulation they adopt a servile relationship. Compliments may turn upon almost any point connected with another. Flattery is more carefully selected, being adapted to the humour or weakness of the person, and implying something which he would desire to possess or fancies that he possesses, as a point of superiority. Flattery nourishes the passions. Adulation gratifies the vanity. From one point of view adulation is flattery, low, servile, shameless, fulsome.

"*Flattery*, if its operation be nearly examined, will be found to owe its acceptance not to our ignorance, but knowledge of our failures, and to delight us rather as it consoles our wants than displays our possessions."—*Rambler*.

"And he that called Arsinoe Ἥρας ἴον, Juno's violet, kept all the letters of the name right, and *complimented* the lady ingeniously."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"Flattery corrupts both the giver and the receiver; and *adulation* is not of more service to the people than to kings."—BURKE.

BLANDISHMENT (Lat. *blandīri*, *to caress*) is the use of art for the sake of winning, whether by flattery, kind words, or affectionate actions or caresses.

"Cowering low in *blandishment*."
TENNYSON.

FLATTERER. SYCOPHANT. PARASITE.

The character of the FLATTERER has been given above.

The SYCOPHANT (Gr. συκοφάντης, a *common informer*, *backbiter*) bears at present the meaning of a person of obsequious and servile character. With the sycophant, flattery is only exhibited as a manifestation of servility, without being itself distinctively characteristic of him.

The PARASITE (παράσιτος, *one who eats beside*, *a flatterer*, a word which had orig. no bad sense in Greek), in modern English bears the meaning of one who earns invitations to the tables of the wealthy by flattery and such arts of conversation as tend to recommend him as a guest. The character of the sycophant and the parasite differ according to the different objects which they have in view. The object of the sycophant is to ingratiate himself, and he will stoop to mean artifices for the purpose; the object of the parasite is to provide for himself, and he submits to social degradation to gain it. Parasites are often needy men, but courtiers are often sycophants.

"This it is that giveth unto a *flatterer* that large field under pretence of friendship, whence he hath a fort, as it were, commodiously seated and with the vantage to assail and endamage us, and that is self-love."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch*.

"A *sycophant* will everything admire;—
Each verse, each sentence, sets his soul on fire."
DRYDEN.

"He knew them flatterers of the festal hour,
The heartless *parasites* of present cheer."
BYRON.

FLOURISH. THRIVE. PROSPER.

The two former are employed both of vegetative life and growth and of the doings of men, the latter only of men's state and doings. To FLOURISH is to be in the possession and display of all powers belonging to the individual according to his nature. It implies a certain degree of anterior development, thus preserving the *inceptive* character of Lat. *flōrescĕre*, or *-iscere*, which appears in part. *fleurissant* of Fr. *fleurir*. The result of flourishing is the admiration of others, or of beholders. Great men flourish at the particular period of their reputation. THRIVE (Da. *thrif*, *good luck*) is to prosper by industry and care. Hence, as in FLOURISH the physical sense is the proper, and the moral the improper or metaphorical, so in THRIVE the idea of social or industrial success is the primary sense, and the physical is the derived. Acquisition in substance by growth is the idea expressed by THRIVE. Hence it implies less of anterior development than FLOURISH. The full-grown plant flourishes, the seedling thrives.

PROSPER (Lat. *prospĕrare*, *to make fortunate*) is so to thrive as to be in advantageous circumstances. Prosperity belongs to him who hoped for success, while the merely fortunate man owes it to chance. Men prosper when they successfully carry out certain aims and undertakings. Although prosperity belongs exclusively to the designs of men, the term is employed of things in which they are not directly, yet indirectly, recognized; as the prosperity of the arts, of commerce, of agriculture, and the like.

"By continual meditations in sacred writings, a man as naturally improves and advances in holiness as a tree *thrives* and *flourishes* in a kindly and well-watered soil."—BISHOP HORNE.

"With this advantage then
To union, and firm faith, and firm accord,
More than can be in heaven, we now return
To claim our just inheritance of old,
Surer to prosper than *prosperity*
Could have assured us." MILTON.

FLOW. ARISE. PROCEED. ISSUE. SPRING. EMANATE.

To express one or more objects coming out of one or more others is the purport of all these words. That which comes out in continuous supply FLOWS (A. S. *flōwan*). That which comes up bodily out of something else gradually is said to rise or ARISE (A. S. *árísan*). What comes forth from another as a starting-point, source or origin PROCEEDS (Lat. *prŏcēdĕre*, *to come forth*). That which goes out from something else which contained or enclosed it ISSUES (Fr. *issu*, p.p. of O. Fr. *issir*, Lat. *exīre*, *to go out*, *to end*). That which comes forth bodily, but not gradually, but suddenly or rapidly, SPRINGS (A. S. *springan*, *to spring*, *to leap*). That which oozes or drips out of something else, imparting of its own particles, nature, substance, or composition, EMANATES (Lat. *emānāre*, *to distil*). The moral application or analogous use of these terms ought to adhere as closely as possible to these physical distinctions. See further remarks under PROCEED.

"Those thousand decencies that daily *flow*
From all her words and actions."
MILTON.

"Yet many will presume;
Whence heavy persecution shall *arise*
On all who in the worship persevere
Of spirit and truth." *Ibid.*

"Teach me the various labours of the moon,
And whence *proceed* the eclipses of the sun." DRYDEN.

"Life's warm vapour *issuing* through the wound." POPE.

"'Twas ebbing darkness past the noon of night,
And Phosphor, on the confines of the light
Promised the sun ere day began to *spring*."
DRYDEN.

It should be observed, that two apparently contradictory ideas are associated with the term SPRING—the one that of visible, sudden, and present rising, the other that of remote causation. This no doubt comes from the twofold association of a spring, as the breaking forth of water from the ground, and as constituting also a remote source to which the river is to be traced.

"Aristotle doth not deny God to be the efficient cause of the world, but only asserts that He created it from eternity, making Him a necessary cause thereof, it proceeding from Him by way of *emanation*, as light from the sun."—RAY.

ARISE is more naturally used where the relation between cause and effect, whether it be physical or moral, is simple and direct; PROCEED where it is metaphysical or remote. ARISE denotes a cause, PROCEED a principle. Blunders arise from inadvertence; no imperfection can proceed from God. EMANATE seems to point to what flows steadily from a source by virtue of some necessary activity. Hence the term is used of that which has the force of official sanction or moral persuasion: so laws may emanate from a certain form of government, a sage counsel from persons of authority and experience.

FLUID. LIQUID.

FLUID (Lat. *fluĭdus, flowing*) is the generic term, of which LIQUID is one kind (*liquĭdus, flowing, liquid*). The word "gaseous" denotes another kind of consistency. The characteristic of a fluid is that it retains no definite shape or form, owing to the ease with which its parts change their relative position. Air and the gases are fluids, but not liquids. Water is a fluid, regarded in itself, liquid as opposed to solid.

"The second supposition is, that the earth being a mixed mass, somewhat *fluid*, took, as it might do, its present form by the joint action of the mutual gravitation of its parts and its rotatory motion."—PALEY.

"In oil of aniseed, which I drew both with and without fermentation, I observed the whole body of the oil in a cool place to thicken into the consistence and appearance of white butter, which with the least heat resumed its former *liquidness*."—BOYLE.

FOLLOW. SUCCEED. ENSUE.

Persons and things FOLLOW and SUCCEED. Only things ENSUE. To FOLLOW (A. S. *fylegan*) is to move behind and in the same direction, whether with a view to overtake or not: hence, in analogous senses, to adhere, as to a leader, to copy as an original, to succeed, to result. To SUCCEED (Lat. *succēdĕre, to come into the place of*) is to follow in such a way that the subsequent thing takes the place of the preceding. One such case is sufficient to constitute a succession, as, "The son succeeds to his father's estate;" but what has been once may be repeated in more cases, and SUCCEED may be predicated of several things following in order or series. In such repeated succession the idea still holds good of each succeeding item in the series taking for a time the place of the preceding. In matters of which the eye takes cognizance, this would be objective and local. In matters of the other senses it would be subjective and mental. One wave follows another when it rolls behind it. One wave succeeds another when it rolls over the same rock or breaks upon the same coast. One clap of thunder succeeds another when the mind receives and identifies the impressions of both or all. ENSUE (O. Fr. *ensuir, to follow after*) is to follow in virtue of *a principle of sequence*, either in the relation of cause and effect, inference, or chronological succession.

"Learning and Rome alike in empire grew,
And arts still *followed* where her eagles flew."
POPE.

"For how art thou a king,
But by fair sequence and *succession?*"
SHAKESPEARE.

"Discourse *ensues*, not trivial, yet not dull,
Nor such as with a frown forbids the play
Of fancy, or proscribes the sound of mirth."
COWPER.

FOPPISH. FINICAL. DANDYISH. SPRUCE. COXCOMBICAL.

FOPPISH (Dut. *foppen, to deride, to mock*). The character of a fop is that of a man whose ambition it is to win admiration by personal appearance and dress. Here the essence of his character ceases, and the rest is a necessary outcome of it. He is silly, pert, and affected, not so much on purpose as because he has no conception of any higher ideal than that which he seeks to realize. The following opposes the fop to the sloven:—

"Give me leave to say that I should have liked your introduction better if, instead of pointing your satire entirely against one extreme, you had stated the due and pro-

per medium between foppery on one hand and slovenliness on the other."—WATERLAND.

FINICAL (coined from *fine*) is affectedly fine. The finical person is conceitedly careful of minutiæ about himself—the syllables which he clips, the details of dress and ornaments to which he pays attention, the thousand littlenesses of taste with which his mind is embarrassed, by the minute and incessant interest which he bestows upon them.

"Be not too *finical*, but yet be clean,
And wear well-fashioned clothes like other men." DRYDEN.

The DANDY (etym. quite uncertain) is a man who has a weakness for dress or personal finery; which, however, is often very innocent. Men of great worth and intellectual attainments have been touched by it. On the other hand, the fop is essentially asinine and selfish. DANDY is a word belonging to conversation rather than to literature. SPRUCE, of which the origin is very uncertain, denotes such neatness of attire as fails to produce any effect of elegance or dignity—a prim tidiness, and nothing more. Hall, writing of certain courtiers in the time of Henry VIII., says, "They were appereyled after the fashion of Prussia or Spruce;" which may possibly be the origin of the word.

"Beware of men who are too *sprucely* dressed;
And look you fly with speed a fop professed." CONGREVE.

COXCOMB (*i.e. cock's comb*) denotes a vain, showy man, not necessarily vain or showy in dress, though there will be a likelihood of it; whose conceit lies in magnifying his own superficial acquirements. The coxcomb is a sort of intellectual fop.

"The shallow speculations of the petulant, assuming, short-sighted *coxcombs* of philosophy."—BURKE.

FORCIBLE. COGENT.

As applied to the reasoning and persuasions of men, FORCIBLE is commonly employed of the style or mode of reasoning; COGENT (Lat *cōgĕre, to compel*), of the specific inducement or argument. Cogent reasons, put in a forcible way.

"He is at once elegant and sublime, *forcible* and ornamented. He unites energy with copiousness, and dignity with variety."—LOUTH.

"No better or more *cogent* reason can be given of anything than that it implies a contradiction to be otherwise."—MORE, *Immortality of the Soul.*

FOREFATHERS. ANCESTORS. PROGENITORS. PREDECESSORS.

We descend from FOREFATHERS, ANCESTORS, and PROGENITORS; but FOREFATHERS includes parents; ANCESTORS (O. Fr. *ancessour*, Lat. *antĕcessōrem*, from *ante, before*, and *cĕdĕre, to go*) excludes them.

PREDECESSORS (Lat. *præ-dĕcessōres, præ, before*, and *dĕcēdĕre, to depart*) expresses our civil, not our genealogical, ancestry. We are children of our forefathers, the posterity of our ancestors and progenitors, the successors of our predecessors. FOREFATHERS and PROGENITORS are more ordinary terms. ANCESTORS implies some dignity of birth.

"The covetousness of the gentry appeared, as in raising their rents, so in oppressing the poorer sort by enclosures, thereby taking away the lands where they had used, and their *forefathers*, to feed their cattle for the subsistence of their families."—STRYPE.

"The blood weeps from my heart when I do shape
In forms imaginary th' unguided days
And rotten times that you shall look upon,
When I am sleeping with my *ancestors*."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Ah! whither shall we go?
Down to the grave, down to those happy shades below,
Where all our brave *progenitors* are blest
With endless triumph and eternal rest?"
POMFRET.

"When the cause of God and the common interest of our Christian brethren do require it, we should then as freely part with all we have as our *predecessors* in Christianity did."—SHARP.

FOREGO. RESIGN.

We FOREGO the actual or the possible; we RESIGN the actual. We forego claims which we might make, pleasures which we might enjoy. We resign actual pretensions, possessions, and the like.

In the following of Pope FOREGO relates to the actual :—

"The dumb shall sing, the lame his crutch *forego*."

In this to the possible :—

"Unhappy as you appear, God has *foregone* to punish you."—LANDOR.

FOREIGNER. STRANGER. ALIEN.

STRANGER (O. Fr. *estrange*, Lat. *extrāneus*) denotes one who is strange or unknown, whether a fellow-country-man or not. A FOREIGNER (*see* FOREIGN) is a native of another country. As the stranger needs not be a foreigner, so the foreigner needs not be a stranger. An ALIEN (Lat. *ălĭēnus*) is a foreign resident in a country, or one who is not naturalized, or has not the privileges of a subject or a citizen in the country in which he resides.

"The Catholic was rendered a *foreigner* in his native land only because he retained the religion along with the property handed down to him from those who had been the old inhabitants of that land before him."—BURKE.

"'Tis good the fainting soul to cheer,
To see the famished *stranger* fed,
To milk for him the mother-deer,
To smooth for him the furry bed."
CRABBE.

"It is enacted in the laws of Venice,
If it be proved against an *alien*
That by direct or indirect attempts
He seek the life of any citizen,
The party 'gainst the which he doth contrive
Shall seize one half his goods."
SHAKESPEARE.

FORERUNNER. PRECURSOR. HARBINGER. MESSENGER.

FORERUNNER and PRECURSOR belong to the class of perfect synonyms, PRECURSER (Lat. *præ-cursŏrem*, *præ*, *before*, and *currĕre*, *to run*) being exactly in Latin what FORERUNNER is in English. Yet even such synonyms tend in the course of time to assimilate themselves to slight alterations of meaning or application. FORERUNNER is used both in a literal and a metaphorical sense, PRECURSOR only in the metaphorical, in the sense of prognostic or indication.

HARBINGER (O. Fr. *herberge*, *a lodging*, *harbour*, now *auberge*) is properly an officer who precedes many others to ensure lodgings for their reception. As metaphorically used, it is a more lively image than PRECURSOR, and is employed of *visible* forerunners. For instance, we should hardly speak of discontent as the harbinger, but as the precursor, of a revolution. The term has also a favourable, not a mournful, meaning. We speak of the birds as harbingers of spring, more naturally than of certain symptoms as harbingers of the plague. HARBINGERS of death seems a forcible and proper image, because we are so accustomed to personify death, that the term lends itself to mean an announcement of the near approach of the King of Terrors.

A MESSENGER (Fr. *messager*, L. Lat. *missātĭcum*, *mittĕre*, *to send*) is one who brings a message or news. He therefore differs from the others in having the present or the past for his subject, while the others have the future. The forerunner announces, the precursor indicates, the harbinger ushers, the messenger declares.

"These signs *forerun* the death or fall of kings." SHAKESPEARE.

"An event which appears like the *precursor* of the Millennium."—BURKE.

"Think not, however, that success on one side is the *harbinger* of peace."—GOLDSMITH.

"For God will deign
To visit oft the dwellings of just men,
Delighted, and with frequent intercourse
Thither will send His winged *messengers*
On errands of supernal grace."
MILTON.

FORESIGHT. FORETHOUGHT. FORECAST. PREMEDITATION.

FORESIGHT is the faculty of anticipating actual experience. FORETHOUGHT is provident care. FORECAST is provident management. The word is of somewhat wider meaning than FORETHOUGHT, and furnishes a verb; to forecast consequences being to exercise forethought upon them, and meet them practically.

PREMEDITATION (Lat. *præmĕdĭtatiōnem*, *præ*, *before*, and *mĕdĭtāri*, *to meditate*) has reference only to such words or actions as are uttered or performed by one's self; the others referring to what is independent of us

The want of foresight is an intellectual deficiency; the want of forethought is a moral deficiency. The not forecasting may spring from inability, or from not appreciating the gravity of the case. The absence of premeditation indicates strong self-reliance.

"Give us *foresightful* minds; give us minds to obey
What *foresight* tells."
SYDNEY, *Arcadia.*

"A sphere that will demand from him *forethought*, courage, and wisdom."—I. TAYLOR.

"Their lords the Philistines, with gathered powers,
Enter'd Judæa seeking me, who then
Safe to thy rock of Etham was retired,
Not flying, but *forecasting* in what place
To set upon them, what advantaged best."
MILTON.

"The orations which he made upon the sudden without *premeditation* before, do show more boldness and courage than those which he had written and studied long before."—NORTH, *Plutarch.*

FORETELL. PREDICT. PROPHESY.

FORETELL is the simplest and most comprehensive. It means generally to declare beforehand what is to happen. This may be in an ordinary or extraordinary way—by sagacity and experience, or by supernatural knowledge, real or pretended.

PREDICT (Lat. *prædĭcĕre, prædictus, to tell beforehand*) is much the same as FORETELL, but is only employed of persons, while FORETELL is used also of unconscious indicators, as "the clouds foretell" (not predict) "rain."

PROPHESY (Gk. *προφητεύω, to speak for, or instead of*, i.e. *the gods; to interpret their will;* of which interpretation foretelling is *one kind* only), as a synonym of PREDICT, is properly used only of *supernatural* knowledge and declaration concerning the future, except when it is used simply in the sense of outspeaking or preaching without reference to the future.

"His birth, if we believe Plutarch, was attended by prodigies *foretelling* the future eminence and lustre of his character."—MIDDLETON, *Life of Cicero.*

"I thank my better stars I am alive to confront this audacious *predictor*, and to make him rue the hour he ever affronted a man of science and resentment."—SWIFT.

"*Prophesy* unto us, Thou Christ, who is he that smote Thee?"—*Bible.*

FORGE. FABRICATE.

These words are both from the same root (Lat. *făbrĭcare, to frame, construct, fabrica, a workshop;* the Fr. *forge;* Prov. *faurga;* with many other intermediate forms, see LITTRÉ). As at present used, FORGE is employed both of manual and mental things, and so combines the meanings of *counterfeit* and *invent*, as to forge a signature or a tale. To FABRICATE is only employed of mental fictions, as to fabricate an excuse, except when it means simply to manufacture, as to fabricate woollens. FABRICATE involves a more sustained exercise of the inventive faculty than FORGE. We fabricate tales, we forge statements, or even words and names.

"*Forgery* may with us be defined at common law to be the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right."—BLACKSTONE.

"Our books are not *fabricated* with an accommodation to prevailing usages."—PALEY.

FORGETFULNESS. OBLIVION. OBLIVIOUSNESS.

FORGETFULNESS is a word expressing a quality or habit; while oblivion expresses a condition. A man is in a state of forgetfulness. Things fall into OBLIVION. Forgetfulness, however, may be predicated of things when they are regarded as in a state into which men's minds have thrown them. The terms oblivious (Lat. *oblivĭonem, forgetfulness, oblivion*) and OBLIVIOUSNESS are employed to designate more distinctly in persons *a way of being* forgetful.

"Hail gentle sleep!
Nature's soft nurse, how have I frighted thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh mine eyelids down,
And steep my senses in *forgetfulness.*"
SHAKESPEARE.

"But such as neither of themselves can sing,
Nor yet are sung of others for reward,
Die in obscure *oblivion.*" SPENSER.

"I wonder what *obliviousness* is come upon him, that he so cleaveth unto the doctors whom he affirmed before either to

make no mention of it or else very seldom." —FRYTH.

FORLORN. DESTITUTE.

FORLORN (A.S. *forloren, lost utterly*) applies only to persons, and expresses the fact and the feeling of being deserted by, or at a distance from friends.

DESTITUTE (Lat. *dēstĭtūtus, dēstĭtuere, to forsake*) means generally wanting in or deprived of resources of any kind, as friends, food, money. FORLORN denotes a matter of feeling, DESTITUTE a matter of fact.

"As a distracted mother weeps *forlorn*,
When to the grave her fondling babe is borne." FENTON.

"With granted leave officious I return,
But much more wonder that the Son of God
In this wild solitude so long should bide,
Of all things *destitute*, and well I know
Not without hunger." MILTON.

FORM. FIGURE. SHAPE. CONFORMATION. MOULD. FASHION.

FORM (Lat. *forma*) is the impression upon the senses produced by the composition of the parts of a body into a whole, whether organic or inorganic, natural or artificial, fair or unsightly; as distinguished from the matter of which it is composed. Form may be taken as a term lying intermediately between SHAPE (A.S. *scapan, to form, to shape*), on one side, denoting more of the materialistic, and FIGURE (Lat. *fĭgūra*) on the other, denoting, more of the conceptional. The shape of a stone; the form of a statue; the figure of a man.

CONFORMATION (Lat. *conformātionem*) differs from FORM in being more than merely delineative, and denotes the delineation taken in connexion with and consequent upon the structure. Except when conformation is used in the abstract sense of bringing to a harmonious agreement, or the condition so produced, the term is not applied but to the human figure, the disposition of the parts of the animal frame as determined by their natural functions.

MOULD (Fr. *moule*, Lat. *mŏdŭlus, a measure or standard*) expresses the idea of shape or form as the result of some plastic operation or will.

FASHION (Fr. *façon*, Lat. *factionem, a making*) has much in common with MOULD, inasmuch as it is the result of specific forming. It admits, however, in addition to the idea of SHAPE, that of arrangement, and is commonly the result of labour and workmanship, and is applicable to matters giving less the idea of solidity. Fashion involves pre-existent principles or modes; the thing fashioned being brought into conformity with them. The idol is often fashioned like a man, that is, made to wear the general character or semblance of the human form. FORM has a mental and a material meaning—the form of a man, forms of words, forms of belief. FORM is of simpler, FIGURE of more complex, outlines. The figure of a man or woman is the form in its details. Between FORM and SHAPE there is this strong difference, that FORM includes not only the exterior surface, but also the solidity of a thing—its length, breadth, and thickness; while the shape is merely what we can see of the outside. The words, therefore, though they may often be used interchangeably, have a different meaning. A cannon-ball has the form of a sphere, as being round and solid; the shape of a sphere, as presenting to the eye a spherical surface and outline.

"The earth was without *form* and void." —*Bible*.

"A *figure* is the superficies, circumscription, and accomplished lineament of a body." —HOLLAND, *Plutarch*.

"Rude fragments now
Lie scattered where the *shapely* column stood." COWPER

"In the Hebrew poetry, as I before remarked, there may be observed a certain *conformation* of the sentences, the nature of which is, that a complete sense is almost equally infused into every component part, and that every member constitutes an entire verse." —LOUTH.

"Did I request Thee, Maker, from my clay
To *mould* me man?" MILTON.

"Unskilful he to fawn or seek for power,
By doctrines *fashioned* to the varying hour;
For other aims his heart had learned to prize,
More skilled to raise the wretched than to rise." GOLDSMITH.

FORMAL. CEREMONIAL. CEREMONIOUS.

FORMAL (*see* FORM) bears the twofold meaning of according to form, and characterized by an excess of form, as, "to make a formal call," "to receive a formal appointment or dismissal." As applied to persons or their manners, the term has always an unfavourable sense—a person being called formal who does anything too much or too demonstratively upon pattern and rule; over-precise in look, speech, manner, or arrangements.

CEREMONIOUS and CEREMONIAL (Fr. *cérémonie*, Lat. *cærĭmōnia*) had, not long ago, the same meaning, till CEREMONIAL came to mean connected with public ceremony, and CEREMONIOUS branched off into the sense of dealing overmuch in conventional forms of demeanour. Men are formal in themselves, ceremonious towards others.

"So have I seen grave fools design
With *formal* looks to pass for wise;
But Nature as a light will shine,
And break through all disguise."
LANSDOWNE.

"The two sacraments of the Circumcision and the Passover had assuredly besides the *ceremonialness* annexed to them the institution of typifying Christ to come."—GOODWIN.

"Tos *ceremonious* in testifying their allegiance."—RALEGH.

FORWARDS. ONWARDS.

FORWARDS expresses movement in the direction which one fronts or which is before one; ONWARDS, movement along a given line towards a proposed point. FORWARDS is opposed to backwards or sideways. ONWARDS would be opposed, if such a word had existed, to *offwards*, that is, in any direction but the line of destination. The migratory crab moves onwards but not forwards.

FRACTION. FRAGMENT. FRACTURE. RUPTURE.

FRACTION, FRAGMENT, and FRACTURE are derivatives of the Lat. *frangĕre*, part. *fractus*, *to break*. FRAGMENT is properly expressive of the result of physical disintegration, or what is closely analogous to it; as, fragment of a mountain, a dress, a loaf, a fragment of an ancient poet. FRACTION is a term bearing more distinct reference to a unit or a magnitude to which it stands proportionably related. FRACTURE is the violent discontinuity of parts, and applies to hard and more or less brittle substances, as RUPTURE (Lat. *ruptūra*, from *rumpĕre*, *to break asunder*) to those which are softer and more elastic. The fracture of the skull; the rupture of a blood-vessel. The force of fracture too is external; that of rupture from within.

"Several parcels of nature retain still the evident marks of *fraction* and ruin."—BURNET.

"It has been said that if the prodigies of the Jewish history had been found only in the *fragments* of Manetho or Berosus, we should have paid no regard to them, and I am willing to admit this."—PALEY.

"High-piled hills of *fractured* earth."
THOMSON.

"Meanwhile the tepid caves, and fens, and shores,
Their brood as numerous hatch from the egg that soon
Bursting with kindly *rupture*, forth disclosed
Their callow young." MILTON.

FRAGRANCE. SCENT. ODOUR. PERFUME. SMELL. AROMA.

SCENT (Fr. *sentir*, Lat. *sentīre*, *to perceive*) and SMELL (perhaps L. Ger. *smellen*, *to smoke*. Richardson suggests a possible A. S. *smæc-lian*, or *smæg-lian*, as diminutive of A. S. *smæccan*, *to smack*, *taste*) express both the sense or its exercise, and that which acts upon it. In this latter application, SMELL is generic, and expresses any kind of emanation which affects the olfactory nerves, whether pleasant or otherwise. Scent is the smell which issues naturally from a body, and is peculiar to it, as the scent of a rose or a fox.

ODOUR (Lat. *ŏdōrem*) is a newer word in English than SMELL, for which it serves as little more than a polite substitute.

AROMA (Gr. ἄρωμα, *spice*, *sweet herb*) though now employed almost identically with FRAGRANCE, yet had originally the sense of the peculiar fragrance of spices. So Chaucer—

"My chamber is strowed with mirre and insence,
With sote savoring alos, and with sinamone
Breathing an *aromatike* redolence."

PERFUME (Fr. *parfum*, Lat. *per, through*, *fūmus, smoke*) is better applied to inanimate and strong, as FRAGRANCE (Lat. *frāgrantia*) is better employed of animate, fresh, and delicate odours. The perfume of incense or of musk; the fragrance of fresh flowers. In a close and over-scented atmosphere we might complain of the sickening effect of perfume, but hardly of fragrance. Odour is the emanation which affects the organs of sense; a smell is the action of that emanation on the sense. Odour belongs to the body imparting, smell to the body receiving, the impression. Odour is to the sense of smelling what light is to the sense of seeing. An odour may be very slight, a scent is of some considerable strength. If we were speaking of a substance not specific, as water, we should say that it had no smell or odour; if of a specific object, as a certain kind of rose, we should say that it had either no smell or no scent.

"While, whispering pleasure as they fly,
Cool zephyrs through the clear blue sky
Their gathered *fragrance* fling."
GRAY.

"The *scentless* and the *scented* rose."
COWPER.

"The whole house was filled with the *odour* of the ointment."—*Bible.*

"The Emperor Commodus retired to Laurentum, as the sea-air, *perfumed* by the odour of the numerous laurels that flourished along the coast, was considered as a powerful antidote against the pestilential vapours."—EUSTACE, *Italy.*

"All the *smell* of plants and of other bodies is caused by these volatile parts, and is smelled wherever they are scattered in the air; and the acuteness of *smell* in some animals shows us that these effluvia spread far, and must be inconceivably subtle."—REID.

FRAME. CONSTITUTION. TEMPERAMENT. COMPOSITION.

The FRAME (A. S. *fremman, to further, to effect*) is the structure, the CONSTITUTION (Lat. *constĭtutionem, disposition*) is the temper or aggregate of powers in such structures as have life and organization. A man's frame is his limbs, muscles, bones, nerves, &c.; his constitution is that same frame taken in connexion with its vital powers and condition. It is only a metaphorical mode of speech when we speak of anyone as being in a particular frame of mind, which means no more than state. Emotion may agitate the frame. Intemperance will shake the constitution. The frame of government in England is its political form or structure, and might be given in a few words. Its constitution is matter of long study and exposition, embracing the growth and development of its forces and their reciprocal action and adjustment.

TEMPERAMENT (Lat. *temperāmentum, proportionate mixture*) is the state in respect to the predominance of any quality, or the proportion of different qualities or parts.

The COMPOSITION (Lat. *compŏsĭtionem, a putting together*) is the sum of the parts which make up a thing. It involves all needful elements, with their disposition, in due proportion and orderly arrangement, whether in natural or artificial productions, in organic or inorganic forms.

"The elementary *composition* of bodies."
WHEWELL.

"Some bloody passion shakes your very *frame*."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Our *constitutions* have never been enfeebled by the vices or luxuries of the old world."—STORY.

"Galen was a better physician than an ill divine, while he determines the soul to be the complexion and *temperament* of the prime qualities."—BISHOP HALL.

FRAME. FORM.

To FRAME is to give unity by mutual adaptation of parts. To FORM is to give unity in any way. In framing, the parts have as direct a relation to the whole as to one another. In forming, the parts may have a direct relation to the whole, but no organic relation among themselves. The essence of framing is construction; the essence of forming is collocation. A carpenter *frames* a box by shaping and fitting top, bottom, sides, &c. A certain disposition of ground, water, trees and buildings might *form* a

pleasing landscape. Both terms are used in a secondary as well as material sense. In that case FRAME preserves the analogy of material construction, and applies to the more complex and elaborate, FORM to the more simple, processes of the mind. We form ideas, conceptions, and the like; we frame arguments, answers, excuses, devices, theories. FRAME always denotes the action of man; FORM is applicable also to the constitutions of nature. The founder of a society frames it; its members form it, that is, constitute it.

"How many excellent reasonings are *framed* in the mind of a man of wisdom and study in the length of years!"—WATTS.

"God *formed* man of the dust of the ground."—*Bible.*

FRAUD. GUILE. CIRCUMVENTION.

FRAUD (Lat. *fraudem, deceit*) and GUILE (O. Fr. *guile*) have in common the idea of duplicity, or deceit in action; but they differ in the motives in which they directly originate. Fraud aims at the disadvantage of another, or is at least such a deceiving of one's neighbour as shall in some way redound to one's own benefit and his loss, inconvenience, or humiliation. Guile is a wily regard for one's own interests, without directly referring to the interests of one's neighbour. In the views of high morality, guile is fraud, as truth is that of which no man ought to be robbed through the instrumentality of deceit. Guile is more an abstract quality than fraud. Guile is in the nature; fraud is embodied in act. Guile in the character is a foul blot and an intense evil. Many good qualities must be absent to admit of guile, many high qualities contemned. There must be a disregard of truth, justice, candour, and generosity in the man of guile, while selfishness predominates, and deceit is ever ready to carry out its aims.

"An Israelite indeed, in whom is no *guile*."—*Bible.*

"Take heed, my Lord' the welfare of us all
Hangs on the cutting short that *fraudful* man." SHAKESPEARE.

CIRCUMVENTION (Lat. *circumventionem, circumvĕnīre, to encircle, beset*) is the gaining of one's ends in treating with another. This may be by fraud, but may also be by address. It trades either on the weaknesses, the ignorance of others, or their comparatively inferior knowledge or experience. It is the process of stratagem.

"Cunning is only the want of understanding, which, because it cannot compass its ends by direct ways, would do it by a trick and *circumvention*."—LOCKE.

FREE. INDEPENDENT.

He is FREE (*see* FREEDOM) who is not subject to any constraint; he is INDEPENDENT who is not subject to any influence or consideration. Liberty involves freedom of action; independence freedom of desires. A free man does only what he pleases, an independent man desires only what pleases him, without being under any motive which acts upon his will one way or another. Man is a free agent, inasmuch as he has the choice of his actions, but he is not independent, inasmuch as he is always subject to influences which determine his wishes. He is never, for instance, independent of his duty, though he may be free to perform or neglect it. A free spirit is unfettered by cares and such thoughts as intrude themselves to the embarrassment of the movements of the mind. An independent spirit is one which will not suffer itself to be guided by prejudice or dictated to by authority. Man possesses moral liberty, but moral independence is for none.

FREE. EXEMPT.

EXEMPTION (Lat. *exemptionem, a removing*) is a species of freedom, or freedom from certain things, and under certain circumstances.

FREEDOM may come in various ways, and may be said of anything from which it is desirable to be free; as to be free from pain, inconvenience, oppression, interruption. EXEMPTION carries our minds to a dispensing power. Hence we may be exempted from any natural ill if we deem ourselves leniently or mercifully dealt with by Divine Providence; or we

are exempt by virtue of some human authority which binds others, as an obligation, a service, or a tax. Exemption is that sort of freedom which consists in not sharing the liabilities to which *others* are subject. We may be free casually, or by natural causes or circumstances, we are exempt by exceptional arrangement.

"In this, then, consists *freedom*, namely, in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall choose or will."—LOCKE.

"Can authors their *exemption* draw
From Nature's or the common law?
They err alike with all mankind,
Yet not the same indulgence find."
LLOYD.

FREEDOM. LIBERTY.

FREEDOM is both a quality and a condition.

LIBERTY (Lat. *libertātem*, *liber*, *free*) is only a condition. Freedom is therefore more independent and abstract. Liberty relates to such restriction or confinement as is opposed to it. The slave when set at liberty shares that freedom which his master has all along enjoyed. So we may use the term FREEDOM in the sense of a free manner, or unrestrainedly; as, "They ate, drank, talked, and laughed with freedom." We could not say with liberty. Freedom rather represents a positive, liberty a negative, idea. We may be at liberty to speak in society on any subject we choose; but there will be many on which we shall be prevented from speaking with freedom. This distinction between FREEDOM and LIBERTY is not affected by the fact that in very many cases the terms might be employed indifferently. The bird escaped from its cage enjoys freedom and liberty, the first in the full use of its wings, the latter as being no longer a captive. Liberty is the power of putting one's will into action. Freedom is the absence of everything interfering with the exercise of that will.

"*Freedom*, or not freedom, can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act."—LOCKE.

"The natural *liberty* of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule."—*Ibid.*

FREQUENT. HAUNT. INFEST.

The difference between these terms is a practical one. When we mean habitual resort of no harmful character, we say FREQUENT (Lat. *frĕquentare*, *frĕquens*, *frequent*); when we mean to imply the impropriety or unpropitiousness of the resort, we use HAUNT (Fr. *hanter*; possibly Lat. *habĭtāre*, LITTRÉ). This distinction is of comparatively recent introduction into the language. The unfavourable sense has passed over to the haunters. Ordinary men frequent. Thieves, ghosts, and wild beasts are said to haunt. So in the case of the noun—the resorts of pleasure; the haunts of vice. But this distinction again is of modern growth. FREQUENT carries with it more the ideas of activity and voluntariness, HAUNT those of passiveness and extraneous influence. Interest and desire of enjoyment induce us to frequent. Interest and melancholy associations induce us to haunt. We seek eagerly when we frequent, when we haunt it is often in spite of ourselves. We are, as it were, spell-bound.

INFEST (Fr. *infester*, Lat. *infestāre*) denotes such haunting or frequenting as commonly involves a plurality of beings, and always annoyance or injury as the result of their visitations. It is only by a kind of rhetorical impersonation that the term is applied to other than living agents, as when Addison speaks of the cares and passions that *infest* human life.

"The Lord of Flies, so called (whether from the concourse of flies to the abundance of the sacrifices, or for his aid implored against the *infestation* of these swarms), was held the chief."—BISHOP HALL.

"He *frequented* the court of Augustus."
DRYDEN.

"I've charged thee not to *haunt* about my doors." SHAKESPEARE.

FREQUENTLY. OFTEN. COMMONLY. ORDINARILY. GENERALLY. USUALLY.

OFTEN (A.S. *oft*) commonly refers to a series known to be established; or, given the fact of the series, denotes that the repetition of its items is numerous; or, in other words, OFTEN relates to a

standard of frequency implied or expressed, and has a sort of fixed value.

FREQUENTLY (*see* FREQUENT) denotes the simple numerous repetition of anything, without any natural or scientific but only a moral standard to which such repetition can be referred. Uncalculated recurrences occur frequently; calculated recurrences (if so it be) occur often. For instance, "How often does the wheel of that machine revolve in the hour?" It would be absurd to ask, "How frequently?" In truth FREQUENT expresses better that which occurs with rapid repetition, as the result of a variable cause, OFTEN as the result of an uniform cause. OFTEN belongs more to naked facts or events, FREQUENTLY to such as are the results of action and habit. I have often happened to meet him. I have frequently been to see him.

COMMONLY denotes that kind of frequency, the non-occurrence of which would create surprise; ORDINARILY, that which follows, or seems to follow, a fixed *order* or *rule* (Lat. *ordĭnem*).

GENERALLY, that which occurs in the majority of similar cases, so that the contrary would be an exception or a specific deviation.

USUALLY (Lat. *ūsus, custom*), that which occurs in such a way that the idea of custom is connected either with the occurrence itself or with the observation of him who experiences or takes cognizance of it.

HABITUALLY (Fr. *habituel, habitual*), that which exhibits both the force and the frequency of habit, and usually its frequency alone.

FRESH. NEW.

AS NEW (Fr. *neuf*, Lat. *nŏvus*) denotes that which either absolutely and in itself, or relatively to us, has existed only recently, so FRESH (A.S. *fresc*) denotes that which brings with it some force or characteristic of novelty beyond the fact of it. A new instance of kindness is simply one more. A fresh instance is one that comes as freely as if none others had preceded it, the term expressing freedom of supply; or again, a new house is one recently built, a fresh house is an additional erection of the builder.

"A *fresh* pleasure in every *fresh* posture of the limbs."—LANDOR.

"Thou profoundest hell,
Receive thy *new* possessor." MILTON.

FRETFUL. CROSS. PEEVISH. PETULANT. QUERULOUS.

FRETFUL (A.S. *frettan, i.e. for-etan, to eat away*) denotes a disposition which exaggerates and feels unduly causes of annoyance or irritation, and so exhibits itself in a complaining impatience. Fretfulness is constitutional, showing itself in persons of weak and nervous temperament, invalids, and sickly children.

"Are you positive and *fretful*,
Heedless, ignorant, forgetful?"
SWIFT.

CROSSNESS (*i.e.* as its formation indicates, *thwartedness* or *thwartingness*) is such fretfulness as shows itself in unkindness of speech or manner to others Crossness is a thing of humour and often passes off rapidly. It is peevishness mixed with vexation or anger.

"The lighter sort of malignity turneth but to a *crossness* or aptness to oppose; but the deeper sort to envy or mere mischief."—BACON.

PEEVISH (WEDGEWOOD compares Da. *piave, to whimper, cry like a child*) denotes a querulous dissatisfaction which it would be impossible to justify. It is often constitutional, the result of temperament, old age, and physical infirmity.

"*Valentine.* Cannot your grace win her to fancy him?
Duke. No, trust me; she is *peevish*, sullen, forward,
Proud, disobedient, stubborn, lacking duty."
SHAKESPEARE.

PETULANCE (Lat. *pĕtŭlantia, saucineness*, from obs. *pĕtŭlare, to assail in jest*) is less sour and more energetic than PEEVISHNESS. It is capricious passion unrestrained, which is impatient of authority and control, and is characteristically exhibited by the young against their elders or superiors.

"The pride and *petulance* of youth."—WATTS.

QUERULOUS (Lat. *quĕrŭlus*) denotes the disposition which is continually ex-

pressing itself in little complaints of trivial grievances or ill-treatment.

"Enmity can hardly be more annoying than *querulous*, jealous, exacting fondness."—MACAULAY.

It is the expression of peevish discontent.

FRIGHTEN. TERRIFY. INTIMIDATE. ALARM. SCARE. STARTLE.

To FRIGHTEN (A.S. *fyrhtu, fright*) is to put in a condition of fear suddenly, and so violently as to paralyze and take complete possession of the mind. A brave man may feel fear; but it is a manifestation of cowardice to be frightened. Fright proceeds from the apprehension of physical evil.

To TERRIFY (Lat. *terrificāre*) is to inflict terror, which is a stronger form of fright, and leading to an instinctive effort at *escape* from the object dreaded.

INTIMIDATE (Fr. *intimider*) is usually a purposed act, and commonly done with the design of *compelling to action, or deterring from it*; as, to intimidate by threats. Even where the cause is an influence, and not a conscious agent, the result is the same. "He did not put to sea, being intimidated by the weather."

To ALARM (*see* ALARM) is to induce the feeling that cause exists for fear, whether the fear be actually felt or not, or turn out to have been groundless.

To SCARE (Nor. *skjerra, to frighten*) is to cause to desist, or to fly, from fright. It is to produce suddenly the combined effect of fright and repugnance.

To STARTLE is to cause to *start* with fright or fear, hence it involves, when literally taken, an involuntary movement of the body. Yet it is not expressive of great or lasting fear, and may be almost entirely produced by great surprise into which little fear enters.

"The supposition that angels assume bodies need not *startle* us."—LOCKE.

"Antony, on the other hand, was desirous to have him there, fancying that he would either be *frightened* into a compliance which would lessen him with his own party, or by opposing what was intended, make himself odious to the soldiery."—MIDDLETON, *Life of Cicero.*

"Infectious cowardice
In thee hath *terrified* our host."
CHAPMAN, *Homer.*

"Before the accession of James I., or at least during the reigns of his three immediate predecessors, the government of England was a government by force, that is, the king carried his measures in Parliament by *intimidation*."—PALEY.

"By proof we feel
Our power sufficient to disturb this heaven,
And with perpetual inroads to *alarm*,
Though inaccessible, his fatal throne;
Which, if not victory, is yet revenge."
MILTON.

"And as a child, when *scaring* sounds molest,
Clings close and closer to the mother's breast."
COWPER.

FULFIL. DISCHARGE. REALIZE. SUBSTANTIATE.

To FULFIL is to *fill up* according to a measure or standard, which may be internal or external, personal or otherwise; as to fulfil one's own intention, promise, the desire of another, a law, an obligation or duty, expectations or hopes entertained.

DISCHARGE (O. Fr. *descharger, to unburden*) is to relieve one's self of what is of the nature of a weight laid upon us in the form of an obligation, duty, debt, or office. Generally speaking, we discharge in order to relieve ourselves, we fulfil in order to satisfy others.

To SUBSTANTIATE is to give substance, in the sense of reality, to things of statement, claim, or assertion, by the means of proof or evidence. It is sometimes, however, employed in the sense of giving solidity to what is capable of being enjoyed or possessed in a more or less developed form.

"He would not embitter their enjoyments, but he would sweeten and *substantiate* them."—KNOX.

REALIZE is to bring from abstract or possible into *real* existence. We realize a scheme when we carry it effectually into execution. We realize a description when we can bring it vividly before the mind's eye. We realize an estate when we convert it into money.

"The Spirit dictates all such petitions, and God Himself is first the author and then the *fulfiller* of them."—SOUTH.

"Had I a hundred tongues, a wit so large
As could these hundred offices *discharge*."
DRYDEN.

"It will be as hard to apprehend as that an empty wish should remove mountains; a supposition which, if *realized*, would relieve Sisyphus."—GLANVILL.

FULNESS. PLENITUDE.

Although these words are etymologically equivalent, the Lat. *plēnus* and the English *full* being closely allied, PLENITUDE (Lat. *plēnĭtūdĭnem*) is used in a higher style, and with a more abstract leaning. Indeed, PLENITUDE is never physical fulness, but moral, denoting the possession of some power or qualification in a noble and pre-eminent degree. The fulness of a stream, the fulness of enjoyment. The plenitude of power, wisdom, authority. Fulness, however, is equally applicable to physical and moral abundance.

"A short sentence may be oftentimes a large and a mighty prayer. Devotion so managed being like water in a well, where you have *fullness* in a little compass."—SOUTH.

"The painting preserves the same character, not only when He is supposed descending to take vengeance upon the wicked, but even when He exerts the like *plenitude* of power in acts of beneficence to mankind."—BURKE.

FURIOUS. VIOLENT. VEHEMENT. IMPETUOUS.

FURIOUS (Lat. *fūrĭōsus, raging*) means having fury, which is excessive and violent *rage*. The term FURIOUS as applied to natural forces is not proper. A furious wind is a metaphor, meaning animated as if with the spirit of a furious man. A furious force is one which displays itself in such a way that we cannot foretell the extent to which it may reach, or the mischief it may do.

VIOLENT (Lat. *vĭŏlentus, violent, boisterous*) means exercising great or undue force contrary to law, reason, or moderation.

VEHEMENT (Lat. *vĕhĕmens, impetuous*) conveys the idea of pursuing one's own ends with keenness and energy, though it is not exclusively used of human character or demeanour. A vehement wind or stream is one which seems eagerly bent on running its own course. In their moral applications, men are furious in their passions; violent in speech, manner, and conduct; vehement in their expressions, desires, and pursuits. It may be observed that vehemence is in its effects confined to the subject, while fury and violence tend to effect others. Violence is never laudable; vehemence may be.

IMPETUOUS (Lat. *impĕtus, assault, violent impulse*) is used both mechanically and morally. Mechanically, impetus is nearly equivalent to momentum, being measured by the multiplication of mass into velocity, but it is used less strictly and more popularly. Morally, impetuosity conveys the idea of being carried away by the feeling of the moment with eagerness, and with little reflexion.

"A power steps in that limits the arrogance of raging passions and *furious* elements, and says, 'So far shalt thou go, and no farther.'"—BURKE.

In matters of human conduct violence is often coupled, or contrasted, with fraud; violence and fraud being the two main modes of wrong-dealing among men.

"Since he who begins to violate the happiness of another does what is wrong, he who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that *violence* does in that respect what is right by the terms."—WOOLASTON.

"Thy present wants, or fears, or desires carry thy spirit in thy own prayers eagerly and *vehemently* in pursuit of those thy wants, fears, or desires, because they are things presently incumbent upon thee and in thy view."—HALE.

Vehemence is the manifestation in act or demeanour of eagerness. The impetuous man is he who is actuated by a variety of motives of unequal and uncertain power.

"There being no kind of vice which men would not abandon themselves unto, considering the *impetuousness* of their own natural appetites, and the power of external temptations, were this restraint from religion once removed and abolished."—WILKINS.

Vigour of scope and rapidity of action in regard to an aim or subject characterize impetuosity; energy and sustained rapidity of movement, vehemence; excess or abuse of force, violence; while violence with distraction becomes fury. The impetuous man, though not wise, is capable of an act of dashing bravery. The vehement

man will do what he has set himself to do with vigour and vivacity. The violent man ought to be shunned; the furious man put under restraint.

G.

GAIN. EMOLUMENT. LUCRE. PROFIT.

GAIN (Icel. *gagn, advantage;* not the Fr. *gagner*) is here a generic term. It denotes that which comes to a man as the fruit of his exertions, or accrues to him as a desirable possession. The gain accrues directly to the man. The PROFIT (Lat. *prŏfĭcĕre, to be of advantage*) arises from his trade or dealing, and the matters which are the subject of it. Hence gains are commonly upon a considerable scale, profits are commonly made in little instalments; but the gain is more uncertain or casual than the profit, which ought to accrue in a regular manner as the fruit of professional industry, while we often hear of ill-gotten gain. Yet exorbitant profit, though it retain the name, is sometimes a kind of theft.

EMOLUMENT (Lat. *ēmŏlŭmentum, effort, gain*) is any profit arising from office, employment, or labour. It supposes, however, some dignity of occupation, and would not be employed of menial work, manual labour, or even a petty trade; and is most commonly employed of *official* income and revenue, including indirect and fluctuating sources of payment, as fees, dues, and the like.

LUCRE (Lat. *lŭcrum, gain, profit*) is a term very seldom used, and, when used, denotes sordid or ill-gotten gain. The verb to *gain* is distinguished from the verb to *win* as *endeavour* is distinguished from *luck* or *address;* but the noun GAIN is used in the broadest sense as the opposite of loss. But some amount of action is presupposed, of which gain is the result. That which accrues to a man by fixed order, as for instance, an hereditary estate, is not strictly a gain, though it may be a boon.

"A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expenses of cultivation, should *gain* both the rent of the landlord and the *profit* of the farmer. He is apt to denominate, however, his whole *gain profit,* and thus confounds rent with profit; at least in common language." SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"His prædia, in like manner, were tributes, tolls, portage, bankage, stockage, coinage, profits by salt pits, mills, watercourses, and whatsoever *emoluments* grew by them, and the like."—HOLINSHED.

"Albeit for profit and *lucre* all things are set to sale."—*Ibid.*

GAMBOL. PRANK. FROLIC.

GAMBOL (once spelt *gambauld, gambaud;* Fr. *gambade,* It. *gambata, a jumping about*) is a skipping, playing, or leaping in merriment.

PRANK (WEDGWOOD compares Ger. *prangen, to glitter,* Du. *pronk, finery;* and connects *prank* with *prance*) is an act which is merry and ludicrous, and tends to mischief towards others, or a personal joke or trick.

A FROLIC (Ger. *fröhlich, glad. merry*) is an exuberant manifestation of a mind which requires sportive relaxation. Dumb animals gambol. Young people have their pranks and frolics.

"Bears, tigers, ounces, pards
Gambol'd before them."
MILTON.

"In came the harpies, and played their accustomed *pranks.*"—RALEGH.

"While many a pastime circled in the shade,
The young contending as the old surveyed;
And many a gambol *frolicked* o'er the ground,
And sleights of art and feats of strength went round." GOLDSMITH.

GAME. PLAY.

PLAY (A. S. *plegan, to play*) is a common term for any active form of amusement. Play becomes GAME (A. S. *gamian, to play*) when it is systematic and is exercised according to rule. The verb to play, however, is employed in reference to games. Boys are at play when they amuse themselves in a random manner. When they go to cricket they begin a game. But in regard to the verbs, to play a game is the phrase used, because to

game is restricted to playing at games of chance or gambling.

"It is very remarkable that the people of these islands are great gamblers. They have a *game* very much like our draughts."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"The lamb thy riot dooms to bleed to-day,
Had he thy reason, would he skip and *play?*
Pleased to the last he crops the flow'ry mead,
And licks the hand just raised to shed his blood." POPE.

GAUDY. SHOWY. GAY.

GAUDY is displaying gauds (Lat. *gaudium, joy, an object producing joy*) or trinkets; hence ostentatiously showy in colour or decoration.

GAY (Fr. *gai, merry*) denotes such colouring as expresses or inspires gladness. Nor is it restricted to colouring; but life, activity, form, festive arrangement, and light, equally contribute to a gay scene.

SHOWY (A. S. *sceawe, a show*) is strikingly conspicuous, on the score of colouring more especially, or ornamentation. The three terms are applicable to inanimate substances as well as to persons; as gaudy furniture, showy dress, a gay parterre. Gay lies at one extreme, and is a term of praise. Gaudy at the opposite extreme, as a term of dispraise. Showy lies between the two.

"The modern invention of multiplying the works of the artists by devices which require no ingenuity, has prostituted the ornaments of a temple to the *gaudiness* of a suburban villa, and the decorations of a palace to the embellishment of a tradesman's door-post."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"Belinda smiled, and all the world was *gay*." POPE.

"When they had taken any spoils from the enemy, the men would make a present of everything that was rich and *showy* to the women whom they most admired."—*Spectator*.

GAZE. GAPE. STARE.

These terms express a fixedness of look, and vary according to the emotion of mind which produces them.

We GAZE (Sw. *gasa, to stare with fright*, cf. *aghast:* SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) when the attention is roused and fixed by the curious, the interesting, the beautiful, or the affecting.

We GAPE (A. S. *geápan, to gape*) from idle curiosity, ignorant wonder, or listless, open-mouthed amusement of mind.

We STARE (A. S. *stárian, to stare, gaze*) whenever, from any motive, we fasten unconscious looks, as from wonder, surprise, stupidity, fright or horror, impudence or curiosity.

"So, checking his desire, with trembling heart,
Gazing he stood, nor would nor could depart:
Fixed as a pilgrim 'wildered in his way,
Who dares not stir by night, for fear to stray,
But stands with awful eyes to watch the dawn of day." DRYDEN.

"The Dutch, who are more famous for their industry and application than for wit and humour, hang up in several of their streets what they call the sign of the *gaper;* that is, the head of an idiot dressed in cap and bells, and gaping in a most immoderate manner. This is a standing jest at Amsterdam."—*Spectator*.

"They stand *staring* and looking upon Me."—*Bible*.

GEM. JEWEL.

The Latin *gemma* had other senses than that of *a precious stone;* as, *a bud*. When applied to precious stones it meant not only those which were precious from their rarity and intrinsic substance, but those also on which the skill of the engraver had bestowed an artistic value. Not only the diamond or the emerald, but the cornelian and the agate incised by the sculptor, are classically speaking GEMS.

JEWEL, on the other hand (O. Fr. *joyel*) is not employed to designate any stones but those which are of intrinsic value. In old English, however, a precious ornament of gold, or of more than one inlaid gem or precious stone, was called a JEWEL.

GENDER. SEX.

SEX (Fr. *sexe*, Lat. *sexus*) is a natural division of animals.

GENDER (Fr. *genre*, Lat. *gĕnus, -ĕris*) is the technical or artificial recognition of sex, its exclusion, and its analogies. There are two sexes and three genders.

"*Gender* being founded on the distinction of the two *sexes*, it is plain that in a proper

sense it can only find place in the names of living creatures which admit the distinction of male and female, and therefore can be ranged under the masculine or feminine genders."—BLAIR.

GENIUS. TASTE. SCIENCE.

GENIUS (*see* ABILITY) is a pure gift of nature. That which it produces is the work of a moment.

TASTE (Fr. *tâter*, O. Fr. *taster*) is seen in works of study and time. It belongs to the exhibition of a multitude of rules established or assumed. It produces only conventional beauty. That a work should be good on principles of taste, it must be elegant, finished, worked up without an appearance of elaborateness. A work of genius will wear an air of neglect, an irregular, unstudied, bold, and even perhaps wild character. A keen perception of beauties and faults belongs to taste. Life, grandeur, power, force of imagination, activity of conception, belong to genius. Taste sees what is calculated to produce agreeable sensations. Genius produces striking and forcible impressions. Taste is trained. Genius seizes as by intuition, forms a conception without imitation, and realizes it without rule, yet acting upon the principles of rule without being conscious of it. Custom, philosophy, intercourse with men of taste strengthen taste. Taste in the arts, as in everything, is the recognition of the beautiful or the graceful, the love of that which is intrinsically excellent, and the preference of and acquiescence in it.

SCIENCE (Lat. *scientia, knowledge*) is, in those matters in which it may play a part with genius and taste, the exact knowledge of the rules of art, the practical conformity of art to the truth of nature. Genius is the most powerful and the least imitable of all. It often needs to be corrected by science and tempered by taste. Science is the most exact, rigid, and judicial; but truth may be barren, and science without impulse, feeling, and imagination may elicit no more than the cold sympathy of reason. Taste is the most elegant, graceful, and agreeable.

GENTLE. MILD. MEEK, SOFT. BLAND. TAME.

GENTLE (O. Fr. *gentil*, Lat. *gentilis, gentem, a family*) denoted primarily *well-born*. Hence, refined in manners, and, by a further extension of meaning, of quiet nature and placid disposition. The term, therefore, is applicable to the natures of animals, and only by analogy to external forces and influences; indeed, to anything capable of producing soft and soothing impressions on the one hand, or violent and harsh on the other. A gentle person, look, force, voice, and the like.

"Oh, *gently* on thy suppliant's head,
Dread Goddess, lay thy chastening hand;
Not in thy Gorgon terrors clad,
Nor circled with the vengeful band."
GRAY.

GENTLE is thus an essentially relative term, implying the absence of its contrary, and, therefore, most expressive in those subjects where the contrary is usual or conceivable.

TAME (A. S. *tám*) denotes that gentleness which is the result of training or domestication. The sheep is a gentle animal; the wolf may be tamed. By a metaphor, TAME is used to signify spiritless; as, "a tame resistance," "a tame poem." Tameness is a condition in which ferocity or energy is absent or has been subdued. As gentleness implies inherent energy and power, which is exercised in moderation at the dictates of the will or disposition, so tameness implies the absence of these qualities, as being the manifestation of mere temperament, natural or acquired. Tameness is inanimate tractableness or quiet, and so is often employed of animals whose nature makes them easy of association with man.

"That it may not be suspected that there is anything of *tameness* or mean-spiritedness in this conduct, the advantage in point of dignity and esteem really lies on the side of the good-natured and peaceable man."—WATERLAND.

MILD (A. S. *milde*) conveys the idea of subdued but not deteriorated energy. The air is mild, which might be harsh; the fruit is mild, which might have been acrid or strong; the

expression is mild, which might have been stern; the disposition is mild, which might have been given to severity, but seems alien to it.

"*Mildness* would better suit with majesty, Than rash revenge and rough severity."
DRAYTON.

Mildness and gentleness are compatible with power and penetration, which SOFTNESS (A. S. *soft*, *soft*) is not. A soft voice, a soft light, soft music, all please and soothe, but do not enrapture. The characteristic idea of softness is pleasant impress. It is opposed to harshness and hardness. It is equally opposed to energy and resistingness. Hence the tendency of the term to assume morally an unfavourable character; as denoting effeminacy, too great susceptibility, and too great simplicity.

"There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted (such as Plutarch and Atticus), who out of a certain *softness* and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up besides Him an evil soul or Dæmon above the world, self-existent, to bear all the blame of them."
—CUDWORTH.

MEEKNESS (Dan. *myg*, *pliant*) differs from mildness, gentleness, and softness, in being never applied, like them, to the deportment, but only to the temper or character. It is a theological virtue; but with the world at large it is not in favour; whence has been imposed upon it the idea of *excessive* submissiveness, and an absence of that "spirit" which more readily finds admiration. It may be observed that meekness at least excludes obstinacy as well as pride; while persons who have softness in manner are often found by no means wanting in self-will. Meekness results from the absence of arrogant self-will or self-assertion. It is the quality which meets not violence with violence, or force with force, or clamour with clamour, but endures provocation and submits to wrong.

"By inheriting the earth, He meant inheriting those things which are without question the greatest blessings upon earth, calmness or composure of spirit, tranquillity, cheerfulness, peace, and comfort of mind. Now these I apprehend, are the peculiar portion and recompense of the *meek*."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

BLAND (Lat. *blandus*, *flattering*, *alluring*) is that which produces pleasing impressions by soothing qualities of character, and is employed exclusively of the outer manifestations of expression and manners. It is ordinarily associated with calmness and dignity, with affableness and courtliness in superiors. A bland manner in a friend or equal would be unacceptable, as approaching too nearly to condescension. Milton uses the term of natural influences—"Exhilarating vapours bland."

"Arrayed in arms, and *bland* in voice and look." LEWIS, *Statius*.

GHASTLY. GRIM. GRISLY.

GHASTLY (A. S. *gæstlic*, *frightful*) is the same word as *ghostly*; hence the predominant idea is that of a supernatural or deathlike pallor, from which the signification has been extended to denote simply deadly, horrible; as, "ghastly wounds."

"Her face was so *ghastly* that it could scarcely be recognised."—MACAULAY.

GRIM (A. S. *grim*, *savage*) is, on the other hand, essentially connected with *life* and the expression of *the countenance* of man or beast. Surliness, ferocity, and gravity, combined into a fixed and rigid expression, would constitute grimness.

"The *grim* face of law."—DENHAM.

GRISLY (A. S. *gryslic*, *terrible*) applies to the whole form or appearance, and conveys the idea of fear as produced through what is ugly and forbidding.

"My *grisly* countenance made others fly."
SHAKESPEARE.

GHOST. APPARITION. SPECTRE. PHANTOM. VISION. PHANTASM.

GHOST (A. S. *gást*, *a spirit*) is primarily, though this sense is no longer colloquial, the spirit or soul of a man. Hence, as a synonym with those given above, it denotes an apparition of a specific kind, that is, of the spirit of some departed person in visible though disembodied form.

"I thought that I had died in sleep,
And was a blessed *ghost.*"
COLERIDGE.

APPARITION (Lat. *appărĭtiōnem, an attendance,* from *appārēre, to appear*) is the generic term, of which GHOST is a species. A sudden appearance which produces a startling effect from its unexpectedness is an apparition in the broadest sense of the word. An apparition is always of a person or a collective object, not of many objects or a complex view.

"I think it is the weakness of mine eyes
That shapes this monstrous *apparition.*"
SHAKESPEARE.

SPECTRE (Lat. *spectrum*) is a preternatural personal appearance without individuality, and therefore not assumed to be in particular the spirit of any, either departed or living. Both GHOST and SPECTRE are in their common acceptation taken for something human.

An apparition or a VISION (Lat. *vīsiōnem, a seeing, an apparition*) might be of a celestial nature, as of angels, or an angel; VISION including more than a solitary apparition, and admitting the idea of *a scene* in which many figures appear. Nor is the term SPECTRE employed but in the sense of an uncongenial or horrible apparition. A lovely vision; a hideous spectre. VISION differs from APPARITION as the subjective from the objective. One has a vision, one sees an apparition. A vision may come from a frenzied or even disordered imagination, an apparition is supposed to have an external reality.

"Thus passed the night so foul, till morning fair
Came forth with pilgrim steps in amice gray;
Who with her radiant fingers stilled the roar
Of thunder, chased the clouds, and laid the winds
And grisly *spectres,* which the fiend had raised
To tempt the Son of God with terrors dire." MILTON.

"Upon the foot of this construction it is supposed that Isaiah, in prophetic dream or *vision,* heard God speaking to him, like as St. Peter heard a voice and saw a *vision* while he lay in a trance, and that in idea he transacted all that God so ordered him to do."—WATERLAND

PHANTOM (Fr. *fantôme,* Lat. *phantasma, an image, an appearance*) denotes what has an apparent but no real existence. No spirit is therefore supposed for it.

PHANTASM (Lat.; from Gr. φάντασμα, *an appearance, phantom*) equally expresses the unreal, but is purely subjective, and refers what is seen or imagined to the mind acting upon itself. A phantom is a single object, as a spectre or a will-o'-the-wisp. A phantasm may be a complex object or a scene. We even speak of phantasms in the sense of creations of a diseased or disordered imagination; but a phantom expresses more the *delusion,* phantasm the *play* of the misguided mind.

"Like the French Republic, the Italian Republic is in their eyes a *phantom* which appeared yesterday, and may vanish to-morrow."—EUSTACE, *Italy.*

"According to them, the Devil, that is so often spoken of in the Scriptures, is nothing else but either a disease of the body or a *phantasm* in the brain, or the wicked principles and inclinations of a man's heart."—SHARP.

GIGANTIC. COLOSSAL.

A GIANT is, or is supposed to be, a *living being,* as the Titans and Giants (Lat. *gĭgantes*) of antiquity.

A COLOSSUS (Gr. κολοσσός) is a gigantic *statue* like that of Apollo, seventy cubits high, which stood at the mouth of the harbour of ancient Rhodes, and was absurdly supposed to have bestridden it. This difference lies at the root of their application. Both are equally symbolical of what exceeds the ordinary human limits of magnitude in bulk, but the former only expresses what is vast in mind or purpose. We speak equally of gigantic and colossal magnitude, or a gigantic or colossal stride; but a scheme of vast magnitude, though it might be termed gigantic, that is, such as a giant might conceive, could not be termed colossal.

GIVE. GRANT. BESTOW. CONFER. RENDER.

The idea common to these terms is that of communicating to others what

is our own, or in our power. And, indeed, GIVE (A. S. *gifan*) denotes this generally, and no more.

To GRANT, CONFER, and to BESTOW are characteristic modes of giving. To grant (O. Fr. *graanter*, L. Lat. *creantare, to guarantee*) is always from one person to one or more others, in accordance with an expectation, prayer, or request.

To BESTOW (*be-* and *stowe, a place*) meant originally to lay up in store. It is still used in parts of England in the sense of *to bury*. Hence its latter meaning is to give something of substantial value, with the intention of benefiting the object of the bestowal.

CONFER (Lat. *conferre, to bestow*) implies not so much the value of the thing given as the condescension of the giver, while GRANT implies his liberality and good will. Honours, distinctions, favours, privileges are conferred. Goods, gifts, endowments are bestowed. Requests, prayers, privileges, favours, gifts, allowances, opportunities are granted.

"*Give*, and it shall be *given* unto you."—*Bible.*

A peculiar sense attaches to the word GRANT as a legal term, as a piece of land granted to a noble or religious house. So Blackstone speaks of "the transfer of property by sale, grant, or conveyance."

To RENDER (Fr. *rendre*, Lat. *reddĕre*) is to bring in relation to a person or a state, and so to restore, pay, inflict, assign, contribute, furnish; or to bring into a state, as to render safe or unsafe, to render from one language into another.

"Render therefore unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's."—*Eng. Bible.*

"*Grant* me the place of this threshing-floor."—*Bible.*

"Almighty God, though He really doth and cannot otherwise do, yet will not seem to *bestow* His favours altogether gratis, but to expect some competent return, some small use and income for them."—BARROW.

"I esteem the encomiums you *conferred* upon me in the senate, together with your congratulatory letter, as a distinction of the highest and most illustrious kind."—MELMOTH, *Cicero.*

GLAD. JOYFUL. PLEASED. DELIGHTED. GRATIFIED.

GLAD (A. S. *glæd, shining, cheerful*) denotes the lowest degree of pleasure. It is the opposite term to sorry, and commonly no more denotes joyousness than SORRY denotes deep sorrow or grief. Hence it is used to express complimentary feeling, as, "I shall be glad to see you," and is commonly preceded by some augmentative word.

JOYFUL (Fr. *joie, joy*; Lat. pl. *gaudia*) is, on the other hand, used for the highest degree of pleasure excited by an external event. Gladness admits, however, of degrees, and may be more tempered, thoughtful, and lasting than joy, which may even be exuberant and excessive.

PLEASED (Fr. *plaisir, pleasure*) may denote either the pleasure of joy or the pleasure of satisfaction or approbation.

GRATIFIED (Lat. *grātĭfĭcāri, to gratify*) implies a sense of pleasure due to the behaviour of another.

DELIGHTED (O. Fr. *deliter*, from the Lat. *dĕlectare, to delight*) is a much stronger term than glad or pleased for expressing the same kind of feeling.

"Then are they *glad*, because they are at rest."—*Bible.*

"*Joy* is the vivid pleasure or delight inspired by immediate reception of something peculiarly grateful, of something obviously productive of an essential advantage, or of something which promises to contribute to our present or future well-being."—COGAN.

"It is supposed that the very determination which is the ground and spring of the will's act is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable and the mind better pleased in it than another; and this preference and superior *pleasedness* is the ground of all it does in the case."—EDWARDS.

The term GRATIFY extends to a peculiar meaning beyond that of personal conduct of one towards another, in which it is nearly synonymous with *indulge*; as the gratification of the senses, desires, and the like. When expressive of lively satisfaction at the act or conduct of another, it commonly indicates some superiority in the person satis-

fied; as, the father is gratified by his son's conduct.

"For who would die to *gratify* a foe?"
DRYDEN.

"So on they fared, *delighted* still to join
In mutual converse." MILTON.

GLANCE. GLIMPSE.

A GLANCE (Sw. *glans, brightness*) expresses both the sudden shooting of a bright object or ray of light before the eyes, and the rapid casting of the vision itself upon an object.

GLIMPSE (connected with *gleam, glow, glitter*, &c., and with Du. and Ger. *glimmen, to shine faintly*) differs in implying the seeing momentarily and imperfectly, while GLANCE implies that the object is seen momentarily and distinctly. GLANCE is more commonly voluntary, GLIMPSE involuntary. We take glances; we catch glimpses.

"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth *glance* from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Who this is we must learn, for man He seems
In all His lineaments, though in His face
The *glimpses* of His Father's glory shine."
MILTON.

GLIDE. SLIDE. SLIP.

To SLIP is commonly, though not necessarily, an involuntary movement (A. S. *slipan, to slip, glide away*).

To SLIDE (A. S. *slidan*) is voluntary or involuntary.

GLIDE (A. S. *glidan*) is voluntary, or analogous to it. SLIP conveys the idea of sliding in an accidental or deviating manner, as when the foot slips, or a bone slips out of its place. A slip is not only sudden and rapid, but it is short, while SLIDE and GLIDE are continuous and protracted. To slide is to move glibly over a surface, and without hindrance. But SLIDE and GLIDE differ, in that SLIDE always supposes a surface or basement upon and over which the movement takes place, while GLIDE expresses the movement alone. Noiseless, uninterrupted, equable, and apparently effortless progress may be called gliding. So a bird may be said to glide in the air, and ghosts glide from one chamber to another. A vessel glides *through* the water, not upon it.

"She (Medea) *glode* forth, as an adder doth." GOWER.

"They have not only *slid* imperceptibly, but have plunged openly into artifice."—LORD BOLINGBROKE.

"These worldly advantages, these honours, profits, pleasures, whatever they be, are of uncertain continuance, and may in a little time *slip* away from us; to be sure, we shall in a little time *slip* away from them."—ATTERBURY.

GLORY. HONOUR. FAME.

GLORY (Lat. *glōria*) is the result of success in such things as excite the admiration of men at large—extraordinary efforts, brilliant achievements.

HONOUR (Lat. *hŏnōrem*) is the result of excellence, as acknowledged by the narrower circle in which we personally move, and according to their particular standard of it. Honour is never entirely separated from virtue; but glory may have no connexion with it. Honour must ever regard the rights of others; glory may be earned at their expense. Glory attends great deeds, honour attends the discharge of duty. Therefore we may if we please despise glory, but it is ill to despise honour.

FAME (Lat. *fāma*) is the result of meritorious success in the more select but less showy walks of life. We speak of the glory of the conqueror, the honour of the gentleman, the fame of the scholar and the philanthropist. Honour and fame are always external to one's self; but GLORY is sometimes used in the sense of self-glorification, or, as Hobbes has called it, "Internal gloriation or triumph of the mind." But fame has not the moral worth of honour. The man who is honoured has his reward in the feeling which is entertained towards him, the famous man in that his name is often in people's mouths.

"Brave though we fall, and honoured if we live,
Or let us *glory* gain, or *glory* give."
POPE, *Homer*.

"*Honour* makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"*Fame* is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise
(That last infirmity of noble minds),
To scorn delights and live laborious days."
Lycidas.

GLOW. Warmth. Heat.

Glow (A. S. *glówan, to glow*) is a shining with vivid light or intense heat. It combines the ideas of brightness and warmth. The incandescent metal glows with intense heat, the glow-worm with vivid and steady light. In the glowing substance the glow emanates from the substance itself. A healthy glow of the body is the exact opposite of an external chill.

Warmth (A. S. *wearm, warm*) is moderate heat, less addressing itself, or not at all, to the eye.

Heat (A. S. *hætu*), in its common acceptation, signifies not merely that principle which is present in all bodies, and on the degree of which depends their fluid or solid state, but the evolution of caloric in a strong or excessive quantity. The analogous use of the terms is regulated by these natural distinctions. We speak of the fire of genius, the heat of passion, the glow of generous feeling, the warmth of friendship, and the like.

"Persons who pretend to feel
The *glowings* of uncommon zeal;
Who others scorn, and seem to be
Righteous in very great degree."
Lloyd.

"The *heat* and hurry of his rage."
South.

"Many persons, from vicious and dead and cold, have passed into life and an excellent grace and a spiritual *warmth* and holy fire."—Bishop Taylor.

GOLD. Golden. (A. S. *gold.*)

These terms are both used as adjectives, with this difference, that the former signifies made of gold, the latter also as having the characteristics of gold; as wealth, brightness, yellowness. A gold cup; golden corn, sunsets, days, thoughts, or memories.

GOODNESS. Virtue.

Goodness (*good*, from a Teutonic base, "*Gad*," *to suit, to fit*: Skeat, *Etym. Dict.*) is natural and without effort.

It is instinctive Virtue (Lat. *virtūtem*), as virtue is trained or practised goodness. Hence, in some sort, goodness may be without virtue, and virtue without goodness. The tenderness of feeling shown by many children is goodness, not virtue. To abstain from theft in a thief would be virtue, not goodness. Yet goodness, in the highest degree, is superior to any virtue; for He who alone is perfect goodness could not be called virtuous, which is human. Virtue is actual goodness, as set against possible evil in man's thoughts and deeds. Goodness is often used in a specific sense, as equivalent to kindness or benevolence. Goodness is in those—

"Glad hearts, without reproach or blot,
Who do Thy will, and know it not."

But virtue lies in resisting and controlling evil temptations and tendencies.

"*Goodness* is strictly and eminently moral, It is in its nature of a boundless extent. If it be not universally operative, it cannot exist as a perfection."—Cogan.

"The exemplary desire of regulating our thoughts and pursuits by right principles constitutes *virtue*; and all the duties which are performed with warmth and feeling are deemed the result of virtuous affections."—Cogan.

GOODS. Chattels. Commodity. Merchandise. Wares. Effects. Property. Possession. Articles.

Goods is employed in the sense of transferable articles of property, such as are intended for sale, or might realize a money value if sold.

Effects (Lat. *effecta, things wrought out*) represent the personal estate, even down to the smallest matters in use, and such as would practically be of no value but to the proprietor.

Chattels (O. Fr. *chatel*, L. Lat. *căpĭtăle, property*) is a wider term than Goods or Effects, and comprises every kind of property except the freehold and what is parcel of it. Chattels are divided into real and personal; real chattels, in the words of the old lawwriters, savour of the reality—relate to, or are interest in land: personal

chattels are movable goods, as horses, plate, money, &c.

A COMMODITY (Fr. *commodité*) is any movable article valuable by money, but is restricted to articles of necessity. Works of art, for instance, as such, are not commodities; but a painting, if regarded as an article of furniture, might be called a commodity.

MERCHANDISE (Fr. *marchandise*) is the generic term for all articles of trade, considered as such in the aggregate; while WARES (A. S. *wâru*) is the sum of articles of a particular kind.

POSSESSION (Lat. *possessionem*, from *possĭdēre, to possess*) is that of which a man is, as a fact, possessed, whether rightfully or not, or irrespectively of the mode in which he may have acquired it.

PROPERTY (Fr. *propriété*, Lat *proprĭĕtātem, ownership*) is that which is properly one's own, and, in the absence of any qualifying expressions, would be taken to imply a legal title to possession.

ARTICLE (Lat. *artĭcŭlus*, dim. of *artus, a joint*) is a specific and relative term. It is such a commodity as may be brought under a particular head; as articles of food, furniture, clothing, decoration, and the like.

"They would fight not for *articles* of faith but for *articles* of food."—LANDOR.

GOOD-HUMOUR. GOOD-NATURE.

GOOD-HUMOUR is a cheerful state of the spirits, producing gaiety in others, as it is itself gay. Yet it may be transient, and followed by a reactive peevishness.

GOOD-NATURE is that plastic disposition which naturally shares the joys of others, yet suffers ofttimes from weak complaisance to their wishes.

GORGEOUS. SUMPTUOUS.

Both terms express a character of the imposing, but the GORGEOUS (O. Fr. *gorgias, flaunting, vain*, and that in some way from *gorge, the throat*) represents that which is so through amplitude and colour; while SUMPTUOUS (Lat. *sumptŭōsus*) is that which gives the same impression from its costliness. Gorgeous, for instance, or sumptuous furniture. A sumptuous repast would be one consisting among other things of costly dishes, a gorgeous repast would imply the precious metals, and high decoration in any way.

GOVERN. RULE. REGULATE.

GOVERN (O. Fr. *governer*, Lat *gŭbernāre, to steer, direct*) is to exercise power or authority with judgment and knowledge; hence govern is never taken by itself in a bad sense.

RULE (Norm. Fr. *ruile*, Fr. *règle*; Lat. *rĕgŭla, see* LITTRÉ) denotes no more than control and direction by superior authority or power, however exercised. Rule is exercised over the wills and actions of men only. GOVERN is more extensively applied, as to govern the horses or the helm. RULE belongs more to the simple power of the individual, GOVERN to that power as it is modified by principles and limitations of government. The despot rules, the constitutional monarch governs. GOVERN implies a subject of some importance, RULE is applicable to trivial things as well.

REGULATE (Lat. *rĕgŭlāre, to direct*) denotes the exercise of a controlling power over force already in action or progress; as, to regulate the movement of a machine, to regulate finances. It denotes less dignity and authority than RULE or GOVERN, but closer care and management, and the exercise of judgment and address. The wise man will govern his passions, while he rules his conduct and carefully regulates his expenditure and his affairs.

"The Bishop's *governance* should be so gentle and easy, that men hardly can be unwilling to comply with it."—BARROW.

"Ne shall the Saxon's selves all peaceably
Enjoy the crown which they from Britons won,
First ill, and after *ruled* wickedly."
SPENSER.

"Some say that under force
Of that controlling ordinance they move,
And need not His immediate hand, who first
Prescribed their course to *regulate* it now."
COWPER.

GRACE. FAVOUR.

GRACE (Lat. *grātia*) denotes a benefit gratuitously conferred, or a service gratuitously rendered.

FAVOUR (Lat. *fāvōrem*) has in it more of personal affection and interest, the sign of desire for the well-being of the person favoured. Grace excludes right and strict merit. Favour is preference of persons for any cause. Grace is removed from justice, and favour from impartiality. Grace excludes equivalent, but does not exclude partial deserving. Favour supposes no merit beyond pleasing. GRACES has no sense analogous to the plural FAVOURS. It is goodness, benevolence, clemency, generosity, which grants grace. Particular good will and personal inclination accords favours. One may grant grace to an enemy, one shows favour, or confers favours only on those one loves. GRACE interests the receiver; FAVOUR also, and perhaps equally or more than equally the giver. One is happy at receiving grace. One may set a slight value on favour. GRACE conveys primarily the idea of power and superiority in him who grants it; FAVOUR familiarity in him who receives it.

GRACIOUS. MERCIFUL. KIND.

GRACIOUS (*see* GRACE), when compared with KIND (literally, entertaining feelings naturally due to creatures of the same *kind* or nature, A. S. *cynde*, *natural*) differs from it not so much in essence as in exhibition; the gracious being the kind as shown to inferiors, while kindness may be towards any. It has in it an element of condescension. Graciousness can only be shown to beings of some moral dignity and capacity, who may be able to appreciate the nature and value of actions. Kindness may be shown towards dumb animals. Kindness is a duty in all. Graciousness rather implies such kindness as is in excess of the mere demands of duty, and is exhibited where it could not be claimed even of moral right.

"I therefore beg you will be *graciously* pleased to accept this most faithful zeal of your poor subject, who has no other design in it than your good, and the discharge of his own conscience."—BISHOP BURNET.

"Be *kindly* affectioned one to another with brotherly love."—*Bible.*

MERCIFUL (Fr. *merci*, Lat. *mercēdem*, *recompense*, *reward*) is the quality of withholding pain, evil, or suffering, when it is in one's power to inflict it; or, in a milder sense, the granting of benefits in spite of demerit.

"Blessed are the *merciful*, for they shall obtain *mercy*."—*Bible.*

GRAND. GREAT. SUBLIME. NOBLE. MAJESTIC. IMPOSING. MAGNIFICENT. STATELY. SPLENDID. SUPERB. AUGUST.

GRAND (Lat. *grandis*, *large*, *grand*) is applied to the union of excellence with something which conveys the impression of vastness or greatness in the sense of expansiveness; as a grand mountain or cataract, a grand sight, grand music, a grand monarch, a grand conception, a grand character. The grand expands the mind with a sense of vastness and majesty.

"I have ever observed that colonnades and avennes of trees of a moderate length were, without comparison, far *grander* than when they were suffered to run to immense distances."—BURKE.

GREAT (A. S. *greát*), as a synonym of GRAND, denotes less vividly what is impressive, yet is associated with power and gifts capable of accomplishing ends of their own. The truly great man may be sometimes the very opposite of grand. Cincinnatus was great indeed, when, having saved his country, he laid aside his grandeur. Greatness, in its moral sense, appeals more directly to the reason than the senses. The great man has extraordinary powers of which he makes use to accomplish high and important ends. A great undertaking is extensive or arduous in itself, while it needs high qualities to bring it to a successful issue.

"*Greatness* of soul is to be acquired by converse with the heroes of antiquity."—KNOX.

SUBLIME (Lat. *sublīmis*, *lofty*, *sublime*) is the highest of all these terms. It is so high in character that the sublime inspires awe rather than delight

in the scenes of art or nature, and in the character and deeds of men. The truly sublime is not only awful but elevating. It is seldom applied directly to persons.

"The age was fruitful in great men; but, if we except the *sublime* Julian Leader, none, as regards splendour of endowments, stood upon the same level as Cicero."—De Quincey.

Noble (Lat. *nōbĭlis, well-known, noble*) is a term of opposition, and derives its force from that against which it is set. It is that which is above the puny, petty, low, mean, or dishonourable, with any, the smallest degree, of which it is incompatible. It is properly a social and moral term; and it is only by a sort of picturesque analogy that we speak of a noble tree or palace. A noble nature or action is innately superior to that which is base.

"Know this, my lord, *nobility* of blood
Is but a glittering and fallacious good:
The *nobleman* is he whose *noble* mind
Is filled with inborn worth unborrowed from his kind." Dryden.

Majestic (Lat. *mājestas, excellence, majesty*) refers exclusively to external effect of form or movement, and has no connexion with moral greatness. The basest tyrant might have a majestic person or air. The movements of an epic poem should be majestic. Concentrated strength, self-possession, and grace make up the majestic.

"But in the midst was seen
A lady of a more *majestic* mien;
By stature and by beauty marked their Sovereign Queen." Dryden.

Imposing, like Majestic, is purely external; but that which is majestic has always an individuality, while many things in detail may combine to produce an imposing effect. The term is not of old usage. Nor is imposing a term of unqualified praise; for that may have an imposing exterior which has little intrinsic substance or solidity.

Magnificent (Lat. *magnĭf'icus*) is applied to objects of rich and varied beauty on a large scale, and especially, in the case of works of art, to those which combine size, excellence, elaborateness of conception and execution, with great effectiveness; though the term Magnificence by no means expresses the character of a work of art simply as such, however excellent. That costliness and elaborateness are requisite to entitle a work of art to the epithet magnificent, may be seen in the case of architecture. The Gothic cathedral may be magnificent; the Great Pyramid is stupendous, but not magnificent. On the other hand, a purely natural production might be called magnificent for its uniform beauty and size; as a magnificent pearl.

"Man He made, and for him built *Magnificent* this world." Milton.

Stately is exhibiting *state* or dignity, or what is analogous to them, and can only be applied to what has, or may be conceived to wear, an air of imposing dignity; as a stately figure, walk, palace, avenue, or forest tree. Stateliness involves the combination of height and grace.

"Ye that in waters glide, and ye that walk
The earth, and *stately* tread or lowly creep." Milton.

Splendid (Lat. *splendĭdus, splendēre, to shine brightly*) is like Magnificent, but less strong, and differs from it in being applied to abstract qualities, which magnificent never is. Splendid, not magnificent, talents. The splendid implies always something brilliant, gorgeous, or striking.

"Liveries whose gorgeousness evinces not the footman's deserts, but his lord's *splendidness*."—Boyle.

Superb (Fr. *superbe*, Lat. *sŭperbus, haughty, splendid*) has no application in our language to human disposition, but is used of objects of nature or of art which are of the best, that is, the largest or best developed, the best manufactured, the most imposing or elaborate; as a superb diamond, tree, house, carpet, bracelet, equipage. The original force of the Latin *superbus* still runs through the modern use of the term. It indicates that striking superiority to other objects of the same class which, in conscious creatures, would naturally be accompanied by pride.

"With laboured visible design
Art strove to be *superbly* fine."
CHURCHILL.

AUGUST (Lat. *augustus, consecrated, majestic*) is only employed of persons and of what emanates from them as creating extraordinary respect, or respect mingled with awe. There seems, however, to be no reason why the term should not be employed analogously of visible objects, as the august mountain solitudes; but there is a kind of personality attributed to such features of nature.

"Not with such majesty, such bold relief,
The forms *august*, the king, or conquering chief,
E'er swelled on marble as in verse have shined—
In polished verse—the manners and the mind." POPE.

GRATIFY. INDULGE. HUMOUR. SATISFY. PLEASE. SATIATE. GLUT. CLOY.

TO GRATIFY (Lat. *grātĭfĭcāri, to oblige*) is first to please, then to indulge, and, in the latter sense, to indulge not only persons, but the mind and its tastes or desires, the senses and the appetites.

INDULGE (Lat. *indulgēre*) is to concede something to a weakness or a wish. The subject-matter of gratification is more positive than that of indulgence. We gratify passions, desires, and the like; we indulge humours or other less powerful influences. In indulging we escape the trouble or effort of resisting; in gratifying we look for keen enjoyment. The former is a sign of weakness, the latter often of vicious determination.

"His (Virgil's) sense always somewhat to *gratify* our imagination on which it may enlarge at pleasure."—DRYDEN.

"Restraint she will not brook;
And, left to herself, if evil then ensue,
She first his weak *indulgence* will accuse."
MILTON.

TO HUMOUR (Lat. *hūmōrem, moisture*, the idea of Galen and many later physicians being that the general temperament was caused by the prevalence of the particular *humour*; whether choleric, or phlegmatic, or sanguine, or melancholy) is to adapt oneself to the variable mood of another.

"By *humouring* the mind in trifles, we teach it to presume on its own importunity in greater matters; and it will be found a convenient rule in the management of our passions, as of our children, to refuse a compliance with them, not only when they ask improper things, but when they ask anything with impatience."—BISHOP HURD.

To gratify is capable of much difference in the character of the gratification. The lowest and most sensual passions may be gratified, and the purest wishes on behalf of another, as when a father is gratified with the successes of his son.

TO SATISFY (Lat. *sătĭsfăcĕre, to give satisfaction*) is to fill up the measure of a want, whether the want be ordinate and lawful, or unlawful and inordinate, and, like GRATIFY, admits of many degrees and kinds; but SATISFY does not imply pleasure, as it is implied in GRATIFY; but the feeling, though less vivid, is more substantial. Hence it follows that there may be satisfaction without gratification, and gratification without satisfaction. The cravings of a hungry man are satisfied with very plain diet, in which there is no gratification of the palate. The gratification of licentiousness and worldliness are often felt to be utterly unsatisfactory.

"The word *satisfaction* is frequently employed to express the full accomplishment of some particular desire, which always communicates a temporary pleasure, whatever may be the nature of that desire."—COGAN.

PLEASE (Fr. *plaisir, pleasure*) has the twofold meaning of exciting, 1, anything of the nature of pleasure; and 2, specifically a feeling of honourable satisfaction, as when a superior expresses himself as pleased with another. PLEASURE holds an intermediate position between SATISFACTION and GRATIFICATION, being more than the first, and less than the second. To be pleased denotes a more lasting condition than to be gratified, and also conveys the idea of combined gratification and approval of the judgment arising from objects which operate

continuously upon our minds; as to be pleased with a landscape we contemplate, or a book we are reading, or with the conversation, or society, or manner, or conduct of others.

"The soul has many different faculties, or, in other words, many different ways of acting, and can be intensely *pleased* or made happy by all these different faculties or ways of acting."—ADDISON.

SATIATE (Lat. *sătiare*) denotes excessive SATISFACTION, or satisfaction and something more. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that as extremes proverbially meet, to be satiated is often, practically, the opposite of being satisfied; for to be satisfied denotes pleasure and contentment, while satiety is the feeling of dissatisfaction and discontent produced by *over*-satisfaction. SATIATE, GLUT (Lat. *glŭtire, to swallow down*), and CLOY (Fr. *clouer, to nail, close up*, and so clog, *clou*, Lat. *clāvus, a nail*) have much in common. Indeed, GLUT and CLOY may be taken as the complement of satiety, the former denoting the excess of supply over demand or legitimate requirement, the latter the reaction in individual feeling by way of loathing, dissatisfaction, and loss of appreciation, naturally and necessarily consequent upon the excess. GLUT is used impersonally, as when a market is said to be glutted or overstocked; CLOY, only of persons and their desires.

"The variety of objects dissipates care for a short time; but weariness soon ensues, and *satiety* converts the promised pleasure to indifference at least, if not to pain."—KNOX.

"Thus must ye perish on a barbarous coast!
Is this your fate, to *glut* the dogs with gore,
Far from your friends, and from your native shore?" POPE, *Homer*.

"Alas! their love may be called appetite;
No motion of the liver, but the palate
That suffer surfeit, *cloyment*, and revolt;
But mine is all as hungry as the sea,
And can digest as much."
SHAKESPEARE.

GRATITUDE. THANKFULNESS.

GRATITUDE (Fr. *gratitude*) relates rather to the inner state of feeling, THANKFULNESS to the exhibition of it in words. We commonly use GRATEFUL in reference to human agents; THANKFUL, to Divine Providence. We may look grateful. We speak our thanks. Thankfulness is mistrusted if it be not expressed; but gratitude may be too deep for words. Thankfulness is uneasy till it has acknowledged a kindness; gratitude, till it has recompensed it.

"*Gratitude* is a pleasant affection excited by a lively sense of benefits received or intended, or even by the desire of being beneficial. It is the lively and powerful reaction of a well-disposed mind upon whom benevolence has conferred some important good."—COGAN.

"Give us that due sense of all Thy mercies, that our hearts may be unfeignedly *thankful*."—*Book of Common Prayer*.

GRATUITOUS. VOLUNTARY. WILLING.

GRATUITOUS (Lat. *gratuĭtus, done without profit or reward*) means given without equivalent or recompense, granted irrespectively of claim, or where none exists; hence in the applied sense of uncalled-for by circumstances, and, still further, unwarranted by them, as a gratuitous insult is one that was wholly unmerited, and as a gratuitous assertion is one for which no proof is forthcoming.

VOLUNTARY (Lat. *vŏluntārius*) is more restricted in its sense than WILLING, having the negative signification of not done under compulsion. All our outward actions, whatever may be the full nature of their motives, must be called VOLUNTARY; but they are not necessarily performed willingly, that is, it does not follow that our wishes and inclinations go along with the actions performed. The vows of the cloister must, of necessity, be taken *voluntarily*. There are multitudes of cases in which they have not been taken *willingly*. It may be observed that WILLING and VOLUNTARY are applicable both to the agent and the act; GRATUITOUS, only to the act. VOLUNTARY and WILLING belong more to the freedom of act and motive in the agent himself; GRATUITOUS, to its effect upon others, or the character of such acts or motives in relation

to others. A voluntary benefit is one which is given with freedom of will; a gratuitous benefit is one which has been purchased by nothing on the part of the receiver.

"The Greek word signifies most *gratuitous*, most free, undeserved, and the pure effect of grace."—BATES.

"Nothing is more certain than that God acts not necessarily, but *voluntarily* with particular intention and design, knowing that He does good, and intending to do so, freely and out of choice, and when He has no other constraint upon Him but this, that His will inclines Him to communicate Himself and to do good."—CLARKE.

"His *willingness* to forgive returning sinners."—*Ibid.*

GRATUITY. GIFT.

GIFT being simply a thing given, GRATUITY (*see* GRATUITOUS) is a certain kind of gift. It is commonly expected as due, but could not be enforced as a legal claim.

"The Cavaliers and Presbyterians of the city, hoping to improve this opportunity, invited them to join with the city, as they termed their party there, promising them their whole arrears, constant pay, and a present *gratuity*, giving them some money in hand as an earnest of the rest."—LUDLOW, *Memoirs*.

GRAVE. SERIOUS. SOLEMN.

GRAVE (Fr. *grave*, Lat. *grăvis*, *heavy*) means characterized by weight, but not used in the physical but only in the moral or analogous sense; hence important, and, as applied to character or persons, having the appearance of being charged with affairs weighty or important. This is sometimes more in appearance than reality, and comes of humour. It is opposed to *gay*, and may be predicated of manner, appearance, and expression of countenance. As GRAVE denotes an appearance of habitual self-control or sense of responsibility, so SERIOUS (Lat. *sĕrius*) conveys the idea of consideration or reflexiveness, as applied to the air or expression of countenance. Gravity may be special, seriousness is habitual. Business makes people grave, responsibility makes them serious. The grave person is not merely one who does not laugh, but who never shocks the proprieties of his condition, of his age, or of his character. The love of truth, the respect for reason and conscience, the sense of duty, tend to make people grave. The combination of reflexiveness and earnestness, or self-examination, makes seriousness, which is hardly a matter of mere humour like gravity. Important thoughts make grave, thoughts important to one's self make serious, so that seriousness is closely allied to apprehension. Like GRAVE, it is used of circumstances, and then has a stronger force. A grave consideration is one of argumentative weight; a serious circumstance is one that is likely to affect us. While GRAVE, as so employed, means no more than important, SERIOUS means giving cause for apprehension, attended with danger or disastrous consequences. A grave, but not a serious, assembly of old men.

SOLEMN (Lat. *sōlennis*, *sōlemnis*, occurring regularly as a religious rite; and so *regular*, *formal*) is primarily marked by religious rites; hence, fitted to awake serious reflexions. When used of the manner or countenance of an individual, it has the sense of affectedly serious, and implies ridicule. The judge is grave, the preacher serious; the service or the cathedral solemn.

"Justice is *grave* and decorous, and in its punishments rather seems to submit to a necessity than to make a choice."—BURKE.

"One might have expected that events so awful and tremendous as death and judgment, that a question so deeply interesting as whether we shall go to heaven or hell, could in no possible case, and in no constitution of mind whatever, fail of exciting the most *serious* apprehensions."—PALEY.

"But they who have the misfortune to be of this make should by no means trust to their own most *solemn* purposes, or even vows. Their chief safety is in flight."—SECKER.

GRAVITY. WEIGHT. HEAVINESS.

These terms are compared here in a physical sense. GRAVITY is weight scientifically, or rather philosophically, considered, and is therefore a scientific term, and is hardly used except in the phrase "centre of gravity,"

and belongs to the theory of gravitation.

WEIGHT (*the amount weighed*) is wholly indefinite, and is opposed only to that which is imponderable. The lightest substances have some amount of weight. WEIGHT, however, is always abstract, and is used scientifically, while HEAVINESS is concrete, that is, expresses the *sensation* of weight (A. S. *hefig*, *heavu*, *hard to heave*, A. S. *hebban*). This is not always the case with the adjective *heavy*. A heavy burden means one of which the weight is severely felt; but, "How heavy is this?" is equivalent simply to, "What is the weight of this?" WEIGHT, from its association with the balance, has a sense peculiar to itself—that of determining power, as we speak of weighty considerations. Everything has weight, which is the natural tendency of all bodies to the centre of the earth. Those bodies which have much weight, either in proportion to their bulk or to the force and strength applied to them, are heavy. A bag of gold is heavier than a bag of feathers of the same size, because gold has more weight than feathers. Weight depends more upon substance, heaviness on quantity. A pound of feathers and a pound of gold have equal weight, though feathers and gold are not equally heavy. In their secondary senses, GRAVITY denotes the weight of practical importance, HEAVINESS the weight of care or trouble, WEIGHTINESS the urgency of fact or reasoning. HEAVY, rather than WEIGHTY, is the term employeyd to express the force which results from the weight of a body in motion. Thus we speak of a heavy, not a weighty, blow. The felled tree falls not weightily, but heavily, to the ground. Weight differs from gravity as being the effect of gravity, that is, the downward pressure of a body under its influence. Weight is thus a measure of the force of gravity.

"Entellus wastes his forces on the wind,
And thus deluded of the stroke designed,
Headlong and *heavy* fell." DRYDEN.

"Without *gravity*, the whole universe, if we suppose an undetermined power of motion infused into matter, would have been a confused chaos without beauty or order, and never stable or permanent in any condition."—BENTLEY.

"We know the *weight* of a given quantity of matter on the surface of the sun as well as we know its weight upon the surface of the earth."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

GREATNESS. GENEROSITY. MAGNANIMITY.

GREATNESS (A. S. *great*), in the sense of greatness of mind, is a relative quality. It is a moral elevation or superiority. Greatness of mind comes of sentiments raised above the sentiments of ordinary persons.

MAGNANIMITY (Lat. *magnănĭmĭtātem*) though etymologically its Latin equivalent, has a more extended meaning. It is such greatness in all its height, plenitude, and perfection.

GENEROSITY (Lat. *gĕnĕrōsĭtātem*) is literally the virtue of a noble race. Greatness of mind leads to great acts; generosity does great things out of a sublime disinterestedness, and for the benefit of others. Magnanimity does great things without effort and without any idea of sacrifice, with the same ease that common persons do common things. Magnanimity is without self-consciousness, and has a simplicity like that of genius. Greatness of mind may perhaps aim at glory; generosity would not value glory without doing good; magnanimity can see opportunities of glory and let them pass, or pass over to another. Greatness of mind foregoes an opportunity of revenge, generosity converts it into a means of benefit, magnanimity would forget the injury, and have the injurer forget it also. Greatness of mind raises our admiration, generosity our love also; magnanimity is a thing about which to feel enthusiastically.

GREEDY. ACQUISITIVE.

GREEDY (A. S. *grédig*) denotes the low animal desire of possession and eagerness of enjoyment, whether in matters of food or any other object of appetite or desire.

ACQUISITIVE (Lat. *acquīrere*, part *acquīsītus*) denotes the quality of deriving gratification from the mere addition to the existing stock of one's possessions. Hence the greedy longs for quantity, the acquisitive is content

with very little at a time. The greedy looks to the thing to be gained; the acquisitive also derives pleasure from the process of gaining it. The desires of the greedy are coarse, or show themselves in coarse form, the desires of the acquisitive may turn upon the choicest things. The greedy snatches his prey when he can. The acquisitive is ever on the watch, and working little by little, not despising those small things which the greedy does not seek. The wild beast hunting his prey is greedy from hunger or natural voracity. The bird which roams incessantly seeking materials for its nest or food for its young, and gathering them even in minutest portions, is acquisitive.

GRIEVANCE. Hardship.

A Grievance (O. Fr. *gref, heavy, sad*, Lat. *grăvis*) is a mental hardship, or a hardship as dwelt upon in the mind.

Hardship is externally suffered. Purely physical endurances, as exposure to the elements, are hardships, not grievances. Grievance carries the idea of matter of complaint or trouble, which might have been otherwise but for the conduct of men. So heavy taxation is a hardship when viewed in its pauperizing effects, a grievance as furnishing ground of complaint against a government or an administration. Hardship comes from a force stronger than ourselves, whether from nature or from man. Grievance may exist between equals. Among civilized nations one may have a grievance against another, where Hardship could not be predicated; yet the national grievance might be such as to entail hardship upon individuals.

"Heroes are always drawn bearing sorrows, struggling with adversities, undergoing all kinds of *hardships*, and having in the service of mankind a kind of appetite to difficulties and dangers."—*Spectator.*

"Cause of the war and *grievance* of the land." Pope, *Homer.*

GRIEVE. Mourn. Lament.

To Grieve is purely mental (*see* Grievance); it is to feel the pain of an inward distress.

To Mourn (A. S. *murnan, to mourn, to care for*) and Lament (Lat. *lāmentāri*) are to give outward expression to grief, the former in visible, the latter in audible signs. Bitter grief; deep mourning; loud lamentation. Unlike Mourn and Lament, the verb Grieve is used in the sense of actively to trouble or hurt, as well as intransitively to feel trouble. Misfortune grieves me, or causes me to grieve.

"Who fails to *grieve* when just occasion calls,
Or *grieves* too much, deserves not to be blessed." Young.

The term Mourn may indicate sorrow, either expressed or unexpressed; but Lament implies its expression of necessity.

"As the apostle says of circumcision and uncircumcision, so say I here, that neither *mourning* for sin, nor confession of it, avail anything, but a new creature."—South.

"Eve, who, unseen,
Yet all had heard, with audible *lament*
Discovered soon the place of her retire."
Milton.

GRIN. Grimace.

The characteristic of a Grin (A. S. *grennian, to grin*) seems to be the withdrawing of the lips so as to show the teeth.

A Grimace (Fr. *grimace*, O. Scand. *grima, a mask*) is any distortion of the countenance. It may be habitual or intentional, and proceed from a great variety of feelings, from the most excited wrath on the one hand, or from a smirking self-complacency on the other.

GROAN. Moan.

The Groan (A. S. *grânian, to groan*) is produced by hard breathing, and consists of inarticulate sounds.

The Moan (A. S. *mænan, to moan*) is a plaintive sound produced by the organs of utterance, and is often slightly articulate. The moan is often also voluntary; the groan is involuntary, the result of deep pain, unless it be simulated. There is a difference, however, in the causes by which the two are produced. Moaning comes always from some pain or misery; groaning comes from pain, but it may also come from a strong feeling

of resistance to what is felt to be burdensome or unjust; hence it is often an expression of indignation. The groans of suffering and of indignation are combined in the following:—

"Nor Philoctetes had been left inclosed
In a bare isle, to wants and pains exposed,
Where to the rocks with solitary *groans*
His sufferings and our baseness he *bemoans*."
DRYDEN, *Ovid*.

GROW. BECOME. INCREASE.

To GROW (A. S. *grówan*) is gradually to BECOME (A. S. *becuman, to attain to, to befall*). A man may become suddenly angry, but he only grows angry by degrees. GROW often indicates a state which one is approaching; BECOME, a state which one has reached. To become is to be one thing from having been another. To grow is to be approaching to some state. A man is growing old *before* he has reached old age. Not till he has reached it has he become old.

To INCREASE (Lat. *increscĕre*) is the result or manifestation of growth. Trade has been growing for years past, and is now considerably increased. To INCREASE, however, does not necessarily imply to GROW; rapid expansion or dilatation of parts will produce increase in bulk; but the process of growth implies either an accretion of parts by external apposition, or an assimilative power from within, as in the vital force. The snowball grows by accretion, and so increases as it rolls. The tree grows by its own vitality, and increases also in size.

GRUDGE. SPITE. PIQUE.

A GRUDGE (one of many similar onomatopoetic words in other languages besides English: so *grunt, growl*, &c.) is a feeling of continuous and sullen dislike cherished against another, having its origin in some act of the person against whom it is felt.

SPITE (perhaps an abbrev. of DESPITE, O. Fr. *despit*, Lat. *despectus, a looking down, despising*; but see WEDGWOOD) is a more active and demonstrative form of malevolence (but not so enduring as GRUDGE), which shows itself in cutting words and irritating demeanour. It belongs to persons who are quick to feel and weak to control or hide their feelings. We owe a grudge, and show spite.

PIQUE (Fr. *piquer, to prick*) is purely personal, and comes of offended pride, or a quick sense of resentment against a supposed neglect or injury, with less of malevolence than GRUDGE or SPITE, both of which are characterized by a desire to injure, which does not belong to PIQUE. The verb *to grudge* has a negative force unknown to the noun GRUDGE. We grudge another that which we do not regard him sufficiently to give him, or to contemplate him as possessing, with complacency. On the other hand, a grudge is always an actively malicious feeling, which would hurt if it had the opportunity.

"Esau had conceived a mortal *grudge* and enmity against his brother Jacob."—SOUTH.

"Begone, ye critics, and restrain your *spite*;
Codrus writes on, and will for ever write."
POPE.

"Out of a personal *pique* to those in service, he stands as a looker-on when the government is attacked."—ADDISON.

As a reflexive verb, to pique one's self expresses a feeling of pride *un*wounded, as—

"Men *pique* themselves on their skill in the learned languages."—LOCKE.

GUARD. GUARDIAN.

Of these GUARD (Fr. *garde, garder, to guard, take care of*) is applied both to persons and things; GUARDIAN, less often to things, and more commonly to persons. But a more marked difference is that GUARD denotes a protector against physical danger, violence, theft, and the like; GUARDIAN, against anything which may militate against the interests of persons, especially during youth or minority, when they are too inexperienced to manage their own affairs.

"The *guard* which kept the door of the king's house."—*Bible*.

"You may think, perhaps, that man is too mean, too insignificant a being to be worthy of the ministration and *guardianship* of celestial spirits."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

GUESS. Conjecture. Divination. Supposition. Hypothesis. Surmise.

To Guess (formerly *gessen*, Da. *gisse*) is to make a statement upon what is unknown, with the hope of being right; if by lucky chance only, this is in the strictest sense a guess; if with a very slight amount of knowledge, which is just sufficient to incline the scale of probability, this is a Conjecture (Lat. *conjectūra, an inference, conjicĕre, to cast together*). Hence Conjecture is employed of complex, while Guess belongs to the simplest, things. I hold something in my hand, and in play I say to a child, "Guess what it is." An historian or a diplomatist who is furnished with inadequate evidence for knowledge, conjectures motives and consequences as best he may.

Supposition (Lat. *suppŏsĭtionem, a placing under*) belongs to that of which part is known and part unknown; a fact, for instance, is known; its cause is unknown; therefore the cause, or supposed cause, is placed under the fact as a theoretical foundation for it. And generally, to imagine with probability, to infer from evidence which, though not complete, is the best that can be had, is supposition. Hence Supposition has in it much more of rational inference than Guess or Conjecture.

Hypothesis, similarly, is *a placing under*, as the groundwork of argument or of action (ὑπόθεσις), but is technically employed of philosophical supposition, learned or scientific theories. The French Academy has thus distinguished between Supposition and Hypothesis. The supposition is a proposition laid down for the sake of an inference to be drawn from it. The hypothesis is the supposition of a thing, whether possible or impossible, from which a consequence is drawn. Hence it follows that the hypothesis is a supposition purely ideal, while the supposition stands for a proposition either true or confessed. The hypothesis is adopted for the sake of accounting for facts or a system. The hypothesis may be true or not true. The supposition is excluded from the thesis not because it is incapable of proof, but because it is taken as proved. Hypothesis is sometimes used in the sense of the system based upon hypotheses. In this sense the systems of Copernicus and Descartes are called *hypotheses*. In this technical sense, as Hypothesis belongs to science, so Supposition belongs to logic.

Divination (Lat. *dīvīnātiōnem, the faculty of predicting, divination*) is literally a term of ancient augury for the gathering the will of heaven, either naturally by a divine inspiration, or artificially from certain manifestations; in this sense, divination precedes prediction. To divine, accordingly, as commonly employed, is to use such conjecture as depends both upon hazard and upon natural sagacity. It may be observed, in its relation to prediction, that, unlike that term, it is not restricted to the future, but is equally applicable to facts of the past.

Surmise (O. Fr. *surmise, accusation, surmettre, to lay upon*) is a conjecture of a matter of fact. Of the above, those which are most nearly related to one another are, Guess, Conjecture, and Surmise. The subject of a guess is always a fact, or something regarded in the simple light of a fact; a conjecture is more vague and abstract, and may be on the possibility of a fact. The subject of a guess is definite and unmistakable when known. The subject of a conjecture may remain indefinite and unknown. If a sentence be a set enigma, I guess its meaning, and so know it. If it be involved and indistinct, I can but conjecture its meaning, and may not arrive at it after all. In guessing, if successful, we arrive at a certain or probable conclusion from uncertain premises. In conjecturing, we arrive at an uncertain conclusion from uncertain premises.

"You go on arguing and reasoning what necessity of nature must signify, which is only talking without book, and *guessing* what words anciently meant, without consulting the ancients to know the fact."—Waterland.

"You may see how our (English) tongue is risen, and thereby *conjecture* how in time it may alter."—CAMDEN.

"A sagacity which *divined* the evil designs."—BANCROFT.

"I am sure his reason by which he would persuade you to become a convert to their Church is shewed to be no reason, because it proceeds upon this false *supposition*, that the Church of Rome was once the Catholic Church, which it never was."—SHARP.

"Hypothetical necessity is that which the *supposition* or *hypothesis* of God's foresight and preordination lays upon future contingents."—CLARKE.

"There are various degrees of strength in judgments, from the lowest *surmise*, to notion, opinion, persuasion, and the highest assurance, which we call certainty."—SEARCH.

A SURMISE is in matters personal and practical, what HYPOTHESIS is in matters purely scientific.

GUIDE. RULE. DIRECTION.

GUIDE (Fr. *guide*) is primarily a living director; hence, when employed of inanimate influences or media, it conveys the idea of something which is not rigidly invariable, but still keeps up with our needs under alteration of circumstances.

RULE (Nor. Fr. *ruile*, Fr. *régle*, Lat. *règŭla*, *see* LITTRÉ) on the other hand, is a rigid and inflexible thing, a form of thought or a form of words, a maxim which must be acted up to. So conscience is the guide of men's actions. The duty to one's neighbour is the rule of Christian reciprocity.

A DIRECTION (Lat. *directionem*, *a making straight*) may be given at a distance, or once for all, and is to be acted upon by being remembered. It is not universally applicable, but only suited to the particular case. When coming from a superior, a direction has the force of an instructive command.

"Common sense, or that share and species of understanding which Nature has bestowed upon the greater part of men, is, when competently improved by education, and assisted by Divine grace, the safest *guide* to certainty and happiness."—V. KNOX, *Essays*.

RULE is employed in more senses than one. To say nothing of its purely physical meaning of a rod or measure, it signifies also an uniform course of things, a regulative order, a constant method, and both the exercise of governing powers and the state of those on whom it is exercised. In the sense in which it is synonymous with GUIDE and DIRECTION, as the guide regulates the movements, and the direction indicates the course, so the rule regards principally the actions, or what one ought to do; but it is cold and without force in itself.

"There is something so wild and yet so solemn in Shakespeare's speeches of his ghosts and fairies, and the like imaginary persons, that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, though we have no *rule* by which to judge them."—ADDISON.

A rule is a compendium of principles which is familiar to us, and so available for application under new or unfamiliar circumstances.

"I have before made mention how Muscovie was in our time discovered by Richard Chanceler in his voyage towards Cathay by the *direction* and information of M. Sebastian Cabota, who long before had this secret in his mind."—HACKLUYT.

GUISE. HABIT. GARB.

The former (Fr. *guise*, *manner*, *way*) includes the other two, GUISE being the combined effect of dress and deportment.

GARB (O. Fr. *garbe*, *fashion*, *gracefulness*) is official or appropriate dress.

HABIT (Fr. *habit*, Lat. *hăbĭtum*, *condition*, *dress*) is much the same; but GARB, like DRESS, may comprise several articles of apparel, while HABIT denotes one such article of a somewhat ample character, as the habit of a monk.

"In easy notes and *guise* of lowly swain,
'Twas thus he charmed and taught the listening train." PARNELL.

"*Habited* like a juryman."—CHURCHILL.

"That by their Moorish *garb* the warriors knew
The hostile band."
HOOLE, *Orlando Furioso*.

GUSH. FLOW. STREAM.

Of these, FLOW (Lat. *fluere*) is the generic term, and the others are modes of flowing.

GUSH (Icel. *gusa*) is to flow abundantly and forcibly, or, as it were, burstingly.

STREAM (A. S. *strēám*, *a stream*, verb *strēámian*) is to flow amply and

continuously but quietly. A body of water may flow broadly or narrowly; it streams narrowly; it gushes violently.

"While his life's torrent *gushed* from out the wound." POPE.

"Oh, could I *flow* like thee, and make thy stream
My great example, as it is my theme:
Though deep, yet clear; though gentle, yet not dull,
Strong without rage, without o'erflowing, full." DENHAM.

H.

HABITATION. ABODE. DOMICILE.

HABITATION (Lat. *hăbĭtātionem*) is a place which one inhabits, not necessarily a house or tenement of any kind.

ABODE (*see* ABIDE) has the same sense, but with a less direct reference to the constant passing of one's life there. Habitation is the natural or *habitual* place of abode.

DOMICILE (Lat. *dŏmĭcĭlium*) adds to the idea of habitation and abode a relationship to society and civil government, and is consequently a term rather technical than conversational. An abode is pleasant or unpleasant, convenient or inconvenient. A habitation is suitable or unsuitable, healthy or unhealthy, commodious or otherwise. HABITATION points more directly than ABODE to furnishing necessary shelter and protection. The woods are the abodes of birds, their nests are their habitations.

"The body moulders into dust, and is utterly incapable of itself to become a fit *habitation* for the soul again."—STILLINGFLEET.

"We will come and make our *abode* with him.—*Bible.*

The legal force of the term *domicile* is a residence at a particular place, with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there.

HAPPEN. CHANCE. OCCUR.

To HAPPEN (Icel. *happ*, *chance*, *luck*) is used of all occurrences, whether accidental or not, which are not regarded as the result of specific design on the part of the individual to whom the term is applied. For that which is the issue of a train of circumstances, however connected, may be said to happen to those who have had no hand in bringing it about.

To CHANCE (Fr. *chance*, *chance*, *hazard*, Lat. *cădentia*), on the other hand, is only used when the character of the event, as regards the individual whom it befalls, is fortuitous.

To OCCUR (Lat. *occurrĕre*, *to run towards*) is a relative term, equivalent to happening to a person, or to falling undesignedly in his way. It is said, not only of events, but of ideas or thoughts which suggest themselves. Events of remote history happen; but they are not occurrences *to us*.

"When four different persons are called upon in a court of justice to prove the reality of any particular fact that *happened* twenty or thirty years ago, what is the sort of evidence which they usually give? Why, in the great leading circumstances which tend to establish the fact in question, they in general perfectly agree."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

"If a bird's nest *chance* to be before thee."—*Eng. Bible.*

"There doth not *occurre* to me at this present, any use thereof for profit."—BACON.

HAPPINESS. FELICITY. BEATITUDE. BLESSEDNESS. BLISS. BLESSING.

HAPPINESS (Icel. *happ*, *chance*, *luck*) is that feeling which results from the conscious enjoyment of an aggregate of good things. It is a state of the soul, and is applied to every degree of consciousness of well-being, and is not employed of any state, however keen, of mere animal gratification, irrespectively of the mental state. Happiness is a term both of philosophy and of common conversation.

FELICITY (Fr. *félicité*, Lat. *felicĭtātem*) is not only a more formal word for happiness, but also involves a substantial ground of the feeling. It is the consciousness not only of enjoyment, but of a state of prosperity. Our happiness is evident to others, and may make us objects of envy; our felicity is felt by ourselves. Happi-

ness is less continuous, so that we speak sometimes of a specific happiness. I have had the happiness to make his acquaintance. Felicity is not so employed. External blessings make up man's happiness, but his felicity largely depends on himself.

Blessedness (A. S. *bletsian, to bless;* connected with *blithe* and *bliss*) denotes a state of the most refined and pure happiness, arising from the possession of the choicest goods or material of happiness, and is the characteristic of the person's entire state in soul and body. Bliss is happiness of a rapturous or ecstatic nature.

Beatitude (Lat. *beatus*) is the Latin equivalent of Blessedness, and is used in the higher and more spiritual style. It conveys the idea of *imparted* blessedness. Cicero seems to have invented the word *beātĭtūdo*, to express a condition of happiness wanting in nothing. Blessing nearly answers to the Latin *benediction;* but, while Benediction is used only of good wishes, Blessing is used both of good wishes and good things. (*See* Happy.)

"The word happy is a relative term; in strictness, any condition may be denominated happy in which the amount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of *happiness* depends upon the quantity of this excess."—Paley.

Happiness depends on the possession of such things as wealth, honour, friends, health; the satisfaction of mind involved in the enjoyment of such things constitutes Felicity.

"Did faith ever violate peace, or obedience impair domestic *felicity?*"—Warburton.

"As almost here she with her *bliss* doth meet."

Davies, *Immortality of the Soul.*

"Jupiter has by him two great vessels, one filled with *blessings*, the other with misfortunes."—*Tatler.*

"About Him all the sanctities of heaven
Stood thick as stars, and from His sight received
Beatitude past utterance." Milton.

"The deeps and the snows, the hail and the rain, the birds of the air and fishes of the sea, they can and do glorify God, and give Him praise in their capacity; and yet He gave them no speech, no reason, no immortal spirit, no capacity of eternal *blessedness.*"—Bishop Taylor.

HAPPY. Fortunate. Lucky.

Happy denotes the possession o goods which are really such; Fortunate (Lat. *fortūnātus, fortuna, fortune*), the possession of what are so considered. Men may be called fortunate in reference to very small things; as a lucky throw in a game of chance. Happy involves a larger scale of benefit. A man is happy in what he has; fortunate, in getting it.

There is a close connexion between Lucky (Du. *luk, geluk, good fortune, happiness*) and fortunate; but Lucky is used only of minor occurrences; Fortunate, of the larger results of favourable chance. To be lucky is less than to be fortunate; to be fortunate, less than to be happy. Luck excludes all idea of effort; but a man may be fortunate in his undertakings. A fortunate man obtains what he wishes and hopes to gain. A lucky man gets what he may desire, but did not expect to gain. Merchants who make successful speculations are fortunate. Lottery prizes and unexpected legacies fall to the lucky. It is more grand to be fortunate, more complete to be happy. One is fortunate as possessing what fortune has to bestow, happy in the enjoyment of what constitutes true felicity. The fortunate man has exultation, the happy man serenity. Some men are happy without having been fortunate, others are fortunate in the estimation of the world yet far from happy. To be fortunate is to have much, to be happy is to enjoy what one has. Ambition may be fortunate, moderation is happy.

"Oh! *Happiness*, our being's end and aim,
Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, whate'er thy name. Pope.

"As Sylla was sacrificing in his tent in the fields of Nola, a snake happened to creep out of the bottom of the altar; upon which, Postumius, the Haruspex, who attended the sacrifice, proclaiming it to be a *fortunate* omen, called out upon him to lead his army immediately against the enemy."—Middleton, *Life of Cicero.*

"He who sometimes lights on truth is right but by chance; and I know not whether the *luckiness* of the accident will excuse the irregularity of the proceeding."—Locke.

HARDLY. SCARCELY.

These terms are correctly employed in proportion as it is borne in mind that SCARCELY relates to quantity, HARDLY to degree. "It is scarcely ten miles off." "I shall hardly be able to finish this work."

HARMLESS. INOFFENSIVE. UNOFFENDING. INNOCUOUS.

HARMLESS denotes in a twofold sense the absence of the disposition to do hurt, and the state of immunity from harm. In the former sense, it is used in reference to the power or disposition of living creatures. We speak of harmless animals.

INNOCUOUS (Lat. *innŏcuus*), on the other hand, is employed of things, and not persons; as, an innocuous potion, atmosphere, plant. INOFFENSIVE and UNOFFENDING differ in that the former means not being even indirectly a source of annoyance or offence, while the latter means devoid of all disposition to offend. UNOFFENDING can only be employed of human beings; INOFFENSIVE, of influences in general, which are capable of being unpleasantly or noxiously felt; as inoffensive odours. HARMLESS and INNOCUOUS belong to the nature of beings; INOFFENSIVE and UNOFFENDING are used relatively.

"For when through tasteless flat humility,
In dough-baked men some *harmlessness* we see,
'Tis but his phlegm that's virtuous, and not he." DONNE.

"Useful and *inoffensive* animals have a claim to our tenderness, and it is honourable to our nature to befriend them."—BEATTIE.

"Horace very truly observes that whatever mad frolics enter into the heads of kings, it is the common people, that is, the honest artizan and the industrious tribes in the middle ranks, unoffended and *unoffending*, who chiefly suffer in the evil consequences."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"And not only *innocuous*, but they (spiders) are very salutiferous too, in some of the most stubborn diseases."—DERHAM.

HARSH. ROUGH.

HARSHNESS (*see* ACRIMONY) acts upon the affections and the feelings, to which it does violence.

ROUGHNESS (A.S. *rûh*, *rough*) is a matter of manner, which externally annoys, as indicating a want of consideration or deference, but is easily endured by sensible persons, where it is seen to be a mere defect of polish. Roughness is not necessarily a defect. Morally, harshness is always offensive to the mind, taste, feelings, or senses.

"*Harshness* and brutality."—SHAFTESBURY.

"I could endure
Chains nowhere patiently, and chains at home,
Where I am free by birthright, not at all.
Then what were left of *roughness* in the grain
Of British natures, wanting its excuse,
That it belongs to freemen, would disgust
And shock me." COWPER.

HASTE. DISPATCH. HURRY. SPEED. BUSTLE.

HASTE (Sw. *hasta*, *to haste*) is voluntary speed directed to the commencement or continuation of something.

HURRY (with other similar words, probably onomatopoetic), is an effort of HASTE, embarrassed by confusion or want of self-collectedness. Haste signifies heat of action; hurry implies haste, but includes trepidation or perturbation. What is done in haste may be done well; what is done in a hurry can at best only be done inaccurately.

"Homer himself, as Cicero observes above, is full of this kind of painting, and particularly fond of description, even in situations where the action seems to require *haste*."—GOLDSMITH.

"Sisters, hence with spurs of speed,
Each her thundering falchion wield,
Each bestride her sable steed,
Hurry, hurry, to the field." GRAY.

SPEED (A.S. *spédan*, *to succeed*, *to make haste*) is the degree of rapidity with which things are done. Haste implies a wish for quickness; speed, its actual attainment.

DISPATCH (O. Fr. *despescher*, now *dépêcher*; L. Lat. *dispĕdicare*, *to get rid of pĕdica*, *a fetter*, cf. *empêcher*. *See* LITTRÉ's reasons for preferring this derivation) is the promptitude and speed which are brought to bear upon *the execution* of a task, business, or transaction.

BUSTLE (? perhaps *t.q.* the older *buskle*, and so from A.S. *busgian*, *to be busy*) is tumult or stir arising from hurried activity, whether on the part of one person or of a crowd. It is the most unpractical and weakest exhibition of hurry.

"Thou *bustler* in concerns
Of little worth, an idler in the best."
COWPER.

"He saw a young Indian, whom he judged to be about nineteen or twenty years old, come down from a tree, and he also ran away with such *speed* as made it hopeless to follow him."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"A husbandman or a gardener will do more execution by being able to carry his scythe, his rake, or his flail with sufficient *dispatch* through a sufficient space, than if with greater strength his motions were proportionately more confined and slow."—PALEY.

HASTINESS. RASHNESS. TEMERITY. PRECIPITANCY.

HASTINESS is the disposition to overhaste, and is applicable to too great quickness of feeling as well as action; as a hasty temper, a hasty act. The others relate only to actions.

RASHNESS (Da. and Sw. *rask*, *quick*, *rash*) is the quality of determining or acting from the impulse of the feelings, with little or no reflexion on the cost or consequence. It is the courage of the unreflecting and of the inexperienced.

TEMERITY (Lat. *tĕmĕrĭtātem*) is that kind of rashness which underrates or disregards personal danger or consequences, and is the passive state of which rashness is the active quality. To enter upon a hazardous speculation would be called RASHNESS, but not TEMERITY. To approach too near to the brink of a precipice would be temerity. Rashness has in it more of the excited, and temerity more of the dogged. RASHNESS refers to the act, TEMERITY to the disposition.

PRECIPITANCY (Lat. *præcĭpĭtāre*, *to throw headlong*) is employed, not of acts, but of the judgment which dictates them. Haste in deciding upon measures which required more consideration and reflexion, is what is commonly called PRECIPITANCY. A man is precipitate who judges, or acts, or speaks before the time.

"But Epiphanius was made up of *hastiness* and credulity, and is never to be trusted where he speaks of a miracle."—JORTIN.

"His beginnings must be in *rashness*, a noble fault; but time and experience will correct that error, and tame it into a deliberate and well-weighed courage."—DRYDEN.

"It must be acknowledged that the *temerity* of making experiments may casually lead to improvements in medical science; but it is a cruel *temerity*, for experiments in medicine are made on the sick at the hazard of life."—KNOX.

"But if we make a rash beginning, and resolve *precipitantly* without observing the above-named rules and directions, in all probability our hasty purposes will end in a leisurely repentance."—SCOTT, *Christian Life*.

HASTY. CURSORY.

HASTY, as contrasted with CURSORY, is only employed of observation; CURSORY (Lat. *cursōrius*, *pertaining to one who runs*) also of treatment. The subject was viewed hastily, and treated cursorily. HASTY is always at least an unsatisfactory epithet. CURSORY is not so much so; as a cursory review may be all that is needed. Hasty is that which occupies little time; cursory, which occupies little thought.

"The turns of his (Virgil's) verse, his breakings, his propriety, his numbers, and his gravity, I have as far imitated as the poverty of our language and the *hastiness* of my performance would allow."—DRYDEN.

"It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals that their maxims have a plausible air, and on a *cursory* view appear equal to first principles. They are light and portable."—BURKE.

HATE. DISLIKE.

HATE (A.S. *hatian*) is to feel such an enmity as to desire the injury, destruction, or removal of the object. It is applied to persons and qualities of a personal kind, though not always strictly personal; as "to hate the light," for instance, which really means to hate the knowledge which comes from wise men. It is a perversion of language to speak of hating the impersonal. DISLIKE is a version in a milder form, a version being a strong, settled, and avowed dislike. DISLIKE is applicable, as HATE is not, to impersonal influence; as to dislike a particular taste or smell. Hate is a matter of

principle; dislike, a matter of taste, feeling, or sentiment.

"Indeed the affection of hatred is of so unpleasant a nature, that the being who could *hate* every thing would be his own tormentor."—COGAN.

"The Americans when the Stamp Act was first imposed, undoubtedly *disliked* it as every nation *dislikes* an impost."—JOHNSON.

(*See also* HATRED.)

HATEFUL. ODIOUS.

Of these terms HATEFUL is the stronger, ODIOUS (Lat. *ŏdiōsus, ŏdium, hatred*) being frequently employed of what is irksome, while HATEFUL is nearly equivalent to *detestable*. Hateful tyrants, hateful vices; odious measures, odious smells. Nothing is truly hateful but that which is evil; while the offensive may be odious.

"Want is a bitter and a *hateful* good,
Because its virtues are not understood."
DRYDEN.

"It was an *odious* thing to the people of England to have a king brought unto them upon the shoulders of Irish and Dutch."—BACON.

HATRED. AVERSION. ANTIPATHY. ENMITY. REPUGNANCE. ILL-WILL. RANCOUR. MALICE. MALEVOLENCE. MALIGNITY. MALIGNANCY.

HATRED (A.S. *hatian, to hate*) is a very general term. HATRED applies properly to persons. It seems not absolutely involuntary. It has its root in passion, and may be checked or stimulated and indulged. It may spring from a variety of causes, and springs up more readily in some natures than in others. It is active and resentful, and desires the harm or destruction of its object. Insulting manners, or the existence or presumed existence of offensive qualities in another, are sufficient to produce hatred. It needs a reaction as of gratitude or some quickening of interest to expel it, for as has been well said, it is a shorter step from hatred to love, than from hatred to indifference.

AVERSION (Lat. *āversionem, a turning away, a loathing*) is strong dislike. Aversion is an habitual sentiment, and springs from the natural taste or temperament which repels its opposites, as an indolent man has an aversion to industry, or a humane one to cruelty. We dislike what is unpleasant to us. We have an aversion to what shocks or disgusts, or raises a feeling of repugnance.

"Strictly speaking, *aversion* is no other than a modification of desire; a desire of being liberated from whatever appears injurious to well-being."—COGAN.

ANTIPATHY (Gr. ἀντιπάθεια, *aversion*) is used of causeless dislike, or at least one of which the cause cannot be defined. It is founded upon supposition or instinctive belief, often utterly gratuitous, often not without some truth, of the character of the person as worthy of dislike. Both aversion and antipathy have less of voluntariness than hatred.

"There are many ancient and received traditions and observations touching the sympathy and *antipathy* of plants; for that some will thrive best growing near others, which they impute to sympathy, and some worse, which they impute to *antipathy*."—BACON.

Faults of which we have a peculiar horror, or ways very unlike our own, excite aversion. It is only removed by our becoming more like others, or their becoming more like us. Difference of temperament, singularity of humour may cause antipathy. It can only be extinguished when reason asserts the mastery over fancy, and judges soberly.

ENMITY (Fr. *inimitié*, as if from a Lat. *ĭnĭmīcĭtātem*) is the state of personal opposition, whether accompanied by strong personal dislike or not; as "a bitter enemy," or, on the other hand, "the enemy," meaning the hostile party. In some of its metaphorical or applied senses it is little more than equivalent to strong opponent, as we speak of an enemy to falsehood; but an enemy is one who carries hatred into practice. Enmity may be tempered by generosity, and the laws of honour.

"And by these guileful means he more prevailed
Than had he open *enmity* profest;
The wolf more safely wounds when in sheep's clothing drest." LLOYD.

REPUGNANCE (Lat. *rĕpugnantia, opposition*) is characteristically employed of acts or courses of action, measures, pursuits, and the like. We

do not employ it directly of persons, so as to say, "I have a repugnance to such an one;" here we should use the term AVERSION. It denotes an involuntary resistance to a particular line of conduct to which circumstances impel us. A repugnance to study. There is a use of REPUGNANT and REPUGNANCE analogous to that of *abhorrent* and *abhorrence*, in which the terms denote a strong contrariety and dissimilarity between any two objects or subjects capable of being brought into juxtaposition or comparison; as slavery is repugnant to Christianity. So in the following:—

"If things in themselves evil, *repugnant* to the principles of human nature, and those of civil societies, as well as to the precepts of Christianity, are made lawful only for the carrying on their design, we need not go farther to examine them, for by these fruits we may know them."—STILLINGFLEET.

But the noun REPUGNANCE as employed of persons expresses a specific feeling, not, like AVERSION, an habitual sentiment.

ILL-WILL is a settled bias of the disposition away from another. It is very indefinite, and may be of any degree of strength.

RANCOUR (Lat. *rancōrem, rancidity, rancour*) is a deep-seated and lasting feeling of ill-will. It preys upon the very mind of the subject of it. While enmity may be generous and open, rancour is malignant and private. It commonly denotes such ill-will or disturbance of feeling towards another as survives from a former enmity or difference. So that, even after the forms of enmity are laid aside in reconciliation, something of rancour is apt to remain behind.

"*Rancour* is that degree of malice which preys upon the possessor."—COGAN.

MALICE (Lat. *mălĭtia, bad quality, spite*) is that enmity which can abide its opportunity of injuring its object, and pervert the truth or the right, or go out of its way, or shape courses of action, to compass its ends. Malice is, generally speaking, however, not audacious or atrocious. It aims at inflicting on its object petty sufferings rather than great evils.

MALEVOLENCE (Lat. *mălĕvŏlentia*) is the casual or habitual state of ill-will, but differs from ill-will in that the latter is *always* casual, while malevolence is with some habitual, or so easily excited as to seem so.

"*Malice* is more frequently employed to express the dispositions of inferior minds to execute every purpose of mischief within the more limited circle of their abilities."—COGAN.

"*Malevolence* commences with some idea of evil belonging to and connected with the object; and it settles into a permanent *hatred* of his person and of everything relative to him."—COGAN

MALIGNITY (Lat. *mălignĭtātem*) is yet worse; it is cruel malevolence, or innate love of harm for the sake of doing it. It is malice the most energetic, inveterate, and sustained. A further difference, it seems, ought to be noted between MALIGNITY and MALIGNANCY. While MALIGNITY denotes an inherent evil of nature, MALIGNANCY denotes its indication in particular instances. Malignant spirits, for instance, conveys the idea of spirits already engaged on their errands of mischief; and, again, MALIGNITY always implies evil purpose, while MALIGNANCY is said of unpurposed evil. The malignancy, not malignity, of a disease.

"Now this shows the high *malignity* of fraud and falsehood, that in the direct and natural course of it, it tends to the destruction of common life by destroying that trust and mutual confidence that men should have in one another."—SOUTH.

"I will not deny but that the noxious and *malignant* plants do many of them discover something in their nature by the sad and melancholick visage of their leaves, flowers, and fruit."—RAY.

HAVEN. HARBOUR. PORT.

A HAVEN (A. S. *hæfene*) is always a *natural* harbour.

A HARBOUR (*see* HARBINGER) is first a station for rest, shelter, lodging, entertainment; and thence a sheltered station for ships, whether *natural or artificial*.

A PORT (Fr. *port*, Lat. *portus, harbour*) is commonly employed in the sense of a frequented harbour, with its commercial restrictions and regulations, customs, dues, and the like. A

port is a harbour viewed in its national, civic, or commercial relations.

"And now the surrender of Dorchester (the magazine from whence the other places were supplied with principles of rebellion) infused the same spirit into Weymouth, a very convenient *harbour* and *haven*."—CLARENDON.

"These legal *ports* were undoubtedly at first assigned by the crown, since to each of them a court of port-mote is incident, the jurisdiction of which must flow from royal authority."—BLACKSTONE.

HAZE. FOG. VAPOUR. MIST.

HAZE (etym. doubtful) is employed to designate a light thin vapour which thickens the air without a feeling of dampness.

FOG (Danish *fog*, orig. a sea term) is thick watery vapour differing from cloud only in the absence of elevation. Those who, by ascending high hills, find themselves in cloud, experience no difference of sensation from that of fog.

VAPOUR (Lat. *vāpōrem*), as a term of physics, is any substance in the gaseous or aeriform state of which the ordinary state is liquid or solid.

MIST (A. S. *mist*) is watery vapour dense enough to fall in visible particles, and so nearly approaching the form of rain.

HEAD. LEADER. CHIEF.

HEAD (A. S. *heafod*), as coming from the Teutonic, is the analogue of CHIEF (Fr. *chef*, Lat. *căput*), as coming from the Latin. But, as now employed by ourselves, HEAD denotes no more than the first in an organized body, while CHIEF expresses pre-eminence, personal and active. A person may be the head of a number, because there must be *some* head; but if he is the chief, his personal importance and influence is felt, whether for good or ill. So personal is the idea of CHIEF, that a man may be chief among others without being in any sense their head, that is, bound to them in a relationship of command.

A LEADER (A. S. *lǽdan*, *lád*, *a path*) is one who controls, directs, and instigates others in definite lines of movement or action. The head is the highest man. The chief is the strongest, best, or most conspicuous man. The leader is the most influential man.

"A reform proposed by an unsupported individual in the presence of *heads* of houses, public officers, doctors, and proctors, whose peculiar province it would have been urged is to consult for the academic state, would have been deemed even more officious and arrogant than a public appeal."—KNOX.

"I thank God I am neither a minister nor a *leader* of opposition."—BURKE.

"The *chief* of sinners."—*Bible.*

HEALTHY. WHOLESOME. SALUBRIOUS. SALUTARY. HALE.

HEALTHY (A. S. *hælð*, *health*) bears the twofold meaning of *possessing* health, and *imparting* health. A healthy person; a healthy atmosphere.

WHOLESOME (*whole*, in the sense of *sound*) means tending to health or soundness, or not inconsistent with them, whether of body or mind; as a wholesome appetite, wholesome air, wholesome advice. But both HEALTHY and WHOLESOME are commonly employed in more than a negative sense, as when we say, "the situation is perfectly healthy," "the food is quite wholesome." HEALTHY or HEALTHFUL stands to WHOLESOME as the positive to the negative. The former promotes or increases our bodily strength; the latter does no harm to our physical constitution. And so HEALTHY is more commonly applied to what comes to us in the way of exceptional benefit; WHOLESOME, to the necessaries of life. Unwholesome food disorganizes the functions of the body; healthy air and recreation improve the physical powers. In like manner, a wholesome truth, wholesome advice, is preservative of morality and our interests. A healthy tone of mind tends to the improvement of our faculties. The wholesome is assimilated and acted upon *by* us; the healthy acts *upon* us.

"A few cheerful companions in our walks will render them abundantly more *healthful*, for, according to the ancient adage, they will serve instead of a carriage, or, in other words, prevent the sensation of fatigue."—KNOX, *Essays.*

"Not only grain has become somewhat cheaper, but many other things, from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and *wholesome* variety of food."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

But SALUBRIOUS and SALUTARY (Lat. *sălubris, sălutăris; sălus, health*) are stronger and more positive. A salubrious air tends actually to *establish* health, while that which is salutary tends to *restore* it. It may be observed that, while SALUTARY is employed of morals, as salutary advice, SALUBRIOUS has no such application. It may be added that SALUBRIOUS is employed in a passive sense. SALUTARY is always active. A salubrious condition; salutary remedies.

HALE (A. S. *hál, sound, whole*) is employed only of the human body. It denotes a health and soundness which have survived impairing effects, especially of old age.

"His stomach, too, begins to fail,
Last year we thought him strong and *hale*,
But now he's quite another thing."
SWIFT.

"Give the *salubrious* draughts with your own hand;
Persuasion has the force of a command."
KING.

"When St. Paul delivered over to Satan, the design of it was salutary, that the spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus."—WATERLAND.

HEAP. ACCUMULATE. AMASS. PILE.

To HEAP (A.S. *héap*) is to place particles or substances upon one another, so as to form some degree of elevation. The action is indefinite in character, and may be performed with or without rule or system.

In this respect it differs from PILE (Fr. *pile*, Lat. *pila, a pile, support*; and so, the thing supported) which is to heap piecemeal, and with system or care. To heap stones is general; to pile them is specific. But even if the process of heaping have been performed with care, the heap which is the result has no distinctness of parts. On the other hand, the word PILE may be used in a phrase expressive of praise. A heap of ruins. A noble pile of architecture.

To ACCUMULATE (Lat. *accŭmŭlare, cŭmŭlus, a heap*) conveys the idea of chance or desultory heaping. Men heap things when they know where to lay their hands to find them; they accumulate things when they heap them as they find them; hence ACCUMULATE tends more strongly than HEAP to a figurative or moral meaning. The farmer heaps, but does not accumulate, corn, unless he buys it up from different quarters for storing. But by industry and good fortune he accumulates wealth.

AMASS (Fr. *amasser, to pile together, masse, a mass*) is to accumulate in large quantities what is of substantial value, for the purpose of creating a store or fund; as to amass wealth or learning: while that which is accumulated may be of no value; as an accumulation of old clothes, or mud at a river's mouth.

"The whole performance is not so much a regular fabric as a *heap* of shining materials thrown together by accident, which strikes rather with the solemn magnificence of a stupendous ruin, than the elegant grandeur of a finished *pile*."—JOHNSON.

We heap things of the same or different kinds; we accumulate things of the same kind.

"He did conceive that it was against the first principles of Nature and false, that an heap or *accumulation* should be and not be of homogeneous things; and therefore that which in its first being is not treasonable can never confer to make up an *accumulative* treason."—*State Trials*.

"The heire shall waste the whourded gold, *amassed* with much payne."—SURREY.

HEARKEN. ATTEND. LISTEN.

These terms have each a primary and secondary meaning. The primary meaning belongs to the acts, the secondary to the characteristics of the acts. The primary meaning of to HEARKEN (A.S. *hyrcnian*) is voluntarily and specifically to exercise the faculty of hearing; of ATTEND (Lat. *attendere, to turn to, to give heed to*) to perform the mental act of bringing the understanding to bear on what is so heard; and of LISTEN (A.S. *hlystan*) to hearken and attend conjointly with some degree of propensity or interest. The secondary meanings are in accordance with these. We hearken to injunctions, commands. We attend to instructions or advice. We listen to entreaty or persuasion.

"But here she comes; I fairly step aside
And *hearken*, if I may, her business."
MILTON.

"He now prepared
To speak, whereat their doubled ranks they bend
From wing to wing, and half inclose him round,
With all his peers; *attention* held them mute." MILTON.

"The external ear, we are told, had acquired a distinct motion upward and backward, which was observable whenever the patient *listened* to anything which he did not distinctly hear."—PALEY.

HEARTY. SINCERE. CORDIAL. FRANK. CANDID. OPEN. INGENUOUS. WARM.

HEARTY is having the *heart* in a thing—earnest, sincere. Heartiness implies honesty, simplicity, and cordiality; but the term leans rather to expressing the outward demonstration of feeling than any quality of the feeling itself, though this is by no means excluded; as a hearty desire, a hearty laugh, a hearty shake of the hand, to return hearty thanks. So a hearty meal is one partaken of with good-will instead of with a languid or sickly appetite.

"Where leisurely doffing a hat worth a tester,
He bade me most *heartily* welcome to Chester." COTTON.

SINCERE (Lat. *sincērus*), unlike HEARTY, expresses nothing of the strength of feeling, but only denotes that it is genuine, and not pretended. SINCERE is very often mistaken for HEARTY, as in the common phrase, "I return my *most sincere thanks*." Thanks are either sincere or not. Sincerity does not admit of degrees, though the exhibition of feeling does. Sincerity is when the man disguises nothing from others or from himself; and so may be predicated both of principle and of practice or demeanour. It is truth or truthfulness of motive. Sincerity combines reality of conviction and earnestness of purpose with purity or freedom from unfairness or dishonesty. Unless these be combined, sincerity becomes a very fallacious term.

"And a good man may likewise know when he obeys God *sincerely*. Not but that men often deceive themselves with an opinion, or at least a groundless hope, of their own *sincerity*. But if they will deal fairly with themselves, and use due care and diligence, there are very few cases (if any) wherein they may not know their own *sincerity* in any act of obedience to God. For what can a man know concerning himself if not the reality of his own intentions."—TILLOTSON.

CORDIAL (Lat. *cordi-*, *stem of cor*, *cordis*, *the heart*) is the Latin form of the Saxon HEARTY, and differs rather in the mode of application than in the essence of the meaning. CORDIAL is more subjective. HEARTY, more objective. Cordial feelings; hearty manifestations of them. Cordial thanks are thanks warmly felt, hearty thanks are thanks warmly expressed.

As SINCERE relates to the disposition, so FRANK (Fr. *franc*, L. Lat. *francus*, *free*) and CANDID (Lat. *candĭdus*, *white*, *guiltless*) relate to the speech and manner. That man is frank who is open and unreserved in the expression of his sentiments, whatever they may be. That man is candid who is fair of mind, without prejudice, ready to admit his own faults or errors. In the full sense of the term, CANDOUR is that absence of reserve or dissimulation which comes from purity, innocence, and guilelessness. Sincerity prevents a man from saying one thing while he thinks another. It is a virtue. Frankness makes him speak as he thinks. It is the natural effect of disposition. The sincere man will not deceive, the frank man will not dissemble. Sincerity is a security in the intercourse of the *heart*. Frankness facilitates *social* intercourse.

"Then would Britain and Ireland have but one interest; and it is rank absurdity in politics to expect any *cordiality* between them whilst their interests are separate."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson.*

"Reserve with *frankness*, art with truth allied,
Courage with softness, modesty with pride."
POPE.

Candour is openness towards one's self; frankness, towards others.

"If our modern infidels received these matters with that *candour* and seriousness which they deserve, we should not see them act with such a spirit of bitterness, arrogance, and malice."—*Spectator.*

OPENNESS (A. S. *open*) denotes no more than an opposite tendency to that of concealment, reticence, or reserve. It is a less active quality than frankness; and, while openness is consistent with timidity, frankness implies some degree of boldness.

INGENUOUS (Lat. *ingĕnuus*) implies a permanent moral quality. A man may be not remarkable for frankness, yet at heart thoroughly ingenuous, that is, a lover of integrity, and a hater of dissimulation. Men of retiring manner are often truly ingenuous; for ingenuousness is, after all, more allied to modesty than to frankness.

WARM relates to all the feelings, and indicates the quality of specific feeling as entertained in a high degree. We speak, therefore, of the warmth of resentment as well as of friendship.

"By their frequent change of company they (soldiers) acquire good breeding and an *openness* of behaviour."—HUME.

"The evangelists *ingenuously* confess the misbehaviour of the apostles on some occasions."—JORTIN.

"The young plainly need it (admonition) most, as they are just entering into the world, with little knowledge, less experience, and yet scarcely even any distrust, with lively spirits and *warm* passions to mislead them, and time to go a great way wrong if they do not go right."—SECKER.

HEATHEN. PAGAN. GENTILE.

HEATHEN (A.S. *hæðen*, orig. *a dweller on a heath, wild region*) is a term now employed to comprise all nations or religions besides Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism.

PAGAN (Lat. *pāgānus, one dwelling in a village, pāgus*) originally denoted those who were remote from the centres of Christianity and civilization.

GENTILE (Lat. *gentilis, gentem, a nation*) bore, under the Hebrew term *goim*, the meaning of all men who had not received the Jewish rite of circumcision. It was afterwards transferred by the Christians to all who were not Christians or Jews. In civil matters a Gentile was one who was not a Roman. The distinction at present prevailing between HEATHEN and PAGAN is that the former denotes a false creed, the latter a superstitious worship. Heathen superstitions and pagan idolatries. When used as an epithet, HEATHEN has always an unfavourable sense. Not so PAGAN; as pagan art or architecture is employed to designate those simply which Christianity has had no influence in producing. GENTILE is a national term expressing those who were not Jews. HEATHEN, a national term expressing those who were not converted to Christianity. PAGAN, an individual term denoting those who remained idolaters in spite of Christianity.

"It has always been my thought that *heathens* who never did, nor without miracle could, hear the name of Christ, were yet in a possibility of salvation."—DRYDEN.

"The ruin of *Paganism* in the age of Theodorus is perhaps the only example of the total extirpation of any ancient and popular superstition, and may therefore deserve to be considered as a singular event in the history of the human mind."—GIBBON.

"A light to lighten the *Gentiles*, and the glory of Thy people Israel."—*English Bible.*

HEAVEN. HEAVENS. PARADISE.

HEAVEN (connected with *heave* = *the place raised aloft*) is opposed to *earth*. It is the upper vault of the firmament. Spiritually it is the abode of God and of immortal spirits or intelligences, and is thus opposed to *hell;* a place of light and joy as opposed to darkness, misery, and doom. The idea is vague, yet not obscure. It expresses a definite reality. HEAVENS represents the variable aspect of the regions above the earth in their physical character. So the stars of heaven, the serene or starry appearance of the heavens. The moralist and the divine treat of HEAVEN. The astronomer and astrologer, in different ways, study the HEAVENS.

PARADISE (Heb. *pardés*, Gr. *παράδεισος*), is literally a *garden*, the earthly paradise having suggested the idea of a heavenly. As HEAVEN is the abode of purity, brightness, and happiness, so PARADISE is the place of perfect enjoyment. It is God and His presence that constitute heaven. It is for the most the speculations of men that create a paradise. Some nations seem to combine the idea of a spiritual heaven with that of a sensual paradise. Accordingly the wor PARADISE lends itself to familiar tr

ment; as, a paradise of luxury, indolence, gaiety, sweets; a fools' paradise.

HEAVENLY. CELESTIAL. DIVINE. GODLIKE.

HEAVENLY is of or belonging to heaven (A. S. *heofon*, connected with *heave*—the place *heaved* or *raised*), in its fullest sense material and spiritual, and so like those pure spirits with which heaven is peopled; "heavenly bodies," "heavenly bliss," "heavenly virtues."

CELESTIAL (Lat. *cœlestis*, *cœlum*, *heaven*) is the Latin equivalent of the Saxon HEAVENLY, but lends itself more readily to the ideas of heathen religions; while HEAVENLY has been consecrated to Christian ideas. CELESTIAL is also rather a poetic than a prosaic term.

DIVINE (Lat. *divinus*) is restricted to the person of God or celestial beings, and is not employed of the material heavens; as, Divine Being, Divine excellences, not Divine bodies. The term is always of a personal *character*, though not always strictly personal; as Divine beauty, that is, beauty as of a Divine being; the Divine will, or will of God. GODLIKE, like God, or like a God, is not used simply as a qualifying term, like HEAVENLY and DIVINE, but is a term of *great praise*, whether of individuals or qualities; as, a godlike form, the godlike quality of forgiveness.

"Endued with *heavenly* virtues."—*English Liturgy.*

"That mind will never be vacant which is frequently recalled by stated duties to meditations on eternal interests; nor can any hour be long which is spent in obtaining some new qualification for *celestial* happiness."—*Rambler.*

"Which *Divine* revelation both the necessities of men and their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for."—CLARKE.

"Vain, wretched creature, how art thou misled,
To think thy wit these *godlike* notions bred!
These truths are not the product of thy mind,
But dropt from Heaven, and of a nobler kind."
DRYDEN

HEED. CARE. ATTENTION.

HEED (A. S. *hédan*, *to take care*) combines ATTENTION and CARE; but, while ATTENTION (Lat. *attendĕre*, *to turn to*, *to give to*) has the general sense of a careful giving of the mind to anything that is proposed to it, HEED has exclusive relation to what concerns one's own interests. One pays attention to another; one takes heed to one's own ways. Heed is practical attention on motives of caution.

CARE (A. S. *caru*, *care*, *sorrow*) is also cautious regard, but may be exercised on behalf of others as well as one's self. To take care of another, would be to associate with him. To take heed of him, would be to avoid him in care for yourself. CARE extends to actions; HEED and ATTENTION are confined to thought, except when ATTENTION means thought in the sense of waiting on another.

"He who considers what Tacitus, Suetonius, Seneca say of Tiberius and his reign, will find how necessary it was for our Saviour, if He would not die as a criminal and a traitor, to take great *heed* to His words and actions."—LOCKE.

"With as much *care* and little hurt as doth a mother use."—CHAPMAN, *Homer.*

"Due *attention* to the inside of books, and due contempt for the outside, is the proper relation between a man of sense and his books."—CHESTERFIELD.

HEINOUS. FLAGITIOUS. FLAGRANT. ATROCIOUS.

HEINOUS (Fr. *haineux*, *haine*, *hatred*) is strictly hateful, odious; hence, hatefully bad. That is heinous which partakes of the nature of aggravated crime or offence.

That is FLAGITIOUS (Lat. *flăgĭtiōsus*, *flăgĭtium*, *a burning shame*) which is disgracefully and shamefully bad in persons, practices, or times.

FLAGRANT (Lat. *flăgrans*, *flăgrāre*, *to burn*) marks more strongly than FLAGITIOUS the striking character, or *glaring* badness of the thing. A flagitious thing may be done in secret; a flagrant crime, misrepresentation, or violation of duty, is one of which the public necessarily takes cognizance. FLAGRANT, unlike FLAGITIOUS, applies to error as well as crime.

ATROCIOUS (Lat. *ātrōcem*) carries the deed back to the source, and represents it as springing from a violent or savage spirit, or attended with aggravating circumstances. HEINOUS and FLAGRANT intensify specific *kinds* of action; FLAGITIOUS and ATROCIOUS are simply applicable to actions. So flagitious or atrocious deeds; heinous cruelty; a flagrant blunder. FLAGITIOUS expresses the badness of the deed; ATROCIOUS, the badness of the motive, as one of violent and energetic evil.

"There are many authors who have shown wherein the malignity of a lie consists, and set forth in proper colours the *heinousness* of the offence."—*Spectator.*

It deserves to be remarked that all these epithets appertain to character and deeds, but are not directly applicable. We cannot say a heinous, flagrant, or flagitious man, nor very easily an atrocious man; but an atrocious tyrant, a heinous offence, a flagitious character. Milton, however, in an old-fashioned way, says:—

"Punishing tyrants and *flagitious persons.*"

"Ruined fortunes and *flagitious* lives."—MIDDLETON, *Cicero.*

"The mysteries of Bacchus were well chosen for an example of corrupted rites and of the mischief they produced, for they were early and *flagrantly* corrupted."—WARBURTON, *Divine Legation.*

"When Cataline was tried for some *atrocious* murders, many of the consulars appeared in his favour, and gave him an excellent character."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

HELP. AID. SUCCOUR. SUPPORT.

HELP and AID may be here treated as identical. For their finer points of difference, *see* HELP.

HELP is of service to us in our work or efforts, SUCCOUR (Fr. *secours*, Lat. *succurrĕre*) is of service against danger, and SUPPORT (Lat. *supportare*) at all times. The support is required by the individual who is too weak for the situation in which he is placed. Succour is that which he implores who is too weak against the enemy that attacks him; help that which he seeks who is too weak for the work or task with which he is charged. Religion ought to be a support under the trials of life, a succour against its temptations and passions, a help in efforts after virtue. The need of a support proves only weakness; the need of help adds the idea of action; the need of succour involves that of fear. Help, inasmuch as it necessarily implies action, is only applicable to living agents; succour, involving danger, is applicable to all things that may fall into it; support, implying weakness, whether in a physical or moral sense, is applicable to what is animate or inanimate. So one speaks of supporting a statement, helping or aiding a man, succouring a falling state.

HELP. AID. ASSIST. SUCCOUR. RELIEVE.

To HELP (A. S. *helpan*) is the broadest of these terms, of which the rest are modifications. It denotes the furnishing of additional power, means of deliverance, or relief; as to help a man in his work; to help him to escape; to help his sickness, his infirmities, or his troubles.

To AID (Fr. *aider*, Lat. *adjūtare. See* BRACHET) is less energetic than HELP, and lends itself better to that inactive kind of assistance which is rendered by, or rather derived from, inanimate things. "I fell, but recovered myself by the help of a friend." "I crossed the mountains safe with the aid of a chart and a staff." To aid is to help by co-operation, and, in some instances, to enable to help one's self. There is a plain and material force in HELP which is by no means so strongly expressed by AID. Hence AID is the better term where finer work is doing, especially the work of the mind, as "aid to reflexion." HELP more directly promotes the end, aid facilitates the process.

ASSIST (Lat. *assistĕre, to stand by, to defend as counsel*) is purely personal, though *assistance* is used with more latitude. It would not be permissible to say, "My stick assisted me to rise;" yet we might say, "I rose with the assistance of my stick;" the simple word HELP or AID would, however, be much better. Help is some thing more urgently needed than as-

sistance. Help is required in labour, danger, difficulties, and the like; assistance in the pursuit of a study or the performance of a work. Assistance supposes the presence of a need, which the assister stands by to watch and to supply to the best of his power, strength, and judgment. He who is doing needs often to be assisted; he who is suffering, to be helped. The man who is attacked by robbers needs help, not assistance, unless, after his rescue, he should find himself strong enough to endeavour to rout or capture them.

Succour (Lat. *succurrĕre, to run up to*) relates to a condition of trouble or distress, and implies celerity and timeliness in the aid brought.

To Relieve (Fr. *relever*, Lat. *lĕvis, light*) is to *lighten* of a burden, or to lighten the burden itself. It is applicable to anything of the nature of a burden, as pain, distress, poverty. We help generally; we aid the weak; we assist the struggling; we succour the indigent or bereaved; we relieve the needy, the afflicted, or the anxious. The aider should be active, the helper strong, the assister wise, the succourer timely, the reliever sympathizing.

"Who travels by the weary wandering way,
To come unto his wished home in haste,
And meets a flood that doth his passage stay,
Is not great grace to *help* him over past,
Or free his feet that in the mire stick fast."
SPENSER.

"*Aiders*, advisers, and abettors."—BLACKSTONE.

"But genius and learning, when they meet in one person, are mutually and greatly *assistant* to each other; and in the poetical art Horace declares that either, without the other, can do little."—BEATTIE.

"The devotion of life or fortune to the *succour* of the poor is a height of virtue to which humanity has never arisen by its own power."—*Tatler*.

"The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress and the *relievers* of their indigence."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

HERESY. Heterodoxy. Schism.

Heresy (Gr. *αἵρεσις, a choice*, Eccles. *heresy*) is a new opinion in religion set up by an individual or a sect against the old, and is taken to relate to fundamental and vital points.

Heterodoxy (Gr. *ἑτεροδοξία, error of opinion*) is a milder term, and denotes slighter deviations or defects in the creed, for which the person is not necessarily responsible; for heterodoxy may be the result of an inexact theology, while heresy is deliberately maintained.

Schism (Gr. *σχίσμα, a division, schism*) is a rending of external unity or religious communion, of which heresy is often the cause.

"The word *heresy* is Greek, and signifies a taking of anything, particularly the taking of an opinion. After the study of philosophy began in Greece, and the philosophers disagreeing among themselves had started many questions, not only about things natural, but also moral and civil, because every man took what opinion he pleased each several opinion was called a *heresy*, which signified no more than a private opinion without reference to truth or falsehood."—HOBBS.

"*Heterodoxy* was to a Jew but another word for disloyalty, and a zeal to see the rigour of the law executed on that crime was the honour of a Jewish subject."—HURD.

"*Schism* is a rent or division in the Church when it comes to the separating of congregations, and may also happen to a true Church as well as to a false."—MILTON.

HIDE. Conceal. Secrete. Cover. Screen. Shelter. Shield.

Hide (A. S. *hidan*) is so to place physically as to render invisible, or so to treat morally as to make imperceptible. Strictly speaking, this is an act of a voluntary agent; but the licence of colloquial language employs the term in the sense of mere exclusion from view; as, "The trees hide the house." To hide, however, is always positive, while Conceal (Lat. *concelāre*) may be negative. A man hides his feelings by a deliberate effort, or by misleading the minds of others; he conceals his intentions sometimes by simply not revealing them. To conceal is almost invariably to hide with intention. The little brook is hidden when it is overgrown by foliage. On the other hand, the snake lies in the grass concealed. To

hide is a more simple and, as it were, natural movement. To conceal is more deliberate and reflexive. When suddenly surprised men hide what they do not wish to be seen in their possession. They conceal it beforehand if they anticipate a visit of inspection.

"Heaven from all creatures *hides* the book of fate."—POPE.

"The next ground upon which such as are wont to promise themselves security both from the discovery and punishment of their sins, is the opinion which they have of their own singular art and cunning to *conceal* them from the knowledge, or at least of their power to rescue them from the jurisdiction of any earthly judge."—SOUTH.

SECRETE (Lat. *sēcernĕre, to separate*, part. *sēcrētus*) is never used in other than a physical sense, and denotes the specific and purposed hiding of what is of a movable nature. Under this term one's self must be included.

"The whole thing is too manifest to admit of any doubt in any man how long this thing has been working, how many tricks have been played with the Dean's (Swift's) papers, how they were *secreted* from time to time"—POPE.

The term SECRETE commonly supposes an unworthy or unlawful motive. In another sense, and not as a synonym of CONCEAL, SECRETE is used of organic operations; so the snail secretes the material of which the shell is formed.

To COVER (O. Fr. *covrir*, Lat. *co-operīre*) is only accidentally to hide; hiding or concealment from view being the result of total covering and other circumstances, as the non-transparency of the covering material. It may be observed that hiding and concealment imply an impossibility of seeing or perceiving, though, of course, not an impossibility of detection. A man is concealed or hidden in a cupboard; but he is not so if his form is simply covered by some covering which exhibits the outline of his figure, unless owing to some circumstance the searcher failed to observe it. Complete covering on the one side, or such as to produce non-recognition on the other, is needful to constitute concealment. All that is essential to covering is super-extension; anything else as concealment is accidental.

"*Cover* thy head, *cover* thy head, nay, prithee, be *covered*."—SHAKESPEARE.

SCREEN (O. Fr. *escran*, Mod. Fr. *écran, a screen*) is to place in relation to an interposed obstacle for the purpose of protection or concealment. In the former case, the influence may not be such as to render invisibility necessary, as to screen from wind or draught by a plantation or a transparent glass partition.

To SHELTER (connected with shield, A. S. *scyldan, to shield, to protect*) is very nearly the same as SCREEN; but while SCREEN is employed of protection against the less violent, SHELTER is used of the more violent, annoyances. SHELTER also is more complete than SCREEN. Screening is partial shelter. To screen from harm; to shelter from attacks; to screen from the sun or the wind; to shelter from the storm and blast; to screen from blame; to shelter from violence.

"A ridge of hills
That *screened* the fruits of th' earth and seats of men
From cold septentrion blasts."
MILTON.

"It was a still
And calmy bay, on th' one side *sheltered*
With the broad shadow of an hoary hill."
SPENSER.

SHIELD (A.S. *scȳld*), while it bears generally the same meaning as SCREEN and SHELTER, involves more the idea of personal effort, and voluntary action. It is to interpose for the purpose of protection or defence. Generally speaking arrangements screen, circumstances shelter, persons shield.

"God *schilde* us fro the werre."—R. BRUNNE.

HIDEOUS. SHOCKING.

HIDEOUS (O. Fr. *hideus*) is primarily frightful to behold, as a hideous monster. It has been extended to sounds, as a hideous noise. The effect of the hideous is produced through the senses or the imagination, not through the pure reason.

SHOCKING (Fr. *choc, a shock, a collision*) acts with more sudden effect, and is applicable to the moral feelings

and the taste. Things can be only casually shocking; but hideousness is a permanent quality. The hideous contradicts only beauty; the shocking contradicts morality.

"The war-dance consists of a great variety of violent motions and *hideous* contortions of the limbs, during which the countenance also performs its part."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"The grossest and most *shocking* villanies."—SECKER.

HIGH. TALL. LOFTY.

HIGH (A. S. *héah*), as regards their purely physical application, has an additional sense to that of the other two, as denoting, 1, continuous extension upwards; and 2, position at a point of elevation. A tree may be high, tall, or lofty. Clouds are high without being tall. In the sense in which it is synonymous with the other two, HIGH denotes considerable elevation. So we say, a high house, but not a high man.

TALL (origin uncertain) means high in stature, that is, with a slenderness as well as height, and implies growth upwards, natural or artificial. Hence we speak of a tall man, tree, column, mast, but not of a tall mountain or house.

LOFTY (*loft, an upper room*, prop. meaning *air*; A. S. *lyft*, Ger. *luft*) denotes an imposing elevation, or the union of expansion with height; as a lofty room. HIGH and LOFTY are applicable to moral characteristics; TALL is not.

"The full blazing sun,
Which now sat *high* in his meridian tower."
MILTON.

"I fear to go out of my depth in sounding imaginary fords which are real gulfs, and wherein many of the *tallest* philosophers have been drowned, while none of them ever got over to the science they had in view."—BOLINGBROKE.

"Did ever any conqueror *loftily* seated in his triumphal chariot yield a spectacle so gallant and magnificent?"—BARROW.

HILARITY. JOVIALITY *or* JOLLITY.

These differ as the subjects. HILARITY (Fr. *hilarité*, Lat. *hilaritatem*) belongs to social excitement, especially of the table among more refined company; JOVIALITY (Lat. *Jŏviālis*, of or belonging to Jupiter or *Jove*, the planet Jupiter having been supposed to impart the mirthful character to those who were born under it), to the same thing among the less refined. It is only to state the same thing in another form, to say that hilarity is more an affection of the mind, joviality of the animal spirits.

"It (music) will perform all this in an instant, cheer up the countenance, expel austerity, bring in *hilarity*."—BURTON, *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

"The sport of their loudest *jovialities*."—BARROW.

HINT. SUGGESTION. INTIMATION. INSINUATION. INNUENDO.

A HINT (A. S. *hentan, to pursue*) is an indirect communication of instruction, the incompletely expressed form of which has commonly for its cause a reluctance on the part of the hinter to speak more fully and plainly.

SUGGESTION (Lat. *suggestionem, a hint*) is given visibly or entire to the persons receiving it, though the communication is commonly concealed from others. The man who makes a good suggestion claims more gratitude than the hinter, who shuns responsibility, unless it is the best that he could do under the circumstances. Both HINT and SUGGEST have ordinarily reference to practical assistance and directions, HINT referring to the present or the past, and SUGGESTION to the future; a hint of danger, a suggestion how to avoid it. But HINT rather concerns matters of knowledge; SUGGEST, matters of conduct.

TO INTIMATE (Lat. *intīmare, to make known*) meant at first to share secretly or privately, in which sense it is at present obsolete. It now means to give obscure or indirect notice, or to suggest apart from others. It is in this point that INTIMATE differs from HINT and SUGGEST, which relate to the affairs of the person to whom the hint or suggestion is made; while INTIMATE may relate primarily to the mind or intentions of him who makes the intimation. I give another a hint, or make him a suggestion; intimate

my own wishes or purpose. But the subject of the intimation is commonly one in which the other is personally concerned.

To INSINUATE (Lat. *insinuare, to make one's way to, to make known*) is to introduce gradually and artfully, to state by remote allusion. Like HINT, it comes commonly from a wish to impart a fact or an impression without incurring the responsibility of plainly stating it.

An INNUENDO is a law term, expressing a manner of indicating *by a nod* (*innuendo*, gerund of Lat. *innuĕre, to nod to*) a person or thing meant, when otherwise there was some uncertainty; and is now used much in the same sense as INSINUATION, but as more expressive of specific aim at personal character and conduct; and is couched in language of double meaning, as insinuation is couched in language of indirect application.

"He hath frequently taken the *hint* from very trifling objections to strengthen his former works by several most material considerations and convincing arguments."—NELSON, *Life of Bull.*

"If good? Why do I yield to that *suggestion*,
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,
And make my sealed heart knock at my ribs,
Against the use of nature?"
SHAKESPEARE, *Macbeth.*

"Mr. Plott, who, as he since informed me, had prevailed with them to propose this treaty, earnestly pressed me to lay hold on the opportunity, *intimating* by his words and gestures that if I refused it I should not have another."—LUDLOW, *Memoirs.*

"Cervantes made Don Quixote say, 'If the stories of chivalry be lies, so must it also be that there ever was a Hector or an Achilles, or a Trojan war.' A sly stroke of satire by which this mortal foe of chivalry would, I suppose, *insinuate* that the Grecian romances were just as extravagant and as little credible as the Gothic."—HURD.

"As, by the way of *innuendo*,
Lucus is made a non lucendo."
CHURCHILL.

HIRELING. MERCENARY.

HIRELING (A. S. *hȳr, wages*) is one who serves or acts for hire, and is not necessarily a term of venality, though never one of honour.

MERCENARY (Lat. *mercēnārius, one hired for wages*) is also one who serves for wages, but is employed exclusively in a bad sense when used of the character, though not so when used of the employment. Hired soldiers, called mercenaries, may earn their wages honourably. A mercenary match is one made for the sordid love of money. The acting for profit exclusively in any way is called mercenary.

"The *hireling* fleeth because he is an *hireling*."—*Bible.*

"This is to show both how tyranny stands in need of *mercenary* soldiers, and how those *mercenaries* are by mutual obligation firmly assured unto the tyrant."—RALEGH.

HISTORY. ANNALS. CHRONICLES.

ANNALS (Lat. *annālis, a record of the occurrences of a year*), the bare public registration of events connected with the progress of affairs of state, are the germ and rudiments of history. These are followed by CHRONICLES (Gr. χρονικά, *i.e.*, βιβλία, papers, books, relating to *time*, χρόνος), which are only ampler narratives, and fall short of that analysis of motive and action, cause and effect, which are needed to make up the idea of philosophic HISTORY. By a poetic licence, ANNALS is used as an elegant word for HISTORY; as, "The short and simple annals of the poor."—Gray.

"For justly Cæsar scorns the poet's lays;
It is to *history* he trusts for praise."
POPE.

"For among so many writers there hath yet none to my knowledge published any full, plain, and mere English *history*. For some of them of purpose meaning to write short notes in manner of *annales*, commonly called abridgments, rather touch the times when things were done than declare the manner of the doings."—GRAFTON.

"A *chronicler* should well in divers tongues be seen,
And eke in all the arts he ought to have a sight,
Whereby he might the truth of divers actions deem,
And both supply the wants, correct that is not right."
Mirrour for Magistrates.

HOARD. TREASURE.

HOARD (A. S. *hord*) is to amass with commonly some degree of ugly

vacy or secrecy, and is a term of collective application.

TREASURE (Fr. *trésor*, Lat. *thēsaurus*) is applicable to a single thing or to a number. We hoard that which we believe may stand us in good stead; we treasure that which is intrinsically valuable, or on which we personally place a value.

"As some lone miser visiting his store
Bends at his *treasure*, counts, recounts it o'er.
Hoards after *hoards* his rising raptures fill;
Yet still he sighs, for *hoards* are wanting still."
GOLDSMITH.

HOLD. ARREST. DETAIN. KEEP. RETAIN. PRESERVE. CONSERVE. INTERCEPT.

To HOLD (A. S. *healdan*, *haldan*) as used in a purely physical sense, is to cause to remain in a fixed position or relation, and is equally applicable to voluntary agents and mechanical force or support.

To ARREST (O. Fr. *arester*, *to cause to stop*) is to exercise a holding power upon what is in action, movement, or progress, and, like HOLD, may be either voluntary or mechanical.

To DETAIN (Lat. *dĕtĭnĕre*) is a milder term than ARREST, the result being physical, but the cause not necessarily so; as, to be detained by important business; or by physical causes operating indirectly upon the person; as, to be detained by an accident. It is to hold against external movement or claim.

KEEP (A. S. *cēpan*) is to hold in some desirable relation to one's self, whether direct possession or not, against separating or depriving forces, and hence has often the sense of guardianship.

RETAIN (Lat. *rĕtĭnĕre*) is to keep as against any *intrinsic* alteration or loss of power to hold; as, a metal retains heat; I still retain my intention.

To PRESERVE (Lat. *præservāre*) is to cause to continue whole, unbroken, or unimpaired; as, to preserve fruits, to preserve silence. He kept silence, that is, as something from which he would not part. He held his tongue, that is, as something which he would not allow to move. He retained his silence, that is, in spite of attempts to induce him to abandon it. He preserved silence, that is, from being broken. The idea of preservation is that of provision against deteriorating or destructive influences, accidents, dangers. Vigilance and the use of preventive or counteractive means are the methods of preservation.

CONSERVATION stands to preservation as the moral to the material. That which is kept in physical integrity is preserved. This may be the act of a moment, that which is continuously sustained in moral integrity is conserved.

That is INTERCEPTED (Lat. *intercĭpĕre*, *to intercept*) which is arrested between two points, as the point of departure and arrival, or some point in space, and the spectator or auditor. Obstructive interposition is interception.

"A valiant protector, a careful *conserver* and an happy enlarger of the honour and reputation of your country."—HACKLYT.

"Remember, mortal princes, ye be but dust. Ye be no Gods. God will shortly *intercept* your breath."—JOYE *on Daniel*.

"A person lays *hold* upon a thing when he takes possession of it, and claims it as his right and property. In this sense the apostle speaks with much diffidence and humility of his hope of laying *hold* of his reward."—HORSLEY.

"Consent to pay thee that I never had!
Arrest me, foolish fellow, if thou dar'st."
SHAKESPEARE.

"If I lend a man a horse, and he afterwards refuses to restore it, this injury consists in the *detaining*, and not in the original taking; and the regular method for me to recover possession is by action of detenue."—*State Trials*.

"Am I my brother's *keeper?*"—*Bible*.

"Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye *retain*, they are *retained*."—*Ibid*.

"In this case, would this man, think we, act rationally, should he, upon the slender possibility of escaping, otherwise neglect the sure infallible *preservation* of his life by casting away his rich goods?"—SOUTH.

HOMAGE. FEALTY. COURT.

HOMAGE (O. Fr. *homage*, L. Lat. *hominaticum*, *hŏmĭnem*, *a man*) was the act by which a feudal inferior pro-

fessed himself to be the man or subject of the feudal lord.

FEALTY (O. Fr. *fealte*, Lat. *fidēlitātem*) was the *fidelity* of such a tenant; and, more strictly, a lower species of homage made by oath on the part of such tenants as were bound to personal service.

COURT (O. Fr. *cort*, Mod. Fr. *cour*, *an enclosed space*) is to endeavour to gain favour by such demeanour or acts as are practised at the *courts* of princes. In present parlance, we pay homage to men of excellence, virtue, or power, or, by a figure of speech, to the excellences themselves; we show fealty to principles by which we have professed to be guided, or to persons who are not so far our superiors as is implied in HOMAGE. And we pay court when we desire personal favour, consulting the character and humour of the person to whom we pay it.

"All these are spirits of air, and wood, and springs,
Thy gentle ministers who come to pay
Thee *homage*, and acknowledge thee their Lord.
What doubt'st Thou? Son of God, sit down and eat." MILTON.

"Studious to win your consort, and seduce
Her from chaste *fealty* to joys impure."
FENTON.

"Needs a shipwrecked seaman be *courted* to come to shore, or a weary traveller to a place of rest?"—BISHOP BEVERIDGE.

HONESTY. SINCERITY. UPRIGHTNESS. PROBITY. INTEGRITY.

HONESTY (Fr. *honnêteté*) is a perfectly plain and unambiguous term. It denotes in the worthiest sense more than commercial strictness of dealing. Honesty is a virtue of man in every state of life. Consistent honesty would be perfect social virtue, the whole duty to one's neighbour, fairness and straightforwardness of thought, speech, purpose, or conduct.

SINCERITY (Fr. *sincérité*) has a double meaning, either, 1, reality of conviction or earnestness of purpose; or, 2, exemption from unfairness or dishonesty. The one is the condition of mind in itself; the other, the relation of this state to practical matters. Hence a man may be sincere and dishonest. Sincere in his profession of his purpose, and dishonest in the means he employs to effect it. Sincerity is a virtue so far as it forbids us to say one thing and think another.

UPRIGHTNESS is honesty combined with a native dignity of character; it belongs to men who can mix with their fellow-men and retain an independent bearing; while the poorest labouring man who has no contact with the world may be strictly honest. As commonly taken, honesty is not so much a matter of principle as of act and habit. A man is said to be honest who will not defraud, directly or indirectly. An honest tradesman asks fair prices, and sells good articles. He may be a sad slanderer, and deprive others of their due in this respect; yet the world would still call him honest.

PROBITY (Fr. *probité*) and INTEGRITY (Fr. *intégrité*) are higher terms, indicative of higher virtues and larger characteristics. The man of probity is a man of principle, and not merely of habit; he is far more than commercially honest; he gives men their due in all respects. He is upright in those obligations which the law does not touch. Integrity comes from a sense of responsibility, a desire to keep that *whole* in oneself which ought not to be broken. It will show itself in the discharge of a trust or the execution of an office, but not only so. To the man of integrity life itself is a trust. Fidelity to the obligations of law and duty suffice for probity. Integrity is a habitual regard to the principles of morality and conscience. Integrity is the quality of the man who is firm and constant in the discharge of his duty. It stands opposed to corruption. Probity is virtue under a negative aspect. Do to others as you would that they should do to you is the rule of virtue. Do not to others what you would not that they should do to you is the rule of probity. Fidelity to law, to morals and conscience which are prohibitive in their force, constitutes probity.

"Goodness is that which makes men prefer their duty and their promise before their

passions or their interest, and is properly the object of trust. In our language it goes rather by the name of *honesty*, though what we call an *honest* man the Romans called a good man."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

"Let us consider that *sincerity* is a duty no less plain than important, that our consciences require it of us, and reproach us for every breach of it."—KNOX.

"'Then,' says the good Psalmist, 'shall I not be ashamed;' that is, then may I safely confide in my own innocence and *uprightness*, when I have respect unto all Thy commandments."—ATTERBURY.

"If we could once get ourselves possessed of this *probity*, this purity of mind and heart, it would better instruct us in the use of our liberty, and teach us to distinguish between good and evil."—SHARP.

"*Integrity* undaunted goes
Through Libyan sands and Scythian snows,
Or where Hydaspes wealthy side
Pays tribute to the Persian pride."
ROSCOMMON, *Horace.*

HOPE. EXPECTATION. TRUST. CONFIDENCE. ASSURANCE.

All these terms denote the reposing of the mind upon the future. The anticipation of the future is common to HOPE (A. S. *hopian, to hope*) and EXPECTATION (Lat. *exspectationem, a looking out, an expecting*). In proportion as it is welcome, we hope; in proportion as it is certain, we expect. We may expect, but not hope for, an occurrence which will cause us pain. Hope is a faculty of the human soul, a quality which diminishes with the increase of age. The young who live in the future are full of hope. It is an active, energetic force, well fitted to the time of life, which needs encouragement and support in its work.

CONFIDENCE and ASSURANCE closely resemble each other; but CONFIDENCE (Lat. *confidentia*) is properly used only in relation to moral agents, and on the ground of probity of character. Assurance (Fr. *assurer, to secure, sûr, sĕcūrus*, Eng. *sure*) is confidence in one's self, or such confidence as flows from internal conviction upon matters of fact. Assurance is passive; confidence is active. Confidence is such assurance as leads to a feeling of security or reliance. We have assurance in ourselves, we have confidence in others.

To TRUST (*to think true*) is to rest upon another as able to bear what we impose; so we trust or not in what is solid or unsolid; men, who are trustworthy or otherwise; statements, which may be veracious or not; strength or efforts, which may or may not be equal to the task. Trust in opinion is belief; in religious opinion, faith; in pecuniary worth, stability, and integrity, credit; and in moral probity, combined with sufficiency of power, confidence. Assurance is based upon mental confidence on moral evidence in favour of the thing expected.

"*Hope* is the encouragement given to desire, the pleasing expectancy that its object shall be obtained."—COGAN.

"In its general operation the indulgence of hope is mixed with certain portions of doubt and solicitude; but when doubt is removed, and the *expectation* becomes sanguine, hope rises into joy."—*Ibid.*

"In a word, every man implicitly *trusts* his bodily senses concerning external objects placed at a convenient distance."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"Yet not terrible
That I should fear; not sociably mild,
Like Raphael, that I should much *confide;*
But solemn, whom, not to offend,
With reverence I must meet, and then retire."
MILTON.

"On informing him of our difficulties and asking whether we might venture across the plain, he bid us, like Cæsar, with an air of *assurance*, follow him and fear nothing."—GILPIN.

HOPELESS. DESPERATE.

HOPELESS is an epithet of things; DESPERATE (Lat. *dēspērāre, to give up hope*, part. *dēspērātus*) of things and persons. HOPELESS is less strong than DESPERATE, because it sometimes denotes no more than an absence of hope of success in matters where success is desirable and desired, but no more. A project may have been hopeless from the first; so that no real hope was placed in it. A desperate undertaking is one which is associated with great if not absolute *abandonment* of hope, in what is not only desired but begun. It deserves, however, to be observed, that the full force of *despair* does not survive in the adjective DESPERATE. There must be *some degree of hope* in a desperate *undertaking*;

though a desperate *act* must be the simple result of despair.

"These words are part of that vision of the valley of bones, wherein the prophet Ezekiel doth, in a very lofty and lively manner, set out the lost and *hopeless* state of Israel, then under captivity."—ATTERBURY.

"So Satan, whom repulse upon repulse
Met ever, and to shameful silence brought,
Yet gives not o'er, though *desperate* of success,
And his vain importunity pursues."
MILTON.

HOST. ARMY. ARMAMENT.

HOST (Lat. *hostis, an enemy*) denotes an opposing or hostile force of indefinite number, not strictly organized; hence, generally, a very numerous collection.

ARMY (Fr. *armée*, Lat. *armātus, armed*) is composed of a definite number of organized soldiers.

ARMAMENT (Lat. *armāmenta, implements, tackling*) is a term which draws the attention primarily to the equipment, and secondarily to the forces. It is a body of forces equipped for war, and is applicable both to sea and land forces. Musketry, artillery, and all munitions of war are implied in an armament.

"They below
Lie well equipped and sheltered, nor remote
The whole united *armament* of Greece at Salamis." GLOVER.

HOUSE. FAMILY. LINEAGE. RACE. STOCK.

HOUSE (A. S. *hús*), when employed as a synonym with the rest here given, is only employed of very distinguished families, as the House of Austria, the House of York or Lancaster, and is an historical term comprising successive generations.

FAMILY (Lat. *fămĭlia, a household*) denotes those who descend from one common progenitor; hence the term may be applied to the whole human race or "family of man." FAMILY is more used of the middle classes, HOUSE of those of the highest quality. Families are spoken of in connexion with alliances, houses with high dignities and titles.

LINEAGE (Fr. *lignage, ligne, a line*) is that common line of descent which constitutes the house or family.

RACE (Fr. *race*, O. H. G. *reiza, a line*: LITTRÉ) is more comprehensive, indefinite, and broad; as, the human race, the Caucasian or Mongolian race —indicating masses of men ethnologically one.

STOCK (A. S. *stoc*) is an analogous term, in which the descendants or children are referred to their parents or ancestors, as the scion belongs to the stem. The term is commonly employed when the *qualities* of the nature are considered as inherited or congenital. Men come of a good or a bad stock.

"Thy mother was no goddess, nor thy *stock*
From Dardanus." DENHAM.

HOWEVER. YET. NEVERTHELESS. NOTWITHSTANDING. STILL. BUT.

BUT (A. S. *bútan, except, besides*) has a twofold meaning, which might be expressed by the phrases, "But yet," and, "But on the contrary;" as, "This is not summer, but it is as warm;" and, "This is not summer, but winter." It is with the first of these meanings that the other terms given above are synonymous. HOWEVER has a waiving or cancelling force. "However, the matter is not important," would mean, that in any case it is so, whether what had been advanced were admitted or not. It seems equivalent to saying that what follows is so indisputable, that the speaker is willing to forego all that has been said. YET is stronger than BUT; and STILL yet stronger. It does not cancel, but retains previous argument, and admits it; maintaining that what follows is not removed for all that. "All you say is true; still I think." NOTWITHSTANDING and NEVERTHELESS are still stronger; NEVERTHELESS being the strongest of all. YET brings into contrast both expanded statements and simple ideas. "Addison was not a good speaker; yet he was an admirable writer," might have been rendered by, "Addison was not an orator, but

a writer;" or, "Addison was ineloquent, yet accomplished;" where it will be observed that BUT follows a negative expression, and YET a positive and adverse, or seemingly adverse, one; or, conversely, "He was accomplished, *but not* eloquent." NEVERTHELESS and NOTWITHSTANDING are almost identical; they have no difference beyond that which is apparent on the face of the structure of these composite forms. First, it will be observed that NEVERTHELESS is a conjunctive abverb, while NOTWITHSTANDING is also used as a preposition. "He contradicted me, but I maintained the truth of what I had said, notwithstanding," or, "nevertheless;" but we might also say, "I maintained my statement, notwithstanding his contradiction;" where NEVERTHELESS could not have been used. This force, however, has grown up out of transposition of the order; in old and more formal English, it would have been, "His contradiction of me notwithstanding;" that is, affording no effectual opposition. NOTWITHSTANDING implies that the *fact* stated remains true; NEVERTHELESS, that its *force* remains undiminished.

HUE. COLOUR. TINT.

HUE (A. S. *hiw, heow, appearance*) was formerly written *hew*. It is, strictly speaking, a compound of one or more colours, so forming an intervenient shade.

The COLOURS (Fr. *couleur*, Lat. *cŏlōrem*) are properly the seven prismatic colours deduced from light by the prism.

TINT (Fr. *teinte*) is a colour or hue faintly exhibited. With painters a tint is a subdued colour, weakened in the case of oil colours by white, and in water colours by water. HUE is a vague conversational, rhetorical, or poetical term. COLOUR is strictly artistic and scientific. Unlike TINT, both HUE and COLOUR are applicable to white.

"His robe, with lucid pearls besprinkled o'er,
Receives a snowy *hue* unknown before."
HOOLE, *Tasso*

"I took it for a fairy vision
Of some gay creatures of the element,
That in the *colours* of the rainbow live."
MILTON.

"Or blend in beauteous *tint* the coloured mass." POPE.

HUGE. ENORMOUS. PRODIGIOUS. VAST.

These terms express excessive size. HUGE (O. Fr. *ahuge, huge, vast*: SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) denotes great size, with shapelessness or massiveness preponderating over proportion.

ENORMOUS (Lat. *ēnormis, irregular, enormous*) is huge of its particular kind, far exceeding its own proper average or standard.

PRODIGIOUS (Lat. *prōdĭgĭōsus, prōdĭgium, a prodigy*) expresses size or quantity such as produces astonishment in our own minds.

VAST (Fr. *vaste*, Lat. *vastus, waste, vast*) expresses the quality of great superficial extent.

"The knight himself even trembled at his fall,
So *huge* and horrible a mass it seemed."
SPENSER.

"And on the other hand, had man's body been made too monstrously strong, too *enormously* gigantic, it would have rendered him a dangerous tyrant in the world, too strong in some respects even for his own kind, as well as the other creatures."—DERHAM.

"We may justly, I say, stand amazed that men should be so *prodigiously* supine and negligent in an affair of this importance as we see they generally are."—SHARP.

"What a *vast* field for contemplation is here opened!"—WOOLASTON.

HUNGER. APPETITE.

HUNGER (A. S. *hungor*) relates to a strong craving of food, either from too long an abstinence or from natural voracity.

APPETITE (Lat. *appĕtītus, eager desire*) belongs more to the taste, and comes of the disposition of the organs to find pleasure in eating. The first is the more urgent but less nice, and is contented with what is enough. The second demands less imperatively, but demands a greater variety of aliment. All kinds of food appease hunger, while none excites it. Appetite is more delicate. It is not every

dish that satisfies it. Hunger is appeased, appetite satisfied. Hunger is a want, appetite a desire. Hence APPETITE is a convertible term for desire; and lends itself more readily to secondary applications. Sordid or noble appetites. We speak of a thirst, rather than hunger, for glory or any other specific object of desire.

HURT. DAMAGE. DETRIMENT. INJURY. HARM. PREJUDICE. INJUSTICE. WRONG. MISCHIEF.

HURT (O. Fr. *hurter*, Mod. *heurter, to strike against*) is physical injury causing pain, and is applied to animals as having a sensitive life, and to plants as being quasi-sensitive. When used of the mind or feelings, hurt is employed analogously, in the sense of receiving a rude shock; as, "His pride was hurt." The word is employed in its strict meaning in the following:—

"The least *hurt* or blow, especially upon the head, may make it (an infant) senseless, stupid, or otherwise miserable for ever."—*Spectator*.

Some degree of physical violence is implied in HURT. A subtle noxious influence would injure, but not hurt. The constitution might be injured or harmed, but not hurt, by residence in an unhealthy locality.

DAMAGE (O. Fr. *damage*, orig. from the Lat. *damnum, loss* or *injury*) is harm externally inflicted on what is of value; as, trees, movable property, crops, personal reputation. A slave so severely hurt as to lose the use of a limb is damaged, as being a valuable commodity, but the term is not employed of bodily injury to persons in general.

"That to the utmost of our ability we ought to repair any *damage* we have done to others, is self-evident."—BEATTIE.

This refers of course only to such damage as involves a wrong done. On the other hand, damage may be purely material, as the damage done to crops by a storm, or as in the case given above.

DETRIMENT (Lat. *detrimentum, loss, damage*) is used very generically, and would include loss of value by internal causes. It is also applied to what is of the nature of a good without having a strictly appreciable value; as a detriment to religion and morals. It stands, generally speaking, to things of moral value as damage to things of material value.

"Though every man hath a property in his goods, yet he must not use them in *detriment* of the commonwealth."—*State Trials*.

INJURY (Lat. *injūria, injustice, harm*) has the purely physical meaning of permanent hurt to physical objects, and of harm to whatever is susceptible of it, as moral beings, and even abstract goods; as, a tree is injured by a storm; injury to a man's person or to his character; injury to the cause of religion or of progress. The word INJURY is one of the rarer cases in which a term of moral import has become applicable in a physical sense, instead of the converse. The primary idea is that of wrong or a deed against justice. As such deeds are often done by violence, and accompanied by material hurt, the term has come to be applicable to the infliction or result of violence even in unconscious subjects. There are few words in the English language having such varied and extensive applications.

"Many times we do *injury* to a cause by dwelling on trifling arguments."—WATTS.

HARM (A. S. *hearm, grief, injury*) is personal and intentional injury, but is not confined to this, and may be unintentional and impersonal. Harm is that sort of hurt which causes trouble, difficulty, inconvenience, loss, or impedes the desirable growth, operation, progress, and issue of things. Harm is that which contradicts or counteracts well-being, and is unfavourable to the proper energy of what has activity. HARM is as wide a term as INJURY, from which it differs but slightly. But HARM is more general than INJURY, more vague and less specifiable; hence harm is often undefined or undefinable injury. My watch will not go. It is plain that some harm has happened to it; yet I can perhaps trace no sign of injury

"And who is he that shall *harm* you, if ye be followers of that which is good?"—*Bible.*

PREJUDICE (Lat. *prajūdĭcium, a preceding judgment, disadvantage*) is a foregone conclusion, and, by an unfavourable extension of meaning, against a person; hence generally harm. It is, however, employed only of persons and their interests or causes; though the adjective prejudicial has a wider application in the sense of hurtful. Shakespeare seems to have gone to the extreme limit of the word when he says—

"To seek how we may *prejudice* the foe."

"I am not to *prejudice* the cause of my fellow poets, though I abandon my own defence."—DRYDEN.

INJUSTICE is the principle of which injury is the manifestation. INJUSTICE is also used in the sense of moral injury; as, a suspicion which does another an injustice. Injustice relates to existent rights, which are disregarded or violated; but these rights are of the broadest kind, and extend even to the natural claims of humanity.

"If this people resembled Nero in their extravagance, much more did they (the Athenians) resemble and even exceed him in cruelty and *injustice*."—BURKE.

WRONG (that which is *wrung* or *turned aside*; so Fr. *tort*, Lat. *tortus*, *twisted*) is an injury done by one person to another in express violation of justice. It may be observed that both injustice and wrong lie in the principle, injury in the act. So one may commit a wrong or an injustice without committing an injury, supposing that circumstances turned out more favourably or less unfavourably to the person than we contemplated or intended. On the other hand, where design was absent, there might be injury without injustice. Anything is a wrong which impairs a right of whatever kind this right may be, as of property, privilege, honour, reputation. In fact, WRONG commonly applies to goods and reputation; it robs one of one's due.

"The distinction of public *wrongs* from private, of crimes and misdemeanours from civil injuries."—BLACKSTONE.

MISCHIEF (O. Fr. *meschef, the bringing to a bad end; mes*, which is the Lat. *minus, less*, and *chef*, Lat. *căput, a head*) is harm or damage produced by something blameworthy, as heedlessness, neglect, perversity, wantonness. It is a confusion of thought to use the term as simply equivalent to INJURIOUS, and to say, as is sometimes said, "The heavy rains have been mischievous to the crops." MISCHIEF conveys the idea of a bad or wantonly injurious intent, as well as the harm in which it results, and so belongs to beings of intelligence and will, not to elemental or mechanical forces. MISCHIEF is, however, not so grave a term as injury or damage. It commonly denotes not so much destructive as detrimental effects produced by the folly, idleness, or perversity of men. An opposite to mischief is *bonchief, i.e. advantage, good fortune*; a word now obsolete. It would seem that more latitude might be allowed to the noun MISCHIEF than to the adjective *mischievous*. The latter ought to carry with it the idea of injurious *intention*, the former may be used analogously, and is a convenient term to express untoward damage which is not of the most serious kind, but which has the effect of impairing the soundness of a thing.

"Why boasteth thou thyself, thou tyrant, that thou canst do *mischief*?"—*English Psalms.*

HUSBAND. SPOUSE.

The HUSBAND (not a true A. S. word, but borrowed from Scand., and this from Icel. *húsbóndi, the master of a house*; Icel. *hús, a house, buandi, inhabiting*, part.: SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) designates the physical quality, the SPOUSE (Fr. *epoux*, Lat. *spondēre*, part. *sponsus, to betroth*) the social connexion. The husband answers to the wife, as the man to the woman. The spouse answers to the spouse as one party to another. The spouse is the higher, more spiritual term; the husband the more familiar. The husband is the head of the wife, over whom he has legal rights. The spouse is the partner of the wife in moral as well as natural union.

HYPOCRITE. DISSEMBLER.

HYPOCRITE (Gr. *ὑποκρῑτής, an actor*) is a false pretender to virtue or piety, and is a DISSEMBLER (Lat. *dissĭmŭlātor*) as to one half of his character, that is, as to being what he pretends not to be (*see* DISSEMBLE), but not as to the other, namely, the not being what he pretends to be. Hypocrisy, it has been observed, is the homage which vice pays to virtue; an idea which is only expanded in the following:—

"*Hypocrisy* is a more modest way of sinning. It shows some reverence to religion, and does so far own the worth and excellency of it as to acknowledge that it deserves to be counterfeited."—TILLOTSON.

"Thou liest, *dissembler!* on thy brow
I read distracted horrors figured in thy looks." FORD.

I.

IDEA. NOTION. CONCEPTION. PERCEPTION.

The perceiving of something external by the mind through the senses is called a sensation; the image as it exists in the mind as a matter of reflexion is an IDEA (Gr. *ἰδέα*). The idea is thus present to the fancy, and independent of the cause which excited it. When two or more ideas are combined, so that the expression of them would take the form of an affirmation, this is a NOTION. "I saw the moon last night;" this was sensation or physical perception. "I recollect the image of what I saw;" this is the idea. I connect it with roundness of shape, so as to say, "It was spherical;" this is a notion. Ideas are faint or vivid, vague or distinct; notions are single or complex, true or false. A notion is true of which the ideas are veritably associated in fact; false when we associate ideas necessarily or naturally incoherent. In a complex notion we often associate some that are naturally united with some that are incoherent. The truth can only be obtained by disentangling the parts, and comparing anew the parts and their combinations with experience. Such is the sense of the word IDEA, for which we are indebted to Locke, according to the Cartesian system. Before him the term IDEA, as employed according to the system of Plato, meant the archetypes or patterns of created things, as they existed in the creative mind before, and independently of, their embodiment in outward and visible things.

CONCEPTION, according to Coleridge (Lat. *concĭpĕre, to comprehend*, part. *conceptus*), is a conscious act of the understanding, assimilating objects or impressions; that is, referring them to the same general class or order by means of some or more characters in common.

PERCEPTION (Lat. *percĭpĕre, to perceive*, part. *perceptus*) is a term of which the use varies with philosophers. Its older use was nearly identical with that of consciousness. It has of late been narrowed to the faculty whereby we acquire knowledge, and especially, through the senses, of the external world. With others perception and sensation are confounded; while with others, again, sensation is physical, and perception that operation of the mind in regard to external things which follows and is based upon sensation.

"Socrates and Plato suppose that *ideas* be substances separate and distinct from matter, howbeit subsisting in the thoughts and imaginations of God, that is to say, of mind and understanding."—HOLLAND'S *Plutarch*.

"Whatsoever is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding that I call *idea*."—LOCKE.

"For it (the mind) being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature, and hence I think it is that these ideas are called *notions*, as they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things."—LOCKE.

"By sight we have a *conception* or image composed of colour and figure, which is all the notice and knowledge the object imparteth to us of its nature by the eye. By hearing we have a *conception* called sound."—HOBBS

"The power of *perception* is that we call the understanding. *Perception*, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts—1, the *perception* of ideas in our own minds; 2, the *perception* of the signification of signs; 3, the *perception* of the agreement or disagreement of any distinct ideas."—LOCKE.

IDEAL. IMAGINARY.

The use of the adjective IDEAL flows from the Platonic use of the term IDEA. It is not opposed to the real, but abstracted from it. The ideal is formed from the actual by abstracting what is excellent in individual specimens into an imaginary whole. IMAGINARY denotes what has no existence but in the imagination. In the IDEAL the component parts are real, though the whole may be called IMAGINARY, inasmuch as it is not practically met with; but the IMAGINARY is applicable to such things as *never could be* met with; things created by the mind independently of experience, as the animal called the griffin, for instance.

"With inward view,
Thence on th' *ideal* kingdom swift she turns
Her eye, and instant, at her powerful glance,
Th' obedient phantoms vanish or appear."
THOMSON.

"When time shall once have laid his lenient hand on the passions and pursuits of the present moment, they too shall lose that *imaginary* value which heated fancy now bestows upon them."—BLAIR.

IDEAL. MODEL.

When these terms appear as synonyms, it is that either might be taken to mean the perfect form of anything. MODEL (*see* EXAMPLE) may mean either a pattern of what a thing is, or a pattern of what it might be at the best. In the latter case, it stands to the IDEAL as the conception to the illustration. The Venus de Medicis is the ideal of female beauty as it is a conception of the sculptor, a model as it is a statue.

"The *ideal* is to be attained by selecting and assembling in one whole the beauties and perfections which are usually seen in different individuals, excluding everything defective or unseemly."—FLEMING.

"He that despairs measures Providence by his own contracted *model*."—SOUTH.

IDENTITY. SAMENESS.

SAMENESS (A. S. *same*) belongs to things.

IDENTITY (Fr. *identité*) to our cognition of the things. We recognize sameness when we establish identity.

IDIOT. FOOL.

An IDIOT (Gr. ἰδιώτης, *a private person* taking no part in public affairs, and so *ill informed, awkward*, hence, by a modern extension of meaning, *of weak mind*) is one who is destitute of the ordinary intellectual powers of man. He is a born fool, the mental condition being commonly accompanied by some defect in the physical formation.

FOOL (Fr. *fol, fou, crazy*) is capable of other meanings, denoting, *e.g.*, a person of very languid mind and sluggish comprehension, or one who lives contrary to the principles of practical wisdom.

"An *idiot* or natural fool is one that hath had no understanding from his nativity, and, therefore, is by law presumed never likely to attain any."—BLACKSTONE.

"Thou *fool*, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die."—*Eng. Bible*

IDLE. LAZY. INDOLENT.

IDLE (A. S. *idel, empty, vain*) originally meant unprofitable, as, "idle pastures," that is, not supporting cattle. It has at present a twofold meaning, 1, unemployed, and 2, averse to employment. Idleness bears reference to a man's proper tasks and duties. He who escapes from these, and will do nothing useful, is idle, although he may be far from LAZY (O. Fr. *lasche*, Mod. Fr. *lâche, louse, languishing*), and the opposite to INDOLENT. Idleness is consistent with activity in other matters than those of duty and business, as in reaction or in mischief.

INDOLENT (Lat. *in, not*, and *dŏlēre, to suffer pain*) denotes a love of ease and an aversion to active effort, whether of mind or body. It is possible to be indolent in mind, and not in body, and *vice versâ*. LAZY is a stronger and more disparaging term than INDOLENT, expressive of a slothful habit of body, to which physical

effort, and especially industrious employment, is hateful. Laziness is not incompatible with reflexiveness and study.

"The truth is, *idleness* offers up the soul as a blank to the devil for him to write what he will upon it."—SOUTH.

"Shall we keep our hands in our bosom, or stretch ourselves on our beds of *laziness*, while all the world about us is hard at work pursuing the designs of its creation?" —BARROW.

"But, indeed, there are crowds of people who put themselves in no method of pleasing themselves or others; such are those whom we usually call *indolent* persons."—*Spectator*.

IDLE. LEISURE. VACANT.

As applied to portions of time, IDLE, as an idle hour, is always taken in a sense more or less unfavourable. An idle hour is confessedly one which might have been better spent.

A LEISURE hour (Fr. *loisir, to be permitted*, an obsolete infinitive; Lat. *licēre, see* LITTRÉ) is one which has been rightly spared from business, or which is open to being so, but of which nothing is said as to the spending.

A VACANT hour (Lat *vacans*, part. of *văcāre, to be empty, disengaged*) is indefinitely one which might have been filled up, but is not. A leisure time is welcome; a vacant hour may be unwelcome if employment were desired. In an idle hour we have done what we afterwards regretted.

IGNOMINY. INFAMY. OPPROBRIUM. SHAME.

IGNOMINY (Lat. *ignōmĭnia, in-, not*, and *nōmen, name, deprivation of good name*) is public disgrace which attaches to persons.

INFAMY (Lat. *infāmia*) is total loss of reputation, or extreme baseness, as attaching to character or deeds. Infamy is stronger than ignominy, inasmuch as it consigns the subject of it to public detestation, while ignominy brings contempt. It may also be observed that ignominy depends upon the sentiments of men, who may inflict it where it is undeserved; whereas infamy depends upon the fact of deeds done.

OPPROBRIUM, a Lat. word, *reproach, scandal*, is less strong, indicating a mingled feeling of reproach and disdain, which may be undeserved.

SHAME (A. S. *sceamu*) carries with it the additional idea of the sense or feeling of disgrace. But shame differs from the rest in being irrespective of social estimation and treatment. It is a feeling which results from an appeal direct or indirect to the natural sense of right and wrong, either in accusation or simple detection. It is the judgment which, recognizing an enormity of demerit, condemns to infamy. It is a sense of profound humiliation associated with the penalties paid for base crimes which constitutes ignominy. Those punishments which combine disgrace with pain are ignominious. Such are the pillory, the gibbet, the cross. On the other hand, beheading was a punishment in our own former history not ignominious.

"Who (the king) never called a Parliament but to supply his necessities, and having supplied those, as suddenly and *ignominiously* dissolved it, without redressing any one grievance of the people."—MILTON.

"But the afflicted queen would not yield, and said she would not damn her soul nor submit to such *infamy*; that she was his wife, and would never call herself by any other name."—BURNET.

"'He,' saith St. James, 'that speaketh against his brother, and judgeth his brother, speaketh against the law and judgeth the law;' that is, he *opprobriously* doth imply the law to be defective until he doth complete or correct it."—BARROW.

"*Shame*, which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us."—LOCKE.

IGNORANT. ILLITERATE. UNLEARNED. UNLETTERED.

IGNORANT (Lat. *ignōrāre, to be ignorant of*) denotes want of knowledge, either of a single fact, or, generally, of such matters as it is considered that men ought to know.

ILLITERATE (Lat. *illĭtĕrātus*) is ignorant of *letters*. Some persons are ignorant of common practical everyday matters, who are far from being illiterate; others are illiterate who

without the opportunities of good education, have picked up a considerable stock of general information.

UNLEARNED and UNLETTERED differ from ILLITERATE in not implying reproach. A man may be learned in one branch of learning, and unlearned in another. UNLETTERED is rather a rhetorical and poetical than a prosaic term. An honest peasant of little or no education ought to be called unlearned; a pretentious rich man, but uneducated, may well be styled ILLITERATE.

"Yet ah! why should they know their fate,
Since sorrow never comes too late,
And happiness too swiftly flies?
Thought would destroy their paradise
No more. Where *ignorance* is bliss,
'Tis folly to be wise." GRAY.

"Others are not capable either of the employments or divertisements that accrue from letters. I know they are not, and therefore cannot much recommend solitude to a man totally *illiterate*."—COWLEY.

"The immortality of the soul has been commonly believed in all ages and in all places by the *unlearned* part of all civilized people, and by the almost general consent of all the most barbarous nations under heaven."—CLARKE.

UNLETTERED is a very old word in English, as in the following:—

"And thei sighen the stidefastnesse of Peter and Joon, for it was foundern that thei weren men *unlettrid*."—WICLIF.

IMBIBE. ABSORB.

In IMBIBING (Lat. *imbĭbĕre, to drink in*) the moisture taken away from one body is taken into another.

In ABSORBING (Lat. *absorbĕre, to swallow* or *suck up*) the moisture is simply taken away. For instance, a sponge both absorbs and imbibes moisture. It absorbs it, inasmuch as it sucks it away from the place where it was lodged; it imbibes it, inasmuch as the particles of moisture pass into the sponge. On the other hand, the rays of the sun absorb moisture, but do not imbibe it. The same difference appears in the moral or secondary applications of the words. We imbibe what we assimilate to ourselves in the way of instruction, doctrine, principles, and the like. We are ourselves absorbed by some occupation which takes all our time, interest, and attention.

IMITATE. COPY. COUNTERFEIT.

The idea common to these terms is that of making one thing to resemble another. One IMITATES (Lat. *imĭtāri*) through esteem or appreciation of the object.

One COPIES (Lat. *cŏpia, plenty*, the copy being a multiplication of the original) from dearth of supply, or sterility of invention, or want of originality.

One COUNTERFEITS (Fr. *contrefaire*) for selfish ends of amusement or profit. We imitate persons, character, conduct, writing, painting, speaking, actions, works of art, and so forth, when we try to identify ourselves with the spirit and character of the agents and performers, so as to act or work in their manner. We copy when we can servilely assimilate our acts to those of others, or simply reproduce their productions. We counterfeit when we so produce that the production is referred to a false authorship, or that it shall not be what it pretends to be. The merit of imitation is in freedom, the merit of copy is in exactness. Counterfeit productions are only to be condemned. One may imitate yet keep one's own originality; not so with copying.

IMITATE. FOLLOW.

These terms both denote the regulation of our actions by some thing proposed or set before us for that purpose. But we IMITATE (Lat. *imĭtāri*) what is external to us; we FOLLOW what is sometimes external, sometimes internal. We imitate an example, or, which is tantamount to the same thing, we follow it; but we may also follow the dictates of reason and common sense; we may follow even our own devices. We imitate objects, persons, actions; we follow guides, influences, dictates of reason, impulses, and propensities. There is a difference between following an example and imitating an example. In the first place, to IMITATE an example is accurate and direct, an example being a model or pattern and as such to be imitated. To FOLLOW an example is secondary and inexact, for we can only

follow an example when we regard it in a derived sense as a guide. We imitate an example when we do the same things, we follow an example when we do like things. One follows a guide or a rule, one imitates a type or model.

"Acts of benevolence and love
Give us a taste of heaven above.
We *imitate* the immortal powers
Whose sunshine and whose kindly showers
Refresh the poor and barren ground,
And plant a paradise around."
SOMERVILE.

"Our chief professors having thought themselves above those rules that had been *followed* by our ancestors, and that lay open to vulgar understandings."—CHESTERFIELD.

IMMATERIAL. UNIMPORTANT. INSIGNIFICANT. INCONSIDERABLE. TRIFLING. TRIVIAL. FRIVOLOUS. FUTILE. UNESSENTIAL. IRRELEVANT. PETTY. NUGATORY.

IMMATERIAL is used of the unimportant in minor and familiar matters, especially in matters of practice; while UNIMPORTANT commonly relates to abstract difference of result; as "It is immaterial whether we go to-morrow or not;" "It is unimportant whether the word be taken in the one sense or the other." Unimportant is general; immaterial is specific. IMMATERIAL is unimportant as regards argumentative or practical considerations, and so is an epithet of things, and not of persons. An unimportant person is one who carries little or no weight, either generally, or in regard to a specific case. The epithet IMMATERIAL is not applicable in this way.

"It is true that there be some scholastical and *immaterial* truths, the infinite subdivisions whereof have rather troubled than informed Christendom."—BISHOP HALL.

"They would be surprised to be informed that one of the ancient critics has acquired a great reputation by writing on an art which is conversant in sound rather than in sense, and which is therefore in their opinion *unimportant*."—KNOX.

INCONSIDERABLE and INSIGNIFICANT differ not so much essentially as in their application; INCONSIDERABLE being used of size, number, weight, importance; INSIGNIFICANT of matters of personal bearing, appearance, weight of character.

"Let him calmly reflect that within the narrow boundaries of that country to which he belongs, and during that small portion of time which his life fills up, his reputation, great as he may fancy it to be, occupies no more than an *inconsiderable* corner."—BLAIR.

"What schoolboy, what little *insignificant* monk, could not have made a more elegant speech for the king, and in better Latin, than this royal advocate has done!"—MILTON.

TRIFLING (*trifle*, a corruption of *trivial*) applies not only to questions of importance, but also of value or utility. The trifling is opposed to the grave and considerable. That is trifling which need not exercise our care, anxiety, or attention.

TRIVIAL (Lat. *trīvialis, belonging to a trīvium, a place where three roads, (tres viæ), meet;* hence *common*) denotes that which is destitute of originality or force, or is unimportant by reason of the commonplace character of the thing, and is very commonly employed of matters of consideration or remark, pursuits and the like. A trifling remark is not worth listening to, because there is little or no force in it. The trivial remark has lost its force by repetition.

FRIVOLOUS (Lat. *frīvŏlus, silly, trifling*) denotes that which is in such a manner unimportant as to be destitute of gravity or earnestness, so that it involves disgrace to allege, to follow it, or to heed it. The term is applicable both to persons and things; TRIVIAL, to things alone. FRIVOLOUS is a term of habit and disposition; TRIFLING, of specific matters.

FUTILE (Lat. *fūtilis*, from *fundĕre, to pour or let loose, pouring out easily, worthless*) is employed of intellectual subject-matter, or its expression by statement and reasoning; as futile theories or arguments.

"Those who are carried away with the spontaneous current of their own thoughts must never humour their minds in being thus *triflingly* busy."—LOCKE.

The fundamental sense of TRIVIAL is seen in the following, where it is opposed to philosophical:—

"And for the pretended *trivialness* of the fifth and sixth days' work, I think it is apparent from what we have noted on the fifth

day, that Moses his ranging of fish and fowl together is a consideration not vulgar and *trivial*, but philosophical."—More.

"It is the characteristic of little and *frivolous* minds to be wholly occupied with the vulgar objects of life."—Blair.

Bacon employed the term Futile in the sense of having a tendency to pour forth in conversation, and so to pour forth what was weak:—

"As for talkers and *futile* persons, they are commonly vain and credulous withal."

It is now not applied directly to persons, but to mental efforts in the way of arguments, and especially of objections, and by a further extension of meaning to efforts or attempts generally. A futile attempt is one in which time, thought, and strength have been as it were placed in a vessel that *pours out easily*.

"He was prepared to show the madness of their declaration of the pretended rights of man, the childish *futility* of some of their maxims, the gross and stupid absurdity, and the palpable falsity of others."—Burke.

Nugatory (Lat. *nūgātōrius*, of or belonging to a *trifler*, *nūgātor*) denotes that which is so far trifling that it lacks operative force. In the nugatory the mean bears no proportion or a very inadequate one to the end gained.

"If all are pardoned and pardoned as a mere act of clemency, the very substance of government is made *nugatory*."—I. Taylor.

Unessential is literally belonging not to the *essence*, but, as it were, to the *accidents* of a thing, not going to form part of the thing itself. So Unessential and Immaterial differ in denoting what does not constitute, the former conceptional, the latter practical completeness. Station, it might be said, is unessential to virtue, that is, does not enter into the idea or definition of it; immaterial to it, that is, virtue can act without it.

Irrelevant belongs to argumentative considerations. An irrelevant remark (*i.e.* not *relevant*, Lat. *rĕlĕvare*, *to lighten*) is one which does not appertain in any way to the argument, does not, as it were, hold of it, is not subordinate to, but unconnected with it.

The term Petty (Fr. *petit*, *small*) we apply to what is so small as to be beneath consideration. It denotes a somewhat contemptible insignificance or meanness. It is applicable to littleness in character, conduct, office, argumentative consideration.

"Neither difference of time, nor distance of place, nor rigour of unjust censure, nor any *unessential* error, can bar our interest in this blessed unity."—Bishop Hall.

"Some of which dispositions were upon oath, some upon honour, and others neither upon oath nor honour; but all or most of them were of an irregular and *irrelevant* nature."—Burke.

"Divided power contention still affords,
And for a village strive the *petty* lords."
Rowe, *Lucan*.

IMMATERIAL. Incorporeal. Spiritual. Disembodied.

Immaterial (*see* above) is employed of everything which exists, or may be conceived to have existence, apart from material composition, or which does not fulfil the definition of matter. Light and other imponderable agents might be called *immaterial* in this sense, but more decidedly the mind and thoughts of man.

Incorporeal (Lat. *incorpŏreus*, *in-*, *not*, and *corpus*, *a body*) denotes the absence of organized matter in the constitution. Angels are incorporeal beings. Incorporeal and Immaterial are relative and negative.

Spiritual (Lat. *spīrĭtuālis*) is absolute and positive, indicative of the actual presence or possession of that distinct condition of existence which we call spiritual, and which is not a mere negation of the material or the corporeal, as in the case of the pre-existence of spirits to the formation of matter, the earth, or man.

Disembodied is employed of such existences as have *ceased* to be corporeal.

"Angels are spirits *immaterial* and intellectual."
Hooker.

"Thus *incorporeal* spirits to smaller form
Reduced these shapes immense."
Milton.

"There is a natural body, and there is a *spiritual* body."—*English Bible*.

"Devils embodied and *disembodied*."
W. Scott

IMMENSE. INFINITE. BOUNDLESS.

The IMMENSE (Lat. *immensus, in-, not,* and *mĕtior,* part. *mensus, to measure*) is the *relatively* INFINITE (*infīnitus, in-, not,* and *fīnītus, bounded*). The infinite is the *essentially* BOUNDLESS. The infinite is so by virtue of itself; the immense, by virtue of our inability to place or discern limits. The power of God is infinite; the expanse of ocean immense. BOUNDLESS is more applicable to what meets the eye, which searches in vain for limits; while IMMENSE expresses the effect upon the mind, and the inability practically to define or limit; as, boundless deserts, boundless beneficence.

"This power of repeating or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of *immensity.*"—LOCKE.

"I know that whatsoever hath or must necessarily have limits or fines, is not, cannot be *infinite;* and, therefore, this globe in my hand cannot be *infinite;* and if I can find in any other thing a parity of reason, I do and may remove *infiniteness* from it as reasonably and evidently as I do from this globe I hold, or this hour I write, or this life I live."—HALE.

BOUNDLESS is a term poetical, rhetorical, and inexact; IMMENSE is a practical term, INFINITE is metaphysical.

"Where'er the eye can pierce, the feet can move,
This wide, this *boundless* universe is Jove."
LYTTELTON, *Speech of Cato.*

IMMINENT. IMPENDING. THREATENING.

These terms are all employed in regard to some evil near at hand in the way of peril or misfortune.

IMMINENT (Lat. *imminēre, to hang over*) denotes that which is ready to fall, and is near at hand. So we may say, "He was in imminent danger." But we could not say, "He was in IMPENDING (Lat. *impendēre, to hang over*) danger," inasmuch as impending is indefinite as to time. The evil imminent or impending is, however, already brought into contact with us, while a THREATENING evil (A. S. *threatian, to urge, to threaten*) is in the future, and may pass off without coming near us at all. The imminent and impending evil has nearly touched us, though we may have escaped from them. We ourselves escape from imminent and impending danger; but the threatening danger passes away *from us.* Thus also imminent has the force of expressing degree; impending, of expressing fact—any danger while it exists is impending; but only a *great* as well as *close* danger would be said to be imminent. We might therefore say thus, "I think it my duty to warn you that danger is impending. But I would not alarm you needlessly. I do not speak of it as imminent, because I think that, by timely precautions, you may reasonably hope to escape it." He who at night approaches a precipice through ignorance is in imminent danger of his life; but death is impending in the natural course of things even when we are most safe.

"So it is certain that it is absolutely necessary my life should be out of *imminent* hazard before I can take a delight in the sufferings of others, real or imaginary, or, indeed, in anything else, from any cause whatsoever."—BURKE.

"Destruction hangs o'er yon devoted wall,
And nodding Ilion waits th' *impending* fall."
POPE.

"The honour, sir, that flames in your fair eyes
Before I speak, too *threateningly* replies."
SHAKESPEARE.

IMMODEST. INDECENT. INDELICATE.

The first of these (Lat. *immŏdestus, unrestrained*) belongs to the character and disposition; the second (Lat. *indĕcens, unbecoming*) to outward acts and appearance, or expressions, as conveying them. Want of reflexion might lead to INDECENCY; corruption of nature is the cause of IMMODESTY.

INDELICATE (*see* DELICATE) denotes an offence against refined propriety, good manners, or perfect purity of mind. Indelicacy relates to what is conventional. The coarser modes of thought and speech of the humbler classes, or their mode of dress indi-

cates no immodesty of necessity *in them*. On the other hand, an indelicacy in words, as coming from a refined and educated person, being calculated to convey more than its superficial meaning, may be very much so. The refined licentious literature of the day makes use of the indelicate to express the indecent, knowing the trained and susceptible intellects with which it has to deal. INDELICATE, however, is also applicable to moral propriety purely, and often denotes want of sensitive consideration for others; so, to laugh in the house of mourning is indelicate, even where *unfeeling* would be too strong a term, as it might be done thoughtlessly; where no such thoughtlessness could be pleaded such behaviour might be called indecent.

IMMOLATE. SACRIFICE.

SACRIFICE (Lat. *săcrĭfĭcium*) denotes the depriving one's self of something for the purpose of consecrating it to the Divinity. It is so devoted as to be transformed or lost to one's self.

IMMOLATE (Lat. *immŏlare; mŏla, the cake* placed on the head of the victim to be slain) denotes the offering of a bloody sacrifice. It involves the death. A sacrifice may be of many kinds of objects; immolation is only of living beings. That which is sacrificed is given to the Deity; that which is immolated is destroyed in his honour. The purpose of sacrifice is generally to perform an act of worship, that of immolation to perform an act of propitiation. In their secondary and moral application we sacrifice that which we voluntarily renounce for the sake of some other interest, or the interest of another. We immolate that which we treat like a victim, depriving it of what is precious or desirable for our interests or those of others. We are said to sacrifice feelings, hopes, plans, and the like, as well as persons. It would be by a greater effort that we should speak of immolating them. Self-immolation may be on special occasions as an act of peculiar heroism. Self-sacrifice to some extent is a daily duty.

IMMUNITY. EXEMPTION.

IMMUNITY (Lat. *immūnĭtātem*) is a dispensation from an onerous charge.

EXEMPTION (Lat. *exemptionem, a taking out*) is an exception from a common obligation.

IMMUNITY in its primary sense is seldom used, but of matters of jurisprudence and finance. It is an exemption from civil charges and fiscal dues. EXEMPTION is extended to all kinds of charges, dues, duties, obligations; hence an exemption from cares, vices, diseases in the moral and the physical order of things. Immunity is properly a title or condition by virtue of which persons or things are withdrawn from certain civil or social burdens. Exemption is the particular act conferring upon persons or things a freedom from some burden to which they would have been subjected together with others without this exception to the common rule. Immunity is rather a sort of right founded or based on the nature or quality of things. Exemption is rather a sort of privilege accorded as a favour on certain considerations. Immunity is primarily applicable to those exemptions which are enjoyed by corporations, communities, cities, or orders of persons. Exemption to private privileges is either personal or in connexion with certain offices. IMMUNITY relates specially to persons enjoying it. EXEMPTION to advantages enjoyed.

"As no man is *exempt* from some defects, or can live free from some misdemeanours, so by this practice (slander) every man may be rendered very odious and infamous."—BARROW.

"But man is frail, and can but ill sustain
A long *immunity* from grief and pain."
COWPER.

IMPAIR. INJURE.

To IMPAIR (L. Lat. *impējōrāre, to make worse*) is to injure in a lasting manner, so that though the detriment be but partial, it is permanent. We hear that a friend has received an injury in the eye; we hope that his eyesight will not be impaired. Hence injury is of bodies themselves; impairing is of their value, their action, their utility, or their properties. (*See* INJURY.)

"Time sensibly all things *impairs*.
Our fathers have been worse than theirs,
And we than ours."
ROSCOMMON, *Horace*.

IMPART. COMMUNICATE.

IMPART (Lat. *impartire*, and *-pertire, to bestow*) is to give a *part* or share.

COMMUNICATE (Lat. *communicare*) is to give so as to have in common. IMPART has the stronger meaning in one respect. We communicate what has come to us generally; we impart what we regarded as peculiarly our own. "He told me the fact. I now communicate it to you," might or might not be a favour to the other party; but, "I impart it to you," would imply that I consider myself in some sense as conferring a favour in making the communication. IMPART is often used of natural action not accompanied by consciousness or purpose; as the sun imparts warmth. COMMUNICATE involves also the will or intention to impart; so we should naturally refrain from saying that the clouds communicated rain. There is, however, an application of the word COMMUNICATE, though not a common one, namely, to transmit as a medium of connexion, intercourse, or supply. In this sense it is used of animate or inanimate things, as, the telegraphic wire communicates intelligence—that is, serves as a *common* medium between the sender and the receiver.

"Well may he then to you his cares *impart*."
DRYDEN.

"As the inquisitive, in my opinion, are such merely from a vacancy in their own imaginations, there is nothing, methinks, so dangerous as to *communicate* secrets to them; for the same temper of inquiry makes them as impertinently *communicative*."—*Spectator*.

IMPASSABLE. IMPERVIOUS.

IMPASSABLE denotes that which cannot be *passed* along, over, or through; as an impassable road, barrier, or morass. It relates to the movements of living creatures.

IMPERVIOUS (Lat. *impervius*) relates to that which cannot be pierced or penetrated by animate or inanimate influences; as a wood is impervious to the sun's rays. Impassable denotes an accidental or temporary, impervious a permanent quality.

"But lest the difficulty of passing back
Stay his return, perhaps over this gulf
Impassable, impervious, let us try
Advent'rous work."
MILTON.

IMPERTINENT. IMPUDENT. INSOLENT.

IMPERTINENT (Lat. *impertinentem*) *not pertaining to the matter in hand*, has the primary meaning of *irrelevant*; hence unbecoming in speech or action. He is impertinent who meddles with matters in which he has no concern. He is rude because he does not see his own subordinate relation to the matter in question.

IMPUDENCE (Lat. *impudentia, shamelessness*) is an unblushing assurance which is accompanied by cool disregard of the presence or claims of others to respect; and it is manifested in words, looks, tones, gestures, or even affected silence. Impudence is a frolicsome disrespect.

INSOLENT (Lat. *insolens, unusual, insolent*) has for its radical meaning a disposition to act in violation of the established rules of social intercourse. It is now used in the sense of unbridled exhibition of impudence or pride, to the disregard of the feelings of others, or their purposed wounding. The impudent person may be so from levity of character. The impertinent is so from want of humility and deference. The insolent is commonly urged, by some feeling of dislike, rebellion, or opposition, to a studied disrespect. Impertinence is no respecter of propriety; impudence no respecter of delicacy; insolence no respecter of persons. Impertinence is the converse of reserve; impudence of modesty; insolence of meekness.

"I'd have the expression of her thoughts be such
She might not seem reserved, nor talk too much;
That shows a want of judgment, and of sense;
More than enough is but *impertinence*."
POMFRET.

"Can any one reflect for a moment on all those claims of debt which the minister exhausts himself with contrivances to aug-

ment with new usuries, without lifting up his hands and eyes in astonishment at the *impudence* both of the claim and the adjudication?"—BURKE.

"The clergy, according to the genius of that religion, having their authority fortified with such severe laws, were now more cruel and *insolent* than ever."—BURNET.

IMPIOUS. IRRELIGIOUS. PROFANE.

IRRELIGIOUS (Lat. *irrĕligiosus*) is negative.

IMPIOUS (Lat. *impius, irreverent*) and PROFANE are positive (Lat. *profānus; pro, in front of, i.e. without*, and *fanum, the temple*, literally excluded from religious mysteries). A man under no influence of religion is irreligious. When applied to things, however, it implies a tendency to be unfavourable to religion, though without of necessity a premeditated determination or desire to be so. IMPIOUS denotes a defiant irreligion, and a disposition to do dishonour to what religious men hold in veneration, especially as regards the character, works, or dealings of the Supreme Being. As IMPIOUS relates more commonly to the thoughts, so PROFANE to the words or acts of men. Profanity is irreverence in speech about sacred things. It may be observed that PROFANE has the milder sense, also, of secular, or *not distinctively* religious: so history may be divided into sacred and profane. Impious thoughts; irreligious persons or books; profane language.

"They were the words of Job at a time when to his other calamities this domestic affliction was added, that one who ought to have assuaged and soothed his sorrows provoked his indignation by an *impious* speech."—BLAIR.

"In his (Lord Bolingbroke's) reasonings for the most part he is flimsy and false, in his political writings factious, in what he calls his philosophical ones *irreligious* and sophistical in the highest degree."—*Ibid.*

"Somewhat allied to this (blasphemy), though in an inferior degree, is the offence of *profane* and common swearing or cursing."—BLACKSTONE.

IMPLACABLE. INEXORABLE. UNRELENTING. RELENTLESS.

IMPLACABLE (Lat. *implācābĭlis, in-, not*, and *plācāre, to appease*) denotes a disposition which nothing can appease

INEXORABLE (Lat. *ĭnexōrābĭlis, in-, not*, and *exorare, to move by intreating*) is implacable to entreaty in particular and in a specific case.

UNRELENTING is not relenting (Fr. *ralentir, to retard; lent, slow*) that is, yielding, from harshness, hardness, or cruelty, as a fact; while RELENTLESS is unyielding as a property or habit. A relentless cruelty; an unrelenting line of conduct. "In spite of the sufferings of his enemy, his revenge was implacable. He looked on the tears and heard the entreaties of his prisoner, but remained inexorable." UNRELENTING belongs rather to the person, RELENTLESS to the quality which he exhibits. The implacable man is so from moral hardness of heart; the inexorable may be so from mental stubbornness or inflexible resolution. If partiality in the administration of justice were asked by the accused, the judge would be bound to show himself inexorable.

"An object of *implacable* enmity."—MACAULAY.

"*Inexorable* equality of laws."—GIBBON.

UNRELENTING is passive, RELENTLESS active. The former denotes rather the specific fact of not giving way before external influences, which would tend to stop the course of injustice or cruelty; the latter the condition of nature which suggests nothing in the way of forbearance.

"He (Oldham) has lashed the Jesuits with deserved and *unrelenting* rigour. But though severe punishment is often necessary, yet to see it inflicted with the wanton cruelty of an assassin is not agreeable."—KNOX.

"Nor hope to be myself less miserable
By what I seek, but others to make such
As I, though thereby worse to me redound.
For only in destroying I find ease
To my *relentless* thoughts." MILTON.

IMPLANT. INGRAFT. INCULCATE. INFUSE. INSTIL.

IMPLANT, INGRAFT, and INCULCATE (Lat. *inculcāre, to tread in, to impress upon*) are employed of abstract principles, and rules of right and wrong.

INSTIL (Lat. *instillāre, to pour in by drops, stilla, a drop*) and INFUSE (Lat. *infundere*, part. *infūsus, to pour in*) of such things as move the heart, feel-

ings, and passions. To IMPLANT conveys the idea of that tender and careful cultivation of the young which belongs to the office of parents. That which is implanted becomes part of the nature, and grows with the growth. To INGRAFT conveys the idea of such later training of the more mature mind as belongs to the master or preceptor. INSTIL conveys the idea of gently and gradually introducing sentiments with the aid of influences collateral to the influence of the person instilling them, while INFUSE denotes the direct endeavour of the person; nor does INFUSE imply such permanency in what is infused as INSTIL. We instil abiding sentiments; we may infuse what is temporary, as a spirit of patriotism, or military ardour. To INCULCATE points to the repeated efforts of exhortation, precept, and the like, which are employed to give force to what is impressed, by way of practical admonition.

"To provide effectually for the maintenance of the social virtues, it hath pleased God to *implant* in man not only the power of reason, which enables him to see the connection between his own happiness and that of others, but also certain instincts and propensities which make him feel it."—HURD.

"*Ingrafted* love he bears to Cæsar."—SHAKESPEARE.

"The Earls of Monmouth and Warrington were *infusing* jealousies into their party with the same industry that the Earl of Nottingham was at the same time *instilling* into the king jealousies of them; and both acted with too much success."—BURNET.

"For the wisdom of poets would first make the images of Virtue so amiable that her beholders should not be able to look off, rather gently and delightfully *infusing* than *inculcating* precepts."—DAVENANT.

IMPLY. SIGNIFY. INVOLVE. ENTAIL. NECESSITATE.

IMPLY (a coined word) is to signify in substance or by fair inference, or by construction, though not expressed in words.

INVOLVE (Lat. *involvĕre, to roll up*) denotes a drawing after by practical force, as IMPLY by metaphysical force. Hence an implication may often be recognized or not at will; while that which is involved follows of stern logical or practical necessity. War implies fighting; but it involves such things as taxation and bloodshed. The premises of a syllogism do not imply but involve the conclusion which is evolved from them. On the other hand a relative term, as father, implies its correlative, son.

SIGNIFY (Lat. *signĭfĭcāre, to point out*) is to declare by any kind of conventional sign, as by words—which are signs of ideas—gestures, signals, writing—which is written signals—and the like. Implication is indirect signification. Words which signified little might be made to imply much by the tone or manner in which they were uttered.

"Your smooth eulogium, to one crown addressed,
Seems to *imply* a censure on the rest."
COWPER.

"One of which boats I sent away with an officer round a point on the larboard hand, to look for anchorage. This he found, and *signified* the same by signal."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

IMPLY is opposed to EXPRESS; INVOLVE goes beyond the interpretation of things, and has to do with their necessary relations.

"We cannot demonstrate these things so as to show that the contrary *involves* a contradiction."—TILLOTSON.

ENTAIL is from the O. Fr. *entailler, to cut into*. An estate in tail, or entailed, is one which is cut down to or limited to certain heirs; hence to ENTAIL is employed in the secondary sense of to fix, or insure inalienably upon a person. It has nearly the same sense as NECESSITATE (Lat. *nĕcessĭtātem, necessity*), but NECESSITATE implies action as the consequence, while ENTAIL is applicable to consequences generally. So inasmuch as action is involved in labour, we might say that poverty entails or necessitates labour. But riches entail (not necessitate) anxiety. The force of ENTAIL is strictly employed in the following:—

"We adhere to the determination of our fathers, as if their opinions were *entailed* on us as their lands."—GLANVILL.

"And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being

hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being *necessitated* to do otherwise."—EDWARDS.

IMPORT. PURPORT. MEANING. SENSE. SIGNIFICATION. TENOR. DRIFT. SCOPE.

The IMPORT (Fr. *importer*, Lat. *importāre, to carry or convey*) is that which a word, statement, phrase, or document is specifically and directly designed to convey. We, however, more commonly speak of the meaning or signification of words, and the import of expressions or statements.

"To draw near to God is an expression of awful and mysterious *import*."—BLAIR.

The PURPORT (O. Fr. *pourporter, to make known*) is the import of something continuous, or regarded in its continuity, and may be applied to continuous action as well as continuous speech. IMPORT is more allied to MEANING and SIGNIFICATION; PURPORT to DRIFT and SCOPE.

"Thus there he stood, whilst high over his head
There written was the *purport* of his sin,
In cyphers strange, that few could rightly read." SPENSER.

Both IMPORT and PURPORT are employed of moral, not material, subjects. Thus a certain vegetable production is the meaning or signification, not the purport, of the word *oak*. But where more than this is meant we may employ the term IMPORT; as we may say that a human habitation of a certain character, capacity, solidity, and the like, is the import of the word *house*.

MEANING (A. S. *mænan, to intend to tell*) is used in a twofold sense, either, 1, the casual intention of the person, or, 2, the fixed import of the thing. "That is not my meaning," illustrates the first. "Take the words in their grammatical meaning," the second.

"What *mean* ye to weep and to break mine heart?"—*English Bible*.

"The word is always sufficiently original for me in that language where its *meaning*, which is the cause of its application, can be found."—TOOKE.

SENSE (Lat. *sensus, sensation, understanding*), unlike MEANING, is inseparably attached to the thing or the expression, and is irrespective of the uses. We say, "I used the word in that sense;" but we could not say, "That is my sense," for meaning. Sense is imposed force or technical recognized acceptation.

"Shall take it in the literal and grammatical *sense*."—*Preface to Thirty-Nine Articles*.

SIGNIFICATION (Lat. *significātionem*) is nearly identical with MEANING or IMPORT. SIGNIFICATION, however, is the act of making known, as well as the intention of the terms employed for the purpose. Signification is attached to the thing, and does not belong to the person. "As the words have that signification;" we could not say, "That is my signification. SIGNIFICATION has a stricter reference than MEANING to what is of a symbolical nature, as the signification of words or of demonstrations; but MEANING is capable of reference to anything which requires interpretation or accounting for, as, "I cannot understand the meaning of such conduct;" that is, "I am at a loss to interpret or account for it." The term MEANING is the most generic of all these synonyms.

"It (Lord) is a word, therefore, of large and various *signification*, denoting dominion of every sort and degree, from the universal and absolute dominion of God, to the private and limited dominion of a single slave."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

TENOR, DRIFT, and SCOPE relate not to isolated terms, but to continuous speech. The TENOR (Lat. *tĕnōrem, course, direction*) is the general course and character which holds on through a speech or a remark. The tenor of a speech might be affected by the temper or feelings of the speaker, the drift of it is an indirect expression of his permanent sentiments.

The DRIFT (or object towards which it *drives*) is the object, not, however, expressly notified, but gathered generally—the tendency of it, or aim not formally avowed.

The SCOPE (Gr. *σκοπός, mark* or *object*) is the avowed design, that which it is aimed at and is intended to embrace. "To discuss such a point does not fall

within the scope of this discourse." The TENOR and DRIFT differ, the former including more than what is actually said, and comprising the character of it, the latter relating to the remarks or statements only, but in connexion with their aim or object.

"The whole *tenor* of the Gospels and Epistles shows that human virtues are all light in the balance, and have no proper efficacy in themselves for procuring human salvation."—WATERLAND.

"But so strangely perverse is his commentator, that he will suppose him to mean anything rather than what the obvious *drift* of his argument requires."—WARBURTON *On Pope.*

"I think I could easily demonstrate that from Adam to Moses, from Moses to the Prophets, from the Prophets to Jesus Christ, the main *scope* and design of all Divine revelation hath been the gradual discovery of this great mystery of the mediation."—SCOTT, *Christian Life.*

IMPORTANCE. CONSEQUENCE. WEIGHT. MOMENT. ACCOUNT.

IMPORTANCE (*see* IMPORT) is the quality of being important; but CONSEQUENCE (Lat. *consequentia, consequi, to follow upon*) is not in this sense the quality of being consequent. In other words, it is only the nouns, and not the adjectives, that are synonymous. Another adjective, however, has been framed—*consequential*, which means, assuming the air of dignity and importance. As applied to persons, a person may be of importance specifically, so that a matter could not well go on without him; but he is of consequence inherently. CONSEQUENCE in this sense is recognized importance in a social point of view; a person of high rank and consequence may not be of importance in regard to a particular matter.

WEIGHT (A.S. *wegan, to bear, to weigh*) is efficacious importance, which may have the effect of practical influence; as, a character or consideration of great weight.

MOMENT (Lat. *momentum, movement, influence, movere, to move*) is not thus applicable to persons, but only to events, affairs, transactions, or practical considerations. WEIGHT belongs to words and arguments, MOMENT to occurrences. Consequence, as regards things, is that sort of importance which attaches to what is attended with decided results. A thing of no consequence is a thing which ends with itself. "It is a matter of great consequence that we should not delay our departure; for business of moment depends upon it; and the importance of your position will give weight to the expression of your views."

ACCOUNT (O. Fr. *aconter;* Lat. *ad*, and *computare, to count*) is theoretical, as importance is practical. A thing or person of account is one who or which is deserving of an estimate, whatever that estimate may be. A thing which is of no account is not worth considering. It does not express any high or great estimate. We speak of great importance, consequences, weight, and moment, but seldom of great account except for the purpose of denying it. But ACCOUNT involves the exercise of reason on the nature or character of things, and not on the question of their relative magnitude. That is of no account which is irrelevant, which forms no item in the calculation in hand.

"And of the counseill non *accompte*
He set." GOWER.

"The cause was not common and ordinary, such as were wont to be tried before the governors of provinces, but of an unusual and public nature, not a question of words and names, as Gallio thought it, but a matter of the highest *importance* to the world."—STILLINGFLEET.

"The corruption of our taste is not of equal *consequence* with the depravation of our virtue."—WARTON.

"When to demonstration on the one side, there are opposed on the other only difficulties raised from the want of our having adequate ideas of the things themselves, this ought not to be esteemed an objection of any real *weight*."—CLARKE.

"Whoever shall review his life, will find that the whole tenor of his conduct has been determined by some accident of no apparent *moment*."—JOHNSON.

IMPORTUNATE. URGENT. PRESSING.

IMPORTUNATE, which expresses the quality of the verb importune (Lat. *importunus, troublesome, unmannerly*), is only applicable to persons, and de-

notes a peculiar tenacity and troublesome pertinacity of application.

URGENT (Lat. *urgēre, to impel*) and PRESSING (Lat. *prĕmĕre*, part. *pressus, to press*), are equally applicable to matters of business and practical considerations generally. There is a very slight difference between them; but PRESSING seems to be more commonly used of the abstract nature of things; URGENT, of the things themselves: as pressing necessity; pressing importance; an urgent appeal; an urgent case; urgent affairs. It may be added, that that which is pressing demands immediate *attention*; that which is urgent immediate *action*; as also that persons are pressing, and circumstances urgent.

"But of all other passages of Scripture the necessity and efficacy of this *importunity* in prayer that we speak of, is most wisely set forth to us by our blessed Saviour, in that remarkable parable of His in the eleventh of St. Luke's Gospel."—SHARP.

"But time is *urgent*. Haste we to consult
Priest, prophet, or interpreter of dreams
(For dreams are also of Jove), that we may learn
What crime of ours Apollo thus resents."
COWPER.

"Mr. Gay, whose zeal in your concern is worthy a friend, writes to me in the most *pressing* terms about it."—POPE.

IMPOSE. INJOIN.

We IMPOSE (Fr. *imposer*, Lat. *impōnĕre, to place upon*), or circumstances also may impose, what is of the nature of a burden, charge, obligation.

We INJOIN (Lat. *injungĕre*) that which is the subject of authoritative admonition, whether positive or negative. As it is authority that injoins, so it is force or power that imposes. Accordingly that which is imposed is commonly more defined than that which is injoined. A specific task is imposed, a general course of conduct or some principle of action is injoined, leaving the application of it to be regulated by circumstances; as, to injoin moderation or secresy.

IMPOSTOR. DECEIVER.

An IMPOSTOR (Lat. *impostor, a deceiver*) is a deceiver of the public, while DECEIVER (Fr. *décevoir, to deceive*) might be of the public or of a private individual. Any one who deceives by word or deed is a deceiver. An impostor assumes a false appearance, and impersonates what is not truly his. An impostor acts for his own benefit; a deceiver may act simply for the injury of another.

"But now, when Time has made th' *imposture* plain
(Late though he followed Truth, and limping held her train),
What new delusion charms your cheated eyes again."
DRYDEN.

"Surely, if these things prove true, let me be registered to my perpetual infamy, not only for a most notorious *deceiver*, but such an hypocrite as never trod upon the earth before."—STRYPE.

IMPRESS. IMPRINT.

IMPRESS (Lat. *impressare*, freq. of *imprĭmere*) and IMPRINT (compounded of *im-* and *print*) have their physical and their metaphorical senses. In the former they are identical—meaning to press for the purpose of making a mark. In the latter, IMPRINT is so to press upon the mind as to produce a lively image of the thing; IMPRESS is so to press as to produce a conviction of its importance or necessity. "My father's kind maxims are imprinted on my mind; he early impressed me with their importance." We imprint on the imagination or the memory; we impress on the understanding and the heart.

"It seeming to me a near contradiction to say that there are truths *imprinted* on the soul which it perceives or understands not; *imprinting*, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived."—LOCKE.

"So deep the deadly fear of that foul swain
Was erst *impressed* in her gentle sprite."
SPENSER.

IMPRESSION. INDENTATION. MARK. PRINT. STAMP.

In its physical sense, IMPRESSION (*see* IMPRESS) is a mark made by pressure, either on the surface, or so as to penetrate below the surface of a body. It is of a distinct outline.

INDENTATION (Law Lat. *indentāre, to cut into teeth, dentes, or notches*) is a mark as of a tooth, either a sharp depression by violence of the surface of a solid body, or a lateral notching

of it, as in the indentations of a saw. It may be entirely wanting in distinctness of outline.

MARK (Fr. *marque*) is more general, and may be cut, coloured, pressed, smeared, or produced in any way which causes a visible trace, whether accidentally or by design, in protuberance or depression.

PRINT (*see* IMPRESS) is an impression of definite outline, as the print of feet upon sand, but implying less force and depth than impression.

STAMP (a stronger form of the word *tep*) is commonly employed at present of merely superficial impression, generally with colouring matter; as, to stamp a letter. Sometimes, however, it is of stronger force; so that the characteristic meaning of STAMP is rather a formal, official, or symbolical impression. IMPRESSION may be made by any part of the body, or by an instrument. INDENTATION commonly implies an instrument. MARK is indefinite. PRINT may be either; and STAMP usually denotes an instrument. A stamp is a *characteristic* mark impressed.

IMPROVE. BETTER. MEND.

It is somewhat remarkable that, contrary to the usual rule, the Latin term IMPROVE (*im-*, Lat. *in, and prove*, Lat. *prŏbāre, to approve*) is of more extensive application than the Saxon BETTER, which is seldom used but of the outward circumstances or condition; while IMPROVE expresses all that is expressed by the phrase *to make better*, and is applicable to anything which may be conceived by the mind as existing in degrees of possible goodness.

MEND (abbreviated from O. Fr. *amender*, the Lat. *ēmendāre*) has not the general scope of IMPROVE, but relates specifically to what is or has become defective or *faulty* (Lat. *mendum, an error*). The mind of the child is improved when it is gradually instructed; his circumstances are bettered when he is well fed and clothed instead of poor. MEND is more generic, and applies to what is physically impaired, or morally ill-conducted. IMPROVE is better applicable than either of the others to what exists only in the mind abstractedly; as a plan, conception, form of expression, matter of taste, subject of beauty or power.

"Reflect upon that great law of our nature, that exercise is the great source of *improvement* in all our faculties."—BLAIR.

Formerly the term BETTER had much the sense of IMPROVE. So Bishop Taylor,

"Grace is the improvement and *bettering* of nature; and Christian graces are the perfections of moral habits, and are but new circumstances, formalities, and degrees."

INACCESSIBLE. UNAPPROACHABLE.

UNAPPROACHABLE (Fr. *approcher, to approach*, Lat. *appröpiare*) expresses more than INACCESSIBLE (Lat. *ĭnaccessĭbĭlis, in-, not*, and *accēdĕre, to come to*), for that which is unapproachable cannot be even drawn near to; that which is inaccessible cannot be come up to.

INACTIVE. INERT. SLUGGISH. SLOTHFUL.

INACTIVE is general. It simply denotes absence of activity, or indisposition to behave or act with vigour. This may proceed from a variety of causes, as diffidence, timidity, or an insufficient knowledge of the circumstances of the case. Persons may even remain inactive *purposely*.

INERT (Lat. *inertem, unskilled, idle, in-, not, artem, art*) denotes something natural, constitutional, or habitual. Yet it need not be the last, and one might feel inert from temporary indisposition.

SLUGGISH (*slug, an idler*, connected with *slack* and *slow*, A. S. *sláw*) indicates even more than this, as if some defect of temperament obstructed all efforts.

SLOTHFUL (A. S. *sláw, slow*) is commonly employed as a relative term in connexion with activity *as a duty* to one's self or to others; hence such terms as, "Slothful in business." The man is slothful who is sluggish in such a way as to be dilatory or negligent of the duties which claim

his attention. The sluggish man does what he has to do lazily or inertly; the slothful man gives his own ease the preference, and indulges it when he ought to be at work.

"Every one exerted himself to the uttermost with a quiet and patient perseverance equally distant from the tumultuous violence of terror, and the gloomy *inactivity* of despair."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"If to your builder you will conduct give,
A power to choose, to manage, and contrive,
Your idol chance, supposed *inert* and blind,
Must be enrolled an active, conscious mind." BLACKMORE, *Creation*.

"Every man who has undertaken to instruct others can tell what slow advances he has been able to make, and how much patience it requires to recall vagrant inattention, to stimulate *sluggish* indifference, and to rectify absurd misapprehensions."—KNOX.

"Not *slothful* in business, but fervent in spirit."—*English Bible*.

INADEQUATE. INSUFFICIENT.

INADEQUATE (*in-*, *not*, and *ădæquāre*, part. *-ātus*, *to make equal or level*) refers to an *external*, INSUFFICIENT (Lat. *insufficientem*) to an *internal* requirement. That which is inadequate is insufficient for a purpose; while INSUFFICIENT may refer only to a want, or material requirement. For instance, we might say, "You undertook to bring a hundred, but you have brought only ninety; this is insufficient." We could not use the term INADEQUATE without specifying or implying a purpose. In very many cases the terms may be used interchangeably. Yet even in such cases, INSUFFICIENT rather relates to quantity, INADEQUATE to proportion. If we said, "The population is inadequately represented," we should mean, that the number of representatives was not in proportion to the number of the population; if we said insufficiently, that there were too few of the representatives themselves. An insufficient number; an inadequate force; an insufficient amount; an inadequate provision. When the insufficient has been so adjudged by the mind it may be called inadequate, which very often means, the insufficient conceived or determined to be such—subjective insufficiency. Moreover, insufficiency denotes more simply a lack of quantity; inadequate, a lack of force or quality, where no purpose or direct requirement exists. INSUFFICIENT falls short of the measure of need, INADEQUATE of the measure of justice, propriety, and right relationship. A prolix speaker may have treated his subject quite sufficiently, yet very inadequately.

"We must accept them (translations) with all their unavoidable imperfections, as in general sufficiently representative of the sense of their originals, though in some particulars that sense be *inadequately* conveyed to us."—HURD.

The word *sufficient* had formerly a meaning answering to *adequate*; as when St. Paul asks, "Who is sufficient for these things?"

"It may here perhaps be pretended by modern deists, that the great ignorance and undeniable corruptness of the whole heathen world has always been owing, not to any absolute *insufficiency* of the light of Nature itself, but merely to the fault of the several particular persons in not sufficiently improving that light."—CLARKE.

INADVERTENCY. INATTENTION.

INADVERTENCY (Lat. *in-*, *not*, and *advertĕre*, *to turn the mind towards*) is the quality or effect of not taking *notice*; INATTENTION (*in-*, *not*, and *attendĕre*, *to turn or stretch the mind towards*), of not taking *heed*. In the former case there was an involuntary accident; in the latter a culpable neglect. Or if there is anything culpable in inadvertency, it is of another nature, and comes from not realizing the importance of what was overlooked, not from any heedlessness as being the *cause* of the overlooking, which would be inattention. Inadvertency therefore is occasional; inattention is more sustained, and, indeed, may involve many acts of inadvertency. In inadvertency you failed to observe because not apprised; in inattention, though you had been apprised. In the one case you might have avoided, in the other you ought to have avoided the fault. Yet both may be culpable, in that inadvertence may be where one might have foreseen, as

inattention where one might have taken care. Earnest minds going straight to their purpose may be inadvertent, frivolous minds having no purpose may be inattentive. Frequent inadvertence is stupidity, frequent inattention rudeness.

"When the intention seems upright, and the end proposed is to make men better and wiser, what is not ill executed should be received with approbation, with good words, and good wishes; and small faults and *inadvertencies* should be candidly excused."—JORTIN.

"The universal indolence and *inattention* among us to things that concern the public, made me look back with the highest reverence on the glorious instances in antiquity of a contrary behaviour in like circumstances."—*Tatler.*

INANITY. VACUITY. VACANCY.

INANITY (Lat. *ĭnānĭtātem, emptiness*) is not now used in a physical sense. It denotes such mental emptiness as implies want of strength of mind, or want of character, a characterless vapidity of mind. The older philosophers used the terms *inane* and *inanity* in the sense of *void*, denoting the voidness of space in the abstract, as Locke:—

"The great *inane*, beyond the confines of the world."

The noun *inanition* is employed to express the emptiness of the body either from want of food, or want of digestive power.

"But nothing still from nothing would proceed.
Raise or depress, or magnify or blame,
Inanity will ever be the same."
SMART.

"However pleased people may appear, they commonly retire from the company in which these (noise and laughter) have formed the only entertainment with an unsatisfied and uneasy *vacuity*, and sometimes with disgust and disagreeable reflection."—KNOX, *Essays.*

"He landed them in safety, and conducted them to their companions, among whom he remarked the same *vacant* indifference as in those who had been on board." COOK'S *Voyages.*

VACUITY (Lat. *văcuĭtatem, exemption, a vacant space, empty*) denotes simply emptiness, or an empty space.

VACANCY draws attention to the fact that such emptiness is customarily filled, and so only temporary. Vacuity of mind would denote that the mind was unstored by education; vacancy of mind, that it was for a time idle or unoccupied, or was wanting in the common faculties.

INATTENTIVE. CARELESS. THOUGHTLESS. HEEDLESS. NEGLIGENT. REMISS.

INATTENTIVE (*see* INATTENTION) is specific, and relates to casual matters. It is not so much an expression of an habitual temperament as of an occasional state, though this may often come from an habitual impatience of persistent thought. Like HEEDLESS, it relates to the passing matters of the moment, heedlessness (A. S. *hédan, to mind*) being inattention of a certain kind or to certain particulars, as to practical warning, advice, and consequences of conduct.

CARELESS denotes that want of attention to matters of minor or ordinary moment which comes from unawakened interest or indifference.

THOUGHTLESS is employed of more serious inattention to matters of graver moment. It designates that quality which, though apparently not highly reprehensible, may lead to very disastrous results. It is the unrestrained conduct of the man who does not pause to weigh the importance of actions or the probability of results.

NEGLIGENT and REMISS both refer especially to cases where the contrary qualities are matters of duty and responsibility; but NEGLIGENT is a term of more reproach than REMISS. NEGLIGENCE (Lat. *negligentia*) may lead to the omission of duty altogether; while REMISSNESS (Lat. *rĕmittĕre*, part. *remissus, to slacken*) at least implies its performance, though in a careless manner. Negligence indicates want of care and interest; remissness, want of activity and energy.

"What prodigies can power divine perform
More grand than it produces year by year,
And all in sight of *inattentive* man?"
COWPER.

"Therefore for Coriolanus neither to care whether they love or hate him manifests

hat true knowledge he has in their disposition, and out of his noble *carelessness* lets them plainly see it."—SHAKESPEARE.

"Seamen are so accustomed in ships of war to be directed in the care of themselves by their officers, that they lose the very idea of foresight, and contract the *thoughtlessness* of children."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"To have no apprehension of mischief at hand, nor to make a just estimate of the danger, but *heedlessly* to run into it, be the hazard what it will."—LOCKE.

"This paper hath undone me; 'tis th' account
Of all that world of wealth I have drawn together
For mine own ends—indeed, to gain the popedom
And see my friends in Rome. Oh, *negligence!*
Fit for a fool to fall by."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Some indiscretion of conduct or frowardness of temper, some *remissness* or tardiness in good offices, or some neglects or failures in services."—WATERLAND.

INAUGURATE. INITIATE.

We INITIATE (Lat. *initiare*) when we do something which is of the nature of a first act in a series of proceedings, which are of a continuous character.

We INAUGURATE when we formally or solemnly set such proceedings in motion or progress. As it was the duty of the Roman augur to take the omens at the commencement of some public transaction and ceremony, the word INAUGURATE signifies to open with formality. He who inaugurates must have personal or official weight that he may give sanction to what is begun. He who initiates must have skill and tact that he may give to the proceeding the most suitable and favourable commencement.

INBORN. INBRED. INHERENT. INNATE.

The INBORN denotes more strictly what is involved in the nature, INBRED what has been involved in the habits or training of individuals.

INNATE (Lat. *innātus, inborn*, part. of *innascor*) is the Latin equivalent of the Saxon INBORN, but is used in a more philosophic way; as, "the doctrine of innate ideas," that is, derived from sources independent of sensations from external objects.

INHERENT (Lat. *inhærēre, to stick*), unlike INBORN and INBRED, is applicable to many other things than those which have life, and has the general force of essentially, or logically involved; so we speak of the inherent properties of matter, as distinguished from what may be temporarily or accidentally attached to it. INNATE, INBORN, and INHERENT may often be used interchangeably; INHERENT denoting permanent indwelling; INNATE and INBORN, that this indwelling is not artificial or designed, but congenital.

"When men have been so long seated in a place that the majority of the inhabitants are become natives of the soil, the *inborn* love of a country has by that time struck such deep roots into it that nothing but extreme violence can draw them out."—WARBURTON.

"Haste and delay as *inbred* qualities were remarkable in the two most martial people of Greece."—DRAYTON.

"I consider a human soul without education like marble in a quarry, which shows none of its *inherent* beauties till the skill of the polisher fetches out the colours, makes the surface shine, and discovers every ornamental cloud, spot, and vein that runs through the body of it."—*Spectator*.

"Certain *innate* principles, some primary notions, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, characters as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it."—LOCKE.

INCAPABLE. INCOMPETENT.

INCAPABLE (Lat. *in-, not*, and *căpābilis, capable of*) is an absolute term, denoting want of spatial extent or adequacy to contain, inadequate mental, or physical, or moral power, or general unfitness or insusceptibility.

INCOMPETENT (Lat. *incompĕtentem, see* COMPETENT) denotes a specific and relative incapacity as to a given task, duty, office, or undertaking. INCOMPETENT is only employed of persons; INCAPABLE may be employed of inanimate substances, as a bridge may be so dilapidated as to be incapable of repair. An incompetent person; an incapable subject. The incompetent cannot act; the incapable cannot be acted upon. The twofold force of INCAPABLE, of its active and passive significations, appears in the following,

where the word means incapable in essence, and incapable in operation.

"Whatever is *incapable* of being a cause in any time ever was and ever will through eternity continue equally *incapable*."—BROOKE.

"Now that *incompetence* arises from this, that no man can judge rightly of two things but by comparing them together; and compare them he cannot unless he exactly know them both."—SOUTH.

INCOHERENT. INCONGRUOUS. INCONSISTENT. INCOMPATIBLE.

INCOHERENT (Lat. *in-, not, cohærēre, to stick together*) is seldom employed of material substances, the term *incohesive* better supplying its place. It is generally applicable to cases which are deficient in that sort of unity which depends upon the interdependence of parts, especially in sequence or continuity, and commonly implies defective form of *statement*, because mere ideas, though they may be incoherent, cannot be pronounced so till they are expressed.

INCONGRUOUS (Lat. *incongruus*) denotes that kind of absence of harmony or suitableness of which the taste and experience of men takes cognizance. It is applied to the modes and qualities of things; INCONSISTENT (Lat. *in-, not*, and *consistĕre, to stand together*), that kind which cannot be adjusted to some recognized third term as a standard. It is applied to the actions and sentiments of men.

INCOMPATIBLE (Fr. *incompatible*), that which cannot exist under similar circumstances, conditions, or suppositions. It is applied to the essential attributes of things. Unlike the others, INCOMPATIBLE is only used specifically of cases preceded by the term *with*. Generally speaking, it is reason which decides upon inconsistency, taste upon incongruity, experience upon incompatibility, and judgment upon incoherency.

"Observe the *incoherence* of the things here joined together, making 'a view extinguish,' and 'extinguish seeds.'"—BLAIR.

"God commands not impossibilities; and all the ecclesiastical glue the liturgy or laymen can compound is not able to soder up two such *incongruous* natures into the one flesh of a true beseeming marriage."—MILTON.

"If we should suppose Him to have been an impostor and a false prophet, a character would arise full of contradictions and *inconsistency*."—JORTIN.

"Certain properties *incompatible* with the essential properties of matter."—CLARKE.

INCONSTANT. CHANGEABLE. MUTABLE. VARIABLE. FICKLE. VERSATILE.

That which is INCONSTANT (Lat. *inconstantem*) whether the term be employed of persons or qualities (it is only by poetic licence that the term is used of anything else, as Shakespeare's "inconstant moon"), owes its character to an impatience of uniform or sustained adherence and attachment. CHANGEABLE denotes no more than exhibiting the phenomenon of easy or frequent change, whether in opinions, feelings, or the phenomena of physical nature and appearances; as a changeable disposition, changeable weather. As epithets of character, INCONSTANT and CHANGEABLE stand related to each other as negative and positive. The changeable person is continually rejecting what he has adopted, in order to take up something new. The inconstant person simply attaches himself to nothing long. Changeableness is active, inconstancy passive. Changeableness is a fault of commission, inconstancy of omission. *See* CONSTANCY.

"Success on Mævius always does attend; *Inconstant* Fortune is his constant friend."
POMFRET.

"I choose to give an instance in the stuff I have been speaking of, because the mixture being more simple, the way whereby the *changeableness* is produced may be the more easily apprehended."—BOYLE.

MUTABLE (Lat. *mūtābilis*, from *mūtāre, to change*) is seldom used of anything but external circumstances and events of life, though Byron has the forced phrase, "Most mutable in wishes." MUTABLE is a term of moral reflexion, and is commonly associated with change, as it affects men's hopes, desires, attachments, observations, and experience.

"What man that sees the ever-whirling wheel
Of change, the which all mortal things doth sway,
But that thereby doth find and plainly feel
How *mutability* in them doth play
Her cruel sports, to many men's decay?"
SPENSER.

VARIABLE (Lat. *vāriābĭlis, changeable*) denotes indefinite multiplicity of change. A thing may be changeable which is liable to one or two changes. It is variable when its transmutations are so numerous that they defy anticipation, and may assume many different phases in a short space. In matters of the will or feelings of men we use the term VARIABLE; in physical matters, CHANGEABLE.

FICKLE (A. S. *ficol*) denotes that specific changeableness which exhibits itself in matters of taste, purpose, and attachment—the changeableness of easily transferred likes and dislikes.

VERSATILE (Lat. *versātĭlis; versāre, to turn frequently*) denotes changeableness, not as involuntary, but voluntary; not as weakness, but as indicating power of mind, an ability easily to adapt one's self to altered circumstances; as a "versatile genius."

"We should also recollect that besides this temporary *variableness* of the mind, the tongue is unruly."—KNOX.

"The one was fire and *fickleness;* a child
Most mutable in wishes; but in mind
A wit as various, gay, grave, sage, or wild,
Historian, bard, philosopher combined."
BYRON.

"Nature seems incapable of such extraordinary combinations as composed his (Julius Cæsar's) *versatile* capacity."—*Ibid.*

INCONTROVERTIBLE. INDUBITABLE. UNQUESTIONABLE. INDISPUTABLE. UNDENIABLE. IRREFRAGABLE.

These terms all express conclusiveness of evidence, not absolute certainty or truth. INCONTROVERTIBLE (made up from *in-, not,* and the verb *controvert*) applies to such matters as are so clear and certain as not to admit of lengthened and argumentative questioning or contradiction.

INDUBITABLE (Lat. *indŭbĭtābĭlis, in-, not,* and *dŭbĭtāre, to doubt*) throws the matter back yet farther, and asserts that not only may the matter not be controverted in terms, but not even doubted of in the mind. UNQUESTIONABLE expresses that which may not be called in question; INDISPUTABLE, that which may not be disputed; UNDENIABLE, that which may not be denied; IRREFRAGABLE (Lat. *irrĕfrăgābĭlis, not to be withstood*) that of which the argumentative force or the evidence may not be broken. It is in their application that their differences consist. INCONTROVERTIBLE is employed of statements, views, or opinions, evidence, and the like, but not of simple facts; INDUBITABLE, of facts and assertions; UNQUESTIONABLE, of propositions; INDISPUTABLE, of rights and claims also; UNDENIABLE, of statements; IRREFRAGABLE, of evidence and arguments.

"This therefore may be assumed as an *incontrovertible* principle that the difference of good and evil in actions is not founded on arbitrary opinions or institutions, but in the nature of things and the nature of man."—BLAIR.

"There may be an *indubitable* certainty where there is not an infallible certainty."—WILKINS.

"Making us receive that for an *unquestionable* truth which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture."—LOCKE.

"Precedents of *indisputable* authority."—*Rambler.*

"Thus says he, it must be *undeniably* plain; thus, that is, grant him his premisses, and the conclusion follows without doubt."—WARBURTON.

"I do not find that anything hitherto has been so clearly and *irrefragably* proved for the immortality of the soul."—SOUTH.

INCREASE. ACCESSION. AUGMENTATION. ADDITION. ENHANCEMENT. MULTIPLICATION.

INCREASE (Lat. *increscĕre, to increase*) is the most comprehensive of these terms, and indeed includes the rest. It denotes addition of bulk, quantity, number, degree, value, force, and extension, either by internal vitality or by accession from without.

ACCESSION (Lat. *accessiōnem, an addition*) is an accidental mode of increase by addition from without; while both ADDITION (Lat. *addĭtiōnem*) and AUGMENTATION (Lat. *augmenta-*

tiōnem) imply *purposed* increase. Augmentation is commonly increase in what is of the nature of a desirable possession, and is not consonantly with present custom, so often employed, like ADDITION and ACCESSION, of such things as are evils, *e.g.* misery or misfortune. INCREASE and AUGMENTATION are intrinsic, ACCESSION and ADDITION extrinsic, being applicable to the thing which causes, not that which receives, increase. INCREASE stands to addition or accession as the effect to the cause, and expresses not an operation, but a state or result. In the case of increase and augmentation, the thing added loses its individuality, and passes into the general mass and unity of the matter augmented; in addition and accession, they still remain, as it were, outside it. So the addition and accession may still be contemplated after the union has been made; but no separate part or item is expressed by INCREASE or AUGMENTATION. An estate bequeathed to a proprietor, in addition to that which he holds already, may be a valuable accession, and tend not only to increase his property, but to augment considerably the revenue derived from it. Augmentation is *intrinsic increase* in the stock and *substance* of things. It affects quantity in the gross, as increase affects quantity in extent.

"Wherever the commerce between the sexes is regulated by marriage, and a provision for that mode of subsistence to which each class of the community is accustomed can be procured with ease and certainty, there the number of the people will *increase;* and the rapidity as well as the extent of the *increase* will be proportioned to the degree in which these causes exist."—PALEY.

"Ancient Troy, seated on an eminence at the foot of Mount Ida, overlooked the mouth of the Hellespont, which scarcely received an *accession* of waters from the tribute of those immortal rivulets the Simois and Scamander."—GIBBON.

"Though fortune change, his constant spouse remains,
Augments his joys, or mitigates his pains."
POPE.

"All the praises and commendations of the whole world can *add* no more to the real and intrinsic value of a man than they can *add* to his stature."—SWIFT.

ENHANCE (of which the root is O. Prov. *enans, forwards*, Lat. *in, ante*) is not employed of mere material addition, but to the heightening of a property or quality first of favourable, afterwards also of unfavourable qualities. That which is enhanced possesses a force, a value, a beauty. It had at one time a physical meaning, *viz.* to raise, which has entirely given way to the metaphorical one; as in Spenser, "Who naught aghast his mighty hand *enhanced*," that is raised.

"The reputation of ferocity *enhanced* the the value of their services in making them feared as well as hated."—SOUTHEY.

MULTIPLICATION (Lat. *multĭplĭcātiōnem*) is the same thing as numerical addition, or addition as applied not to quantity but to numbers. The rule of multiplication is virtually only a rule of addition, by which any number is added to itself a given number of times. It may be observed that MULTIPLICATION is sometimes employed of indefinite increase of quantity.

"I will greatly *multiply* thy sorrow."—*English Bible.*

INDEBTED. OBLIGED.

INDEBTED (O. Fr. *endetter, to bring into debt*) is in reference to what may have been received from or done for us by others. It is a much stronger term than OBLIGED. "I am indebted to him for saving my life." It would be inadequate to say OBLIGED (Lat. *obligare, to bind, to oblige*). OBLIGED is never employed directly of events or circumstances—which is the case with INDEBTED—but only of persons. "For the abolition of slavery in this country we are mainly indebted (not obliged) to Christianity." The feeling of moral obligation is not necessarily implied in INDEBTED; hence the term is employed with readiness of *many* agents, where OBLIGED could not be so employed. In such cases it seems to mean little more than acknowledgment of a cause or source; as, "For such elements of the national character we are indebted to our Saxon ancestry." On the other hand, OBLIGED always indicates *some* amount of favour received, and gratitude due, though the favour may be very slight, and cannot, as we have seen, be *very* great; as, to be obliged by an act of substan

tial kindness, or a piece of common courtesy.

"As a misery is not to be measured from the nature of the evil, but from the temper of the sufferer, I shall present my readers who are unhappy either in reality or imagination with an allegory, for which I am *indebted* to the great father and prince of poets."—*Tatler.*

"Thus man to heaven by his own strength would soar,
And would not be *obliged* to God for more."
DRYDEN.

INDICATION. TOKEN. SYMPTOM.

INDICATION (Lat. *indĭcare*, part. *indĭcātus, to point out*) is a subjective token, that is, its force as a sign depends upon the understanding of the observer. Hence an indication may be either very simple, direct, and palpable, or complex, indirect, or inferential. INDICATION has frequently the force of a sign of something inherent in the person or subject. A hearty shake of the hand is an indication of goodwill, sleep of weariness, a crack in a wall of a sinking of the foundation.

TOKEN (A. S. *tâcon, a token*) conveys simpler and more direct evidence, and may consist in a visible material object; as a book is given in token, or as a token of friendship. INDICATION is not so used, being of a more complex character; as an act, a speech, an expression, a line of conduct.

SYMPTOM (Gr. *σύμπτωμα, a falling in, a symptom*) is a specific token or indication naturally attached to that which it indicates, so that seeing the one enables us to infer the other. Like INDICATION, but more strongly, it consists not in simple objects, and derives its force from experience and induction of instances in which it occurs. A token is recognized by sense and feeling; an indication, by observation and experience; a symptom, by knowledge and science.

"Modesty is the certain *indication* of a great spirit, and impudence the affectation of it."—*Spectator.*

"In every canoe there were young plantains and branches of a tree which the Indians call e midho. These, as we afterwards learnt, were brought as *tokens* of peace and amity."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"It will save the patient from that *symptome* of being afraid of water, which is incident unto such as be so bitten."—HOLLAND, *Pliny.*

Tokens and symptoms are of things present; indications may also be of things to come. Symptoms accompany. Tokens are given. Indications are made or given, accompany, precede, or even follow.

INDIFFERENCE. APATHY. INSENSIBILITY. CALLOUSNESS. NEUTRALITY.

INDIFFERENCE (Lat. *indiffĕrentem*, a word of Cicero's coinage to translate ἀδιάφορον) denotes no more than a casual fact, namely, that the presence or absence of something makes no difference to a person. This may be in many ways, as with or without a full knowledge of circumstances, so that it might be removable or not. It expresses a state, and not any quality of persons.

INSENSIBILITY and APATHY (Gr. *ἀπάθεια, ἀ-, not,* and *πάθος, suffering* or *feeling*) are qualities inherent, though insensibility is commonly acquired or produced, apathy innate; but APATHY and INSENSIBILITY are used in different relations; for insensibility may be either intellectual or moral; apathy is always moral. Insensibility may be either from want of understanding or from want of feeling; apathy is from want of feeling. Again, in apathy and in insensibility the matter is looked at from different points of view. Apathy as it exists in the person; insensibility as its existence is evidenced by the unavailingness of external appliances or influences to excite feeling. Hence APATHY is used abstractedly, INSENSIBILITY in specific reference to some such appliance or influence. A man is simply apathetic. He is insensible *to* something. Indifference is to the soul what tranquillity is to the body, and insensibility is to the soul what lethargy is to the body. Indifference checks vigorous action and strong desire. Insensibility is the bane of tender and of noble feeling. Indifference springing from the absence of passion leaves open the mind to the sway of pure reason. Insensi-

bility isolates a man from his kind and makes him a brute or a savage. Indifference is the placid summer lake, insensibility is the same lake frozen. Indifference, it has been said, makes philosophers, and insensibility makes monsters. Apathy is the extreme of indifference and drugs the mind, and produces nothing but inaction. It is possible to be insensible to some things and not to others. The good man is insensible to the attractions of vice. The apathetic man never acts but with an effort, against his inclination, and only when compelled by external force.

CALLOUSNESS keeps up in its secondary a strict analogy to its primary meaning. *Callum* or *callus*, in Latin, is *hard skin* or *rind*, that thickening of the animal or vegetable integument which is the result of use or exposure. Hence callousness is the insensibility of habituation.

"He discovered him to be a mean person by the rusticity and hardness of his body: not by a *callousness* of his feet or a wart upon his fingers; but his whole body was hard and servile."—BP. TAYLOR, *on Repentance.*

NEUTRALITY, as its name sufficiently indicates (Lat. *neuter, neither*), is the state of taking no part on either side. It may refer both to parties and to their sentiments; in other words, we may be neutral in action or in feeling. It may be the result of disposition or of duty. Or a neutrality of action may be accompanied by strong partiality of feeling. It is a condition of communities as well as persons, while the others are confined to the latter.

"Men who possess a state of *neutrality* in times of public danger desert the interests of their fellow-subjects."—ADDISON.

"In matters of religion, he (the upright man) hath the *indifference* of a traveller whose great concernment is to arrive at his journey's end."—SHARP.

"Pride is always an ignorant, lazy, or cowardly acquiescence in a false appearance of excellence, and proceeds not from consciousness of our attainments, but *insensibility* of our wants."—*Rambler.*

"In this sullen *apathy* neither true wisdom nor true happiness can be found."—HUME.

Apathy, or a dispassionate state, was recommended by the Stoical philosophers as the secret of human happiness.

INDIGENOUS. ABORIGINAL.

The separation in use between these terms is at present wider than formerly. INDIGENOUS (Lat. *indĭgenus, indu-*, for *in*, and *gigno, I beget*) is seldom used of races, but most commonly of the vegetable productions of a country; while ABORIGINAL (Lat. *ăbŏrĭgĭnes, original inhabitants*) is used only of men. But, even as employed of men, a distinction is observable. An indigenous people is an ethnological, aborigines an historical, term. The former term is used to express the earliest in physical history, the latter the earliest in the history of civilization. The race found in existence in newly-discovered countries by civilized discoverers is called aboriginal. INDIGENOUS is used in a metaphorical way, not applicable to ABORIGINAL, as—

"The emotions *indigenous* to the human mind."—I. TAYLOR.

"Their language (that of the inhabitants of Biscay) is accounted *aboriginal*."—SWINBURNE.

INDIGNATION. RESENTMENT.

INDIGNATION (Lat. *indignātiōnem*) is a feeling akin to anger, but without its selfishness, being excited by a real or supposed wrong towards ourselves or others, in which the feeling of wrong predominates over and tempers the sense of hurt, and in which the existence of injury, though it must mostly follow practically, is not essential.

RESENTMENT (Fr. *ressentiment*) is more energetic and active than indignation, which latter may be expressed only in words, or even a look; while resentment seeks to make itself felt. It is the reaction of the mind against personal injury or insult. It may be more or less lasting; and in its purer and more unselfish form may be excited on behalf of others. It denotes a stronger feeling of personal dislike against the offender than indignation, which springs from the act.

"*Indignation* expresses a strong and de

vated disapprobation of mind, which is also inspired by something flagitious in the conduct of another."—COGAN.

Up to a late period of English literature, the word RESENTMENT was used to signify the appropriate return of feeling, whether in the way of gratitude or its opposite, which is the simple and etymological force of the word. So Bishop Bull writes—

"Throughout this excellent song the sacred Virgin expresseth a deep sense of her own unworthiness, and upon that account a profound *resentment* of the singular favour of the Almighty bestowed upon her."

"*Resentment*," says Cogan, "is a lesser degree of wrath, excited by smaller offences committed against less irritable minds. It is a deep, reflective displeasure against the conduct of the offender."

INDISPOSITION. ILLNESS. (*See* DISEASE.)

INDISPOSITION is a slight disorder of the healthy functions of the body. ILLNESS is continuous indisposition. It supposes an actual or probable termination, and conveys an idea of the accidents of sickness generally, without the features of any specific complaint.

"By our laws, as that Modus lays them down, the King neither can nor ought to absent himself from his parliament unless he be *indisposed* in health, nor then neither till twelve of the Peers have been with him to inspect his body and give the Parliament an account of his indisposition."—MILTON.

"Alas, I only wish for health again
Because I think my lover shares my pain;
For what could health avail to wretched me
If you could unconcerned my *illness* see."
LITTLETON.

INDISTINCT. CONFUSED. OBSCURE.

INDISTINCT (Lat. *indistinctus, not separated*) may, like the other synonyms here mentioned, be employed of the physical or the mental perception—of the sight, the hearing, or the understanding. That is indistinct which does not present itself to the eye or the mind in clear outline and definite totality, so that we comprehend it positively and negatively, and see at once what it is, and what it is not. The distinct is clear in itself, and separable from surrounding objects.

CONFUSED (Lat. *confundĕre*, part. *confūsus, to pour together, to confound*) denotes a manifold indistinctness of parts, relations, or objects in relationship. Want of force may make things indistinct, want of definiteness makes them confused. An indistinct sound is a faint sound, a confused sound is a medley of sounds of different characters.

OBSCURE (Lat. *obscūrus*) expresses that which is difficult to comprehend from want of light, clearness, or perspicuity. Indistinctness and obscurity, as they are applied to matters of the understanding, commonly relate, the former to the mode of expression, the latter to the subject matter. A person's words may be indistinct even from thickness of utterance. His expressions may be so from want of power to make things plain. If he is obscure, it is probably from insufficient statements, or possibly from the inherent abstruseness of the subject. So we speak of indistinct ideas, confused statements, obscure subjects, meanings, or allusions.

"The colours of objects, according as they are more distant, become more faint and languid, and are tinged more with the azure of the intervening atmosphere. To this we may add that their minute parts become more *indistinct*, and their outline less accurately defined."—REID.

"Amphion so made stones and timber leap
Into fair figures from a *confused* heap."
WALLER.

"These questions of predestination being perplexed, thorny, and troublesome through their *obscureness*, may, without all detriment of salvation, be either unknown or discussed."—BISHOP HALL.

INDIVIDUAL. PARTICULAR. SINGLE. SOLITARY.

The difference between these terms is best seen by considering that against which each stands opposed. INDIVIDUAL (Lat. *individuus, indivisible*) is opposed to *collective*; PARTICULAR (Lat. *particularis*), to *universal*. Hence an individual instance is one, and *not more*; particular is one, and *not another*.

SINGLE (Lat. *singŭlus*, more commonly plur. *singŭli*) has the force of *only one*, or even one, standing against a possible plurality, and hence is commonly employed in a negative sentence; while SOLITARY (Lat. *sōlĭtārius, alone by itself*) is employed in positive sentences. "I have found one solitary instance." "I have not found a single instance." Particular implies something specifically, as distinguished from generally or universally, true. If I say, "It is true in this particular case," I discard all responsibility of statement as regards other such cases.

"It would be wise in them, as *individual* and private mortals, to look back a little." —SWIFT.

"Of this Prince there is little *particular* memory."—BACON.

"But he might have altered the shape of his argument and explicated them better in *single* scenes.

Cor. That had been *single* indeed."

B. JONSON, *Every Man out of his Humour.*

"With *solitary* hand
Reaching beyond all limit at one blow,
Unaided could have punished thee and whelm'd
Thy legions under darkness." MILTON.

INEFFABLE. UNSPEAKABLE. UNUTTERABLE. INEXPRESSIBLE.

INEFFABLE (Lat. *ĭneffābilis, unpronounceable, in-, not, e, out,* and *fāri, to speak*) is commonly used only of those things which transcend expression by their admirable or precious qualities; as the ineffable joys of heaven. UNSPEAKABLE serves the purpose of a superlative adjective of quantity, especially in summing up states of mind; as unspeakable joy, misery, satisfaction. UNUTTERABLE has a tendency to the unfavourable, as INEXPRESSIBLE to the favourable. We more often speak of unutterable sorrow than unutterable joy. UNUTTERABLE, however, has the meaning of too deep to be uttered at all; while INEXPRESSIBLE means too high or too deep to be *adequately* conveyed in terms. Hence it may apply to the inherent expressiveness of *words only*, to which the others are inapplicable; as, "Such an idea of a foreign writer may be inexpressible in English."

"He said, and on His Son with rays direct
Shone full. He all His Father full exprest
Ineffably into His face received,
And thus the filial Godhead answering spake." MILTON.

"Him that without exception doth *unspeakably* exceed all other things."—FISHER, *Godly Treatise.*

"I believe few parents would wish their sons to live the life of Cowper, which, though virtuous and amiable, was at certain times *unutterably* woeful."—KNOX.

"Who since the morning hour set out from heaven,
Where God resides, and ere mid-day arrived
In Eden, distance *inexpressible*
By numbers that have name."
MILTON.

INEFFECTUAL. VAIN. ABORTIVE. FRUITLESS.

Of these terms, which all relate to human endeavour, VAIN is the most general (Lat. *vānus, empty*). It may apply to the object of the attempt as well as to the attempt itself. Accordingly, this twofold force is often expressed in the use of VAIN. A vain ambition may mean that the effort will be fruitless, and the object not worth achieving were it otherwise. Accordingly, as the rest express failure as limited by human weakness, VAIN may express that failure which comes necessarily from the nature of the thing aimed at, or even desired. Thoughts, hopes, and desires or suppositions may be vain; but only efforts are ineffectual, abortive, or fruitless. INEFFECTUAL and FRUITLESS differ as the specific from the general. The former relates to a particular end, which is represented as not gained; the latter to the absence generally of profitable results. Again, INEFFECTUAL is applicable to material influences or powers; FRUITLESS, to the exertion of the human will. We speak of fruitless attempts or ineffectual attempts, but of ineffectual, not fruitless, remedies.

ABORTIVE (Lat. *ăbortīvus, born prematurely*), like FRUITLESS, is only applicable to voluntary efforts, not to mere natural powers, and commonly to such efforts as imply some amount of design, or complex efforts and schemes. INEFFECTUAL and FRUITLESS

imply more strongly that the failure is owing to the weakness of the person making the attempt; ABORTIVE is more external in its character, and may denote the untoward issue as the result of unforeseen or irresistible counteraction of what has been well prepared. Unforeseen casualties may render the best-laid plans abortive.

"Hereford was surprised on the 18th of December by Colonel Birch and Colonel Morgan, after it had been besieged for about two months *ineffectually* by the Scots."—LUDLOW.

"Full sure he thought Troy's fatal hour arrived.
Vain thought! he knew not the designs of Jove." COWPER.

"Any enterprise undertaken without resolution, managed without care, prosecuted without vigour, will easily be dashed, and prove *abortive*."—BARROW.

"The *fruitlessness* of their inquiries into the arcana of the Godhead."—WARBURTON.

INFATUATION. FOLLY.

FOLLY is of two kinds—mental and practical. The former is weakness of understanding; the latter, weakness of conduct.

INFATUATION (Lat. *infătuare, to make a fool of*) brings out more strongly the idea of FOLLY (Fr. *folie*) in its practical aspect. The infatuated man acts under some peculiar beguiling, fascinating influence, leading him from the paths of prudence and self-control—some one thought or desire which blinds his understanding to what he ought to do or avoid, and for the sake of which other needful considerations are sacrificed.

"The *infatuations* of the sensual and frivolous part of mankind are amazing; but the *infatuations* of the learned and sophistical are incomparably more so."—I. TAYLOR.

"What *folly* 'tis to hazard life for ill!"
SHAKESPEARE.

INFERENCE. DEDUCTION. CONCLUSION. CONSEQUENCE. INDUCTION.

INFERENCE (Fr. *inférer, to infer*) is the broadest of these terms, denoting any process by which from one truth or fact laid down or known we draw another. Inference may be either by INDUCTION or DEDUCTION, and hence may be probable or certain. Inference by induction is more or less probable, except where all cases of the kind have been collated, when it ceases, strictly speaking, to be inference, and is only the assigning of a common name, or stating an universal proposition. From having seen twenty swans all white, one might infer that all swans are so. This would be only a probability in itself, and, as a fact, not true. In induction we observe a sufficient number of individual facts or cases, and extending by analogy what is true of them to others of the same class, establish a general principle or law. This is the method of physical science. The process of deduction is the converse of this. We lay down a general truth, and connect a particular case with it by means of a middle term. When inference is conducted by the syllogistic process, it is called DEDUCTION (Lat. *dēductionem, a deducing, dēdūcĕre, to draw from*), the thing inferred being the CONCLUSION, which establishes, or, as it were, shuts up (Lat. *concludĕre, to shut up*) the argument. A conclusion is a proposition viewed relatively to others from which it has been deduced.

A CONSEQUENCE (Lat. *consĕquentia, consĕqui, to follow up*) is a conclusion regarded as admitting of degrees of closeness or directness. Between the first stage of any argument and any particular consequence several links of reasoning may intervene. Hence the common phrase, "remote consequences," as meaning results which will follow sooner or later from what has been stated or conceded. Unlike the rest, CONSEQUENCE is applicable to *practical* results, as a severe cold may have been the consequence of imprudent exposure. The consequence is also logically taken in an abstract sense. The conclusion is the proposition which follows from the premisses, the consequence being the link between the two; and so the conclusion may be drawn true in fact though the consequence be false, *i.e.* in reasoning; or the conclusion false in fact though the consequence be true, *i.e.* logically true.

"Though it may chance to be right in the conclusion, it is yet unjust and mistaken in the method of *inference*."—GLANVILL.

"From the words of Moses cited by our Saviour, the doctrine of a future state may as clearly be *deduced* as from any single text which can be produced out of any one of the Prophets."—JORTIN.

"He granted him the major and minor, but denied him the *conclusion*."—ADDISON.

"Link follows link by necessary *consequence*."—COLERIDGE.

"When by thus comparing a number of cases agreeing in some circumstances, but differing in others, and all attended with the same result, a philosopher connects, as a general law of nature, the event with its physical cause, he is said to proceed according to the method of *induction*."—STEWART.

INFERIOR. SECOND. SECONDARY. MINOR.

INFERIOR (Lat. comparative of *inf*ĕ*rus, low*) is not employed generally in the physical sense, but expresses the quality of being lower in rank, importance, excellence, force, value, and the like.

SECOND (Lat. *sĕcundus*) relates to a presumed or declared order of sequence, implying a first, which it immediately succeeds. The principle of the sequence may be any; as, place, time, value, dignity, or one arbitrarily assumed. SECONDARY is opposed to *primary*, and denotes second in order of necessity, importance, or operation.

MINOR (Lat. *mĭnor, less*) has, in addition to the idea of inferiority, that of subdivision; as the minor sections of a body, where the relation is not extrinsic, but intrinsic.

"*Inferiors* both in fortune and in understanding."—*Tatler*.

"But here you exclaim of 'the strange abuse made of quotations and *second*-hand representations.'"—WATERLAND.

"Europe herself hath so many mother-languages quite discrepant one from the other, besides *secondary* tongues and dialects."—HOWELL.

"Asia *Minor*."—*Geography*.

INFLUENCE. SWAY. ASCENDANCY.

INFLUENCE (an astrological term, a *flowing in*, O. Fr. *influence, of planetary virtues into men*) is hidden or indirect exercise of power, which, in personal matters, may spring from a variety of sources, as talent, wealth, position, or persuasive power. It is in moral things analogous to what takes place in physical, when effects are produced by gentle, gradual, or unobserved processes for good or ill.

SWAY (A. S. *swegian, to prevail*) is power of control either consciously exerted or specifically tending to definite ends; while influence may be altogether indefinite. ASCENDANCY (also an astrological term, denoting that degree of the ecliptic which rises above the horizon at the time of birth, supposed to exercise great influence over the character and destiny of individuals) denotes, according to its origin, a governing or controlling power in relation to a certain time or set of circumstances. It is uniform influence. It is moral power which influences human conduct to the exclusion of other motives, and in individuals is the result sometimes of natural superiority, sometimes of personal aim, and very often of both combined. Sway is relative to a supposed course or line of procedure which has been affected. To sway the counsels or decisions of an assembly, for instance, is to exercise an altering or modifying influence.

"After the restoration there succeeded in its place, and since the revolution has been methodically pursued the more successful expedient of *influence*."—PALEY.

The primary import of SWAY is seen in the following:—

"Oft must menne on the oke smite till the happie dente have entred which with the oke's own *swaie* maketh it to come all at ones."—CHAUCER.

"That predominant love of righteousness and hatred of iniquity maintaining an absolute *ascendency* in the mind in all times and upon all occasions."—HARLEY.

INFORM. ACQUAINT. APPRISE. ADVISE. INSTRUCT. TEACH.

INFORM (Lat. *informāre, to fashion, to declare*) relates only to matters of fact made known to one who could not have known them before.

INSTRUCTION (Lat. *instructiōnem, an arranging*) relates to the principles

drawn from known facts. One informs by virtue of possessing specific knowledge of matters of fact which have in some way, possibly even by accident, come to one's ears. One instructs by virtue of having more knowledge. Priority of knowledge makes the informant, superiority of knowledge the instructor.

TEACHING (A. S. *tæcan, to teach*), as distinct from instruction, is applied to practice (it may be the practice of a art or branch of knowledge). A child is instructed in grammar, and taught to speak a language. TEACH has a purely mechanical application, which does not belong to INSTRUCT. A dog may be taught a trick; but he could not be instructed in anything. The two processes of teaching and instruction may thus go on simultaneously. In mathematics there is no information, because the propositions are not statements of fact, but are based upon principles assumed. Information is of new facts; instruction is of undeveloped truths. Information extends knowledge; instruction gives additional understanding; teaching, additional power of doing.

ACQUAINT (Fr. *accointer*, L. Lat. *adcognĭtare, to make known*), APPRISE (Fr. *apprise, instruction*, from *aprendre*, the Lat. *apprendĕre*), and ADVISE (Fr. *avis, an opinion*=Lat. *ad visum, according to what has seemed best*) closely resemble INFORM, inasmuch as they relate to the communication of matters of fact. I inform a man when I simply tell him a fact which he did not know before. I acquaint him with that of which I furnish him with all the details. So I inform him of the fact, and acquaint him with the particulars of it. I apprise him of what particularly concerns him to know, whether it be a good or an evil, or a danger, or a probability of any sort. I advise him of that which I impart to him formally, officially, or as in duty bound, of what occurs in due course, or in the way of business. All the other terms may be used of unintelligent things, but only living persons can inform.

"Your (Algernon Sidney's) present abode was no secret to me before I knew it from your own hand; that *information* having been given me about two or three months since by some English gentlemen."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

"Divers that first believe the Scripture but upon the Church's score are afterwards by *acquaintedness* brought to believe the Scripture upon its own score."—BOYLE.

"It is evident from the care taken to *apprise* the world of it, even before Christianity was promulgated, how important and essential a part this must be of that Divine religion."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

"There were several letters from France just come in with *advice* that the king was in good health."—ADDISON.

"The coldness of passion seems to be the natural ground of ability and honesty among men, as the government or moderation of them the great end of philosophical and moral *instructions*."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

"As a child is *taught* to expect from its parent, so are we taught to expect from God every good of which our nature is capable."—GILPIN.

INFRACTION. INFRINGEMENT.

Although these terms are connected by a common derivation (Lat. *infringĕre, to break, to weaken*), they are differently applied: INFRACTION being reserved for the violation of public rights and formal treaties; INFRINGEMENT of minor, or else more personal and social claims. The infraction of a treaty of commerce; the infringement upon one's neighbour's liberty or convenience; an infringement of the laws of good society or good manners.

"The *infringers* of the duties of imperfect obligation, which civil laws cannot reach."—WARBURTON.

"The young King of Denmark, upon his coming to the crown, complained of these *infractions*."—BURNET.

INGENIOUS. CLEVER. INVENTIVE.

INGENIOUS (Lat. *ingĕniōsus, having good natural talents*) is purely mental.

CLEVER (*see* CLEVER) is practical as well as mental. Ingenuity is more akin to genius, cleverness to talent; the one is inventive, the other executive. The use of CLEVER in English is overdone, as the term is made to stand for every form of intellectual ability and adaptive faculty. Ingenuity is genius on a small scale, or as

shown in matters of minor moment or less gravity and seriousness. A readiness in nicely doing actions not habitual is commonly called CLEVERNESS, where bodily activity is engaged, and ingenuity where mental. Cleverness is ingenuity of the body, as ingenuity is cleverness of the mind. Men may contrive ingeniously, and manage cleverly.

"Of all the means which human *ingenuity* has contrived for recalling the images of real objects, and awakening by representation similar emotions to those which are raised by the original, none is so full and extensive as that which is executed by words and writing."—BLAIR.

"He (the Duke of Monmouth) gave the hangman but half the reward he intended, and said if he cut off his head *cleverly*, and not so butcherly as he did Lord Russell's, his man should give him the rest."—BURNET.

INVENTIVE (Lat. *invēnīre*, part. *inventus, to find*) expresses the active and practical side of ingenuity. The ingenious person sees readily, the inventive person projects, adapts and contrives. He deals in expedients, and constructs means to an end, where such means are not ready to his hand.

"For Alcibiades, as he was passing ingenious and *inventive* of matter, so he wanted audacity, and was not so ready as some others to utter the same."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch.*

INGRATIATE. INSINUATE.

These terms differ as to the modes adopted. INSINUATE (Lat. *insĭnuare, to make to wind in*) leans to an unfavourable signification, as often implying artfulness of purpose and selfish ends; INGRATIATE (Lat. *in, into, grātia, favour*), the compassing the same end with candour and merit. INSINUATE is used of physical influences and substances, and, metaphorically, of influences in the abstract; INGRATIATE, only of the acts and demeanour of human agents. INGRATIATE is never employed, like INSINUATE, of simple ideas, notions, suppositions, or statements. Insinuation, in this sense, is indirect declaration, or a statement of a part, leaving more to be inferred.

"One of those who came off was the old man who had already *ingratiated* himself into our favour."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"Some do wind and *insinuate* into the grace and favour of the hearer, and by such an occasion draw his heart unto them."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch.*

INNOCENCE. PURITY.

INNOCENCE (Lat. *innŏcentia*) is a negative, PURITY (Lat. *purĭtatem*) is a positive quality. Innocence is freedom from harm or guilt, hence specifically of some particular act or charge. A very wicked and injurious person may be quite innocent of a particular crime. Purity is perfect moral cleanness. Purity is spotlessness of soul. Innocence is purity of manners. Purity is the cause and safeguard of innocence. Purity regards the mind and the motives, innocence the intentions and the actions.

INNER. INWARD. INTERNAL. INTERIOR. INTRINSIC.

These terms may be partly illustrated by those to which they stand opposed. Thus inner is opposed to outer, inward to outward, internal to external, interior to exterior. INNER is employed of such things as admit of degrees of comparison in relation to a state or position inwards. Thus inner means more towards the centre, and has a superlative—inmost or innermost. The inner walls of a fortification are those which approach the stronghold. INWARD is used, not like inner, of physical locality or relationship, but morally to express the quality of being within, as opposed to being exposed to observation or view; as, "He believes it in his inward heart, whatever he may say."

INTERNAL (Lat. *internus*) is always specific, being not an absolute but a relative term, and coupled with some object in particular implied or expressed; as, the internal arrangements of a house; internal trade, which implies external commerce, to which it stands opposed.

INTERIOR (Lat. *intĕrior*), like INNER, admits of degrees, which are excluded from INTERNAL; as, the interior districts of a country, which are removed in different degrees from the borders or confines of it.

INTRINSIC is internally or inherently

belonging, as distinguished from what is only apparent or fictitious; hence genuine, real.

INORDINATE. IMMODERATE. EXCESSIVE. EXTRAVAGANT. EXORBITANT.

INORDINATE (Lat. *inordĭnatus, disordered*) is well employed of human desires; as an inordinate ambition or love of pleasure; or human qualities, as inordinate vanity.

IMMODERATE (Lat. *immŏdĕratus, unrestrained*) has a wider application to anything exceeding just limits; as immoderate demands, immoderate grief.

EXCESSIVE (Lat. *excēdĕre*, sup. *excessum, to go beyond*) differs from IMMODERATE in relating to the thing itself, not to the person; as, "He was immoderate in his claims;" or, "The demand itself was excessive." In the term "excessive expenditure" there is not the same reflexion on the conduct of individuals as in "immoderate expenditure."

EXTRAVAGANT (Lat. *extra, beyond*, and *vāgāri, to wander*) has the same application, with the idea of a reckless absence of calculation or proportion in matters of expending or demanding; as, an extravagant demand or claim. It is applicable to anything which is immoderately expended, as extravagant praise.

EXORBITANT (Lat. *exorbĭtare to go out of the track, orbĭta*) denotes the designedly extravagant. A demand may be extravagant from want of attention; it is exorbitant as the result of an extortionate aim, or a desire to enjoy or acquire more than is reasonable, fair, or just. Exorbitant passions are those which claim over-indulgence. The exorbitant is the more extravagant form of the excessive. Both are applicable to things which being susceptible of increase have received more than is due, but the latter advances upon the former. That which is excessive passes the ordinary course or bounds. That which is exorbitant passes them to a degree which is out of all proportion. Exorbitant pretensions are beyond excessive pretensions. The first are strained, but we do not know where the second will end. EXCESSIVE is capable of a meaning not altogether unfavourable. EXORBITANT always denotes what is wrong. An excessive generosity is a sort of noble weakness. An exorbitant generosity could be only madness.

"Their object is to merge all natural and all social sentiment in *inordinate* vanity."—BURKE.

"In the fourth place, from all that has been said, we should learn never to be *immoderately* anxious about our external situation, but submit our lot with cheerfulness to the disposal of Heaven."—BLAIR.

"*Excessive* lenity and indulgence are ultimately *excessive* rigour."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"They declaimed against human reason. They depressed it as *extravagantly* as their adversaries had advanced it."—WARBURTON.

"To reduce the crown from the *exorbitances* it affected within the ancient and legal boundaries of the constitution."—BISHOP HURD.

INQUIRY. INTERROGATE. ASK. QUESTION.

INQUIRE (Lat. *inquīrĕre*) denotes the process of seeking for truth by one or more questions, which may be put in different ways and in different directions, or answered from different sources.

INTERROGATE (Lat. *interrŏgare, to ask*) is to put several questions in a formal and systematic manner, and is directed only to one quarter and to living persons. ASK is simpler, and generally turns upon a simple affirmative or negative answer to a matter of fact; as, "Ask him if such is the case." It has, of course, also the sense of *crave*.

QUESTION (Lat. *quæstiōnem, an inquiry, quærĕre, to seek*) is of wider meaning; and, in addition to the sense of INTERROGATE, has that of disputing or arguing from a doubt of some specific statement or alleged fact. Where QUESTION is used in the sense of putting questions, it differs from INTERROGATE in being of wider signification. Interrogation is of some fact. Question may be of the possession of knowledge in a more extended way, as to question a student in history.

Hence QUESTION, unlike the others, turns upon matters more strictly connected with the condition of the person questioned. Curiosity leads us to question. Authoritativeness appears in interrogation; desire of knowledge, in inquiry.

"And all that is wanting to the perfection of this art (of medicine) will undoubtedly be found if able men, and such as are instructed in the ancient rules, will make a further *inquiry* into it."—DRYDEN.

"The traveller, whoever he might be, coming to the fortified habitation of a chieftain, would probably have been *interrogated*."—JOHNSON.

"Th' eternal *quest'ner* shun; a certain rule,
There is no blab like to the *quest'ning* fool."
HAMILTON, *Horace*.

"We own it to be highly proper that men should *ask* themselves why they believe; but it is equally proper for them to *ask* why they disbelieve."—SECKER.

INQUISITIVE. CURIOUS. PRYING.

The CURIOUS person (*see* CURIOUS) is eager for information generally, or for the possession of it in any one of many ways, as in problems of Nature, art, or science, as well as with reference to causes of little or no importance or concern to himself.

He is INQUISITIVE (Lat. *inquīsītīvus, searching into*) who busies himself with inquiries on a small scale, of no intrinsic importance or of little practical concern to himself.

The PRYING man (the derivation of *pry* is very uncertain) uses his own powers of observation, rather than questions put to others, for the purpose of discovering their secret affairs out of a puerile or low-minded curiosity.

"Exercising upon theological matters that *inquisitiveness* and sagacity that has made in our age such a happy progress in philosophical ones."—BOYLE.

"Man is read in his face, God in his creatures, but not as the philosopher, the creature of glory, reads him, but as the divine, the servant of humility; yet even he must take care not to be too *curious*."—B. JONSON.

"So close in poplar shades, her children gone,
The mother nightingale laments alone,
Whose nest some *prying* churl had found."
DRYDEN, *Virgil*.

INROAD. INVASION. INCURSION. IRRUPTION. INTRUSION.

Forcible or unallowed entrance is common to these words. An INROAD is an entry by some novel and forcible method, involving an injury and trespass in the action.

INVASION (Lat. *invāsiōnem; invādĕre, to invade*) denotes a forcible entry upon what is the property of another, with a violation of his right of property, and with the direct intention of depriving him of some such right, or in retaliation for alleged injuries committed by him.

INCURSION (Lat. *incursiōnem, an onset; incurrĕre, to run into*) is a lighter kind of invasion, without the idea of permanence or occupation, and, as a transitory act, involving the original intention of a return.

IRRUPTION (Lat. *irruptiōnem, a rushing into*) is more violent and sustained, being done in the spirit of destruction and conquest.

INTRUSION (Lat. *intrudĕre, to thrust into*) is such an entry as, being without violence, is nevertheless without right or welcome.

"Far from their *inroads* in my pastures feed
The lowing heifer, and the pampered steed."
TICKELL, *Iliad*.

"The universal good-will which is so strong in him exposes him to the assaults of every *invader* upon his time, his conversation, and his property."—*Tatler*.

"So Greece to combat shall in safety go,
Nor fear the fierce *incursions* of the foe."
POPE, *Homer*.

"Letters had there been happily profest in very ancient time with frequency of scholars, until *irruptions* of pagans had brought them to this lately restored deficiency."—DRAYTON.

"The Pope would not desire any violation of the immunities of the realm, or to bring those into public contention which had been hitherto enjoyed without *intrusion* or molestation."—BURNET.

INSCRUTABLE. UNSEARCHABLE. IMPENETRABLE.

INSCRUTABLE (Lat. *inscrūtābilis*) relates to that particular form of the unsearchable which baffles intrinsic inquiry, and so denotes what cannot be comprehended by reason of the

mystery and complexity which belong to it.

UNSEARCHABLE relates to what cannot be explored by reason of its intrinsic depth or distance. Hence INSCRUTABLE is applicable to things of ordinary kinds, but of extraordinary difficulty; as, "inscrutable designs:" unsearchable, to extraordinary things; as, the "unsearchable attributes of God."

IMPENETRABLE (Lat. *impĕnĕtrābĭlis; pĕnĕtrāre, to penetrate*) stands to INSCRUTABLE as the more specific to the more generic. INSCRUTABLE denotes the nature of the thing; IMPENETRABLE may apply also to what is made inscrutable. The decrees of God are inscrutable; the designs of a subtle diplomatist may be impenetrable by the disguise in which he clothes his ideas. INSCRUTABLE belongs to the whole; IMPENETRABLE also to the parts in detail.

"'Tis not in man
To yield a reason for the will of Heaven,
Which is *inscrutable*."
BEAUMONT *and* FLETCHER.

"He who without warrant but his own fantastic surmise takes upon him perpetually to unfold the secret and *unsearchable* mysteries of high Providence, is likely for the most part to mistake and slander them."—MILTON.

"Nothing almost escaped that he acheved not, were the thing never so difficyle, or (as who sayth) *impenetrable*."—SIR T. ELYOT.

INSIDE. INTERIOR.

These terms differ in dignity. Anything which has an outside may have an inside. But, as the *exterior* is a graver word than *outside*, so is INTERIOR than INSIDE. The interior of St. Paul's Cathedral conveys a different impression from the inside; the latter is simply that which is not the outside or the neighbouring street; the former is architecturally correlative to the exterior. In the same way, in speaking of insignificant objects, we use the term INSIDE; as the inside, not the interior, of a glove, or a shoe.

INSIDIOUS. TREACHEROUS.

An enemy is INSIDIOUS (Lat. *insĭdiōsus, artful*). A friend is TREACHEROUS (*see* FAITHLESS). The insidious man carries on a system of deceptive treatment under the mask of indifference. The treacherous man betrays all at once the friendship or confidence which has been reposed in him. In their metaphorical meanings, this distinction is sustained. A treacherous climate is one which, under the appearance of cloudless skies and warmth, harbours fever or other disease, which may at any time take sudden effect. An insidious disease is one of which the virulence and certain progress are marked by the absence of pain, and the slow degrees by which it develops itself.

"The upright man hath little of the serpent, none of its lurking *insidiousness*."—BARROW.

"The world must think him in the wrong,
Would say he made a *treach'rous* use
Of wit, to flatter and seduce." SWIFT.

INSIGHT. INSPECTION.

INSIGHT is for one's self. INSPECTION (Lat. *inspectionem; inspĭcĕre, to look into*) is for some purpose external to one's self directly connected with the object inspected. Insight extends knowledge or experience. Inspection is for the sake of assurance or amendment. Insight is quick, and may be instantaneous; inspection is careful and gradual. Insight is connected with the understanding; inspection more simply with the bodily vision.

"Angels, both good and bad, have a full *insight* into the activity and force of natural causes."—SOUTH

"The embroilment in his father's affairs could never have happened if the affairs of that kingdom had been under a more equal *inspection*."—BURNET.

INSINUATE. SUGGEST.

One INSINUATES (Lat. *insĭnuare, to put into the bosom*) finely and with address; one SUGGESTS (Lat. *suggĕrĕre*, part. *suggestus*) by influence and design. In order to insinuate one must manage the time, the occasion, the air and manner of saying the thing. To suggest, one must have gained some sort of influence over the minds of persons. One covers skilfully what one insinuates, one gives force to what one suggests. The subject of an insinuation is commonly an opinion; that of suggestion an act or course of action, though we may

also suggest openly and in matters of opinion also; as, to suggest an explanation for a difficulty. There is both in insinuation and in suggestion, a limited statement which is left to be enforced, expanded, or applied by the understanding of the person addressed. Insinuation is of a personal character, having to do with men's characters, motives, and actions; suggestion may be on any matter. The moral cowardice which shrinks from the responsibility of an outspoken declaration, leads persons to insinuate. The modesty which distrusts its own judgment, or which is slow to dictate to others, leads them to suggest.

INSIST. PERSIST.

INSIST (Lat. *insistĕre, to persevere, to urge*) and PERSIST (*persistĕre, to continue steadfastly*) both denote determined continuance in speech or action against some amount of opposition, which is overcome in the former case by determination and energy of will; in the latter by perseverance and patience. We insist as against others. We persist in what exclusively relates to ourselves. "He persisted in that course." "He insisted on his friend's adopting it." INSIST implies some alleged right, as authority or claim. PERSIST may be from obstinacy alone, and either with or against rights.

"I urged you further; then you scratched
your head,
And too impatiently stamped with your
foot;
Yet I *insisted;* yet you answered not,
But, with an angry wafter of your hand,
Gave sign for me to leave you."
SHAKESPEARE.

"I, on the other side,
Us'd no ambition to commend my deeds:
The deeds themselves, though mute, spoke
loud the doer.
But they *persisted* deaf, and would not
seem
To count them things worth notice."
MILTON.

INSTINCTIVE. INTUITIVE.

That is INSTINCTIVE (Lat. *instinguĕre*, part. *instinctus, to instigate, impel*) which we are led to feel or to do by the involuntary and unreasoning prompting of nature; instinct being, according to Paley's well-known definition, "A propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction."

That is INTUITIVE (Lat. *intuēri, to look on*, part. *intŭĭtus*) which is the action or result of knowledge, independent of reasoning or instruction. The instinctive regards feeling and action, whether bodily or mental, the intuitive regards perception. Generally speaking, I do a thing instinctively, and understand it intuitively.

INSTITUTE. INSTITUTION.

To INSTITUTE (Lat. *institŭĕre*, part. *institūtus*) is to set up, to cause to stand, to establish. That which is publicly established with authority is an institution. But the word INSTITUTION has the particular meaning of an established, organized society. INSTITUTE (setting aside its meaning of authoritatively recognized precepts or principles of jurisprudence) is similarly employed. The difference seems to be that INSTITUTION being an old word in English, and INSTITUTE in this sense being an adoption of the French *Institut*, which is a literary and philosophical society, the term INSTITUTE is restricted to this use. So among other institutions in large towns, literary, charitable, or commercial, we observe generally in these days a mechanics' institute.

INSTRUMENT. IMPLEMENT. TOOL.

INSTRUMENT (Lat. *instrūmentum, instruĕre, to furnish*) is used in more than reference to physical manipulation. We speak of agricultural and surgical, but also of mathematical instruments. Anything which is employed to do a work or effect an end is an instrument, as a musical instrument.

IMPLEMENT (Lat. *implēmentum*, in a late sense of *a fulfilling, implēre, to fill up*) is always restricted to physical use.

TOOL (A. S. *tól*) is a simpler word for an instrument of the manual arts, and differs from IMPLEMENT in being more general or less specific. An implement is a tool regarded in reference to its particular purpose. In the metaphorical application, INSTRU-

MENT is capable of an honourable or indifferent, as well as dishonourable, TOOL only of a dishonourable, sense. "The tool of a party." "An instrument in the hands of God." "An instrument in bringing about a peace between the two nations." The character of a tool is simplicity, of an implement technical adaptation, of an instrument scientific ingenuity and effectiveness. One speaks of the tools of a carpenter, of the implements of husbandry, of the instruments of the astronomer. The implement goes to perform a work with which it comes into physical contact, the instrument is a scientific invention for multiplying and enhancing the faculties and powers of men.

"The bold are but the *instruments* of the wise." DRYDEN.

"Dilated and infuriate, shall send forth
From far with thund'ring noise among our foes
Such *implements* of mischief as shall dash
To pieces and o'erwhelm whatever stands
Adverse." MILTON.

INSULT. AFFRONT. OUTRAGE. INDIGNITY.

AN INSULT (Lat. *insultāre, to leap upon*) is never accompanied by violence, as at present used—this sense being reserved for *assault* (Lat. *assilīre, to leap upon*, sup. *assultum*) another compound of the same verb—but consists in words or actions of an offensive and derogatory kind.

AFFRONT (O. Fr. *afronter*, Lat. *ad frontem, to the forehead or front*) is a marked intentional, if not public, breach of politeness. It lies more in manner than in words, and may be unaccompanied by words. It is more demonstrative and less bitter than insult.

OUTRAGE (Fr. *outrage*) is gross and violent insult and indignity, or overbearing or cruel violation of the feelings or the person.

INDIGNITY (Lat. *indignĭtatem, unworthiness, baseness*) can only be practised upon persons claiming or entitled to high respect; the force of it depending on the contrast between the worth or station of the person, and the treatment to which he is subjected.

"The defender of religion should not imitate the *insulter* of it in his modes of disputation, which may be comprised in sophistry, buffoonery, and scurrility."—WARBURTON.

"If thy brother or thy neighbour have offered thee an injury or an *affront*, forgive him."—CHILLINGWORTH.

As INDIGNITY implies superiority in the object of it, so AFFRONT implies equality; while INSULT may be to the strong or the weak, to superiors, equals, or inferiors. The weakness and modesty of women are said to be insulted or outraged, not affronted. An affront is a manifestation of reproach or contempt in the face of another. It wounds, and is intended to wound, those who are sensitive to their honour. An insult is an insolent attack. It is more easy to imagine an affront where none was intended than an insult. There never can be a justification of insult. Affront is passive in its character, insult and outrage active. Good men never insult, but it would be better to affront another or run the risk of doing so, than to appear to sympathize with him in what is disgraceful. AFFRONT does not exclude politeness, INSULT does.

"This is the round of a passionate man's life: he contracts debts when he is furious, which his virtue, if he has virtue, obliges him to discharge at the return of reason. He spends his time in *outrage* and reparation."—JOHNSON.

"The Spaniards took it as the greatest *indignity* in the world that Holland should pretend to oblige the crown of Spain to accept the very conditions of France."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

INSUPERABLE. INSURMOUNTABLE. INVINCIBLE. UNCONQUERABLE.

Mental barriers are commonly said to be INSUPERABLE (Lat. *insuperabilis; in-, not*, and *sŭpĕrare, to get over*); such are difficulties, obstacles, or objections. That is said to be insuperable which the person has not the power of overcoming; as that is INSURMOUNTABLE (*in-, not, and surmountable*, Fr. *surmonter, to surmount*) which does not admit of sufficient external appliances; so, an insuperable aversion, an insurmountable objection.

INVINCIBLE (Lat. *invincĭbilis*) is em-

ployed to denote that which power cannot overcome; as, invincible ignorance, the Invincible Armada.

UNCONQUERABLE (Lat. *conquīrĕre*, in a late sense of *to conquer*), denotes what cannot be overcome by the particular power of reason or persuasion, and is accordingly applied usually to the resistance which proceeds from antagonistic feeling; as, unconquerable prejudice, aversion, and the like.

"Many who toil through the intricacy of complicated systems are *insuperably* embarrassed with the least perplexity in common affairs."—*Rambler*.

"Doubtless they saw in the attempt (to convert the people beyond the Rhine) *insurmountable* difficulties, either from the diversity of language, or the ferocity of these nations so remote from Christian mildness."—JORTIN.

"The *invincibleness* of general custom."—WILKINS.

"All is not lost; the *unconquerable* will
And study of revenge, immortal hate,
And courage never to submit or yield,
And what is else not to be overcome."
MILTON.

INSURRECTION. SEDITION. REBELLION. REVOLT. REVOLUTION. MUTINY. DEFECTION. RIOT.

An INSURRECTION (Lat. *insurrectionem, insurgĕre*, sup. *insurrectum, to rise up*) is a rising up of individuals against the laws of a community or state or the authority of the government. This may or may not be carried out into fighting or active opposition, the mere taking up arms against the State being sufficient to constitute insurrection.

SEDITION is, literally, a separation of the people (Lat. *sēdītiōnem; se-, apart*, and *itionem, a going*). It is such a commotion in the State as manifests public discontent, without aiming at violent opposition to the laws. It is generally the work of turbulent and audacious spirits.

REBELLION (Lat. *rĕbellionem*) is from the Latin *re-, again*, and *bellum, war*. The term was applied by the Romans, not to risings at home, but abroad, among those conquered nations who, in seeking to cast off the Roman power, involved the State in a *new* war. It is employed by us in the sense of a rising of the whole or the great majority of a people against the supreme ruler or government, being an extended insurrection or revolt.

REVOLT (Fr. *révolte*), is an attempt to shake off one ruler or form of government, for the purpose of substituting another. This may not have come to overt acts of violence. A parliament may be in a state of revolt from the supreme ruler without using more than meetings and proclamations. It may be well to dwell a little on the specific differences between Rebellion and Revolt. Rebellion is an outbreak of disobedience and indignation. The rebel rises up against the authority that presses upon him. The Revolter turns against the society to which he was attached. The object of the former is to escape from the power that dominates over him, that of the latter, to overthrow and destroy the power and the laws which he has recognized. A successful rebellion ends in a revolt, a permanent revolt in a revolution. Rebellion and revolt are states of war, revolution is a state of peace, though on a new footing. REVOLT is commonly employed of important matters, REBELLION sometimes of things less important. Hence REBELLION is more easily applicable to individuals and individual acts than REVOLT. REVOLUTION, which is of the same derivation, is such a radical change in the political organization as supposes a revolt successfully carried out.

MUTINY (Fr. *meute*, Lat. *mŏta, a troop raised for some expedition*, became = *émeute*, whence, adj. *mutin*, BRACHET) is a movement of revolt against minor institutions or against military or naval authorities or commanders, as the mutiny of a regiment or a ship's crew. Insurrection, rebellion, and revolt, may be universal or partial. Sedition and mutiny are always partial. Revolution always universal.

"Our people here at home, grown discontent
Through great exactions, *insurrections* breed."
DANIEL.

"*Sedition* is of the like tendency with treason, but without the overt acts that are essential to the latter."—BRANDE.

"For *rebellion* being an opposition, not to persons but to authority, which is founded only in the constitution and laws of the government, those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels."—LOCKE.

"Our discontented counties do *revolt*."
SHAKESPEARE.

REVOLT is not commonly employed of individuals, but of communities which form part of a more extended jurisdiction, as the "revolted provinces."

"The violence of *revolutions* is generally proportioned to the degree of the maladministration which has produced them."—MACAULAY.

"In every *mutiny* against the discipline of the college he was the ringleader."—*Ibid.*

DEFECTION differs from the above in having not an active but a negative force. Defection (Lat. *dĕfectionem*) is the failure in duty, obligation, allegiance, to that to which one ought to be attached or has attached one's self. It springs from abated force of principle, as estrangement of feeling. Insurrection, sedition, and mutiny are external acts. Revolt, rebellion, revolution, and defection are expressive also of acts or states of mind.

"There were fewer instances then of leaving one sect for another than now we have of *defection* to Popery, or of apostasy to Mahometism."—BENTLEY.

RIOT (O. Fr. *riote*, and *riot*, LITTRÉ) the doing of anything in a turbulent or violent way against the peace, and by three or more persons assembled for the purpose. Such is its legal definition. In common parlance any uproar or noisy and tumultuous conduct in one or more may be called a riot.

"His headstrong *riot* hath no curb."
SHAKESPEARE.

INTELLECT. INTELLIGENCE. UNDERSTANDING. REASON.

INTELLECT (Lat. *intellectus, intellĭgĕre, to understand*) is, in the strict scientific view, that part of the human soul by which it knows, as distinguished from those by which it feels or wills. It is employed in the further sense of the capacity for higher forms of knowledge, as distinguished from the faculties of perception and imagination; the faculty of seeing the relations of objects, involving comprehension and judgment. The former identity of INTELLECT and INTELLIGENCE has been of late years dissolved (omitting its meaning of INFORMATION, as contained in the newspapers), and INTELLIGENCE now means a good quality of the understanding, a readiness to comprehend things of ordinary occurrence, which may be quickened by practice and experience; while INTELLECT is confined to the mental powers and their capacity in the abstract. UNDERSTANDING is the Saxon expression for the Latin INTELLECT and INTELLIGENCE. Its characteristic seems to flow from this fact. It is a native word, and so applied in a more colloquial way, and to the things of life in their more familiar and practical aspects. Hence such phrases of frequent occurrence, as "A sound practical understanding." "I understand it sufficiently for practical purposes."

"The word *intellect* can be of no essential use whatever, if the ambiguity in the signification of the good old English word *understanding* be avoided; and as to *intellection*, which a late very accurate writer has attempted to introduce, I can see no advantage attending it."—STEWART.

"In affirming that the universe proceeds from chance, it would appear that atheists mean either that it has no cause at all, or that its cause did not act *intelligently* or with design in the production of it."—BEATTIE.

REASON (Fr. *raison*, Lat. *rătionem*) is used in manifold senses. As a synonym here it may be defined as that faculty or capacity of the human mind by which it is distinguished from the inferior animals; and again, as being different from the lower powers of cognition, such as sense, imagination, and memory, and as separate from the feelings and desires. The reason is distinguished from the understanding, when the latter is made to include conception, judgment, and reasoning. It is then that faculty by which man perceives first truths intuitively as being beyond the reach of explanation or what logicians term Discourse.

"The sense perceives, the understanding in its own peculiar operation conceives, the *reason*, as rationalized understanding comprehends."—COLERIDGE.

INTELLECTUAL. MENTAL.

MENTAL (Fr. *mental*, Lat. *mentem, the mind*) is simply belonging to the mind as distinct from the body; INTELLECTUAL (*see* INTELLECT) to the powers, attributes, and dignity of mind, as distinguished from sense or matter. "The conversation turned on mental subjects," would mean metaphysics; on intellectual subjects, might mean any branch of high knowledge or education.

"In order to the actual intellection of any object, there is a spiritual *intellectual* light necessary to enable the object to move or affect the intellective faculty."—SOUTH.

"A strong expression of *mental* energy."—STEWART.

INTENSE. EXTREME.

EXTREME (Lat. *extrēmus*) qualifies the last degree of measurement, INTENSE (Lat. *intendĕre, to stretch*, part. *intentus* and *-sus*) a high degree of force. That which is extreme is beyond what is common, that which is intense is strained or exercised beyond what is common. Extreme pain is very *great* pain, intense pain is very *violent* pain. Extreme heat is registered by the thermometer, intense heat makes itself felt.

INTERCEDE. INTERPOSE. MEDIATE. INTERFERE. INTERMEDDLE.

To INTERCEDE (Lat. *intercēdĕre, to go between*) is of words; to INTERPOSE (Fr. *interposer*) is of action. We intercede with a superior on behalf of an equal or inferior; we interpose between equals. In interposition we exercise our own power or authority; in intercession we endeavour to enlist on our behalf the power or authority of another.

MEDIATE (Lat. *mĕdiare, to be in the middle*) is to interpose between two parties, as the equal friend of each, with influence recognized by each.

INTERFERE (O. Fr. *entre-ferir, to exchange blows*, Lat. *fĕrire, to strike*) and INTERMEDDLE are applicable to any pre-existent or appointed course of things, whether matters of personal conduct or not; as, to interfere in a dispute; to interfere with arrangements; or one arrangement may interfere with another. INTERFERE implies the exercise of influence, personal power, or authority, for the purpose, or with the effect of altering or modifying some established course. INTERMEDDLE is only employed of the interference of one conscious agent with the affairs of others in an obtrusive way, and without any recognized right, but of self-will.

"Moses *interceded* for transgressors, and caused an atonement to be made for them, and stopped the wrath of God: so did Christ."—JORTIN.

"Those who in quarrels *interpose*,
Must often wipe a bloody nose."
GAY.

"And thereupon was Warwick (by whose cast
All must be wrought) employed to *mediate*
A present marriage, to be had between
Him and the sister of the young French queen." DANIEL.

"In truth, it is not the *interfering* or keeping aloof, but iniquitous *intermeddling* or treacherous inaction which is praised or blamed by the decision of an equitable judge."—BURKE.

INTERCOURSE. CONNEXION. COMMUNICATION. COMMUNION. DEALING.

INTERCOURSE (Lat. *intercursus*, in a late sense, whence Fr. *entrecours*) subsists only between persons, CONNEXION (Lat. *connexionem, a binding together*), and COMMUNICATION (Lat. *communĭcātionem, an imparting*) between both things and persons. INTERCOURSE is a very wide term, comprehending every kind of reciprocal action and dealing between persons and communities, or nations, in matters of business, thought, words, or feelings, from matters of the gravest to the most ordinary character. Connexion is permanent, as communication is temporary, intercourse; the former involving an unity and community of purpose or dealing; the latter a more casual interchange of words and thoughts in the common affairs of life.

COMMUNION (Lat. *communionem, participation in common*) which lies less in externals than COMMUNICATION, is among many, being such interchange of offices as flows from a bond of unity in sentiment, feeling, or conviction.

Communication is from one to another; communion is reciprocal.

DEALING (A. S. *dǽlan, to divide*) is entirely confined to external transactions, being inapplicable to matters of the mind and feeling.

> "This sweet *intercourse*
> Of looks and smiles."
>
> MILTON.

"The eternal and inseparable *connection* between virtue and happiness."—ATTERBURY.

"Cardinal Wolsey in his ambassage into France, commanded his servants to use no French, but mere English to the French in all *communications* whatsoever."—CAMDEN.

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INTEREST. CONCERN.

CONCERN (Lat. *concernĕre, to mix together*, whence Fr. *concerner*) is grave interest. As INTEREST (Lat. *intĕresse, to be of importance*) may flow from what touches our feelings, so concern belongs to what is of practical importance to our circumstances and state. So grave is the character of CONCERN (while we may be interested even in trifles), that the term is sometimes employed to express the extreme of compassion and even sorrow. There is a distinct and objective use of the term INTEREST, in which it is synonymous, not with concern, but with advantage.

INTERLOPER. INTRUDER.

The INTERLOPER was one who ran in between the legal trader and his trade, for the purpose of appropriating its profits and advantages. We owe the term to the Dutch (Dut. *looper, a runner*, cf. Eng. *leap*) and to the period when they monopolized the carrying trade of the world. As at present employed, the word retains this force.

The INTRUDER (Lat. *intrūdĕre, to thrust in*) is one who pushes himself into a place or a society in an unwelcome manner; the interloper is an intruder with the further design of benefiting himself by the intrusion, which he seeks to establish for a continuance; while the intruder may possibly offend only once or momentarily.

"They see plainly, whatever privileges are allowed your company at Dort will be given by the other towns, either openly or covertly, to all those *interlopers* who bring their woollen manufacture directly thither."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

"An *intruder* upon their retreat, and a disturber of their repose."—*Rambler*.

INTERMEDIATE. INTERVENING.

These differ as being in the middle differs from coming into the middle. INTERMEDIATE (Lat. *intermĕdius*) time, space, points;

INTERVENING occurrences (Lat. *intervĕnire, to come between*). The intermediate is calculated and fixed; the intervening is accidental and often unforeseen. There is, however, a sense in which INCONVENIENT stands to INTERMEDIATE as the observation of a fact to the fact itself. When the intermediate is discerned in the course of observation it is intervenient, or accruing in the course of time.

"He saw also the *intermediate* joys of paradise, wherewith the souls of the faithful are refreshed until the resurrection."—BISHOP BULL.

"But a law is then properly dispensed with when it is capable of being obeyed, and the person capable of yielding such obedience to it is yet, by an *intervenient* power, discharged from his obligation to obey."—SOUTH.

INTERMISSION. INTERRUPTION. CESSATION.

CESSATION (Lat. *cessāre, to cease*) is final. INTERMISSION and INTERRUPTION are not final, inasmuch as they denote rest intermediate between two movements. The one denotes extinct, the others suspended motion. INTERMISSION (Lat. *intermittĕre, to disconnect*) is internal; interruption external. Intermission is temporary cessation (or cessation at intervals) regarded in itself, or as self-produced; INTERRUPTION (Lat. *interrumpere, to break apart*)

is the same thing as produced by external force or influence. It may be observed that INTERMISSION denotes complete cessation, while INTERRUPTION may denote no more than such check as produces an alteration of proceeding. The stream which is interrupted by a rock still flows on. An intermission of a supply of water implies, for the time, a cessation of the flow. An interruption of a speech would denote that it was still pursued, though the uniformity of its delivery had been interfered with.

"Scourge after scourge, and blows succeeding blows;
Lord, has Thy hand no mercy, and our woes
No *intermission?*" HARTE.

"The parliaments and two or three high-spirited kings had given some *interruption* to the cruel exactions."—BURNET.

"The general eclipse and *cessation* of oracles."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch.*

INTERVAL. INTERSTICE. INTERSECTION. INTERSPACE.

INTERVAL (Lat. *intervallum*) is a void space intervening between any two objects, as points of time, or such abstract difference as is analogous to this; as, *e.g.*, to be second to another in some matter of proficiency, but at a great interval.

An INTERSTICE (Lat. *interstĭtium*) is an interval between things closely set, especially the parts which compose an otherwise continuous body or surface.

INTERSPACE (Lat. *inter* and *spătium*) is the space comprised by intersecting lines.

INTERVENTION. INTERPOSITION.

These differ as the involuntary from the voluntary. INTERVENTION (Lat. *intervĕnīre, to come between*) being employed of accidental forces and influences, as well as the acts of voluntary agents, INTERPOSITION (Lat. *interpōnĕre, to place between*) only of the latter. The moon is obscured by the intervention of clouds; a happy intervention of circumstances. Human or Divine interposition. An exception to this, however, occurs in the purely physical sense, in which INTERPOSITION is sometimes used, as the privation of the sun's light by the interposition of an opaque body. In that case, the difference between the terms is that one implies previous motion, the other not. Every planetary obscuration is an interposition, implying intervention. In the acts of men, the motive of intervention is commonly less authoritative or forcible than interposition. "He owed his life to the intervention of another," would mean, entreaty or help; interposition would involve rescue.

"The species not only of sensible objects, but even of notions of the mind, are preserved in the memory, without confusion and dissipation, notwithstanding lapse of time and *intervention* of infinite variety of numbers."—HALE.

"The righteous would be detained prisoners here below by the chains of their unhappy natures, were there not some extraordinary *interposure* for their rescue and enlargement."—GLANVILL.

INTERVIEW. MEETING.

MEETING (A. S. *métan, to meet with, obtain*) is the simpler and more comprehensive, but less distinctive of these terms. It may serve to express any coming together of physical or inanimate, as well as animate objects or voluntary agents; as the meeting of the waters, of clouds, of friends, of an assembly or conference. It may be designed or accidental.

An INTERVIEW (Fr. *entrevue*, formerly *entreveu*) is, as its name denotes a mutually-recognized meeting between two or more persons, usually preconcerted, and for a purpose already known. It involves a common matter of importance to both parties, which demands formal adjustment.

"Stay, stay your steps, and listen to my vows;
'Tis the last *interview* that fate allows."
DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

"We can just as easily conceive the connection and mutual influence of soul and body; as we can explain how two mathematical lines indefinitely produced can be for ever approaching each other, yet never *meet.*"—BISHOP PORTEUS.

INTRODUCE. INSERT. PRESENT.

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INTERVENING occurrences (Lat. *intervĕnire, to come between*). The intermediate is calculated and fixed; the intervening is accidental and often unforeseen. There is, however, a sense in which INCONVENIENT stands to INTERMEDIATE as the observation of a fact to the fact itself. When the intermediate is discerned in the course of observation it is intervenient, or accruing in the course of time.

"He saw also the *intermediate* joys of paradise, wherewith the souls of the faithful are refreshed until the resurrection."—BISHOP BULL.

"But a law is then properly dispensed with when it is capable of being obeyed, and the person capable of yielding such obedience to it is yet, by an *intervenient* power, discharged from his obligation to obey."—SOUTH.

INTERMISSION. INTERRUPTION. CESSATION.

CESSATION (Lat. *cessāre, to cease*) is final. INTERMISSION and INTERRUPTION are not final, inasmuch as they denote rest intermediate between two movements. The one denotes extinct, the others suspended motion. INTERMISSION (Lat. *intermittĕre, to disconnect*) is internal; interruption external. Intermission is temporary cessation (or cessation at intervals) regarded in itself, or as self-produced; INTERRUPTION (Lat. *interrumpere, to break apart*)

is the same thing as produced by external force or influence. It may be observed that INTERMISSION denotes complete cessation, while INTERRUPTION may denote no more than such check as produces an alteration of proceeding. The stream which is interrupted by a rock still flows on. An intermission of a supply of water implies, for the time, a cessation of the flow. An interruption of a speech would denote that it was still pursued, though the uniformity of its delivery had been interfered with.

"Scourge after scourge, and blows succeeding blows;
Lord, has Thy hand no mercy, and our woes
No *intermission?*" HARTE.

"The parliaments and two or three high-spirited kings had given some *interruption* to the cruel exactions."—BURNET.

"The general eclipse and *cessation* of oracles."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch.*

INTERVAL. INTERSTICE. INTERSECTION. INTERSPACE.

INTERVAL (Lat. *intervallum*) is a void space intervening between any two objects, as points of time, or such abstract difference as is analogous to this; as, *e.g.*, to be second to another in some matter of proficiency, but at a great interval.

An INTERSTICE (Lat. *interstĭtium*) is an interval between things closely set, especially the parts which compose an otherwise continuous body or surface.

INTERSPACE (Lat. *inter* and *spătium*) is the space comprised by intersecting lines.

INTERVENTION. INTERPOSITION.

These differ as the involuntary from the voluntary. INTERVENTION (Lat. *intervĕnire, to come between*) being employed of accidental forces and influences, as well as the acts of voluntary agents, INTERPOSITION (Lat. *interpōnĕre, to place between*) only of the latter. The moon is obscured by the intervention of clouds; a happy intervention of circumstances. Human or Divine interposition. An exception to this, however, occurs in the purely physical sense, in which INTERPOSITION is sometimes used, as the privation of the sun's light by the interposition of an opaque body. In that case, the difference between the terms is that one implies previous motion, the other not. Every planetary obscuration is an interposition, implying intervention. In the acts of men, the motive of intervention is commonly less authoritative or forcible than interposition. "He owed his life to the intervention of another," would mean, entreaty or help; interposition would involve rescue.

"The species not only of sensible objects, but even of notions of the mind, are preserved in the memory, without confusion and dissipation, notwithstanding lapse of time and *intervention* of infinite variety of numbers."—HALE.

"The righteous would be detained prisoners here below by the chains of their unhappy natures, were there not some extraordinary *interposure* for their rescue and enlargement."—GLANVILL.

INTERVIEW. MEETING.

MEETING (A. S. *métan, to meet with, obtain*) is the simpler and more comprehensive, but less distinctive of these terms. It may serve to express any coming together of physical or inanimate, as well as animate objects or voluntary agents; as the meeting of the waters, of clouds, of friends, of an assembly or conference. It may be designed or accidental.

An INTERVIEW (Fr. *entrevue*, formerly *entreveu*) is, as its name denotes a mutually-recognized meeting between two or more persons, usually preconcerted, and for a purpose already known. It involves a common matter of importance to both parties, which demands formal adjustment.

"Stay, stay your steps, and listen to my vows;
'Tis the last *interview* that fate allows."
DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

"We can just as easily conceive the connection and mutual influence of soul and body, as we can explain how two mathematical lines indefinitely produced can be for ever approaching each other, yet never *meet.*"—BISHOP PORTEUS.

INTRODUCE. INSERT. PRESENT.

INTRODUCE (Lat. *intrōdūcĕre, to lead within*) has its physical and its moral

irresolute doubts as to what he *shall do*, the undecided as to what he *ought to do*. In irresolution the feeling is not affected towards an object powerfully enough to prefer it. In indecision the mind does not see in any object motives powerfully enough to fix its choice. The soul that is feeble, timid, pusillanimous, indolent, unenergetic, will be irresolute. The mind which is timid, sluggish, light, without understanding and without sagacity will be undecided. The irresolute man must be prompted, urged, incited, the undecided man must be enlightened, instructed, persuaded, convinced.

IRRITABLE. IRASCIBLE.

The former (Lat. *irrĭtare*) is used of substances as well as sentient beings, the latter (Lat. *īrasci, to be angry*) only of sentient beings. Parts of the human frame are rendered irritable by disease or injury. The idea is that of an extreme and morbid susceptibility. The merest trifle affects the irritable man. The irascible man is quick to anger. The irritable man does not allow vent to his feelings. Reserved and timid persons are often irritable. The irascible man breaks out. The irritable man is of extreme sensibility and suffers continually from this peculiarity of temperament, and is an object of compassion. The irascible man flies off without cause, and is rather an object of fear. The irritable man is to be managed by sympathy, the irascible by prudence.

ISSUE. EMERGE.

ISSUE (Fr. *issu*, part of *issir, to go out*, Lat. *exīre*), in the purely physical sense, denotes the coming forth of one body out of another which comprised it, and had some close relationship to it, even if it were not so close as that of cause and effect; while EMERGE (Lat. *ēmergĕre*) denotes no more than the becoming visible by coming out of that which before had the effect of concealing, or in which the object had been plunged and enveloped. "Horsemen issued from the wood," would convey the idea of their having been previously stationed there; that they emerged, would mean, that they were seen to come out of it. ISSUE is as often the result of mechanical force exercised on inanimate things; as the stream issued from the rock. EMERGE is more appropriate to the movements of voluntary agents. In the secondary or analogous applications of these words, ISSUE denotes the existence of cause and effect; EMERGE, that of antecedent and consequent.

"From this Eternal Fountain of all truth and of all good gifts, there *issues* light which lighteth every one that cometh into the world."—JORTIN.

"At the very moment when some of them seemed plunged in unfathomable abysses of disgrace and disaster, they have suddenly *emerged*."—BURKE.

J.

JADE. WEARY. TIRE. HARASS. FATIGUE.

JADE (North Eng. form, *yaud, a sorry horse*, has suggested a connexion with A. S. *eode*, i.e. *goes, or gone;* as if a wearied-out animal, but?) denotes the superinducement of weariness by forced repetition of the same act or effort; a sensation of physical weariness to little profit of work done.

To WEARY (A. S. *wérig*) denotes the wearing effect of mental or bodily exertion, which is accompanied with dissatisfaction and distate of the employment. Weariness is less than the former the result of specific exertion, and may follow from satiety; so that men may weary even of enjoyments.

TIRE (A. S. *terian, tirian, to vex, irritate*) has much the same force with WEARY, but commonly refers to more active causes and greater lassitude in consequence. It is the result of the difficult, the laborious, or the burdensome.

FATIGUE (Lat. *fătigāre, to weary*) relates to normal and systematic exertion, which has resulted in such a moderate effect as repose may correct.

HARASS (O. Fr. *harasser, to tire out*) combines with the idea of wearying

that of mental annoyance in care, importunities, perplexity. The weariness, however, is secondary. So that a person may be considerably harassed without being wearied or fatigued. An accumulation of petty efforts and instigations results in the feeling of being jaded.

"What thousands seek,
With dishes tortured from their native taste,
And mad variety, to spur beyond
Its wiser will, the *jaded* appetite!"
ARMSTRONG.

"Whether by fate, or missing of the way,
Or that she was by *weariness* detained."
SURREY, *Virgil.*

"Yet whatever degree of elegance he possesses, the natural monotony of French verse *tires* the ears accustomed to the various harmony of our English poet."—KNOX.

"Bankrupt nobility, a factious, giddy, and
Divided senate, a *harass'd* commonalty,
Is all the strength of Venice."
OTWAY.

"And so the conqueror, *fatigued* in war,
With hot pursuit of enemies afar,
Reclines to drink the torrent gliding by,
Then lifts his looks to repossess the sky."
PARNELL.

JANGLE. JAR. WRANGLE.

JANGLE (O. Fr. *jangler*) is a term formed to express the sound of confused talk, as of persons disputing with one another. It expresses the lighter discordance of feeling, and the state of persons who are out of humour with one another.

As JANGLE stands to *disputation* and contradiction, so does WRANGLE (Low Germ. *wrangen, to wrestle, to strive*; compare A. S. *wringan, to wring, to strain*) stand to *contention*; that is, it involves more of argument, and of a subject matter in which the disputants are contending for points in which they are *personally interested*.

JAR (a word formed perhaps to represent the sound, but see SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) denotes more than the mere sound or expression of disagreement, and includes discordant sentiment, feeling, purpose, and the like.

"There are those, I know, who will regard this praise, whatever it be, as injurious to the learned prelate rather than honourable to him; who will be ready to tell us that controversial *janglings* are out of date, that they never did any good, and are now at length fallen into general and just contempt."—HURD, *Life of Warburton.*

"Cease, cease such *jars*, and rest your minds in peace." SHAKESPEARE.

"I worship as my fathers did before me,
Unpractis'd in disputes and *wrangling* schools." ROWE.

JAUNT. EXCURSION. TOUR. TRIP. RAMBLE.

JAUNT (the same word as *Jaunce*, O. Fr. *jancer, to play tricks with a horse*; thus to "jaunt" is to play the fool, hence to ramble; SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) is a pleasant journey of a lively character, and so not commonly accompanied with the fatigue of walking, having no specific object or purpose beyond that of pleasurable locomotion.

An EXCURSION (Lat. *excursiōnem, a running forth*) is a trip for pleasure or health, commonly undertaken in company, and with a definite point or place in view.

TOUR (Fr. *tour, a turn*) is a systematic excursion, having for its object the visiting of certain places, or the observation of a particular district. The road of return is different from the setting out.

RAMBLE is a roving excursion taken at leisure, with no determinate object in view, and an expectation that matters of interest sufficient will present themselves in the course of the *roaming*—with which word (A.S. *ryman, to make room*) RAMBLE is perhaps connected.

A TRIP (Dut. *trippen*) is a short, active expedition to a particular place, undertaken with a view to a speedy return. The word JAUNT had of old a graver meaning, equivalent to a wearisome journey on foot. So Milton—

"Our Saviour meek, and with untroubled mind,
After his aery *jaunt*, though hurried sore,
Hungry, and cold, betook him to his rest."

The modern use of the term is illustrated by the following:—

"Then a fresh maggot takes them in the head,
To have one merry *jaunt* on shore;
They'd not be fettered up, they swore."
YALDEN.

"Of rest was Noah's dove bereft,
When with impatient wing she left
That safe retreat the ark.
Giving her vain *excursions* o'er,
The disappointed bird once more
Explored the sacred bark."
COTTON.

"He one day, attended by some of his officers, endeavoured to make the *tour* of the island."—ANSON'S *Voyages*.

"The little boat was obliged to make three *trips* before we could all get over to the rest of the party."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"We must not *ramble* in this field without discernment or choice, nor even with these must we *ramble* too long."—BOLINGBROKE.

JEER. SCOFF. GIBE. SNEER.

JEER (of uncertain origin) is personal, consisting of words addressed to an individual; which is also the case with GIBE (cf. Icel. *geib, idle talk*); but JEER conveys more of ridicule and contempt, GIBE of bitter scorn and ill-will.

SCOFF (O. N. *skaup, derision*) is to manifest contempt in any way, as by looks, gestures, or words. It relates not so much to the person as to the force of what he says or does.

SNEER (Low Ger. *snarren, to grumble*) is connected with the grimace of expression rather than with words. If employed, as it may be, of *spoken* contempt, sneering is covert and indirect, while scoff is open, insolent, and defiant.

"'Friend Tortoise,' quoth the *jeering* Hare,
'Your burthen's more than you can bear.
To help your speed it were as well
That I should ease you of your shell.'"
LLOYD.

"A Socrates himself in that loose age,
Was made the pastime of a *scoffing* stage."
DRYDEN.

"Shrewd fellows and arch wags, a tribe
That met for nothing but a *gibe*."
SWIFT.

"Who can refute a *sneer?*"—PALEY.

JEST. JOKE. SPORT.

As they relate to the display of the humorous, a JEST (orig. meaning a tale, *geste*; O. Fr. *geste*, Lat. *gesta, an exploit*) is for the sake of others; a JOKE (Lat. *jŏcus*) for one's own. Jokes spring more purely out of the imagination, and less from external circumstances, and are therefore commonly less personal and more harmless. JOKE indicates more of pure hilarity, wit, or humour; JEST more of ridicule and satire.

SPORT (an abridgment of *disport*, O. Fr. *se desporter, to carry one's self away from work to amusement*) relates to both persons and things, and denotes no more than that they are treated in a light, where they might have been treated in a graver, manner. Sport stands to jest as playfulness to ridicule.

"Let your *jests* fly at large; yet therewithal
See they be salt, but not yet mixed with gall."
DRAYTON.

"And joyous mirth
Engages our raised souls, pat repartee,
Or witty *joke*, our airy senses moves
To pleasant laughter."
GAY.

"And while the robes imbibe the solar ray,
O'er the green mead the *sporting* virgins play,
Their shining veils unbound."
POPE, *Homer*.

JOIN. UNITE.

To JOIN (Fr. *joigner*, Lat. *jungĕre*) is to put things into permanent contact.

To UNITE (Lat. *ūnīre*) is, as its etymology indicates, to join them in such fashion that they may be *one*. The objects joined or united may be of the same or of different natures. It would be impossible to define the point at which junction may become union; but practically it may be said that things firmly brought together are joined, inseparably brought together are united. This impossibility of separation may come either from the indissoluble force of the connexion, or from the fact that the individuality of the thing joined is lost. When two streams join they become united into one. We join persons when we employ them for a common purpose, we unite them when we make them one in their interests or feelings. Love and friendship unite persons, while they may join in social intercourse or the same undertaking. Many are joined in marriage who are not united in heart. Men unite in esteem; they may join in battle. That which is joined may be separated, though it be

needful to employ force. That which is united cannot be separated without being broken.

JOURNEY. Travel. Voyage.

These differ as the special from the general. Travel (Fr. *travail, pain*; cf. *arbeit, labour*, which in some parts of Germany means *to travel*) is locomotion from place.

Journey (Fr. *journée, a day, a day's work, or journey*) is the portion of travel performed on any one occasion. It is well enough known that Voyage (Fr. *voyage*, Lat. *viāticum, provision for a journey*; 2, *a journey*) is now restricted to travel by sea; but it may be remarked that this belongs to the usage, not the derivation of the word, the French *voyage* being used in the sense of journey. Travel is indefinite; journey definite, having its appointed destination. We journey *to* a country, and travel *in* it.

"We must all have the same *journey's* end, if we hope to get to heaven; but some may meet with a freer road, and a calmer season, and better company in their *journey* than others."—Stillingfleet.

"It was the well-known remark of the Emperor Charles V., who had *travelled* so frequently through both countries, that everything abounded in France, but that everything was wanting in Spain."—Smith, *Wealth of Nations*.

"I love a sea-*voyage* and a blust'ring tempest."
Beaumont and Fletcher.

JUDGE. Umpire. Arbiter. Arbitrator.

Judge (Fr. *juge*, Lat. *jūdicem*) is generic, denoting, in its widest sense, one who has knowledge sufficient to decide a question; and, in its more restricted sense one who is invested with authority to do so.

The Umpire (Fr. *non-pair, odd man*; the third party called in between other two) and Arbiter (Lat. *arbĭter, a judge*) are such, not by natural qualifications, but by specific appointment, and only in private matters. They pronounce a decision on their own personal responsibility, and are not required to give reasons or quote precedents. The umpire is commonly chosen for his skill and conversance with the subject-matter of the question; the arbitrator, for his good-temper and impartiality; the cases which come under the cognizance of the former being questions for adjudication in competition; of the latter, cases of dispute. Arbiter is the old term for what is now expressed by Arbitrator, but has risen to a loftier meaning—that of sovereign controller, or one whose power of governing and deciding is unlimited. An umpire may be called in where there is not agreement among arbitrators.

"And now by this their feast all being ended,
The *judges* which thereto selected were
Into the Martian field adown descended,
To deem this doubtful case for which they all contended." Spenser.

"If they (the arbitrators) do not agree, it is usual to add that another person be called in as *umpire* (imperator or impar), to whose sole judgment it is then referred."—Blackstone.

"It is a sign from Jove.
Now follows war, with all its woes again;
Or peace between us, by his fixed award;
For Jove is *arbiter* of both to man."
Cowper, *Iliad*.

"It happens well if the matter in question is not almost settled before the *arbitrator* is called into the debate."—Sterne.

JUDGMENT. Sense.

Sense (Lat. *sensus, sentire, to feel*) in the intellectual application of the term must by analogy be the same thing in the mind which Sense in the material application is in the body. It is the faculty of warning, knowing, distinguishing, discerning objects, their qualities, their relations; when the faculty connects, combines these relations, and pronounces on their existence, it is Judgment (Fr. *juge, a judge*, Lat. *jūdicāre, to judge*). Sense is the intelligence which takes cognizance of things; judgment is the reason which decides upon them, the verifying faculty which determines on the facts submitted to it by the sense. Sense and judgment are often and easily confounded; but sense is the perceptive reason, judgment is the determinative reason. Judgment is the practical development of sense. If the sense judges, it is not formally, but lightly and instinctively. Yet a

person of great sense is acting ever upon some degree of judgment. He sees so far, so deeply, and so well, he brings involuntarily so much reflexion to bear upon the matter, that in his case to see and to determine are the same thing. Good sense is the ground of solid judgment, but it is not sufficient to contribute or insure it. Men of very good sense are not always men of sound judgment, because they allow passion or prejudice, which does not deprive them of their sense, to corrupt their judgment. The integrity of a judge is not merely his clear-sightedness. He who has no sense is a beast. He who has no judgment is a fool. The man of sense has practical discernment. The man of judgment has profound discrimination. One listens to the former and consults the latter.

JUMP. Leap. Bound.

To Jump (Sw. *gumpa*) is to throw one's self off the ground in any direction, or to any height, however small, from a standing posture, alighting again on the feet.

To Leap (A. S. *hleâpan*) is the same movement, but for a considerable interval and without involving a return to one's footing, as to leap upon a horse. Curtius leaped, not jumped into the gulf in the Forum.

To Bound (Fr. *bondir*) is to move forward by a leap or a succession of leaps.

JUICE. Liquor. Liquid. Humour.

Juice (Fr. *jus*, Lat. *jus, broth*) is the moisture which is naturally furnished by bodies in greater or less quantity, and may be expressed from them, as in vegetables and fruits, and less commonly in animal bodies. Liquid is fluid which is not aeriform. Liquor is liquid in relation to artificial uses and treatment.

Humour (Lat. *hūmōrem, moisture*) is especially the moisture or fluid of animal bodies secreted in health or disease.

"If,so, yet still I can assure our safety;
For as you fear my softness of complexion,
I'll stain it with the *juice* of dusky leaves."
Mason.

"A fermented *liquor*, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is made of molasses, bears very little resemblance to our beer, makes a considerable part of the common drink of the people in America."—Smith, *Wealth of Nations*.

"In oil of aniseeds, which I drew both with and without fermentation, I observed the whole body of the oil in a cool place to thicken into the consistence and appearance of white butter, which with the least heat resumed its former *liquidness*."—Boyle.

"*Æmil.* Is he not jealous?
"*Desdemona.* Who? he? I think the sun where he was born
Drew all such *humours* from him."
Shakespeare.

JUST. Right.

Just has taken up the combined meanings of the Latin *justus* and the French *juste;* the latter meaning nicely coincident or fitting, as in the English verb to *adjust*. A just observation may be one which expresses justice or which bears a character of fitness. The contrary to the former would be an unjust, to the latter an irrelevant or inappropriate one.

That is Right (Lat. *rectus*) which goes straight to the point without deviation or error. That is right which is according to rule, that is just which is according to proportion. A right remark is relatively true, a just remark is well timed, opposite, and suitable. Taking the terms in their purely moral meaning, he does just who observes in his dealings what is relatively due to others, he does right who acts according to the direction of a true rule or law.

The French force of Just appears in the following:

"Many of the poets, to describe the execution which is done by the passion, represent the fair sex as basilisks which destroy with their eyes; but I think that Cowley has with greater *justness* of thought compared a beautiful woman to a porcupine that sends an arrow from every part."—*Spectator*.

"Hear then my argument, confess we must
A God there is supremely wise and *just*,
If so, however things affect our sight,
As sings our bard, whatever is is *right*."
Jenyns.

JUSTICE. Precision.

Justice is a safeguard against the

false, PRECISION against the superfluous and useless. Justness or justice of thought produces precision of expression.

K.

KEEPING. CUSTODY.

KEEPING (A. S. *cépan, to store up*) is simple and generic.

CUSTODY (Lat. *custōdia*) is a specific keeping, involving responsibility, and is for the sake of obviating escape in the case of persons, and loss in the case of inanimate objects; as the custody of prisoners or documents.

"In Baptista's *keep* my treasure is."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Tailor, take him to thy *custody*."
Ibid.

KILL. MURDER. SLAY. ASSASSINATE. SLAUGHTER.

To KILL is the broadest and simplest term (with some A. S. *cwellan, to kill:* SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*, gives Icel. *kella, to hit on the head, kollr*), meaning no more than to deprive of life, and is applied in the fullest sense of the term life, as the vegetative life of plants, which may be killed by frost. In the case of persons, the act may be the result of accident or self-defence, as well as in malice prepense.

To MURDER (Fr. *meurtre, murder*, Low Lat. *mordrum*) was anciently employed only of the *secret* killing of one human being by another, but now means the killing with malicious forethought and intention. To ASSASSINATE is to murder by secret, close, and sudden attack upon the person, who is generally one of importance. The nature of the deed flows from the origin of the word—*haschisch*, inebriating hemp by which the Assassins of the East, or followers of the Old Man of the Mountain, were incited to their work of stabbing crusaders and others. It is a deviation from the original sense to apply it to poisoning.

SLAY (A. S. *sleán, to strike, to kill*) is to kill with a weapon, or by violence, (not, for instance, by poison,) and in a sort of animal way, that is, with little thought but that of destroying animal life, whether in men or other animals. It is violent, but not necessarily illegal; as, to slay in battle. SLAUGHTER commonly denotes killing in a promiscuous way, or extensively. This is still the case, even when the butcher slaughters a single beast, the idea being that of supplying the meat market. KILL and SLAY, but not the others, are applicable to cases of suicide, though in composition we meet with the term self-murder.

"Thou shalt not *kill*."—DECALOGUE.

"The first great disturbance in the world after the fall of man was by a *murderer*, whom the vengeance of God pursued."—SOUTH.

"*Man.* Of ruin, indeed, methought I heard the noise.
Oh, it continues! they have *slain* my son!
Chorus. Thy son is rather *slaying* them; that outcry
From *slaughter* of one foe could not ascend.'
MILTON.

"He (Oliver Cromwell) said *assassinations* were such detestable things that he would never begin them; but if any of the king's party should endeavour to *assassinate* him, and fail in it, he would make an *assassinating* war of it, and destroy the whole family."—BURNET.

KINGLY. ROYAL. REGAL.

KINGLY means like a king; ROYAL (Fr. *roi*, Lat. *règem, a king*), belonging to the person of a king; REGAL, belonging to the attributes of a king. A kingly form; a royal residence; regal magnificence.

"He stands in daylight, and disdains to hide
An act to which by honour he is tied,
A generous, laudable, and *kingly* pride."
DRYDEN.

"And by descent from *royall* lynage came
Of ancient kinges and queenes."
SPENSER.

"Our adversaries sometimes tell us of a throne, a power of judging, a *regal* authority belonging to the Son, and that therefore he is God, and they observe, as they think shrewdly, but in truth very weakly, that the Holy Ghost has, therefore, none of that title as having no *regal* dominion."—WATERLAND.

KINSMAN. RELATIVE.

KINSMAN is one of the same kin, and so related by blood.

RELATIVE (Fr. *relatif*) is one connected either by blood or by affinity.

"By consent of the Britons, Hengist and Horsa sent for their two sons or near *kinsmen* to come over with a new army of Saxons by sea."—SIR W. TEMPLE.

"*Relative* has indeed, within my memory, by a ridiculous affectation of false and unfounded accuracy, crept into improper use to the exclusion of relation."—TOOKE.

KNAVISH. DISHONEST.

The latter simply states that the person is the opposite to honest, or that the act is so; the former (A. S. *cnafa*, cf. Ger. *knabe*, *a boy*, *a young man*) carries the mind directly to the person and his frauds and artifices. DISHONEST is a term of grave, KNAVISH of contemptuous, reproach. The former expresses a habit; the latter a propensity.

"Although his master had thoroughly thwacked him for his *knavish* tricks played a few days before, and that then it seemeth he had opportunity to be revenged, he to the contrary, employed himself after a marvellous fashion to save his master."—NORTH, *Plutarch*.

"One thing was very *dishonestly* insinuated, that the prisoner was a Papist, which was only to incense the jury against him, and it had its effect."—*State Trials*.

KNOWLEDGE. LEARNING. ERUDITION. SCIENCE. LITERATURE. ART. LETTERS. PHILOSOPHY.

KNOWLEDGE is a general term, denoting the fact or the subject of knowing, clear perception or apprehension, familiar cognizance.

LEARNING (A. S. *leornian*, *to learn*) is acquired knowledge in any branch of science or literature.

SCIENCE (Lat. *scientia*, *scīre*, *to know*) is, literally, knowledge, but usually denotes knowledge according to system. Science embraces those branches of knowledge of which the subject is ultimate principles, or facts as explained by principles, or laws arranged in natural order.

LITERATURE (Lat. *lĭtĕra*, *a letter*), in its widest application, embraces all compositions which do not appertain to the positive sciences. As a man of literature is versed in the *belles lettres*, so a man of learning excels in what is taught in the schools, and belongs almost wholly to the past; while LITERATURE includes the current compositions of the day.

ERUDITION (Lat. *ērŭdītus*, *cultivated*) relates to literature and learning rather than to science, and to its extensive attainment, involving a knowledge of subjects commonly unfamiliar.

ART (Lat. *artem*) is the application of knowledge to practice. As science consists of speculative principles, so art is a system of rules, serving to facilitate the performance of certain actions. Arts are divided into two classes, the useful, mechanical, or industrial arts, and the liberal, polite, or fine arts. The former are called trades; the latter have to do with imagination and design, as poetry, painting, sculpture, designing, and the like. The term "liberal arts" was formerly applied to the subjects of academical education; as "Degrees in arts at the universities."

LETTERS (Fr. *lettre*; Lat. *lĭtĕra*, *a letter*) equivalent to the French "*belles lettres*," polite learning—is to LITERATURE as the abstract to the concrete; literature being letters in specific relationship; as, the literature (not the letters) of a particular country.

PHILOSOPHY (Gr. φιλοσοφία) is literally the love of wisdom, and therefore has varied in its application, according to the kind of wisdom in vogue. Phenomena as explained by causes and reasons would be the subject of mental philosophy, phenomena as the result of forces and laws would be the subject of physical philosophy. The different departments of human knowledge, as theology, natural history, ethics, metaphysics, are specific applications of philosophy.

"*Knowledge*, then, seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is there is *knowledge*."—LOCKE.

"The parts of human *learning* have reference to the three parts of man's understanding, which is the seat of *learning*, history to his memory, poesy to his imagi-

nation, and philosophy to his reason."—BACON.

"'Twere well, says one sage, *erudite*, profound,
Terribly arch'd and aquiline his nose,
And over-built with most impending brows—
'Twere well could you permit the world to live
As the world pleases. What's the world to you?" COWPER.

"The works of speculation or *science* may be reduced to the four classes of philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and physic."—GIBBON.

"Our descendants may possibly contemplate with equal ridicule and surprise the preposterous partiality which the present age has shown to the frippery and tinsel of French *literature*."—EUSTACE, *Italy*.

"Art can never give the rules that make an *art*. This is, I believe, the reason why artists in general, and poets principally, have been confined in so narrow a circle."—BURKE.

"Ich for sothe in science of *lettres* knowe thy konnyng."—R. GLOUCESTER.

"In *philosophy* the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God or are circumferred to Nature or are reflected or reverted on himself, out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, divine philosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy."—BACON.

L.

LACONIC. CONCISE.

The LACONIC, so called from the Laconians or Lacedemonians, who affected it, is a species of CONCISENESS. *See* CONCISE. The term CONCISE is a term of simple praise belonging to expression or style. LACONIC expresses an affected conciseness, which springs not from desire to do justice to the expression, but from some peculiarity or sentiment of the speaker, who wishes to avoid the smallest waste of words upon the subject or the person addressed. Conciseness is a proof of regard, laconism of disregard. So that it is associated not only with brevity but with bluntness. To be concise shows mental refinement, to be laconic shows the moral want of it.

LACK. WANT. NEED. NECESSITY.

LACK (an old Low Ger. word) refers more directly to the failing or inadequate source or supply; WANT (Icel. *vanta, to be wanting*), to the inadequate supply or possession, combined with the requirement or demand.

NEED (A.S. *neád, want, compulsion*) relates directly to the urgency of the demand, and indirectly to the absence of supply. Want is commonly absence of mere possession; need, absence of means of action. As they express states, NECESSITY (Lat. *necessitatem*) is stronger than NEED, for whereas NEED is negative, NECESSITY has a positive and compelling force. A man is in need of food. Under some circumstances there is a necessity for immediate action. Need is pressing, necessity unyielding. Need is the strongest degree of requirement, necessity of demand. In the phrase of the English Psalms, "See that such as are in *need* and *necessity* have right," the second term is an augmentation of the first. Need may be temporarily and easily removed; necessity is more lasting and less remediable. We need, in cases of difficulty, the advice and support of friends; but lacking this, we are often compelled, by necessity, to decide and act for ourselves. The words LACK, WANT, and NEED, rise in force. The superfluities of life—wealth, estates, great power or influence—I lack; the conveniences which I am without, I want; the necessaries which I am without, I need. Lack is the absence of excess; want, of comfort; need, of sufficiency.

"But though each court a jester *lacks*,
To laugh at monarchs to their face,
Yet all mankind behind their backs,
Supply the honest jester's place."
DODSLEY.

"There is yet another cause of *necessity* which has occasioned great speculation among the writers upon general law, namely, whether a man in extreme *want* of food or clothing may justify stealing either to relieve his present *necessities*."—BLACKSTONE.

"It is evident that nothing can be more amiable, suitable, and universally subser-

vient both to the *needs* and to the refreshments of the creature than light."—SOUTH.

LAG. LINGER. LOITER. SAUNTER. TARRY.

LAG (Gael. *llag*, *weak*, *slack*) is commonly relative to others, with whom the movements of the lagging person are slow in comparison, a definite line of progress being common to all.

LINGER (A.S. *lengan*, *to prolong delay*) relates not to any definite onward movement, either of others or of the person lingering, but simply to the locality at or near which the lingerer stops and delays. It is sometimes employed of inanimate, and therefore involuntary things; as, a lingering hope or sickness.

LOITER (cf. Du. and Ger. *luddern*, *to loiter*; Du. *leuteren*, *loteren*, *to delay*) is to linger from tardiness or indolence, as LINGER implies a constraining or retarding influence attached to the locality.

SAUNTER (which has been derived from *sainte terre*, the *Holy Land*, as if connected with the strolling of pilgrims, but is, more probably, a modification of the German *schlentern*, *to wander idly*, of which other forms are *schlendern* and *slendern*) is to move onwards, but in a lazy, dreamy fashion.

TARRY (Fr. *tarder*, *to linger*; Lat. *tardāre*) differs from the others in denoting, for a time, movement absolutely suspended, but in reference to an implied progress. We lag through laziness or absence of mind; linger through attachment; loiter through idleness; saunter for pleasure; and tarry for a purpose.

"Yet not content, more to increase his shame,
When so she *lagged*, as she needs mote so,
He with his spear (that was to him great blame)
Would thump her forward, and enforce to go."
SPENSER.

"On yonder cliffs, a grisly band,
I see them sit; they *linger* yet,
Avengers of their native land."
GRAY.

"We must proceed on speedily, and persist constantly, nowhere staying or *loitering*."—BARROW.

"Upon the first suspicion a father has that his son is of a *sauntering* temper, he must carefully observe him whether he be listless and indifferent in all his actions, or whether in some things alone he be slow and sluggish, but in others vigorous and eager."—LOCKE.

"Why is his chariot so long in coming? why *tarry* the wheels of his chariot?"—*English Bible*.

LAND. COUNTRY. SOIL. MOULD. EARTH. GLOBE. WORLD.

LAND (A.S. *land*) denotes, severally, the solid, as distinguished from the fluid portions of the globe; any portion of that mass as related or appertaining to an individual or a people; the composition of the earth's surface as regards its agricultural use; and, by a rhetorical extension of meaning, the persons inhabiting a particular land.

COUNTRY (Fr. *contrée*, Lat. *contrāta*, *the tract over against* the spectator) is a tract of land as it meets the eye, or such a tract as connected with residents or inhabitants, or as opposed to the city or the town. It is also, like LAND, often used for the inhabitants of the country; as, "The unanimous feeling of the country." According as the term COUNTRY is employed under a physical or a social aspect, it is accompanied by different sets of epithets. It is populous or thinly inhabited, prosperous or otherwise, fertile or sterile. LAND in imaginative style is employed to represent a characteristic locality which is peopled by certain associations, as the land of dreams, a land of plenty, fairy land.

SOIL (Lat. *sŏlum*) is never employed but of the physical components of the earth's surface.

EARTH (A.S. *eorðe*, orig. meaning not certain), GLOBE, and WORLD have a special connexion with one another. Omitting the use of EARTH in the sense of SOIL, from which it differs in that SOIL is employed of the aggregate of superficial substances, while EARTH designates only the lighter and looser particles, just as MOULD (A.S. *molde*, *mould*, *earth*) again denotes especially the highly fertile and fine particles of decayed organic matter, we come to regard it as a synonym with GLOBE (Fr. *globe*, Lat. *glŏbum*, *a ball*) and WORLD (A.S. *woruld*). In

speaking of the earth we commonly have in mind its external and material part. The term WORLD denotes the moral and abstract view of the same thing; the world of Nature and the world of man in combination. We speak of the construction, the productions, the geological formation, the planetary movements of the earth, and its relative place in the solar system. The world is the earth viewed in relation to its inhabitants. The earth abounds in wonders and beauties. The world is subject to the control of a supreme Moral Governor. The WORLD is thus a term of higher moral dignity than EARTH; so we speak of the civilized world, not earth. It is in relation to its character as the abode of recently-discovered peoples, that the continent of America was called the New World. The intellectual, political, religious, gay, scientific world, a poet's world of dreams, and the like, all denote the idea of sentient occupation, or peopling. The same character of connexion with mind and sentient recognition, as of the Creator or of the angels, belongs to the use of the term WORLD in reference to the heavenly bodies; as, "The unnumbered worlds which lie outside our own." EARTH is limited to our own planet, though we speak of other worlds. A future life of social happiness is called a better world. GLOBE is used for the earth poetically, and also under its scientific aspects, as in geology and physical geography.

"As soon as the *land* of any *country* has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"All the *soil* on that side of Ravenna has been left there insensibly by the sea's discharging itself upon it for many ages."—ADDISON.

"It is said of Archimedes that he would undertake to turn about the whole *earth*, if he could but have some place beside the *earth* to fix his feet upon."—SOUTH.

"Look downward on that *globe*, whose hither side
With light from hence, though but reflected, shines;
That place is *earth*, the seat of man; that light
His day." MILTON.

"Sure there is need of social intercourse,
Benevolence, and peace, and mutual aid
Between the nations, in a *world* that seems
To toll the death-bell of its own decease,
And by the voice of all its elements
To preach the general doom." COWPER.

"Adam, earth's hallowed *mould*."
MILTON.

LANDSCAPE. PROSPECT. VIEW.

The English termination *-ship*, like the German *schaft*, is connected with the verb *schaffen*, and the English *shape*. Thus lordship, friendship, is that which constitutes a lord, a friend, and the like. To this class of words belongs LANDSCAPE. Thus landscape is a shape of land, or the artistic representation of it. It is, therefore, such a prospect as comprises rural objects, or an open space of country.

PROSPECT (Lat. *prōspectus*, from *prōspĭcĕre, to look forward*) is a more general term, denoting a broad expanse overlooked, without denoting anything of what composes it. Hence we may have a prospect of the open sea or of the starry heavens.

VIEW (Fr. *vue*, Lat. *vĭdēre, to see*) is yet wider in its application, and is applicable to single objects; as, a view of a town or a street, as well as of an extensive tract. It implies unity in variety, and details combined into a whole. LANDSCAPE has no secondary sense. This is the case with VIEW and PROSPECT—the former signifying opinions and aims, the latter the recognized probability of events; as some persons are said to hold peculiar views; after seasonable weather there is every prospect of a good harvest.

"Straight my eye hath caught new pleasures,
Whilst the *landscape* round it measures."
MILTON.

"Heavens! what a goodly *prospect* spreads around,
Of hills, and dales, and woods, and lawns, and spires,
And glittering towns, and gilded streams, till all
The stretching *landscape* into smoke decays." THOMSON.

Unlike the rest, VIEW is used subjectively for the act of viewing, as well as objectively for the thing viewed.

"For what can force or guile with Him?
Or who deceive His mind, whose eye
Views all things at one *view?* He from heaven's height
All these our motions vain sees and derides." MILTON.

LANGUAGE. DIALECT. IDIOM. TONGUE. SPEECH.

LANGUAGE (Fr. *langage*; *langue*, *the tongue*) is the most comprehensive of these terms. It denotes any mode of expressing or conveying ideas; as, the language of the deaf and dumb. It may be written as well as spoken, nor is the idea dependent upon any particular mode of transmission.

On the other hand, in the word TONGUE (A. S. *tunge*, *tongue*, *speech*), the idea of spokenness is exclusively retained. TONGUE, SPEECH, and the other terms are applicable only to human beings, while LANGUAGE may be employed of the natural utterances of irrational animals; as the language of birds. SPEECH is the faculty or expression of articulate sounds, and is used broadly of the whole human race, while TONGUE is commonly restricted to the peculiar speech of a people; as the English or mother tongue.

DIALECT (Gr. διάλικτος, *discourse*, *a dialect*) is speech characterized by local peculiarities or specific circumstances; as, for instance, a science or a profession; provincial dialect; the dialect of the learned.

IDIOM (Gr. ἴδίωμα, *a peculiarity*, *an idiom*) is a form of expression peculiar to a language or an author; and, in a wider sense, the aggregate of peculiarities in a language—that is, its general cast or genius. The idioms of a language belong to its structure, and are the same, wherever the language is spoken. The dialects vary, as being forms engrafted upon it here and there, or mutations to which it has been subjected locally.

"The ends of *language* in our discourse with others being chiefly these three—first, to make known one man's thoughts to another; secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible; and thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things, *language* is either abused or deficient when it fails in any of these three." —LOCKE.

"And we all know the common *dialect* in which the great masters of this art used to pray for the king, and which may justly pass for only a cleanlier and more refined kind of libelling him in the Lord, as that God will turn his heart and open his eyes." —SOUTH.

"But whence art thou inspired, and thou alone,
To flourish in an *idiom* not thine own?"
DRYDEN.

"For what royalme almoste (Englande excepted) hath not all the good autours that ever wrote translated into the mother-*tounge*?"—UDAL.

"The acts of God to human ears
Cannot without process of *speech* be told."
MILTON.

LARGELY. COPIOUSLY. FULLY.

As adverbs expressing modes of abundance, LARGELY (Fr. *large*, Lat. *largus*) commonly implies the will of an agent; as, "He distributed honours largely among the citizens;" COPIOUSLY (Lat. *cōpiōsus*, *having abundance*), the mere natural abundance of supply; as, "Rivers copiously supplied in rainy seasons."

FULLY (A. S. *ful*) applies indiscriminately to both, but commonly implies an antecedent measure of requirement or capacity. It is also more properly used of abstract things than the others; as, "To be fully persuaded."

"*Largelie* promised, and slacklie performed."—HOLINSHED.

"If our barren wits were dried up, they might be *copiously* irrigated from those fruitful well-springs."—BURTON, *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

"All hail, Patroclus! let thy vengeful ghost
Hear and exult on Pluto's dreary coast;
Behold Achilles' promise *fully* paid,
Twelve Trojan heroes offered to thy shade."
POPE, *Homer*.

LAST. CONTINUE. ENDURE. REMAIN.

LAST (A. S. *lástan*, *to perform*, *continue*) denotes a continuance in time, and also a condition unimpaired. It is applicable to physical and to abstract things; as, "This memorial will last for many generations;" "The storm lasted through the night;" "Under the violence of the waves, the ship will not last much longer." The term, it will be seen,

lends itself less appropriately to the expression of mere physical conservation, and better to abstract duration. It would be impossible now to say, with Bacon, the "lasting of trees," meaning their preservation.

CONTINUE (Fr. *continuer*) is not applicable at all in this sense, but only to permanence in place, in time, and in sequence as a matter of observation; as, "The sound continues;" "The border continues round the pattern." The first-mentioned force of CONTINUE, that of permanence in locality, is now so rare that it may be considered nearly obsolete; as, in the sentence of the English Bible, "They continue with Me now three days, and have nothing to eat." Indeed, it may be associated with action or movement as REMAIN is associated with rest.

To ENDURE (Fr. *endurer*) conveys the idea of lasting, in spite of influences at work to destroy, and is applicable to physical and moral permanence; as, "Metals endure a certain degree of heat without melting;" "His patience, it is to be feared, will not endure much longer."

REMAIN (Lat. *rĕmānere*) has the same relation to REST as CONTINUE has to action and movement. The walker continues walking; the stander remains standing.

"Your sufferings are of a short duration; your joy will *last* for ever."—HART, *Meditation.*

"The same dull sights in the same landscape mixt,
Scenes of still life, and points for ever fixt,
A tedious pleasure in the mind bestow,
And pall the sense with one *continued* show." ADDISON.

"The favour of God is to them that obtain it, a better and an *enduring* substance, which, like the widow's barrel and cruse, wastes not in the evil days of famine."—HORNE.

"Entellus thus: My soul is still the same,
Unmoved with fear, and moved with martial fame;
But my chill blood is curdled in my veins,
And scarce the shadow of a man *remains.*"
DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

LATENT. SECRET. HIDDEN. OCCULT.

LATENT (Lat. *lătēre, to be hid*) is applied to those cases of the hidden or secret in which the possibility or propriety of the contrary state is contemplated; as, a latent motive; a latent cause of mischief. It is most commonly employed of that which is of the nature of an undeveloped or *suppressed force.*

What is SECRET (Lat. *sēcrētus*, part. of *sēcernĕre, to set apart*) is so far removed from common observation as to be unperceived. It involves a purposed hiding; and, therefore, that which is secret must be known *to some one.*

What is HIDDEN (A. S. *hídan, to hide*) is so covered as to be invisible, which may be from natural or from artificial causes. In the former case, it was never known to any; as with the hidden minerals not yet disinterred from the earth.

OCCULT (Lat. *occŭltĕre*, part. *occultus, to hide*) denotes the untraceable rather than the unknown, and is a term of processes and influences, the existence of which is known, but whose mode of operation is latent, below the surface, and not exposed to the sight and observation of mankind.

"Every breach of veracity indicates some *latent* vice, or some criminal intention which an individual is ashamed to avow. And hence the peculiar beauty of openness or sincerity."—STEWART.

"The blind, laborious mole
In winding mazes works her *hidden* hole."
DRYDEN.

"My heart, which by a *secret* harmony
Still moves with thine, joined in connection sweet." MILTON.

"It is of an *occult* kind, and is so insensible in its advances as to escape observation."—I. TAYLOR.

LATEST. LAST. FINAL. ULTIMATE. EVENTUAL.

LATEST, the superlative of LATE (A. S. *late*), applies only to the last in the order of time, being opposed to the earliest. LAST, which is an abbreviated form of the same word, relates to the order of succession generally, as well as of time in particular.

FINAL (Lat. *fīnālis, fīnis, an end*) is employed of that which, in reference to human actions, brings with it an end; as, a final decision, which puts, as it were, the finishing stroke to a thing.

ULTIMATE (Lat. *ultĭmāre, to come to an end*) brings out more strongly, in relation to cause and effect, the fact of preceding circumstances, as well as the finality of the fact itself. The ultimate belongs to a line of purpose or inquiry, as final does to a line of action. An ultimate object; ultimate principles. A final farewell; a final (not ultimate) touch to a painting. An ultimate conclusion; a final (not ultimate) word. FINAL and ULTIMATE are absolute, and can be followed by nothing. LATEST and LAST are sometimes used relatively, and so admit the possibility of being followed by something of the same kind. A person's last injunctions may be the last which he has had the opportunity of giving; the latest intelligence may be so interesting as to cause us to look forward with eagerness to the news of to-morrow.

EVENTUAL (Lat. *ēventus; e, out*, and *vĕnīre, to come*) points not so much to the finality of the effect or consequence as to the continuous operation of the preceding cause. That is eventual which happens as a final or remote consequence, or late in a train of circumstances, without actually involving the idea of causation.

LAUDABLE. PRAISEWORTHY. COMMENDABLE.

LAUDABLE (Lat. *laudābĭlis*) and COMMENDABLE (Lat. *commendābĭlis*) seem better applicable to the actions or qualities of individuals, and PRAISEWORTHY to the individuals themselves; as, a praiseworthy character; laudable ambition; commendable propriety. LAUDABLE is weaker than COMMENDABLE; the former denoting that praise is possible, the latter, that it is appropriate and right. A thing is laudable in itself. It is commendable or praiseworthy as exhibited in or done by some person.

"Yet in my opinion obsolete words may then be *laudably* revived when either they are more sounding or more significant than those in practice."—DRYDEN.

"But whether they so kept it or not, if this gift of chastitie which they professed were given them of God, small *praise-woorthie* was it in them to keep it."—FOX, *Martyrs*.

"He who, though undeservedly, hath lost his reputation, hath lost many opportunities of doing service to mankind. What comes from him, though *commendable* and profitable in itself, is often suspected, slighted, and ill-received."—JORTIN.

LAWFUL. LEGAL. LEGITIMATE. LICIT.

LAWFUL denotes conformable to *law* (Fr. *loi*, Lat. *lĕgem*) in any sense in which the term law may be employed, whether the law of the land, moral law, propriety, or specific regulation. LEGAL is conformable or appertaining to the law of the land. LEGITIMATE has the wider sense of conformable to law, rule, principle, justice, fairness, or propriety. LEGITIMATE denotes that which is in conformity with specific law or the principles of a particular system. It stands to rule as lawful to law.

LICIT (Lat. *licitum, permitted, lĭcēre, to be lawful*) is far less common than its negative, *illicit*. These terms regard the lawful or legal in reference to mutual trade, intercourse, connexions, or relations between man and man.

"This judicial trial of right yet remains in some cases, as a divine lot of battle, though controverted by divines, touching the *lawfulness* of it."—BACON.

"But if you lessen the rate of use, the lender, whose interest it is to keep up the rate of money, will rather lend it to the banker at *legal* interest than to the tradesman or gentleman who, when the law is broken, shall be sure to pay the full natural interest, or more."—LOCKE.

"Every such process of reasoning, it is well known, may be resolved into a series of *legitimate* syllogisms, exhibiting separately and distinctly in a light as clear and strong as language can afford each successive link of the demonstration."—STEWART.

LAX. LOOSE. VAGUE.

LAX (Lat. *laxus, loose*) is connected, probably, with *loose*. It is employed of intellectual and moral, as well as

physical, matters; as, a lax statement; lax principles or habits; a lax fibre. It denotes want of logical strictness, moral restraint, or physical tension.

"The flesh of that sort of fish being *lax* and spongy, and nothing so firm, solid, and weighty as that of the bony fishes."—RAY.

"In this general depravity of manners, and *laxity* of principles, pure religion is nowhere more strongly inculcated than in our universities."—JOHNSON.

LOOSE (A. S. *leas*, *false*, *loose*, *weak*) has the same applications, but, as physically employed, differs from LAX. A loose rope may have been purposely let loose; but LAX would imply a want of due constriction in its texture, as, for instance, by dryness. Morally, LAX is not employed of speech and actions so commonly as LOOSE; lax principles; loose talk or behaviour.

VAGUE (Fr. *vague*, Lat. *vāgus*, *wandering*) is employed only of intellectual things. As LAX and LOOSE denote both what is wanting in logical strictness and moral propriety, so VAGUE denotes that which is indefinite, and ambiguous, whether from want of clearness and precision of statement or conception, or from definiteness of authority. A vague idea; a vague proposition; a vague report, which is equivalent to a rumour; a vague notion or impression, and, in consequence, vague hopes and desires.

"The most voluptuous and *loose* person breathing, were he but tied to follow his dice and his courtships every day, would find it the greatest torment that could befall him."—SOUTH.

"This law has been styled—and, notwithstanding the objections of some writers to the *vagueness* of the language, appears to have been styled with great propriety—'the Law of Nature.'"—MACKINTOSH.

LAY. PUT. PLACE. SET.

Of these the simplest and most comprehensive, and, therefore, the least distinctive, is PUT, which denotes no more than to bring in any way to a position or relation; as, to put a question; to put a book on the shelf.

To PLACE (Fr. *placer*, Lat. *platēa*, *a street*, *a courtyard*) is to put in a particular part of space, or in a specific position. A book is placed on the shelf, as being the appointed arrangement for it.

To LAY (A. S. *lecgan*, *to cause to lie*) can be used only of those things which may be made in some degree to lie; while SET (A. S. *settan*), is used of those which may be made to stand. We lay a plate on the table, and set a candlestick. To set a thing is to give it fixity. So LAY points to the flat or recumbent arrangement of the object, PUT to the distinct act of the person, PLACE to the specific locality, and SET to the establishment of the object.

LEAD. CONDUCT. GUIDE.

To LEAD (A. S. *lēdan*, from *lād*, *a path*) is only employed of animate objects, with commonly, though not necessarily, the idea of preceding, to show the way. It is associated with the ideas of care, responsibility, and persuasion.

CONDUCT (Lat. *conducĕre*, part. *conductus*) and GUIDE (Fr. *guider*) are applicable to inanimate objects, and to affairs in general; as, to conduct or guide a traveller or a transaction. As applied to sentient beings, CONDUCT is more prominently associated with the ideas of authority and office; GUIDE, with those of knowledge and skill. One conducts an argument or a lawsuit, guides a traveller, leads a child. One conducts or guides those who do not know the way; one leads those who cannot or will not go alone. We are conducted in our proceedings in order that we may do precisely that which we have to do; we are guided that we may not wander from the right line or road. We are led to those points or persons whom it is required we should reach. To guide is to teach or to show the way; to conduct is to show the road, to direct the movements, as the head; to lead is to direct the very steps. A general guides his army when he knows, as it does not, the line of march; he conducts his army when he gives them the full benefit of his skill and experience. He leads his army when he has given orders to follow him. Men are guided by reason, conducted by experience, and, too often, led by passion.

"He tried each art, reproved each dull delay,
Allured to brighter worlds, and *led* the way." GOLDSMITH.

"A favour'd goat, *conductor* of my herd,
Strayed to a dale whose outlet is the post
To Phocian's left, and penetrates to Greece."
GLOVER, *Leonidas*.

"Common sense, or that share and species of understanding which Nature has bestowed on the greater part of men, is, when competently improved by education, and assisted by divine grace, the safest *guide* to certainty and happiness."—KNOX, *Essays*.

LEAN. MEAGRE. LANK.

LEAN (A. S. *hlǽne*) signifies devoid of *fat*, MEAGRE (Fr. *maigre*, *lean*), devoid of *flesh*. MEAGRE lends itself much more readily to metaphorical uses, meaning destitute of fulness and power, deficient in quantity or requisite quality; as, a meagre supply; a meagre statement, argument, exposition, or treatment of a subject.

"Thirst, *leanness*, excess of animal secretions, are signs and effects of too great thinness of blood."—ARBUTHNOT.

"Thou art so *lean* and *meagre* waxen late,
That scarce thy legs uphold thy feeble gait." SPENSER.

That is LANK (A. S. *hlanc*) which is so long and slender as to appear weak and deficient in firmness or fulness.

"The clergy's bags
Are *lank* and lean with thy extortions."
SHAKESPEARE.

LEAN. BEND. INCLINE.

Of these BEND (A. S. *bendan*) and INCLINE (Lat. *inclinare*, *to bend*), do not involve of necessity a relation to the perpendicular, which is implied in LEAN (A. S. *hlǽnan*, *to make to bend*), except when it is used in the metaphorical sense of leaning in opinion or moral inclination. That which inclines, leans, or bends only in a slight degree, and in relation to any kind of line, vertical, horizontal, or otherwise. The tower of Pisa leans, and might be said to incline, in a certain direction. In this case, INCLINE is only a more refined word. A road inclines to the right, if its deviation is but slight; it bends, if it is sufficiently rapid to form a distinct curve. In their moral usage, a man leans to certain opinions, as having a natural or constitutional tendency to adopt them. He bends when strong external pressure of circumstances bears upon him; as, *e. g.* to necessity. He inclines when he is prompted by natural preference and bias, or tendency of the will. Both BEND and INCLINE are intrinsic; LEAN has also an extrinsic application when it is followed by the prepositions upon or against.

"Thus to relieve the wretched was his pride,
And ev'n his failings *leaned* to virtue's side." GOLDSMITH.

"She had also contrived another puppet, which, by the help of several little springs to be wound up within it, could move all its limbs, and that she had sent over to her correspondent in Paris, to be taught the various *leanings* and *bendings* of the head, the risings of the bosom."—*Spectator*.

"Shall I venture to say, my lord, that in our late conversation you were *inclined* to the party which you adopted rather by the feelings of your good nature than by the conviction of your judgment?"—BURKE.

LEAVE. LIBERTY. LICENCE. PERMISSION.

LEAVE is the simplest term (A. S. *leáf*, *permission*); it imples the placing of a person in a position to act or not, as he pleases; a discretionary permission; LIBERTY (Fr. *liberté*), that all obstructions or hindrances are removed to specific action; as, liberty of speech; liberty of access. These two may be taken as well as given. LICENSE and PERMISSION must be specially granted. Liberty is fuller, more discretionary, and generally more courteous; leave is more familiarly permissive. The characteristic difference between the two may be further seen in the phrases to take leave, and to take a liberty. The first is to assume permission without stopping to ask for it; the second is to give one's self a freedom of action, beyond due restraint.

LICENCE (Lat. *licentia*, *permission*) is liberty in a particular case, formally, or even legally granted by special permission; as, a licence to print; a marriage licence or a poetic licence.

PERMISSION (Lat. *permissionem*) is the mere absence on the part of an-

other of prevention or of opposition, without implying sanction or approval.

"Then let us not think hard
One easy prohibition, that enjoy
Free *leave* so large to all things else, and choice
Unlimited of manifold delights."
MILTON.

"So that the idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other."—LOCKE.

As LICENCE implies the principle of liberty, so it implies also a contrary principle of restraint, except when it is employed of one's self, in which it is simply equivalent to reckless assumption of liberty. He who receives licence from authority receives certain free powers, but modified by the authority which granted it. So, politically speaking, licence may imply not a little which is *against* freedom.

"My lords, from the precedent now before us, we shall be induced—nay, we can find no reason for refusing—to lay the press under a general *licence*, and then we may bid adieu to the liberties of Great Britain."—CHESTERFIELD.

"The will
And high *permission* of all-ruling Heaven
Left him at large to his own dark designs."
MILTON.

LEAVE. QUIT.

We LEAVE that to which we may return.

We QUIT (Fr. *quitter, to leave, to part from*) that to which we purpose not to return.

LENGTHEN. PROLONG.

To LENGTHEN is to add to one of the ends or to extend the substance.

To PROLONG (Fr. *prolonger*, Lat. *prōlongāre*) is to throw farther on the termination of a thing, whether by continuity, by postponements, or by the introduction of incidental matter. One is commonly said to lengthen a cord, a rod, a discourse, or letter; to prolong a walk, a conversation, a story, an occupation.

LEVITY. GIDDINESS. LIGHTNESS. VOLATILITY. FLIGHTINESS.

LEVITY (Lat. *lĕvĭtātem, lightness*) is that kind of lightness which denotes an inability or inaptitude to weigh the importance of principles in thought and action, and so borders on immorality, if it is not actually such. It is, in its outward form, a disregard of the proprieties of time and place.

GIDDINESS (A. S. *gyddian, to be merry*) is wild thoughtlessness, especially such as comes of exuberant spirits, combined with scanty powers of reflexion, as in some young persons; an inability, as in the case of vertigo, to collect the thoughts.

LIGHTNESS (A. S. *leoht, light*) is that quality of mind which disposes it to be influenced by trifling considerations, and shows itself therefore in inconstancy of purpose and want of steadfastness and resolution.

VOLATILITY (Lat. *vŏlātĭlis, flying, transitory*) is active lightness of disposition; a tendency to fly from one thing to another from curiosity and petty interest, and to extract pleasure of a passing kind from a variety of objects and pursuits.

FLIGHTINESS (A. S. *fliht, flyht, a flying*) comes of mental unsteadiness, which shows itself in capricious fancies, irregular conduct, and disordered intentions; it betokens intellectual deficiency.

"That *levity* which is fatigued and disgusted with everything of which it is in possession."—BURKE.

"Young heads are *giddy*, and young hearts are warm,
And make mistakes for manhood to reform."
COWPER.

"When I therefore was thus minded, did I use *lightness*?"—*English Bible.*

"*Volatile* and fugitive instances of repentance are not the proper and proportioned remedy to the evil of vicious habits."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"The *flighty* gambols of chance are objects of no science nor grounds of any dependence whatever."—SEARLE.

LIFT. HEAVE. RAISE. ELEVATE. ERECT. EXALT. HOIST. HEIGHTEN.

The idea common to these terms is that of making high or higher than before.

To LIFT (Icel. *lypta, to raise*) is to bring up from a specific spot to a higher by a direct exertion of pa-

sonal or mechanical force, producing a separation in the thing lifted from its former points of rest or support. That is lifted which is drawn up into the air, as that may be RAISED (Icel. *reisa, to raise*) which still preserves mediate or immediate contact with the ground—that is, of course, in the physical senses of these terms. We lift a ladder when we take it up off the ground. We may raise it by one end only, so as to place it against the house.

HEAVE (A.S. *hebban, to lift*) denotes the raising slowly, as of weight or with difficulty. It has the additional force of impelling as well as raising; as, to heave a stone at an object. *See* SWELL.

ELEVATE (Lat. *ēlĕvare; lĕvis, light in weight*) is to raise *relatively*, or to bring from a lower place to a higher.

To ERECT (Lat. *ērĭgĕre*, part. *ērectus*) is *to raise perpendicularly*, still preserving the relation to, and support of, some base or foundation on which the thing erected rests.

To EXALT (Lat. *exaltāre, to elevate*) is so to raise as to produce with the raising an impression of dignity and superiority; the physical being emblematical of a moral raising.

HOIST (O. Dut. *hyssen*), commonly combines the idea of gradual raising of something weighty with that of mechanical means, or at least of some effort; as to hoist a package, a sail, or an ensign.

HEIGHTEN (A.S. *heáh, high*) is to increase an already existing height, as opposed to lowering; to make higher or taller. A thing already raised or erected may be further heightened, as a flag-staff, by an addition to its substance.

"As for the casting up of the eyes, and *lifting* up of the hands, it is a kind of appeal to the Deity."—BACON.

"Shed thy faire beames unto my feeble eyne,
And *raise* my thoughtes too humble and too vile." SPENSER.

"If a pagan had been present at one of the Christian assemblies and, at the *elevation* of the Host, had seen them all fall down and worship."—SHARP.

"Round her throne,
Erected in the bosom of the just,
Each virtue 'listed forms her manly guard."
YOUNG.

"Walked boldly upright with *exalted* head." DRYDEN.

"Let him take thee
And *hoist* thee up to the shouting plebeians." SHAKESPEARE.

"Fancy enervates while it soothes the heart,
And while it dazzles wounds the mental sight;
To joy each *heightening* charm it can impart,
But wraps the hour of woe in tenfold night." BEATTIE.

LIKENESS. RESEMBLANCE. SIMILARITY. SIMILITUDE.

LIKENESS (A.S. *lic*) is the most familiar and comprehensive. It is applicable both to the internal nature and to the outward semblances of things.

RESEMBLANCE (Fr. *ressembler, to be alike*) has much the same meaning, but has a more subjective, as likeness a more objective, force; that is, likeness belongs rather to objects themselves; resemblance, to their properties, and the effect produced by them. Hence LIKENESS seems more appropriate in the case of visible and palpable objects; RESEMBLANCE, in the qualities of things, and where the likeness is fainter. A strong likeness in feature; a faint resemblance in manner.

SIMILARITY (Fr. *similaire, similar*) lends itself more readily to express likeness in properties or accidents of things than things themselves; as, a similarity of appearance, nature, disposition, of proceeding, of result, or of such things as are judged purely by the mind, and not the senses; as a similarity of belief. SIMILITUDE is to similarity as the concrete to the abstract, similitude being embodied similarity or likeness as it is not only recognized or appreciated, but represented and expressed. Hence a similarity may be shown by a similitude, in the rhetorical sense of the term. When a tyrant is called a tiger, it is a similitude based upon a similarity.

"There is a fabulous narrative that in the northern countries there should be an herb

that groweth in the *likeness* of a lamb, and feedeth upon the grass."—BACON.

"To do good is to become most like God. It is that which of all other qualities gives us the *resemblance* of His nature and perfection."—SHARP.

"From the knowledge I had of this tree, and the *similarity* it bore to the spruce, I judged that, with the addition of inspissated juice of wort and molasses, it would make a very wholesome beer."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"Thus they turned their glory into the *similitude* of a calf that eateth hay."—*English Psalms.*

LIKELY. PROBABLE.

LIKELY (literally, *like what has happened*, and so *like to happen*) has the same sense as PROBABLE (Lat. *prōbābĭlis*), and an additional force beyond it. PROBABLE qualifies only facts or events as regards the evidence which is greater for than against it, hence *affording* ground for belief; as, probable evidence distinguished from mathematical or demonstrative. But LIKELY has the further force of possessing an inherent tendency to bring about a result, and so the probable cause of it. In this way LIKELY is applicable to persons and events, not simply in regard to their occurrence, but their effects and actions. "It is probable that I shall go to-morrow," might be expressed thus: "I am likely to go to-morrow," where "I am probable" could not have been employed.

LIMB. MEMBER.

MEMBER (Lat. *membrum, a limb*) is a general term applied to any distinct section or portion of an organized body performing a distinct office, as the eye, the ear.

LIMB (A. S. *lim*) is the term restricted to the arms and legs. MEMBER lends itself, as LIMB does not, to secondary or metaphorical uses; as, a member of Parliament, a family, or an association.

"And on the grass her dainty *limbs* did lay,
In secret shadow, far from all men's sight."
SPENSER.

"But now are they many *members*, yet but one body."—*English Bible.*

LISTLESS. CARELESS. SUPINE.

The LISTLESS person (originally *lustless, i.e. wanting in vigour*) is in a state of mental and moral torpor, which excludes the desire of any object which requires exertion. LISTLESS stands to the ends of action as CARELESS to action itself, whether physical or mental. The careless man does his work without pains; the listless man does not think it worth doing at all.

SUPINE is the Lat. *sūpīnus, lying on the back*, as opposed to *prōnus, bending forwards.* So the supine is without that proneness which comes from the propensity to activity and the faculty of interest. As listlessness is employed of minor matters, so supineness implies matters of some principle and obligation. The careless person is not necessarily supine; he may be active, energetic, and lively, but specifically indifferent or uninterested in the object before him. The listless person has no interest. The supine may have some amount of it, but not enough to be an incentive to action, or enough to overcome a constitutional laziness. Listlessness is rather the absence of desire; supineness, the absence of pure interest. Carelessness may come from an excess of animal spirits, and a playful defiance of fortune. A person is supine by nature; circumstances may make him listless.

"That *listlessness* and depression of spirits which generally accompany national disasters."—EUSTACE, *Italy.*

"If, indeed, the little improvement they apparently derive from such perfunctory lectures arises from their own *supineness*, themselves only are justly culpable; but I suspect their very *supineness* usually arises from the indifference and dulness of the tutors' manner."—KNOX, *Essays.*

"The Priest whose office is, with zeal sincere,
To watch the fountain and preserve it clear,
Carelessly nods and sleeps upon the brink
While others poison what the flocks must drink."
COWPER.

LITTLE. SMALL. DIMINUTIVE. MINUTE.

LITTLE (A. S. *lytel*) is the most general term, and is applicable to quantity as well as size; as a little person, a little water.

SMALL (A. S. *smæl*) applies to that which is wanting in extension or extent. We could not say "a small

water," but "quantity" or "piece of water." Both have the moral import of insignificant or mean. LITTLE and SMALL being both relative terms, the former is stronger than the latter; LITTLE meaning remarkably or exceptionally small. Hence SMALL belongs more purely to standards of comparison, without implying disparagement. If my income has diminished, I must occupy a smaller (not a littler) house. Little is opposed to big; small to large. A little child is contrasted with a grown man. A small child is a *proportionately* small, that is, puny or ill-developed child. LITTLE is often associated with the feelings, as SMALL is not. So it may be a term of endearment; as, a little darling.

DIMINUTIVE (Lat. *dimĭnuĕre, to diminish*, part. *dimĭnūtus*) is relative to an assumed or expressed standard; as a diminutive person is one who falls far below the average size.

MINUTE (Lat. *mĭnuĕre*, part. *mĭnūtus, to diminish*) is that which requires or implies closeness of observation or inspection, and is a term of purely physical proportion, except when it is used analogously or metaphorically.

"I confess I love *littleness* almost in all things; a *little*, convenient estate, a *little* cheerful house, a *little* company, and a very *little* feast."—COWLEY.

"Thenceforth I 'gan in my engrieved breast
To scorn all difference of great and *small*
Sith that the greatest often are opprest,
And unawares do into danger fall."
SPENSER.

"The *diminutiveness* of his figure was totally eclipsed by the expansion of his instrument."—*Student*.

"Whose corpuscles, by reason of their *minuteness*, swim easily for a while in the water."—BOYLE.

LIVELIHOOD, LIVING. SUBSISTENCE. SUPPORT. MAINTENANCE. SUSTENANCE.

The means of living or supporting life, or the life so supported, are the ideas common to these terms.

LIVELIHOOD stands to LIVING (A. S. *lif, life; liban* and *lybban, to live*) as the general result to the course or means; the getting of the living being the livelihood, that is, occupation, calling, or work in life. A livelihood is a calling or profession regarded as the condition of subsistence; while living is the subsistence itself. Both LIVELIHOOD and LIVING are restricted to rational creatures, whose maintenance depends upon their own exertions.

SUBSISTENCE (Lat. *subsistĕre, to sustain*) is employed of what furnishes support to animal life generally and directly, as food; while to SUPPORT (Lat. *supportāre, to convey to*) is to furnish with the means of sustenance in any shape, as money, food, and the like.

MAINTENANCE (Fr. *maintenir*; Lat. *mănus, the hand*, and *tĕnĕre, to hold*) has a wider meaning, and denotes generally the keeping up of anything which has to be upheld in a course of being, action, or operation; as the maintenance of life, of the body, of a fabric, of respectability, of splendour, of public war or worship.

SUSTENANCE (Lat. *sub, under*, and *tĕnĕre, to hold*) denotes no more than means of supporting life, but is not restricted to animal life, being applicable to the vegetative life of plants. Sustenance passes into the body of things; not so maintenance, nor (in all cases) support. Livelihood is earned. Living is procured. Subsistence accrues. Support is given Maintenance is afforded. Sustenance is imparted. Unlike the rest, MAINTENANCE and SUPPORT are applicable to things of the moral nature: as the support of courage and hope; the maintenance of order, cheerfulness, or resolution.

"My lord, saith he, was never worthy man
So nobly bred, and of so high descent,
Of so fair *livelihood*, and so large rent."
DRAYTON.

"'Tis the very profession and *livelihood* of such people, getting their *living* by those practices for which they deserve to forfeit their lives."—SOUTH.

"By the means of *subsistence*, I understand not the means of superfluous gratifications, but that present competency which every individual must possess in order to be in a capacity to derive a support from his industry in the proper business of his calling."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"By giving up the belief of a God, I throw away all these considerations, and leave my-

self utterly destitute and *supportless*."—SCOTT, *Christian Life.*

"All men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace and order for the *maintenance* of society."—HUME.

"It is a mistake to suppose that the rich man *maintains* his servants, tradesmen, tenants, and labourers. The truth is, they *maintain* him."—PALEY.

"The sheriffs of Hertford and Essex were commanded to ward him there, and to prevent all *sustenance* to be brought him."—DRAYTON.

LONELY. SOLITARY.

LONELY conveys the idea of the melancholy or the forsaken; while SOLITARY (Lat. *sōlĭtārius*) denotes no more than the absence of life or society. A bird of solitary habits is distinguished from gregarious birds. A lonely wanderer is not only solitary, but feels it in sadness. Places are solitary, as being without inhabitants. They are lonely, as producing in persons the effects of isolation. So we may be lonely, though not solitary, in crowds. As the essence of solitariness is separation, not the feelings consequent upon it, it is a synonym of *single*; as a solitary instance, that is, one, and only one.

"To the misled and *lonely* traveller."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Hie home unto my chamber,
Where thou shalt find me sad and *solitary*."
Ibid.

LOQUACIOUS. TALKATIVE. GARRULOUS.

The LOQUACIOUS person (Lat. *lŏquācem*, from *lŏqui, to speak*) is one who is in the habit of talking continually or excessively. The TALKATIVE person is not necessarily so exclusively fond of the sound of his own voice, and likes talkativeness in others as well.

The GARRULOUS person (Lat. *garrŭlus, garrire, to chatter*) is unduly communicative, and fluently eloquent in imparting small and valueless information. He tends more distinctively to talk about his neighbour's affairs and his own. He is full of petty experiences, which he occupies the time of others in detailing. Children are often talkative; lively women loquacious; old men garrulous.

"Why *loquacity* is to be avoided, the wise man gives us a sufficient reason, Prov. x. 19: 'In the multitude of words there wanteth not sin;' and Eccles. v. 7: 'In many words there are divers vanities.'"—RAY.

"Pardon, my lord, the feeble *garrulity* of age, which loves to diffuse itself in discourse of the departed great."—BURKE.

"With such cautions, there is no doubt but that *talkativeness* is greatly to be preferred to taciturnity, both for our own and others' pleasure and improvement."—KNOX, *Essays.*

LOUD. NOISY. CLAMOROUS. OBSTREPEROUS. SONOROUS.

LOUD (A. S. *hlúd*) is producing *any* kind of sound in a high degree, whether continuously or not. It is a characteristic also of the sound itself striking the ear with force.

NOISY (O. Fr. *noise*, Lat. *nausea, disgust, quarrel*; but LITTRÉ inclines to *noxia, hurt, damage, annoyance*) means producing confused, unmusical, senseless, and abnormal sound, which cannot be reduced to musical notes, or a ratio of vibration. The loud deafens us, the noisy distracts us.

CLAMOROUS (Lat. *clāmāre, to call aloud; clāmōrem, a shout*) applies only to the unrestrained and noisy exercise of the human or animal voice, as the manifestation of some strong sentiment or desire.

OBSTREPEROUS (Lat. *obstrĕpĕre, to make a noise at*) is producing a disturbing or tumultuous noise.

SONOROUS (Lat. *sŏnōrus, sounding*) is having the power or quality of loudness by nature, as a sonorous voice, a sonorous metal; and carries with it no disagreeableness of impression, on the one hand, or musical character, on the other, but is simply opposed to weakness or deadness of sound.

"The *loudest* peals and rattlings of our conscience."—BARROW.

"The king's demand of a supply produced one of those *noisy* speeches which disaffection and discontent regularly dictate."—JOHNSON.

"We may much more easily think to *clamour* the sun and stars out of their courses, than to word the great Creator of them out of the steady purposes of His own will by all the vehemence and *loudness* of our petitions."—SOUTH.

"There are who, deaf to mad ambition's call,
Would shrink to hear th' *obstreperous* trump of fame,
Supremely blest if to their portion fall
Health, competence, and peace."
BEATTIE.

"They have *sonorous* instruments, but they can be scarcely called instruments of music."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

LOWER. REDUCE.

To LOWER is the simpler and generic term, being applicable to anything which exists in degree, and of which that degree may be altered for more or less.

To REDUCE (Lat. *rĕdūcĕre, to bring back*) is to lower in a certain way, that is, to lower in reference to an exclusively internal standard. We lower a bucket into a well. We reduce a substance to powder, the particles being regarded as in their individuality prior to their existence in combination. We reduce expenses, that is, make them lower by bringing them back to what they have been or ought to be. We reduce an argument to a simple statement when we regard this statement as containing the primary truth or meaning, and all else as accretion, accident, or surplusage. To lower is to reduce in respect to size, quantity, rank, value, and the like. As applied to persons, LOWER relates to moral estimation and social position, REDUCE to their circumstances and resources.

"Many writers seem to have imagined that the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, in consequence of the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, was the real cause of the *lowering* of the rate of interest through the greater part of Europe."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"They resolve that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and *reducible* to nothing again."—CUDWORTH.

LOWLY. HUMBLE. MODEST. DIFFIDENT.

LOWLY is rather a term of the natural disposition, and sometimes expresses simply the social condition;

HUMBLE (Lat. *hŭmĭlis*), of the spirit and intellect, except when meaning socially inferior; as, a humble station of life. Humility is more reflexive than lowliness. A man by self-discipline and thoughtfulness may become truly humble, who is by no means of a lowly disposition naturally. Humility resembles modesty; but it implies rather a readiness to yield what is due to us than a shrinking from notice. Humility, it has been well observed, does not consist in a disposition falsely to underrate ourselves, but "in being willing to waive our rights, and descend to a lower place than might be our due; in being ready to admit our liability to error, and listening patiently to objections, even when they thwart our views; in freely owning our faults when conscious of having been wrong; and, in short, in not being over-careful of our own dignity."

MODESTY (Lat. *mŏdestia*) does not imply self-distrust, but an unwillingness to put ourselves forward, and the absence of over-confidence in our own powers. The modest man is not ignorant of his powers, but does not vaunt or assume upon them.

A DIFFIDENT man, on the other hand (Lat. *diffīdĕre, to distrust*) is over-distrustful of his own powers, and, whether from an exaggerated dread of failure, or from any other cause, shrinks from undertaking what he may be quite competent to perform. Modesty and humility are virtues; diffidence is not in itself a virtue, and may amount to a defect. The opposite to diffidence is confidence; to modesty, impudence or assurance; to humility, pride or conceit. DIFFIDENCE, however, unlike the rest, bears the additional sense of distrust of others. In short, diffidence is distrust. This, when entertained of others, is a kind of suspicion; when of ourselves, a kind of modesty, or, in excess, a kind of fear.

"As lofty pines o'ertop the *lowly* reed,
So did her graceful height all nymphs exceed."
CONGREVE.

"I will invite all manner of persons, of what manners or dispositions soever, whether the ambitious or *humble*-minded, the proud or pitiful, ingenuous or base-minded."—*Spectator*.

"*Modesty* is a kind of shame or bashfulness proceeding from the sense a man has

of his own defects compared with the perfections of him whom he comes before."—South.

"To rely at all times upon the care and protection of God, without unreasonable anxiety, *diffidence*, and distrust."—Clarke.

LUXURIANT. Exuberant.

Luxuriant (Lat. *luxŭriare, to wanton, to grow in size, luxury*) applies only to vegetation and what is analogous to growth; as luxuriant crops, a luxuriant imagination.

Exuberant (Lat. *exūbĕrare, to be in great abundance; ūber, the udder*) is to the production what luxuriant is to the growth; the former denotes a flourishing life, the latter a copious, and sometimes excessive, produce. Hence Exuberance is sometimes employed to imply that kind of abundance which needs to be restrained, as exuberant grief, exuberant joy; while Luxuriant is never used but in a happy and favourable sense.

"Poets no less celebrated for the *luxuriancy* than for the elegance of their genius."—*Observer*.

"So that allowing me in my *exuberance* one way, for my deficiencies in the other, you will find me not unreasonable."—Burke.

M.

MACHINE. Engine.

A Machine (Fr. *machine*, Lat. *māchĭna*) is a combination of bodies adapted to transmit force and apply it to the production of some specific work or effect.

Engine (Fr. *engin*, Lat. *ingĕnium, in the sense of a machine, a war engine*) is more commonly applied to machines of the more massive kind which produce some difficult result by the employment of a high degree of power. Locomotive machines, for instance, are called engines.

MADNESS. Derangement. Insanity. Mania. Frenzy. Aberration. Alienation. Craziness.

Madness (A. S. *gemæd, mad*) expresses any kind or degree of disorder of the intellect, whether permanent or transient, casual or congenital; as, hereditary madness, the madness of rage, or any other passion.

Insanity (Lat. *insānĭtatem, unhealthiness*) is a more philosophical or technical term for madness, and is popularly used for all such diseases. It is not employed, like Madness, of passing derangement.

Lunacy has now nearly the same extent of meaning, though once used to denote periodical insanity (Lat. *lu nātĭcus, one affected by the moon*).

Derangement, Alienation, Aberration are not scientific but colloquial terms expressive of the aspects of the disease.

Mania, Delirium, and Frenzy denote excited states of the disease; Mania (Gr. *μανία, madness*), as denoting simply its violence; Delirium (Lat. *dēlirium, madness; dēlirus, from dē, from,* and *lira, a furrow, one who goes out of his way in ploughing*), a wandering, inconsecutive state of mind. Frenzy (Gr. *φρενῖτις, inflammation of the brain*) is applied to more ordinary and temporary kinds of mental excitement; as, a frenzy of rage; the frenzy of the prophet or the poet. *See* Idiot.

"Festus, said Paul, thou art beside thyself, much learning doth make thee *mad*."—*Eng. Bible*.

"It is in the highest degree improbable, and I know not whether it hath ever been the fact, that the same *derangement* of the mental organs should seize different persons at the same time, a *derangement* I mean so much the same as to represent to their imagination the same objects."—Paley.

"There is a partial *insanity* of mind and a total *insanity*. The partial *insanity* seems not to excuse them in the committing of any offence for its matter capital."—Hale

"*Manie*
Engendred of humours melancolike."
Chaucer.

"Who deem religion *frenzy*."
Cowper.

"The *aberration* of youth."—Hall.

Craziness (from *craze*, connected with Fr. *écraser, to breuk*) is the imbecility of a broken-down intellect, and as it were, a decrepit state of mind. It is commonly the result of age or severe mental pressure or trial, and is often accompanied by hallucination in

connexion with personal life and history.

"Grief hath *crazed* my wits."
SHAKESPEARE.

MAGICIAN. NECROMANCER. SORCERER. WIZARD. ENCHANTER.

The MAGICIAN (Fr. *magicien*, Gr. *μάγος*), was one skilled in magic or the black art.

The SORCERER (Lat. *sortiarius*, lit. *one who told fortunes by lot*, *sortem*) is literally a diviner by lots. The magician is looked upon as a benign, the sorcerer as a dangerous being.

NECROMANCER (Gr. *νεκρομαντεία*, *necromancy*) pretended revelations from the dead. The WIZARD was at first the *wise* man, afterwards the magician or sorcerer. As the magician had it in his power to produce blessings by his supernatural skill, and the necromancer divined by his communications with the dead, the sorcerer had the power of hurting by evil spells and charms, while the wizard was able by an unearthly trickery, to add to or extricate from the misfortunes and embarrassments of life.

It was the office of the ENCHANTER (Lat. *incantātorem*) to bind by a spell and to enchain by illusion.

MAINTAIN. SUSTAIN.

(Fr. *maintenir*, and *soutenir*, the Lat. *mănu tĕnĕre* and *sustĭnĕre*). To maintain is to keep in the same state, to sustain is to keep in the same place. The thing which is not maintained will change, deteriorate, or lapse; the thing which is not sustained will fall. Vigilance maintains, power sustains. Power sustains the laws. The magistrates maintain their execution. We sustain what is weak, and maintain what is variable. You sustain assaults, effects; you maintain order, claims, and things generally in their proper course, place, and condition. The term SUSTAIN is applicable physically; MAINTAIN is only applicable morally, or to speak generally, the object maintained lies more remote, and is more abstract than the object sustained. Food sustains life. It is, as it were, an advance on this to say that health is maintained by temperance. The law will maintain you in your rights and sustain you in your efforts to secure them. An establishment cannot be maintained when the diminished income of the proprietor is insufficient to sustain its expenses.

MAJESTY. DIGNITY.

MAJESTY (Lat. *mājestātem*) is purely external, belonging as a personal attribute to the highest persons in the community.

DIGNITY (Lat. *dignĭtātem*) manifests itself externally, but is also related to internal and essential qualities, and may exist in all ranks. Virtue, respectability of character, innocence under unjust suspicion, may maintain a native dignity. Some noble qualities belong to dignity. Where it is only in external bearing it indicates a sense of what is due to one's self or the station which one holds. It is the mean between pomposity and insignificance. On the other hand, an imposing person and gorgeous dress may invest the meanest tyrant with an air of majesty.

MAIM. MUTILATE. MANGLE.

To MAIM (Fr. subst. *mahain*, connected with Lat. *mancus*, *maimed*, *defective*, LATHAM) is to deprive of the use of a member or limb of the body, so as to render a person less able to attack or defend himself in fighting, or, by an extension of the term, less competent to physical action and movement generally.

To MUTILATE (Lat. *mūtĭlare*, *to maim*), is to deprive, not only of the use of the limb or member, but of the limb or member *itself*, or of any portion of the body.

To MANGLE (Low Lat. *măcŭlāre*, *to disfigure by wounds*; *mangŭlare*, *to injure*, WEDGEWOOD) is to cut or bruise with repeated strokes or injuries in an irregular manner, producing ruptures and laceration.

"By the antient law of England he that *maimed* any man, whereby he lost any part of his body, was sentenced to lose the like part."—BLACKSTONE.

"The rhapsodies of Homer were necessarily in a very *mutilated* state, or recorded

in men's memories after an imperfect manner and by piecemeal only."—*Observer.*

"Concise *manglers* of the human face divine" (said of painters).—TICKELL.

MAINTAIN. ASSERT. VINDICATE. HOLD. SUPPORT. UPHOLD.

MAINTAIN (Fr. *maintenir*, Lat. *manus, the hand*, and *tĕnĕre, to hold*), in the sense in which it is synonymous with the other terms here given, denotes the holding firmly or with vigour and constancy; while HOLD (A. S. *healdan*) denotes simply entertaining with any degree of firmness in argumentative defence, and even without argument at all. We hold views, opinions, or belief; we maintain, besides these, positions, arguments, rights, claims.

To ASSERT (Lat. *assĕrĕre, lay hold of, claim*) is to lay down a statement or advance a claim in a positive manner, as if identifying one's self with it, and being ready to accept its consequences. Asserting commonly precedes maintaining; the former being positive declaration, the latter persistent upholding afterwards. We assert facts and claims.

To VINDICATE (Lat. *vindĭcare, to claim*) is to defend with an implied degree of success. MAINTAIN, ASSERT, and HOLD apply to things. VINDICATE and SUPPORT also to persons. It stands to justice as ASSERT and MAINTAIN to truth. HOLD is always used of persons; SUPPORT, also of evidence. We hold truths or convictions; we support the forms in which they are expressed as propositions. To hold is moral or intellectual; to support is operative or technical. We support resolution, plans, movements, or persons in their efforts.

"Judge Anderson, who sate at the assizes in the county of Suffolk, did adjudge it not *maintainable*, because it was not spoken maliciously."—WOOD, *Athenæ Oxonienses.*

"Now nothing is more shameful and unworthy a natural philosopher than to *assert* anything to be done without a cause, or to give no reason of it."—RAY.

"For God,
Nothing more certain, will not long defer
To *vindicate* the glory of His name
Against all competition." MILTON.

"This is the unity of the Christian Church, the *holding* of Christ for the head, and not, as the present Church of Rome teaches, the *holding* of the Pope for the visible head of it."—PEARCE, *Sermons.*

"The question is not whether a thing be mysterious, for all things are mysterious, but whether the mystery be *supported* by evidence."—GILPIN.

UPHOLD (*up* and A. S. *healdan, to hold*) is to maintain in a state of power, dignity, strength; to prevent from falling into the contraries of these, whether persons, cases, feelings, principles, statements, views, positions, sentiments, or opinion. We are induced to uphold by a sense of justice, truth, usefulness, and sometimes, it must be added, self-interest.

"Honour shall *uphold* the humble in spirit."—*Eng. Bible.*

MALICIOUS. MALEVOLENT. MALIGNANT.

MĂLICIOUS denotes the character which delights in doing harm for harm's sake. It may, however, be applied to parts of the character, or to manifestations of it; as to take a malicious pleasure in anything.

MALEVOLENT (Lat. *mălĕvŏlus*) is more strictly personal against others.

MALIGNANT (Lat. *mălignantem*, part. of *mălignāre* or *ārī, to do maliciously*) is that which is virulently bent upon harm or evil, and lends itself more readily to express the character of inanimate influences, where the harm is contemplated without the intention; as a malignant ulcer or fever. MALICIOUS carries the idea of designing; MALEVOLENCE, that of impulse of nature; MALIGNANT, intrinsic vice or harmfulness.

"*Malicious* slander is the relating of either truth or falsehood for the purpose of creating misery."—PALEY.

"Emulation is indeed frequently accompanied with ill-will toward our rivals; but it is the desire of superiority which is the active principle, and the *malevolent* affection is only a concomitant circumstance."—STEWART.

"In some connections *malignity* seems rather more pertinently applied to a radical depravity of nature and *malignancy* to indications of this depravity in temper and conduct in particular instances."—COGAN.

MANFUL. MANLY. MANNISH.

MANFUL is commonly applied to

conduct; MANLY, to character. Manful opposition; manly bravery. MANFUL is in accordance with the strength of a man; MANLY, with the moral excellence of a man. MANFUL is what a man would, as such, be likely to do; MANLY, what he ought to do, and to feel as well. MANNISH expresses the unseemly imitation or likeness to the character of a man, in those who have some other character to support; and so is applicable to the coarseness of women, or the assumption and precocity of children.

"*Manly* virtue, like the sun,
His course of glorious toil should run,
Alike diffusing in his flight
Congenial joy, and life, and light."
SWIFT.

"I kill'd a man, whose death I much repent;
But yet I slew him *manfully* in fight,
Without false vantage or base treachery."
SHAKESPEARE.

"But, alas! the painted faces and *manishnesse*, and monstrous disguisedness of one sex."—BISHOP HALL.

MARINE. MARITIME. NAVAL. NAUTICAL.

MARINE (Lat. *mărīnus, belonging to the sea*), and MARITIME (Lat. *mărĭtĭmus*, meaning the same), both mean belonging to the sea, but under different aspects; MARINE, to the sea in its simplest aspect or natural state, as marine productions or deposits; MARITIME to the sea as it is employed by man, or in relation to the life of man; as a maritime people, maritime trade or occupations. An analogous difference may be observed in the use of the terms NAVAL and NAUTICAL.

NAVAL (Lat. *nāvālis*) is simply belonging to ships; NAUTICAL (Lat. *nautĭcus, belonging to sailors*) belonging to anything with which ships are specially connected, or for which they are employed. A naval life, the naval profession, a naval armament; nautical discoveries, a nautical almanac.

"The code of *maritime* laws, which are called the laws of Oleron, and are received by all nations in Europe as the ground and substructure of all their *marine* constitutions, was confessedly compiled by our King Richard the First, at the Isle of Oleron."—BLACKSTONE.

"The victory of Duilius, as it was honoured at Rome with the first *naval* triumph that was ever seen in that city, so gave it unto the Romans a great encouragement to proceed in their wars by sea."—RALEGH.

"The *nauticall* compasse."—CAMDEN.

MARINER. SAILOR. SEAMAN.

MARINER (*see* MARINE) is one whose occupation is connected with the navigation of ships. A SAILOR, as at present employed, designates one who serves especially in the navy; while SEAMAN is common to the navy and the merchant service.

MARK. INDICATE. DESIGNATE.

The proper force of the verb to MARK (Fr. *marquer*) is to distinguish, to enable us to discern an object by peculiar characters, so that one cannot misunderstand or confound them.

The proper force of INDICATE (Lat. *indĭcare*) is to give knowledge and information about a subject which one does not know, or of which one is in search, so as to direct one's view, one's steps, or one's thoughts to see, remark, or discover it.

The proper force of DESIGNATE (Lat. *dēsignāre*) is to set forth the thing hidden by means of the relation of certain signs to it, so that without actually subjecting the thing to the sight we may know it and be sure of it. MARKS, such as impressions, spots, stains, whether natural or artificial, enable us to know and recognize a thing amid a multitude of others of the same kind by some distinctive property or exclusive feature. INDICATIONS, such as gestures, sign-posts, conventional pointers, show us by giving us information, the object of our search or the line of procedure; and by directing us to it, help us to reach it. SIGNS, such as a signature, signals of flags, telegraphs, or beacons, by their significance or demonstrative force founded upon the nature of things or arbitrarily established, inform us that a thing is, where it is, or what it is. The hand of the clock marks the hour, the index of a book indicates the page on which a certain article is printed. The flag of a ship designates the nation to which it belongs.

MARRIAGE. WEDDING. NUPTIALS. MATRIMONY. WEDLOCK.

MARRIAGE (Fr. *mariage*) is properly the act which unites man and wife;

MATRIMONY (Lat. *mātrĭmōnium, wedlock; mātrem, a mother*), the state of such union, with all its relationships, rights, and obligations. Although marriage is sometimes used for the state, matrimony is never used for the act. WEDLOCK is the old Saxon term for matrimony, and is a term of legal associations; as lawful wedlock.

WEDDING (A. S. *weddian, to covenant, promise*) is employed only of the ceremony of the marriage.

NUPTIALS (Lat. *nuptiālis, belonging to a marriage, nuptiæ* pl.) is little more than the Latin equivalent of the Saxon WEDDING. Like most Latin equivalents, however, it has a more dignified meaning. We should naturally speak of a village wedding, and the nuptials of a prince.

"*Marriage* Love's object is, at whose bright eyes
He lights his torches, and calls them his skies;
For her he wings his shoulders and doth fly
To her white bosom as his sanctuary."
BEN JONSON.

"The misinterpreting of the Scripture directed mainly against the abuses of the law for divorce given by Moses, hath changed the blessing of *matrimony* not seldom into a familiar and co-inhabiting mischief."—MILTON.

"Is mirth seasonable on the day of *marriage*? Behold, the greatest *wedding* that ever was is this day solemnized; heaven and earth are contracted; divinity is espoused to humanity; a sacred, an indissoluble knot is tied between God and man."—BARROW.

"The relation between Christ and His Church, it is evident, must be of a nature not to be adequately typified by anything in the material world; and nothing could be found in human life which might so aptly represent it as the relation of husband and wife in the holy state of *wedlock*."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"He (Earl Athelwold) then besought me for some little space
The *nuptials* might be secret." MASON.

MARSH. SWAMP. BOG. QUAGMIRE. MORASS. FEN.

A MARSH (Fr. *marais*, Low Lat. *mariscus*), is a considerable tract of low swampy land, sometimes covered with water.

A SWAMP (old Norse, *squampa, to splash;* WEDGEWOOD) is a piece of flat spongy land not covered with water, and of no considerable extent. SWAMP indicates the character of patches of land. Marshes are sometimes so extensive as to form geographical features of a country. A BOG is a soft and treacherous swamp covered with vegetation, yet not compact enough to bear more than a slight weight upon its surface. It is this incompleteness and shifting character of the ground which is more distinctively expressed by quagmire, as it were "quakemire." MORASS, which is another form of MARSH, is an extensive marsh, sterile and too wet for pasturage;

While FEN (A. S. *fen*) is a marsh producing reeds, sedge, coarse grass, and a variety of aquatic vegetation.

MARTIAL. WARLIKE. MILITARY. SOLDIER-LIKE.

MARTIAL (Lat. *martialis, belonging to Mars, the God of War*) is, to a great extent, equivalent to WARLIKE; as, a martial or warlike people; a martial or warlike appearance. However, WARLIKE lends itself better to express what belongs to war in action. So a martial, not a warlike, sentence or tribunal; martial, not warlike, law.

MILITARY (Lat. *mīlĭtāris, belonging to a soldier*) is directly pertaining to soldiers, and so indirectly pertaining to war; as military discipline, which includes much besides what is peculiar to war, as, for instance, punctual routine, provisions, honours, ammunition, roads. "The town wore a very military appearance;" that is, there were many soldiers going about. SOLDIER-LIKE expresses what is appropriately belonging to the character, conduct, and appearance of a soldier, and is individually, not abstractedly, applied.

MARVEL. PRODIGY. WONDER. MIRACLE. MONSTER. PHENOMENON.

MARVEL (Fr. *merveille*, Lat. *mira*

bĭlis, wonderful) is commonly a related wonder. But it has also the wider sense of a production which strikes us with admiration as a work in its kind of surprising excellence.

PRODIGY (Lat. *prōdĭgium*) is an unusual portent of Nature.

WONDERS (A. S. *wunder, wundor*) are natural and true, and owe their character to our inexperience.

MIRACLES (Lat. *mīrăcŭlum, a marvel, mīrāri, to wonder*) are deviations from the known and established constitution and course of things, being supernatural, as wonders are natural, and marvels, for the most part, fictitious.

MONSTER (Fr. *monstre, monstrum, a divine omen*, from *mŏnere, to warn, advise*) is a marvellous deviation from the ordinary type, being some specific form, wonderful for enormity or shapelessness. A marvel or a wonder is complex, as a prodigy is simple. The former are occurrences, the latter phenomena. What is wonderful takes our senses, what is marvellous takes our reason, by surprise; what is prodigious is opposed to our experience. The wonderful is opposed to the common, the marvellous to the probable. Nature is full of wonders. The common production of an oak from an acorn is a wonder. The old romances abounded in the marvellous. Miracles attest the prophet. Prodigies were of frequent occurrence, according to Livy, in the earlier Roman history, as when a statue sweated, or a cow spoke with the human voice. A monster may be a creation of the imagination or a freak of Nature, as the hydra in one case, or a calf with six legs in the other. WONDER may be regarded also as the generic term which comprises the rest. Universal efforts of Nature produce prodigies. Supernatural power works miracles; a rare industry and artistic skill, or boldness, or genius works marvels. A marvel of painting or of architecture, for instance. In proportion as the laws and forces of Nature have become known, natural phenomena, as eclipses or electric fires, have ceased to be prodigies. As the Christian religion has become established, the original need of miracles has ceased. In proportion as art spreads, its marvels lose their character by becoming more common.

A PHENOMENON (Gr. φαινόμενον, *a thing shown*) is literally no more than an appearance—hence a striking or unexpected exhibition. In a scientific sense it denotes the outward result or illustration of a law, that part of a thing which presents itself to our observation as distinguished from the ground, substance, or unknown constitution which underlies it and puts it forth, as the phenomena of heat, electricity, or of the human mind.

"Among the various *phenomena* which the human mind presents to our view, there is none more calculated to excite our curiosity and our wonder than the communication which is carried on between the sentient thinking and active principle within us, and the material objects with which we are surrounded."—D. STEWART.

"With which they wrought such wondrous *marvels* there." SPENSER.

"And yesterday the bird of night did sit,
Ev'n at noonday, upon the market-place,
Hooting and shrieking. When these *prodigies*
Do so conjointly meet, let not men say
These are their reason, they are natural."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Behold a *wonder!* they but now who seemed
In bigness to surpass earth's giant sons,
Now less than smallest dwarfs in narrow room
Throng numberless." MILTON.

"A *miracle*, then, is the extraordinary effect of some unknown power in Nature limited by divine ordination and authority to its circumstances, for a suitable end."—GREW.

"A *monster* which hath not the shape of mankind, but in any part evidently bears the resemblance of the brute creation, hath no inheritable blood, and cannot be heir in any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage."—BLACKSTONE.

MASS. VOLUME. DIMENSIONS. QUANTITY.

The MASS (Fr. *masse*) is the quantity of matter belonging to a body.

The VOLUME (Lat. *vŏlūmen, volvĕre, to roll*) is its extent in length, width, and depth. One judges of the mass of a body by its weight, the weight of all bodies being proportionate to the quantity of matter which they contain.

DIMENSION (Lat. *dīmensiōnem*) is measure in a single line, as length, breadth, height, thickness, circumference. When the aggregate of these is expressed by the plural dimensions, it is equivalent to extent or size.

QUANTITY (Lat. *quantĭtātem*) is the abstract quality of amount, the being so much and neither more nor less. It is that attribute of a thing which makes it capable of measurement.

MASSACRE. CARNAGE. BUTCHERY. SLAUGHTER.

MASSACRE (Fr. *massacre*) denoted originally the killing of victims for sacrifice. It now denotes the promiscuous slaughter of many, and is more commonly applied to the destruction of human than of merely animal life. It is a term of direct reproach, being the act of treachery or indiscriminate barbarity.

CARNAGE (L. Lat. *carnāticum*, Lat. *carnem*, *flesh*) is such slaughter as produces a mass of animal remains. It expresses the same result as MASSACRE, but not the same intention. After a great battle there may be terrible carnage, yet no massacre. Barbarity, ferocity, atrocity in all their horrors dictate

BUTCHERY (Fr. *boucherie*, *a slaughter house*), which points more directly to the character of the person or persons committing acts of slaughter upon men, as if they were no better than animals.

SLAUGHTER (A. S. *sleán*, *to smite*, *to slay*) points not so directly to the character of the person as of the deed, and commonly denotes extensive, indiscriminate, or superfluous taking away of life, whether human or otherwise. It bears, however, no necessary meaning of wantonness or cruelty, but only extensive destruction of life, or the killing of a large carcase, when it is employed of the inferior animals.

MASTER. POSSESSOR. OWNER. PROPRIETOR.

As a synonym with the following, MASTER (Lat. *māgister*) relates primarily to beings gifted with life; the master of a house is the master of the persons inhabiting it. The other terms apply to mere *goods* as such. Master, however, denotes an active power; otherwise, though one might be POSSESSOR, he would not be master.

OWNER (A. S. *ágnian*, *to possess*) and PROPRIETOR (Fr. *proprietaire*, Lat. *proprius*, *one's own*) are essentially the same; but the former is more familiar and employed of less important as well as more important possessions. The owner of a book or an estate; the proprietor of an estate, not of a book. Unlike MASTER, these three terms indicate not of necessity active control. So a minor is, in the eye of the law, owner, proprietor, and possessor of his estate; but he is not master of it until he comes of age. So insane persons possess that over which they are not permitted to exercise control. Both OWNER and PROPRIETOR convey, as POSSESSOR does not necessarily, the idea of right. The possessor may have become such by fraud or force as against the rightful owner or proprietor.

"When I have made myself *master* of a hundred thousand drachmas."—ADDISON.

"Think of the happiness of the Prophets and Apostles, Saints and Martyrs, *possessors* of eternal glory."—LAW.

"It is evident that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man by being *master* of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property."—LOCKE.

MATERIALS. MATTER. SUBJECT.

MATERIALS (Lat. *mātĕriālis*, *belonging to matter*) is MATTER so selected or prepared as to serve the purpose of artificial production; while MATTER denotes, in the aggregate, all that constitutes the palpable and visible, as distinct from the world of mind, and spiritual conception or being. The productions of Nature are composed of matter; those of art, of materials. In their metaphorical application to things intellectual and literary, the matter of a work is the whole substance of it, as composed by the author; the materials are the exter-

nal elements which he imports and assimilates in the production of his work.

The SUBJECT (Lat. *subjectum, the thing placed under, the subject*), in this case, is that concerning which statements are made, or which is generally brought into view by discussion and illustration. In philosophy we meet with the compound term *subject-matter;* this is distinguished from *object-matter*. The former is that with which the science is directly, the latter that with which it is necessarily, but indirectly, concerned. For instance, of philosophy at large, it might be said, that its subject-matter is truth; its object-matter, happiness. It is important to distinguish specially between the matter and the subject. The matter is the class of objects of which one treats. The subject is the specific object of which one treats. The varieties of the Gospel are the matter of sermons. A particular sermon has, for instance, Charity for its subject.

"*Materials* for sacrifice."—DRAYTON.

"As thee, O Queen, the *matter* of my song." SPENSER.

"This *subject* for heroic song
Pleased me long choosing, and beginning late." MILTON.

MATURE. RIPE.

These words illustrate the tendency so often observable of Saxon words to adhere to the physical and literal, and of Latin words, to the moral and metaphorical.

RIPE (A. S. *ripe, víp, harvest*) is in Saxon what MATURE (*mātūrus, ripe*) is in Latin. RIPE denotes complete natural development, or what is simply analogous to it; as a fruit is ripe, or a plan of action is ripe. Consideration, judgment, thought, when carried out to the full, are said to be MATURE. RIPE belongs to what is ready to be dealt with practically; MATURE to what has had sufficient time bestowed upon it. A scheme is mature as being well digested, ripe as being fit for carrying out.

"When they (the acts of men) be done with such moderation that nothing in the doing may seem superfluous or indigent, we say that they be *maturely* done."—SIR T. ELYOT, *The Governour*.

"Should they submit ere our designs are *ripe*,
We both must perish in the common wreck,
Lost in a general undistinguish'd ruin."
ADDISON, *Cato*.

MAY. CAN.

CAN denotes power; MAY, probability, possibility, and permission. I can, or cannot, walk; that is, I have, or have not, the power to walk. It is remarkable that the negative CANNOT is used in the sense of extreme improbability; as, "Surely it cannot be raining with this bright sun;" in which cases it seems to take the place of MAY NOT. So we should say, "I think, with the wind from the south, it may rain to-day." But we should not say, "Surely, with the wind from the north, it may not," but "it cannot rain to-day." MAY NOT negatives, not probability, but permission.

MEAN. ABJECT. *For* MEAN *see* BASE *and* DESIGN.

The ABJECT (Lat. *abjectus, cast away, abjĭcĕre, to cast away*) represents the extreme of lowness as produced by mental causes, or social circumstances. Abject melancholy; abject poverty. It is not a term of purely moral import. Abject misery; abject superstition; not abject vice. It belongs to the low, not as it is base, but as it is disesteemed. ABJECT is also characteristically employed of the spirit. It is a term of comprehensive import. It belongs to the extreme of moral and social humiliation.

"And banish hence these *abject*, lowly dreams." SHAKESPEARE.

MEAT. FLESH.

MEAT (A. S. *mete*) is not a term directly expressive of any natural substance in particular, whereas FLESH (A. S. *flæsc*) is. In old English MEAT meant food. The meat-offering of the Anglican version of the Book of Leviticus is not flesh, but flour. Hence it follows that, as applied to the animal substance, meat is always eatable, while the flesh of many animals is not so.

MEDITATE. CONTEMPLATE. MUSE. REFLECT. CONSIDER. REGARD. PONDER. REVOLVE.

To CONTEMPLATE (Lat. *contemplāri*, part. *contemplātus*) is a more direct act of the mind than MEDITATE (*mĕdĭtāri*, part. *mĕdĭtātus*) or MUSE (Fr. *muser*, *to loiter or trifle*), as is seen in the difference of their grammatical use; CONTEMPLATE being essentially a transitive verb; MEDITATE and MUSE, except where MEDITATE is used in the sense of *intend*, being followed by the preposition upon. Meditation is internal; contemplation external. The poet, for instance, meditates; the astronomer contemplates. Not but that we may mentally contemplate a mental subject; yet, in that case, we still take, as it were, an external view of it, and consider it in itself, and in its totality; when we meditate upon it, we regard its internal nature, properties, bearings, relations, or issues. Contemplation takes in the whole at once; meditation takes it to pieces. Contemplation is fixed and sustained attention; meditation implies analysis, and the viewing of a subject in many different ways. We contemplate what is before us, or present in imagination, in fact, or in anticipation. We meditate on what is absent, past, or future. Hence the terms CONTEMPLATE and MEDITATE sometimes bespeak practical purpose or intention to act. To muse is to meditate with less effort of mind, and is incompatible with its painful exercise. We may meditate on a matter which has caused us profound sorrow; we should hardly be said to muse upon it. Yet MUSE seems to denote more decided absence of mind than MEDITATE. Musing belongs to the past, and, in this respect, unlike CONTEMPLATE and MEDITATE, is inapplicable to the future.

"He that accustoms himself to *meditate* upon the greatness of God, finds these questions continually rising and stirring in his heart."—SOUTH.

"To *Contemplation's* sober eye,
Such is the race of man;
And they that creep and they that fly,
Shall end where they began."
GRAY.

"There flow'ry hill, Hymettus with the sound
Of bees' industrious murmur oft invites
To studious *musing*." MILTON.

REFLECT (Lat. *reflĕctĕre*, *to bend backwards*) applies *solely* to the past. It is the turning back of the mind to meditate upon itself, its own acts and states, or what has occupied it, or been presented to it as external facts. Reflexion is commonly said of matters of speculation or moral action; CONSIDER (Lat. *considĕrāre*), of matters practical, requiring the use of observation and judgment. We reflect upon what we are or shall be, have done or ought to do. We consider facts or cases presented to us, our present condition, position, and resources, and what steps we ought to take for right action. Meditation is more involuntary than reflexion. We ponder and take to pieces and view in all its lights that which lies near our hearts; but we need often to be stopped in our career of heedlessness, and to have our minds drawn off from more attractive and less important things, in order that we may give serious reflexion to what we should otherwise disregard.

"Forced by *reflective* reason, I confess
That human science is uncertain guess."
PRIOR.

"But mercy, lady bright, that knowest well
My thoughts, and seest what harmes that I feel.
Consider all this, and rue upon my sore."
CHAUCER.

To REGARD (Fr. *regarder*, *to look*) is to look at with attention or interest; hence to consider in such a way as to form a judgment. This force it shares with consider; as, "I consider or regard him as a friend." In this sense CONSIDER implies more previous thought than REGARD. "I consider that he has acted wisely," would involve a more deliberate judgment to that effect, than "I regard his action as a wise one." The latter is to look upon in a certain light; the former is to do this upon certain grounds.

PONDER (Lat. *pondĕrāre*, *to weigh*) denotes a long-sustained meditation on what is of deep personal concern.

"He valued his religion beyond his own safety, and *regarded* not all the calumnies and reproaches of his enemies, as long as he made this his constant exercise—to keep a conscience void of offence, both towards God and towards men."—STILLINGFLEET.

"The modest queen awhile, with downcast eyes,
Pondered the speech, then briefly thus replies." DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

REVOLVE (Lat. *rĕvolvĕre, to roll back, to reflect upon*) is an analogous term. It is to turn a thing over and over repeatedly in the mind, as a material substance is turned over in the hand, for the purpose of viewing under all aspects and lights. It had formerly a peculiar application to books and reading, from the oldest books being parchment rolls, whence the word "volume."

"This having heard straight I again *revolved*
The Law and Prophets." MILTON.

MEDLEY. MIXTURE. MISCELLANY.

MEDLEY (Fr. *mêlée, mêler, to mix*, formerly *mesler*) is such a compound as involves a mass of ill-assorted, unrelated, or confused ingredients.

MISCELLANY (Lat. *miscellāneus, mixed*) is a compound of things which are so various as not to stand strictly connected, yet may be brought together for a purpose and with method. A miscellany has the diversity without the incongruity of a medley.

MIXTURE (Lat. *mixtura, a mixing*) is the more general term, denoting a combination or interfusion of particles or ingredients, which may be either congruous or incongruous, proportionate or disproportionate, judicious or injudicious. A mixture may be of two; a medley is of more than two.

"More oft in fools' and madmen's hands than sages',
She seems a *medley* of all ages."
SWIFT.

"In great villainies there is often such a *mixture* of the fool as quite spoils the whole project of the knave."—SOUTH.

"The *miscellaneous* matter I propose to give in these sheets, naturally coincides with the method I have taken of disposing them into distinct papers."—*Observer.*

MEET. FIT. APT.

MEET (A. S. *gemét, fit, proper*, and this from *métan, to meet with*; thus answering strictly to the Lat. *convĕniens*, and the older English *convenient*, in the sense of *fit*) is a moral term, as FIT is both natural and artificial or acquired, and APT natural only.

"It is *meet* and right so to do."—*Anglican Liturgy.*

"That which ordinary men are *fit* for, I am qualified in."—SHAKESPEARE.

"They have not always *apt* instruments."—BURKE.

MELODY. HARMONY. ACCORDANCE. CONCORD. UNISON.

MELODY (Gr. μελῳδία, *a singing*) is the rhythmical succession of sing notes in music, so as to form a who or musical thought.

HARMONY (Gr. ἁρμονία, *a fitting together, harmony*) is the concord of tw or more musical strains differing i pitch.

CONCORD (Lat. *concordia, con-, to gether*, and *cor, cordis, the heart*) the fitness of two or more sounds t be heard simultaneously, not being UNISONS (Lat. *ūnĭsŏnus, having one and the same sound*), *i.e.* similar notes, in different octaves, sounded together. ACCORDANCE expresses the abstract quality of which any given concord is the specific illustration. The first, third, and fifth notes of a key, being in accordance, form a concord when struck together.

"The *melody* of birds." MILTON.

"These accessory sounds, which are caused by the aliquots of a sonorous body vibrating at once, are called harmonies, and the whole system of modern *harmony* depends on them."—SIR W. JONES.

"While kindred notes, with undulation sweet,
Accordant wake from all thy vocal strings."
MASON.

"If the true *concord* of well-tuned sounds
By unions married do offend thine ear,
They do but singly chide thee, who confounds
In singleness the parts that thou should'st bear." SHAKESPEARE.

"They say of two strings that are perfect *unisons*, touch the one, the other also sounds."—LEIGHTON.

MEMORABLE. SIGNAL.

These terms are applied to facts or exemplifications of principle, proper-

ties, or character, but with some little difference of subject-matter.

SIGNAL (Lat. *signālis*, belonging to a *sign*, *signum*) is used of events in regard both to their moral and their historical value or importance. Thus we might say, "a signal bravery;" "a memorable exploit;" "signal," not "memorable," "benevolence." It may be added, that SIGNAL expresses an already existent notoriety; MEMORABLE, that such notoriety is due. As they relate to actual occurrences, that is signal which is conspicuously remarkable as well as memorable. That is memorable which, whether externally striking or not, is to be had in remembrance, for its intrinsic importance. That which is signal is striking, conspicuous, produces a marked effect and sensation, having the character which is best expressed by the French *éclat*.

"These knowing no other Europeans but Spaniards, it might be expected they would treat all strangers with the same cruelty which they had so often and so *signally* exerted against their Spanish neighbours."—ANSON'S *Voyages*.

"Yet registers of *memorable* things
Would help, great prince, to make thy judgment sound,
Which to the eye a perfect mirror brings,
Where all should glass themselves who would be crowned." STIRLING.

MEMORIAL. MONUMENT. REMINDER.

MEMORIAL (Lat. *mĕmŏriāle*, neut. of *mĕmŏriālis*, *belonging to memory*) and MONUMENT (Lat. *mŏnŭmentum*, *a memorial*) have, etymologically, the meaning in common, of something which puts in mind, or aids the memory. They differ in their applications. A monument is public, and purposely set up to keep in general remembrance. A memorial may be private, and may keep in remembrance not by the nature of the thing, but by circumstance and association.

REMINDER is a casual and temporary memorial, and applies, as the other two do not, more especially to the future, in connexion with obligations and intentions incurred or formed in the past. MEMORIAL belongs more to the feelings of individuals; MONUMENT, to the cherished remembrance of illustrious deeds by the public. A memorial is the more affectionate; monument, the more laudatory.

"And was it not worthy his being hated of his brethren, and being sold out of his country, to give such a noble example of fidelity and chastity, as to stand a *monument* of it in Holy Writ for the admiration and imitation of all following ages?"—SOUTH.

A memorial or a reminder may consist in words. Not so a monument, though it may bear them.

"Though of their names in heavenly records now
Be no *memorial*, blotted out and razed
By their rebellion from the Book of Life."
MILTON.

"There is an active and actual knowledge in a man of which these outward objects are rather the *reminders* than the first begetters or implanters."—MORE.

MEMORY. RECOLLECTION. REMEMBRANCE. REMINISCENCE.

MEMORY (*see* above) is the generic term, expressive of that capacity of the mind by which we retain the knowledge of past thoughts or events.

REMEMBRANCE (Lat. *rĕmĕmŏrāri*, *to call to mind*) and RECOLLECTION (Lat. *rĕcollĭgere*, part. *rĕcollectus*, *to gather again*) express, the former the simple action, the latter the exercise of the memory. "Do you remember me?" "I do." This implies no more than a state; an impression has not been effaced. RECOLLECT denotes an effort often of a complex character. "I cannot recollect all the circumstances of the story, but I remember it generally."

REMINISCENCE (Lat. *rĕmĭnisci*, *to remember*), like RECOLLECTION, involves a more decidedly conscious, and less spontaneous, exercise of the memory than REMEMBER; but reminiscence is the recovery of single traces or circumstances; recollection is a combination of several. What sensibility is to sensation, memory is to remembrance.

"This laying up of our ideas in the repository of the *memory*, signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception an-

nexed to them, that it has had them before."—LOCKE.

"In other cases, the various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are recalled in consequence of an effort of our will. This latter operation, too, is often called by the same name, memory, but is more properly distinguished by the word *recollection*."—STEWART.

"Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that every man is born with a certain *reminiscence*, and that when we seem to be taught, we are only put in mind of what we knew in a former state."—BOLINGBROKE.

"And so likewise, though not so frequently, religion is expressed by the *remembrance* of God. Now, *remembrance* is the actual thought of what we do habitually know. To remember God is to have him actually in our minds, and upon all proper occasions to revive the thoughts of Him."—TILLOTSON.

Reminiscence is intermediate between remembrance and recollection, being more conscious and energetic than remembrance, but less particular and detailed than recollection. REMINISCENCE is commonly used in the sense of a faint, and, as it were, shadowy remembrance.

MENTION. NOTICE.

A MENTION (Lat. *mentionem*) is more explicit than NOTICE (Lat. *nōtĭtĭa, knowledge*), in one sense of the term NOTICE, and less so in another. MENTION commonly means the simple direction of attention to an object in words, without further account or treatment of it. NOTICE, as it is purely mental and is synonymous with observation, falls short of this. On the other hand, as synonymous with announcement, NOTICE is more explicit than MENTION, being the formal mention of something by way of information. In both senses, however, there is in NOTICE a more active excitement of attention in our own mind or in that of another. We mention a fact as such; we give notice of it, as being a matter of interest to others. So much less lively is the sense of MENTION than that of NOTICE, that the word sometimes means little more than the utterance of the name of a person or an object, as in the following example:—

"Now the *mention* (of God's name) is vain when it is useless, and it is useless when it is neither likely nor intended to serve any good purpose."—PALEY.

"But they persisted deaf and would not seem
To count them things worth *notice*."
MILTON.

Yet NOTICE is never a word of strong meaning: we may be said to notice with our minds anything which we do not overlook, and with our lips anything which we do not pass over in silence.

MERCILESS. UNMERCIFUL.

The former is actively, the latter passively, deficient in mercy. The man who is bent upon retaliation or retribution, and will not listen to any pleading or possible extenuation of the offence is UNMERCIFUL. If, when the time of vengeance is come, he sanctions or inflicts excessive pain upon the offender, he is MERCILESS.

"*Merciless* to dying sinners in stopping up the passages of repentance and salvation against them."—SOUTH.

"The temple is of no use without an altar, and the man cannot pray without mercy. God never can hear the prayers of an *unmerciful* man."—BP. TAYLOR.

MERCY. CLEMENCY. LENIENCY. COMPASSION. PITY. COMMISERATION. CONDOLENCE. SYMPATHY.

MERCY (Fr. *merci*, Lat. *mercēdem*) has relation to the infliction of retaliation or punishment, and denotes in general a disposition on the part of superiors in power whether by authority or by circumstances not to exact all the suffering from an offender which would be due on the score of his offence; or, in a wider sense, not to exact the whole amount of what is due on the score of any obligation when the rendering of it would inflict pain or privation. Mercy is judicial in its character, without sentiment, and laying hold of external circumstances which may warrant a diminution of punishment. It is a moral and especially a Christian duty in all. On the other hand it must not interfere with the efficient administration of justice.

PITY, on the other hand (Fr. *pitié*, Lat. *pietātem*) is more purely personal and emotional, not discriminating calmly, as mercy does, between cir-

cumstances which do and do not diminish the culpability of the individual, or are affected by his moral character. Moreover, mercy is felt or exercised toward those who are in our power; pity, to such as may not be so. The judge may have mercy upon the criminal or not. The crowd may pity him or not. We pity others *as sufferers*. We are merciful to them *as offenders*.

COMPASSION (Lat. *compassiōnem, fellow-feeling*) and pity are much alike; but compassion is such fellow-feeling in trouble as comes from an equal; pity, such as comes from one who in some sense is a superior. We should feel, for instance, pity, not compassion, for a dumb animal overburdened, or in any way ill-treated. Pity often implies an approach to contempt, which compassion never does, having in it more of tenderness, and less of weakness. We compassionate those into whose state or feelings we may conceive ourselves as entering. We may pity those with whom we feel at the time nothing in common, as the reckless or the silly. Hence a high-spirited person will feel it a degradation to be an object of pity. The martyr or the dying hero are not objects of pity. The object of pity, according to Aristotle, is suffering not wholly unmerited, but the result of faults rather than crimes, as shown in characters of common stamp. Pity is a quality belonging to rational beings in virtue of their common nature, the feeling extending to inferior creatures so far as, like themselves, they are capable of suffering. It sleeps in the human heart till awaked by the sight of agony or misery, or the cry of pain. He who is without pity is cruel. The love of the divine Father, Christianity teaches us, is infinite pity, the love of the incarnate Son is infinite compassion.

"The Lord is long-suffering, and of great *mercy*, forgiving iniquity and transgression, and by no means clearing the guilty."—*Bible*.

"His fate *compassion* in the victor bred. Stern as he was, he yet revered the dead." POPE.

"Oughtest thou not to have had *compassion* on thy fellow-servant, even as I had *pity* on thee?"—*Bible*.

CLEMENCY (Lat. *clēmentia*) and LENIENCY (Lat. *lēnīre, to soften*), like MERCY, are employed not of suffering generally, as PITY and COMPASSION, but in regard to offenders or merited punishment. Clemency lies rather in the disposition of the person; leniency, in the character of the act. We speak of lenient, but could not speak of clement, punishment. Clemency is a magisterial quality, a virtue or not according to circumstances. It lies in the discretion of individuals, and so may be exercised in a mistaken manner.

SYMPATHY (Gr. *συμπάθεια, fellow-feeling*) is literally a fellow-feeling with others, whether in joy or grief. It is now commonly restricted to such a feeling under pain or trouble, and so nearly resembles COMMISERATION (Lat. *commĭsĕrāre, to pity, to excite compassion*); but sympathy involves equality, while commiseration may, and most commonly does, imply inferiority in some sense on the part of the suffering party. Commiseration may be regarded as standing midway between pity and compassion, having less contempt than pity, and less generosity than compassion. Yet commiseration is a softer emotion than compassion. We speak of a barren compassion more often than of a barren commiseration, as if the former were more easily assumed than the latter. May we not say that where both are equally sincere, compassion is the more noble, commiseration the more tender? CLEMENCY is used analogously of other forces than human action; as the clemency of the seasons. It denotes no more than an indisposition to employ rigorous measures, where it is used of persons. LENIENCY expresses the fact of such absence of rigour, and is applicable to the judgment as well as the conduct. We may judge as well as treat leniently. In some such cases the leniency may come of other kinds of disposition besides compassion; and accordingly leniency is not so purely moral as clemency. Prejudice, weakness, or even guilt in ourselves, may induce us to

regard the character or conduct of others with leniency.

"I know you are more *clement* than wild men,
Who of their broken debtors take a third,
A sixth, a tenth, letting them thrive again
On their abatement. That's not my desire." SHAKESPEARE.

"Say that my *lenity* shall grant your prayer.
How for the future shall I rest assured
Of your allegiance?" SMOLLETT.

"Common experience is my guide, and that must have informed everybody how much we continually *sympathize* with the sentiments and affections of the company among whom we converse." — SEARCH, *Light of Nature.*

"There is one kind of virtue which is inborn in the nobility, and indeed, in most of the ancient families of this nation;—they are not apt to insult on the misfortunes of their countrymen. But you, sir—I may tell it you without flattery—have grafted on this natural *commiseration*, and raised it to a nobler virtue."—DRYDEN.

CONDOLENCE (Lat. *condŏlēre, to suffer with*) is to sympathy as the expression of feeling to the feeling itself.

"I come not, Samson, to *condole* thy chance,
As these, perhaps; yet wish it had not been,
Though for no friendly intent."
MILTON.

MERIT. DESERT. WORTH.

Of these, DESERT (O. Fr. *deserte*, from *deservir, to deserve*) and MERIT (Lat. *mĕrĭtum*, from *mĕrēri, to deserve*) have the twofold meaning of the moral quality or relationship of good and of evil deserving; though the noun when used without qualification is assumed in a favourable sense and without the uncertainty which belongs to the verb, while WORTH (A. S. *weordh*) is employed only in a favourable sense. Worth is the intrinsic and permanent value of moral character, and belongs to the persons. Merit belongs to the action and particular case. The verb MERIT is stronger than the verb DESERVE. "He deserves a reward," would imply no more than that there is a fitness in the case for such reward. "He merits a reward," that there would be an injustice in withholding it. Worth describes the qualities; merit, the actions of a man. MERIT and DESERT are well-nigh identical in meaning; but MERIT is used more abstractedly; as, "the merits of the case;" "the merits of a literary production." It represents excellency less strictly in connexion with its dues than does DESERT, which always takes into account some correspondent treatment of persons.

Worth belongs directly to moral character. Merit may accrue from what is excellent in other ways, as literary merit.

"High words that bore
Semblance of *worth*, not substance."
MILTON.

"All power
I give thee. Reign for ever, and assume
Thy *merits*." MILTON.

"Fame due to vast *desert* is kept in store,
Unpaid till the deserver is no more."
CONGREVE.

METAMORPHOSE. TRANSFIGURE. TRANSFORM. TRANSMUTE.

We speak of a thing as METAMORPHOSED (Gr. *μεταμόρφωσις, transformation*) when, the identity being preserved, the form, or particles composing it are entirely changed.

TRANSFIGURATION (Lat. *transfĭgūrātionem*) is such a marked change as still, however, leaves the original figure or form plainly discernible.

TRANSFORMATION (Lat. *transformātionem*) is the normal or permanent change in the form of bodies, which is the result of internal laws of growth; as the transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly.

TRANSMUTATION (Lat. *transmutationem, a transposition*) is employed more commonly, not of the whole, but of the particles which constitute it. Transformation usually does not go beyond a change of visible appearance, as the transformation of an actor by a change of dress. Metamorphosis is change of internal structure also. Narcissus was not only transformed into the likeness, but metamorphosed into the substance, of a flower. TRANSFIGURATION and TRANSMUTATION denote the highest degree, the former of spiritual, the latter of material, change. Our Saviour was transfigured upon the mount. It was supposed that the philosopher's stone,

if found, would transmute other substances into gold. METAMORPHOSE is a term which belongs peculiarly to the region of mythology and fable; TRANSFORMATION to the natural order of things. A metamorphosis is commonly a marvellous, unexpected, prodigious, complete change of form. Transformation is the only one of the terms which lends itself to express a purely moral change of character, as if a sinner should be transformed into a saint. There was a mystical and theological use of this term. By sustained and intense contemplation of God, the soul might be transformed into the Deity.

"Thus men my Lord he *metamorphosed*
From seemely shape to byrds and ugly beasts." GASCOIGNE.

"He was *transfigured* before them."—*English Bible.*

"Thus it must be in our *transformation* onwards. The Spirit of God doth thus alter us through grace, whiles we are yet for essence the same."—BP. HALL.

"That perpetual course of *transmutation* which the matter of human bodies runs."—SCOTT'S *Christian Life.*

METAPHOR. FIGURE. SIMILITUDE. SIMILE.

FIGURE (Lat. *fĭgūra, shape, figure of speech*), as here referred to, is a rhetorical mode of expressing abstract ideas in words, suggesting pictures drawn from the world of sensible images.

METAPHOR (Gr. μεταφορά) is a SIMILITUDE (Lat. *sĭmĭlĭtudĭnem, likeness, a simile*) conveyed in a word, as a similitude is a comparison by an image conveyed in more than one term. As "a torrent of eloquence," is a metaphor. "His words flow like a stream," is a similitude. The SIMILE is the root idea of which the similitude is the rhetorical amplification. The simile is a matter of thought; the similitude, a feature of style.

"In all languages the series of physical causes and effects is *metaphorically* likened to a chain, the links of which are supposed to be indissolubly and necessarily connected."—D. STEWART.

"The Temple of Jerusalem was reallie the materiall temple, and *figurativelie* it was the bodie of Christ."—FOX, *Martyrs.*

"Such is the *similitude* between Judaism the ancient stock, and Christianity which was engrafted upon it."—GILPIN, *Sermons.*

"*Similes* always fail in some part."—LOCKE.

MIGHTY. STRONG. POWERFUL. POTENT.

MIGHTY (A. S. *miht, might*) denotes the possession of force or power of any kind, whether bodily or mental; and, in an extended sense, the possession of ample resources for effective action; as, a mighty nation.

STRONG (A. S. *strang*) is a term of great simplicity and breadth, denoting physical power in action, in endurance, or in resistance, the possession of ample resources of action; denoting also that which is morally or logically cogent or influential, efficacious, stimulating, well-established, vigorous by nature, or energetic on a specific occasion.

POWERFUL, according to its derivation (Fr. *pouvoir*), denotes the capability of producing great effects of any kind, which is also the definition of POTENT (Lat. *pŏtens*, part. of *posse, to be able*); but POTENT is not so commonly employed of directly physical force, but of physical and moral influence, or of influence alone. A powerful arm or blow. A potent remedy; a potent prince. MIGHTY expresses the union of majesty with strength, and belongs peculiarly to living beings. It would be only by an effort of the imagination, attributing to it a kind of personality, that a machine could be called mighty. Nor in this case should we say strong, but powerful, unless we meant that it was firmly constructed. STRONG and POWERFUL are both used of physical force; the latter, both of that which is mechanical and that which is muscular; the former, only of that which is muscular. In their application to persons, a powerful man is strong; but a strong man is not necessarily powerful. STRONG is more appropriately used of those who are of sound constitution and firmness of body, and are capable of bearing much fatigue; POWERFUL, of those who can put forth great force at the moment. Power is active in its signification; strength, active and

passive. A strong mind is firm, and not easily shaken by adverse circumstances. A powerful mind exerts strong influence over others.

"Great Gormond, having with huge *mightiness*
Ireland subdued, and therein fixed his throne." SPENSER.

"He ceased; and next him Moloch, sceptr'd king,
Stood up, the *strongest* and the fiercest spirit
That fought in heaven, now fiercer by despair." MILTON.

"*Strong* and substantial, it hath stood against all the storms of factions, both of belief and ambition, which so *powerfully* beat upon it."—DANIEL.

"His founder's merit was the merit of a gentleman raised by the arts of a court and the protection of a Wolsey to the eminence of a great and *potent* lord."—BURKE.

MIMIC. IMITATE. APE. MOCK. SIMULATE.

To MIMIC (Lat. adj. *mīmĭcus*) is to ridicule by imitation of what is personally peculiar.

To IMITATE (Lat. *ĭmĭtāri*, part. *ĭmĭtātus*) is the generic term, of which the rest are kinds, having the broad sense of following as an example or pattern, or producing an external semblance of anything, and is applicable both to physical production, and to moral conformity of conduct. To APE is servilely to imitate, especially in externals, commonly implying the inability to imitate higher peculiarities, and better worth imitating. The term does not, like MIMIC, involve contemptuous imitation.

SIMULATE (Lat. *sĭmŭlāre; sĭmĭlis, like*) expresses that kind of imitation which amounts to a fictitious exhibition of character, the wearing of another's appearance, the comporting of one's self so as to be mistaken for him. It is rhetorically applied to things as well as persons; so it is a peculiarity of hysterical disorder that it simulates different diseases.

MOCK (Fr. *moquer*) denotes such action as manifests ridicule or contempt. A derisive exhibition of personal peculiarities is an easy and natural way of showing such contempt; but, inasmuch as it is not the only way, mockery includes the idea of personal insult and derision in any manner openly indicative of contempt, even though there be no mimicry in the mocking. The object of mockery is to make a man ridiculous or contemptible in his own eyes. It indicates the worst conceivable disposition towards him, and so is the most irreconcilable insult. It is hatred, outrage, and contempt in one. Yet effective as it is in itself, it indicates weakness of mind in those who employ it.

"When full-grown, vanity is the worst of vices and the occasional *mimic* of them all. It makes the whole man false."—BURKE.

"*Imitation* is a facultie to expresse truelie and perfitelie that example which ye go about to folow."—ASCHAM.

"The people of England will not *ape* the fashions they have never tried, nor go back to those which they have found mischievous on trial."—BURKE.

"And many a fane he reared that still sublime
In massy pomp has *mocked* the stealth of time." WARTON,

"The first smooth Cæsar's art caressed,
Merit and virtue *simulating* me."
THOMSON.

MIND. INTELLECT. SPIRIT. SOUL.

MIND (A. S. *mynd*) is taken to denote the whole rational faculty in man, the power of judgment, and sometimes a particular state of the judgment; a bias of the intellectual or the moral nature; a judgment or opinion; an inclination or desire.

The INTELLECT (Lat. *intellectus*) is commonly taken for the faculty of man's nature, by which he knows, as distinguished from those by which he perceives only or desires; especially his capacity for the higher forms of knowledge. The word was formerly commonly used in the plural.

SPIRIT (Lat. *spīrĭtus, breath*), and SOUL (A. S. *sáwl*) both denote that in a man's nature which is not his body; but SPIRIT is used relatively; SOUL, absolutely. SPIRIT is employed when some idea of the body which it tenants, or has tenanted, is still in the mind; SOUL, as denoting man's higher, spiritual, and immortal self. When taken by themselves, SPIRIT often expresses energy of moral resolution; SOUL,

energy of feeling. A spiritless performance; a soulless composition. Mind is opposed to matter; soul, to body; spirit, to flesh. The intellect is often coupled, and even contrasted, with the will.

"First, in man's *mind* we find an appetite
To learn and know the truth of everything,
Which is co-natural, and born with it,
And from the essence of the soul doth spring."
DAVIES, *Immortality of the Soul.*

"The privilege of a much nearer access than is allowed us to contemplate God's perfections, the advantage of having incomparably more illuminated *intellects* to apprehend them with."—BOYLE.

"Or unsphere
The *spirit* of Plato, to unfold
What worlds or what vast regions hold
Th' immortal mind that hath forsook
Her mansion in this fleshy nook."
MILTON.

"Four different opinions have been entertained concerning the origin of human *souls:* 1. That they are eternal and divine. 2. That they were created in a separate state of existence before their union with the body. 3. That they have been propagated from the original stock of Adam, who contained in himself the mental as well as the corporeal seed of his posterity. 4. That each soul is occasionally created and embodied in the moment of conception."—GIBBON, *Decline and Fall.*

MISCONSTRUE. MISINTERPRET.

The difference is slight between the usages of these terms; yet MISCONSTRUE (prefix *mis-*, the Fr. *mes-*, which is the Lat. *mĭnus*, and *construĕre, to construct*) seems more commonly employed of things of which the meaning has to be gathered by inference; MISINTERPRET (Lat. *interprĕtem, an interpreter*), of those of which it is directly expressed. Hence we should say, "to misinterpret words or actions;" "to misconstrue motives." The simple verb CONSTRUE stands to sentences as INTERPRET does to words. MISCONSTRUE seems more general than MISINTERPRET, which is more direct and personal. Interpretations should be truthful. Constructions of conduct should be charitable. I misinterpret a man's actions when I pass wrong judgment. I misconstrue them when I err in the nature of their intentions.

"When the apostle had been speaking of the righteousness of God displayed by the wickedness of man, he was not unaware of the *misconstruction* to which this representation was liable"—PALEY.

"Mr. Hume's great principle with respect to the origin of our ideas, which (as I before hinted) is only that of Locke under a new form, asserts the same doctrine with greater conciseness, but in a manner still less liable to *misinterpretation.*"—STEWART.

MISERABLE. UNHAPPY. WRETCHED.

UNHAPPY (prefix *un-*, and *hap, luck*) is the least forcible of these terms. A child deprived of its toy is unhappy. It may amount to little more than the absence of positive contentment.

MISERABLE (Lat. *mĭserābĭlis*), and WRETCHED (A. S. *wrec, wretched*) are employed only of the extreme degrees of unhappiness in feeling and reflexion. MISERABLE seems to denote rather the feeling or state; WRETCHED, the outward exhibition of such unhappiness; as the beggar who is in a miserable condition presents a wretched appearance.

"Our language, by a peculiar significance of dialect, calls the covetous man the *miserable* man."—SOUTH.

MISERABLE and WRETCHED imply a higher organization and faculties of reflexion than unhappy. An irrational animal might be unhappy. He who loses hope is miserable, and, if he fall into despair, is wretched. Great unhappiness must be supposed if the condition of the person is called miserable. In that case unhappy expresses the state directly, miserable the effect or impression produced by it. A life is unhappy in which something occurs to mar the happiness of it, a life is miserable which is destitute of the elements of happiness. MISERABLE and WRETCHED very commonly, and UNHAPPY less commonly and with less force and latitude of meaning, are employed to denote the debasement rather than the actual suffering of such conditions. The proud and prosperous quite as much as the suffering and the poor are in the sight of an infinitely perfect God "miserable sinners." It is in this

way that we speak of a miserable writer, and his wretched productions.

"No doubt there is to every wrong and vicious act a suitable degree of *unhappiness* and punishment annexed."—WOOLASTON.

"Every man, be he never so extreme and *wretched* a sinner, may and ought to hope assuredly, that albeit the majesty of God is supereminent and unspeakable dignity, yet is He gracious, merciful, and mild."—FULLER.

MODE. MANNER.

While MODE (Lat. *mŏdus*) is also applicable to way of *being*, MANNER (Fr. *manière*) denotes way of *action*. Manner, too, is casual; mode, systematic. MODE might be defined regular manner. Hence manner of action implies voluntariness on the part of the agent; mode of action, uniformity in the thing acting. Modes of existence. Manners of conduct or operation.

"If they find a determinate intellection of any *modes* of being which were never in the least hinted by their external or internal senses, I'll believe that such can realize chimæras."—GLANVILL.

"It is not the *manner* of the Romans to deliver any man to die before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face."—*English Bible.*

MODERATE. TEMPER.

Both MODERATE (Lat. *mŏdĕrare* and *-ri*) and TEMPER (Lat. *temperāre*), denote the reducing of that which is excessive. But that is moderated which is reduced by *any* force. That is tempered which is reduced by an alien and contrary force. So, for instance, anger is moderated by pride, calculation, good manners, or regard for appearances. On the other hand, it may be tempered by compassion, by love, by recollection of previous kindness. A man insulted by another may moderate his anger in order to gather up his strength and satisfy his revenge. Irritated by a child, his anger is tempered by a feeling of pity for the ignorance and weakness of one so young. So again, great grief at the loss of a friend might be moderated by a feeling of the strong duty of submission to the Divine will, or the necessity which we recognize of not aggravating the grief of others by our own lamentations. It might be tempered by a certain joy that great pain was at an end, or that the death to us so heavy a loss, was a gain and a blessing to the departed, and a hope of reunion in another and a better life. To moderate is to suppress; to temper is to counterbalance. The former belongs rather to the manifestation of feeling, the latter to the feeling itself. It is one thing to moderate laughter, and another to temper the sense of ridicule. Religion may be said to moderate the troubles of men so far as it leads to resignation, to temper them so far as it gives consolation.

MODERN. NEW. NOVEL. FRESH. RECENT.

MODERN (Lat. *mŏdernus*, from *mŏdŏ*, *just now*) denotes the thing of to-day, as distinguished historically from the things of former times; NEW (Lat *nŏvus*) that which has been just formed, or just submitted to our observation or experience; NOVEL (Lat. *nŏvellus*), that which being new, strikes us also with a feeling of strangeness; FRESH (A. S. *ferse*), that of which the influence is unabated or revived, or which, being new, strikes us with a sense of abundance in supply; RECENT (Lat. *rĕcentem*), that between which and the present moment a short interval only has elapsed. It may or may not be in existence still. MODERN belongs at least to an order of things which still exists, and has its influence on society. Recent facts are fresh in our memory. Modern fashions are in vogue in the present day. What we get in exchange for the old is new. What has never occurred before, or never in the same form, is novel. As NEW is opposed to old, so is NOVEL to familiar or expected. That which is new presupposes something precedent. That which is novel is abruptly new. The new year follows the old. A new edition is one more edition. A novel style of writing is one which is exhibited for the first time. The novel affects our understanding, imagination, or taste; the new is only a fresh item of our experience.

"Yet was much taxed, by that age precise,
For faults which *modern* times not strange have thought."

STIRLING.

"And thou profoundest hell,
Receive thy *new* possessor."
MILTON.

"I must beg not to have it supposed that I am setting up any *novel* pretensions for the honour of my own country."—WALPOLE.

"That love which first was set will first decay;
Mine of a *fresher* date, will longer stay."
DRYDEN.

"Amphitryon, *recent* from the nether sphere." LEWIS, *Statius.*

MODIFY. QUALIFY.

To MODIFY (Lat. *mŏdĭfĭcare, to set limits*) is to change the form or external qualities of a thing, to vary by giving a new form or shape; to reduce to other and often diminished limits. It is not employed directly of physical objects, but of physical substances and properties. We do not modify wood or stone, but matter in the abstract, or such properties or effects as light and sound. We modify what has a mental or subjective form and totality, as a rule, by making its requirements more or less stringent, or a contract by altering its terms; we QUALIFY (Lat. *quāles, of what kind*, and *făcĕre, to make*) when we impart to a thing requisite properties by addition or diminution. We modify the form and qualify the substance of things. We modify by remodelling, we qualify by reconstituting. We modify by changing the outlines, we qualify by changing the ingredients. A statement which is too large needs to be modified, one which is too strong, to be qualified.

MOMENT. INSTANT.

INSTANT (Lat. *instāre*, part. *instantem, to be at hand*) is the point of time now present.

MOMENT (Lat. *mōmentum*, for *movimentum*, from *mŏvēre, to move*) is not restricted to the present, but is common to it and the past. We say, "Do so this instant;" or, "He thought so at the moment" (not "at the instant"); or, "Do so this moment." But they may be used interchangeably when they are used abstractedly from what occurs in them, or as simply equivalent to a point, or the shortest possible or conceivable time. "In the twinkling of an eye;" "In a moment," or, "In an instant." "It happened at that moment," or "at that instant." MOMENT is not employed to express so strictly as INSTANT a minute point of time, has a more extended signification, and is often equivalent to time when a thing occurred. MOMENT takes into itself other associations than that of time, while INSTANT is merely the minutest period. So it has made all the difference between success and failure to act at the right instant or an instant too late. The same results have turned upon seizing or letting slip the favourable moment. Every moment is precious to those who know the value of time. Instant is an atom of time in general. Moment is a little piece of our time. "I have not a moment to lose; I must go this instant." So happy moments, not happy instants.

"All these which in a *moment* Thou behold'st,
The kingdoms of the world, to Thee I give." MILTON.

"He made him stoop perforce unto his knee,
And do unwilling worship to the saint
That on his shield depainted did he see:
Such homage, till that *instant*, never learned he." SPENSER.

MONARCH. PRINCE. SOVEREIGN. POTENTATE.

MONARCH (Gr. *μόναρχος, ruling alone*) denotes the possessor of supreme and peculiar power politically. It determines nothing of the extent of such power, but only that it is undivided. Hence the term is employed rhetorically of what is first of its kind in Nature. "The monarch of the forest or of the beasts."

The term PRINCE (Fr. *prince*, Lat. *princĭpem*) is also indefinite as to the extent of power, and commonly denotes a secondary degree of it; so that a monarch or his nobles might equally be called princes.

SOVEREIGN (Fr. *souverain*) is an hereditary monarch viewed in his relation to his own subjects; while POTENTATE (Low Lat. *pŏtentātus, a sovereign*) expresses the possession of great power, authority, and extended

dominion, as well as his relation to other princes and nations, or, as they are sometimes called, powers.

"Heaven's awful *monarch*."
MILTON.

"The sistere I salle gyve a rich *prince* of myght." R. BRUNNE.

"Charitee,
Whiche *is* the vertue *soveraine*."
GOWER.

"Exalting him not only above earthly *princes* and *potentates*, but above the highest of the celestial hierarchy."—BOYLE.

MOOD. TEMPER. HUMOUR.

HUMOUR (Lat. *hūmōrem, moisture*) and MOOD (A. S. *mōd, mind, disposition*) agree in denoting a temporary state of the mind and feelings; but MOOD relates more directly to the mind, HUMOUR to the feelings.

TEMPER (Fr. *tempérer, to temper*, Lat. *temperāre*) is the constitution of the mind, particularly in regard to the passions and affections, or to some one which modifies its disposition generally.

"With pity calmed, down fell his angry *mood*." SHAKESPEARE.

"Remember with what mild and gracious *temper* he both heard and judged."—MILTON.

"Examine how your *humour* is inclined,
And what the ruling passion of your mind."
ROSCOMMON.

MORALS. MORALITY.

MORALS (Lat. *mōres*) is a word denoting the doctrine and practice of the duties of life. MORALITY is the relation in conformity or nonconformity to the principles of morals, but often employed in reference to the former alone.

MORBID. DISEASED.

These are etymologically equivalent, MORBID being the Latin form (*morbĭdus, sickly; morbus, disease*) of the English DISEASE, *i.e. dis-ease*, violation of *ease* and well-being; but MORBID has a technical application to cases of a prolonged nature; to continuous derangement or deterioration without violent symptoms, and is as often used of the mental as of the physical constitution; as, a morbid condition of the nervous system, a morbid sensibility. It is also employed, only abstractedly, of states and conditions, not of parts affected. We say "a diseased," but not "a morbid limb." MORBID expresses that abnormal influence which tends to show itself in disease.

"Whilst the distempers of a relaxed fibre prognosticate and prepare all the *morbid* force of convulsion in the body of the state, the steadiness of the physician is overpowered by the very aspect of the disease." BURKE.

"They should choose such places as were open to the most favourable aspects and influence of the heavens, where there was a well-tempered soil, clear air, pure springs of water, that *diseased* persons coming from unhealthy places might obtain recovery."—BATES.

MOREOVER. BESIDES.

These terms agree in expressing an additional fact by way of reason to what may have been stated already. They seem to differ, not in themselves, but in the relative weight of the reason which they introduce; MOREOVER implying that what is added is of some importance; while BESIDES implies that though stated with a view to add weight, the case would have been good enough without it. "I cannot well go out to-day; I am much engaged; besides, it is beginning to rain." "There will always be war among men, so long as ambition reigns in human hearts; moreover, other causes are perpetually at hand."

MOROSE. SULLEN.

MOROSENESS (Lat. *mōrōsus, self-willed*) and SULLENNESS (formerly *solein*, Lat. *sōlus, alone, lonely*) are states of mind or temper; but the former manifests itself in those who are in influence; the latter, in those who are in subservience. "If the master is morose, little wonder that the servant is sullen." Moroseness comes from harsh views of human nature; sullenness, from a feeling of discontent. The one is wrong actively; the other, wrong passively. The one is a matter of treatment; the other, a matter of endurance. Moroseness is more purely mental; sullenness shows itself in the demeanour.

"Many in all ages have followed St. John into the wilderness, and chosen retirement

not out of any *moroseness* of temper or misanthropy."—BISHOP HORNE.

"I found him seated with so much *sullen* and stupid gravity, that, notwithstanding what had been told me, I really took him for an idiot, whom the people, from some superstitious notions, were ready to worship."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

MOTION. MOVEMENT. LOCOMOTION.

MOTION (Lat. *mōtiōnem, a moving*) is abstract, MOVEMENT is concrete, that is, bound up with the thing itself that moves. So, the laws of motion; the movements of the planets; the movements of an army; or a body of men in motion. The motion of the heavenly bodies might be spoken of as well as their movements. In that case, the idea of motion is opposed to that of rest; movement is definite and specific motion in regard to a particular subject. Hence MOTION is a more scientific or technical word than movement. So we use the terms, "perpetual motion;" "composition and resolution of motion," not of movement. On the other hand, where personal action is regarded as under rule, we apply to such changes of the bodily position the term MOVEMENT. "He made a motion with his hand." "Some animals are naturally graceful in their movements."

LOCOMOTION (Lat. *lŏcus, a place,* and *mŏvēre,* part. *mōtus, to move*) is the particular motion from one place to another. In locomotion the whole body moves, in motion either the whole or one or more of the parts. Motion is seen in plants, but not locomotion.

"Devoid of sense and *motion.*"
MILTON.

"In human works, though labor'd on with pain,
A thousand *movements* scarce one purpose gain;
In God's one single can its end produce,
Yet serves to second too some other use."
POPE.

"The *loco-motive* manner of an Englishman circulates his person and of course his cash into every quarter of the kingdom."—*Observer.*

MOTIVE. PURPOSE. OBJECT. INDUCEMENT. REASON.

MOTIVE (Lat. *mōtīvus, that which moves to the doing of anything,* Fr. *motif*) is the term commonly employed of that which excites to action and determines choice.

The motive is of the nature of an INDUCEMENT when it leads us to action (Lat. *indūcĕre, to lead on*) by its agreement with our inclinations or desires of good.

It is a REASON (Fr. *raison,* Lat. *rătiōnem*) when it takes such a form as commends itself to our reason or judgment.

OBJECT (Lat. *objĭcĕre,* part. *objectus, to cast over against one*) is that to which the desires are directed, and on which the purpose is fixed as the end of action or effort; something which it is endeavoured to realize or bring about; the final cause.

The PURPOSE (O. Fr. *pourpos,* according to some from *pourpenser, to bethink one's self;* with others, more probably, the Lat. *prōpŏsĭtum*) is the operation of that process of which the object is the end and aim. The object is definite and fixed; the purpose is continuous and variable till the object is gained. The inducement is always practicable and tangible; the reason is the definition of the inducement. The purpose may, however, be regarded from two points of view; that is, either as an end, in which case it is identical with object, or as a plan for attaining it. But an object is external to one's self; a purpose may be internal, as a purpose to lead a new life.

"By *motive,* I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly."—EDWARDS, *Freedom of the Will.*

"He travelled the world on *purpose* to converse with the most learned men."—*Guardian.*

"Be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a *reason* of the hope that is in you."—*Eng. Bible.*

"*Object,* beside its proper signification, came to be abusively applied to denote motive, end, final cause. . . . This innovation was probably borrowed from the French."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

"Let, then, the fortune or the honour (for both are included in the magical word silver) which eminent worth may propose

to itself, be among the *inducements* which erect the hopes and quicken the application of a virtuous man."—Bishop Hurd.

MOVE. Stir.

The verbs are used both as transitives and intransitives. As transitives, to Move (Lat. *mŏvēre*) is to impel a thing so as to cause it to change its place; being employed analogously of what induces moral as well as physical change.

To Stir (A. S. *styrian*) is to move in such a way that the movement is accompanied by some amount of internal commotion or disturbance. Again, Stir in the intransitive sense, expresses more distinctively that kind of quick, short movement which is confined to the individual or object, and implies little or no change of locality.

"The mind *stirs* not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation."—Locke.

"In Him we live and *move* and have our being."—*English Bible.*

MUTTER. Murmur.

To Mutter, formed to express the kind of sound, is to utter articulate words, but in a confused, indistinct undertone.

Murmur (Lat. *murmur*) is inarticulate, like the sound of running water, and the sign of sullenness and discontent. Mutter does not necessarily imply the expression of any particular feeling, as the magician may mutter his incantation.

MUTUAL. Reciprocal. Correlative.

Mutual (Lat. *mūtuus, interchanged*) implies nothing as to time or order of action.

Reciprocal (Lat. *rĕcĭprŏcus*), involves an idea of priority and succession. A mutual thing is simply a thing which exists between two persons; a reciprocal thing so exists as the result of a giving and returning. "The attachment was mutual," would mean simply that it was felt on both sides; that it was reciprocal, that what one had given the other also had returned.

"But as He framed a whole, the whole to bless,
On *mutual* wants built *mutual* happiness."
Pope.

"This atonement was the end of the incarnation, and the two articles *reciprocate* for an incarnation is implied and presupposed in the Scripture doctrine of atonement, as the necessary means to the end."—Bishop Horsley.

That is Correlative (prefix *cor-*, Lat. *con-, with,* and *relative*) which bears a reciprocal relationship, but is confined to what has the nature of fixed arrangement in nature or art. In correlatives the two related things go together, so that the existence of one draws after it of necessity the existence of the other. Sometimes this is in idea, sometimes in actual expression. "Spiritual things and spiritual men," says Spelman, "are *correlatives,* and cannot in reason be divided." On the other hand father is a correlative *term* an implies a son, as son a father; so centre and circumference.

"It is an universal observation which we may form upon language, that where two relative parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other in number, rank, or consideration, there are always *correlative* terms invented which answer to both the parts and express their mutual relation."—Hume.

MYSTERIOUS. Mystical. Cabalistical. Magical.

Mysterious (Lat. *mystĕrium, a secret,* from Gr. *μυστήριον*) denotes that a thing is not only obscure, but that there is in the character of that obscurity something which excites curiosity and wonder.

Mystical (Gr. *μυστικός, secret, connected with mysteries*) denotes that which does not so much excite emotion as baffle curiosity and comprehension, by secret meanings involved in the subject as it meets the ear or the eye; as, mystic words of prophecy, that is, words which have a meaning not limited to their primary application. Mazes of the mystic dance; that is, whose movements are more than they seem, and are significant of ideas and emotions. The mysterious opposes itself to inquiry; the mystical invites it. The mystical speaks

a double language, the mysterious is darkly silent.

"By a silent, unseen, *mysterious* process, the fairest flower of the garden springs from a small, insignificant seed."—HORNE.

"Fool, thou didst not understand
The *mystic* language of the eye, nor hand."
DONNE.

CABALISTICAL (*see* CABAL) preserves its primary idea, the mystic value and significance of signs, such as letters, words, signs, and numbers, all of which, as belonging to the Jewish Law, were by the Cabalists invested with a meaning, supposed to contain a mystery, and in some cases to have a predictive force. As the cabalistic points to an inherent virtue of signs, so the MAGICAL (Gr. *μαγικός, Μάγος, a magian*) points to the preternatural powers of human agents. A magical effect is produced when it is such as seems far to exceed the time, opportunities, materials, or resources of him who brings it about; hence the magical is startling in itself, and imposing in its effects. It is mysteriously effective, as if its operation were aided by something above ordinary processes and powers.

"Some have imagined that envy has a certain *magical* force in it, and that the eyes of the envious have by their fascination blasted the enjoyments of the happy."—*Spectator.*

"Rabbi Elias, from the first chapter of Genesis, where the letter aleph is six times found, *cabalistically* concludes that the world shall endure just six thousand years, aleph in computation standing for a thousand."—SIR T. HERBERT, *Travels.*

N.

NAKED. BARE. UNCOVERED.

NAKED (A. S. *nacod*) denotes the absence of any covering; BARE (A. S. *bær*), destitute of some specific or proper covering. A man is naked when he has no clothes upon him; his head is bare when his hat or head covering is absent. A tree which has lost its leaves in winter could only be called naked by analogy, that is, by being regarded as destitute of a kind of clothing. It is, when stripped of its leaves, commonly called bare. When applied to objects in general, BARE commonly conveys the idea of destitution or privation; bare walls means unfurnished walls. While NAKED is used sometimes in a favourable sense, meaning unobscured, unencumbered (as we speak of the naked truth), BARE always denotes want, insufficiency, or isolation.

UNCOVERED (prefix *un-* and *couvrir*, Lat. *coŏpĕrīre*) is entirely a colourless term, and depends upon the context. Anything may be uncovered which is capable of being covered, whether in the sense of clothed or not. Commonly speaking, the naked is the uncovered where it *might* be covered; the bare, the uncovered where it *ought* to be, or might be better conceived as, covered.

"Wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and *naked.*"—*English Bible.*

"For never-resting time leads summer on
To hideous winter, and confounds him there;
Sap checked with frost, and lusty leaves quite gone;
Beauty o'ersnowed, and *bareness* everywhere."
SHAKESPEARE.

"None of the Eastern people use the compliment of *uncovering* their heads when they meet, as we do."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages.*

NAME. APPELLATION. DENOMINATION. TITLE. DESIGNATION.

Of these NAME (A. S. *nama, name, noun*), connected with the Lat. *nōmen*, is the simplest and most generic, indicating simply the word by which a thing or person is distinguished. It is the current representation of the thing itself.

APPELLATION (Lat. *appellātiōnem, an entitling*) properly denotes a descriptive term where some individual is expressed, or some peculiar characteristic; as, "Alexander of Macedon's appellation was 'the Great;'" or, "S. Thomas Aquinas' appellation was 'the Angelic Doctor.'"

A TITLE (Lat. *tĭtŭlus*) is a name in some way indicative of dignity, distinctiveness, or prominence, and not, as appellatives may be, of reproach. It is a kind of honourable political appellation.

DENOMINATION (Lat. *dēnōmĭnātiōnem, a naming after*) is a distinctive name, implying sectional division or classification. It may be expressed by either a noun or an adjective; as, Pharisee, good, bad. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that the term belongs to such distinctions as are imposed by men, not such as are based upon the differences of nature; though the denominations so imposed may agree with natural distinctions. We do not, for instance, speak of plants, animals, or minerals of different denominations.

DESIGNATION (Lat. *dēsignātiōnem, a describing*) is a distinctive title, pointing out more specifically one individual from others. The word carries the mind beyond the fact of a distinctive name, to the effort of those who imposed it as peculiarly appropriate or characteristic. Designation is to the individual what denomination is to the class.

"A *name* which every wind to heaven would bear,
Which men to speak, and angels joy to hear." COWLEY.

"Men must endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure. They must institute some persons, under the *appellation* of magistrates, whose peculiar office it is to point out the decrees of equity, to punish transgressors."—HUME.

"If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the sublime be all found consistent with each other, and all different from those which I place under the head of beauty; and if those which compose the class of the beautiful have the same consistency with themselves, and the same opposition to those which are classed under the *denomination* of sublime, I am in little pain whether anybody chooses to follow the *name* I give them or not, provided he allows that what I dispose under different heads are in reality different things in nature."—BURKE.

"The ranking of things into species, which is nothing but sorting them under several *titles*, is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them."—LOCKE.

"This is a plain *designation* of the Duke of Marlborough. One kind of stuff used to fatten land is called marl, and every one knows that borough is the name of a town."—SWIFT.

NARRATE. RECOUNT. TELL.

NARRATE (Lat. *narrāre*) belongs to the rhetorical; RECOUNT (Fr. *raconter*) to the instructive, TELL to the popular and familiar. One narrates with study, by rule, and with due attention to style, and with a view to engaging and interesting the auditory or the public. One recounts with care, as anxious that all important facts should be taken count of. One tells plainly, simply, intelligibly, agreeably, amusingly.

NARROW. CONTRACTED. CONFINED.

NARROW (A. S. *nearu, nearo*, connected with *near*) denotes no more than the being of little breadth, without of necessity implying either that it is the result of any artificial process, or any disparaging force; as, a narrow stream. A narrow escape is one in which the interval between the point of danger and the person avoiding it is near or narrow.

CONTRACTED (Lat. *contrăhĕre*, part. *contractus, to draw in*) implies an artificial process, or the result of narrowing influences. Metaphorically, a narrow mind is so by nature; a contracted mind is so by association, training, or prejudice.

CONFINED (Fr. *confiner, to confine*, Lat. *confinis, bordering upon*) implies more strongly than CONTRACTED the operation of *external* forces. A stream is contracted within its ordinary course by the drought of summer; it is confined to a narrow bed by artificial embankments.

"Men should accustom themselves by the light of particulars to enlarge their minds to the amplitude of the world, and not reduce the world to the *narrowness* of their minds."—BACON.

"The more effectual *contraction* of the wind-pipe in any strong or violent expiration or coughing."—RAY.

"That man can do wrong arises from a weakness and not a superior strength in him, from the imperfection of his views, and the *confinedness* of his powers."—HOADLEY.

NATIVE. NATAL. NATURAL.

NATIVE (Lat. *nātīvus*) indicates a relation to an object on the score of origin; pertaining to one's birth; as, native land or language; conferred by birth, as native genius.

NATURAL (Lat. *nātūrālis, belonging*

to nature) pertaining to the constitution of Nature, or some particular nature, as opposed to what is unconnected with Nature, artificial, distorted, or the like.

NATAL (Lat. *nātālis, belonging to one's birth*) means belonging to the event or circumstances of a man's birth; as a natal day, hour, star.

NAUSEA. LOATHING. DISGUST.

As employed of repugnance of feeling towards objects, NAUSEA (literally SEA-SICKNESS, Gr. *ναυσία*; *ναῦς, a ship*) is commonly employed of that dislike which is the result of over-much supply, involving tediousness and *satiety*; LOATHING (*see* LOATHE), of a strong *constitutional* dislike, whether physical or of the moral taste; DISGUST (O.Fr. *desgouster, to loathe; goust*, Lat. *gustus, taste*) of what strongly offends the moral sense rather than the physical; as, disgust at the conduct of another.

NEAR. NIGH. CLOSE.

As adverbs, NEAR (A. S. *neára*, comparative of *néah, nigh*), NIGH, and CLOSE (Fr. *clos*, part. of *clore, to shut*) may be thus in usage distinguished. We commonly now employ NEAR both of time and space, while we restrict NIGH to space. Nigh at hand. "The time draweth nigh," would be now expressed by the "Time draws near." We seldom employ NIGH but with amplification; as, nigh at hand. NEAR is by no means so strong and definite as CLOSE. Houses are near to each other which are separated by what the speaker may consider a moderate interval; they are close when they almost touch. NEAR is employed as an adjective, an adverb, and a preposition; NIGH, as an adjective and an adverb, but not as a preposition; in that case, it requires the addition of To. NEAR is only, however, used as an adjective when it is separated by the verb from its substantive; as, "The house is near;" but not "A near house." Both NEAR and CLOSE have a metaphorical sense of parsimonious, which is not to the present purpose.

NEAREST. NEXT.

NEAREST denotes the closest proximity of space, NEXT the proximate place in order. The nearest house is that to which the distance is the shortest, the next house is that to which one comes after the present in course or computation.

NECESSARY. ESSENTIAL. REQUISITE. NEEDFUL.

NECESSARY (Lat. *nĕcessārius*) is an indefinite term. Necessity may relate to the order and course of Nature, or the projects and designs of men, or the laws of thought and argumentation. That is necessary which is of essential and indispensable obligation.

REQUISITE (Lat. *rĕquīsītum, a want, a requirement*) relates to some end, whether of thought or action, which the requisite indispensably subserves.

ESSENTIAL (Lat. *essentia, essence; esse, to be*) denotes what is needful to make a thing what it is or professes to be—being regarded as vitally part and parcel of the thing itself. NECESSARY relates to the course of things; ESSENTIAL, to the constitution of things, and our conceptions of them; REQUISITE, to human deliberation and choice. NEEDFUL is less abstract than NECESSARY, and applies to personal requisites specifically and in detail. "To cross the water is necessary in order to travel in France; but money is needful to travel at all." NECESSARY is a term primarily of logic; ESSENTIAL of metaphysics; REQUISITE, of practical life. That is necessary to a thing which the very notion of it seems to draw after it. That is essential without which it would not fulfil its definition or be what it is. That is requisite without which it would be in a condition of deficiency or want.

"A certain kind of temper is *necessary* to the pleasure and quiet of our minds."—TILLOTSON.

"Judgment is more *essential* to a general than courage."—DENHAM.

"All truth *requisite* for men to know."
MILTON.

It may be observed that nothing is more common than the employment of ESSENTIAL in the sense of strongly desirable or necessary. Hence such

intolerable vulgarisms as that "It is very essential to wrap up one's self in cold weather." It should have been either REQUISITE or NECESSARY; the latter representing the act as induced by circumstances; the former, by our own wants and feelings.

"All things *needful* for defence abound."
DRYDEN.

The needful is, generally speaking, that form of the necessary which involves a double object—the immediate and the remote. The necessary is wanted for itself, except so far as abstract ends are additionally considered, as happiness, comfort, and the like; the needful, for something also to which it conduces.

NEEDY. NECESSITOUS.

NEEDY (A. S. *néád, want, compulsion*) and NECESSITOUS (*see* NECESSARY) are both employed of persons lacking the common necessaries of life, or of their station in it; but NEEDY is employed more directly of the person, and NECESSITOUS of the condition. Hence necessitous may imply a casual state; while NEEDY implies one more permanent, as being characteristic of the individual or class.

NEFARIOUS. INIQUITOUS.

These terms both express the strongest disapprobation of human conduct or transactions; but NEFARIOUS (Lat. *nĕfārius, execrable*) points more directly to the intrinsic badness of the deed; INIQUITOUS (Lat. *iniquus, unfair, unjust*), to the detriment done to others, who are involved in the object or consequences of the act. INIQUITOUS, however, is quite applicable also to deeds or conduct regarded intrinsically. In that case that is iniquitous which is flagrantly immoral, that is nefarious which is regarded as violating sacred obligations, deeds of unhallowed wrong.

"That for their own *nefarious* ends
Tread upon Freedom and her friends."
CUNNINGHAM.

"In this city (Athens) there were parties, and avowed ones too, for the Persians, Spartans, and Macedonians, supported each of them by one or more demagogues pensioned and bribed to this *iniquitous* service."—BURKE.

NEGLECT. DISREGARD. SLIGHT.

These may be all regarded as both nouns and verbs. NEGLECT (Lat. *neglĭgĕre, to neglect*, part. *neglectus*) is not so positive as SLIGHT (old Ger. *sleht, smooth, simple*). Neglect may be the consequence of inattention or preoccupation. Slight of persons is always an act of dislike and contempt. It is not absolutely confined to persons as its object. We may slight as well as neglect an opportunity. To neglect it is to overlook it; to slight it, is to think little of it, and so undervalue it. DISREGARD relates more specifically to what is brought into personal relation to one's self, and has commonly a positive and deliberate force, amounting to intentional neglect, or the setting a small value on a thing, or a voluntary overlooking of it; as, to disregard an insult, or an attempt, on the part of another, to do one an injury. We should speak of slighting rather then disregarding the *good* offices of others. *Some* exercise of judgment, whether wisely or not, is involved in DISREGARD; while SLIGHT may be the result of prejudice, and neglect, of ignorance or inattention.

"Thus said, he turned, and Satan, bowing low,
As to superior spirits is wont in Heaven,
Where honour due and reverence none *neglects*,
Took leave." MILTON.

"It is too common for those who have been bred to scholastic professions, and passed much of their time in academies, where nothing but learning confers honours, to *disregard* every other qualification."—*Rambler*.

"Hear your own dignity so much profaned,
See your most dreadful laws so loosely *slighted*.
Behold yourself so by a son disdained."
SHAKESPEARE.

NEIGHBOURHOOD. VICINITY. PROXIMITY. PROPINQUITY.

NEIGHBOURHOOD (A. S. *néahgebúr*, is Saxon, VICINITY (Lat. *vicinĭtātem, vicinus, a neighbour*) is Latin. Hence, as commonly happens, the Saxon term is the more comprehensive. NEIGHBOURHOOD is, in the first place, employed both of the place or places in the vicinity, and of the persons in-

habiting them; VICINITY, only of the place. Again, NEIGHBOURHOOD is employed to designate the general nearness or collectiveness of persons or objects among one another; VICINITY, only of the nearness of one thing to another, or a person to a place. Hence a difference in the form of expression; as, to live in the vicinity of the sea, rather than the neighbourhood, nothing more being meant than physical proximity.

"Till, towards night, they came unto a plain,
By which a little hermitage there lay,
Far from all *neighbourhood* the which annoy it may." SPENSER.

"The weather was pleasant, and we daily saw some of those birds which are looked upon as signs of the *vicinity* of land, such as boobies, men-of-war, tropic birds, and gannets."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

PROXIMITY (Lat. *proximus, nearest*) is the closest degree of nearness, as

PROPINQUITY (Lat. *propinquus, near*) expresses only nearness, in general and irrespectively of degree; while neighbourhood is social nearness, vicinity topographical nearness, and proximity close nearness. As NEIGHBOURHOOD and VICINITY are confined to physical nearness, PROXIMITY and PROPINQUITY are applicable to moral nearness, as of ideas, time, kindred.

"If he plead *proximity* of blood,
That empty title is with ease withstood." DRYDEN.

"The ligaments in the inside of the sclerotic tunicles of the eye draw the retina nearer to the crystalline humour, and by their relaxation suffer it to return to its natural distance according to the exigency of the object in respect of distance or *propinquity*."—RAY.

NEWS. TIDINGS. INTELLIGENCE.

NEWS denotes what is generally new in the way of intelligence from any or all quarters. This may be interesting to ourselves in common with others, or it may be wholly uninteresting.

TIDINGS are news of what has *tided* or *betided* (A. S. *tid; tide, time*), more or less expected from a particular quarter, and always personally interesting. As we may have news of a foreign war, and tidings of our friends engaged in it. News may be good or bad; but we speak of good more often than of evil or bad tidings.

INTELLIGENCE (Lat. *intelligère, to understand*) is a more formal word, denoting public or official communication of news, and is always of general interest, whether good or bad, and commonly on definite subjects.

"I wonder that, in the present situation of affairs, you can take pleasure in writing anything but *news*."—*Spectator*.

"When presumptuous Spain
Baptized her fleet invincible in vain,
Her gloomy monarch, doubtful, and resigned
To every pang that racks an anxious mind,
Asked of the waves that broke upon his coast
'What *tidings?*' and the surge replied, 'All lost!'" COWPER.

"My lion, whose jaws are at all hours open to *intelligence*, informs me that there are a few enormous weapons still in being."—STEELE.

NIGGARDLY. MISERLY. AVARICIOUS. COVETOUS. SORDID.

All these terms describe excess of selfishness in the use or acquisition of money or valuable possessions. The NIGGARDLY man (Icel. *hnöggr, niggard, sparing*) is hard upon others; the MISERLY man (Lat. *miser, miserable*), upon himself as well. He lives only for his hoard.

The AVARICIOUS (Lat. *avāritia, avarice,*) is simply rapacious for himself; the COVETOUS (O. Fr. *covoiter, to covet*, Lat. *cupĭdus, desirous of*) is so at the expense of others. The quality of the miser starving in the midst of plenty is more ridiculous than pitiable; that of the niggardly man, the more pitiable and hateful; for he would profit though others should starve, that of the avaricious and covetous, the more formidable. Avarice is greediness; but covetousness would snatch the food from another's mouth. The avaricious man is a man of cares and desires; the covetous man, one of envy and design.

SORDID (Lat. *sordĭdus, foul*) expresses the sacrifice or loss of what is noble, and the adoption of what is mean in feeling and conduct in reference to the acquisition of gain. As the covetous man is desirous of appropriating the wealth of others, so

the avaricious man is simply inordinately desirous of gain. The avaricious are eager to get, and hug it when got. The covetous are also eager to obtain, but not so desirous of keeping. The avaricious are never profuse, but the covetous may be, and may even be spendthrifts, desiring the wealth of others that they may squander it or keep it. As the character of the avaricious and covetous are more concerned with acquiring, so the niggardly is more concerned with retaining. The niggardly man finds it hard to part with his money, and would cheapen as far as possible the just claims of others upon him; while with the miser all thoughts, either directly or indirectly affecting either himself or others, are second to the dominant idea of mere hoarding, to which the claim of hunger itself is often made to give way.

"On the other side there is not in Nature anything so remotely distant from God, or so extremely opposite to Him, as a greedy, griping *niggard*."—BARROW.

"For the sake of collecting what is never to be used, and adding to his beloved heap, the *miser* will forego the comforts, the conveniences, and almost the necessaries of existence, and voluntarily submit all his days to the penuries and austerities of a mendicant."—HORNE.

"Still, however (said Asem), the inhabitants must be happy. Each is contented with his own possessions, nor *avariciously* endeavours to heap up more than is necessary for his own subsistence; and each has therefore leisure for pitying those that stand in need of compassion."—GOLDSMITH.

"The difference between avarice and *coveitice* is this, *coveitice* is for to coveit swiche things as thou hast not, and avarice is to withholde and keep swiche things as thou hast without rightful nede."—CHAUCER.

"*Sordid*, unfeeling, reprobate, degraded, spiritless outcast."

SOUTHEY, *Anti-Jacobin*.

"The *miser* will forego the comforts, the conveniences, and almost the necessaries of existence."—HORNE.

NIGHTLY. NOCTURNAL.

NIGHTLY is derived directly from the English word *night*; NOCTURNAL, from the Lat. *noctem*, *night*, whence *nocturnus*. Yet they are somewhat differently employed. The former is a term of more familiar character than the latter; but a further difference is discernible, flowing, however, from the same difference of origin. NIGHTLY means simply, at time of night, or every night; while NOCTURNAL means, connected with the nature of the night. A nightly visit. The nocturnal habits of some birds, insects, and quadrupeds.

NOMINATE. APPOINT.

As applied to the APPOINTMENT to certain offices, the NOMINATION (Lat. *nōmĭnare*, *to name*) commonly stands to the APPOINTMENT (O. Fr. *apointer*, *to appoint*; Low Lat. *appunctare*) as the first step to the completion. The appointment consists in the formal conferring of office in a regular method; the nomination, in the right of naming the individual to be so appointed. Where there is no discretion left, the nomination is virtually, but not formally or legally, the appointment. But there are cases in which the two are distinct; as where a person or a corporate body has the right of nominating more than one person to an office, out of which one is selected by a higher power for the appointment.

"The *nomination* of persons to places being a prerogative of the king."—CLARENDON.

"The accusations against Columbus gained such credit in a jealous court, that a commissioner was *appointed* to repair to Hispaniola, and to inspect into his conduct."—ROBERTSON.

NOTE. ANNOTATION. COMMENT. COMMENTARY. OBSERVATION. REMARK.

In the sense in which it is synonymous with the other terms here given, NOTE (Lat. *nŏta*, *a mark*) is always written, being either a brief writing to assist the memory, or a marginal comment or explanation. It is this latter aspect of the word which is more fully expressed by ANNOTATION, especially in illustration of the meaning of a text.

COMMENT (Lat. *commĭnisci*, part. *commentus*, *to reflect upon*) has a less systematic meaning, and denotes the expression of anything which may

casually suggest itself as worth making in relation to what is said or written, and may be itself either written or said. The purpose of comment is elucidation. When the comment is only spoken as well as casual, and has relation rather to the circumstances of the case than to its interpretation, it may be called an OBSERVATION or REMARK. This last (Fr. *remarquer, to remark*) is of more general meaning still, and may be employed of anything by way of observation, even where no explanation or illustration is intended, and by way of reference to any subject which may be thought worthy of it, or to afford an opportunity for it.

OBSERVATION (Lat. *observātiōnem, a watching, a remark*) is not only not explanatory, but presupposes a complete understanding of the matter upon which the observation is founded.

COMMENTARY (Lat. *commentārii*, and *-ria, note-books, memoirs*) is a systematic collection of comments in a literary form, and by way of explanation and illustration. In the title "Cæsar's Commentaries," the term bears the meaning of *memoirs* of particular transactions. Its more ordinary meaning is that of a book of expositions on the work of an author. Certain differences are specially worthy of notice between the verbs to OBSERVE and to REMARK. To remark is slighter than to observe, and a remark slighter than an observation. I may make a casual remark which is very remotely connected with the subject under consideration; hence such phrases as, "I may as well remark in passing." To remark is to note down casually; to observe is to note down more carefully. A phenomenon in the heavens may be remarked by a casual spectator, and if it be conspicuous can hardly escape remark. It will be observed by an astronomer. Observation often follows upon remark, and is the analysis or expansion of it. "Did you remark the level of the thermometer yesterday at mid-day?" "No, I did not; but I will observe it more carefully to-day." The careful general remarks those individuals who behave with bravery, while he observes the operations of the enemy. Observe is commonly more general, remark more specific. Some persons observe the conduct and behaviour of others for the purpose of remarking upon their faults

NOTES. REMARKS. CONSIDERATIONS. OBSERVATIONS. REFLEXIONS.

Taking these terms in their literary connexion, NOTES contain something short and precise. REMARKS show that a distinction or selection of one or more points has been made. OBSERVATIONS designate some matter of criticism and research. REFLEXIONS are thoughts added to those of the author. Notes are often necessary. Remarks are sometimes useful. Observations ought to be erudite, and reflexions just. Notes are commonly explanatory. They are called for by obscurity of expression or reconditeness of allusion, or unfamiliarity of subject-matter; as when manners and customs have much changed from those of the period, or are dissimilar to those of the country of the author. Remarks may serve to set the subject of the text in a stronger light, as turning on some particular point worthy of notice. Historical observations tend to clear up some historical allusions, while an observation on a peculiarity of style or expression will prevent its being overlooked. Reflexions, being of a gratuitous character, need to be very pertinent, or they may supplant and obscure the original thoughts of the author. Notes should be short and clear, for their object is to explain, and if extended they become commentaries. Remarks should be new, useful, critical. The two defects of a remark are triteness and uninterestingness; *i.e.* saying in the first instance what the world knows, and in the second what it does not care to know. Observations should be luminous, curious; for their object is to draw forth what is fine, to elucidate what is obscure, to draw attention to what is interesting, to give prominence to what is concealed. CONSIDERATIONS ought to have the op-

posite character to notes. They should be full and profound, and only on matters in themselves *considerable*. Reflexions should be natural and easy without being trivial, expressed in a manner new and pointed, solid and judicious rather than subtle and ingenious, flowing naturally out of the subject, and imprinting themselves upon the mind.

NOTIFY. SIGNIFY. CERTIFY.

To NOTIFY (Lat. *notificare, to make known*) is to SIGNIFY (Lat. *significare*) in a formal, perspicuous, and authentic manner, so that the thing shall be not only known but indubitable, certain, notorious. That which is signified to us we cannot be ignorant of. That which is notified to us we cannot elude. One generally signifies intentions, and notifies orders or desires. The word NOTIFY is sometimes used, after the analogy of CERTIFY, directly upon the person; as, to notify the meeting. SIGNIFY is not so employed, but has an impersonal use of its own; it does not signify that it is of no consequence. CERTIFY is the most formal; "I certify" some fact, and the *certificate* will be used in some matter of business; it may even be necessary that I shall have first sworn to its truth before a magistrate.

NOTORIOUS. NOTED.

While NOTED is reserved for that which is well known, favourably or eminently, NOTORIOUS (Lat. *notoria, a notice, news* is employed to express what is publicly known, and universally in men's mouths, commonly, though not invariably, with an unfavourable meaning. But this is only a rough distinction. The case seems to be affected by the question whether the matter is one of facts or persons. At least, NOTORIOUS is never used of what is known purely for good. We speak indiscriminately of a notorious or a noted fact, but not person; nor are virtue and excellence ever said to be notorious. Notorious is that which is so well known that the extensive knowledge of it is taken as an evidence of its certainty. It is a term of ancient civil law.

NOXIOUS. HURTFUL. PREJUDICIAL. PERNICIOUS. DETRIMENTAL. DELETERIOUS. INJURIOUS.

Of these, the most general in their application are HURTFUL (*see* HURT) and INJURIOUS, of which the others may be regarded as modifications.

NOXIOUS (Lat. *noxius*, from *noxa, hurt*) is applied physically and analogously to physical influences, and to what is like them in morals, as a noxious air or climate; noxious principles or practices.

PREJUDICIAL (Lat. *præjudiciālis, belonging to a preceding judgment*, with an implied unfavourable character, formed beforehand) bears specific relation to some particular nature, action, or operation as prejudicial to character, interest, health, life.

PERNICIOUS (Lat. *perniciōsus; pernĭcies, destruction*) denotes that which tends, by its injurious quality, to the destruction of its subject.

DETRIMENTAL (Lat. *detrīmentum, loss, harm*, from *dĕtĕrĕre, to wear away* or *impair*) is less strong than PERNICIOUS, and denotes a tendency, not to destroy, but to impair and diminish in force or value.

DELETERIOUS (Lat. *dēlēre, to abolish, annihilate*) brings out more strongly the purely physical side of PERNICIOUS, as "deleterious medicines," and is most commonly employed in connexion with the life and health of men.

"Again it is urged that Nature has not only produced many *noxious* and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of men."—CUDWORTH.

"Charles II. had great vices, but scarce any virtues to correct them; he had in him some vices which were less *hurtful*, which corrected his more *hurtful* ones."—BURNET.

"That which in the first instance is *prejudicial* may be excellent in its remoter operation; and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning."—BURKE.

"He who has vented a *pernicious* doctrine, or published an ill book, must know that his guilt and his life determine not together."—SOUTH.

"Though every man hath a property in his goods, he must not use them in *detriment* of the commonwealth."—*State Trials*.

"In some places those plants which are entirely poisonous at home lose their *deleterious* quality by being carried abroad."—GOLDSMITH.

"We naturally love excellence wherever we see it; but the envious man hates it, and wishes to be superior to others, not by raising himself by honest means, but by *injuriously* pulling them down."—BEATTIE.

NUMBER. COUNT.

These terms NUMBER (being derived from Lat. *nŭmĕrāre, nŭmĕrus, a number*) and COUNT (from Fr. *compter*, and *conter*, the Lat. *compŭtare, to compute*) may often be employed strictly in the place of COUNT, as to number the sand of the sea-shore (or to count it); but NUMBER (to say nothing of such a phrase as, "To number houses in a street," meaning, to fix numbers upon them) has also the force of presenting as the result of computation; as, "The army numbered fifty thousand." It has also a more rhetorical and solemn character than COUNT in the sense of to pass into a previously existing number; as, "He was numbered with the dead." On the other hand, it is devoid of that force of reckoning, in the sense of moral estimation, which belongs to COUNT, as in such a phrase as, "I count it simple folly;" and expresses no more than arithmetical computation or addition. I number denotes the same thing as I tell off, not, I estimate.

NUMERAL. NUMERICAL.

NUMERAL means of or belonging to numbers, and is applied to terms, especially of grammar; as a numeral adjective. NUMERICAL is of or belonging to number in the abstract; as a numerical difference—a difference of number, as distinguished, for instance, from one of quality. The difference between six oranges and eight, where all are of equal size and goodness, would be numerical.

O.

OATH. VOW.

OATH (A. S. *áð*) belongs to engagements with men; Vow (Fr. *vœu*) to engagements made directly with God. In the oath one takes God to witness to one's engagement with our willingness to submit to the effects of His vengeance if one should violate one's undertaking. But in a vow one voluntarily enters upon an engagement with God, and employs the vow to make the obligation more binding, and the neglect or violation of it more criminal. The oath is an ascititious bond by which one renders men more sure of one's good faith. Jephthah kept religiously the rashest of all vows. Joshua kept his promise to the Gibeonites with all the strictness of an oath. Yet the oath should be only in relation to things lawful between man and man, and the vow which violates a law of nature is a sacrilege rather than a vow.

OBDURATE. HARDENED, CALLOUS. OBSTINATE. PERTINACIOUS. CONTUMACIOUS.

While HARDENED is the most general term, the others, with the exception of OBSTINATE, may be regarded as modifications of it. We speak of persons or their feelings as hardened when we mean to express the result of habituation, and this actively or passively; as, hardened in vice; hardened against impressions, as, for instance, scenes of suffering.

CALLOUS (Fr. *calleux*; Lat. *callōsus, thick-skinned*, from *callum, callus, the thick skin of animal bodies*) commonly denotes rather insensibility through nature or habituation, than any blunting of the moral feelings. This latter use, however, is not excluded, as in the phrase, "A callous conscience."

OBDURATE (Lat. *obdūrāre*, part. *obdurātus, to harden*), on the other hand, denotes the state of being hardened against moral influences. They rise in meaning in the following order: CALLOUS denotes a deadening of the sensibilities; HARDENED, a settled disregard of and habit of resistance against the claims of persuasion, duty, and sympathy; OBDURATE, a moral determination in opposition to both moral principle and natural feeling.

OBSTINATE (Lat. *obstĭnātŭs, resolute*, in a good or bad sense) is more purely mental than moral, and denotes such inflexible conduct as consists in standing out against persuasion, instruction, entreaty, and, by an extension of the use of the term, against attack.

PERTINACIOUS (Lat. *pertĭnācem, very tenacious*) represents obstinacy, as it were, from the other or opposite point of view. As obstinacy consists in holding *out*, so pertinacity consists in holding *on*. The man who reiterates and clings to his own purpose or opinion is pertinacious; the man who does so in direct opposition to external influence is obstinate.

CONTUMACIOUS (Lat. *contŭmācem, haughty, stubborn*) expresses the resistance to the demands of constituted authority.

"The ear is wanton and ungoverned, and the heart insolent and *obdurate*, till the one is pierced, and the other made tender by affliction."—SOUTH.

"Tell such people of a world after this, of their being accountable for their actions, and of the Gospel denunciations of damnation upon all who lead such ungodly lives without repentance; they are *hardened* to everything of this kind."—GILPIN, *Sermons*.

"Licentiousness has so long passed for sharpness of wit and greatness of mind, that the conscience is grown *callous*."—L'ESTRANGE.

"So was both sides with *obstinate* despite,
With like revenge, and neither party bowed." DANIEL.

"Disputes with men *pertinaciously* obstinate in their principles are, of all others, the most irksome."—HUME.

"Now, these courts being thus established in the Church, when any offender is presented into any of them, he is cited to appear there, which if he neglect or refuse to do, he is pronounced *contumacious*."—BEVERIDGE.

OBEDIENCE. SUBMISSION.

OBEDIENCE (Lat. *ŏbēdientia*) is an action. SUBMISSION (Lat. *submissiōnem*) is a result of the will. It may be passive while obedience is necessarily active. One submits to an evil which there seems no possibility of removing. One obeys a law in doing what it commands, or in avoiding what it forbids. Obedience is to will, authority, law, submission is to power. Obedience may be absolutely forced. Submission must always be to *some extent* involuntary, though the submission may be coerced, and so repugnant to one's feelings. Obedience may be involuntary, or even contrary to one's will. Real obedience to an order may be the result of a feigned submission to the authority which gives it. Obedience is from time to time in the details of action. Submission is once for all. A child may obey to-day and disobey to-morrow. Such an one is not strictly in submission to his parents. Submission commonly proceeds from the character and disposition, obedience from duty or principle. Obedience does not imply to so great an extent as submission, the surrender of the will to another. One obeys the precepts of religion. Men sometimes submit their reason to faith. Where submission is mentioned it is in its humility; where obedience is mentioned it is in the recognition of and co-operative with right.

OBEDIENT. COMPLIANT. YIELDING. SUBMISSIVE. DUTIFUL. OBSEQUIOUS.

OBEDIENT (Lat. *ŏbēdientem*, part. of *ŏbēdīre, to obey*) involves a relationship of inferiority to another, and a recognized physical or moral subserviency; but the moral power is the primary, the physical the secondary, application. We obey God, men, and laws, commands, and the like, as the media through which their will is expressed and made known to us. It is only by analogy that the ship is said to obey the helm, or a body to fall in obedience to the law of gravitation.

COMPLIANT (verb *comply*, not connected with *ply* and *pliant*, but orig. from Lat. *complēre, to complete*) indicates more equality between the parties, than OBEDIENT. As obedience stands to law, command, injunction, or precept, so compliance stands to wishes, desires, demands, requests, proposals, and the like.

YIELDING (A. S. *geldan, to pay*) is a term expressive of the natural disposition or tendency to comply, and involves commonly some weakness of

nature and incapacity of resistance to the will of another, where such resistance is lawful or needful.

SUBMISSIVE (Lat. *submittĕre, to lower, to lower one's self*) is a stronger term than OBEDIENT, and carries the meaning of prospective obedience or compliance with possible as well as actual commands or desires of another.

DUTIFUL (*duty, that which is due*, Fr. *dû*) denotes that character of act, conduct, or disposition which allows itself to be swayed by the consciousness of a moral relationship, involving the right of the one party to submission, obedience, or deference, and the obligation of the other party to render it without coercion, but by the understood, rather than expressed, power of control.

OBSEQUIOUS (Lat. *obsĕquiōsus, complaisant*) has now lost its original use, in which it was equivalent to COMPLIANT, and has lapsed into the unfavourable meaning of over-compliant, or demonstratively, over-courteously, and almost servilely attentive to the wishes of another.

"Yet to whate'er above was fated,
Obediently he bowed his soul;
For what all-bounteous Heaven created,
He thought Heaven only should control."
COWPER.

"The Earl of Surrey, afterwards Duke of Norfolk, to show how *compliant* he was to the humours of the princes which he served, did as dexterously comply with his prodigality as he had formerly with his father's sparingness."—BURNET.

"That *yieldingness*, whatever foundations it might lay to the disadvantage of posterity, was a specific to preserve us in peace in his own time."—LORD HALIFAX.

"He in delight
Both of her beauty and *submissive* charms,
Smiled with superior love, as Jupiter
On Juno smiles when he impregns the clouds
That shed May flowers." MILTON.

"I advised him to persevere in *dutifully* bearing with his mother's ill-humour."—*Anecdotes of Bishop Watson.*

"The common people have not yet contracted that *obsequiousness* and submission which the rigour of their government, if no revolution occurs to redress it, must in time reduce them to."—*Observer.*

OBLOQUY. CONTUMELY.

The contemptuous speaking against another is common to these words; but while OBLOQUY denotes disparagement generally (Lat. *oblŏqui, to speak against*), CONTUMELY (Lat. *contūmĕlia*) involves the unmerited treatment of another, accompanied with disrespect. A person may be publicly spoken against out of his own hearing, in which case he still incurs obloquy; but contumely is shown to his face, and is not confined to words.

"That particular sort of *obloquy* which is called detraction or backbiting."—BARROW.

"Nothing aggravates tyranny so much as *contumely*."—BURKE.

OBSEQUIES. FUNERAL.

These terms express different aspects of the same thing

FUNERAL (L. Lat. *fūnĕrālia*, pl., *things belonging to a funeral, fūnus, -ĕris*) represents the interment of the dead as accompanied by its proper rites, ceremonies, and attendance.

OBSEQUIES (Lat. *obsĕquiæ*) is the same funeral solemnity regarded as the last duty performed to a deceased person. The idea of obsequies is that of respectful valediction; that of funeral is mournful ceremony.

"But you must know, your father lost a father,
That father lost, lost his; and his survivor bound
In filial obligation for some term
To do *obsequious* sorrow."
SHAKESPEARE.

"The *funeral* bake-meats coldly furnish'd forth
The marriage table." *Ibid.*

OBSERVANCE. OBSERVATION.

OBSERVANCE (Lat. *observantia, observance of duties, respect*) is the due rendering to rule, law, custom, or occasion, a formal or practical recognition. The observance of sacred days; the observance of the principles of truth, justice, or the laws.

OBSERVATION (Lat. *observātiōnem*) is simply the act of close and attentive contemplation, with the view of becoming closely acquainted with the object; as, the observation of the heavens. The intention of an observance is the fulfilment of a moral or religious duty; the intention of ob-

servation is to acquire or retain exactly some additional fact for the information of ourselves or the instruction of others.

"Since the obligation upon Christians to comply with the religious *observance* of Sunday arises from the public uses of the institution, and the authority of the apostolic practice, the manner of observing it ought to be that which best fulfils these uses, and conforms the nearest to this practice."—PALEY.

"The difference between experiment and *observation* consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries, or rather in the comparative command we possess over them as instruments for the investigation of truth."—STEWART.

OBSERVE. KEEP. FULFIL.

These words are synonymous as they express in common the practical regard of a commandment, rule, or law. The literal sense of OBSERVE (Lat. *observare*) is to keep before one's eyes, to pay attention to.

To KEEP (O. Eng. *kepen*, A. S. *cépan*) is to hold in one's hand for the purpose of preserving, maintaining, or defending unimpaired.

The idea of FULFILLING is that of filling up, completing, consummating. You observe the law by your attention in executing that which it prescribes. You keep it by the continual care you exercise that it shall not be violated in any point. You fulfil it by exactness in entirely supplying all that it supposes, and affording all the action which it requires.

To observe a rule or law marks generally fidelity in the discharge of one's duty. To keep it marks perseverance and sustained regard. To fulfil it points to the completeness of the result.

We observe customs, traditions, casual precepts, as *e.g.* the ordinance of keeping certain days holy. We keep laws or obligations which are perpetually binding, and so might be at any moment violated, as the marriage vow: we keep the obligation to accomplish an engagement, or to fulfil a task. One keeps silence by persistently avoiding the breaking of it. One observes silence when it is imposed by injunction or analogously by circumstances. The former may have in it more of obstinacy than right. The latter is at least in obedience to principle, or allegiance to another. FULFIL belongs rather to moral, as KEEP and OBSERVE to legal requirements.

OBSTACLE. IMPEDIMENT.

The following remarks may be added to what has already been said under the head of DIFFICULTY.

The OBSTACLE (*obstăcŭlum*) is something before you, which stops your progress.

The IMPEDIMENT (Lat. *impĕdīmentum*) is here and there, around and about you, to detain you in your movements. In order to advance, the former must be surmounted, the latter removed. An obstacle implies to some extent the ideas of greatness, importance, power of resistance. Hence efforts are needed to surmount it, or to destroy it in order to pass over it. The impediment implies something inconvenient, annoying, embarrassing, hence it must be got rid of and taken away; like an ample garment which prevents freedom of action, or a chain which fetters the limbs. The obstacle belongs to important matters and great enterprises and difficulties. The impediment belongs rather to common matters and ordinary difficulties. An impediment is vexatious. An obstacle may even provoke to courage and additional effort. The timid, unenterprising person sees many obstacles. The indifferent person, who wants heart, will see many impediments.

OCCASION. OCCURRENCE. CONJUNCTURE. CASE. CIRCUMSTANCE.

OCCASION (Lat. *occāsiōnem*) is employed of any new event, whether it present itself or is purposely sought, and in a sense quite indefinite as to time or object.

OCCURRENCE (Lat. *occurrĕre, to run against*) is employed only of that which comes without our seeking, and in fixed relation to the present time.

CONJUNCTURE (Lat. *conjunctūra; conjungĕre, to join together*) marks a situation which has resulted from a

concourse of events, matters of business, or matters of interest.

CASE (Lat. *cāsus, cădĕre, to fall*) is employed to express the foundation of the affair, with a particular reference to the nature and speciality of the thing.

CIRCUMSTANCE (Lat. *circumstantia, a surrounding, an attribute*) denotes something which stands related to another, as an accessory to the main transaction. Occasions are, generally speaking, common or uncommon, usual or unusual, ordinary or extraordinary. Occurrences are expected or unexpected, singular or unremarkable, welcome or unwelcome. Conjunctures are advantageous or untoward. A case is important or unimportant, simple or complicated, common or uncommon, good or bad. A circumstance is trivial or grave, important or unimportant, pressing or immaterial, relevant or irrelevant to the matter in hand. An occasion is a time for action. An occurrence for speculation. A conjuncture for prudent management. A case a thing for study and comprehension. Circumstances for attentive consideration, as being the signs and distinctive indications of cases.

OCCASION. OPPORTUNITY.

OCCASION (Lat. *occāsiōnem, a befalling, an opportunity*) is no more than something which falls in our way, or presents itself in the course of circumstances or events.

An OPPORTUNITY (Lat. *opportūnĭtatem*) is an occasion regarded in its relation to ourselves and our own intentions, as an available source or season of action by reason of fitness and convenience. The occasion commonly *controls us;* but we *avail ourselves* of the opportunity. We may have frequent occasion to meet a certain person, but no opportunity of taking him apart to converse with him privately. An occasion is sometimes nearly of the nature of a cause, when an internal motive finds excitement in external circumstances; but an opportunity is nothing unless we are to seize it.

"Every man is obliged by the Supreme Maker of the universe to improve all the *opportunities* of good which are afforded him."—JOHNSON.

"Sin, taking *occasion* by the commandment, deceived me."—*English Bible.*

OCCUPANCY OCCUPATION.

The difference between these two words flows from the different forces of the verb *occupy*—to take possession, and to hold possession.

OCCUPANCY (Lat. *occŭpāre, to take possession of*) is the taking or having possession in relation to rights, claims, or privileges; OCCUPATION, in relation to no more than the fact of possessing and holding. We speak of the occupancy of an estate; and the occupation, not occupancy, of a country by an army. Occupancy has a passive, occupation also an active sense.

"As we before observed that *occupancy* gave the right to the temporary use of the soil, so it is agreed upon all hands that *occupancy* gave also the original right to the permanent property in the substance of the earth itself, which excludes every one else but the owner from the use of it."—BLACKSTONE.

"Whereas of late yeares a great compasse hath yeelded but small profit, and this onelie through the idle and negligent *occupation* of such as dailie manured and herd the same in occupying."—HOLINSHED.

OFFEND. DISPLEASE. VEX. MORTIFY.

OFFEND (Lat. *offendĕre, to strike against*) relates always to the conduct of one person towards another, and implies, therefore, conscious agents on both sides, and a condition of real or supposed slight on one side. It belongs to superiors and equals rather than to inferiors to be offended. In the case of equals, it still implies an alleged deficiency of regard or consideration. In its more general force OFFEND denotes an abrupt collision of anything against the feelings or taste, and so is applicable to inanimate influences, as an ugly drawing offends the eye. This force is more prominent in the adjective OFFENSIVE.

DISPLEASE (Lat. *displĭcēre, to displease*) is less strong, and belongs not so much to personal offence received at the hands of another as the feel-

ing of dissatisfaction on the part of a superior, where the measure of requirement or duty has not been fulfilled by the other. DISPLEASE is more directly applicable to the conduct of the person; OFFEND, to the person himself.

VEX (Lat. *vexāre*) is to make angry, or irritated by petty provocations or annoyances, especially if repeated. We commonly use the term VEX to express an abuse of power, annoyance by a sort of persecution.

MORTIFY (Lat. *mortificāre, to cause death to*) differs from all in being absolutely referable to occurrences irrespective of actions or agents; and expresses a strong feeling of personal disapproval mixed with disappointment in what has occurred or been done, where the question is of persons. That is mortifying which disturbs a state of complacency of mind.

"The emperor himself came running to the place in his armour, severely reproving them of cowardice who had forsaken the place, and grievously *offended* with those who had kept such negligent watch."—KNOLLES.

"When Thou wert so wrathfully *displeased* at us."—*English Bible.*

"Sorrow may degenerate into *vexation* and chagrin."—COGAN.

"I am *mortified* by those compliments which were designed to encourage me."—POPE.

OFFENDER. DELINQUENT.

The one is an active and positive, the other a passive and negative, transgressor. He who violates law or social rule is an OFFENDER; he who neglects to comply with its requirements is a DELINQUENT (Lat. *dēlinquĕre, to fail, offend*). It may be observed that, as every citizen is bound positively to obey the laws of his country, as well as negatively not to slight or fall short of them, so a delinquency, though by the force of the term it implies omission, may, in some cases, be a commission. So in the following—

"A *delinquent* ought to be cited in the place or jurisdiction where the *delinquency* was committed."—AYLIFFE.

In this broader sense, a delinquent is one whose acts fail of his obligations to the State. So again—

"He that politicly intendeth good to a common weal may be called a just man; but he that practiseth either for his own profit, or any other sinister ends, may be well termed a *delinquent* person."—*State Trials.*

DELINQUENT is a more limited term than OFFENDER. The delinquent offends against the majesty and justice of law. The offender may run counter to any law, rule, custom, or even to taste.

"The proud he tamed, the penitent he cheered,
Nor to rebuke the rich *offender* feared."
DRYDEN.

OFFER. GIVE. PRESENT. PROFFER.

All these words describe forms of donation. To GIVE (*see* GIVE) is the simplest, and expresses plain, direct, and unqualified bestowal, but is applicable to what is injurious as well as desirable, as to give a blow or an offence, as well as what is distinctively termed a gift.

PRESENT (Lat. *præsentāre, to place before*) is a more formal word than GIVE, and is therefore employed of the gift from an inferior to a superior.

OFFER (Lat. *offerre*) is of a more contingent nature, and involves the question of acceptance on the other side. We offer a gift, and then present it if accepted. Where there is no qualification, GIFT is generally taken to imply something of considerable value; PRESENT, something of no great value; and OFFERING, what is given to a superior in some formal manner in token of such superiority or to conciliate favour. A present has for its motive some feeling of regard; a gift may be without any. Any benefit conferred, without compliment to its object, may be called a gift. Hence the gifts, not the presents, of Nature or of fortune. We offer remarks. Thoughts and opportunities present themselves. We only present what we have actually by us, so as to give it from hand to hand. We offer that which we desire to give or even to do. You present your compliments by what you actually say or write. You

offer your services by proposing to give them when occasion shall require. You present what you have in your hand, you offer what you have in your power. One offers to pay. The tradesman presents the bill for payment.

PROFFER (Lat. *proferre*) is less positive than OFFER. It has the sense of proposing to offer or of offering, and at the same time leaving it to the feeling and judgment of the other to accept. It is a more formal, deliberate, and official act than to offer.

"He made a *proffer* to lay down his commission of command in the army."—CLARENDON.

"When *offers* are disdained, and love denied." POPE.

"And when they had opened their treasures, they presented unto Him *gifts*, gold, and frankincense, and myrrh."—*English Bible.*

"Mrs. Johnson used to define a *present*, that it was a gift to a friend of something he wanted or was fond of, and which could not be easily gotten for money."—SWIFT.

OFFICE. FUNCTION. DUTY.

OFFICE (Lat. *officium*) has more than one sense, as a special duty conferred by public authority for a public purpose; and so any special duty, trust, or charge. By an extension of meaning, it is employed of what is analogous to duty in reasoning beings, that is, a definite operation; as the office of the gastric juice in digestion, or of a particular piece in machinery.

FUNCTION (Lat. *functionem, a discharging; fungi, to discharge*) is, properly, the discharge of the office or DUTY, and follows the application of those terms to both conscious and unconscious action. There is connected with FUNCTION the idea of continuous action, and of belonging to an organized body, or to what is analogous to it. Duties are performed, offices filled, functions discharged. Office is set and appointed work arising out of a relative connexion with system, whether natural or conventional. The function is the carrying out of the office. The duty is the function regarded in connexion with the obligation to discharge it, and so belongs not, except by a strained analogy, to any but beings of intelligence and responsibility.

"All members have not the same *office*."—*English Bible.*

"Every soldier was able to do all the *functions* of an officer."—BURNET.

"The hardest and most imperative *duty*."—HALLAM.

OFFSPRING. ISSUE. PROGENY.

OFFSPRING (literally, that which *springs off* from another) and PROGENY (Lat. *progĕnies*) are applicable to the young of all animals; while ISSUE (Fr. *issu*, part. of *issir*, Lat. *exīre, to go forth*) is applicable only to the human race. OFFSPRING applies more commonly to the first, PROGENY also to succeeding generations; ISSUE is a term not so much of nature as of genealogy, and is employed where a record for any purpose is kept of the individual members of a family. It is more commonly after a man's death that we speak of his issue. OFFSPRING and ISSUE relate directly to the parents; PROGENY to ancestors generally, even though not in the direct line of parentage. Perhaps, too, we more commonly use the term OFFSPRING in connexion with physical qualities or characteristics; progeny, in connexion with moral. The degenerate progeny of noble ancestors. A numerous and healthy offspring.

"From whence it follows that these were notions not descending from us, not our *offspring*, but our brethren."—SOUTH.

"Next him King Leyr in happy peace long reigned,
But had no *issue* male him to succeed,
But three fair daughters, which were all uptrained
In all that seemed fit for kingly seed."
SPENSER.

"What idle *progeny* succeed
To chase the rolling circle's speed,
Or urge the flying ball." GRAY.

OLD. ANCIENT. ANTIQUE. ANTIQUATED. AGED. ELDERLY. OBSOLETE.

OLD (A. S. *eald*) denotes what has existed for a long time, and, in some cases, exists still, as an old man; in others does not exist still, as the old Romans. It has also the force of standing for a simple expression of duration of existence, without imply-

ing that this duration is of great extent, as an infant a week old.

Ancient (Fr. *ancien*, Low Lat. *antianus*, from *ante*, *before*) has the same application to that which is past, and that which still continues to exist. The Ancient Britons have ceased to exist. An ancient forest exists still. It is opposed to *modern*, and has the force of historically old, or of age in what has been long recognized *by men*.

Antique (Lat. *antiquus*, *ancient*) now conveys the idea of what is *curiously* old, and is peculiar to the age to which it belongs, or exhibits peculiarities in consequence of its age; as, "An antique carving;" "Antique root of an oak."

Antiquated (Lat. *antiquāri*, pass. in a late sense of *to decay*) describes that which, by lapse of time, has passed out of fashion or use.

Aged (Fr. *âge*, Lat. *ætatem*; for the intermediate forms, *see* Brachet) carries with it the progress of years in life and growth, whether human or any other life; as, an aged man; an aged tree. It is a term of more dignity than old, connecting the subject with times and events which have successively passed over it.

Elderly is never used but of men and women, and denotes the approach of old age.

Obsolete (Lat. *obsolescĕre*, sup. *obsŏletum*, *to grow out of use*) expresses that of which the life or force has fallen into desuetude. It is applied chiefly to terms, documents, customs, and observances, and is never used of persons.

"So must thou live, till like ripe fruit thou drop
Into thy mother's lap, or be with ease
Gathered, not harshly plucked, for death mature;
This is *old* age." Milton.

"Had *ancient* times conspired to disallow
What then was new, what had been *ancient* now?" Pope, *Epistles of Horace*.

Ancient is generic; Antique, specific. Ancient qualifies anything which belongs to the nations of antiquity, except the style of their art, which is called Antique. Hence, in some cases, the antique is not, in fact, ancient, but modern. Ancient architecture is the science of building as practised by the ancients; antique architecture exhibits the style of long-past ages. This may be in a recently-erected building.

"The melancholy news that we grow *old*."
Young.

"His *anticke* sword
Rebellious to his arm lies where it falls,
Repugnant to command."
Shakespeare.

"And if we do chance to think upon the serious resolutions we then entertained, we look upon them as the weak results of our infirmity, useful indeed for that time, but now *antiquated* and grown unreasonable."—Hale.

"His house was known to all the vagrant train,
He chid their wand'rings, but relieved their pain;
The long-remembered beggar was his guest,
Whose beard descending swept his *aged* breast." Goldsmith.

"A squire of the house fell in love with me. Somewhat an *elderly* man, big-bearded and personable."—Shelton, *Don Quixote*.

"*Obsolete* or obsolescent."—Johnson.

OMEN. Prognostic. Presage.

Omen (Lat. *ōmen*) and Prognostic (Gr. προγνωστικός, *foreknowing*) are both indications observed in external objects; but the omen rests on fanciful or superstitious association; prognostic, on the laws of nature, being based upon a knowledge of the sequence of phenomena. The term Omen is, however, used conversationally in the sense of a possible or probable prognostic; something which renders the occurrence of another thing probable, or to be hoped, or dreaded. It is, however, more commonly referred to the former than the latter. In our elder literature, Prognostic often occurs in the sense of divination.

A Presage (Fr. *présage*, Lat. *præsāgium*) is subjective, and commonly expresses something anticipated for good or ill, of which it seems impossible to give the grounds, but of which one feels the strong probability. Such being its indefinite character, it is of course often to be resolved into the mere effect of emo-

tion or of fancy. The omen may belong to the present and its undertakings; the presage and prognostic belong to what is future.

"The chief subjoins, Oft have these eyes beheld
Dire *omens*, and my skill the cause revealed;
Yet never felt I this excess of fear,
Or did the stars more *ominous* appear."
LEWIS, *Statius.*

"The consequences are before us, not in remote history, not in future *prognostication*; they are about us, they are upon us."—BURKE.

When a presage is founded upon some external fact or appearance, it is then identical with an omen or prognostic; but it differs from them in being capable of denoting a *mere* feeling of anticipation without assignable grounds. In that case it is more commonly, like *foreboding*, used of the calamitous than the fortunate; as Pope says, "With sad, *presaging* heart."

"The enthusiastic love of Nature, simplicity, and truth in every department both of art and of science, is the best and surest *presage* of genius."—STEWART.

OMIT. NEGLECT.

The act of letting pass is common to these two words; but OMIT (Lat. *ŏmittĕre, to let go*) is entirely neutral in its meaning, and expresses no more than the negation of action or attention. This may be laudable, culpable, or indifferent, according to the nature and circumstances of the case. We may omit purposely, or through oversight and forgetfulness; and that where action would be wise, prudent, and right, or altogether the contrary of these.

NEGLECT (Lat. *neglĭgĕre*, part. *neglectus*) is *always* imprudent or culpable, implying omission where the contrary was a matter of duty, wisdom, or obligation. The term OMIT is in some cases applied to things without life; while NEGLECT is never applied but to creatures of consciousness and will. "The text of a certain manuscript *omits* the passage in question." So in law, *cāsus ŏmissus*, a case not provided for.

"Our Saviour likewise tells us that men shall not only be proceeded against for sins of commission, but for the bare *omission* and neglect of their duty, especially in the works of mercy and charity."—TILLOTSON.

"In heaven,
Where honour due and reverence none *neglects*."
MILTON.

ONLY. SINGLE.

As *one* (A. S. *án*) expresses simple unity, so ONLY (which is *onely* or *one-like*) and SINGLE (Lat. *singŭlus*; more frequently plural, *singŭli*) express modifications of unity. ONLY denotes unity in reference to a class; SINGLE, one as distinguished from many others. SINGLE has often the sense of *one* where more might be expected or wanted, and is thus joined, as ONLY cannot be, with a negative; as, not a single drop, which is tantamount to, not even one drop. It may be observed that, while SINGLE is an adjective, ONLY is, generally speaking, an adverb.

ONSET. ATTACK. ASSAULT. ENCOUNTER.

ONSET (literally, *a setting on*) is commonly applied to such an attack or charge as betokens the commencement of a sustained effort. It is only employed where there are two parties to the conflict, the one attacking, and the other resisting. We may speak of an onset upon the walls of a castle, but only as implying living defenders. Nor is the term commonly used of individual, but of collective, attacks; an army or a detachment, not an individual combatant, makes an onset.

ATTACK (Fr. *attaquer*) and ASSAULT (O. Fr. *assalt*, Lat. *ad, to, saltus, a leap*) may be made upon unresisting objects, as a fortification; assault being more direct and violent than attack, which may be impersonal; as, to attack the enemy or the enemy's camp, a man, or his opinions. Both these are applicable to individuals. An attack is a term of varied force. An attack may be furious or mild, impetuous or cautious, while both onset and assault indicate energetic movement.

ENCOUNTER (O. Fr. *encontrer, to encounter*, Lat. *in-* and *contra, against*) is a hostile meeting face to face be-

tween two persons or parties, often the result of a *chance* meeting, and is never employed of unresisting or inanimate material, as the walls of a fortification. But in the sense of coming upon something by chance, we employ the term of inanimate things; as, to encounter a difficulty. In this application the term is seldom used but of the abstract—that is, *the difficulty*, not that which constitutes it. So a ditch being a possible obstruction, we might speak of encountering an obstacle in the form of a ditch, but hardly of encountering the ditch itself.

"As when in Indian forests wild,
Barbaric armies suddenly retire
After some furious *onset*."
GRAINGER.

"Satan, who that day
Prodigious power had shown, and met in arms
No equal ranging through the dire *attack*
Of fighting seraphim." MILTON.

"At length a universal hubbub wild
Of stunning sounds and voices all confused,
Borne through the hollow dark, *assaults* his ear
With loudest vehemence." *Ibid.*

An exception to this is in a legal use of the term ASSAULT, which implies no attack or stroke, but even excludes them.

"*Assault* is an attempt or offer to beat another, without touching him; as if one lifts up his cane or his fist in a threatening manner at another, or strikes at him but misses him."—BLACKSTONE.

OPENING. APERTURE.

OPENING means, generally, any place naturally made, or purposely left, open (A. S. *openian, to open*).

APERTURE (Lat. *apertūra, an opening*) is the same thing, but used in an exacter and, as it were, more scientific sense. To say nothing of OPENING in the sense of beginning or introduction, nor of the fact that OPENING may express the process or art of opening, while aperture expresses only the result or fact, OPENING may be very loosely employed; as, "An opening in the mountains, with nothing but sky beyond." An aperture is commonly an opening of the nature of a perforation, being surrounded by the substance which exhibits it, as an aperture to admit light into a hut. An opening may be extremely slight; an aperture is of some considerable size. We occasionally see openings in bad masonry or ill-seasoned woodwork, which we should not call APERTURES. An opening is called an aperture when it answers a natural purpose. Yet it seems that art makes openings and nature makes apertures in smaller objects. The surgeon who opens a vein would hardly be said to make an aperture, yet it might naturally be said that blood discharged itself through the aperture.

"A person that is short-sighted in looking at distant objects, gets the habit of contracting the *aperture* of his eyes by almost closing his eye-lids."—REID.

"Large was the cave, but scarce at noon of day
The winding mouth received a feeble ray,
Yet from an *opening* to the right appeared
A beam of sunshine that the dwelling cheered."
HOOLE, *Orlando Furioso*.

OPERATE. WORK. ACT.

WORK (A. S. *weorcan*) is employed of the systematic and regular exhibition of force, whether conscious or mechanical.

OPERATE (Lat. *ŏpĕrāre, to work, labour*) is a term more definitely involving rule and purpose or effect than work. A fermenting fluid might be said to work, or the muscles of the face under agitation; but OPERATE, for the most part, includes moral influences or abstract forces, as a law may be said to operate for the harm or benefit of society, or a system or institution is in full or partial operation.

ACT (Lat. *ăgĕre, to do*, part. *actus*), when not employed of the result of moral motives, but in a physical sense, is ordinarily used to denote the mechanical operation of that which is working *as it ought*, or so as to produce the required result; as a part of a machine which has been obstructed, when the obstruction is removed, begins to act. Action is uniform movement according to appointment and design. A diseased joint, when healed, might be said to work or to act, not to operate. Act commonly refers to

structural working or freedom of play in a complex or organized subject. WORK is applied to the whole, ACT to the parts. A machine is said to work well when all its parts act properly.

"Nature and grace must *operate* uniformly, even as gravitation *operates* uniformly upon matter."—JORTIN.

"Oh, thou hast read me right, hast seen me well;
To thee I have thrown off that mask I wore;
And now the secret *workings* of my brain
Stand all revealed to thee." ROWE.

"An increase of the electrical matter adds much to the progress of vegetation. It probably *acts* there in the same manner as in the animal body."—BRYDONE.

OPINION. SENTIMENT. NOTION.

As the sensations stand to the ideas of men, so are their SENTIMENTS (Fr. *sentiment*, Lat. *sentīre, to feel*) to their OPINIONS (Lat. *ŏpinionem*). Each involves the exercise of judgment; the former concerning sensations and external, the latter concerning ideas and internal, phenomena. An opinion is maintained by the pure intellect on the subjects of science, argument, principles, or facts and occurrences. The sentiments are opinions entertained in matters of feeling and taste. A sentiment may therefore be either an erroneous opinion, or an unformed one, according as it is not or is verified by the pure judgment. Judgments formed of the truth or falsehood of religious doctrine are opinions; judgments formed of the spirit of its precepts, and of practices flowing out of them, are sentiments. Sentiments depend upon the moral constitution and habits; opinions are of the nature of inferences and deductions, which fall short of absolute knowledge. Sentiments are things of the heart and mind; opinions, of the mind alone. There is more of instinct in sentiment; more of definition in opinion. "I contemplate a work of art, and myself feel the admiration to which I consider it to be generally entitled." This is a sentiment. "I see in it a style of art which seems to betoken a foreign artist. I refer it to an Italian school of sculpture." This is an opinion.

"*Opinion* is the result of obscure and intermediate perception. That the planets revolve about the sun is a branch of knowledge; that they are inhabited by beings similar to men is only an *opinion*."—BELSHAM.

"I am apt to suspect that reason and *sentiment* concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions."—HUME.

NOTION (Lat. *nōtionem, a taking cognizance, a conception*), in this sense, denotes the uninformed or immature decision of the mind, resulting rather from the appearances of things, and such opinion as the existent state of our knowledge inclines us to entertain. Metaphysically, a notion is that which is expressed by a logical proposition, as *idea* is that which is expressed by a logical term. It is sometimes extended to the process of forming the judgment which is expressed by the proposition.

"*Notion*, again, signifies either the act of apprehending, signalising, that is, the remarking or taking note of the various notes, marks, or characters of an object which its qualities afford, or the result of that act."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

OPPOSE. RESIST. WITHSTAND. THWART.

TO OPPOSE (Lat. *oppōnĕre*, part. *oppŏsĭtus*) is always active, and implies a direct object.

RESIST (Lat. *rĕsistĕre, to stand against*) is both active and passive, and may have an indirect object. The former is the exertion of conscious force; the latter is employed of inanimate objects, as water of itself might be said to resist the action or progress of fire, while its progress might be said to be opposed by those who are engaged in extinguishing it. Opposition consists in bringing to bear an adverse force of our own; resistance, merely in neutralizing an adverse force. *With-* in WITHSTAND is equivalent to the *re-* in RESIST. The term has a purely negative sense. We oppose by active *force*. We resist by inherent *power*. We withstand by inherent *firmness*.

TO THWART (A. S. *thweor, oblique, transverse*, verb *thweorian*) denotes, not in particular any kind or degree of force, and denotes such action as defeats a purpose, design, or scheme

It relates, therefore, exclusively to the opposition to mental power exerted towards the accomplishment of an object, which it is the interest of the opposing party to defeat, or which it is in the nature of circumstances to counteract.

"I am too weak to *oppose* your cunning."
SHAKESPEARE.

"That mortal dint,
Save He who reigns above, none can *resist*."
MILTON.

"Some village Hampden, that with dauntless breast
The little tyrant of his fields *withstood*."
GRAY.

"E'en at thy altars while I took my stand,
The pen of truth and honour in my hand,
Fate, meditating wrath 'gainst me and mine,
Chid my fond zeal, and *thwarted* my design."
CHURCHILL.

ORAL. VERBAL. VOCAL.

ORAL (Fr. *oral*, Lat. *os*, *ōris*, *the mouth*) means spoken by word of mouth; VERBAL (*verbum*, *a word*), the same thing; VOCAL (Lat. *vōcālis*), belonging to the voice (Lat. *vōcem*). The difference is in the application. They stand each in opposition to other ideas. Oral is opposed to written or printed in volumes and documents, and stands related to history, records, and tradition; verbal, to common and brief communications; vocal, to instrumental in music, or to sounds produced in other ways, or to silence.

"Before the invention of the arts of writing, carving, and painting, *oral* tradition must have been the only vehicle of historical knowledge; and with respect to this, it is well worth our notice that the wisdom of Providence has made provision for the instruction of youth in the dispositions and circumstances of their aged parents."—PRIESTLEY.

"These *verbal* signs they (children) sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in their first use of language."—LOCKE.

"Nothing can be said to be dumb but what naturally speaks; nothing can speak naturally but what hath the instruments of speech, which, because spirits want, they can no otherwise speak *vocally* than as they take voices to themselves in taking bodies."—BISHOP HALL.

ORBIT. CIRCUIT. CIRCLE. COMPASS. CYCLE.

The ORBIT (Lat. *orbĭta*) is the path described by the orb or heavenly sphere. It may be spherical or elliptical.

"Only there is this difference, that the bodies of the great system were projected at great distances from each other, and in such a manner that the planets revolve in *orbits* almost circular, so as not to come too near to the sun, or to be carried too far from him in their revolutions."—MACLAURIN.

The CIRCLE (Lat. *circŭlus*) is primarily a mathematical figure, being a curved line at all points equidistant from the centre. It has its secondary application denoting a company bound together and associating by some common tie; the domestic circle, a large circle of acquaintance.

"It is in the nature of things that they who are in the centre of a *circle* should appear directly opposed to those who viewed them from any part of the circumference."—BURKE.

CIRCUIT (Lat. *circŭĭtus*) is movement round some tract or circumscribed district. It is employed of the act, the space, and the outline of the revolution; as, a planet's circuit, to complete the circuit, and the like. To make a circuit of a district is analogous to the drawing of a circle not in geometrical exactitude, but in the fact of returning finally to the starting point. A circuit is made for some systematic purpose, as of survey, measurement, inspection, and is prescribed as well as circumscribed.

COMPASS (Fr. *compas*, L. Lat. *compassus*) combines the idea of circularity with that of enclosure. The verb *to compass* has the senses of to environ, to go round, and metaphorically to bring about as a design. In old English the verb *to compass* had the meaning of get the better of, in which it resembles that of the present word *circumvent*, though with a less unfavourable meaning morally. When we have fetched a compass we have enclosed something in a circuit. This need not be mathematically a complete circular movement.

"So the *circuit* or compass of Ireland is

1,800 miles, which is 200 less than Cæsar doth reckon or account."—STOW.

CYCLE (Lat. *cyclus*, Gr. κύκλος, *a ring or circle*) is subjective. It is a conceived circle or imaginary orbit; a conception of periodic movement and recurrence. If, for instance, it were believed that all things happen by a chain of necessity in fixed and immutable sequence, it would be conceivable that the same things should occur and the same forms reappear, each in its own place and order, though the cycles should be of enormous circumference, that is, consist of enormous intervals of time between the exhibition and re-exhibition of the same phenomena. In common language we sometimes speak of a cycle of fashion; as, if what is in vogue at one time may after many changes be expected to become so again. The cycle of the seasons.

"The last bad *cycle* of twenty years."—BURKE.

ORDER. DISPOSE.

To DISPOSE (Fr. *disposer*) involves little more than an orderly or harmonious *placing* of things.

To ORDER (Fr. *ordre*, subst.; Lat. *ordĭnem*) is applicable to the *continuous* exercise of a controlling power. DISPOSE belongs rather to things external; ORDER, to things moral.

"To him that *ordereth* his conversation right will I show the salvation of God."—*Eng. Bible.*

"The rest themselves in troops did else *dispose*." SPENSER.

ORDER. RULE.

A wise and harmonious disposition of things is expressed by these words, but the RULE (Lat. *rēgŭla*) is prior in the order of thought. It relates closely to the authority and the form of such disposition, while ORDER belongs to its result. The rule is the principle, the order is the application of the principle. Where we see order, we may have the operation of rule. One observes order, and follows a rule; and to do the latter is the surest way of effecting the former. An institution is obviously in excellent order. If the cause were investigated, it would be found that its rules were carefully attended to.

ORIGINAL. PRIMARY. PRISTINE. PRIMITIVE. PRIMORDIAL.

ORIGINAL (Lat. *ŏrĭgĭnem, an origin*) denotes that which is connected with the origin or beginning of a thing. The original meaning of a word is that which it bore at or near its first employment, without of necessity involving the ideas of priority or succession.

PRIMARY (Lat. *prīmārius, of the first rank*) essentially involves succession; as the primary meaning of a word implies other derived or secondary senses; while its original meaning may be that which it retains still; so a primary consideration comes first in order of importance. That which is primary is first morally; that which is original is first historically. The former denotes gradation of force, the latter native association.

PRIMORDIAL (Lat. *prīmordiālis, belonging to first beginnings, prīmordia*) is applied only to such matters as have a history or a development. So in botany a primordial leaf is that which is immediately developed from the cotyledon; in geology the term is sometimes applied to the lowest beds of the Silurian period; in history or physiology we speak of the primordial condition of man; and in metaphysics of the "primordial facts of an intelligent nature" (Sir W. Hamilton).

PRISTINE (Lat. *pristĭnus*) has relation to the morals, manners, and customs of men.

PRIMITIVE (Lat. *prīmĭtīvus*) conveys the idea of what is original in mode, fashion, or form; so we speak of the primary meaning, and the primitive form, of a word; primitive manners; primitive simplicity.

"His form had not yet lost
All its *original* brightness." MILTON.

"Those I call original or *primary* qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, namely, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number."—LOCKE.

"Parliaments never recover their *pristine* dignity, honour, power, privileges, this should miscarry."—PRYNNE.

"This is that that will restore to the world the golden age of *primitive* Christianity, when the love and unity of the disciples of Jesus was so conspicuous and remarkable that it became a proverb, 'See how the Christians love one another.'"—SHARP.

OSTENSIBLE. COLOURABLE. SPECIOUS. PLAUSIBLE.

OSTENSIBLE (Lat. *ostendĕre, to show or hold out*) is, literally, that which may be (and so is) held out; 1, by way of true account; and 2, by way of fictitious account. The latter is now its more frequent application. That which is ostensible presents such an appearance as affords a presumption of reality. COLOURABLE denotes that which is so artificially treated as to conceal the truth and lull suspicion, giving an appearance or right or justice.

SPECIOUS (Lat. *spĕcĭōsus, fair*) is superficially fair, just, or correct, appearing well at first view, but in reality unsound.

PLAUSIBLE (Lat. *plausĭbĭlis, deserving applause*) is said of those things which please the ear and do not satisfy the judgment; while SPECIOUS relates, etymologically, to what pleases the eye, yet is not truly what it seems to be. Ostensible causes, pretexts, motives. Colourable views, statements, arguments, interpretations. Specious argument, talk. Plausible representations, accounts, stories.

"It is certain that he (D'Ouvilly) ingratiated himself much with that favourite, and attended him into Spain, where he was even employed in the treaty of marriage, though *ostensibly* acting only in the character of a painter."—WALPOLE.

"Those *colourable* and subtle crimes that seldom are taken within the walk of human justice."—HOOKER.

"I propose next to describe the *specious* or decent man. By the decent man, I mean him who governs all his actions by appearances."—GILPIN.

"Covetousness is apt to insinuate itself by the *plausibility* of its pleas."—SOUTH.

OSTENTATION. PARADE. SHOW.

Of these, the simplest is SHOW (A. S. *sceawe, a show*), which expresses the purposed exhibition of what might be kept concealed, or less demonstratively displayed. It has also the peculiar force of *appearance*, as distinguished from reality.

OSTENTATION (Lat. *ostentātiōnem, display*) is studied display without the external effect of show, but with a stronger implication of motives. A man may make a show of his wealth in equipages, plate, and the like, and make large subscriptions for purposes of ostentation; that is, producing the same inference of his wealth through something not so striking to the eye.

PARADE (Fr. *parade*) is, like SHOW, essentially external. As ostentation is a parade of virtues or other qualities, so parade is ostentation of anything calculated to impress the minds of others in relation to one's own capacities, powers, possessions, or superiority and excellences of any kind. Parade is not only ostentatious, but continuous and complex show, seeking to produce its effect by many objects, and not only one. Parade is formal, artificial, and studied show of what is intended to captivate the eye or the understanding. When one views the subject in a moral point of view, PARADE designates rather the action and the purpose of it, OSTENTATION the principle or cause of the action and the way of doing it. One makes a parade of a thing, not an ostentation of it. One does a thing with ostentation, and for the sake of parade. It is ostentation that makes a parade of things.

"I mention this, not *ostentatiously*, as taking credit on the score of industry and discovery, but hoping that the labour of the task will be some apology on my behalf."—*Observer*.

"It was not in the mere *parade* of royalty that the Mexican potentates exhibited their power."—ROBERTSON.

"A crown,
Golden in *show*, is but a wreath of thorns"
MILTON.

OVER. ABOVE. BEYOND. ON. UPON.

That is OVER (A. S. *ófer, over*) another thing which is higher vertically or in a perpendicular line, either with or without intervening space; as, a bird may hover over its prey; to spread a cloth over a table. It is employed to express, not only position,

but a movement over; as to leap over a stream. Its other senses are analogical, a mode of employment which it shares with the rest, and with which we are not now concerned; as, for instance, in cases of measurement or superiority. When trees or branches are said to hang over a wall, there seems to be implied a double force of verticality and passage over it.

ABOVE (A. S. *ábúfan, i.e. an, on; be, by,* and *ufan, upward:* SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) denotes excess of height.

BEYOND (A. S. *begeondan, be-* and *geond, across, beyond*) betokens that which surpasses a given point in distance from the spectator; but this measurement, though primarily taken horizontally, is not so confined. In speaking of ivy, for instance, as growing up the side of a house, we might say, that it had already grown beyond the first story, the idea being that of space measured vertically.

ON and UPON (A. S. *on, in,* or *on; upp, up*) require to be distinguished. ON denotes that the thing is placed on the upper side of the other, and of course in contact with it; UPON denotes that the position is one of a certain degree of elevation. We place a book upon a shelf; but it is idle and contradictory to say that we place it upon, instead of simply on, the ground.

OVERBEAR. OVERPOWER. OVERWHELM.

That which OVERBEARS is inherent weight or power; that which OVERPOWERS is strength put forth against resisting strength; that which OVERWHELMS (*over,* and Du. *wemelen, to whirl, turn round:* WEDGWOOD) covers and, as it were, drowns in incapacity. A domineering manner overbears. Weight of superior argument or superior muscle overpowers. Masses of matter or adverse circumstances overwhelm. In OVERPOWER the idea is conveyed of reduction to the power of another. This is less strongly implied in OVERBEAR, and not at all in OVERWHELM. OVERBEAR and OVERPOWER are never used but in an adverse sense; OVERWHELMED is sometimes differently employed; as, persons are said to be overwhelmed with compliments, attentions, benefits, and the like, as well as by grief, business, or difficulties, or troubles.

"The judgment being the hegemonical power and director of action, if it be led by the *overbearings* of passion, and stored by lubricous opinions instead of clearly conceived truths, and be peremptorily resolved in them, the practice will be as irregular as the conceptions erroneous."—GLANVILL.

"They spoke like men conquered with an *overpowering* force and evidence of the most concerning truths."—SOUTH.

"The story was proved by *overwhelming* testimony to be false."—MACAULAY.

OVERRUN. OVERSPREAD.

To OVERRUN is said of many individuals, and commonly in a hostile or offensive sense; OVERSPREAD, either of many individuals, or a common substance, and commonly in a neutral sense. It is the necessity of implying intervals in the subject, instead of continuous expansion, which has originated such an expression as "ground overrun with weeds."

"Then did her glorious flowers wax dead and wan,
Despised and trodden down of all that *overran.*" SPENSER.

"Undoubted signs of such a soil are found,
For here wild olive-shoots *o'erspread* the ground,
And heaps of berries strew the fields around." DRYDEN.

OVERSIGHT. SUPERINTENDENCE. SUPERVISION.

A reference to the word OVER will show how OVERSIGHT has acquired two apparently opposite meanings—that of control or supervision, and that of inadvertency. The former flows from the stationary, the latter from the motive, force of the word OVER (*see* INADVERTENCY). It differs from INADVERTENCY in being purely negative, while INADVERTENCY may denote active error. We do wrong things through inadvertency. We omit to do right or needful things through oversight. It differs from superintendence in that it relates only to persons. The superintendence of an institution, and the oversight of its inmates. The object of superintendence is official control, that of SUPERVISION (*Lat.*

super, *over*, and *vĭdēre*, sup. *vīsus*, *to see*) is conformity. Supervision of persons is to ensure the regularity of demeanour, supervision of works or productions to ensure correctness of performance. He who superintends other men is vested with considerable authority in his own person; he who has the supervision of them is himself responsible to a superior power. The chief superintends, the delegate supervises.

"Taking the *oversight* thereof, not by constraint, but willingly."—*Eng. Bible.*

"In a word, he is set forth as operator and manager, director and *supervisor* over all the works of God."—WATERLAND.

"It is He that gave the sun its light, and who directs the courses of the stars; who is *superintendent* everywhere, and steers the whole world."—WATERLAND, ii. 3.

"The mistress of the family always *superintends* the doing of it."—COOK, *First Voyage*, i. 18.

OUTLIVE. SURVIVE.

Although these terms are nearly the same in form, SURVIVE (Lat. *sŭpervīvēre, to outlive*) being the Latin equivalent of the Saxon word OUTLIVE, yet OUTLIVE is commonly employed of the corresponding lifetime of other persons; while SURVIVE is employed generally of any point of time, and even of influences antagonistic to life. We outlive persons and periods. We survive efforts or effects, as a severe accident.

"Conscience accompanies a man to his grave; he never *outlives* it; and that for this cause only, because he cannot *outlive* himself."—SOUTH.

"Christ's soul *survived* the death of His body, therefore shall the soul of every believer survive the body's death."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

OUTLIVE expresses the superiority of life in duration; SURVIVE, its inherent power also. It is often the difference between length and strength of existence.

OUTWEIGH. PREPONDERATE. PREDOMINATE.

The former is used directly as a transitive verb; the latter requires the addition of a preposition. In that way they are synonymous. OUTWEIGH, however, is used of intrinsic, PREPONDERATE (Lat. *præpondĕrāre*, *præ, before*, and *pondus, ponděris, a weight*) of extrinsic, objects of comparison. Thus we say, "one advantage outweighs another;" but of several advantages considered collectively, one preponderates. OUTWEIGH being the Saxon form, directly expresses the material influence; PREPONDERATE better expresses the intellectual or moral. That which preponderates has special *weight;* that which PREDOMINATES (Lat. *præ*, and *dŏmĭnāri, to bear rule*) has special *force;* the one influences, the other impels us. That which preponderates makes itself felt; that which predominates does so by the suppression of other agents or powers. One consideration preponderates over others, as a motive to action; a predominating passion neutralizes other impulses.

"It is really no small argument of the *predominance* of conscience over interest that there are yet parents who can be willing to breed up any of their sons if hopefully endowed to so discouraged and discouraging a profession."—SOUTH.

"Since evil *outweighs* good, and sways mankind,
True fortitude assumes the patient mind."
SAVAGE.

"This only may be said in general, that as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear upon the whole matter in a greater or less degree to *preponderate* on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainment as we call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, &c."—LOCKE.

P.

PACE. STEP.

A PACE (Lat. *passus*) is either a measured STEP, consisting generally of three feet, or it is an abstract term, denoting the aggregate of steps, and the mode in which they are taken, especially in relation to the rapidity of movement.

A STEP (A. S. *steppan, to step, stride*) is employed in the sense of an unmeasured pace, an advance made by

one removal of the foot; or, objectively, that which aids the foot to do this, as the steps of a staircase; or, yet further by analogy, any gradation; as, to do a thing step by step; or a movement morally considered, as to take a bold step. Both STEP and PACE are used in the abstract of the manner of progressive movement by the feet; but in this use PACE is employed, as has been observed, as distinguishing one mode or rate of progress from another, as a walk from a trot; STEP as being peculiar to the individual; as, to know a person by his step. A person may move at a rapid pace without taking quick steps.

PAIN. AGONY. ANGUISH. SUFFERING. PANG.

PAIN (Fr. *peine*, Lat. *pœna*), first, penal infliction, and then, suffering of body or mind, is still used in this double sense; as, to be in great pain, to act under pain of another's displeasure. Pain is the energetic opposite to pleasure—the state, whether physical or mental, which is most repugnant to conscious and sensible beings. It is indefinite as to degree, and may be slight or severe.

PANG (etym. uncertain) is severe and transient, as AGONY (Fr. *agonie*, Gr. *ἀγωνία, a struggle, agony*) is severe and permanent pain.

ANGUISH (Fr. *angoisse*, Lat. *angustia, narrowness, poverty; angĕre, to choke*) is employed to denote the distraction, as agony denotes the struggles, of pain. The mind or body in anguish is enslaved by physical or mental pain, so wrung or distressed as to be incapacitated by it. SUFFERING is strictly the state of which pain is the cause and account. I see a person in an evident state of suffering. I do not know the cause or nature of his suffering till he has told me that he is under the influence of physical or mental pain, as the case may be.

"What pleasure and *pain* are we learn by experience, and they are feelings the idea of which cannot be communicated by definition."—BELSHAM.

"The virtue and good intentions of Cato and Brutus are highly laudable; but to what purpose did their zeal serve? Only to hasten the fatal period of the Roman government, and render its convulsions and dying *agonies* more violent and painful."—HUME.

"The death of Wolsey would make a fine moral picture, if the hand of any master could give the pallid features of the dying statesman that chagrin, that remorse, those pangs of *anguish* which in those last bitter moments of his life possessed him."—GILPIN.

"Who best
Can *suffer* best can do; best reign who first
Well hath obeyed." MILTON.

"Oh, sharp convulsive *pangs* of agonizing pride!" DRYDEN.

PAINTING. PICTURE.

PAINTING, as its name plainly enough expresses, is a representation of objects by coloured pigments (Fr. *peindre, peint*).

PICTURE (which comes directly from the Latin *pictūra*, from *pingĕre, pictus*, as PAINTING comes indirectly through the French) is a similar representation in light and shade, but not necessarily in colour, as by crayon, pencil, Indian ink, or photography. The historian (in the secondary sense) draws a lovely picture; the poet paints in glowing colours.

PALE. PALLID. WAN.

The comparative absence of colour constitutes *paleness* from whatever cause the fact may spring. A PALE cheek (Fr. *pâle*, Lat. *pallĭdus*) indicates sickness or delicacy. A pale blue may be the natural colour of a flower. It is also applied to the comparative absence of light, as a pale star.

PALLID (Lat. *pallĭdus*) denotes an abnormal condition of paleness.

WAN (A. S. *wann*) denotes a lurid, livid, or sickly paleness in the human countenance, but is employed analogously, as we speak of the wan light of the moon; that is, one imparting a paleness which is like to wanness to the objects on which it rests.

"And now the *pale*-faced empress of the night
Nine times had filled her orb with borrowed light." DRYDEN, *Ovid.*

"There the red anger dared the *pallid* fear." DRYDEN.

"Moreover, in the wars of Antony the sun continued almost a year long with a pale and *wan* colour."—HOLLAND, *Pliny.*

PALPABLE. PERCEPTIBLE. TANGIBLE.

There is an affinity between PALPABLE (Lat. *palpābĭlis, palpāre* and *-ri, to stroke, touch softly*) and TANGIBLE (Lat. *tangĭbilis*) as there is between visible (Lat. *visĭbilis*) and PERCEPTIBLE (Lat. *perceptĭbĭlis*). VISIBLE is a stronger term than PERCEPTIBLE. VISIBLE is that which you may see, PERCEPTIBLE that which you can see. Accordingly PERCEPTIBLE commonly means that which it is barely possible to see or perceive. It is obvious that PERCEPTIBLE belongs to all the senses, VISIBLE only to sight. The sun in its meridian splendour may be spoken of as visible. It is preceptible through a mist. Owing to the much wider sense of *perceive* than *see*, PERCEPTIBLE has a manifold application as to subtle and invisible influences, and to matters the existence or presence of which is recognized by the combined operations of sense and reflexion. PALPABLE and TANGIBLE differ, not so much in their ideas as in their applications. PALPABLE regards the faculties of perception, observation, judgment, understanding. TANGIBLE regards the solid or substantial properties of the object itself. A palpable truth or absurdity is one which the commonest understanding can take hold of. A tangible result or benefit is opposed to a nominal, unsubstantial, and as it were shadowy one.

"Clodius was acquitted by a corrupt jury that had *palpably* taken shares of money."—BACON.

"The woman decays *perceptibly* every week."—SOUTHEY.

"Direct and *tangible* benefit to yourselves and others."—SOUTHEY.

PALPITATE. FLUTTER. PANT. THROB.

To PALPITATE (Lat. *palpĭtare, to throb*) is to pulsate with strong, quick, and regular beats.

To FLUTTER (Low Germ. *fluttern*) is to pulsate with weak and irregular beats.

PANTING (connected with old Fr. *pantois, out of breath*) is with regard to the breath what palpitation is with regard to the heart; while THROB denotes a pulsation from the inside to the outside of any part of the frame, the action appearing to be outwards towards the surface.

"The shining moisture swells into her eyes
In brighter flow; her wishing bosom heaves
With *palpitations* wild." THOMSON.

"Set the grave councils up upon their shelves again, and string them hard, lest their various and jangling opinions put their leaves into a *flutter*."—MILTON.

"His breath in quick short *pantings* comes and goes." POPE.

"When with tumultuous *throbs* our pulses beat
And dubious Reason totters on her seat."
THOMSON.

PANEGYRIC. ENCOMIUM. EULOGY.

The idea of praise is common to these words. ENCOMIUM (Gr. ἐγκώμιον, *a laudatory ode to a conqueror*) denotes no more than warm praise.

EULOGY (Gr. εὐλογία, *praise*) is more formal, and is applied only to persons.

PANEGYRIC (Gr. πανηγυρικός, *i.e.* λόγος, *a festival oration*) is an elaborate oration; a laudatory discourse. ENCOMIUM is employed of things as well as persons; but in that case the thing is always the result of human action, though not directly the object of personal praise; as, to pass encomiums on the Constitution of Great Britain. Eulogy commonly relates to meritorious actions; panegyrics, to personal character. The panegyric should be public; the encomium, warm; the eulogy, eloquent. The eulogy may be tempered with criticism, the scope of panegyric is only praise. The panegyric too, unlike the others, always bears reference to the whole character, and not to a performance or an act. The panegyric can hardly be otherwise than partial and strained. It needs an orator eloquent yet discreet.

"I think I am not inclined by nature or policy to make a *panegyrick* upon anything which is a just and natural object of censure."—BURKE.

"Thus Plutarch assures us that our author (Cicero), having made a speech in public full of the highest *encomiums* on Crassus, he did not scruple, a few days

afterwards, to reverse the *panegyric*, and represent him before the same audience in all the darkest colours of his invective."—MELMOTH, *Cicero*.

"Take away this love, and the whole earth is but a desert. And though there were nothing more worthy *eulogies* than virginity, it is yet but the result of love, since those that shall people paradise, and fill heaven with saints, are such as have been subject to this passion, and were the products of it."—BOYLE.

PARE. PEEL.

PEEL (Fr. *peler, to skin*, O. Fr. *pel, the skin*, Lat. *pellem*) denotes a natural, as PARE (Fr. *parer*, Lat. *părare, to prepare*) an artificial process. That is pared which is abraded into specific shape; that is peeled which is deprived of a natural layer or integument spread over it. PEEL is used only in a material sense; PARE, in a moral sense.

"The king began to *pare* a little the privilege of clergy."—BACON.

PEEL is used metaphorically by Milton when he says:—

"But govern ill the nations under yoke, *Peeling* their provinces."

PART. DIVISION. PORTION. SHARE.

Of these terms, PART (Lat. *partem*) is the most general in signification. It is equal or unequal, being that which is less than the whole, in number, quantity, or bulk. Hence, specifically, an equal or proportionate division of quantity; as, "an homer is the tenth part of an ephah." It may be organic or inorganic, physical or conceptional, or even metaphorical, in the sense of portion allotted or interest possessed.

DIVISION (Lat. *divisionem*) always implies action or design, which has been exercised in limitation and separation. A division always retains connexion with that which is divided. We might say, "a disintegrated part or portion;" but "a disintegrated division" would be a contradiction of terms.

PORTION (Lat. *portiōnem*) has commonly the meaning of such a division as bears reference to an individual or to the whole of which it is a part, as viewed or treated by an individual. So a portion of land is a quantity in which some person or persons are interested. A portion of Scripture is such as comes under review, as a division made, not in reference to the subject matter, but the person dealing with it.

SHARE (A. S. *scear, a division*) is especially a portion allotted by purpose or accident, and so is much more subjective than PORTION, which is more objective. A share is a portion in which an individual has a right. In reference to the testamentary allotment in itself of property, for instance, we should use the term PORTION. In reference to the claim or possession of such portion by an individual inheritor, we should use the term SHARE.

It is a custom in Normandy that the daughters who receive of an inheritance cannot receive more than a third part of the inheritance for their share, which they divide into equal portions.

"All the *parts* were formed in his mind into one harmonious whole."—LOCKE.

"The communities and *divisions* of men."—ADDISON.

"In the primitive ages women were married without *portions* from their relations, being purchased by their husbands, whose presents to the woman's relations were called her dowry."—POTTER, *Antiquities of Greece*.

"When they trade upon a joint stock, each member *sharing* in the common profit or loss in proportion to his *share* in this stock, they are called joint-stock companies."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

PARTAKE. PARTICIPATE. SHARE.

To PARTAKE is literally to *take* a *part*, share, or portion (and is followed by "of," sometimes by "in") in common with others. This is also the etymological force of PARTICIPATE (Lat. *partĭcipare, i.e. partem căpere, to take part*), which is the Latin equivalent of it. But in PARTICIPATE there is implied a more perfect unity and community of feeling or possession. Hence it is followed, not by "of," but "in." Two persons may partake of the same dish; but they participate in each other's feelings, convictions, joys, or sorrows. To SHARE (*see* PART) is to

partake or participate according to an allotted or regulated method. SHARE is more easily and naturally applicable to such things as are desirable, but is also by a kind of analogy employed of a proportionate amount of what is undesirable; as to have one's share of the goods and ills of life; to share another's joys and sorrows. PARTAKE is sometimes employed in the sense of taking a part of something. So we partake of a dish by helping ourselves to a portion of it. PARTICIPATE would imply that others share it with us. In the sense of having a part of a thing, PARTAKE is employed of inanimate things in regard to their substance, qualities, or nature. Instinct in some animals seems to partake of the nature of reason.

"From court retired, and pomp's fastidious pride,
The hero dared to throw the king aside,
And in the rustic cot, well pleased, *partook*
Of labour's mean repast and cheerful look."
LLOYD.

"Of all this I have not only had knowledge,
But great *participation* in your joys."
DIGBY, *Elvira*.

"It redresses the old Manichæan impiety, so derogatory to it (God's glory), which makes an evil principle a *sharer* with Him in the direction of the universe."—WARBURTON.

PARTICLE. ATOM. MOLECULE.

PARTICLE (Lat. *particŭla*) is no more than a minute piece of a material substance—*e.g.* a particle of bread. Sometimes the particle, as such, possesses a name of its own indicative of its nature, as a particle of dust, which does not exist except in particles.

ATOM (Gr. ἄτομος, *indivisible*) is literally a particle so small as to be indivisible. But as a term of physical science it has the sense of (1) an ultimate particle of matter presumed to be indivisible, and (2) an ultimate particle of matter not necessarily indivisible. These are distinctions of theory in regard to the nature of matter.

The particle under the second of these divisions is the MOLECULE (Lat. *mōlēcŭla*, the diminutive of *mōles*, *a mass*). It is not asserted of the molecule that it is indivisible so much as that it is not contemplated, like the old philosophic question of atoms, from a mechanical point of view, but maintained as a hypothesis.

PARTY. FACTION.

PARTY. *See* CABAL for the special use of this word, which is common to all the synonyms there given. In its common sense it denotes a number of persons united in opinion or action, or both, with a desire to influence the remainder of the body; or, in a degree less marked, a number taking part in the same thing.

Both FACTION (*see* FACTION) and PARTY (Fr. *parti*) denote the union of several persons distinguished from others holding different views; but FACTION implies activity and secret plotting. PARTY implies no more than a sharing of the same opinions. PARTY by itself has not the odious association of FACTION. Anyone who receives support from a number has a party in his favour, though he may not be the head of a party as an agitator. When a faction has gained influence it is likely to become a recognized party in the state.

PASSAGE. COURSE.

Both these terms have the twofold signification of the act and the way of movement.

PASSAGE (Fr. *passage*) is more mechanical; COURSE (Fr. *course*) is less mechanical, though not necessarily implying actual volition. A man finds a passage, but pursues a course. Any transit from one point to another is a passage. A line of movement chosen, directed, or circumscribed is a course. We speak of the course, not the passage, of the stars generally, and of the passage of a planet, if we mean no more than its transit from one definite point to another in the heavens.

"The sickly young sat shiv'ring on the shore,
Abhorr'd salt water, never seen before,
And prayed their tender mothers to delay
The *passage*, and expect a better day."
DRYDEN.

In their secondary meanings, the word PASSAGE is commonly internal and mental or conceptional, COURSE external. The passage of the mind from one point of consideration to another; the course of events, history, law, or the world.

"Therefore this sin of kind not personal,
But real and hereditary was;
The guilt thereof, and punishment to all
By *course* of nature and of law doth pass."
DAVIES, *Immortality of the Soul.*

PASSIONATE. ANGRY. HASTY.

PASSIONATE (Fr. *passion*, Lat. *passiōnem, a feeling, suffering*) denotes a constitutional temperament of readily excited passion, and often in the specifically restricted sense of irascibility. The passionate man is easily roused by injury or insult, or the supposition of them, but is not commonly resentful or malicious.

ANGRY denotes rather a state than a disposition (Lat. *angōrem, a strangling*; Gr. *ἄγχειν, to choke*). Anger has less of the vehement and impetuous, more of deep disturbance of feeling. To be passionate is always inexcusable. To be angry may be even laudable and rightful, if the feeling do not pass into selfish vindictiveness, but be excited simply by the wrong, and not by the personal provocation of the action.

HASTY (Dn. *haste, to haste*; cf. Ger. *hasten*) denotes that eagerness of temperament which is combined with want of reflexion, and which therefore shows itself in other ways besides anger, as in unreflecting speech, or hasty conclusions. The hasty man is soon offended, but not generally ready to offend in return. The passionate person shows his feeling by excited looks and utterances, and indications of violence under a loss of self-control, without of necessity any sense of injury, but more commonly feeling provocation or annoyance. A feeling of injury, or of annoyance so great as to seem to amount to it, produces anger and resentment.

"It is a very common expression that such a one is very good-natured, but very *passionate*. The expression, indeed, is very good-natured to allow *passionate* people so much quarter; but I think a *passionate* man deserves the least indulgence imaginable."—*Spectator.*

"They have their several sounds and notes of expression, whereby they can signify their dislike and *anger*; but only man can clothe his angry thoughts with words of offence, so as that faculty which was given him for an advantage is depraved to a further mischief."—BISHOP HALL.

"'As for that heat and *hastiness*,' quoth he, 'which was in him misliked and offensive, age and time would daily diminish and bereave him of it; grave and sage counsel, which now was wanting, would come on apace every day more than other.'"—HOLLAND, *Livy.*

PASSIVE. PATIENT. SUBMISSIVE.

PASSIVE (Lat. *passīvus, suffering, capable of suffering*) relates simply to matters of action, and is opposed to *active*, or in some cases to a state of non-resistance, resistance being, however, a species of action. It follows therefore that, except where the state of being passive is purposely assumed, there is nothing of moral force in the term; while

PATIENT, another form of the same verb (Lat. *pătientem*, participle of *păti, to suffer*), is essentially a moral term. It may be remarked, however, that this moral force is by no means so strong in the adjective PATIENT as in the noun *patience*. PATIENT may mean bearing what is painful or disagreeable, without any expression of suffering or discontent, as a patient animal under its burden. It is, however, applicable only to conscious agents, while PASSIVE may be employed of that which makes no physical resistance, whether conscious or unconscious.

SUBMISSIVE (Lat. *submittĕre*, part. *submissus, to submit*) denotes that which by self-surrender shows patience in a specific relation, that is, to some particular exercise of will in a superior, or one stronger than one's self.

"The primary idea attached to the word is that of *passiveness*, or being impulsively acted upon."—COGAN.

"In medical language a person oppressed with disease is called a *patient*, or an involuntary sufferer, and the calmness with which he submits is termed *patience*;

that is, the mind yields with tranquillity to the pains and indispositions of the body." —*Ibid.*

"If thou sin in wine and wantonness,
Boast not thereof, nor make thy shame thy glory:
Frailty gets pardon by *submissiveness*."
HERBERT.

PATHETIC. AFFECTING. MOVING. TRAGIC.

Of these terms, the most general is MOVING, which, though its etymology indicates no more than raising feelings or passion, is by usage restricted to tender or mournful feeling; the tendency to excite feelings of other kinds being commonly expressed by the kindred word *stirring*.

The AFFECTING and the PATHETIC are of necessity nearly allied, the Greek πάθος nearly expressing the Latin *affectus, a state or disposition, or mood;* but PATHETIC expresses more the effect of the person and the narration; AFFECTING, the simple nature of the facts of the case. A sad tale may be affecting when read as a mere account of facts. A pathetic narrative is one which, besides the moving nature of the circumstances, is told in a moving manner. Hence the story is pathetic, the circumstances affecting the appeal moving. The pathetic acts through words, the affecting through the senses generally.

TRAGIC (Gr. τραγικός) is a term which serves to combine the idea of the pathetic with a certain degree of dignity in the sufferer. The suffering of a child might be very affecting, but would hardly be spoken of as tragic in itself. The tragic requires the element of personal history combined with a certain considerableness of personal character. That is more forcibly tragic which involves the misery of many at once. The violent death of the father, by which the whole family are reduced to want and wretchedness, is essentially tragic.

"Had the words, 'except these bonds,' been placed anywhere else, the *patheticalness*, grace, and dignity of the sentence had been much abated."—BLACKWALL, *Sacred Classics*.

It is only by usage that AFFECTING is confined to the sense of exciting, not this or that feeling generally, but the feeling of pity or commiseration in particular. Burke used the term in its wider sense when he wrote—

"It is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it *affecting* to the imagination."

"I would have had them writ more *movingly*." SHAKESPEARE.

"Sith that the greatest often are opprest,
And unawares doe into danger fall;
And ye that read these verses *tragicall*
Learne by their losse to love the low degree." SPENSER.

PAUSE. HESITATE.

These terms are applicable to speech and action. We PAUSE (Fr. *pause*, L. Lat. *pausa, a cessation*) on purpose, as in speaking, in order to give effect to what we say, or in action to give time for reflexion.

We HESITATE (Lat. *hæsitare, to remain fixed*) involuntarily, as not having sufficient conversance with our subject, or from natural defect, or as not sure of our ground, or as not having determined or judged.

"Constant rotation of th' unwearied wheel
That Nature rides upon, maintains her health,
Her beauty, her fertility. She dreads
An instant's *pause*, and lives but while she moves." COWPER.

"Upon these grounds, as they professed, they did without any mincing, *hesitancy*, or reservation, in the most full, clear, downright, and peremptory manner, with firm confidence and alacrity, concurrently aver the fact."—BARROW.

PAY. WAGES. STIPEND. SALARY. PAYMENT.

Of these, the simplest is PAY (Fr. *payer*, the Lat. *pācāre, to appease*). It applies to money regularly or systematically given, as compensation for fixed services—in this way differing from PAYMENT, which is specific compensation on some one account. The soldier receives pay; the tradesman payment.

WAGES (Fr. *gage, pledge, stake*, L. Lat. *vădium*) conveys the idea of pledged pay for services agreed upon, the services being manual or of an inferior sort; in this way differing from SALARY and STIPEND, which are for services of a higher than manual

character. The servant receives wages; the master, for work of another kind, receives stipend or salary. The difference between STIPEND (Lat. *stipendium*, *pay*) and SALARY (Lat. *sălārium*, originally a Roman soldier's allowance for salt, from *sal*, *salt*) is as follows: the salary flows out of the appointment; the stipend, out of the duties performed. Thus a fixed stipend would be equivalent to a salary. Yet, though the salary is more continuous and regular than the stipend, the stipend, so far as it goes, is more sure than the salary; for the stipend implies a contract between the parties, which could not be set aside without mutual consent; while a salary may be contingent upon the will or liberality of him who pays it. STIPEND and SALARY being for more than menial offices are mostly for life. They belong to the tenure of something that may be called an office.

"From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received *pay* for their service during the time which they remained in the field."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"Both temporal prosperity and eternal felicity are the *wages* of the labour which we take."—BARROW.

"The *stipends* of the most useful part of the clergy—those who officiate—are often not greater than the earnings of a hireling mechanic."—KNOX.

"As to my *salary*, he told me I should have twenty-four dollars per month, which was as much as he gave to the old gunner."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

PEACEABLE. PEACEFUL. PACIFIC.

These terms, though belonging to the same root, are variously applied.

PEACEABLE (O. Fr. *pais*, Lat. *pācem*, *peace*) refers more directly to the character or disposition of men; PACIFIC (Lat. *pācĭfĭcus*, *peace-making*) to the designs and intentions of men; while PEACEFUL refers to the state or condition both of men and things. A peaceable disposition; pacific measures; a peaceful attitude of affairs, or a peaceful scene.

"What do these worthies
But rob and spoil, burn, slaughter, and enslave
Peaceable nations." MILTON

"Thus Belial, with words clothed in reason's garb,
Counsel'd ignoble ease and *peaceful* sloth,
Not peace." MILTON.

"Slow from his seat the reverend Priam rose,
His god-like aspect deep attention drew,
He paused, and these *pacific* words ensue."
POPE.

PEASANT. CLOWN. COUNTRYMAN. HIND. SWAIN. RUSTIC.

The first three of these terms owe their distinctive character to that to which by implication each stands opposed.

So a PEASANT (Fr. *paysan*, *a villager*, Lat. *pāgus*, *a village*) is a countryman, as distinguished from the lords or tenants of the soil; a CLOWN (Icel. *klunni*, *a boor*) is a countryman, as distinguished from one trained and educated in cities; and a COUNTRYMAN, one who lives and works in the country (Fr. *contrée*, L. Lat. *contrata*, the tract which lies over *against* the spectator), as distinguished from a citizen. HIND and SWAIN are now seldom used, except in poetry. As the clown is the boorish countryman, so the hind (A. S. *man of the domestics*, see SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*; *hina-man*, *a farmer*) is the simple-minded and illiterate, as the swain (A. S. *swán*) is the innocent and homely countryman, who appears in Arcadian pictures of rural life and loves.

The RUSTIC (Lat. *rustĭcus*, *of the country*, *rus*) is the countryman regarded under the combined view of his unlettered simplicity of mind and manners, and as a type and representative of the life which he leads, and the manners by which he is surrounded. Hence, as an epithet, RUSTIC seems to oscillate between the two ideas of the word *rude*, that is, simplicity and coarseness.

"By an easy extension of the word, pagan and rural became almost synonymous, and the meaner rustics acquired that name which has been corrupted into *peasants* in the modern languages of Europe."—GIBBON.

"A *clownish* mien, a voice with rustic sound
And stupid eyes that ever loved the ground." DRYDEN.

"A simple *countryman* that brought her figs," SHAKESPEARE.

"Let him use his harsh
Unsavoury reprehensions upon those
That are his *hinds*, and not on me."
BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

"Remote from cities lived a *swain*."
GAY.

"Let bashfulness, that *rustic* virtue, by;
To manly confidence thy thoughts apply."
DRYDEN, *Ovid*.

On the other hand, Spenser has—

"And gentle sprite deform with rude *rusticity*."

PEEL. RIND.

We commonly use PEEL (Fr. *peler*, *to skin*, O. Fr. *pel*, *skin*, Lat. *pellem*) only of the separable external integuments of natural productions; RIND (A. S. *rind*), of the harder, harsher integuments of artificial productions, though, rarely, of natural also. Comparative hardness and difficulty of separation seem involved in RIND; comparative softness and ease of separation, in PEEL. The structure in the case of the peel *assists*, of the rind *resists* the operation.

PENETRATE. PIERCE.

To PENETRATE (Lat. *pĕnetrāre*, *to place within*, *to pierce into*) is to make a way into a thing, with commonly the implied notion of some degree of difficulty, and, therefore, a gradual operation; nor is the nature of the means or instrument of penetration of any definite character.

To PIERCE, on the other hand (Fr. *percer*), denotes a quick penetration with a sharp instrument. In most cases, PENETRATE denotes a natural, PIERCE an artificial, process. The same distinction is preserved in their secondary or moral meanings. It is genius or intuition that pierces; it is sagacity and labour of investigation that penetrates.

"The world may search in vain with all their eyes,
Nor ever *penetrate* through this disguise."
DRYDEN.

"We have enough to fill us with admiration of the munificence, power, and wisdom of the infinite Creator, when we contemplate the noble faculties of this our superior part, the vast reach and compass of our understanding, the prodigious quickness and *piercingness* of its thoughts."—DERHAM.

PEOPLE. NATION.

PEOPLE (Lat. *pŏpŭlus*) is a term denoting, primarily, a community under the mere aspect of number, and so is often used of the multitude of the governed, as distinguished from their rulers. As PEOPLE is a geographical, so NATION (Lat. *nātionem*) is a political term, implying some ethnological unity, though not necessarily one and the same government; as, the German nation. In this sense, we might speak of the Irish nation, as being descended from one stock, and subject to one government, though the government were foreign to the stock. The nation is a great family, the people is a great assembly. The same language in the mouths of two widely-separated peoples shows that they were originally one nation. A diversity of languages in the speech of one nation, like the English, shows that the nation is a mixed people. If the state be conquered or subjected by revolution to another order of things, the nation, strictly speaking, is destroyed, though the people remains. This comes of the *political* distinction that the nation is the body of citizens, the people the mass of inhabitants.

"Thou must prophesy again before many *peoples*."—*English Bible*.

"Mountains interposed
Make enemies of *nations*, who had else,
Like kindred drops, been mingled into one."
COWPER.

PERCOLATE. PERMEATE. PERVADE.

That PERCOLATES (Lat. *percōlāre*) which filters through small interstices, that PERMEATES (Lat. *permeāre*) which finds its way along intricate passages; that PERVADES (Lat. *pervādĕre*) which goes through a thing. The characteristic idea of PERMEATE is *intricate* penetration, of PERCOLATE *diffusive* penetration, and of PERVADE *complete* penetration. All three have their secondary applications. The political theorist and reformer will often trust to time for the success of his doctrine. He hopes that, though he may not live to see the end, the idea may percolate into the minds of men, per-

meate through the different classes of society, and finally pervade its entire structure.

PERDITION. DESTRUCTION.

There is a growing tendency in English to restrict the former more and more to a moral application, so that, while DESTRUCTION (Lat. *aestructiōnem*) is used of the discerption of the material particles constituting an organized or constructed body, PERDITION (Lat. *perditiōnem*) shall mean the destruction of the immaterial part—the life or the soul of men. This seems to flow rightly from the words. That goes to perdition which goes to absolute *loss*—which is, as it were, lost to life and view. That is destroyed which is broken up.

PEREMPTORY. DOGMATICAL.

PEREMPTORY (Lat. *pĕremptōrius*—(1) *deadly*, (2) with jurists, *destroying all controversy, decisive*) is, literally, destructive, but, specifically, destructive of debate or remonstrance. A peremptory command is one which leaves no alternative but to obey. It thus belongs more to the will and temper of the individual than to the subject-matter of what he says or thinks. It is a wider term than

DOGMATICAL (Gr. δογματικός, *didactic*), which represents a particular kind of peremptoriness, namely, the insisting on the acceptance of one's own opinion by another, or the submission to it, as laid down in an arrogant or magisterial way. As DOGMATICAL belongs to matters of belief and opinion, it is only connected with beings capable of entertaining these; while PEREMPTORY, expressing, primarily, force of demand, and, secondarily, of personal demand, is applicable to the requirements or exactions of unintelligent force, as, for instance, of circumstances, obligations, and the like.

"*Peremptoriness* is of two sorts, the one a magisterialness in matters of opinion, the other a positiveness in relating matters of fact."—*Government of the Tongue.*

"And in their particular opinions they are as assertive and *dogmatical* as if they were omniscient."—GLANVILL.

PERFORMANCE. PRODUCTION.

Both these terms represent the idea of a work that is the product of operation in skilled labour of an artistic kind. In the case of PRODUCTION, the idea may be one of analogy, as when we speak of the productions of Nature.

In the case of PERFORMANCE (O. Fr. *parfournir, to accomplish*), the idea is restricted to conscious agency or operation. In this last way, PERFORMANCE is more external than PRODUCTION, inasmuch as it denotes that which is done by the exercise of skill; while PRODUCTION involves the idea of mental power. A recitation is a performance; a poem is a production. In the performance the manner is everything, and the result next to nothing; in the production the result is everything, and the manner next to nothing In production, the purpose of the operation is the thing produced; in performance, the thing is done for the sake of doing it.

"His musical *performances*, indeed, were not to the taste of the Italians."—MACAULAY.

"It is a great mortification to the vanity of man, that his utmost art and industry can never equal the meanest of Nature's *productions*, either for beauty or value."—HUME.

PERPLEX. EMBARRASS. PUZZLE. POSE. ENTANGLE.

We are PUZZLED (*puzzle*, said to be corr. of the word *opposal*) when our faculties are confused by what we cannot understand, by moral or physical antagonisms or contradictions, which we cannot reconcile or clear.

We are POSED (*pose*, said to be a corr. of the word *oppose*) when we are arrested by a mental difficulty, or meet with a problem which we cannot solve.

We are PERPLEXED (Lat. *perplexus, interwoven*), when we are unable, under contending feelings or views, to determine an opinion or to pursue a definite line of conduct.

We are EMBARRASSED (Fr. *embarrasser; barre, a bar*) in matters of action, thought, or speech, by anything that interferes with their free action. The perplexed person does

not know which way to turn. The embarrassed person moves, but with difficulty. We are ENTANGLED (*? tangle*, said to be another form of *twangle, to have a jingling sound:* WEDGWOOD) when we find ourselves in verbal or practical difficulties, either by our own error or oversight, or by the designs of others. We are puzzled by calculations or riddles; perplexed by casuistry; embarrassed, in some cases, before our superiors, or in speaking a foreign language, or in our efforts to express ourselves.

"Till, by their own *perplexities* involved,
They ravel more, still less resolved,
But never find self-satisfying solution."
MILTON.

"Awkward, *embarrassed*, stiff, without the skill
Of moving gracefully, or standing still;
One leg, as if suspicious of his brother,
Desirous seems to run away from t'other."
CHURCHILL.

"Hebrew, the general *puzzler* of old heads,
Which the gray dunce with pricks and comments reads,
And dubs himself a scholar, by it grew
As natural t' him as if he'd been a Jew."
BROME.

"This text is produced by our Saviour out of Moses his law, in answer to a question wherewith a learned Pharisee thought to *pose* and *puzzle* him." -BARROW.

"It (integrity) is much plainer and easier, much the safer and more secure way of dealing in the world; it has less of trouble and difficulty, of *entanglement* and perplexity, of danger and hazard in it."—*Spectator.*

PERSON. INDIVIDUAL.

PERSON (Lat. *persōna, a character, personage*) is always an individual human being except in theological language, in which it stands related to substance, the person being the living manifestation, in this sense, of the common nature in the individual.

"There is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost."

INDIVIDUAL (Lat. *indĭvĭduus, indivisible*) represents that which, being one, subsists as a distinct being, especially as distinct from other members of the same class, genus, or species. Hence, though the individual may be both personal and human, it is not of necessity either, but may be an inanimate object. So a botanist, speaking of some mark upon a leaf, or petal of a flower, and regarding it as accidental, might say of it that it did not belong to the species, but was a peculiarity of the individual.

PERSEVERE. PERSIST. CONTINUE.

CONTINUE is the generic term, denoting no more than to do as one has done hitherto.

To PERSEVERE (Lat. *persĕvĕrare, persĕvĕrus, to pursue a matter with constancy*) is to continue in a given course in spite of discouragements. While continuance is neutral, inasmuch as it may be from habit or no very definite cause, and is applicable to unintelligent operations, perseverance has commonly a favourable sense, as coming from reflexion and judgment, and as indicative of moral energy.

PERSISTENCE (Lat. *persistĕre, to continue steadfastly*) has commonly an unfavourable force, as coming of dogged desire to gain one's point, or reluctance to surrender it. But this need not be blameworthy. It may be the contrary. PERSEVERE carries with it more weight, and is employed of graver matters than PERSIST. A boy may persevere in his studies, or persist in playing and trifling. Persistence may be inactive and mental; perseverance is active and practical. PERSEVERE has to do more with the doing a thing; PERSIST, with the motive. We persevere in study; we sometimes, in spite of sound argument to the contrary, persist in the same opinion. We persevere in spite of discouragement, we persist in spite of opposition. We persist in resolutely abiding by the resolutions we have taken. PERSEVERE applies more properly to actions and conduct, PERSIST to the will and opinions. It is in matters of effort and practice that we persevere, in matters of sentiment that we persist. By persevering we reach our end, by persisting we maintain our position.

"Another usual concomitant of infidelity is its obstinacy and pertinacious *persisting*

in error. This, likewise, was the temper of the Jews, not to be convinced by any evidence that could be offered to them."—TILLOTSON.

"He might have learnt
Less overweening, since he failed in Job,
Whose constant *perseverance* overcame
Whate'er his cruel malice could invent."
MILTON.

CONTINUE is more applicable than even PERSIST to purely inactive states, and has sometimes the sense of mere absence of movement or change.

"*Continue* thou in the things which thou hast learned, and hast been assured of, knowing of whom thou hast learned them."—*English Bible.*

PERSONS. PEOPLE.

In colloquial language, these terms are synonymous: as, many PERSONS say so; many PEOPLE do it. The difference seems to be, that in the term PERSONS the individuals are more thought of, and with more deference, while in the term PEOPLE, the individuals are merged in the aggregate. "At the dinner yesterday there were five people," would be, if not inelegant, expressive of contemptuousness. "People of that sort." "Persons of distinction." "People say." "It is said by many respectable persons." It may be observed that PERSONS in this general sense does not appear in the objective case. "This often pleases people" (not persons).

PERSPICUITY. CLEARNESS.

As applied to what is spoken or written, CLEARNESS (Lat. *clārus, clear*) is the more general term, denoting the capability of being well understood, which comes from plainness and directness of thought or particular expressions; while PERSPICUITY (Lat. *perspĭcuitatem, clearness*) is employed of the style of expression rather than the mode of thought. It may be said that that which is well and thoroughly conceived will be clearly expressed. Clearness comes of exact acquaintance with the subject. Pure idiom, and propriety of language, neatness of construction, and a good selection of terms, will go far to ensure perspicuity of style.

"I shall, with as much impartiality and *perspicuity* as I may like a faithful advocate to my country, and cordial indifferent well-wisher both to king and parliament, truly state and debate this controversy."—PRYNNE.

"O prophet of glad tidings, finisher
Of utmost hope! now *clear* I understand
What oft my steadiest thoughts have searched in vain,
Why our great expectation should be called
The Seed of woman." MILTON.

PERUSE. READ.

To READ (A.S. *rædan*) is to interpret characters into their words whether mentally only or audibly also; and, more generally, to gather the meaning by observation of anything which expresses itself by outward effects or indications; as to read a character in a face. PERUSE, the etym. of which is quite uncertain, meant formerly to observe closely and in detail. This might be the matter of some book or not. So Milton—

"Who first with curious eye
Perused him."

So now to peruse is to read thoughtfully. One peruses at length a work in which one is interested; one reads, it may be a name upon a sign-post.

PERVERSE. FROWARD.

PERVERSE (Lat. *pervertĕre*, part. *perversus, to overthrow*) is, literally, turned the wrong way, hence disposed, more or less, to be obstinately wrong. FROWARD (*from*, and the termination of direction, *-ward*) is nearly the English equivalent; a person who is *from-ward* being one who swerves from the line of regularity or government. In usage, FROWARD denotes the disposition which is reluctant to obey or submit; hence it has a direct relation to the will of others. PERVERSE denotes a settled contradiction to the will of others, and a tendency to do the distasteful to others for its own sake. Frowardness is a fault of children; perversity of all who are old enough to form contradictory judgments and determinations, and to adhere to them out of a settled crookedness of heart.

"To worship the God of Israel and him only to serve; yet such was the *perverseness* of the people that this was the commandment that of all others they could never be made to keep."—SHARP.

"It is nothing but a little sally of anger like the *frowardness* of peevish children, who, when they cannot get all they would have, are resolved to take nothing."—BURKE.

PESTILENT. PESTILENTIAL. PESTIFEROUS.

These words are all formed from the Latin root *pestis, the plague*, taken generally for a contagious disorder. PESTILENT denotes what belongs to the plague or to the character of the plague, that which is contagious. PESTILENTIAL denotes that which is infected by the plague and has a tendency to spread the contagion.

PESTIFEROUS (Lat. *pestĭfer, bringing pestilence*) that which actually communicates or carries it. A pestilent thing has harm, poison, evil, and the like, in itself, whether physical or moral; a pestilent viper, pestilent writings. PESTILENTIAL is belonging to pestilence, and pestilence marks the actual spread and reign of the pest or plague. Pestilent things may be dormant, pestilential things are exercising noxious influences with danger to those subjects which may come within their influence. PESTILENT is opposed to innocuous, PESTILENTIAL to salubrious.

PETITION. PRAYER. ENTREATY. SUIT. REQUEST.

PETITION (Lat. *pĕtītionem, pĕtĕre, to seek or ask*) and PRAYER (Fr. *prier*, Lat. *prĕcāri, to pray*) differ in that the prayer is commonly for greater gifts or blessings of supreme importance; while petition relates to the more ordinary wants of our nature or circumstances. From this flows the further difference, that prayer involves a more decided superiority in him who is the object of prayer; while petition may be to a superior or an equal. The characteristic idea of PETITION is the formal recognition of power or authority in another; of PRAYER, earnestness and submission in one's self.

ENTREAT (O. Fr. *entraiter, to entreat of*) involves a certain equality between the parties; it is a request of an urgent character dictated by the feelings, and having reference to some specific act in the power of the other to perform, or, in some cases, to abstain from. The prayer and the petition may be personal or collective, the entreaty is personal or individual.

REQUEST (O. Fr. *requeste*, now *requête*) is a more simple and less forcible expression, and may come from a superior, an equal, or (with due deference) an inferior. Its subject is action in another.

The SUIT (Fr. *suite, a following*) is a petition often prolonged, for some favour toward one's self, and so is only made to those who have it in their power to grant favours; as, a gentleman pays his suit to a lady, a courtier to a prince. It indicates not necessarily the general superiority of another; but a superiority on the point with which the request is concerned, and the possession of that which he may grant to another.

"If there should happen any uncommon injury or infringement of the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of *petitioning* the king, or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances."—BLACKSTONE.

"For some I sought
By *prayer* th' offended Deity to appease,
Kneeled, and before Him humbled all my heart.
Methought I saw him placable and mild
Bending His ear." MILTON.

"*Entreat* me not to leave thee, nor to return from following after thee."—*English Bible.*

"When a person hath received an injury, and thinks it worth his while to demand a satisfaction for it, he is to consider with himself, or take advice, what redress the law has given for that injury, and thereupon is to make application or *suit* to the Crown, the fountain of all justice, for that particular specific remedy which he is determined or advised to pursue."—BLACKSTONE.

"At the approach of evening he took leave; but not till he had *requested* permission to renew his visit."—GOLDSMITH.

PHRASE. SENTENCE. EXPRESSION. PROPOSITION. PERIOD. PARAGRAPH. CLAUSE.

A PHRASE (Gr. φράσις, *a way of speaking*, φράζειν, *to speak*) is a portion of a sentence consisting of two or more words, and is impressed with a

character of its own, though it is not grammatically independent.

A SENTENCE (Lat. *sententia*) is grammatically complete, and stands for any short saying of that character.

An EXPRESSION (Lat. *expressiōnem, a wording*) is a distinctive form of utterance, regarded in a technical or rhetorical point of view, and may therefore consist of either one or more words.

A PERIOD (Gr. *πεῐ́οδος, a circuit, a well-rounded sentence*) is a sentence wholly divested of the idea of its meaning, and regarded only in its material construction as a matter of grammar.

A PARAGRAPH (Gr. *παραγραφή*) meant, at first, a marginal writing, but has come to signify a group of sentences or periods limited by the common point to which they refer.

A PROPOSITION (Lat. *prōpŏsĭtiōnem*) is a sentence regarded in a logical point of view, that is, as stating the connexion or disconnexion between the subject and predicate, by an affirmative or negative copula; as, "Men are, or are not, responsible for their actions."

A CLAUSE (Fr. *clause*, Lat. *clausa*) is grammatically a portion of a sentence containing a subject and predicate, and in its legal sense an article, stipulation, or proviso. It is, generally speaking, some sentence or paragraph having a force of its own, in which it stands related to the rest of the document, and by which the rest is modified and governed.

"Exclusion of all popish members to sit in either house of parliament, with a *clause* in favour of the Duke of York."—BAKER, *Charles II.*

"So bravely set forth, so equipt, and so shod,
That, as Homer has *phrased* it, he looked like a god." BYRON.

"A *sentence* is an assemblage of words expressed in proper form, and ranged in proper order, and concurring to make a complete sense."—LOWTH.

"Eternal God, for whom whoever dare
Seek new *expressions*, do the circle square,
And thrust into strait corners of poor wit
Thee who art cornerless and infinite,
I would but praise Thy name, not name Thee now." DONNE.

"Logicians use to clap a *proposition*,
As justices do criminals, in prison,
And in as learned authentic nonsense, writ
The names of all their moods and figures fit." BUTLER.

"A *period* is the distinction of a sentence in all respects perfect, and is marked with one full prick over against the lower part of the last letter, thus (.)."—BEN JONSON.

"The king's secretaries must first allow and *paragraph* them, and then they are allowed."—EVELYN.

PHRASEOLOGY. DICTION. STYLE.

In the order in which these words here stand, they advance from the more particular to the more general.

PHRASEOLOGY (*see* PHRASE) is the employment of particular expressions in such a way as to be distinctive, but not as a matter of critical praise or blame. We do not speak of good or bad phraseology.

DICTION (Lat. *dictiōnem, delivery, an expression*) is the construction, disposition, and application of words. The term is employed in cases where clearness and accuracy are at stake; while STYLE (Lat. *stȳlus, stĭlus*, a pointed *style*, usually of iron, for writing on waxen tablets) is employed of the characteristics of productions and performances which lay claim to an artistic character, as writing, oratory, painting, and the like. Diction belongs more to the matter, style to the author. Phraseology belongs to speaking and writing, diction to written compositions. The style of an orator would include his diction. The component requisites of diction are clearness and correctness. Style is more subtle, and belongs to the personal peculiarities which mark the talent or genius of the writer or speaker, such as propriety, elegance, ease, precision, elevation, pointedness, expressiveness, rapidity, or deliberateness, flippancy, sententiousness, pungency, and so on.

"The Book of Sophisms (of Aristotle) still supplies a very convenient *phraseology* for marking concisely some of the principal fallacies which are apt to impose on the understanding in the heat of a *viva voce* dispute."—STEWART.

"Though he (Dryden) wrote hastily, and often incorrectly, and his style is not free

from faults, yet there is a richness in his *diction*, a copiousness, ease, and variety in his expression, which have not been surpassed by any that have come after him."—BLAIR.

"Though our author's plan should be faultless, and his story ever so well conducted, yet if he be feeble or flat in *style*, destitute of affecting scenes, and deficient in poetical colouring, he can have no success."—*Ibid.*

PIECE. PART.

PIECE (Fr. *pièce*) is a part actually separated; while PART (Lat. *partem*) may be separated or divided only conceptionally. So we speak of a part of a joint before it is cut off, a piece afterwards. Piece involves the idea of comparative smallness; part, of comparative magnitude. A certain part of a volume might comprise pages; choice pieces would naturally mean small extracts.

PILLAGE. PLUNDER. RAPINE. BOOTY. SPOIL. PREY.

The idea of property violently taken from others is common to these terms.

PILLAGE (Fr. *pillage*, from *piller, to pillage*) points more directly to the stripping undergone by those who are deprived of their goods; RAPINE (Lat. *răpīna, răpĕre, to seize*), to the snatching away on the part of the robbers themselves of whatever valuables come within their reach; PLUNDER (Germ. *plündern, to plunder*), to the quantity and value of the things carried off. PLUNDER and BOOTY (Icel. *býte, exchange, barter*; and this from *býta, to distribute*, the original idea of "booty" being *share*. SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) differ in the comparative lawfulness of the latter. Booty is spoil taken in war; but the term SPOIL (Lat. *spŏlium*) is more pertinent to individuals, booty to the army, or to a band of brigands, in which case there is, of course, no idea of lawfulness, but only of professional gain from others. An army carries off booty; spoil is the gain of combatants. Like PILLAGE, it implies emphatically the stripping of others of their personal property and goods.

PREY (O. Fr. *praie*, Mod. Fr. *proie*, Lat. *prædа*) is that which is seized for purposes of possession under the impulse of animal appetite.

"Whereupon I went myself, and took away from our men whatever they had *pillaged*, and gave it to the owners."—HAKLUYT'S *Voyages*.

"Let that go heap a mass of wretched wealth,
Purchas'd by *rapine* worse than stealth,
And brooding o'er it sit." BEN JONSON.

"For the *plundering* of malignants, and sequestering their estates, I answer that I think the parliament never yet approved the *plundering*, or, in plain English, robbing of any man by any of their forces, they having *plundered* no places taken by assault, for aught I hear, though the king's forces, on the contrary, have miserably *plundered* all the kingdom almost."—PRYNNE.

Robbing is more specific than plundering. Persons are sometimes robbed of their purses or their watches. It is yet worse if they are plundered of all they possess. Hence, PLUNDERING as applied to houses or localities, denotes a more varied or promiscuous kind of robbery; but unlike PLUNDER, which is sometimes, nay commonly, done with leave, as when a victorious army plunders a city, ROBBERY is always in violation of law and right. PREY is never employed but in an odious sense. It involves ideas of violence and destruction. It is the only one of the terms which lends itself freely to a secondary sense. A man falls a prey to his own passions when those passions seem to seize him, to keep hold of him, to deprive him of free action, and to bring him to destruction.

"So rich a *booty* forced to forsake,
To put himself and prisoner out of pain,
He on the sudden stabs him."
DRAYTON.

"He combated this strong one, this mighty and dreadful foe of ours, and baffled him, and bound him, and disarmed him, taking away the whole armour in which he trusted, and *spoiled* him, rifled all his baggage, bare away all his instruments of mischief."—BARROW.

"In gallant trim the gilded vessel goes,
Youth on the prow, and Pleasure at the helm,
Regardless of the sweeping Whirlwind's sway,
That, hushed, in grim repose, expects his evening *prey*." GRAY.

PILLAR. COLUMN.

PILLAR (Fr. *pilier*, L. Lat. *pīlāre*,

Lat. *pīla, a stone pier*) commonly conveys the idea of support; COLUMN (Lat. *cŏlumna*) superadds those of size and ornamentation. Support is, however, not an essential idea of either. Both words may be used analogously of what is like a pillar or column; as, "Lot's wife became a pillar of salt;" "The columns of an army." In this case, column is a term of greater dignity than pillar; an architectural monument, though in the form of a pillar, is thus called a column.

PINCH. SQUEEZE. GRIPE. PRESS. CLENCH.

PINCH (Fr. *pincer*) denotes terminal compression, as between two substances closing upon their extremities; as to pinch with pincers or the fingers; the shoe pinches when the two sides, or the upper leather and sole, have the effect of meeting too closely or tightly upon the foot; a pinch of snuff is so much as is compressed between the ends of the fingers. Objects animate or inanimate, acting mechanically, may be said to pinch, SQUEEZE, or PRESS; while GRIPE denotes a voluntary action.

PRESS (Lat. *prĕmĕre*, part. *pressus, to press*) denotes no more than the effect of forcible action persistently passing from one body to another; hence, as pinching involves two directions or applications of force, pressing may be applied to one or many. In pressing paper the active force is employed only on one side or direction.

SQUEEZE (A. S. *cwysan, to crush* or *squeeze*) denotes a compression of larger surfaces or more points of contact than pinch, while it implies, unlike press, more than one side for the application of the force.

GRIPE (A. S. *grípa, a gripe, a handful*) denotes movement which results in tight, sharp holding, and is a voluntary action.

CLENCH or clinch is connected with *cling*, and has the force of complete union or consolidation of two or more parts into a compact mass by an external grasp or clutch. In its metaphorical sense, to CLENCH is to establish finally and unalterably by a decisive word or act, so as to preclude both the necessity and the possibility of after modification, contradiction, or alteration; an argument clenched is finally determined and closed.

PINION. WING.

The PINION (Fr. *pignon*) is a feathered wing; while WING (Dan. and Swed. *vinge*) is more generally a lateral appendage of comparatively light material, moved with a vibratory motion, and supporting the flying body by its pressure upon the atmosphere. Hence insects, for instance, have wings, but not pinions.

PITEOUS. PITIFUL. PITIABLE. DESPICABLE. CONTEMPTIBLE.

The former three terms, though drawn from the same word *pity* (Fr. *pitie*, Lat. *pietatem*, and so a doublet of *piety*), have different shades of meaning. PITIABLE means deserving of pity, that is, it relates to what is a fit object of pity. PITEOUS is moving or exciting pity; PITIFUL, full of what awakens pity, as a characteristic of disposition, but afterwards transferred from the subject feeling or exhibiting to the object awakening pity. PITEOUS is sometimes, however, used in the sense of feeling pity. When PITIFUL is used in the sense of *morally* deserving of pity, the term involves a feeling very different from compassion. The object of pity is always weak: where this is a reprehensible moral want, the word involves a mixture of disapprobation and contempt.

DESPICABLE (Lat. *despĭcābĭlis*) and CONTEMPTIBLE (Lat. *contemptĭbĭlis*) are only partially synonymous with the above, that is, so far as pity and contempt are akin, or as that which would awaken contempt in one mind might excite pity in another. Crime and error may be viewed under the light of unhappiness and misfortune, though vice, which merits more than pity and misfortune, is no fit object of contempt. DESPICABLE is commonly employed in reference to the energetic

and the positive; CONTEMPTIBLE, of the inactive and negative. Man's conduct is despicable when it proceeds from motives, or exhibits a character which we despise on account of meanness or vice; whereas we use the term CONTEMPTIBLE of characters or efforts which we disregard on the simple ground of weakness. "He exhibited a despicable ingratitude and selfishness." "His opponent seems to have regarded his opposition as contemptible." Vanity is contemptible; malice is despicable.

"She sitting by him as on ground he lay,
Her mournful notes full *piteously* did frame,
And thereof made a lamentable lay."
SPENSER.

On the other hand, Thomson, in his advice to the angler:—

"But if too young and easily deceived,
A worthless prey scarce bends the pliant rod;
Him, *piteous* of his youth, and the short space
He has enjoyed the vital light of heaven,
Soft disengage, and back into the stream
The speckled captive throw."

So in the case of pitiful:—

"And as they went, they heard a rueful cry
Of one that wailed and *pitifully* wept."
SPENSER.

On the other hand:—

"Miles Smith was hurtful to none but himself; he was *pitiful* to the poor, and hospitable to his neighbours."—WOOD, *Athen. Oxon.*

"Samson possesses all the terrific majesty of Prometheus chained, the mysterious distress of Œdipus, and the *pitiable* wretchedness of Philoctetes."—*Observer.*

"'And,' as he says rarely well, 'though some creatures seem to be made of much coarser stuff than others, yet even in the vilest the Maker's art shines through the *despicableness* of the matter.'"—BOYLE.

"A Nazarite in place abominable,
Vaunting my strength in honour to their Dagon?
Besides, how vile, *contemptible*, ridiculous,
What act more execrably unclean, profane!"
MILTON.

PLAN. DESIGN. SCHEME. PROJECT.

PLAN (Fr. *plan*) is, literally, something drawn on a *plane;* hence, a method of action or construction in any way. The plan has reference to the means to be adopted for an end rather than the end itself; as the plan of a campaign has victory over the enemy for its final object. A plan is well or ill arranged or devised, effectual or ineffectual, practicable or impracticable.

A DESIGN (Fr. *désigner*, Lat. *désignare, to mark out, design*) is the conception of the final object or purpose, and is, morally, good or bad, or, artistically, worthy or unworthy. The plan often precedes the design, and is the mode by which the design is effected. The design is the thing which we wish to execute, the plan is the method of executing it. One proposes an end, one has views, one forms a design. The good Christian has no other end than heaven, nor any other view than to please God, nor any design but to work out his salvation.

SCHEME (Gr. σχῆμα, *form, manner*) and PROJECT (Lat. *projectum, a thing stretched forth*) includes both end and means. A SCHEME carries the ideas of ingenuity and contrivance, it excludes largeness and grandeur of aim, and is often selfish; PROJECT, the combination of whatever faculties or efforts are needed for carrying out designs of importance, being a word of greater dignity than SCHEME, which is often employed of mean and petty designs. A man has a project in view; he constructs a scheme; he acts upon a plan which he considers may enable him to realize his design. PLAN, SCHEME, and PROJECT may be confined to one's self and one's own affairs; DESIGN operates upon some thing or person beyond them. PROJECT is more general than DESIGN, which is more specific. "I have a project for making money." "I have a scheme for doing so at other people's expense." SCHEME and PROJECT are speculative and exceptional. PLAN and DESIGN enter, in some measure, into the business of every day. A tendency to idealize leads men to conceive designs; a certain inquietude induces them to start projects. It may be added that PROJECT is more undefined than DESIGN, which is clearer and more specific

He who forms a project has sketched out his intentions, he who has a design has realized them in detail. DESIGN is not so purely personal as scheme, but more so than PROJECT. The design of the avaricious man is to get money, his project is to become rich. The design is more immediate, the project more remote. One's own interests are always more or less closely connected with one's designs, but one may have a project for the benefit of another. A good general is as anxious to conceal his own designs as to discover those of the enemy. A good minister of state ought to be full of projects for the honour of the sovereign and the amelioration of the people.

"The vigour of a boundless imagination told him how a *plan* might be disposed that would embellish Nature and restore Art to its proper office—the just improvement or imitation of it."—WALPOLE, *Anecdotes of Painting*.

"The machine which we are inspecting demonstrates by its construction, contrivance, and *design*. Contrivance must have had a contriver, design a designer, whether the machine immediately proceeded from another machine or not."—PALEY.

"The idea of the possibility of multiplying paper money to almost any extent was the real foundation of what is called the Mississippi *scheme*, the most extravagant *project*, both of banking and stock-jobbing, that perhaps the world ever saw."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

PLEADER. ADVOCATE. DEFENDER.

Taking these terms, not in their technical, but their ordinary and conversational use, a DEFENDER (Lat. *dēfendĕre, to defend*) assists him who or that which is attacked; a PLEADER (*see* PLEA) is one who urges a requirement in favour of another or himself.

ADVOCATE (Lat. *advŏcāre*, part. *advŏcātus, to call to the side for support*) is employed of any who promotes by words; as, to advocate certain principles. We defend persons; plead for their necessities; advocate their cause.

"No culprit ought to *plead* in irons."—BURKE.

"The *advocates* thereof to be branded for incendiaries."—MILTON.

"It would be ridiculous to suppose that the defendant comes and *defends*, or in the vulgar acceptation, justifies."—BLACKSTONE.

PLEASURE. COMFORT. ENJOYMENT. FRUITION.

PLEASURE (Fr. *plaisir*, Lat. *plăcēre, to please*) is a very extensive word, embracing almost every feeling or sensation which is not painful, from its lowest to its highest degree

ENJOYMENT (Fr. *joie, joy*, Lat. *gaudia*, pl.) is keen pleasure *specifically* derived from a particular source.

COMFORT (L. Lat. *confortāre, to strengthen*) has acquired a twofold meaning: 1, a state of quiet enjoyment flowing from a sense of complete supply of every want; and 2, relative ease afforded under mental trouble, in which sense it is nearly the same as *consolation*; but consolation is more active. We give consolation, and take comfort. Comfort, in this case, applies to the mitigation of lesser evils.

FRUITION (Lat. *frui*, part. *fruĭtus, to enjoy*) is a term of the elevated spiritual or rhetorical style. It expresses the pleasure and full satisfaction that issues from possession.

"Where I may have *fruition* of her love."—SHAKESPEARE.

PLEDGE. DEPOSIT. SECURITY. EARNEST. GAGE.

These terms vary according to the different interests which are consulted or secured. A PLEDGE (O. Fr. *plége*, Mod. Fr. *pleige, a pledge, surety*) is something deposited with another as a security for a debt or engagement, enabling that person to verify and claim the issue of it. It is commonly given in return for a favour received or a claim recognized. It is a specific article.

DEPOSIT (Lat. *depōnĕre*, part. *dēpŏsĭtus, to put down*) is very general, and expresses any case in which a part is lodged with another as a responsible keeper, in relation to the whole as forthcoming. It may be anything of value, as a sum of money.

A SECURITY (Lat. *sēcūrŭs, se* and *cūra, without care or anxiety*) is something given to place another beyond risk of loss, and applies, technically, to the document, transaction, or source of this security. Pledges and securities are commonly demanded as well as given; a deposit is commonly voluntary. DEPOSIT, too, denotes something movable; SECURITY may be immovable property, as land. The person himself may become a security. In an extended sense anything may be called a pledge which binds a person after it is given to honour, interest, or love. Children are pledges of affection to the parents. EARNEST, like first fruits, is a part paid or given, as a warrant that more is forthcoming of the same kind. In the case of PLEDGE, the forthcoming thing is a definite and specific article; in the case of EARNEST, it is general and indefinite. It may be, and generally is, some *act;* as a victory in a youthful competition may be an earnest of future energy and success in life. A pledge binds us to payment, indemnification, or compensation of some kind. It has regard to the obligation of the person giving it; an earnest has rather relation to the confidence of the person receiving it.

"But threw his gauntlet, as a sacred *pledge*
His cause in combat the next day to try."
SPENSER.

"To them were committed the oracles of God, that is, with them were entrusted all the revelations of the will of God, the law and the prophecies, as the people with whom God thought fit to *deposit* these things for the benefit of the world."—CLARKE.

"For your *security* from any treachery, having no hostage worthy to countervail you, take my word, which I esteem above all respects."—SIDNEY, *Arcadia.*

"And when the Gospel is preached unto us, we beleve the mercy of God, and in beleving we receave the Spirite of God, which is the *earnest* of eternal lyfe."—TYNDALL.

The legal account of EARNEST is thus given by Blackstone:

"If any part of the price is paid down, if it be but a penny, or any portion of the goods delivered as *earnest,* which the civil law calls arrha, and interprets to be emptionis venditionis contractæ argumentum, the property of the goods is absolutely bound by it."

A GAGE (Fr. *gage,* Lat. *vădium*) is specifically a pledge or security for action or performance, to be forfeited in case of non-performance.

"A moiety competent
Was *gaged* by our king." SHAKESPEARE.

PLIABLE. PLIANT. FLEXIBLE SUPPLE.

PLIABLE (Fr. *plier,* Lat. *plĭcāre, to fold*) is stronger than PLIANT, which has the same derivation. The stick of a driving whip may be pliant; the lash is pliable. A stick of wax, which would only just bear bending without breaking, we should call pliant rather than pliable. PLIANT may be defined as capable of bending; PLIABLE of being *bent about.*

FLEXIBLE (Lat. *flexĭbĭlis*) commonly imparts the idea of specific purpose, and might be defined specifically pliable, or pliable for a particular purpose. As PLIABLE expresses the nature, so FLEXIBLE implies an object, of the bending, and applies to portions of the body bent about at will.

SUPPLE (Fr. *souple,* Lat. *supplex*) is primarily used of the joints of the body, and of other substances analogously. It denotes an easy, active, or, as it were, willing pliability, and would be inapplicable to substances which bend sluggishly and by force, like sealing-wax. In their metaphorical application, a pliant disposition means easy-going; pliable, easily affected and altered by external influences. FLEXIBLE is employed of the mind and purpose, denoting one whose determination may be changed, especially by persuasion or entreaty. SUPPLE has sometimes the force of moulding itself to suit a purpose, especially the character and tastes of another; a supple character, meaning one capable of cringing; but this is an employment metaphorical rather than strictly analogous.

"So is the heart of some men. When smitten by God, it seems soft and *pliable,* but taken off from the fire of affliction, it presently becomes horrid, then stiff, and then hard as a rock of adamant, or as

the gates of death and hell."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

So, physically, the fingers of those who are quick-handed might be called PLIABLE; the arm of the agile, PLIANT.

"The younger they are when they begin with that art (of music), the more *pliable* and nimble their fingers are touching the instrument."—SHARP.

"Who foremost now delight to cleave,
With *pliant* arm, thy glassy wave."
GRAY.

"Which *flexibility* (of the spine), we may also observe, varies in different parts of the chain; is least in the back, where strength rather than flexure is wanted; greater in the loins, which it was necessary should be more *supple* than the back; and greatest of all in the neck, for the free motion of the head."—PALEY.

"This gives the mind a freedom, and the exercising the understanding in the several ways of inquiry and reasoning, which the most skilful have made use of, teaches the mind sagacity and wariness; and a *suppleness* to apply itself more closely and dexterously to the bents and turns of the matter in all its researches."—LOCKE.

PLIGHT. PREDICAMENT.

PLIGHT (A. S. *pliht, a wager, danger*), meant originally risk; and, as a pledge is a matter of risk, so it came secondly to mean a condition of risk, danger, or difficulty.

PREDICAMENT is a term of scholastic philosophy, the Latin *prædĭcāmentum* being the translation of the Greek κατηγορία, a generalized mode under which statements or propositions could be made. According to Aristotle, these were ten in number—substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, time, place, situation, habit. Hence to be in a predicament is to be emphatically in a *state* or *marked condition*, and, by a peculiar restriction, a condition of awkwardness or difficulty. PREDICAMENT is commonly used of such embarrassments as are consequent on our own actions, and are of a moral nature; PLIGHT, of such as are accidental, physical, or external. A man who by oversight, for instance, has bound himself to two different engagements at different places at the same time, is in a predicament. One who has fallen into a ditch in full dress is in a plight.

But the distinction is recent. In old writers PLIGHT has much the meaning of predicament at present, and was afterwards used in no unfavourable sense, but in that of condition generally. So that "in good plight" would involve no contradiction.

"For never knight I saw in such misseeming *plight*." SPENSER.

"O woful sympathy, piteous *predicament*."
SHAKESPEARE.

POISON. VENOM.

POISON (Fr. *poison*, Lat. *pōtiōnem, a draught, a poisonous draught*), is general, but commonly denotes what is received into the system as such by the mouth or the respiratory organs; as, hemlock or noxious gas.

VENOM (Lat. *vĕnēnum*), what is discharged from animals, and received externally, as in the bite or sting of the serpent or the scorpion. The metaphorical uses of the term correspond to this distinction. The instillation of false principles into the mind is poisonous. The shafts of malice are venomous. This distinction is not absolute; for instance, "the poison of asps is under their lips."

"As souls, they say, by our first touch take in
The *poisonous* tincture of original sin."
DONNE.

"The God of truth defend you and all other that maintain His truth from the *venomous* poyson of lyars."—STRYPE.

POLITE. POLISHED. REFINED.

For POLITE, as expressing the external manner, *see* CIVIL.

POLISHED (Lat. *pŏlīre, to polish*) may be applied to anything which exhibits traces of finish in training or preparation; as a polished man, polished manners, a polished discourse. REFINED (prefix *re-*, and FINE, which *see*) expresses anything which shows that it is purified from what is coarse, low, vulgar, or inelegant. As POLITE is opposed to rude, so POLISHED is opposed to rough, and REFINED to coarse. Politeness and polish are attributes of external things; refined, of the mind, thoughts and feelings, training, education, and principles, as well as manners and

speech. It may be observed that in POLITENESS two things are needed—the feeling of respect according to right proportion, and due adherence to conventional modes of expressing such respect. Politeness is the result of a perfect sense of propriety, acquired by moving in the higher circles of more refined society. True politeness is not over-courteous to superiors, nor over-affable to inferiors, but satisfies by a behaviour which weighs and discriminates aright. POLITE, unlike POLISHED, which is exclusively applied as a generic quality to manners and productions, is employed of learning and literature.

"What but custom could make those salutations *polite* in Muscovy which are ridiculous in France or England? We call ourselves, indeed, the *politer* nations; but it is we who judge thus of ourselves, and fancied *politeness* is something more owing to custom than reason."—WATTS, *Logic.*

"Though graced with *polished* manners
and fine sense." COWPER.

"This *refined* taste is the consequence of education and habit; we are born only with a capacity of entertaining this *refinement.*"—REYNOLDS.

POLITIC. PRUDENT.

Practically, these terms are often interchangeable; but PRUDENT (Lat. *prūdens*, for *prōvĭdens*, *looking forward*) is a term which conveys somewhat of moral praise (*see* PRUDENCE); while POLITIC (Lat. *pŏlĭtĭcus*, *belonging to the city*, or *civil polity*, Gr. *πόλις*) expresses only the more selfish side of prudence. As prudence is self-preservation, so policy is self-seeking. A prudent action involves reflexion and self-control; a politic action, worldly wisdom and ingenuity. POLITIC had originally the same meaning which POLITICAL has now, and which it still retains in such phrases as, "body politic," till it came to mean something of the character of personal diplomacy.

"When that comes, think not thou to find me slack
On my part aught endeavouring, or to need
Thy *politic* maxims." MILTON.

"It is no disparagement to a wise man to learn, and by suspecting the fallibility of things, and his own aptness to mistake, to walk *prudently* and safely with an eye to God, and an ear open to his superior."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

POMP. MAGNIFICENCE. SPLENDOUR.

POMP (Lat. *pompa*) is derived from the Greek *πομπή*, *a sending or conducting*; hence, *a procession*. By an extension of meaning, it denotes a show of magnificence. But the character of pomp is always personal; and the purpose of pomp is the exhibition of what tends to exalt the dignity or importance of persons. This character is more marked in the adjective *pompous*, which, when said of persons, denotes such a manner as betrays self-importance. A pompous retinue. A pompous military display is one of which the object is to display the power and importance of the state, the army, the general, or the government.

MAGNIFICENCE and SPLENDOUR lie more inherently in the objects themselves. Magnificence (Lat. *magnĭfĭcentia*) is imposing from greatness, costliness, and the like. Splendour (Lat. *splendōrem*; *splendēre*, *to shine*, *glitter*) is dazzling from the brightness and richness of the things exhibited. The grand and the bright combined make up the splendid. A vast and finely-grown tree is magnificent without being splendid. A magnificent army might mean one of the finest and bravest men; a splendid army, one richly conditioned or accoutred. Magnificence is predicated of objects of beauty on a large scale, as scenery, animal forms, artificial productions; but not of human conduct. The materially prominent is needed to make up the magnificent.

"The mighty potentate, to whom belong
These rich regalia *pompously* displayed."
YOUNG.

"Far distant, he descries,
Ascending by degrees *magnificent*
Up to the walls of heaven, a structure high." MILTON.

"Millions of spirits for his fault amerced
Of heaven, and from eternal *splendours* flung
For his revolt." *Ibid.*

POOR. INDIGENT. NEEDY. NECESSITOUS. PENURIOUS.

Of these terms, POOR (O. Fr. *poure*,

poure, Lat. *paupĕrem*) must be regarded as the simplest and most generic; the others expressing some mode or aspect of poverty.

INDIGENT (Lat. *indĭgentem*, part. of *indĭgēre, to want*) denotes a relative poverty; poverty in respect to such things as are naturally or necessarily pertinent to a man's state, circumstances, or position in life, and is commonly applied to persons of some standing in society. We should not speak of a common beggar as indigent. NEEDY is a term which expresses not so much the severe pressure, as the petty inconveniences and privations of poverty. The needy man is he who never has quite enough for his wants. NECESSITOUS has much the same meaning, but is capable of application to a specific condition. We should say a necessitous rather than needy condition; a needy rather than necessitous person. It is remarkable that, while the substantive PENURY (Lat. *pēnūria, want, need*) expresses permanent and abject want, especially as the result of imprudence or misfortune, as in the phrase, "to be brought to penury," the adjective PENURIOUS is well-nigh restricted to the meaning of exhibiting penury *toward others*, or treating one's self penuriously. Hence the word is equivalent to niggardly or parsimonious. POOR may be employed in reference to the want or absence of anything that has value, even to impersonal objects. A thing is poor as a production of literature, science, or art. So a person may be poor in some respects, not in others.

"Hath not God chosen the *poor* of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which He hath promised to them that love Him? But ye have despised the *poor*." —*English Bible.*

The POOR, unlike the rest designated by the other synonyms, are a permanent class of society, as distinguished from the rich.

"Themistocles, the great Athenian general, being asked whether he would choose to marry his daughter to an *indigent* man of merit, or to a worthless man of an estate, replied that he should prefer a man without an estate to an estate without a man." —*Spectator.*

"Spare the blushes of *needy* merit." DWIGHT.

"There are multitudes of *necessitous* heirs and *penurious* parents."—ARBUTHNOT.

POSITION. PLACE. SITUATION. STATION. LOCATION. LOCALITY.

POSITION (Lat. *pŏsĭtionem, a placing*) has both a subjective and an objective meaning; that is, it denotes the *state* or *manner* of being placed, and so is synonymous with placement or attitude, or the spot where something is placed. Out of these, metaphorical or analogous senses naturally flow. Position is complex placement, that is, it regards the placing of a thing, both in the whole and in detail. If POSITION be used physically, it is voluntarily assumed; if morally, it is that in which persons find themselves often against their inclination.

PLACE (Fr. *place*, Lat. *plătĕa, a broad road or square*) is purely objective, denoting a separate or distinct portion of space, and sometimes that portion specifically occupied by a body. The meanings which the word also bears of rank, office, and the like, are no more than analogous applications of this. Where POSITION is used as synonymous with PLACE, it signifies place as it concerns or affects the person or thing placed. Hence to say that a house is in this or that place, is no more than to say that it stands here or there. That it is in this or that position, means that it bears certain relations more or less advantageous to the objects by which it is surrounded. In this sense position nearly coincides with SITUATION (Lat. *sĭtus, a site*). Situation may be defined "relative position." It involves the nature or character of the position. STATION is a fixed and definite place of staying or stopping (Lat. *stătionem*, from *stāre, to stand*), with the idea of antecedent and subsequent progress or movement more or less strongly implied. It sometimes denotes habitual stay. STATION is only employed of persons or animate objects, or what are considered as such. It often means social position.

LOCATION (Lat. *lŏcationem, a placing*), like most words of similar formation,

stands both for the act and the result of locating. The difference is to be observed between LOCALITY and LOCATION. Locality is objective, location subjective. Locality is place regarded externally to the object located; location is place regarded relatively to it, and in connexion with it, and the assignment of it. Hence the locality of a thing is that place which belongs to it by nature or by accident; its location that in which it has been fixed as an act of appointment.

"We have different prospects of the same thing, according to our different *positions* to it."—LOCKE.

"What *place* can be for us within heaven's bound?" MILTON.

"The word *place* has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that space which any body takes up; and so the universe is a *place*."—LOCKE.

The situation of a thing or person is the correlative of the condition; that is, the situation is the state in reference to external objects or influences. The condition is the internal state irrespectively of such externals.

"Nor did the shores and woods appear less destitute of wild fowl, so that we hoped to enjoy with ease what in our *situation* might be called the luxuries of life."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"Besides, it were a coward's part to fly
Now from my hold that have let out so well;
It being the *station* of my life, where I
Am set to serve and stand as centinel.
DANIEL.

"A lot of earth so singularly *located* as marks it out by Providence to be the emporium of plenty, and the asylum of peace."—*Observer*.

LOCALITY differs from PLACE in possessing, besides the meaning of material placement, the abstract quality of existing in place.

"It is thought that the soul and angels are devoid of quantity and dimension, and that they have nothing to do with grosser *locality*."—GLANVILL.

POSSESS. HAVE.

HAVE (A. S. *habban*, allied to Lat. *căpĕre, to take*) is a simpler and wider term than POSSESS (Lat. *possĭdĕre*), possession being a mode of having. Generally it may be said that one has what is part of or closely connected with one's self. One possesses what is external to one's self, but *appropriated* for certain purposes. I have or I possess an estate; but I have, not I possess, a bad cold. When POSSESS is used of what is internal to one's self, the thing is regarded externally; that is, in reference to its use and purpose, rather than the subject in which it resides. Thus a man has legs by virtue of his human organization. He possesses legs, as being an animal gifted with that particular means of locomotion. So, in reference, not to what a man is, but what he does, or is capable of doing, we say, that he possesses reason and certain mental faculties or powers. To have generally expresses a transitory, to possess a more permanent, power or control. To possess is always therefore to have; but to have is not always to possess. A man is said to have money, which is, however, always changing and circulating, and to possess a house, lands, and the like. We are masters of what we possess, not always so of what we have.

It is not necessary that a thing should be actually in our hands, or that we should have the power of disposing of it in order to have it. It is enough that it belongs to us. But in order to possess a thing, it is necessary that it should be in our hands, and that we should have the power of enjoying or disposing of it. The miser has money in his coffers; he can hardly be said to possess it, rather he himself is possessed by the spirit of avarice.

"It is held
That valour is the chiefest virtue,
And most dignifies the *haver*."
SHAKESPEARE.

"If the soul is not in the very time of the act in the *possession* of liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use of it."—EDWARDS, *On the Will*.

POSTERIOR. SUBSEQUENT.

That is POSTERIOR which comes *later* (Lat. *postĕrior*) in time or place. That is, SUBSEQUENT (Lat. *subsĕqui, to follow upon*) which succeeds *in order*. What takes place at one period of history may be erroneously confounded with a posterior event of like character. What is obscure in a document may be illustrated by a subsequent clause.

POUR. SHED. SPILL.

POUR (etymol. uncertain) is to cause to flow in a profuse manner. The term is indicative of design, or at least arrangement as to the source and quantity in the matter; as, "the clouds pour down rain."

SPILL (A. S. *spillan, to spill*) is more limited as to quantity, and commonly implies accident, though not absolutely, as the spilling of blood in a duel. Yet even here the action is indirect.

SHED (A. S. *sceddan*) is to give forth with a certain profuseness, though not necessarily in a liquid form (to which POUR also is not absolutely restricted), of what formed part of, or was intimately connected with, the body from which the matter is parted; as, a man sheds his blood or the blood of another. A tree sheds its leaves; a bird, its feathers; serpents, their skins, and the like.

"A multitude, like which the populous North
Poured never from her frozen loins to pass
Rhene or the Danaw." MILTON.

"The *shedding* trees began the ground to strow
With yellow leaves, and bitter blasts to blow." DRYDEN.

"He who would have shuddered to *spill* a drop of blood in a hostile contest as a private man, shall deluge whole provinces as an absolute prince."—KNOX.

POVERTY. DESTITUTION. PAUPERISM.

POVERTY (Fr. *pauvreté*, Lat. *paupertātem*) is lack of wealth. DESTITUTION (Lat. *dēstĭtūtionem, a forsaking, a desertion*) is lack of resources of living. PAUPERISM is the social or political state or treatment of the poor.

PRAISE. APPLAUD. APPROVE. COMMEND. EXTOL.

To PRAISE (O. Fr. *preis, value, merit*, Lat. *prĕtium*) is, literally, to set a high value upon, and, by a further extension of meaning, to express it in words, and is the generic term.

APPLAUD (Lat. *applaudĕre, to clap the hands*) is to praise with some degree of excited feeling, and in a demonstrative way. As praise ought to be judicious, and the result of judgment, so applause is commonly the result of a satisfaction or approval quickly excited, and is given to minor performances; as, we might applaud a rope-dancer without praising him; that is, without any expression of moral feeling; we express our admiration of his mere skill.

To EXTOL (Lat. *extollĕre, to raise, elevate*) denotes a sustained expression of praise for lofty acts, or character, and usually in lofty language.

APPROVE (O. Fr. *approver*, Lat. *appröbare*) is a much milder term, and denotes no more than the entertainment of a judgment in favour either of persons or acts and proceedings, with an understanding in many cases that it is expressed; but approval is always specific, while praise may be general. We praise a man generally, or his character. We approve his acts or his conduct in particular cases.

To COMMEND (Lat. *commendāre*) means, in the first place, to intrust, and afterwards to mention as worthy of trust; that is, to praise. It differs from PRAISE, in that praise may be the expression of the attributes of the excellent for its own sake; while COMMEND implies an act of judgment on our part, which precedes the expression. Commendation is a moderate degree of praise. We praise, but could never presume to commend, the Almighty. We bestow commendation. We offer as well as bestow praise. Praise and commendation are by speech; applause may be by act. Praise may be general or specific; commend is specific. We praise a man's character generally, or his conduct on a given occasion. We commend some act in particular. Commendation is the expression of approval.

"If these words have any meaning at all, by *praise* they must mean the exercise or testimony of some sort of esteem, respect, or honourable regard."—EDWARDS, *On the Will.*

"The Greeks have a name in their language for this sort of people, denoting that they are *applauders* by profession, and we

stigmatise them with the opprobrious title of table-flatterers."—MELMOTH, *Pliny*.

As PRAISE and APPLAUD have reference to human character and acts, so EXTOL is sometimes used of what has no direct connexion with these, as virtue in the abstract, or some particular virtue, or something which is simply excellent or practically beneficial, as an institution, form of government, and the like. When EXTOL is used of persons it commonly indicates considerable elevation in the person extolled. Hence applause is of acts or performances regarded as acts accomplished. We may praise, approve of, or commend what a man is doing, we applaud what he has done. We applaud under feelings of approbation suddenly excited. We praise by reason. We applaud by impulse.

"*Extollers* of the Pope's supremacy."—BARROW.

"Those very exceptions which our Saviour makes are a proof that in every other case He *approves* and sanctions the duty of resting on the Sabbath day."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

"He had mean better than his outward show.
Can any way speak in his just *commend*?
For by his rusty outside he appears
To have practised more the whip-stock than the lance." SHAKESPEARE.

PRAY. SUPPLICATE. CONJURE.

The idea common to these terms is that of asking with ardour and submission of those who are in a condition to grant the object of our desire. As between man and man, SUPPLICATE (Lat. *supplicare*) is more respectful than PRAY. It indicates a more lively desire and a more urgent need.

We PRAY (Fr. *prier*) our equals and our friends to do us some service. We supplicate princes or persons in power to accord us some favour or render us justice. But as between man and God we use both terms: we pray as an act of homage, and supplicate as an act of entreaty.

To CONJURE (Lat. *conjūrāre, to unite under an oath*) is not only to pray earnestly, but to rest our prayers upon some appeal which gives them additional weight. I conjure you by your father or mother, your professed friendship for myself, your sense of duty or of right, and the like. This gives to CONJURE an element of superiority which does not belong to prayer and supplication. There is mixed with the idea of entreaty that of a righteous coercion, as if he who conjured had on the ground of that by which he conjures a right, if not to the granting of his prayer, at least to a favourable consideration of it. At the same time we are not said to conjure in reference to God.

PRECARIOUS. UNCERTAIN.

The PRECARIOUS (Lat. *prĕcārius, obtained by entreaty*) is a species of the UNCERTAIN. Derived from the Latin *prĕcāri*, to pray, it signified primarily that which is contingent upon the will of another to grant. It retains its etymological force so far that it relates always to matters of personal interest, or affecting the condition of men. Matters of fact are uncertain; matters of possession or acquisition are precarious. A thing is uncertain until it is determined. It is precarious until it is assured or secured to ourselves.

"That consideration which carries the mind the most forcibly to religion, which convinces us that it is indeed our proper concern, namely, the *precariousness* of our present condition."—PALEY.

PRECEDENCE. PRIORITY. PRE-EMINENCE. PREFERENCE.

PRECEDENCE (Lat. *præcēdĕre, to go before*) is matter of privilege, a distinction of rank or priority of consideration. It also denotes priority of time and order.

PRIORITY (Fr. *priorité*, Lat. *prior, earlier*) denotes an anterior point either of time or order, without implying necessarily anything else.

PRE-EMINENCE (Lat. *præ-ēmĭnentia*) is absolute priority of nature or quality, more commonly, but not universally, in a good sense.

PREFERENCE (O. Fr. *préférer*, Lat. *præferre, to prefer*) is the deliberate selection of a thing or person, as being worthy of higher estimation,

or the state of a thing or person so selected.

"The younger sons and daughters of the king, and other branches of the royal family who are not in the immediate line of succession, were therefore little farther regarded by the ancient law than to give them, to a certain degree, *precedence* before all peers and public officers, as well ecclesiastical as temporal."—BLACKSTONE.

"In payment of debts he must observe the rules of *priority*, otherwise, on deficiency of assets, if he pays those of a lower degree first, he must answer those of a higher out of his own estate."—BLACKSTONE.

"The sense of sight, accordingly, maintains *pre-eminence* over our other senses in furnishing materials to the power of conception."—STEWART.

"I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of will there is an act of choice, that in every volition there is a *preference* a prevailing inclination of the soul."—EDWARDS, *On the Will.*

PRECEDING. ANTECEDENT. ANTERIOR. FOREGOING. FORMER. PREVIOUS. PRIOR.

ANTECEDENT (Lat. *antĕcēdentem*, part. of *antĕcēdĕre, to go before*), PRECEDING, FOREGOING, and PREVIOUS (Lat. *prævius, going before*) are used of what *goes* before; ANTERIOR (Lat. comparative of *ante, before*), FORMER (A. S. *forma, early, former*, and suffix *-er*), and PRIOR (Lat. *prior*), of what *exists* before. ANTECEDENT relates only to the order of time, denoting priority in an established course or sequence. Anterior is opposed to posterior; antecedent to subsequent. ANTECEDENT and PRECEDING differ in that the former may be separated from the point or object to which it relates by a considerable interval, while the latter excludes this. Previous has a less abstract force than preceding. Thus a preceding inquiry is merely an inquiry that went before; a previous inquiry would have in it something of a relative character, as preparatory or preliminary. FOREGOING is the same as PRECEDING, but is restricted to matters of statement, and also implies a relative character; as, the foregoing argument. We do not speak of foregoing events.

FORMER is restricted to a comparison of one object with one other, as opposed to latter, and connected with no other idea than that of priority in time.

PRECIOUS. VALUABLE. COSTLY.

Of these terms, VALUABLE (Lat. *vălēre, to be worth*) is the weakest and most indefinite, inasmuch as it denotes any degree of value, and may even be opposed to valueless.

PRECIOUS (Lat. *prĕtiosus, prĕtium, price*) expresses the possession of *great* value. The value of the precious is inherent; that of the COSTLY (O. Fr. *coster*, Lat. *constāre, to stand at, to cost*) is conventional and extrinsic. A precious stone is synonymous with a jewel. A costly stone would be any which had been largely paid for. An elaborate work of art, as a carved mantel-piece, would be costly rather than precious; but we speak of valuable, not costly, paintings, because they do not present criteria of marketable value.

"In the *precious* metals, where a small difference in the quantity makes a great difference in the value, even the business of weighing with proper exactness requires at least very accurate weights and scales."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

The precious is commonly not remarkable for quantity, but for quality. A thing having no commercial value, which therefore could, under no circumstances of exchange, be costly, may nevertheless be precious to us by reason of its associations, as, for instance, on account of the giver.

"Besides, there lies a nearer way for good qualities to arrive at their *valuableness;* for we find the very sight of them raising an esteem in the beholder, without staying for the benefits to be received from them."—SEARCH.

"Sir John Gates, vice-chamberlain to the king, who was now grown into great favour, obtained another part; for the king gave him all the duke's rich furs, and much of his *costly* household stuff."—STRYPE.

PRECISE. CONCISE. SUCCINCT.

PRECISE (Lat. *præcidĕre, præcisus, to cut short*) relates to what one says, CONCISE (Lat. *concidĕre, to cut up*) to the manner of saying it. The one regards the thing as its object, the other the expression. The speech, narrative, or style which is precise

does not wander from the subject, rejects ideas foreign to it, and disregards all that is not directly to the point and purpose. The concise states and explains much in a few words, and discards all superfluities of speech. The opposite of the precise is the discursive, the opposite of the concise is the diffuse. The precise is always good; the concise may be too contracted for vulgar ears, which will more easily take in what is stated at greater length. A trained understanding is needed for the concise, lest what is too compressed may pass by unheeded or unappreciated. Common understandings can appreciate what is precise.

The SUCCINCT (Lat. *succingĕre, to gird from below, to gird up*) aims at giving a faithful impression, excluding all useless ideas, and choosing those only which are essential to the end in view. The succinct is the opposite of the amplified or expanded.

PREDOMINANT. PREVAILING. PREVALENT. RULING.

That is said to be RULING (Fr. *regle*, Lat. *rĕgŭla, rule*) which exercises a decided influence over one or more in reference to moral, but not physical, influence. So we should not speak of a ruling sickness or disease, but of a ruling fashion, for instance.

PREVAILING and PREVALENT (Lat. *prævălēre, to have great power*), however, are used both of moral or physical influences; but PREVAILING lends itself more readily to the former, PREVALENT to the latter. The prevailing feeling in a community; a prevalent disease. The noun *prevalence* seems equally applicable to both.

PREDOMINANT, as the word indicates (Lat. *præ, before*, and *dŏmĭnāri, to rule*) is *overruling* or exercising a force or influence to the suppression of others. PREVALENT, however, expresses more of energy than PREVAILING. A prevailing belief is one which is widely spread; a prevalent opinion, one which exercises a wide influence. PREVAILING and PREVALENT relate to numbers or area of extension; RULING and PREDOMINANT, to inherent force. The ruling passion is that which exercises the strongest sway, not necessarily over a number, but over the individual.

"Almost every one has a *predominant* inclination, to which his other desires and affections submit, and which governs him, though perhaps with some intervals, through the whole course of his life."—HUME.

What generally prevails is prevalent; what actually prevails is prevailing. A ruling passion sways the life; a predominant passion will not allow others to assert the mastery; a prevalent passion is permanently influential; a prevailing passion is the passion of the hour or the day.

"At length that grounded maxim,
So rife and celebrated in the mouths
Of wisest men, that to the public good
Private respects must yield, with grave authority
Took full possession of me, and *prevailed*."
MILTON.

"Condillac has certainly contributed more than any other individual to the *prevalence* of the logical error now under consideration."—STEWART.

PRE-EMINENCE. SUPERIORITY.

PRE-EMINENCE (Lat. *præ-ēminentia*) is superlative, SUPERIORITY (Lat. *sŭpĕriōrĭtātem, superior*) is comparative. A man is superior to one or more or all others; he is pre-eminent above all others. Besides this, the terms PRE-EMINENCE and SUPERIORITY, when used without qualifications, turn upon different qualities. Pre-eminence is a matter of dignity, superiority of intrinsic qualities. Superiority, it has been said, depends upon the height of the figure, pre-eminence on the height of the chair.

PREFACE. PRELUDE. INTRODUCTION.

PREFACE is compounded of *præ, before*, and *fāri, to speak*; PRELUDE, of *præ, before*, and *lŭdĕre, to play*. In their common usage, this distinction of ideas is preserved.

A PREFACE is made up of preliminary words; a prelude of preliminary acts. Although a PRELUDE is commonly used of conscious acts, as ushering in subsequent acts or events, it is also, by an extension of meaning, sometimes used of

events abstractedly, as indicating others which follow by relation or sequence; as, "The growling of thunder is a prelude to the coming storm." On the other hand, a preface is always an indication of design. It is the laying down of something which shall prepare the mind for subsequent statement or representation.

INTRODUCTION (Lat. *introdŭcĕre, to bring in*) has in it more of relation to the condition of the person whose requirements it meets, PREFACE and PRELUDE to the character of the thing which it demonstrates beforehand. PREFACE has a closer and exacter, PRELUDE a remoter and more general connexion with that which it precedes. A preface is intended for the better understanding of what follows. A prelude brings the mind into a temper and attitude to receive it. An introduction is literally an arrangement which enables a person the better to enter into a thing whether with his body or his mind.

"It is a great beauty in an *introduction* when it can be made to turn on some one thought fully brought out and illustrated, especially if that thought has a close connexion with the following discourse, and at the same time does not anticipate anything that is afterwards to be introduced in a more proper place."—BLAIR.

"As when of old some orator renown'd
In Athens, or free Rome, where eloquence
Flourished, since mute, to some great cause addrest,
Stood in himself collected; while each part,
Motion, each act, won audience, ere the tongue;
Sometimes in height began, as no delay
Of *preface* brooking, through his zeal of right." MILTON.

"The moving storm
Thickens amain, and loud triumphant shouts,
And horns, shrill-warbling in each glade, *prelude*
To his approaching fate." SOMERVILE.

PREPOSSESSION. PREJUDICE.

The common distinction drawn between these words is that they both express a judgment formed beforehand, and without full inquiry; while in the case of PREPOSSESSION (*pre-*, and *possession*) it is favourable, and in PREJUDICE (Lat. *præjudĭcium, a previous judicial inquiry*) it is unfavourable. But a further difference has to be noted. PREJUDICE relates only to questions of practical, while PREPOSSESSION is applicable to those of purely theoretical, judgment. For instance, a person might commence the study of astronomy, prepossessed with the idea that the moon was larger than the sun. This, though a prepossession, would not be a prejudice. It deserves to be remarked that falsehood or unfairness is implied both in PREJUDICE and PREPOSSESSION, and that preconceived or premature judgments *happening to be right* are not provided for in the terms. A correct prejudice and a right prepossession are, according to usage, moral contradictions, though they are not so in fact, by reason of the instinctive tendency of our minds to relegate to the category of the positively false all matters of mere anticipation by conjecture. Both PREJUDICE and PREPOSSESSION involve a mingled state of feeling and opinion respecting a person or other object; but feeling is the more influential in prepossession; opinion, in prejudice.

"Let us suppose for a moment that this happy æra were arrived, and that all the *prepossessions* of childhood and youth were directed to support the pure and sublime truths of an enlightened morality."—STEWART.

"If, after all his profession, he cannot bear any opposition to his opinion, if he cannot so much as give a patient hearing, much less examine and weigh the arguments on the other side, does he not plainly confess it is *prejudice* governs him?"—LOCKE.

PRESUME. ASSUME.

These verbs are compounds of the Lat. *sūmĕre, to take*; the latter being to take to one's self, the former to take beforehand. To assume is to take something for proved or granted which has not been so. To presume is to believe beforehand, to forestall evidence. I assume for the purpose of argument. I presume possibly for the same purpose, but on the ground of an inherent probability. This comes out much more strongly in the nouns. An assumption is only an arbitrary statement or adoption of opinion. A presumption is an item

in a sum of probabilities. Repeated assumptions severally break down the argument. Repeated presumptions may constitute moral certainty. I may assume in argument what I suspect or disbelieve, and allow it to pass to the account of that argument if the question of its truth is to me indifferent. I assume as a basis of opinion. I presume the opinion itself. For instance, one might say to another, "Assuming that you are rightly informed, and in earnest, I never heard so extraordinary an account." Here the belief is in abeyance, because it is contingent upon the seriousness and veracity of the speaker, while there is as yet no proof. "I presume that you are serious and truthful" amounts to saying that I am inclined to believe it. One cannot presume what is contrary to analogy. It is waste of time to assume in argument what your adversary would never concede. Presumption, though always founded upon reason, being a reasonable forestalling of proof, nevertheless varies widely in degree of force or truth. Some presumptions are only conjectures. On the other hand a strong presumption is an instalment of the proof, being the proof itself in course of transformation from probability into certainty.

"The consequences of *assumed* principles."—WHEWELL.

"When the fact itself cannot be demonstratively evinced, that which comes nearest to the proof of the fact is the proof of such circumstances which either necessarily or usually attended such facts, and these are called *presumptions*."—BLACKSTONE.

PRETENCE. PRETEXT. EXCUSE. PRETENSION.

PRETENCE and PRETENSION (Lat. *prætendĕre, to stretch or put forward*) differ as the false from the real. A pretence is a show in act or in word of what has no real existence in one's self, a justification of one's conduct before others in some fictitious way, or a fictitious assumption of what does not really belong to us. It involves both the exhibition of something unreal, and the concealment of something real. Pretension, as the word is commonly taken, is the setting forward or putting before the public something which really belongs to us, or at least a claim which we are prepared to vindicate, and involves no concealment whatever, except where a public claim is made to what is in itself untenable. Pretension is active and demonstrative; pretence is defensive on account of others. It is commonly connected with personal character or abilities, and where ungrounded is the result of miscalculation.

PRETEXT (Lat. *prætexĕre, to weave before, or in front*) is anything which is put forward as the ostensible ground of action, and is relative to something lying beyond it, and justified by it. A pretext is a false or colourable vindication of action. Pretext differs from EXCUSE (Lat. *excūsāre, to excuse*) as the asserter from the disclaimer. A pretext declares a thing to be right; an excuse declares it to be only permissible, if not wrong. A pretext is a ground of independent action; an excuse involves a condition of dependence on the judgment of others. A false excuse is a pretence. PRETEXT and PRETENCE are also different. The pretext deceives as to facts; the pretence, as to consequences. The former conceals the true; the latter puts forward the false. The pretence disguises the motive; the pretext covers the act. If we say, "Religion has often been used as a pretext for persecution," we mean that it has been employed to compass the perpetration of certain acts of cruelty. When we say, "He obtained money under false pretences," we mean, he induced others by his misrepresentations to act upon false grounds in giving him the money. The pretext exists in fact, but is unfairly employed or applied. The pretence has no existence. If a child makes indisposition a pretext for idleness, he is not so ill as he pretends to be; if he makes it a pretence, he is not ill at all.

"I believe, upon a due survey of history, it will be found that the most considerable villainies which were ever acted upon the stage of Christendom have been authorised with the glistering *pretences* of conscience

and the introduction of a greater purity of religion."—SOUTH.

"He said there were some among them that, under colour and *pretext* of honesty, did commit many lewd parts."—NORTH, *Plutarch.*

"You see that an opinion of merit is discouraged, even in those who had the best *pretensions* to entertain it, if any *pretensions* were good."—PALEY.

"In vain would his *excusers* endeavour to palliate his enormities by imputing them to madness."—SWIFT.

PREVENT. ANTICIPATE. OBVIATE. PRECLUDE. FORESTALL.

TO PREVENT (Lat. *prævĕnire*, sup. *-ventum, to go before, anticipate*) is literally to go before simply, and in old English meant to go before with the implied purpose of aiding, as it now implies a purpose of counteracting. It differs from ANTICIPATE (Lat. *antĭcipāre*) as the negative from the positive; to prevent being to cause a thing not to be done or take place; to anticipate is to cause it to take place or effect by doing it or bringing it about one's self or in one's own way. I prevent another from making a remark by saying or doing something which silences him. I anticipate him by making it myself. The anticipation of pleasure is a part of the pleasure, and often the best and purest part.

TO OBVIATE (Lat. *obviāre, to meet on the road*) is to place a thing in the way, or interrupt the course of things; hence, specifically, to prevent a thing from taking its course. To obviate is to prevent by interception. We prevent by direct action upon a thing; we obviate by means of something else as a medium. OBVIATE never has the purely physical sense of PREVENT; as we could not say, "To obviate a man from passing along a particular road." It denotes not necessarily the bringing of design to bear upon the natural force and sequence of things, for circumstances may obviate.

TO PRECLUDE (Lat. *præclūdĕre, to forbid access to*) is to shut out by anticipation, or to prevent by necessary consequence. To prevent removes force; to obviate neutralizes force. All these synonyms are applicable both to conscious and unconscious force. To prevent a difficulty, would be to cause the difficulty *not to occur*. To preclude the difficulty, would be to render it impossible *that it should occur*. To obviate the difficulty, would be to neutralize it *when it did occur*. Hence we commonly speak of preventing occurrences, obviating necessities, precluding possibilities, suppositions, or contingencies. The permissible or possible is precluded; the urgent or cogent is obviated.

"For physick is either curative or *preventive*. *Preventive* we call that which, by purging noxious humours and the causes of diseases, *preventeth* sickness in the healthy, or the recourse thereof in the valetudinary."—BROWN, *Vulgar Errors.*

"Time! thou *anticipatest* my dread exploits." SHAKESPEARE.

"The following outlines will, I hope, not only *obviate* this inconvenience, but will allow me in future a greater latitude of illustration and digression."—STEWART.

"The design of subscription being to preserve one uniform tenor of faith, to *preclude* diversity of opinions."—WATERLAND.

FORESTALL (lit. *to buy up before it is placed in the market-stall*) is to anticipate, and so prevent the action of some influence, power, or person. It involves the ideas of prior occupation or measures taken in advance, whereby the thing anticipated is monopolized, or turned to one's own account. He who forestalls another takes to his own benefit the object of another man's endeavours. One forestalls by vigilance, by diligence, by promptitude of action, by a more skilful use of means, by a better acquaintance of the relation between causes and effects.

"Why need a man *forestall* his date of grief,
And run to meet what he would most avoid?" MILTON.

PRIDE. DISDAIN.

The first of these words is taken both in a good and a bad sense, the latter only in a bad. In the sense in which they are synonymous, they denote a sentiment which induces us to avoid familiarity with others on the ground of a feeling of their inferiority in birth, talent, property,

or station; with this difference, that PRIDE is founded on the high consideration of ourselves, DISDAIN on the low consideration of others. The latter is, therefore, the more odious and intolerable, because it seems the more active or aggressive. If the object be to procure social esteem or respect, they must be considered equally ineffective to this end. With proud persons one can hardly venture to speak, especially to speak familiarly. Disdainful persons are best avoided altogether. It is easier to say what pride is not than what it is. It is not simply the vanity which prunes itself on little peculiarities, nor the presumption which considers itself capable of great things, nor the disdain which adds contempt of others to a high opinion of one's self; but it is closely allied to all these defects, and partakes of the spirit of all.

PRINCIPLE. ELEMENT. RUDIMENT.

These terms are used physically and metaphysically, or analogously.

Physically, the PRINCIPLE of a thing is its cause—that which has nothing prior to it. This is the simple sense of the Latin *principium, beginning*. In this sense of starting-point, the term is in English well-nigh obsolete. "Doubting, sad end of principle unsound," wrote Spenser,—that is, sad end of unsound beginning. Hence it means an ultimate source or origin of physical things, whether an energy, a substance, or an element or ultimate ingredient. In science and in morals the seeming vagueness of the term PRINCIPLE flows from its twofold nature as a starting-point of inquiry. The principles of mathematics are axioms and postulates. The principles of morals are said to be certain self-evident truths. But that which is first in the synthetical is last in the analytical process, and so a principle according to the former is an initiatory item, according to the latter is an ultimate conclusion. In chemistry what is called a principle in substances is not an ingredient from which one passes on to other ingredients, but a substance obtained and exhibited by analysis. In matters of science principles are general rules of which the science is the application and development.

The ELEMENTS (Lat. *ĕlĕmentum*) of a science are its beginnings. He who has learnt the elements of it has made the first complete step in the knowledge of it. On the other hand, to know its principles is to know the philosophy of it. The element in physics is the ultimate indecomposable ingredient (ultimate in point of investigation, primary in point of natural constitution), which goes to make up a substance.

The RUDIMENT (Lat. *rŭdĭmentum*) is an incomplete development of the first stage in the existence of anything complex or organized.

PRIVACY. RETIREMENT. SOLITUDE. SECLUSION. LONELINESS.

PRIVACY (Lat. *prīvātus*, part. *prīvāre, to bereave, to set free*) is opposed to publicity, and is a condition of persons.

RETIREMENT (Fr. *retirer, to draw back*) is a condition both of places and persons. Privacy may be of short duration; retirement implies a longer duration. Hence we say, "hours of privacy;" "a life of retirement."

SOLITUDE (Lat. *solĭtūdĭnem*) and SECLUSION (Lat. *sēclūdĕre, to shut off*, part. *sēclūsus*) imply more than this—an absence from all society; while both PRIVACY and RETIREMENT are compatible with the companionship of a few, but in different senses. Seclusion is the extreme of retirement. Seclusion is sought; solitude may be imposed. The prisoner in his compulsory confinement is not said to be in seclusion, though the word etymologically expresses this exactly. Nor is SOLITUDE applicable to persons collectively, but individually. The inhabitants of a retired village might be said to live in seclusion, but hardly in solitude.

LONELINESS (*lone*, corr. of *alone*) has been well defined the solitude of the heart. Some have never felt more lonely than in a crowd, where it has been an utterly strange and un-

sympathizing one; the very fact of the mere external publicity bringing home the more forcibly the feeling of moral isolation. As PRIVACY is opposed to PUBLICITY, so RETIREMENT may be opposed to sociality; SOLITUDE, to society; SECLUSION, to sociability; LONELINESS, to companionship. Privacy is sought for the sake of any employment with which publicity interferes. Retirement is sought for purposes of reflexion, or as a relaxation after public duties. Seclusion commonly indicates a peculiar humour or constitution of mind. Solitude may be voluntary or involuntary; loneliness is involuntary.

"Which fair and happy blessing thou might'st well
Have far more raised, had not thine enemy
Retired: *privacy* made thee to sell
Thy greatness for thy quiet." DANIEL.

"He was banished into Patmos, a little island in the archipelago, and during his *retirement* there was favoured in a particular manner with revelations from heaven, which he committed to writing, and left behind him for the benefit of the Church." —WATERLAND.

"At which this honest man,
Finding that naught but hate and scorn he wan,
Amongst these idiots and their beastly kind,
The poor, small remnant of his life behind
Determineth to *solitude* to give,
And a true hermit afterward to live."
DRAYTON.

"The invisible mansion of departed spirits, though certainly not a place of penal confinement to the good, is nevertheless in some respects a prison. It is a place of *seclusion* from the external world." — BISHOP HORSLEY.

PROCEED. ADVANCE.

To PROCEED (Lat. *prōcēdĕre*) is simply to go *on;* to ADVANCE (Fr. *avancer*) is to go *forward*. He proceeds who does not halt. He advances who makes ground and is growing nearer to a proposed point. We cannot advance without proceeding; but we may proceed without advancing. To ADVANCE regards the end, to PROCEED, the beginning, of our journey. In advancing we are nearer to a point before us; in proceeding we leave a point behind us. How obvious is the difference between "to proceed with one's studies," and "to advance in one's studies"!

"Farther *advances* in mathematical knowledge."—LOCKE.

"Then he forth on his journey did *proceed*
To seek adventures which mote him befall." SPENSER.

PROCEED. ARISE. FLOW. EMANATE. ISSUE. SPRING.

The two first of these terms are employed to express the course of cause and effect; but PROCEED lends itself more readily to moral, ARISE (A. S. *árisan, to arise*) to physical, sequence and causation. So we might say, with nearly equal propriety, "His cordial reception arose or proceeded from his popularity," inasmuch as the circumstance is regarded both as an external fact or occurrence, and as a moral result; but we should say, "The scanty harvest arose," not proceeded, "from the drought." Simple causation, too, is best expressed by ARISE; complex, by PROCEED.

FLOW (A. S. *flowan, to flow*) and EMANATE (Lat. *emānāre, to flow out of*) are metaphorical terms, and are therefore best employed when the metaphors are best preserved. To FLOW denotes continuity and abundance; EMANATE, little more than source and origin. "All these sad occurrences have *flowed* from a bad system of administration." "The timely hint *emanated* from his goodnature." EMANATE, in spite of its derivation, is not employed simply of fluid. The water is not said to emanate from the fountain. It is employed of fine and subtle substances, as light vapour, odour, minute corpuscles. The ideas of the term are first source and origin, then spread or influence. Acts emanate from authority, and laws from a system of government. It is seldom used of foolish, weak, or deleterious influences.

ISSUE (Fr. *issu*, part. of *issir*, Lat. *exīre, to go out, to end*) and SPRING differ in that ISSUE takes into consideration the end as well as the beginning; while SPRING (A. S. *spring, a spring, fons*

tain-head) regards only the beginning. "Such attempts spring from ignorance, and must issue in failure." We might say also, "issue from ignorance." SPRING more strongly marks the relation of cause and effect; while ISSUE often denotes little more than the relation of antecedent and consequent. Actions are said to spring from feelings which are their motives.

"Teach me the various labours of the moon,
And whence *proceed* th' eclipses of the sun."
DRYDEN.

"Yet many will presume;
Whence heavy persecution shall *arise*
On all who in the worship persevere
Of spirit and truth." MILTON.

"Those thousand decencies that daily *flow* From all her words and actions." *Ibid.*

"That subsisting form of government from which all laws *emanate*."—DE QUINCEY.

"From this Supreme Being, from this eternal fountain of all truth and of all good gifts, there *issues* light which lighteth every one which cometh into the world."—JORTIN.

"Also it is necessarie to understande whennes that sinnes *springen* and how they encresen, and which they lien."—CHAUCER.

PROCEEDING. PROCEDURE. PROCESS. PROCESSION.

A PROCEEDING is a complex action capable of being distinguished as to its parts, steps, or stages. PROCEDURE is proceeding in the abstract, that is, the act or manner of proceeding; the PROCESS is the proceeding regarded as separate or apart from the agent, more especially as something conducted by method and rule. The PROCESSION is the movement, as the PROCEDURE is the mode, of proceeding. *See* TRAIN.

"What could be more fair than to lay open to an enemy all that you wished to obtain, and to desire him to imitate your ingenious *proceeding*."—BURKE.

"If the external *procedures* of God's providence be the rule to measure His love or hatred by, then it cannot be avoided but that the rich and powerful have the fairest plea for heaven, and the martyr the shrewdest marks of approbation."—SOUTH.

In Old English the word PROCESS was used to signify detailed description, or the *account* of what we now call a process, as in the following of Shakespeare:—

"In brief, to set the needless *process* by,
How I persuaded, how I prayed and kneeled,
How he repelled me, and how I replied."

PRODUCE. PRODUCT. PRODUCTION. MANUFACTURE.

PRODUCE (Lat. *prŏdŭcĕre, to lead forward, to beget*) is now restricted to what is naturally produced from any source, as by the soil in vegetation, but for useful purposes, and *in the aggregate;* as the produce of a poultry yard, a farm, a field. PRODUCT is specific, in the sense of that which is produced by some operation in particular, whether mental, moral, mechanical, or natural. PRODUCTION is used both of the operation and the result of producing. In the latter sense, it is not confined to the useful or the natural, but is applicable to the ornamental and the artistic. The production may be viewed simply as a phenomenon in itself. The product has a theoretical or materia value.

"It is evident he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when he speaks of all free actions as the *produce* of free choice."—EDWARDS, *On the Will.*

"Man is the flower and chief of all *products* of Nature upon this globe of the earth."—MORE.

"The value of land consists in this, that by its constant *production* of saleable commodities it brings in a certain yearly income."—LOCKE.

MANUFACTURE (Lat. *mănŭfactus, made by the hand*) includes both manual and mechanical operation; but it is confined to the process of reducing raw materials to forms convenient for use. The work of art, or the article of food, or the dwelling, is not said to be manufactured. Manufacture is the application of science, art, and force, whether manual or mechanical, to the productions of skilled labour.

"A trading and *manufacturing* country naturally purchases with a small part of its *manufactured* produce a great part of the trade produce of other countries."—SMITH *Wealth of Nations.*

PRODUCTION. WORK.

PRODUCTION is from the Latin *prŏdūcĕre, to bring forth or forward,* one of its principal meanings being to give

birth, hence to bring to light by inherent causation or efficacy. This is the peculiar force of the term PRODUCTION. It is so that we speak of the production of nature, of the earth, of the human mind, of anything which gives existence, which brings forth a thing from its own substance or stock.

WORK (A. S. *weorc*) is the result of effort and labour, as a work of industry or of art. One speaks of the work, not the production, of the carpenter and the stonemason. The production is the issue of fecundity, the work is the result of travail. The production comes forth from the productive causes, the work from the hands of the skilful or industrious workman. The production receives a being, the work a form. The tree is a production of the earth, the timber formed out of this production becomes a work, by the shape given to it. The universe is a production of infinite power, a work of infinite intelligence. It is evident that the same things may be often regarded in the light of a production or an art, in proportion as an original creative faculty or an operative process is under contemplation. We may speak of the productions of art or of nature. But a book which was an abridgement or a translation of another, not having invention, would be a work, not a production. This term would belong to the original from which it was abridged.

PROFANATION. SACRILEGE. DESECRATION.

PROFANATION (Lat. *prŏfānātiōnem*) is an irreverence or outrage committed against the sacred things of religion.

SACRILEGE (Lat. *săcrĭlĕgium*) is a crime committed against the Deity himself. It is a profanation of a church to put it to vile uses; it is sacrilege to rob it, because sacred things having been dedicated to the service of God, this is to rob God himself. To complete the idea of SACRILEGE and PROFANATION it is necessary that there should be an intention of a criminal kind.

DESECRATION (Lat. *de, from, săcer, sacred; dēsĕcrāre* being *to consecrate*) is a milder term, and may be the result of ignorance or even necessity. It means the treating in any way which is not distinctive reverence. It sometimes happens that a church is no longer required, or that no funds remain to support it. It is made use of as a store-house. This is not a purposed profanation of the holy place, yet a desecration which all thoughtful persons would deplore.

PROFESS. DECLARE.

To PROFESS (Lat. *prŏfĭtĕri*, part. *professus*) is employed only of what relates to one's self. To DECLARE (*see* DECLARE) is employed of any fact coming within one's cognizance. There is always a particular and private motive for profession. A declaration may be made on any account, as, for instance, in obedience to duty, or for the sake of another.

"Luther that *professed* openly to abhore al that might be noted Papish, defended stontly the presence of Christes bodie in the Sacrament, and to be present really and substantially even with the same words and termes."—BP. GARDNER.

PROFESSION. TRADE. BUSINESS. ART.

BUSINESS is the most general of these terms, and comprises any exercise of knowledge and experience for purposes of gain. When learning or skill of a high order is required, it is called a PROFESSION. When it consists of buying and selling merchandise, it is a TRADE (Fr. *traite*, Lat. *trăhĕre*, part. *tractus, to draw or carry*). When there is a peculiar exercise of skill, it is called an ART. Those exercise an art who exchange skilled labour for money; those a trade, who exchange commodities for money; those a profession, who exchange intellectual exertion for money. The art of the baker lies in making loaves; his trade, in selling them.

"Amongst so many great foundations of colleges in Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated to *professions*, and none left free to arts and sciences at large."—BACON.

"A bank cannot consistently with its own interest advance to a *trader* the whole, or even the greater part of the circulating

capital with which he *trades*."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"It seldom happens that men of a studious turn acquire any degree of reputation for their knowledge of *business*."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

"*Art* can never give the rules that make an *art*."—BURKE.

PROFICIENCY. IMPROVEMENT. PROGRESS.

PROFICIENCY (Lat. *prōfĭcĕre, to make progress*) is more marked than IMPROVEMENT (prefix *im-* and O. Fr. *prover, prŏbāre, to approve of*). In regard to persons IMPROVEMENT is employed of things both manual and mental, active and reflexive; PROFICIENCY is employed more commonly of matters of practical skill or active exercise of mind. Any degree of better condition, capability, or performance is IMPROVEMENT; but PROFICIENCY denotes such a degree as finds *the person* in possession of a positive power and skill.

PROGRESS (Lat. *prōgrĕdi*, part. *progressus, to go forward*) is more indefinite, expressing movement onwards, without implying any point gained. Improvement may be predicated of any thing which is capable of existing in degrees of better or worse. Proficiency regards only the agent. Progress belongs to the work. Personal improvement is more general than proficiency. Improvement betokens a better state, proficiency an increased skill or ability in some one particular. It deserves to be remarked that the English word *improve* is vitious, being a coined word with the meaning of *approve*.

"The clergy in particular, as they then engrossed almost every other branch of learning, so, like their predecessors, the British Druids, they were peculiarly remarkable for their *proficiency* in the study of the law."—BLACKSTONE.

"Reflect upon that great law of Nature, that exercise is the chief source of *improvement* in all our faculties."—BLAIR.

"Growth is *progress*, and all *progress* designs and tends to the acquisition of something which the growing person is not yet possessed of."—SOUTH.

PROFUSENESS. PROFUSION.

PROFUSENESS (Lat. *prŏfundĕre*, part. *prŏfūsus, to pour forth*) is simply the quality or exhibition of the profuse. PROFUSION is the existence of the profuse in what is desirable or good. Profuseness of epithets; profusion of praise. Profuseness is the quality which, as a cause, produces profusion as a result.

"He who with a promiscuous, undistinguishing *profuseness* does not so much dispense as throw away what he has, proclaims himself a fool to all the intelligent world about him."—SOUTH.

"The raptured eye,
The fair *profusion*, yellow Autumn spies."
THOMSON.

PROHIBITION. INHIBITION.

PROHIBITION (Lat. *prohĭbĭtiōnem*) and INHIBITION (Lat. *inhĭbere, to restrain*), the former being literally to abolish and the latter to hold in, have this distinction in usage. The prohibition stops a man from doing a thing, the inhibition stops him after he has begun to do it. PROHIBIT implies no motive in particular, INHIBIT implies the desire to stop what is contrary to established order. One forbids what ought not to be done; one prohibits what might otherwise be done; one inhibits persons from doing what they have assumed the right of doing. *Forbid* is the generic term. Prohibition belongs to government and discipline. Inhibition has a technical force as belonging to law. In this case it is authority exercised to compel adherence to law.

PROMISCUOUS. INDISCRIMINATE.

PROMISCUOUS (Lat. *promiscuus, mixed, promiscuous*) is a term applied to objects; INDISCRIMINATE (Lat. *indiscrīmĭnātim, without distinction*), to actions. A promiscuous crowd; an indiscriminate accusation. The promiscuous appearance of several objects brought together may be owing to the indiscriminate way in which they have been dealt with.

"Say, Muse, their names then known, who first, who last,
Roused from the slumber on that fiery couch,
At their great emperor's call, as next in worth,

Came singly where he stood on the bare strand,
While the *promiscuous* crowd stood yet aloof." MILTON.

"Since, then, in our own order of being, the power of the individual over external bodies is not at all proportioned to his piety or his morals, but is exercised *indiscriminately*, and in equal degrees, by the good and by the bad, we have no reason from analogy to suppose but that the like *indiscrimination* may obtain in higher orders, and that both the good and evil angels may exercise powers far transcending any we possess, the effects of which to us will seem preternatural."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

PROMISE. ENGAGEMENT.

PROMISE (Fr. *promesse*, Lat. *prōmittĕre*, part. *prōmissus, to promise*) is used directly of the object, as to promise a gift. We do not say, to engage a gift, but to engage that the person shall receive it.

An ENGAGEMENT (Fr. *engager, to impledge; gage, a pledge*, Low Lat. *vădium*) is only in this sense a stronger word than PROMISE, by which it is intended to express that the promiser feels as if he had put himself under a pledge to execute his promise. "I promise that you shall have it," means, simply, "I give you my word that I will give it to you." "I engage that you shall have it," means, "I pledge everything in my power to cause you to have it." The word of the promiser is, as it were, put in pledge, though no actual pledge is given. It is like saying, "I pledge my word that it shall be so." PROMISE supposes an accordance where all the gain is on the side of the person to whom the promise is made, and all the power of benefiting on the side of the person who makes the promise. ENGAGEMENT supposes an agreement in which the advantages are on both sides. One promises to do another a service, one engages to deliver goods at a certain time and place, for which he who receives them engages to pay.

"Christian simplicity relates to *promises* and acts of grace and favour, and its caution is that all *promises* be simple, ingenuous, agreeable to the intention of the promiser, truly and effectually expressed, and never giving less in the performance than in the *promises* and words of the expression."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"The king objected that the rendezvous being appointed for the next week, he was not willing to quit the army till that was passed; because if the superior officers prevailed, they would be able to make good their *engagement*, if not, they must apply themselves to him for their own security."—LUDLOW, *Memoirs*.

PROMOTE. ADVANCE. FORWARD. ENCOURAGE.

We speak of PROMOTING (Lat. *prōmŏvēre*, part. *prōmōtus, to make to move forwards*) interests, of ADVANCING (Fr. *avancer*) causes, of FORWARDING plans or purposes, and of ENCOURAGING (Fr. *encourager, cœur, the heart*) efforts. The last application is a little distorted, inasmuch as to ENCOURAGE meaning to give heart, it is, strictly speaking, only *persons* that can be encouraged. We encourage an undertaking by lending countenance and strength to those who undertake it. PROMOTE is used both of good and evil designs or movements; ADVANCE, only of good. We might speak of promoting happiness and contentment or discontent and disturbance. We should speak of advancing happiness, not unhappiness; here we should use PROMOTE. To promote seems to mean no more than to give additional influence; to advance, to do so in cases where such influence is a fair object of desire. FORWARD is a simpler term, but is always more closely connected with persons. We should endeavour to advance the truth on all occasions, and to forward the efforts of those to whom it is dear, but never believe that we can promote good in any way by promoting persecution.

"All my mind was set
Serious to learn and know, and thence to do
What might be public good; myself, I thought
Born to that end, born to *promote* all truth,
All righteous things." MILTON.

"True religion is the best support of every government, which being founded on just principles, proposes for its end the joint *advancement* of the virtue and the happiness of the people."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"The occasional propensity to this superstition (of symbolic figures) was, without question, *forwarded* and *encouraged* by the priesthood."—WARBURTON.

PROMOTION. ADVANCEMENT. PREFERMENT. AGGRANDIZEMENT.

As applied to the raising of persons in their social position, PROMOTION seems restricted to those offices which are held in a scale of gradation, as in the army, navy, government offices, and mercantile houses. ADVANCEMENT is a general term, applicable to any raising of individual position; while PREFERMENT (Lat. *præferre, to place before*) involves some peculiar greatness or dignity of office in that to which the person is preferred, especially in Church or State. AGGRANDIZEMENT is applicable not only to persons, but also to families and communities; it is advancement in rank, power or honour. That which is aggrandized becomes socially greater.

"Can place so lessen us or *aggrandize*."
YOUNG.

"The government is elective; *promotion* depends in a great degree upon talents and virtues, and consequently there is a stimulus to exertion, and a scope for honourable ambition."—EUSTACE, *Italy*.

"Those that are *advanced* by degrees are less envied than those that are *advanced* suddenly."—BACON.

"Sir Antonio More was made receiver of the revenues of West Flanders, a *preferment* with which they say he was so elated, that he burned his easel, and gave away his painting tools."—WALPOLE, *Anecdotes of Painting*.

PROMULGATE. PUBLISH. DIVULGE. REVEAL. DISCLOSE. (*See* DISCLOSE.)

PROMULGATE (Lat. *prōmulgāre, to make known, publish*) is a mode of PUBLISHING (Fr. *publier*, Lat. *publĭcare, publicus, public*, for *pŏpŭlĭcus*, from *pŏpŭlus, the people*); for to PUBLISH is indefinite, and means simply to make generally known, as facts; while PROMULGATE is to make *extensively* known, to give a wide, and, if possible, extending, publicity. Nor is it applied to facts, but rather to principles, opinions, doctrines; hence promulgation is not only publication, but systematic and often repeated publication.

DIVULGE (Lat. *dīvulgāre, to make commonly known*) is to make known what was known only to one's self or to a few, or which there was some propriety or obligation of keeping secret. DIVULGE often refers to a breach of confidence, but does not necessarily imply this.

To REVEAL (literally, *to draw back the veil*, Lat. *rĕvĕlāre*, which hid an object) differs from DIVULGE, inasmuch as REVEAL implies no more than the bare fact of antecedent ignorance, not any propriety or obligation of concealment. To divulge is to give knowledge of facts before kept secret. To reveal is this, and more. It is applicable to what was unknown from being high, abstruse, or mysterious. It applies also to principles as well as facts, and to knowledge in its broadest acceptation.

All these differ from DISCLOSE (O. Fr. *desclos*, part. of *des-clorre, to unclose*), in that DISCLOSE may express the accidental or unintentional, while they involve a purpose. We reveal that which is to their interest to know to whom the revelation is made. We divulge what is to the interest of some *not* to make known.

"An absurd theory on one side of a question forms no justification for alleging a false fact or *promulgating* mischievous maxims on the other."—BURKE.

"How best the mighty work He might begin,
Of Saviour to mankind, and which way first
Publish His God-like office, now mature."
MILTON.

"Descamps says that this mystery, as it was then held, was stolen from Vaillant by the son of an old man, who scraped the grounds of his plates for him. This might be one of the means of *divulging* the new art (of mezzotinto)."—WALPOLE.

"Early the morrow next before that day,
His joyous face did to the world *reveal*,
They both uprose and took their ready way
Unto the church, their prayers to appeal."
SPENSER.

"Thus it was then, and thus it hath been ever since, Truth has had concealed and timorous friends, who, keeping their sentiments to themselves or *disclosing* them only to a few, complied with errors and superstitions which they disliked and despised."—JORTIN.

PRONOUNCE. UTTER. ARTICULATE. DELIVER.

What is given forth by the voice as

mere sound may be said to be UTTERED (A. S. *út*, *out*, compar. *útor*).

What is spoken in distinct syllables is ARTICULATED (Lat. *artĭcŭlātus*, part. of *artĭcŭlāre*, *to articulate*). What is spoken in harmonious, proportioned, and sustained articulation is PRONOUNCED, as words or sentences.

What is given forth by sustained pronunciation is DELIVERED (Fr. *delivrer*, *to release*). Thus do these terms grow upon one another, as *sound*, *syllables*, *words*, and *speech*. PRONOUNCE has the general meaning of making to understand by means of the voice in articulate speech. Man alone utters intelligent speech, though some birds can articulate syllables and words. Difference of climate and habit renders the inhabitants of one country almost incapable of pronouncing certain syllables in the language of another, yet practice will overcome such difficulties. The same words are pronounced differently in different provinces of a country, or by the educated and uneducated.

"In order to be fully and easily understood, the four chief requisites are a degree of loudness of voice, distinctness, slowness, and propriety of *pronunciation*."—BLAIR.

"The ashen beam, his power of *utterance* left
Still unimpaired, but in the dust he fell."
COWPER, *Iliad*.

"They must be put into his (the catechist's) hands the moment they are capable of *articulating* their words, and their instruction must be pursued with unremitting diligence."—BISHOP PORTEUS.

PRONOUNCE. DECLARE.

As applied to the making known by verbal utterance, DECLARE denotes the clear and positive assertion of a thing; PRONOUNCE denotes such a declaration as rests, in some degree, upon individual responsibility. We declare facts, intentions, and the like; we pronounce sentence, judgment, an opinion.

"But the attorney answered them that he is not the *declarer* of his intention: he must be judged by the book, by his words, more certainly by the effect."—*State Trials*.

"The confident and *pronunciative* school of Aristotle."—BACON.

PROOF. TESTIMONY. EVIDENCE. DEPOSITION.

PROOF (Fr. *preuve*, Lat. *prŏbāre*, *to prove*, *approve*) is used in two senses: 1, any effort or process which tends to establish a fact or truth; and 2, such an amount of it as shall lead to conviction, and produce belief. Being a simpler word than TESTIMONY (Lat. *testĭmŏnium*, from *testis*, *a witness*) and EVIDENCE (Lat. *ēvĭdentia*, *distinctness in speech*), it is used more generally of the ordinary facts of life. EVIDENCE is a term of higher dignity, and is applied to that which is moral and intellectual; as, the evidences of Christianity, or the body of proofs, or alleged proofs, tending to establish facts in law. Testimony is strictly the evidence of a witness given upon oath. It always implies, more or less directly, proofs afforded by a living witness, though it is often used of unconscious things in the way of analogy; as, the testimony of Nature, of conscience, and the like. PROOF is a plainer and stronger term than evidence. Proof is positive, evidence may be probable, presumptive, questionable, or circumstantial. Proof belongs more directly to facts; evidence to truth, or what is moral in its nature; testimony to what is personal. The suffering of a martyr, borne in personal testimony of his belief, is not conclusive, though it is no slight evidence of the truth of that for which he suffers: it is incontestable proof, where it is voluntarily undergone, of his own sincerity.

DEPOSITION (Lat. *dēpŏsĭtionem*, *deposition*, as a legal term) is the written testimony of a witness taken down in due form of law, and affirmed or sworn to by the deponent. In a less technical sense it is to declare upon oath, or as solemnly bearing witness.

"Seeing 'twas he that made you to *depose*,
Your oath, my Lord, was frivolous and vain."
SHAKESPEARE.

"To conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, *proofs*, and probabilities; by *proofs* meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition."—HUME.

"The difficulty is when *testimonies* contradict common experience, and the reports

of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature or with one another."—LOCKE.

"*Evidence* signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the other."—BLACKSTONE.

PROPAGATE. SPREAD. CIRCULATE. DISSEMINATE.

Of these, to SPREAD (A.S. *sprædan*) is the most indeterminate, so that the rest may be regarded as modifications of this.

To CIRCULATE (Lat. *circŭlare, to make circular*) is to spread within a circle or particular area; as, "the rumour circulates, or is circulated, through the town."

To DISSEMINATE (Lat. *dissĕmĭnāre; sēmen, seed*) is a metaphorical term, conveying rather the idea of scattering and diffusion than that of any after up-growth.

This is indicated by PROPAGATE (Lat. *propāgāre, to propagate, by means of layers*). A rumour is propagated when many in succession give force to it. Doctrines are propagated when those who spread them succeed in making them take root. Ideas are disseminated when they are largely scattered about, and, as it were, sown broadcast. That which is circulated is matter of local and temporary interest; that which is disseminated is accepted and retained; that which is propagated becomes deeply and lastingly established. DISSEMINATE implies less active and laborious effort than PROPAGATE.

"It was the singular and miraculous blessing of the Gospel in the hands of the first *propagators* of it, that there was no speech nor language where their voice was not heard."—BISHOP HALL.

"He chooses a company of very ordinary unlettered men, but very honest men, to be the witnesses of His conversation and doctrine; and these He designs for the *spreaders* of His religion throughout the world."—SHARP.

'Our God, when heaven and earth He did create,
For ned man, who should of both participate.
If our lives' motions theirs must imitate,
Our knowledge, like our blood, must *circulate*."
DENHAM.

"The horrid scenes that have been passing there have all been, it has been said, by the *dissemination* of speculative notions about liberty and the rights of man among the negroes of that island."—HORSLEY.

PROPERTY. QUALITY. ATTRIBUTE. ACCIDENT.

PROPERTY (Fr. *propriété*) is a peculiar quality. It is thus very extensively applied; as, the properties of matter, which are, in some cases, *permanent*, as extension, gravitation, or colour; *transmutative*, as shown in chemical affinities, as, for instance, the explosiveness of gunpowder, these being accompanied by change in the substances themselves; and *perceptible*, that is, such as produce affections on sentient beings, as smells, poisons.

QUALITY (Fr. *qualité*, Lat. *quālĭtatem*) is that which makes, or helps to make, a thing what it is. It is therefore a subjective or metaphysical term; and in metaphysics qualities are primary and secondary, or necessary to the conception of a thing, and not so essential; as, whiteness is a primary quality of snow, and a secondary quality of a horse.

ATTRIBUTE (Lat. *attrĭbūtum*, a thing *ascribed*, or *predicated*) is, more properly, a *personal quality*, and so is mainly moral, as PROPERTY is mainly physical, and QUALITY metaphysical; as, "Justice and mercy are attributes of God." We may say, roughly, that qualities are perceived; properties, discovered; attributes, ascribed.

In logic an ACCIDENT (Lat. *accĭdens, accĭdĕre, to happen*) is a property or quality which is non-essential to the thing in which it occurs, as blackness in ink, which may be red or blue. So the conditions of human life, which are not essential to it, but forms in which it manifests itself as wealth or poverty, may be called the accidents of existence.

"What the light is—whether a substance or an *accident*, whether of a corporall or incorporall nature—it is not easy to determine."—HAKEWELL.

"*Property* is correctly a synonym for peculiar quality; but it is frequently used as co-extensive with quality in general."—SIR W. HAMILTON

"Humility and Patience, Industry and Temperance, are very often the good *qualities* of a poor man."—ADDISON.

"But mercy is above this sceptr'd sway;
It is an *attribute* to God Himself."
SHAKESPEARE.

It may be added that we do not speak of the attributes of any but *great* persons or personifications; while we speak of the properties of brute matter, and the qualities even of the commonest men.

PROPORTION. RATE. RATIO.

PROPORTION (Lat. *prōportiōnem*) is the relation or adaptation of one portion to another or to the whole in point of magnitude or quantity, and is a term of greater dignity than the others, being employed, not of mere quantity only, but of such quantity as relates to truth, justice, or artistic impression.

RATE (Lat. *rătam*, sc. *partem, a reckoned part*) is an established portion or measure, a fixed allowance. Proportion is a *fixed* value; rate is a *concurrent* value; and is thus employed of movement or continuous proportion. "At the rate or running value or proportion of six miles an hour." RATIO is only employed of the *relation* which one quantity or magnitude has to another; for instance, as two is to four, so is four to eight; as two is to six, so is six to eighteen, and the like.

"*Proportion* is the measure of relative quantity."—BURKE.

"Nor will the purity which is inseparable from it ever let us know what the vast and sinking expenses of lewdness and uncleanness are. In a word, it is vice only that is the chargeable thing; it is only shame and repentance that men buy at such costly *rates*."—SHARP.

PROPOSAL. PROPOSITION. OVERTURE.

These terms represent two aspects of the word propose—that is, *to set forth* (Lat. *prōpōnĕre*). A PROPOSAL is something set forth, or laid down before another for consideration. A PROPOSITION is something laid down in words simply—an affirmation or denial, that is, logically,—any assertion of the connexion or disconnexion of two terms being a proposition, affirmative or negative. The terms are often confounded. But it is also true that the same thing may be called a proposal and a proposition, according to the view taken of it; that is to say, a statement is a proposition; a statement made for purposes of consideration is a proposal also; yet there seems also a further difference in usage; PROPOSITION being used for something *to be deliberated upon*; PROPOSAL, something *to be done*.

"Spare that *proposal*, father! spare the trouble
Of that solicitation." MILTON.

"If a *proposition* ascribing the nature of things has an indefinite subject, it is generally to be esteemed universal in its propositional sense."—WATTS, *Logic*.

An OVERTURE (Fr. *ouverture, an opening*) is literally an opening up or commencement.

A PROPOSAL (Fr. *proposer*) is a thing put forth or forward, and specifically for consideration, that is for acceptance or rejection by another party. A proposal is always with a view to action. An overture is less definite, the end being often implied rather than expressed. A friendly word, for instance, towards one from whom we had been estranged would be an overture of reconciliation. The force of PROPOSAL lies in the thing proposed, which must depend for its acceptance on the desirableness of it. The force of OVERTURE lies in the person making it and the fact that it has been made. Individual feeling or judgment operates in prompting an overture which is always connected closely with one's own state, interest, or desire, while it is possible to make a proposal for another's sake altogether. OVERTURE implies some antecedent relation between the parties out of which the overture springs, and to some point connected with which one of the two parties is prompted to give expression. Accordingly, an overture is not only as regards the movement of the party making it, but also the matter as it lies between the two initiating, while the proposal is final. The overture is to lead to something beyond. The proposal is itself the end. Hence an overture might in

many cases be defined as an initiatory proposal.

PROPOSE. OFFER. PURPOSE.

The meaning of PROPOSE has been partly considered under PROPOSAL. To propose and to OFFER (Lat. *offerre, to present forward*) both relate to practical affairs. We propose for consideration; we offer for acceptance. In argument, to propose a remark, would mean, to lay it down for deliberation or discussion on its own merits; to offer a remark, would mean, to present it for acceptance or rejection, as relevant or irrelevant. To OFFER commonly implies a single undivided interest; to PROPOSE implies complex or common interests. Where one person is concerned, we offer, or where many are as one in community of condition. Where many are concerned, we propose. No two terms are more commonly confounded than PURPOSE and PROPOSE; but the former denotes a settled, the latter, a contingent, state of mind. I propose to do something, if I have not yet made up my mind. I purpose when I *have* made it up. Yet the words PURPOSE and PROPOSE might often be used indifferently, provided it be remembered that they express different aspects of the same thing. I purpose to do a thing when I have formed a practical intention to do it. I propose to do it when I recognize it as a design which I shall carry out, provided that nothing should occur to hinder or deter me. *See* OFFER.

"But I should ill become this throne, O peers,
And this imperial sovereignty, adorned
With splendour, armed with power, if aught *proposed*,
And judged of public moment, in the shape
Of difficulty or danger, could deter
Me from attempting." MILTON.

"The ship a naked helpless hull is left;
Forc'd round and round, she quits her *purposed* way,
And bounds uncertain o'er the swelling sea." ROWE, *Lucan*.

PROROGUE. ADJOURN.

PROROGUE is a legislative term (Lat. *prōrŏgāre*, in the sense of asking the people's consent to a law, &c.) and only applied to national legislative assemblies.

ADJOURN (Fr. *ajourner*, Low Lat. *adjournare*, BRACHET) is employed of ordinary deliberative meetings.

"By the king's authority alone and by his writs are they (the two houses of peers and commons) assembled and by him alone are they *prorogued* and dissolved, but each house may *adjourn* itself."—BACON.

PROSPERITY. WELFARE. WELL-BEING.

WELFARE and WELL-BEING are abstract terms.

PROSPERITY (Lat. *prōspĕrĭtatem*) is a relative term. It is welfare regarded as the successful issue of conduct in the acquisition of material goods, and such estimation as is founded upon the possession of them. Success and progress are involved in the idea of prosperity. Welfare is not so high a term as well-being; welfare denotes a sufficiency of material goods; well-being denotes that it is well with *the whole nature*, moral as well as bodily; as, virtue is necessary to the well-being, though not to the welfare of a man, to which it is, in some respects, often opposed. WELL-BEING is more commonly used of persons collectively, WELFARE personally. The welfare of an individual, the well-being of a community.

"*Prosperity* is but a bad nurse to virtue a nurse which is like to starve it in its infancy, and to spoil it in its growth."—SOUTH.

"Therefore, fair damsel, be ye well aware,
Lest that too far ye have your sorrow sought,
You and your country both I wish *welfare*,
And honour both, for each of other worthy are." SPENSER.

"A necessity, indeed, of fitness, that is, that things could not have been otherwise than they are without diminishing the beauty, order, and *well-being* of the whole, there may be, and, as far as we can comprehend, there certainly is."—CLARKE.

PROSPEROUS. FORTUNATE.

The man is FORTUNATE (Lat. *fortūnātus*) whose welfare was unlooked for; PROSPEROUS, whose welfare was matter of hope and effort. Good fortune comes; but prosperity is, partly, at least, earned, though not of necessity honestly and well earned.

"Amongst men, those who are *prosperously* unjust are entitled to panegyric; but afflicted virtue is insolently stabbed with all manner of reproaches."—DRYDEN, *Juvenal.*

"For first with words, nearer admiration than liking, she would extol his excellences, the goodliness of his shape, the power of his wit, the valiantness of his courage, the *fortunateness* of his successes."—SIDNEY, *Arcadia.*

PROVERB. APHORISM. APOPHTHEGM. BYWORD. AXIOM. MAXIM. SAYING. ADAGE. SAW. TRUISM. PRINCIPLE.

The term PROVERB (Lat. *prŏverbium*) is employed with considerable latitude of meaning, as equivalent to any saying which is frequently repeated, especially one forcibly expressing some practical truth, the result of experience or observation. It is "one man's wit and many men's wisdom." It had of old attached to it the idea of mystical value, and hence came to signify something difficult to understand; as, "His disciples said unto Him, Lo, now speakest Thou plainly, and speakest no *proverb.*"

"The *proverb* is true, that light gains make heavy purses, for light gains come often, great gains now and then."—BACON.

APHORISM (Gr. *ἀφορισμός, a definition*) differs from PROVERB in relating to abstract truth rather than to practical matters. The aphorisms of Hippocrates defined the symptoms of disease. An aphorism may be defined as the substance of a doctrine. The characteristic of an aphorism seems to be the disproportion between the simplicity of the expression and the richness of the sentiment conveyed by it.

"That *aphorism* of the wise man, 'The desire of the slothful killeth him, for his hands refuse to labour.'"—BARROW.

APOPHTHEGM (Gr. *ἀπόφθεγμα*) is a terse, concise saying, of a sententious character. The apophthegm is in common what the aphorism is in higher matters. It is a saying cherished for its aptness, effectiveness, and truth; as in the definition of proverb given above. An apophthegm is a memorable saying emanating from energetic thought.

"In a numerous collection of our Saviour's *apophthegms*, many of them referring to sundry precepts of the Jewish law, there is not to be found an example of sophistry, or of false subtilty, or of anything approaching thereunto."—PALEY.

BYWORD originally meant little more than a common saying, whether expressed by a single term or in more than one. It has taken to itself in later times a contemptuous signification, as if what is frequently named were a thing of meanness or derision; something the familiarity of whose mention has bred contempt.

"I agree with him fully in the last, and if I were forced to allow the first, I should still think, with our old coarse *byword*, that the same power which furnished all their restorateurs sent also their present cooks."—BURKE.

AN AXIOM (Gr. *ἀξίωμα*) is something which is claimed to be conceded as a self-evident proposition. It differs, however, from TRUISM, in being a foundation of argument, which a truism is not. Moreover, truism belongs to morals; axiom, to science. The axiom is a cardinal verity, which is appreciated by any understanding which is in a normal and sound state.

"There are a sort of propositions which, under the name of *maxims* and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science."—LOCKE.

"Allow a man the privilege to make his own definitions of common words, and it will be no hard matter for him to infer conclusions which, in one sense, shall be true, and in another, false, at once seeming paradoxes and manifest *truisms*."—BERKELEY.

MAXIM (Lat. *maxĭma, i.e. sententiārum, greatest, i.e. widest, most general of propositions*) is an established principle or proposition in matters of practical truth; its characteristic is the *authority* with which it is invested, so that it may be appealed to retrospectively. It is a guide and rule of conduct. It is abstract and speculative, though founded upon observation and experience; so differing from PRINCIPLE (Lat. *princĭpium, a beginning, a principle*) which carries knowledge with it, and is applicable to action as a guide or basis of proceeding. A principle is a fundamental truth, or comprehensive law, from which others are derived, or on which they are founded. *See* DOCTRINE.

"A good *principle* not rightly understood may prove as hurtful as a bad."—MILTON.

It may be observed, generally, that principles are last in the order of investigation, and first in the order of practice. They are arrived at by analysis, and when found become bases or starting-points for action or scientific inquiry. A SAYING and a SAW are probably etymologically connected, and represent, the former the more philosophical, the latter, the more vulgar aspect of a proverb. A wise "saw," for instance, has become an expression somewhat satirical, to denote the aiming at the sententious in that which is really commonplace.

ADAGE (Lat. *ădăgium*) represents in proverbs the aspect of their long establishment; as MAXIM, their authority; and PROVERB, their commonness. Hence we commonly find the word coupled with some adjective expressive of this: "the old adage," or the like; as, the common proverb; the vulgar saw; the excellent saying; the incontrovertible maxim; the established or universal principle. The adage has more merit *as a saying* than the proverb. The proverb is popular, familiar, and full of common sense. The adage gives to the same thing point and cleverness, and peculiar turn of expression, antithetical or otherwise. Hence a proverb may be coarse and vulgar. In that case it would not be called an adage.

"Severe to censure, earnest to advise,
And with old *saws* the present age chastise." FRANCIS, *Horace*.

"It was a common *saying* with him, that such altercations were for a logician and not merely for a philosopher."—SIR T MORE.

The term SAYING, it will be seen, does not of necessity imply much authority, and is often the habitual expression of an individual only. "Two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time," is an example of an axiom. "Know thyself," is a maxim. "He who hurts thee instructs thee," is an ancient adage. When Leonidas was asked why brave men preferred honour to life, his answer was an apophthegm: "Because," said he, "life comes from fortune but honour comes from virtue." was an aphorism of Hippocrates, "T virtue of remedies is in assisting na ture." "The dog returns to L vomit," is a proverb.

"The antithetic parallelism gives a acuteness and force to *adages* and mora sentences, and therefore abounds in Solo mon's Proverbs."—LOWTH.

PROVIDENCE. PRUDENCE.

These words are etymologically identical (Lat. *prōvĭdentia, prūdentia*, *prūdens* being a contracted form of *prōvĭdens*), but PROVIDENCE is a habit PRUDENCE, a quality. Hence the first may be employed of the inferior animals; the latter, only of men. PROVIDENCE is more restricted than PRUDENCE, for it is directed only to the supplying of needful wants, or the making preparation against want, danger, or necessity; while PRUDENCE is applicable to everything which belongs to our interests, even of the highest kind. Prudence is rather contemplative, and guards; providence is active, and anticipates.

"Yet, by experience taught, we know how good,
And of our good and of our dignity
How *provident* He is." MILTON.

"Our blessed Saviour having prefaced concerning *prudence*, adds to the integrity of the precept, and for the conduct of our religion, that we be simple as well as *prudent*, innocent as well as wary."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

PROVINCIALISM. SOLECISM. BARBARISM.

A PROVINCIALISM (Lat. *prōvincia, an outlying country subjugated to Rome, a province*) is an expression or mode of speaking which marks a distance from the metropolis, or more refined centre of a community or nation. The style is simply unpolished.

A SOLECISM (Gr. σολοικισμός) is said to mean a corruption of the Attic dialect by the inhabitants of the Athenian Asiatic colonies of Soli in Cilicia. It amounts to a violation of grammatical rule, or the inversion or contradiction of the ordinary processes of the laws of thought.

A BARBARISM (Gr. βαρβαρισμός) is

an expression not only foreign to a language, but uncongenial to its structure and modes, exhibiting in its character a want of acquaintance with its genius and the modes on which its language proceeds. Johnson says: "A barbarism may be in one word, a solecism must be of more," upon the authority of the Greek grammarians, who had made the same distinction. By a further extension of the term, SOLECISM, like BARBARISM, has been made applicable to what is unrefined or irregular *in manners*. The barbarism offends against taste and usage, the solecism against rule and law, the provincialism against culture and refinement.

PROXY. SUBSTITUTE.

The PROXY (*i.e.* Procuracy, Lat. *prōcūrātionem, the office of the procurator, or proctor*) is always personal.

The SUBSTITUTE (Lat. *substĭtuere, to place instead*, part. *substĭtūtus*) may be personal or otherwise. The proxy is an agent, the substitute either an agent or an instrument. Hence, where both are persons, more representative independence of action is implied in PROXY than in SUBSTITUTE. The pleader appears by proxy. The conscript is sometimes allowed to pay money for a substitute. It may be observed that a substitute properly implies the antecedent existence, not only the analogous use, of the thing itself; so that De Quincey's expression seems to be questionable, that in the time of Shakespeare ladies wore masks as "a *substitute* for the modern parasol."

PRUDENT. PRUDENTIAL.

We use PRUDENT of character and conduct; PRUDENTIAL, of the motives of conduct. Hence, a prudent course; prudential morality; that is, morality which is founded upon the theory that virtue is safer than vice. PRUDENT is exhibiting the moral quality of prudence. PRUDENTIAL is actuated by nothing higher than prudence.

"I know not how any honest man can discharge his conscience in *prudentially* conniving at such falsities."—MORE, *On Enthusiasm*.

PUNISHMENT. CHASTISEMENT.

CHASTISEMENT (O. Fr. *chastier*) is administered to him who has committed a fault, to prevent him from falling again into the same offence.

PUNISHMENT (Fr. *punir*) is visited on him who has committed a crime, by way of expiation and example. Children are chastised by their parents, malefactors punished by the judge. Chastisement, to be effective, must be rare; punishment, to be effective, must be severe. Chastisement should be dispensed temperately, punishment proportionately. Religion teaches us that the Almighty, as a Father, chastises us in this life as children, that we may not be punished by Him as our Judge in the life to come. He who chastises is in some sort a superior with power of control. He who punishes may be an equal, an inferior, or even one's self. Circumstances may punish, or the offence may draw after it consequences which may make it its own punishment. Parents who are too indulgent to chastise their children are sometimes punished for it in the ingratitude and rebellion of the same children. Political punishments should be severe only in those cases in which the crime tends to the disorder and ruin of the State. Frequent chastisements lead commonly to no better end than a disgust of virtue.

PURGE. PURIFY.

PURGE is to make pure (Lat. *purgare*); to PURIFY (Lat. *pūrĭfĭcare*) is to bring back a thing to its proper purity. We purge by taking away what is foul, hurtful, or obstructive, especially in conglomeration of foreign substances. To purify is to dissipate, remove, or destroy what there is bad, vicious, or foul in the substance of the thing itself. The fire purifies the metal, the winds purify the air. Pure and wholesome principles purify the morals, the actions, the intentions, the mind.

PURSUE. PROSECUTE.

These words are etymologically the same, the former coming to us, mediately, through the French *poursuivre*

(*i.e.* Lat. *prosĕquĕre:* BRACHET); the latter, directly, from the Lat. *prōsĕqui*, part. *prōsĕcūtus, to pursue.* As applied to processes of mental application, they differ very slightly; but PURSUE seems rather more to belong to general, PROSECUTE, to specific, investigations or undertakings. So we commonly say, to pursue one's studies (indefinitely); but (definitely) to prosecute a particular subject of inquiry. There seems also a further difference. PURSUE is applicable to the guiding principle, PROSECUTE to the subject-matter. We pursue a line of inquiry or given instructions, we prosecute an investigation itself, or a work. We pursue an intention, we prosecute an undertaking.

"The conclusion which I draw from these premises *pursuant* to the query laid down is, that the learned doctor in condemning Arius has implicitly condemned himself."—WATERLAND.

"She was no whit thereby discouraged
From *prosecuting* of her first intent."
SPENSER.

PUSH. SHOVE. THRUST. PROPEL.

All these words denote giving an impulse to a body, but differ as to the manner.

PUSH (Fr. *pousser, to thrust*, Lat. *pulsāre*) is indefinite. It may mean to press against with force, with or without producing change of place in the object.

To SHOVE (A. S. *sceófan*) is to drive along, and so implies a change of position; the action being by gradually increasing force or pressure, and not by sudden impulse, especially by causing it to slide or move along the surface of another body.

THRUST (Icel. *thrysta, to press, thrust*) is applicable to cases in which a definite line of movement or a point of contact is supposed. We push persons; we thrust *at* them in cases in which a line of aim, especially with some weapon, is contemplated.

PROPEL (Lat. *prōpellĕre, to drive forwards*) denotes a more equable or regulated application of force, commonly also sustained, for the purpose of pushing along a given course or line of movement, and so is often used in speaking of the scientific application of power to locomotion.

PUTREFY. ROT. CORRUPT.

These terms may be taken in the following order: CORRUPT (Lat. *corrumpere, to destroy, to spoil*, part. *corruptus*), PUTREFY (Lat. *pūtrĭfĭeri*), and ROT (A. S. *rotian*), to express the different stages of decomposition of organized bodies. The first, that in which the form as seen in life is beginning to be marred; the second, that in which it decays offensively; and the last, that in which its particles cease to cohere and begin to mingle with foreign matter. The verb *corrupt* is seldom used now in an intransitive sense. Formerly this use was more common, as by Bacon, but always rare.

"Though this action of putrefaction comes the nearest to animal digestion, it so far differs from it that the salts and oils are only detained in the animal body so long as they remain benign and friendly to it; but as soon as they *putrefy* entirely, are either thrown off or must produce mortal distempers."—ARBUTHNOT.

"Live the brute
Since as the brute we die, the scorn of man,
Of godlike man, to revel and to *rot*."
YOUNG.

"*Corruption* is a reciprocal to generation."—BACON.

Q

QUALIFIED. COMPETENT. ENTITLED.

A man is QUALIFIED (L. Lat. *qualĭfĭcare, to make*, of such and such *quality*) for a task when his powers, either by training or by nature, have a special aptitude for that task.

A man is COMPETENT (Lat. *compĕtĕre, to suit, to be qualified*) to such a task when he has simply the natural powers, so that after-training may be added. Hence qualification is competency specifically developed. It follows that a man may be competent without being qualified, inasmuch as competency regards native powers; qualification, artificial acquirements. But qualification extends even beyond

this; and, while competency always belongs to inherent power, qualification sometimes denotes such powers as are altogether extraneous to the individual, and come to him from without, or are conferred upon him. The fulfilment of any necessary condition whatever is, so far, a qualification. So that we speak of persons as qualified by their age to hold certain offices.

ENTITLED (prefix *en-* and Lat. *tĭtŭlus, a title*) denotes an assertive kind of qualification; that is, is applied to cases not only of fitness but of privilege, and denotes the condition to claim with success.

"The true reason of requiring any *qualification* with regard to property in voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own."—BLACKSTONE.

"But the Socinians, who concluded that this was not thus, because they knew not how it could be thus, are highly to be reproved for their excess in the inquiries of reason, not where she is not a *competent* judge, but where she is not *competently* instructed."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"*Entitling* themselves to a contemptuous mercy by a display of their imbecility and meanness."—BURKE.

QUARREL. DIFFERENCE. DISPUTE. ALTERCATION. AFFRAY *or* FRAY. FEUD. BROIL. BRAWL.

A QUARREL (O. Fr. *querele*, Lat. *quĕrēla, a complaint*) is vague, general, and indefinite. Any angry contest, confined, however, to words, may be called a quarrel. The etymological force of the word, however, so far survives, that a quarrel always presumes a wrong, or ground of complaint of some kind. Hence the phrase, "to pick a quarrel," meaning to seek wilfully that occasion of contest which does not readily present itself. By an extension of meaning, the verb *to quarrel* is applied to matters in which no question of right at all is concerned, and so denotes little more than actively to complain, as in the phrase, "to quarrel with one's food;" or to find fault, as, "to quarrel with a slight mistake." Sharpness of temper is the usual cause of quarrels in which there is commonly more irritation than hatred.

"If upon a sudden *quarrel* two persons fight, and one of them kills the other, this is manslaughter."—BLACKSTONE.

DIFFERENCE (Lat. *differentia*) is employed of personal matters of minor consequence. It is used both for the dissimilarity of opinion or feeling and for the manifestation of it. Differences between persons are commonly caused by a collision of interests.

A DISPUTE (Lat. *disputāre, to discuss*) is a difference more or less strong kept within the bounds of argument and the expression of opponent views or claims. Difference of opinion is the common cause of dispute. Verbal disputes are often prolonged by obstinacy and inattention to the just value of terms. It may be upon a point external to both parties. It closely resembles ALTERCATION (Lat. *altercationem, a debating, wrangling*), which is literally the alternate expression of feelings of difference. Altercations properly involve but two persons; while disputes may involve many. An altercation is a wordy dispute, into which are introduced ill-temper and personalities.

"Ought lesser *differences* altogether to divide and estrange those from one another whom such ancient and sacred bonds unite?"—BLAIR.

"I here, in this place, make this offer to them, that if I (Prynne) may be admitted a fair *dispute* on fair terms for my cause, that I will maintain, and do here make the challenge, against all the prelates in the king's dominions, and against all the prelates in Christendom, let them take in the Pope and all to help them, that their calling is not jure divino."—*State Trials.*

"When Jacob abruptly left the house of his father-in-law Laban, and was pursued and overtaken by him, a warm *altercation* took place."—GILPIN.

AFFRAY or FRAY (O. Fr. *effroyer, to frighten*, from a supposed Lat. *exfrĭgĭdāre*) is literally to cause to turn cold, or to cause to fear. In this case the quarrel is of a *public* nature, and has ceased to be a matter of mere words. Hence it has been defined by Blackstone, "The fighting of two or more persons in a public place, to the terror of others."

"The Provost of Edinburgh, his son, and several citizens of distinction were killed in the *fray*."—ROBERTSON.

A FEUD (A. S. *fœhð*) is properly

a combination of kindred to avenge injuries or insults, which in uncivilized times extended from the offenders on either side to their kith and kin, and tended to perpetuate itself for generations. Hence the term expresses a deep-rooted, long-standing animosity between two parties, and, by an extension of meaning, sometimes between two individuals.

A BROIL (connected with brawl?) is an angry contention of more than two persons, carrying with it the idea of chance disturbance and fortuitous entanglement in quarrel.

"Yet ofttimes in his maddest mirthful mood,
Strange pangs would flash along Childe Harold's brow,
As if the memory of some deadly *feud*,
Or disappointed passion, lurked below."
BYRON.

"There is no preserving peace, nor preventing *broils* and stirs but by punctually observing that ordinary rule of equity that in cases of doubtful debate, and points of controverted practice, the fewest should yield to the most, the weakest yield to the strongest, and that to the greatest number should be allowed at least the greatest appearance of reason."—BARROW.

BRAWL (Wel. *brawl, a boast*) denotes a noisy and indecent quarreling, such as offends against peaceableness of manners. Where the law imposes strict order, or society demands mutual forbearance and a common respectfulness, a slight degree of unseemly loudness or coarseness of words and manner is sufficient to constitute a brawl.

"Let a man that is a man consider that he is a foole that *brawleth* openlie with his wife."—*Golden Boke.*

QUERY. QUESTION.

A QUESTION (Lat. *quæstiōnem*) is simply such a form of inquiry as involves a verbal answer.

A QUERY is a question on a peculiar subject-matter, that is, where the answer involves a knowledge of the scientific or abstruse. A question may be grave or idle. A query is always grave. Truth generally is the object of a question; *curious* truth, of a query.

"St. Paul, answering that *querie* of the philosophick infidel, 'How are the dead raised up, or with what body do they come?' replieth in this manner."—CUDWORTH.

"But this *question* asked puts me in doubt."—MILTON.

QUICKNESS. CELERITY. EXPEDITION. RAPIDITY. SWIFTNESS. VELOCITY. FLEETNESS. SPEED. FASTNESS.

QUICKNESS (A. S. *cwic, living, active*) is the generic term of which all the rest may be regarded as specific applications.

CELERITY (Lat. *cĕlĕrĭtātem*), and SWIFTNESS (A. S. *swift*, from *swifan, to move quickly*) can only be said of objects passing from one spot to another; while the more generic term QUICKNESS may be used of things moving upon the same spot. Quickness has relation to time by itself, as well as to space; as, quickness of sight or hearing. A dog may run swiftly and hear quickly, but not swiftly. Celerity is commonly used of such movements as results from will, and so belongs to persons and impersonations; while RAPIDITY (Lat. *răpĭdĭtātem*) and swiftness are employed both of conscious and mechanical movement. Rapidity is associated with *excited* movement, and more or less of impetuosity. The torrent, the whirlwind, the changes produced by the elements, or by political revolutions, are rapid. The quick answer to a call, a ready pursuit of an object in a creature of intelligence, is celerity. So we do not speak of the celerity of a cannon-ball, or even of a bird in its flight, but the velocity of the one, and the rapidity of the other.

VELOCITY (Lat. *vĕlŏcĭtātem*) is employed where mechanical rapidity, and nothing else, is intended or contemplated, and is a scientific term for rate of movement, however slow. Hence velocity is the term used where any *comparison* of speed is spoken of.

EXPEDITION (Lat. *expĕdĭtionem, an expedition*) is exclusively confined to the complex actions of intelligent agents; and FLEETNESS (A. S. *fleôtan, to float*), to the quickness of animal movements from place to place. It employed of inanimate things, it is by a rhetorical analogy to animate motion.

In RAPID is sometimes implied the idea of quick succession, that is, quickness which has the effect of diminishing intervals. So the swift revolutions of a wheel, would mean the mere velocity of the wheel's rotatory movement; the rapid revolutions, would mean the short periods in which the rotations were completed.

SPEED (A. S. *spédan, to speed, prosper*) is rapidity in relation to the distance to be traversed, or the transactions to be accomplished. When we are informed of the distance which the horseman has traversed, and the comparatively small time he has spent on the journey, we infer the great speed at which he must have ridden.

FAST (A. S. *fæst*) meaning quick in motion is the same word as fast, meaning *firm*. Hence the idea of fastness is that of close pressure, urgent and continuous movement; to follow fast upon another is to come after him without leaving an interval. Rapidity in succession and then rapidity in motion generally. It rains fast, that is, the drops follow one upon the other without interval.

"He saw a young Indian, whom he judged to be about nineteen or twenty years old, come down from a tree, and he also ran away with such *speed* as made it hopeless to follow him."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"All my predictions are now verifying too *fast*."—CHESTERFIELD.

"Hamlet, this deed of thine for thine especial safety,
Which we do tender as we dearly grieve;
For that which thou hast done must send thee hence
With fiery *quickness*." SHAKESPEARE.

"Time, with all its *celerity*, moves slowly to him whose whole employment is to watch its flight."—*Idler*.

"With winged *expedition*, *swift* as lightning." MILTON.

"We mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a *rapid* whirlwind."—CUDWORTH.

"Herald, be *swift*, and bid Machaon bring
His speedy succour to the Spartan king."
POPE, *Homer*.

"It appears, from experiments of falling bodies, and from experiments of pendulums, which, being of equal lengths and unequal gravities, vibrate in equa times, that all bodies whatsoever in spaces void of sensible resistance, fall from the same height with equal *velocities*"—CLARKE.

QUOTE. CITE.

To CITE (Lat. *cĭtāre, to summon*) is literally to call as a witness, and, in its literary sense, to call in the words of another in aid of one's own. In this way it becomes a synonym with QUOTE (Old Fr. *quoter*, from the Lat. *quŏtus, how many, or which in order*). To cite an author, and to quote an author, have practically nearly the same meaning; but we use the term CITE when the mind dwells primarily upon the matter imported; QUOTE when we think of the precise words. To cite Shakespeare as an authority, does not imply so exact a reproduction of his words as the term QUOTE, for we may cite roughly, but we are bound to quote exactly. A lawyer cites a case as a precedent; he may even go on to quote the words in which judgment was given upon it.

"I propose this passage entire, to take off the disguise which its *quoter* put upon it."—ATTERBURY.

"This little song is not unlike a sonnet ascribed to Shakespeare, which deserves to be *cited* here, as a proof that the Eastern imagery is not so different from the European as we are apt to imagine."—JONES, *On Eastern Poetry*.

R.

RAGS. TATTERS. SHREDS.

These terms agree in expressing torn pieces of almost any textile fabric, but differ in their association. RAGS (etym. unknown) are associated with poverty, beggary, and consequently contempt. A ragged child belongs to poor and negligent parents. The Puritans called the surplice a rag of popery.

TATTERS (O. Nor. *töturr, a rag, tatter*; WEDGWOOD) are torn pieces, not separated like rags, but hanging about in connexion with the body and substance of the piece. The term is capable of an honourable association, as the banners of a regiment which has seen much service

may hang in tatters. Dirty rags, not dirty tatters, commonly.

SHREDS (A.S. *screadian, to cut, to tear*) points to the violence which has torn the substance into pieces. As substances are shivered into fragments, so they are torn into shreds.

RAMBLE. ROAM. ROVE. RANGE. STROLL. WANDER.

The idea of going in a free, irregular manner is common to these terms. To RAMBLE (frequentative of ROAM) is to go about from place to place, without any determinate object in view, but in sheer relaxation of mind.

To ROAM (perhaps Ger. *raum, room, space;* WEDGWOOD) has not the freedom and carelessness of RAMBLE, and is often associated with restlessness, or an impulse to *uneasy* wandering. As ROAM implies something in the impelling to wander, so ROVE involves the idea of a future purpose, and is commonly associated with search or wandering in quest of an object.

RANGE (orig. *to send ranks of soldiers over the country;* Fr. *rang, rank*) differs from the preceding in being within certain limits; as, the ranger of a park. The hunter ranges the woods or the mountains, that is, wanders about some more or less definitely prescribed area, and with no listlessness or want of aim, but, on the contrary, with a purpose of observation or quest. It implies a right and a freedom. To WANDER (A. S. *wandrian*) and to STROLL (Da. *strelle, to stroll*) closely resemble each other; but a stroll is commonly on foot, while WANDER may be also on horseback or on water. STROLL excludes that idea of accident and ignorance of the course or road which sometimes attaches to the idea of wandering. Nor has it so direct a reference to a line of right or proposed movement which has been erroneously left or lost.

"We must not *ramble* in this field without discernment or choice, nor even with these must we *ramble* too long."—BOLINGBROKE, *On the Study of History.*

"Where'er I *roam*, whatever realms I see,
My heart, untravell'd, fondly turns to thee,
Still to my brother turns with ceaseless pain,
And drags at each remove a lengthening chain." GOLDSMITH.

"The wild *rovings* of men's fancies into odd similitudes, startling metaphors, humorous expressions, and sportive representations of things, are grown more acceptable in almost all conversations, than the most solid reason and discourse."—SCOTT, *Christian Life.*

"A milk-white hind, immortal and unchanged,
Fed on the lawns, and in the forest ranged
Without unspotted, innocent within.
She feared no danger, for she knew no sin.
DRYDEN.

"These mothers *stroll* to beg sustenance for their helpless infants."—SWIFT.

"They *wandered* about in sheepskins and goatskins."—*English Bible.*

RANGE. ARRANGE.

ARRANGE and RANGE represent respectively the compounded and uncompounded form of the French *ranger*, from *rang, a rank or range.* ARRANGE expresses the relationship which one establishes among several things which one ranges together. RANGE expresses only an individual idea. ARRANGE is complex. One arranges one's library by ranging one's books. To range is to put in place, arrange is to put in order. We arrange occasionally, we are ranging perpetually. To arrange is an operation which requires some action of mind. To range is little more than physical. The former implies taste and knowledge, the latter is to follow a generic rule. ARRANGE implies a freedom of will and choice. RANGE the obligation of a predetermined order.

RANSOM. REDEEM.

These words are etymologically identical, RANSOM being the old Fr. *raensom*, and Fr. *rançon*, Lat. *redemptionem, a buying off, a release.* In its application, REDEEM is general; RANSOM, particular. We redeem things and persons. We ransom persons only. Moreover, the means of redeeming are manifold. We may redeem not only by money, but by care, by the expenditure of labour, and the like. We ransom only by money Character, life, honour may be re-

deemed. Only persons, or their life or liberty, are the objects of ransom.

"Talk not of life or *ransom*, he replies;
Patroclus dead, whoe'er meets me dies."
POPE, *Homer*.

"For no way else, they said, but this could be,
Their wrong-detained honour to *redeem*,
Which true-bred blood should more than life esteem."
DANIEL.

RAPACIOUS. RAVENOUS. VORACIOUS.

RAPACIOUS (Lat. *răpācem*, from *răpĕre, to seize*) means given to seize from a desire of possessing. This is applicable to matters of greed in food, but obviously extends far beyond them.

RAVENOUS (*raven, to plunder, to devour*, O. Fr. *ravine, violence*, Lat. *răpīner, pillage*) and VORACIOUS (Lat. *vŏrācem, vorāre, to devour*) apply only to matters of food, except by rhetorical analogy. Of these two, RAVENOUS denotes rather the state; VORACIOUS, the nature of the animal. A voracious beast is one that satisfies its appetite by large quantities of food; a ravenous animal or appetite may have been simply made so by long privation. There are some animals which cannot be called voracious, for they pass considerable intervals without taking any food; yet at the times of eating they have become ravenous.

"There are two sorts of avarice; the one is but of a bastard kind, and that is the *rapacious* appetite of gain, not for its own sake, but for the pleasure of refunding immediately through all the channels of pride and luxury."—COWLEY.

"The curiosity of the one, like the hunger of the other, devours *ravenously*, and without distinction, whatever comes in its way, but neither of them digests."—BOLINGBROKE, *Study of History*.

"But it ought to be observed that it is this slowness which alone suspends the *voracity* of this animal (the sloth)."—PALEY.

RARE. SCARCE.

We call a thing RARE (Lat. *rārus, thin, scanty*) when only a few of the kind exist, or can be procured. We speak of a thing as SCARCE, which exists, or is to be had at the present time, in diminished quantities. Diamonds are rare when they are compared with pebbles. They are scarce when there happen to be comparatively few in the market. Thus RARE bears reference to the intrinsic character of things; SCARCE, to their relation to circumstances and requirements. SCARCE implies a previous plenty, which is not the case with RARE. RARE qualifies what is an object of novelty, curiosity, or intrinsic value; SCARCE, what is a matter of necessity or common demand. Things *are* rare by nature; they *become* scarce by circumstances.

"A perfect union of wit and judgment is one of the *rarest* things in the world."—BURKE.

"For the *rarity* of transparent gems, their lustre, and the great value which their *scarceness* and men's folly sets upon them, emboldens some to say, and inclines others to believe, that such *rare* and noble productions of Nature must be endowed with proportionable and consequently with extraordinary qualities."—BOYLE.

RATIONAL. REASONABLE.

These are respectively forms coming to us directly from the Latin (*rātiōnem, reason*) and the French form of the same word, *raison*. RATIONAL has relation to reason as a faculty of the mind, and is opposed to irrational; as, a rational being, a rational state of mind. REASONABLE has reference not so much to the speculative as to the practical reason, denoting governed by, or in accordance with, *right* reason; as, "Reasonable views involve prospects of success."

"Can there, then, be enthusiasts who profess to follow reason? Yes, undoubtedly, if by reason they mean only conceits. Therefore such persons are now commonly called reasonists, or rationalists, to distinguish them from true reasoners, or *rational* inquirers."—WATERLAND.

"The adjective *reasonable*, as employed in our language, is not liable to the same ambiguity as the substantive from which it is derived. It denotes a character in which reason, taking it in its larger acceptation, possesses a decided ascendant over the temper and passions, and implies no particular propensity to a display of the discursive power—indeed, it does not exclude the idea of such a propensity."—STEWART.

RAVAGE. DEVASTATION. DESOLATION. HAVOC.

RAVAGE (Fr. *ravage, ravir, to carry off violently*) is the violence that mars and spoils; DEVASTATION (*dēvastāre*,

to lay waste), the violence that destroys and lays waste; DESOLATION (Lat. *dēsōlātionem*), the violence which makes empty and uninhabited. Ravage is sudden, violent, seizing and dragging away, as the imperious conqueror ravages the territories he has subdued, or the overflowing torrent ravages the fields which it should fertilize, or the flame and the tempest commit ravages. Other forces, such as war, pestilence, and famine, desolate a country. Tyranny and foreign invasions desolate kingdoms. That which ravages cannot be resisted. It is rapid and terrible. That which desolates cannot be arrested: it is cruel and relentless. That which devastates spares nothing: it is fierce and unwearying in its work. Ravage spreads alarm and terror; desolation, mourning and despair; devastation, fear and horror.

HAVOC (A. S. *hafoc, a hawk*, whence probably the Welsh *hafog, destruction*, the word being used as a cry of encouragement to hawks, "Cry *havoc*, and let slip the dogs of war"), denotes *indiscriminate* destruction, whether with specific violence of purpose or not. Recklessness or accident, as well as design, may produce havoc.

"Louis XIV. *ravaged* defenceless countries with armies sufficient to conquer them if they had been prepared to resist."—BOLINGBROKE.

"So dismal and amazing a *devastation*."—TILLOTSON.

"Every kingdom divided against itself shall be brought to *desolation*."—*English Bible*.

"If their first charge could be supported, they (the elephants) were easily driven back upon their confederates. They then broke through the troops behind them, and made no less *havock* in the precipitation of their retreat than in the fury of their onset."—*Rambler*.

REACH. EXTEND. STRETCH.

REACH (A. S. *rǽcan*) is a more significant term, though a simpler one, than EXTEND (Lat. *extendĕre, to stretch out*), inasmuch as it involves not the mere abstract idea of extension, but such extension as attains to a given point; as, a tall man reaches to the top of the door. No such limitation is conveyed by EXTEND or STRETCH. The idea of attainment in addition to extension, which belongs to REACH, is more plainly seen in the transitive application of REACH, as the sound reaches the ear.

The latter, STRETCH (A. S. *streccan*), conveys the idea of effort, or is employed where continuity as the result of effort may be imagined; as, when we speak of a promontory stretching far out to sea, the analogy suggested is that of an outstretched arm. EXTEND is the most abstract of the three, and is applicable both to lines and spaces. In their secondary application, EXTEND is effortless, as observation, power, influence may be extended, that is, simply carried out farther; they may be stretched unduly; they may reach or not to the desired point or amount. Extension is employed scientifically, as a property of matter or space.

"Being at liberty to indulge himself in all the immunities of invisibility, out of the *reach* of danger, he (Junius) has been bold; out of the *reach* of shame, he has been confident."—JOHNSON.

"If any one ask me what this space I speak of is, I will tell him when he tells me what his *extension* is. For to say, as is usually done, that *extension* is to have partes extra partes, is to say only that *extension* is *extension*."—LOCKE.

"His slanting ray
Slides ineffectual down the snowy vale,
And tinging all with his own rosy hue,
From every herb and every spiry blade,
Stretches a length of shadow o'er the field."
COWPER.

REALM. STATE. COMMONWEALTH.

The STATE (Lat. *status, a standing*) is the body politic of a country, sometimes restricted to the legislative body, sometimes extended to the entire body of the people as governed by the laws of their representatives. It denotes government in the most abstract sense.

REALM (Fr. *royaume; roi*, Lat. *rēgem, a king*) denotes such a nation as is monarchical and aristocratic in its constitution. Hence such emphatic expressions as, "a peer of the realm," "the parliament of the realm." We may also, with less regard to its aristocratic constitution, speak of "the

parliament of the country; ' but we do not commonly speak of "a peer of the country."

COMMONWEALTH (*common* and *wealth, weal,* or *well-being*) is a term not bearing so distinctively upon the form of government, but belongs to a free country, as being so administered as to aim at the public good.

"His *realm* is declared to be an empire, and his crown imperial, by many Acts of Parliament, particularly the statutes 24 Henry VIII., ch. 12, and 25 Henry VIII., ch. 28, which at the same time declare the king to be the supreme head of the *realm* in matters both civil and ecclesiastical."—BLACKSTONE.

"The Puritans in the reign of Mary, driven from their homes, sought an asylum in Geneva, where they found a *state* without a king, and a Church without a bishop."—CHOATE.

The term COMMONWEALTH has received a strong anti-monarchical tinge from the fact that this name was given to the government of England which intervened after the death of Charles I., and ended with the resignation of Richard Cromwell.

"The *Commonwealth* yet panting underneath
The stripes and wounds of a late civil war,
Gasping for life, and scarce restored to hope."
BEN JONSON.

REASON. CAUSE.

REASON (Fr. *raison,* Lat. *rătionem*) relates originally to logical sequence. A reason is the CAUSE, not of the existence of a thing, but of our knowing it. It is the mode in which we take account of its being, so answering to the question, How? as, "How do you know that your friend has gone this road?" "Because I recognize his footmarks." In common conversation it is often used loosely instead of CAUSE, either the physical cause, namely, that which produces an effect; or the final cause, namely, the purpose for which a thing is done. Reasons are logical; causes are natural. The cause of a vessel's sailing is the wind acting upon the sails. The reason of its sailing is the order given to its captain. The result of a reason is a conclusion; the result of a cause is an effect. The cause gives the physical, the reason, the metaphysical, account. Generally speaking, the cause is sufficient or insufficient; the reason is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

"Be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a *reason* of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear."—*English Bible.*

"In the notice that our senses take of the common vicissitudes of things, we can not but observe that several particulars, both qualities and substances, begin to exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of *cause* and effect."—LOCKE.

REBOUND. REVERBERATE. RECOIL.

REBOUND (Fr. *rebondir*) is simply to spring or start back on collision by the elastic force of the body struck or rebounding.

REVERBERATE (Lat. *rĕverbĕrāre, to beat back*) is now restricted to the rebounding of sound, and sometimes, but rarely, spoken of the reflexion of rays of light.

RECOIL (Fr. *reculer, to move back, to draw back*) is employed in those cases in which the rebound strikes or closely affects the person causing the movement or projection, as when a gun recoils, or a plot for the injury of another recoils upon the plotter.

"A dreadful sound
Which through the wood loud bellowing did *rebound.*" SPENSER.

"And every soun
Tis but of aire *reverberatioun.*"
CHAUCER.

"First Fear at hand, its skill to try,
Amid the chords bewildered laid,
And back *recoiled,* he knew not why,
E'en at the sound himself had made."
COLLINS.

RECEDE. RETREAT. RETIRE. WITHDRAW. SECEDE. ABSCOND.

To RECEDE (Lat. *rĕcēdere*) is to *go* back.

To RETREAT (Fr. *rétracter,* Lat. *retractāre*) is to *draw* back. Hence RECEDE is the more purely mechanical. A body passing away from us recedes into the distance. RETREAT, except when it is employed in poetic analogy, involves a purpose in receding.

such as the object of leaving one locality or position to go to another.

RETIRE (Fr. *retirer, to withdraw*) is closely similar to RETREAT, but more strongly denotes the purpose of absenting one's self from view. A party of soldiers, unable to hold one post in fighting, may retreat to another. A combatant, convinced that he has no chance of success, may retire altogether from the contest.

WITHDRAW is in English exactly what RETIRE is in French; but, as is common in such cases, withdraw is the more familiar and less dignified term. An army retires from the occupation of a country. An individual withdraws on finding the company uncongenial to him.

SECEDE (Lat. *sēcēdĕre, to withdraw*) denotes a public and formal act of separation from a body with which one was associated, more especially religious and political bodies.

ABSCOND (Lat. *abscondĕre, to hide away*) has in English taken an intransitive sense instead of the transitive sense of the Latin. It is to go into continuous retirement, to withdraw from the sight and intercourse of men, commonly with an implied furtiveness of purpose, as the debtor or the offender against the laws absconds to avoid detection. Ray speaks of swallows absconding in the winter. Bentley used the verb actively.

"Nothing discoverable in the lunar surface is ever covered and *absconded* from us by the interposition of any clouds or mists but such as rise from our own globe."—BENTLEY, *Sermons*.

RECEIPT. RECEPTION.

These terms—both derived from the Latin *rĕcĭpĕre*, part. *receptus, to receive*—differ in the applications to which usage has restricted them.

RECEIPT applies to inanimate objects, as being simply taken into possession; RECEPTION, to persons, and to such objects as are connected with will and sentiment on the part of the givers. A receipt of goods is acknowledged. The reception of favours merits gratitude. "His friend met with a warm reception." I acknowledge the receipt, not the reception, of a letter.

"At the *receipt* of your letter."—SHAKESPEARE.

"His *reception* is here recorded on a medal, on which one of the ensigns presents him his hand."—ADDISON.

RECLAIM. REFORM.

To RECLAIM (Fr. *réclamer, to claim back*) always denotes an external influence, such as the exhortations and representations of friends.

REFORM (Fr. *réformer*) commonly implies motives springing from within. A man reforms himself, and reclaims his neighbour. RECLAIM is also more specific. REFORM is of the character generally. RECLAIM refers to some specific vice or error, to the latter of which REFORM does not apply so forcibly. RECLAIM has also a more extended sense. We may be reclaimed from misery or error. We are reformed only from vice. On the other hand, individuals are reclaimed; systems or institutions also are reformed.

"A qualified property may subsist in animals feræ naturæ per industriam hominis, by a man's *reclaiming* and making them tame by art, industry, and education."—BLACKSTONE.

"This shall certainly be our portion as well as his, unless we do prevent it by a speedy *reformation* of our lives."—SHARP.

RECLINE. REPOSE. REST.

To RECLINE (Lat. *rĕclināre, to lean backwards*) is to lean back for support.

REPOSE (Fr. *reposer*) is to place one's self in the easiest position for rest.

To REST (Fr. *rester, to remain*) is to cease from labour or exertion, and may be in a standing or any other posture.

"To their supper fruits they fell.
Nectarine fruits, which the compliant boughs
Yielded them side-long as they sat *recline*
On the soft downy bank, damask'd with flowers." MILTON.

The word RECLINE in the above is an adjective.

"So forth she rode, without *repose* or *rest*,
Searching all lands, and each remotest part,

Following the guidance of her blinded guest,
Till that to the sea-coast at length she her addrest." SPENSER.

RECOGNIZE. ACKNOWLEDGE.

To ACKNOWLEDGE is opposed to keeping back or concealing. It is to avow our knowledge, where that knowledge had been previously confined to ourselves, and where the avowal of it on our part furnishes others with peculiar and complete evidence. The extent to which acknowledgment furnishes knowledge to others, in the sense of information which they did not previously possess, is a matter of degree. To acknowledge one's obligations for the kindness of others, is little more than openly to express them. To acknowledge one's fault, may or may not imply that it was not known to others. To acknowledge a secret marriage, is to give others a completeness of information which otherwise they had not possessed. The difference between acknowledge and RECOGNIZE (Lat. *recognoscere, to know again*) turns on the previous state of our own minds. We acknowledge what we knew distinctly before, though we did not make that knowledge public. We recognize what we saw at first only *indistinctly*. That which we recognize we know, as it were, anew, and admit it on the ground of the evidence which it brings. A person is recognized as an ambassador when he produces his testimonials. We recognize a friend after a long absence when we have had time to put together the ocular evidence of his identity. We recognize truths, principles, claims, and the like when such grounds for them have been laid before us as we feel we cannot reject. Hence acknowledgment is for the sake of others; recognition is on our own account. In acknowledging we impart knowledge; in recognizing we receive it. Acknowledgment is active, recognition is passive.

"Hang, beg, starve, die in the streets!
For by my soul I'll ne'er *acknowledge* thee,
Nor, what is more, shall never do thee good." SHAKESPEARE.

"But the view in which the State regards the practice of morality is evidently seen in its *recognition* of that famous maxim by which penal laws in all communities are fashioned and directed, that the severity of the punishment must always rise in proportion to the propensity to the crime."—WARBURTON.

RECOUNT. RELATE.

These terms differ in the character of the subject-matter. The idea of giving an account of circumstances or occurrences is common to both; but we RELATE (Lat. *rĕferre*, part. *rĕlātus, to bring back*) generally; we RECOUNT (Fr. *raconter, to relate*) specifically. Anything which has occurred of a complex character, and in order of occurrence, may be related. We recount in closer detail what is personally connected with ourselves and matter of our own experience. We relate the story of another's adventures; we recount our own. The term RELATE is also broadly applicable to all modes of connected statements, as by writing or by word of mouth; RECOUNT is commonly restricted to word of mouth. We relate things that have occurred; we recount them *as* they occurred. We ought to recount fully, and to relate accurately. Nor are we usually said to recount matters of very recent occurrence. The old soldier recounts the battles in which he was engaged, he may relate what he saw an hour ago.

"To all His angels, who with true applause
Recount His praises." MILTON.

"Truth she *relates* in a sublimer strain
Than all the tales the boldest Greeks could feign." WALLER.

RECOVER. RETRIEVE. REGAIN.

RECOVER is the O. Fr. *recouvrer*, from the Lat. *rĕcŭpĕrāre, to recover*.

RETRIEVE is from the French *retrouver, to find again*, It. *ritrovare*. We are said to recover what has been accidentally lost, or lost from want of reflexion; to retrieve that the loss of which is more distinctly chargeable upon us as a fault. A man loses his purse, and by assiduous inquiry and search succeeds, perhaps, in recovering it. He retrieves his good

name. A man may recover by good luck; but he retrieves through his own exertions.

REGAIN (Fr. *regagner, to regain*) denotes the recovery of what is of simple and obvious value. We recover what is of general, even indirect, advantage. We retrieve what it is a positive loss to have parted with. We regain possessions; we retrieve losses; we recover advantages.

"Though wicked men be under the influence of their corrupt prevailing inclinations, in the ordinary course of their lives, yet at some certain seasons, and especially in the absence of temptations, their enchanted reason and understanding may *recover* its due force and spring."—WATERLAND.

"There is much to be done, undoubtedly, and much to be *retrieved*."—BURKE.

"My soul attends thy voice; and banish'd Virtue
Strives to *regain* her empire of the mind."
JOHNSON.

RECTITUDE. JUSTICE.

RECTITUDE (Lat. *rectĭtūdĭnem, straightness, uprightness*) is conformity to the rule of right in principle and practice.

JUSTICE (Lat. *justĭtia*) refers more especially to the carrying out of law as regards the treatment of others. Rectitude is, therefore, in one's self; justice is on account of others. Justice is by moralists sometimes divided into—commutative, which assures to every man what is his own in fact or by promise; distributive, which deals out to several according to their deserts; and general, which through any channels, though not strictly commutative or distributive, carries out the ends of law, as in the government of his children by a parent.

"Nor is the lowest herd incapable of that sincerest of pleasures, the consciousness of acting right; for *rectitude* does not consist in extensiveness of knowledge, but in doing the best according to the lights afforded."—SEARCH.

"The king-becoming graces,
As *justice*, verity, temperance, and stableness,
I have no relish of them."
SHAKESPEARE.

REDRESS. RELIEF.

REDRESS (Fr. *redresser, to straighten*) is, literally, the bringing back to the right, and is said only in regard to matters of right and justice; while RELIEF (Fr. *relief, relever, to raise anew*) is said of the lightening of anything that may be regarded as of the nature of a burden, as pain, inconvenience, obligation, or necessity. Power and justice redress, charity and humanity relieve.

"Thus heavenward all things tend. For all were once
Perfect, and all must be at length restored.
So God has greatly purposed; Who would else
In His dishonour'd works Himself endure
Dishonour, and be wronged without *redress*."
COWPER.

"The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the *relievers* of their indigence."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

REEL. STAGGER. TOTTER.

Involuntary and unsteady motion in animate beings is common to these terms.

To REEL (connected with *roll*) is to move in such a way as to border on the loss of equilibrium.

To STAGGER may be applied to standing as well as walking, and denotes a difficulty of preserving the power of standing upright (Dut. *staggeren, to stagger*). As reeling is the effect of force or misdirected movement, as in intoxication, so staggering indicates either great pressure, as of a burden, or unsteadiness of brain, and consequent weakness.

TOTTER (Du. *touteren, to oscillate, swing*: WEDGWOOD) is the indication of weakness, especially in the support of the limbs, and is applied, as the others are not, to what is inanimate; as, a building tottering to its fall.

"They *reel* to and fro and *stagger* like a drunken man, and are at their wits' end."—*Eng. Psalms*.

"*Tottering* on the seat of elevation."—*Idler*.

RE-ESTABLISH. RESTORE. REPAIR. REPLACE. REHABILITATE.

RE-ESTABLISH (Fr. *rétablir*) signifies properly to put upon a former

footing, to restore to a former *state;* RESTORE (Lat. *restaurare*), to reinstate a thing in its integrity, its force, its consideration, and condition; REPAIR (Lat. *réparer, to mend*), to give back to a thing its form, its totality, its original aspect. We re-establish what has been overthrown, ruined, destroyed. One restores what has been degraded, disfigured, dilapidated. One repairs what has been spoilt, damaged, and deteriorated. Like the verb *establish*, however, we do not speak of re-establishing things purely material, but things which have the nature of force, order, law, continued existence, or operation. The others are capable of a purely material application. We re-establish that which had lost its influence and its action. We restore that which, being capable of variation, has lost much of its stability, force, vigour, activity, or excellence. We repair that which has been injuriously affected contrary to its own intrinsic perfection or the established order of things. We are also said to repair the evil or the loss itself.

REPLACE has a more decided meaning, that of putting a thing back to the place from which it had been removed. It may be observed that the term has also the meaning of furnishing a substitute for what has altogether disappeared, so that the identity of the original is lost.

REFERENCE. RELATION.

Both these words are formed from the Lat. *réferre*, part. *rĕlātus, to carry back*, but express different aspects of the same idea. The *relation* is the fixed connexion recognized as existing between two things in any way.

The REFERENCE is the act of referring, or the state of being referred, and springs out of the case and the occasion. Thus the reference is the specific institution of a mental connexion which ends when the mind ceases to regard the relation, while the relation is inherent and permanent. Unless Christianity stood related to the forms of social life, we could not speak of it in reference to slavery.

REFORM. REFORMATION.

REFORMATION (Lat. *rĕformare, to shape anew*) is usually employed of matters of grave moral or political importance in the interests of nations and the character of individuals.

REFORM is oftener applied to practical details. We speak of a reformation in morals and in religion; a reform in government and administration or management. So reform is commonly local or particular, reformation is general. An organization, a polity, or the character of an individual, may need reform in one or more particulars, without requiring such a radical alteration as would be implied in the term REFORMATION. Whately has well remarked,

"It is a recent custom to speak of *reforming* abuses; but this is an impropriety of language. Abuses may be remedied or extirpated, but they cannot be *reformed*. In the same way, we speak improperly of curing diseases. It is, correctly speaking, the patient who is cured."

Under another view, REFORMATION and REFORM also differ as active and passive. REFORMATION is often used in the sense of the act of reforming; REFORM, of the state of being reformed. A reformation may be going on; a reform may be effected.

"This was a proper time to enter upon the business of a *reformation*, which every man who gave himself a moment's time to think must be satisfied was absolutely necessary."—PITT, *Speech on Parliamentary Reform.*

"What vice has it subdued, whose heart reclaimed
By rigour? or whom laughed into *reform?*"
COWPER.

REFRACTORY. UNRULY. UNGOVERNABLE.

REFRACTORY (Lat. *refractārius, obstinate*) is the active and positive condition of UNRULINESS. The unruly child is simply hard to keep under rule. The refractory child perversely breaks rule. An unruly temper or disposition is under no sound principle of control; a refractory temper rebels against it.

UNGOVERNABLE (Lat. *gŭbernare, to steer, to govern*) denotes that extreme of refractoriness which successfully sets at defiance all attempts at control.

"That religion thus nursed up by politicians might be every way compliant with and obsequious to their designs, and no way *refractory* to the same."—CUDWORTH.

"Who alone canst order the *unruly* wills and affections of sinful men."—*Anglican Liturgy.*

"Haughty and *ungovernable* spirits."—HALE.

REFRESH. REVIVE. RENOVATE. RENEW.

REFRESH (Fr. *rafraîchir, to cool, refresh*) denotes the renewal of what is vital or vivid; as to refresh one who is faint, or a colour which has become faded.

REVIVE (Lat. *rĕvīvĕre, to live again*) is to renew that which is of the nature of vital force, or may be regarded as analogous to it

RENEW and RENOVATE, which are different forms of the same word, the former coming to us through the French *neuf*, and the latter through the Latin *nŏvus, new*, differ in being employed, the former more distinctively of moral, the latter, of physical, subjects; as, to renew a vow; to renovate furniture. All involve the idea of a restoration of things to their former state. REVIVE and REFRESH belong specially to animal bodies. One who had fainted revives when the functions of life return. One who is weary is refreshed when those functions are performed with more animation; REFRESH thus implying an inferior degree of antecedent exhaustion to that implied by REVIVE. Anything of which the force or action has lain dormant or in abeyance may be said to be revived, as a custom, a claim, a practice. In this application, REVIVE belongs rather to things external, RENEW, to things internal, to one's self. To renew a custom, would mean a custom of one's own; to revive a custom, would indicate that others besides one's self are interested. Dormant energies, and even weakened impressions are said to be revived. RENOVATE never implies any cessation or interval of time; whereas RENEW is often employed of the taking up of what has been suspended.

"In order to keep the mind in repair, it is necessary to replace and *refreshen* those impressions of Nature which are continually wearing away."—REYNOLDS.

"Gross corruptions of the Christian doctrine, which the caprice and vanity of this licentious age, have *revived* rather than produced."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"All Nature feels the *renovating* force
Of winter." THOMSON.

"The old custom upon many estates is to let for leases of lives *renewable* at pleasure"—SWIFT.

REFUSE. DECLINE. DENY. REJECT. REPEL. REBUFF. REPULSE.

REFUSE (Fr. *refuser*, Lat. *rĕfūtāre, to push back*) indicates the expression of an unwillingness to grant what others desire, request, or demand.

DECLINE (Lat. *dēclinare, to bend away from*) is a gentle yet determined refusal to act in a manner proposed, and most commonly from motives of consideration or prudence. We may decline what is advantageous to ourselves, as well as what is desired by others.

We DENY (Fr. *dénier*, Lat. *dēnĕgāre*) what is desired of us by others, except in the sense in which denial is opposed to affirmation.

We REJECT (Lat. *rējĭcĕre*, part. *rejectus, to cast back*) what is strongly opposed to our taste, judgment, or inclination.

We REPEL (Lat. *rĕpellĕre, to drive back*) what others press upon us.

REBUFF (It. *ribuffo, rebuff, reproof*) denotes such a refusal or repelling as by its decisive character inflicts a shock upon the other party—refusal that may be felt. To repel is to reject with violence, to rebuff is to refuse with contempt.

To REPULSE, another form of REPEL (Lat. *rĕpellĕre, rĕpulsus*) is effectually to repel, to force back upon another his own advances, overtures, approaches, efforts, attacks. Only the movements of intelligent agents are repulsed, while natural or mechanical forces may be repelled.

Entreaties, invitations, are refused, proposals are declined, requests and petitions are denied, propositions and counsels are rejected, advances are re-

pelled, importunities rebuffed, attacks repulsed.

"Complete to have discovered and *repulsed* Whatever wiles of foe or seeming friend."
MILTON.

"A flat *refusal* on his (their prince's) part reduces them to the melancholy alternative of continuing to submit to one grievance and to stand exposed to the other danger, or of freeing themselves from both without his consent."—BOLINGBROKE.

"He (Evelyn's father) was a studious *decliner* of honours and titles."—EVELYN.

"Begin, then, sisters of the sacred well,
That from beneath the seat of Jove do spring,
Begin, and somewhat loudly sweep the string,
Hence with *denial* vain and coy excuse."
MILTON.

"For always the weakest part of mankind are the most suspicious; the less they understand things the more designs they imagine are laid for them, and the best counsels are soonest *rejected* by them."—STILLINGFLEET.

"They *repelled* each other strongly, and yet attracted each other strongly."—MACAULAY.

"Marvelling that he who had never heard such speeches from any knight should be thus *rebuffed* by a woman; and that marvel made him hear out her speech."—SIDNEY, *Arcadia*.

REITERATE. REPEAT.

To REPEAT (Lat. *rĕpĕtere*) is no more than to do or say what one has already said or done; and this once again or oftener as the case may be.

To REITERATE (Lat. *rĕĭtĕratio*, subst. from obs. *rĕĭtĕrāre*) is to do this in a fixed and determined way, hence naturally, though not necessarily, to exhibit one's determination by *frequency* of the same words or act. He who repeats is often content with repeating the substance, he who reiterates is led by his obstinacy to repeat in exact form.

RELUCTANT. AVERSE. ADVERSE. UNWILLING.

RELUCTANT (Lat. *rĕluctāri, to struggle against*) is a term of the will, which, as it were, struggles against the deed, and relates always to questions of action.

AVERSE (Lat. *āversus, turned away from*) is a term of the nature or disposition, and relates to objects or to actions, as a matter of taste. It indicates a settled sentiment of dislike, as reluctance is specific in regard to acts.

ADVERSE (Lat. *adversus, opposed to*) denotes active opposition and hostility, as a matter of judgment. UNWILLING is the widest of all, and expresses no more than decided disinclination. It is, however, the weakest term of all, and refers to action only.

"Well, says I, since it must be so, here is my arm; but I go half *reluctantly*, for I like this place so well, I could be content to live here always."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature*.

AVERSE is only predicated of beings of intelligence and will. ADVERSE may be employed even of physical influences, as adverse winds. When predicated of persons, ADVERSE is much stronger than AVERSE. The man who is averse to a measure only dislikes it, and may still perhaps adopt it. He who is adverse to it, thinks it his bounden duty to do all he can to oppose and prevent it.

"Happy were it for us all if we bore prosperity as well and wisely as we endure an *adverse* fortune."—SOUTHEY.

"Nature is so far from producing it (virtue) that it yieldeth mighty obstacles and resistances to its birth, there being in the best dispositions much *averseness* from good, and great proneness to evil."—BARROW.

"Which deferring, as it must needs be the argument of an evil man, and an indication of *unwillingness* to live worthily, so it can serve really no prudent end to which it can fallaciously pretend."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

REMAINDER. REST. REMNANT. RESIDUE.

REMAINDER (*see* REMAIN) is not so general as REST (Fr. *rester, to stop or remain*), which is indeed the most general of all these terms, and denotes, universally, that which remains or is left after the separation of a part or parts, whether in fact or contemplation, and may be so as the result of circumstances or purposely. The remainder is the rest under certain conditions, most commonly the smaller part which remains after the greater part has been taken away. It is also

more applicable to mental and moral, REST to physical, matters.

REMNANT (Lat. *rĕmānēre, to stay behind*) has in itself much the same meaning as REMAINDER, of which it is only another form, but differs from it in the implied process which preceded the leaving, which, in the case of remnant, is that of use, consumption, or waste. It is commonly a *very* small part.

RESIDUE (Lat. *rĕsĭduŭs, rĕsĭdēre, to remain behind*) is that part which has not been disposed of; that is, either purposely omitted to be used, or untouched by a previous process of distribution or use. Neither REMNANT, REMAINDER, nor RESIDUE can be employed, like REST, to express the result of purpose.

"Scarce seven, the thin *remainder* of my fleet,
From storms preserved, within your harbour meet." DRYDEN, *Virgil.*

It is possible that the rest may be the larger part, while in the case of the others it is the smaller. Out of a company of twenty, for instance, it might happen that *one* should give expression to a particular opinion, and that *all the rest* should dissent from it; on the other hand, the remainder would imply a minority, and the remnant a *small* minority.

"Plato and the *rest* of the philosophers."—STILLINGFLEET.

"The *remnant* shall return, even the *remnant* of Jacob, unto the mighty God. For though thy people Israel be as the sand of the sea, yet a *remnant* of them shall return."—*English Bible.*

"He burneth part thereof in the fire, with part thereof he eateth flesh, he rousteth roast, and is satisfied. Yea, he warmeth himself, and saith, Aha! I am warm, I have seen the fire. And the *residue* thereof he maketh a god."—*Ibid.*

REMISSION. ABSOLUTION. PARDON. GRACE.

GRACE (Lat. *grātia*) may be regarded as the generic term under which the rest are included.

PARDON (Fr. *pardon*), in the technical sense of jurisprudence, is the grace accorded by the Prince to one who, though implicated in an affair, is yet not the author of it, nor an accomplice. It is then the grace of not punishing the innocent.

REMISSION (Lat. *rĕmissiōnem*) is the grace which is accorded to one who has committed an involuntary murder, or has killed another while defending his own life. It is a grace extended to the unfortunate, or to the hapless exerciser of his own right. There was also another act called the *abolition*, which was nothing less than the arbitrary pardon of one in absolute power extended to a crime irremissible in itself: a robbery of justice.

ABSOLUTION (Lat. *absŏlūtionem*) is a judgment by which an accused person is declared innocent, or reinstated as such.

In common language, the proper idea of REMISSION is that of forbearing from the exercise of the right to inflict a penalty. One remits a penalty or a debt either wholly or in part. That of absolution is the loosing or freeing the accused from the bonds by which he was tied. The exact force of absolution is expressed in a prayer of the English Liturgy, which contains these words: "though we be tied and bound *with the chain* of our sins, yet let the pitifulness of Thy great mercy *loose* us." That of pardon is to grant the entire remission of a fault which one has a right to punish as a superior, or an offence which one is in a position to resent, so that it shall be forgotten, and be as if it had not been committed. It is literally to *give* with perfect freedom, and without any reserve. That of grace is the accordance of a pardon entirely gratuitous, so as to receive the offender to grace or favour. Remission is an act of moderation, abolition of a tyrant's favour, absolution of a just or propitious judge; pardon is an act of clemency or generosity, and grace of affection or goodness. Remission is opposed to exaction, abolition to justice, absolution to condemnation, pardon to punishment, grace to the rigour of justice. The sinner, by the remission of his sins, is freed from rendering account of them. The abolition of them deals with them as if he had never committed them. By absolution he is loosed in heaven

and earth. By pardon, he is no longer an object of punishment. By grace, he is restored to the favour of God.

REMOVE. MOVE.

We MOVE (Lat. *mŏvere*) when we alter in the slightest degree the position of an object, or even cause an internal motion of its parts; we REMOVE (Lat. *rĕmŏvere*) when we take it away bodily.

RENEGADE. APOSTATE. RECUSANT.

These terms both express one who has deserted his faith, his professed principles, or his party.

The APOSTATE (Gr. *ἀποστατής*, literally, *one who stands off or away*) is a religious RENEGADE (Low Lat. *renegatus*, from *rĕnĕgare, to deny*), and the renegade is a political apostate. An apostate denies his former faith; a renegade deserts his former policy.

RECUSANT (Lat. *recūsantem, refusing, rejecting*) is a historical term, and has been applied in English history to those—mostly Roman Catholics—who refuse to acknowledge the king's supremacy in things ecclesiastical.

RENOWNED. FAMOUS.

A person cannot be RENOWNED (Fr. *renommé*) but for great and illustrious deeds; while he may be FAMOUS (Lat. *fāmōsus, famous, infamous*) for this and also for some incident of importance which is associated with him, but does not of necessity betoken any greatness of character; as, "Empedocles is famous for having been swallowed by a volcano, and Tarquin for having been expelled from Rome." Those only are renowned who are principals in great actions. The history of the famous is commonly better known than that of the renowned. Joan of Arc is more renowned than known. No moral worth is implied in renown, though persons may be renowned for virtue. Renown is emphatically the preservation from oblivion. Things as well as persons may be renowned. Champagne is renowned for its wine. The idea of renown is conspicuous and celebrated success.

"He was a wight of high *renown*."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Henry the Fifth, too *famous* to live long."
Ibid.

REPAIR. REPARATION.

REPAIR (Fr. *réparer, to repair, mend*, Lat. *rĕpărāre, to prepare*) is the result of which REPARATION is the process. A bridge, for instance, is undergoing a process of reparation till it is placed in a condition of repair. Repair, too, is a physical process; reparation is a moral action. Repair is always physical or analogous in its use; reparation is purely moral. We speak of repairing a house, a road, a bridge, or, analogously, of repairing shattered fortunes; but of making reparation for injury and wrong to the characters of others.

"Sunk down, and sought *repair*
Of sleep, which instantly fell on me."
MILTON.

"I am sensible of the scandal I have given by my loose writings, and made what *reparation* I am able."—DRYDEN.

REPARATION. RESTITUTION. RESTORATION.

All these terms denote the undoing of that which has been done to the injury of another; but REPARATION (*see above*) relates to moral injury; RESTITUTION, to the wrongful deprivation of property. A man who has stolen a sum of money from another will be compelled, if convicted, and his circumstances permit it, to make restitution (Lat. *restĭtuere, to restore*). If injury has been done to a man's reputation, the injurer may find it hard, even if he should be willing, to make adequate reparation.

RESTORATION (Lat. *restaurare, to restore*) differs in denoting the specific giving back of that which had been taken away. Restitution of stolen property may be made by paying its value in money. Restoration implies the giving back of the articles stolen.

"Mo discords and mo jealousies
Mo murmures and mo novelries
And also mo dissimulations
And eke fained *reparations*."
CHAUCER.

"On a conviction of larceny in particular the prosecutor shall have *restitution* of his

goods by virtue of the statute 21 Henry VI I. c. 11."—BLACKSTONE.

"If I have done any wrong to any man, I *restore* fourfold."—*English Bible.*

REPARTEE. RETORT.

REPARTEE (Fr. *repartie, a rejoinder*) is a far less grave word than RETORT (Lat. *rĕtorquĕre*, part. *retortus, to twist back again, to retort*) being restricted to meaning a sharp, ready, and witty reply; while RETORT is applied to matters more earnest, as arguments, accusations, and the like.

"A man renowned for *repartee*
Will seldom scruple to make free
With friendship's finest feeling."
COWPER.

"I did dislike the cut of a certain courtier's beard; he sent me word, if I said his beard was not cut well, he was in the mind it was. This is called the *retort* courteous."—SHAKESPEARE.

In REPARTEE there is more of wit; in RETORT there is more of logic. Repartee throws back a joke upon the joker; retort throws back the issues of an argument upon the arguer. It is plain that the same thing may often be called a repartee or a retort. Many a serious thing is said in jest. A repartee which veils argument under wit is a retort, and of a very effective kind.

REPEAT. REHEARSE. RECITE. RECAPITULATE.

Of these, REPEAT (Lat. *rĕpĕtĕre*) is the most comprehensive, and is applicable both to actions and words, the rest only to words. Again, we may repeat single words, or even inarticulate sounds. We apply the other terms only to many words consecutively. And again, we may repeat that which originally came from ourselves as well as that which came from others.

REHEARSE, lit. *to harrow over again* (Fr. *herse, a harrow*) conveys the idea of solemnity or exactness in utterance. We rehearse as before an audience and in detail that which it is of public interest to listen to. A rehearsal may be subsequent or preliminary.

We RECITE (Lat. *rĕcĭtāre, to read out publicly*) when our avowed purpose is to give the exact words of another. Rehearsal applies equally to deeds and words; recital, more directly to words, and to deeds only as already committed to some form of relation.

RECAPITULATE (Lat. *rĕcăpĭtŭlāre, to go over the headings, căpĭtŭla*, pl. *again*) is to go over again, as the principal things mentioned in a preceding discourse, in a concise and summary manner, for the purpose of refreshing the memory of the hearers, whether the original statement or exposition were our own or another's.

"Yet I can *repeat* whole books that I have read, and poems of some selected friends which I have liked to charge my memory with."—BEN JONSON.

"Let Dryden with new rules our stage refine,
And his great models form by this design;
But where's a second Virgil to *rehearse*
Our hero's glory in his epic verse?"
ROCHESTER.

"From this time forwards, I presume, the Athanasian Creed has been honoured with a public *recital* among the other sacred hymns and Church offices all over the west."—WATERLAND.

"Hence we may see the reason why creeds were no larger nor more explicit, being but a kind of *recapitulation* of what the catechumens had been taught more at large, the main heads whereof were committed to memory, and publicly *recited*, and so became a creed."—*Ibid.*

REPENTANCE. PENITENCE. COMPUNCTION. CONTRITION. REMORSE. REGRET.

REPENTANCE (Fr. *repentance, repentir, to repent*) is a practical state of mind, involving, with the sorrow for past acts, the resolution to avoid them for the future—deep REGRET and renunciation being combined. PENITENCE is the same thing, with a less general and more theological application. Repentance may have respect to our worldly interests; penitence, to the state of the soul. It is even possible to repent having done a good thing; as, for instance, kindness to another, which has been abused.

COMPUNCTION (Lat. *compunctus, pricked with remorse*) is a warning of the conscience against the act, which, however, is not strong enough to prevent it, and so often accompanies its commission. Compunction may pre-

cede or follow the act; the rest only follow it.

CONTRITION (Lat. *contĕrĕre*, part. *contritus*, *to bruise*) is a continuous state of grief and self-condemnation, which has not found relief in action, and is a mere painful condition of the conscience, either in regard to a specific act or to past conduct generally. Compunction may be for the present; but contrition is always for the past. Contrition may be either specific or general. Compunction is always specific.

REMORSE (Fr. *remords*, Lat. *rĕmordĕre*, *to bite again*) is the strongest form of compunction for the past; a gnawing anguish occasioned by reflection upon a past deed or course. Neither compunction nor remorse denote that genuine regret of wrongdoing for its own sake which is expressed by CONTRITION.

REGRET (Fr. *regret*, from *regretter*, formerly *regreter*, meaning *to pity*) does not carry with it either the energy of remorse or the sacredness of contrition, or the practical character of repentance.

"What this *repentance* was which the new covenant required as one of the conditions to be performed by all those who should receive the benefits of that covenant, is plain in the Scripture to be not only a sorrow for sins past, but (what is a natural consequence of such sorrow, if it be real) a turning from them into a new and contrary life."—LOCKE.

"Heaven may forgive a crime to *penitence*,
For Heaven can judge if *penitence* be true."
DRYDEN.

"*Repentance* extorted from us by the prospect of death can be only a sorrow for sin, perhaps rendered more passionate by our present fears. And this being only sorrow and *compunction*, and perhaps a good resolution, it is plain that still these are only the steps in the repentance of a sinner, and not complete repentance in all its parts."—HOADLY.

"If the sorrow arise merely from the fear of punishment, it is called, in the language of the schools, attrition, and is deemed the lowest and least honourable species of repentance; if from a desire to please God, and a tender sense of having offended so good a Father, it is styled *contrition*, and is of a more generous and noble kind."—BISHOP HORNE.

"When *remorse* is blended with the fear of punishment, and arises to despair, it constitutes the supreme wretchedness of the mind."—COGAN.

"Alike *regretted* in the dust he lies,
Who yields ignobly, or who bravely dies."
POPE, *Homer*.

We even apply the term REGRET to circumstances over which we have had no control; as, any untoward occurrence; the absence of friends or their loss. When connected with ourselves, it relates rather to unwise acts than to wrong or sinful ones; as, foolish or rash conduct, carelessness, the loss of opportunities, and the like, and may be entirely selfish. Contrition is the spontaneous grief which is felt by a heart touched by the sense of having offended against God in sin and evil. Repentance is the bitter yet wholesome reflexion of a scrupulous mind dwelling on some reprehensible act performed. Remorse is the vengeance of an outraged conscience.

REPERTORY. REPOSITORY.

The object of a REPOSITORY (Lat. *rĕpŏsĭtōrium*) is the safety and preservation of the articles laid up; the object of a REPERTORY (Lat. *rĕpertōrium*) is to have them so stored that they may be readily available.

REPETITION. TAUTOLOGY.

The latter stands to the former as species to genus. Not every REPETITION (Lat. *rĕpĕtĕre*, *to repeat*) is TAUTOLOGY (Gr. *ταυτολογία*; *τὸ αὐτό*, *the same thing*, and *λέγειν*, *to say*). Repetition may be often necessary, justifiable, and effective. Tautology is such repetition as is none of these, and is therefore vain and tiresome.

"Our long-tongued chatterers do, after a sort, wound and weary the ears of their hearers by their *tautologies* and *vain repetitions* of the same things."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch*.

REPREHENSION. REPROOF.

Blame is involved in both terms, but more mildly in the former than the latter. The former (Lat. *rĕprĕhendĕre*, *to blame*) denotes little more than an expression of blame; the latter is its *authoritative* expression. Many might express reprehension who would not think themselves entitled to administer reproof.

REPREHENSION may be indirect; REPROOF is personal and direct (Lat. *rĕprŏbāre, to reprove, condemn*). A master of a school may be reprehended by the parents of his scholars; while he visits the scholars themselves with reproofs.

"Foolish *reprehension*
Of faulty men." SPENSER.

"Those best can bear *reproof* that merit praise."—POPE.

REPRESENT. REMONSTRATE.

The literal sense of REPRESENT (Lat. *repræsentare*) is to make once more present, to bring again before the eyes; that of REMONSTRATE (Lat. *re-* and *monstrāre, to show*) is to exhibit anew, to advertise again in a forcible manner. In its present acceptation REPRESENT implies a modest and gentle putting forward of grounds of action or change of opinion, intention, or conduct; REMONSTRATE implies an exhibition, with more or less of force, of duties or obligations for the purpose of dissuading one or recalling him from a false step. You represent to me what I seem to forget. You remonstrate with me on what I ought to respect. Representation carries instruction, counsel, advice. Remonstrance adds to these elements of warning and of censure. Your representation tends to clear up my views, your remonstrance to correct my conduct. Remonstrance supposes an actual wrong, representation may possibly turn upon a matter of impolicy, or a course of conduct which is simply undesirable. One may use representation where the relative condition of another may deter us from the exercise of remonstrance. Indirect and apparently casual information is often the most efficacious mode of representation, while a grave silence may amount to a strong and perhaps the only available, remonstrance.

REPRESENTATIVE. DEPUTY. DELEGATE.

These all denote persons employed to act on behalf of others. The appointmen makes the DEPUTY (Fr. *député*); the being sent elsewhere to act makes the DELEGATE (Lat. *dēlēgāre, to send to a place*, part. *dēlēgātus*); the faithful transmission, or, literally, *presenting again*, of the will or sense of the constituent body makes the REPRESENTATIVE.

"In so large a state as ours, it is therefore very wisely contrived that the people should do that by their *representatives* which it is impracticable to perform in person—*representatives* chosen by a number of minute and separate districts, wherein all the voters are, or easily may be, distinguished."—BLACKSTONE.

"Our Saviour pleads our cause and manages our affairs there, and the Holy Spirit, as His *Deputy* and Vice-gerent, doth it here."—SHARP.

"The bishops being generally addicted to the former superstition, it was thought necessary to keep them under so arbitrary a power as that subjected them to; for they hereby held their bishoprics only during the king's pleasure, and were to exercise them as his *delegates* in his name, and by his authority."—BURNET.

REPRESS. RESTRAIN. SUPPRESS.

REPRESS (Lat. *rĕprĭmĕre*, part. *repressus*), literally, *to press back*, is applied to matters of feeling, as to emotions which tend to manifest themselves in outward expression.

RESTRAIN (Lat. *restringĕre*) bears reference, not so much to the manifestation of the impulse as the impulse itself. He restrains his feelings who does not allow them to rise beyond a certain pitch; he represses them who allows no expression of them by word or looks.

SUPPRESS (Lat. *supprĭmĕre*, part. *suppressus, to press down, to put a stop to*) is total, while REPRESS may be partial, and denotes a more complete overcoming, or a keeping down to such an extent that it shall not be able to show itself; as, to suppress a rebellion, in the first instance; or a correspondence, in the second. On the other hand, an unseemly expression or manifestation of opinion, as in the plaudits of a law court, is said to be repressed.

"And no doubt overgrow they would, and cover the whole face of the earth were they not *repressed* and withstood by good husbandrie."—HOLLAND'S *Pliny*.

"The *suppression* of idolatry in the Ro

man Empire, and the establishment of the Christian Church upon its ruins was an event the most wonderful in the Gentile world, to which nothing but the power of God was adequate."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"And with these sayings scarce *restrained* they the people that they had not done sacrifice unto them."—*English Bible.*

REPRIEVE. RESPITE.

These words are used in common in the sense of a temporary relief from any pressure, burden, or trouble.

The REPRIEVE (O. Fr. *repreuver*, Lat. *reprōbāre, to disallow*) is, however, something given or granted.

The RESPITE (O. Fr. *respit*, Lat. *respectus, a looking back, consideration*) comes to us in the course of circumstances. We commonly speak of a reprieve from punishment, a respite from toil.

"A *reprieve*, from *reprendre*, to take back, is the withdrawing of a sentence for an interval of time, whereby the execution is suspended."—BLACKSTONE.

The derivation, however, given by Blackstone, is erroneous.

"If we may venture to declare more particularly in what sense God might be said to have hardened their hearts, it was very probably by forbearing to strike terror into them, by giving them *respite*, and not pursuing them constantly and without remission."—WATERLAND.

REPRISAL. RETALIATION.

REPRISAL (Fr. *reprise, a retaking*) is, literally, the taking again in return for something taken. Both in this case and in RETALIATION (Lat. *rĕtāliāre, to retaliate; re-, again*, and *tālis, such as*) there is an implied suffering on the part of the party on whom the reprisal or retaliation is made. RETALIATION, however, is the more general term, while REPRISAL is often restricted to cases of war and hostility. Retaliation may be simply in the making another to suffer loss, whereas reprisal implies gain to the party making it. "An eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth," is retaliation, not reprisal. Retaliation is seldom now employed, as it used to be, equally in the sense of returning or requiting good and evil, but is confined to the latter. In reprisal the satisfaction consists of solid benefit; in retaliation, of the indulgence of revenge.

"In this case letters of marque and *reprisal* (words used as synonymous, and signifying, the latter, a taking in return, the former, the passing the frontiers in order to such taking) may be obtained in order to seize the bodies or goods of the subjects of the offending state until satisfaction be made wherever they happen to be found."—BLACKSTONE.

"Revenge in this case naturally dictates *retaliation*, and that we should impose the like duties and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into ours. Nations accordingly seldom fail to *retaliate* in this manner."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

REQUIRE. DEMAND.

REQUIRE (Lat. *rĕquīrere, to need, to want*) is less strong than DEMAND (Fr. *demander*, Lat. *dēmandare, to entrust;* and in later Latin *to demand. See* LITTRÉ, s. v. *demander, to ask or claim*). We demand on the ground of authority; we may require on the ground of expediency, necessity, or right. We demand what in some way redounds to our own gain, advantage, or use. We may require that another should act in a certain way, or do a certain thing for his own sake. We require when we lay down conditions of any kind. We demand when we employ our power, social, moral, or accidental, to exact such conditions, as founding the exaction upon some strong reason. We demand that which is owing and ought to be given; we require that which we wish and expect to have done. The creditor makes a demand on the debtor, the master requires a certain duty from his servant. It is unjust to demand of another what he ought not to give. It is unreasonable to require of him what is not in his power to do.

"That if the Gentiles, whom no law inspired,
By nature did what was by law *required*,
They who the written rule had never known
Were to themselves both rule and law alone." DRYDEN.

"The directors of some of those banks sometimes took advantage of this optional clause, and sometimes threatened those who *demanded* gold and silver in exchange for a considerable number of their notes,

that they would take advantage of it unless such *demanders* would content themselves with a part of what they *demanded*."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

RESERVE. RETAIN.

To RETAIN (Lat. *rĕtĭnēre*) is to keep back simply as an act of power. It is to continue to hold, to restrain from departure, escape, and the like, as against influences which might deprive us of things.

RESERVE (Lat. *rĕservāre*) is to keep back or retain contingently, as a portion of a larger quantity, or over against the fulfilment of some condition, or the accession of some circumstance. To reserve implies the exercise of judgment or discretion. To retain may be lawful or unlawful. When we reserve, we at least profess a reason for what we do; but we may retain by open violence. Retention implies nothing beyond itself; reservation implies a further purpose beyond the act. RESERVE is thus purely moral, while RETAIN is physical and mechanical. I reserve a remark for a favourable opportunity. A heated body retains heat. The memory retains events.

"When a landed estate therefore is sold with a *reservation* of a perpetual rent, if it is intended that this rent should always be of the same value, it is of importance to the family in whose favour it is *reserved*, that it should not consist in a particular sum of money."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"We will add to all this the *retainment* of the same name which the deceased had here, unless there be some special reason to change it, so that their persons will be as punctually distinguished and circumscribed as any of ours in this life."—MORE, *Immortality of the Soul*.

RESIGN. ABDICATE.

We can only ABDICATE (Lat. *abdĭcare, to reject, to abdicate*) a high dignity, power, or station. We can RESIGN (Lat. *rĕsignare, to cancel, to resign*) any situation, employment, or office, high or low, or any advantage. A king abdicates the throne. A domestic servant may resign his situation. According to etymology, RESIGNATION would be by writing, for *signare*, came to be used as = *scribĕre*; abdication, by word of mouth: but this distinction is not adhered to practically. Abdication is always purely voluntary. But persons are sometimes forced to resign. He who abdicates performs a final act, while a resignation has to be tendered to some superior authority for acceptance or refusal. The monarch may abdicate at will, but the minister has before now been refused permission to resign. A more important difference is that resignation recognizes that the office or other thing given up flowed from the source to which it is given back. RESIGN has a much wider metaphorical use than ABDICATE. So we may resign expectations or hopes of what we never as a fact possessed. The monarch does not resign; or, if he do, it denotes the understanding that he owed his elevation originally to the people, the aristocracy, or others, as the case may be.

"Deaneries and prebends may become void, like a bishopric, by death, by deprivation, or by *resignation*, to either the king or the bishop."—BLACKSTONE.

"The consequences drawn from these facts, namely, that they amounted to an *abdication* of the government, which *abdication* did not affect only the person of the king himself, but also of all his heirs, and rendered the throne absolutely and completely vacant, it belonged to our ancestors to determine."—BLACKSTONE.

RESOLUTION. DETERMINATION. DECISION.

A choice between action and inaction is RESOLUTION. A choice between one motive and another is DETERMINATION (Lat. *determĭnare, to limit, to settle*).

An irrevocable choice is a DECISION (*decīdĕre, to cut short, to determine*). Resolution is opposed to practical doubt; determination, to uncertainty or practical ignorance; decision, to hesitation or incompleteness of final purpose. After deliberation we resolve; after consideration we determine; after decision nothing remains but action. Decision commonly implies a choice among *several* courses of action. We determine what to do, and resolve to carry out our determination. Determination is a less energetic form of decision. Resolution is a promise made to one's self to under-

take a thing. It implies a finer moral choice. A stubborn man may be determined, a firm man is resolved, what to do. A decided character is quick in forming a judgment, and firm in adhering to it. He has a sharp understanding of distinct motives and lines of conduct. What he has decided he is likely to carry out resolutely. Both determination and decision are at an end when the action has been entered upon, but resolution may be carried on into the action itself. Decision is an act of the mind, and supposes examination. Resolution is an act of the will, and supposes deliberation. Our decisions should be just, that we may not repent of them. Our resolutions should be firm, that we may not break them. Women come generally to decisions which have no better foundation than imagination and feeling. Men pride themselves on their superior strength; yet how often do they make resolutions in trouble which they forget in prosperity. In matters of science we speak of the decision of a question, and the resolution of a doubt or difficulty.

"Be it with *resolution*, then, to fight."—SHAKESPEARE.

"The will is said to be *determined* when in consequence of some action or influence its choice is directed to and fixed upon a particular object."—EDWARDS, *On Freedom of the Will*.

"The guidance of instinct, indeed, as it is more *decisively determinate*, seems to bring up an offspring with less deviation from the purposes of Nature than the superior faculty of reason."—KNOX, *Essays*.

RESORT. REPAIR.

RESORT (Fr. *ressortir, sortir, to go out*) has both a moral and a material meaning, REPAIR (O. Fr. *repairer, to return home*) only a material. To repair is to betake one's self to a place. To resort is to have recourse either in the sense of repair, in which case it implies *habitual* repairing, or in that of applying one's self to some person, or medium of action, for the purpose of procuring an end. RESORT has often the force of betaking one's self to some special or extraordinary means when the present or ordinary are found insufficient as he who cannot gain his desire by entreaty may resort to violence or threats.

RESTRAIN (*see* REPRESS). CONTROL. CHECK. CURB.

We RESTRAIN (Lat. *restringĕre, to draw back, restrain*) only vital or moral, not mechanical force.

We CONTROL (O. Fr. *contreróle, a list by which we check another list*) any force which develops itself into continuous action or movement. Restraint may hinder action altogether; control implies its continuance under regulation.

CHECK (Fr. *échec, "check!" in playing chess*, lit. "*king!*" Pers. *shah*) denotes a slight force of restraint in movement or action, interposed with some degree of suddenness.

CURB (Fr. *courber*, Lat. *curvāre, to bend*) is employed only of moral forces, impulses, emotions, and the like, denoting a pressure of restraint put upon the feelings, the desires, or the will, by the control or self-control of the individual.

"Nor is the hand of the painter more *restrainable* than the pen of the poet."—BROWN, *Vulgar Errors*.

"If the seeds of piety and virtue be but carefully sown at first, very much may be done by this means, even in the most depraved natures, towards the altering and changing of them, however to the *checking* and *controlling* of our vicious inclinations."—TILLOTSON.

"Collier's attack upon the stage obliged the succeeding dramatic poets to *curb* that propension to indecency which had carried some of their predecessors so far beyond the bounds of good taste and good manners."—BEATTIE.

It may be observed that the objects of restraint, control, or check may be indifferent; while what requires to be curbed is generally a *vicious* inclination or action.

RESTRICT. RESTRAIN.

Although these are but different forms of the same verb (Lat. *restringĕre*, part. *restrictus, to restrain*), they have acquired a different application in usage. RESTRAIN is employed of the simple exercise of power, whether physical or moral. RESTRICT implies moral restraint by prohibition to cer-

tain defined limits. Hence RESTRAIN is general; RESTRICT, specific and relative. Restriction is relative restraint. The imprisoned man is under restraint. He who is abroad on parole is under restriction.

"*Restrain* in me the cursed thoughts that Nature
Gives way to in repose."
SHAKESPEARE.

"This is to have the same *restriction* as all other recreations."—*Government of the Tongue.*

RESULT. EFFECT. CONSEQUENCE.

Of these, EFFECT (Lat. *effectus, an effect*) may be regarded as the generic, of which the others are special forms.

RESULTS (Fr. *résulter, to result*, Lat. *rĕsultare*) and CONSEQUENCES (Lat. *consĕquentia, a consequence*) are different forms of EFFECT. The effect follows immediately from the cause, which may be physical, mental, or moral. They can therefore be generally calculated upon beforehand. Consequences are more remote, springing less directly from causes, following in the train of events, and involving collateral causes or influences. To foresee the consequences of a thing is a matter of comparison and sagacity; to foresee the effects, belongs to absolute knowledge; for, given the cause, the effect follows of course. The effect is, commonly speaking, the object of action, except where the action is complex and purposely indirect; as, for instance, in diplomacy, where the end directly aimed at may be something which will follow indirectly as a consequence. A consequence is, in short, commonly the effect of an effect. Results are still more remote than consequences, and more general, being the sum of all prior causes or operations specified or unspecified. The effect of ploughing is the loosening of the soil; the consequence is the condition of preparation to receive the seed; the result, by the action of sun, frost, rain, snow, wind, and other causes, is the general fertility of the land.

"Such suppose a Deity that, acting wisely but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world, from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably *result* whatsoever is now done in it."—CUDWORTH.

"Happy the man that sees a God employed
In all the good and ill that checker life,
Resolving all events, with their *effects*
And manifold *results*, into the will
And arbitration wise of the Supreme."
COWPER.

"There are, indeed, such *consequences* as are plainly necessary, and those which on their first sight carry in them no less certainty than the principles from which they were immediately derived. Of this nature, are they which are reciprocally deduced from their certain and intrinsical causes to their effects."—BISHOP HALL.

RETRIBUTION. REQUITAL.

Both these terms denote the giving back, or giving, something the character of which depends upon past conduct, and may be either in the way of reward or punishment.

But RETRIBUTION (Lat. *rĕtrĭbuere*, part. *retrĭbūtus, to give back*) bears a more distinct relation to the *justice* of what is so done; while REQUITAL (from *requite*, which is *re-* and *quit*, in the sense of pay, something given to *quiet* the sense of obligation in another; so *quit-rent, quittance*, may have no reference to justice or equity, but be simply the result of personal feeling. Ingratitude may even requite good with evil; but retribution bears reference to the demands and proportion of the case.

"But yet, in the state of Nature, one man comes by no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal, when he has got him into his hands, according to the passionate heats or boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to *retribute* to him, as far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression."—LOCKE.

"They find they had condemned themselves when they so readily passed so severe a sentence upon those husbandmen who had so ill *requited* the lord of the vineyard."—STILLINGFLEET.

RETURN. RESTORE.

We RETURN (Fr. *retourner, to return*) what was borrowed or lent. We RESTORE (*see above*) what was taken or given. It is in such cases a duty to return with punctuality and exactness; to restore wholly, and without diminution. We return that which

came to us under conditions and expectations, as civilities or loans. We restore that of which the alienation was not expressed, or was unconditional, as confidence, deposits, stolen goods, and it goes back in its original form; while we may return one thing by another, being of a different form but equivalent.

REVERIE. DREAM.

These are etymologically coincident. REVERIE being a dreaming, from the French *rêver, to dream;* but a reverie is a day, or wakeful, DREAM. In their remoter and metaphorical applications, REVERIE points rather to the inconsecutiveness, DREAM, to the unreality, of the subject of thought. Men, from absence of mind, wander off into reveries. Ardent and ambitious minds entertain dreams of happiness or greatness, which are, in the multitude of cases, not realized.

REVERSE. INVERT. SUBVERT.

These are compounds of the Latin verb *vertĕre, to turn;* but there are points of usage in which they differ, though in some cases they may be used interchangeably. We might say, for instance, "to reverse or to invert an order." Now to REVERSE is literally to turn so as to face another way. To INVERT is to turn over or upside down. But it will be easily understood that to reverse, in the sense of turning that side before which ought to be behind, may be as violent an alteration, when we come to speak metaphorically, as to place that below which ought to be above. To INVERT, in the above phrase, is a stronger form of expression than to REVERSE. We may reverse in some cases without contravening nature or propriety. Such contravention is commonly employed in invert. We may reverse a proposition by making it negative instead of affirmative; or a decree, by giving it a contrary effect. Such procedure may be right or wrong according to circumstances. SUBVERT is a stronger term, implying the violent overturning of what used to stand as it were firm and erect.

"Each court of appeal, in their respective stages, may, upon hearing the matter of law in which the error is assigned, *reverse* or affirm the judgment of the inferior courts."—BLACKSTONE.

"The sagacious Kepler first made the noble discovery that distinct but *inverted* pictures of visible objects are formed upon the retina by the rays of light coming from the object."—REID.

"Now, if the acts of voluntary agents follow necessarily upon the impulse of external causes, there will be a constant fatality upon them utterly *subversive* of liberty, estimation, and prudence."—SEARCH.

REVERT. RETURN.

To RETURN may be physical or mental, indicating the simple going back to a former point.

To REVERT, though no more than its Latin equivalent (*rĕvertĕre, to make to turn back*) is never used in any but a mental sense. RETURN may be used of unconscious, REVERT can only be used of conscious, agents. As employed of intellectual matters, RETURN denotes simply the going back to a certain point. To revert is to carry back one's attention with more specific effort. Things return to a point, and revert to a state, more especially to the same state as formerly. REVERT being Latin, is used in the higher or more thoughtful style; RETURN, in that which is the more simple.

"All things *reverted* to their primitive order and regularity, calm, quiet, and composed."—WATERLAND.

"When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places seeking rest, and findeth none. Then he saith, I will *return* unto my house from whence I came out; and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished."—*English Bible.*

RIDICULE. DERIDE.

As common laughter may be either sympathetic or hostile—that is, we may laugh *with* others, or laugh *at* them—so RIDICULE and DERISION (both forms of the Lat. *rīdēre, to laugh* are always hostile; but RIDICULE is the lighter term of the two. Ridicule indicates a merry, good-humoured hostility. Derision is ill-humoured and scornful. It is anger wearing the mask of ridicule, and adopting the sound of laughter. We ridicule

what offends our taste. We deride what seems to merit our scorn.

"Jane borrowed maxims from a doubting school,
And took for truth the test of *ridicule*.
Lucy saw no such virtue in a jest;
Truth was with her of *ridicule* the test."
CRABBE.

"British policy is brought into *derision* in those nations that awhile ago trembled at the power of our arms, whilst they looked up with confidence to the equity, firmness, and candour, which shone in all our negotiations."—BURKE.

RIGHT. JUSTICE.

RIGHT (Lat. *rectus*) is the object of JUSTICE (Lat. *justĭtia*). It is a person's due. Justice is the conformity of actions with right. It is that which gives and preserves to each what is his due. The first is dictated by nature or established by authority, either human or divine. It may change according to circumstances. The second is a rule always to be followed, and never varies.

RIGHTEOUS. GODLY.

These terms are of a spiritual character. The GODLY man is he who has a mind which habitually converses with God, as in prayer, meditation, the reading and study of the Scriptures, public worship, and a temper consonant with such things. The RIGHTEOUS man is he who practically recognizes righteousness; that is, that morality which is based upon revealed religion, doing that which is right, as being in conformity with the Divine will; especially between man and man.

"A *godly, righteous*, and sober life."—*English Liturgy*.

RIGID. RIGOROUS.

RIGID, the Lat. *rĭgĭdus, stiff, hard*, and RIGOROUS, from the Lat. *rĭgōrem, stiffness*, are both derivatives of *rĭgēre, to be stiff*, especially from cold, but RIGID is applicable to physical conditions; RIGOROUS, not. Rigid muscles. Rigorous justice. When RIGID is employed of moral subjects, it indicates a character or condition; RIGOROUS, a force. Rules are rigid when they are inflexible to relaxation. Rules or rulers are rigorous when they are hard and energetic in what they exact. Hence we speak of "the rigidity of a statute," "the rigour of a law" when applied, as, for instance, in enforcing penalty. The rigid man binds himself; the rigorous man binds others. So that RIGID is generally passive, rigorous, active, in its force. Rigidity of nature, character, principle, or disposition shows itself in rigorousness of action, operation, or treatment. Hence the words may often be used interchangeably; but to deal rigidly is to deal with inflexible adherence to principle. To deal rigorously is to deal in the energetic application of that principle.

"Be not too *rigidly* censorious.
A string may jar in the best master's hand,
And the most skilful archer miss his aim."
ROSCOMMON, *Horace*.

"Capitation taxes are levied at little expense, and where they are *rigorously* exacted afford a very sure revenue to the state."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

ROAD. ROUTE. COURSE. WAY.

ROAD (A. S. *rád, a riding, a road*) is, strictly, a public way for horses and carriages, and when used metaphorically conveys the ideas of public or common recognition and directness of end; as in such phrases as, "the sure road to honour," or, "to ruin."

ROUTE (Fr. *route*, Lat. *rupta (scilicet via), a broken way, a cross road*) is a circular or circuitous travel, which may consist of more than one road successively.

COURSE (Lat. *cursus, currĕre, to run*) differs from ROUTE as the defined from the indefinite. A traveller finds his way to a town by a circuitous route. The sun runs his course. A road is fixed or marked naturally. A route is unmarked or unfixed. A course is fixed by necessity or by appointment. Yet ROUTE involves the idea of a line ordinary and frequented, as "the overland route to India." Routes differ according to the different points or places by which one passes to the proposed destination.

WAY (A. S. *wæg*) expresses broadly the general manner of travel. To go by coach, by railway, and by ship are

different ways of travelling; but this is rather an analogical extension of the term. The term, especially in the plural, lends itself to moral meanings. Good or evil ways, that is modes of conduct. The way indicates primarily truth of proceeding. A certain road or path is spoken of as the way or not the way which leads to such a place.

"The gates of hell are open day and night,
Smooth the descent and easy is the *way*.
But to return and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labour lies."
DRYDEN'S *Virgil*.

"At our first sally into the intellectual world, we all march together along one straight and open *road*."—JOHNSON.

"Wide through the furzy field their *route*
they take." GAY.

"He rejoiceth as a giant to run his *course*."—*English Psalms*.

ROBBERY. DEPREDATION. THEFT.

These words denote the taking away of that which is the property of another, but differ somewhat in the character of the actions.

ROBBERY (O. Fr. *rober*, Low Lat. *raubare, to rob*) differs from THEFT (A. S. *theôf, a thief*) in being effected by open violence; while theft is committed by stealth or privately, and of articles of comparatively small value.

DEPREDATION (Lat. *deprædāre, to plunder*) is desultory robbery, with no direct violence, and in the absence of the lawful owners, the property being left unguarded. It is more commonly a collective than an individual act, and of a desultory character.

"Larceny from the person is either by privately stealing, or by open and violent assault, which is usually called *robbery*."—BLACKSTONE.

"Nevertheless, I shall in this case send my brother with a detachment of horse to harass Antony in his retreat, and to protect Italy from his *depredations*."—MELMOTH, *Cicero*.

"One of our men in the midst of these hardships was found guilty of *theft*, and condemned for the same to have three blows from every man in the ship with a two inch and a half rope on his bare neck."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

ROBUST. STRONG. STURDY.

ROBUST (Lat. *rōbustus, hard, strong*) implies some degree of size and muscular power, combined with soundness of constitution. A man of small size would not be called robust, nor one who, though possessed of muscular strength, was of a sickly constitution.

STRONG (A. S. *strœng*) is the simple and generic term applicable to both, and as ROBUST is not, to other substances and objects, as a strong rope. STRONG may denote power of mental or muscular action; passive power, as of resistance, endurance, or cohesion; may mean powerful in the sense of influential; or powerful mechanically; impetuous; logically cogent or convincing; or powerfully affecting the organs or senses.

STURDY is the O. Fr. *estourdi*, Mod. Fr. *étourdi*, passive participle of the verb *étourdir, to stun*, and so *stunned, dazed, giddy*. Its earlier meaning in English was, accordingly, foolishly obstinate. It is now only physically employed, and that of persons, and denotes the strength which belongs to compactness and solidity. Where it is employed of certain impersonal objects, this seems rather by way of poetic analogy; as a sturdy oak. It is also sometimes transferred from the actor to the work; as a sturdy opposition. The sturdy man is of no great size, but well-knit of limb, and, without being powerful, can keep his ground and hold his own.

"Survey the warlike horse! Didst thou invest
With thunder his *robust* distended chest?"
YOUNG.

"No man can enter into a *strong* man's house and spoil his goods except he will first bind the *strong* man, and then he will spoil his house."—*English Bible*.

"Even in this early dawning of the year,
Produce the plough and yoke the *sturdy*
steer,
And goad him till he groans beneath his
toil,
Till the bright share is buried in the soil."
DRYDEN.

RODOMONTADE. GASCONADE. RANT.

RODOMONTADE, from *Rodomonte, a boasting hero* in the "Orlando Furioso" of Ariosto, denoted first empty boasting, then empty, blus-

tering talk. GASCONADE, from the inhabitants of Gascony, who had the reputation for this propensity, expresses no more than conceited expressions of self-confidence; while RANT (cf. Ger. *ranzen, to make a noise*) has in it nothing of the element of vaunting, but, retaining that of blustering talk, has added to it that of great mental excitement. The ranter endeavours to substitute vehemence in declamation for dignity of thought.

ROOM. SPACE.

SPACE (Lat. *spătium*) is absolute.

ROOM (A. S. *rûm, room, space*) is relative. Room is space set apart for a purpose, or regarded in reference to such purpose. SPACE is used indefinitely to express that which surpasses our comprehension. It may be infinitely extended in idea, or bounded. ROOM is always bounded. SPACE is a term more commonly associated with the facts of Nature; ROOM, with the requirements of man. Room is space specifically sufficient.

"The ground of a certain rich man brought forth plentifully, and he thought within himself, saying, What shall I do, because I have no *room* where to bestow my fruits?"—*English Bible.*

"This *space*, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called distance; if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity. The term extension is usually applied to it, in what manner soever considered."—LOCKE.

ROTUNDITY. ROUNDNESS.

These words are from Lat. *rŏtundus, round* (from *rŏta, a wheel*), and its der. the Fr. *rond*. ROUNDNESS is the general term. ROTUNDITY is that specific roundness which belongs to the volume of solid bodies. So we might speak at discretion of the roundness or the rotundity of a turnip, but of the roundness, not the rotundity, of a mathematical circle; roundness is applied to a very *partial* convexity, as in the roundness, but not rotundity of a hill. We might speak of the roundness or the rotundity of the earth, of the roundness as regards its shape, of the rotundity as regards the capacity comprised in its roundness. Rotundity is now, however, a term more colloquial than scientific. A more scientific term would be spherical.

"Make it thy vernal care, when April calls
New shoots to birth, to trim the hedge aslant,
And mould it to the *roundness* of the mound,
Itself a shelving hill." MASON.

"And thou all-shaking thunder,
Strike flat the thick *rotundity* of the world."
SHAKESPEARE.

ROUGH. *See* COARSE, ABRUPT, *and* HARSH.

ROUND. TOUR. CIRCUIT.

A ROUND (*see* ROTUNDITY) is made in the way of personal business of an ordinary or familiar kind, as when visitors, watchmen, or tradesmen go their rounds.

A TOUR (Fr. *tour, a turn*) is made in the way of pleasure, as a tour through the Lake District. We speak, however, of a round of pleasure as well as of business, and in either case a definite course seems implied.

A CIRCUIT (Lat. *circŭitus*) is official and pre-defined, and seems to imply primarily a purpose of visitation and inspection. ROUNDS, in the plural, is physically applied; ROUND, in the singular, is used in the secondary sense, as a round of pleasure or gaiety.

RURAL. RUSTIC.

These words are both derived from one source—Lat. *rus, rūris, the country*, from which are formed the adjectives *rūrālis*, and *rustĭcus*.

RURAL, however, is employed of the country, or matters belonging to it, as distinguished from man, or from towns, and is so associated with the pleasant things of Nature.

RUSTIC is applied to the persons or conditions of men in reference to simplicity or rudeness of manners. Etymologically, it is opposed to such words as civil, urbane, denoting the refinement of cities. A rural abode means one pleasantly situated in the country; a rustic abode, one wanting in elegance. We, however, use the

term Rustic in reference to certain styles of construction, in which there is an affectation of rudeness combined with real elegance; as an elegant country retreat built in a rustic style of architecture; that is, with stone or wood which shall wear an appearance of undesigned irregularity.

"For I have loved the *rural* walk through lanes
Of grassy swarth, close cropp'd by nibbling sheep,
And skirted thick with intertexture firm
Of thorny boughs." COWPER.

"Lay bashfulness, that *rustic* virtue, by;
To manly confidence thy thoughts apply."
DRYDEN.

S.

SACRED. Holy. Divine.

Sacred (Lat. *sācrâm*) is less strong than Holy (A. S. *hâlig*), though many cases occur in which the words might be used indifferently, as the sacred vessels, or the holy vessels of the sanctuary. But Sacred denotes rather the character conferred upon objects or persons by setting them apart for certain purposes; Holy, an intrinsic character which they possess in themselves. So we speak of a holy man, not a sacred man. It is well if, in cases where the office is sacred, the man himself is holy. Holy is opposed to unholy; sacred, to profane. We speak of the Holy Scriptures, and the Sacred Scriptures; the former as embodying and reflecting the holy person, will, character, and attributes of an all-holy God; the latter as unlike or apart from other books, and deserving of peculiar treatment and reverence.

Divine (Lat. *divinus*) is a weaker and vaguer word, meaning like a Deity or the Deity, or in any way connected with Him; as, the Divine justice, Divine worship. Divine is opposed to human. The expression of the holy in garb or appearance generally is denoted by the term *sanctity* (Lat. *sanctĭtātem*).

"For how can we think of Him without dread and reverence, when we consider how He is by the infinite *sacredness* of His own Majesty from all immediate converse and intercourse with us?"—SCOTT, *Christian Life*.

"When Christ not only triumphed over hell and the grave, but was exalted to the right hand of God, He then not only bestowed these miraculous gifts of the *Holy* Ghost on the apostles, but settled a constant order of such in the Church, who were to attend to the necessities of it, till there will be no further need of instruction."—STILLINGFLEET.

"Therefore there was plainly wanting a *Divine* revelation to recover mankind out of their universally degenerated estate into a state suitable to the original excellence of their nature; which *Divine* revelation both the necessities of men and their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for."—CLARKE.

SAD. Gloomy. Mournful. Dejected. Melancholy. Moody.

Sad is the most generic of these terms. It is, according to Wedgwood, the Wel. *sad*, meaning *firm*, *discreet*, and means excessive sedateness. Its earlier uses were purely physical, in the sense of heavy, close, hard. As Spenser, "His hand more *sad* than lump of lead." Hence producing a heavy or sombre impression or effect; as, "sad-coloured clothes."—Walton. From this it passed to a moral sense, and was applied to temper, mood, or character, in the sense in which we now employ the term serious; as Bacon says, "A *sad* and religious woman;" hence affected with unhappiness, or, reflexively, producing depression; as, "a sad misfortune." Sadness is reflexive. It implies some cause or ground for the feeling. To be sad without knowing why, would be folly and unreason. We are sad when we reflect upon loss, privation, disappointment, and the like. When Sad appears as an epithet of things or events it does not necessarily denote a feeling of great sorrow in the speaker. A person suffering under a terrible affliction would not speak of it as a sad event though it might be so designated by another, nor would the person suffering under severe mental pain be called Sad.

"Man's feeble race what ills await:
Labour and Penury, the racks of Pain,
Disease and Sorrow's weeping train,
And Death, *sad* refuge from the storms of fate." GRAY.

Gloomy (A. S. *glóm, gloom*) has preserved its etymological force, and differs from Sad in its indefiniteness and indistinctness. Men are often gloomy without knowing why, as under a general foreboding of misfortune. Sadness is almost always the result of the past; gloominess more commonly bears upon the future, which is contemplated with misgiving.

"For the English are naturally fanciful, and very often disposed by that *gloominess* and melancholy of temper which is so frequent in our nation to many wild notions and visions to which others are not so liable."—*Spectator*.

Mournful (A. S. *murnan, to mourn*) applies more distinctively to the *expression* of the sad; as, the mournful sound of a bell; a mournful sight or sound; a gloomy prospect. Mournful is literally full of what causes mourning. It therefore denotes a quality, while Sad denotes a state. By the sight or recital of what is mournful the mind may be made sad.

"Yet if he steps forth with a Friday look and a Lenten face, with a blessed Jesu, a *mournful* ditty for the vices of the times, oh! then he is a saint upon earth, an Ambrose or an Augustine."—South.

Dejected (Lat. *dējĭcĕre*, part. *dējectus, to cast down*) is, literally, cast down, and, like Sad, betokens a specific cause, the subject of reflexion. It is a term denoting the external effect as well as state of sorrow, and brings before the eye of the mind the downcast look and hanging head. It is obviously applicable only to persons. Yet it is not a term of the greatest seriousness. Dejection is not overwhelming sorrow, but betokens sadness and disappointment rather than bitter grief. It is a transient rather than a permanent state.

"When our souls are *dejected*, distressed, tormented with the remembrance of our former sins, He saith to us, as He said to the man in the Gospel, 'Be of good cheer. My son, thy sins are all pardoned.'"—Beveridge.

It may be observed that dejected and Moody (A. S. *mód, mind, disposition*) differ from the rest of these synonyms in being only passive, while they may also be used actively; that is, as not only occupied by but producing a feeling of sadness, and the like.

Melancholy (Gr. μελαγχολιά, μέλας, *black*, and χολή, *bile*) denotes a continued if not chronic state of depression of spirits arising from any cause. Melancholy is commonly the concomitant of over-thoughtful dispositions, which suspect life of dissatisfaction, though they may not have had bitter experiences.

"And *Melancholy* marked him for her own." Gray.

Moody (A. S. *módig*) differs from melancholy, dejected, sad, and gloomy, in being more fitful and capricious. It is less passive, and expresses itself in discontent, ill-humour, peevishness, and a desire to commit harm, as if brooding in sullenness.

"And *moody* madness laughing wild
Amid severest woe." Gray.

SAFE. Secure.

The word Safe (Fr. *sauf*, Lat. *salvus*) is employed in an abstract way, in which Secure (Lat. *sēcūrus, without care*) is not. We may say, "It is safe, or safer, to travel by day," where we could not say, "It is secure." Safety differs from security, as the objective from the subjective, security being the sense or recognition of safety. If I say, "He is safe," I mean in a state removed from danger; if I say "He is secure," I mean in a state which he or I can recognize as removed from danger. Hence Secure has travelled on to mean entertaining a sense of safety, which may be even in opposition to the facts of the case. "While they slept secure the enemy attacked the camp;" where the security was not safety, but emphatically the contrary. But there are further differences to be noted between safety and security. Safety is absolute, security relative; or, in other words, those who are simply out of danger are safe; those who are removed beyond the reach of danger are secure. Safety regards the present in connexion with the past; security is also for the future. Safety is a more abstract term than Security. If effectual measures have been taken for the security of a thing, it is in a condition of safety.

Again, SECURITY sometimes implies such restriction upon the individual as prevents him from being *a cause* of alarm or danger. In looking at a caged lion, we think less of his safety than of our own security. The felon, captured and imprisoned, is secure, without being safe.

"*Secure* from Fortune's blows."
DRYDEN.

"And so it came to pass that they escaped all *safe* to land."—*English Bible.*

SAKE. ACCOUNT.

SAKE (A. S. *sacu, cause or suit in law*) is employed both of persons and things, as also is ACCOUNT (Fr. *accompte*, Lat. *ad* and *computāre, to reckon*). We say, grammatically, "for the sake" and "on account." But SAKE denotes an ulterior purpose which is contemplated; ACCOUNT, an anterior cause or motive which induces. Moreover, ACCOUNT is no more than a cause; SAKE, a cause in which one is *concerned*. If I say, "I am doing this for his sake," I mean that I am doing it because I have an end in view, which I believe it will be to his interest that I should accomplish. If I say, "I am doing it on his account," I mean broadly, that he is in some way the cause of my doing it. Hence it follows that where the object is serviceable, we use SAKE; as, "to make sacrifices for the sake of peace;" that is, to promote the ends of peace. On the other hand, "I took the high road rather than the fields, on account of the darkness," where the darkness is no more than the subject of consideration which influenced my choice.

"Knowledge is for the *sake* of man, and not man for the *sake* of knowledge."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

"In matters where his judgment led him to oppose men on a public *account*, he would do it vigorously and heartily."—ATTERBURY.

SALUTATION. SALUTE.

These words coming from the Lat. *sălūtem, health, safety*, refer more directly, the former to the person, the latter to the thing. A SALUTATION may be in words or any other way, implying personal expression of feeling. The SALUTE is never in words. There is more of familiarity in SALUTATION, and of respect or formal demonstration in SALUTE.

"But at the very time while he is bowing at the threshold of the rich man, the philosopher shall pass by, and because he possesses only a competency, without superfluity and without influence, he shall not be honoured with the common civility of a *salutation*."—KNOX, *Essays.*

"I sent a lieutenant ashore, to acquaint the governor of our arrival, and to make an excuse for our not *saluting*; for as I could *salute* only with three guns, except the swivels, which I was of opinion would not be heard, I thought it was better to let it alone."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

SANCTION. COUNTENANCE. SUPPORT. RATIFY.

We COUNTENANCE (Lat. *continentia, gesture, demeanour*) persons; we SANCTION things; we SUPPORT things and persons. Persons are countenanced by the apparent approval of others. Mere numbers may countenance. Proceedings are *sanctioned* (Lat. *sancire*, part. *sanctus, to sanction or ratify*) by the approval, especially of persons of weight or authority. Persons or measures are *supported* (Lat. *supportare, to carry, convey,*) by any means which may give assistance or encouragement, or promote the end in view. Superiors only can countenance and sanction; all of every degree may support, which implies, more than the rest, active co-operation.

"The strictest professors of reason have added the *sanction* of their testimony."—WATTS.

"But as to the civil religion, Socrates never opposed it, but always *countenanced* it both by discourse and example."—BENTLEY

"The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own happiness or safety compels us to seek from one another assistance and *support*." JOHNSON.

AS SANCTION, COUNTENANCE, and SUPPORT are equally applicable to things done and to things proposed, so RATIFY (Low Lat. *ratificare, to confirm*) belongs only to things done. To ratify is to approve so as to make valid what has been done by another, especially a delegate or representative. It wears an official and political air, involving the ideas of interest and

authority in the person or power that ratifies. Ratification is given to acts done without the knowledge or the full knowledge of others to whom the agents are responsible.

"It is impossible for the Divine Power to set a seal to a lie by *ratifying* an imposture with such a miracle."—SOUTH.

SAVE. SPARE.

We may be SAVED (Fr. *sauver*, Lat. *salvus, safe*) from any evils. We are SPARED (A. S. *spárian, to spare*) only from those which it is in the power of some one to inflict. To save may be the effect either of accident or design. To spare is always designed, denoting intentional forbearance. "He was to have been shot as a deserter, but the clemency of his commander spared his life." "He was struck by a bullet, but the watch in his pocket saved his life." The difference may be seen at once in the two phrases, "he saved my life," and "he spared my life."

"Then he called for a light, and sprang in, and came trembling, and fell down before Paul and Silas, and brought them out and said, Sirs, what must I do to be *saved?*"—*English Bible.*

"God *spared* not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment; and *spared* not the old world."—*Ibid.*

SCANDAL. REPROACH.

The same thing may be matter of both SCANDAL (Gr. *σκάνδαλον, a stumbling-block*) and REPROACH (Fr. *reprocher*, Lat. *rĕprŏpiāre*, the bringing *near* or *home* of an offence); but REPROACH points rather to the intrinsic blame of the act; SCANDAL, to the offence caused by it in the minds of others, and of society at large. It may be observed that SCANDAL is used for the offensive act, and for the imputation, even including the unfounded imputation of it.

"The loss in war sustained through his name,
A lasting *scandal* to the English name."
DRAYTON.

"The Chevalier Bayard, distinguished among his contemporaries by the appellation of the knight without fear and without *reproach*."—ROBERTSON.

SCANDALOUS. INFAMOUS.

SCANDALOUS (*see* SCANDAL) is applied only to deeds and transactions; while INFAMOUS (Lat. *in*, privative, and *fāmōsus, see* FAMOUS) is used both of transactions and persons. INFAMOUS is the stronger term of the two; a scandalous act being one which is calculated to excite a high degree of social blame; an infamous act, one which is calculated to brand the character of the doer with detestation for life.

"Nothing *scandalous* or offensive to any."—HOOKER.

"If anything be of ill-report, and looks *infamously* to the sober part of mankind, why, that very consideration is enough to deter you from the practice of it, for you are to recommend your religion to all the men in the world by all the ways that are possible."—SHARP.

SCANTY. MEAGRE.

These terms are closely similar; and when employed as synonyms, as a meagre supply, a scanty supply, seem nearly identical. But SCANTY (Norse *skanta, measured, exactly fitted*, WEDGWOOD) refers rather to the relation of the thing supplied to the will of the supplier; MEAGRE (Fr. *maigre, thin*, Lat. *mācrum*), to the littleness or poverty of the thing in itself. A meagre supply may be the result of circumstances. A scanty supply reflects upon the giver or provider. SCANTY relates more to number, measure, or rule; MEAGRE, to quantity generally. The *proportionately* meagre is the scanty. Scanty is therefore applicable to number as well as quantity or amplitude; meagre only to the latter.

"The lowest class of labourers, therefore, notwithstanding their *scanty* subsistence, must, some way or another, make shift to continue their race so far as to keep up their usual numbers."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"His education had been but *meagre*."—MOTLEY.

The expressions "scanty hope" and "meagre hope" would thus mean—the latter, that the amount of hope was very small; the former, that the circumstances of the case afforded little ground for hope.

SCARCITY. FAMINE. DEARTH.

SCARCITY (*see* SCARCE) is a generic term, and expresses the scant supply of any article needful or desirable. DEARTH, which is *dearness*, is applied to articles of food primarily, though, by a poetic analogy, extended to mean poverty in supply generally; as, "a dearth of plot and narrowness of imagination."—*Dryden*. SCARCITY is not so serious a term as DEARTH. There may be a scarcity in the market of articles of luxury; a dearth is such scarcity as is felt to be a privation.

FAMINE (Lat. *fames, hunger*) is restricted to a grievous scarcity of food or provisions, and expresses the condition as well as the fact of such want. It is used, unlike the others, only generally and not of specific articles or commodities. The famine is the evil, the dearth or the scarcity is the cause of the evil. In a time of dearth provisions are very dear, in a time of famine victuals must be provided anyhow.

"Value is more frequently raised by *scarcity* than use."—*Idler*.

"The *famine* is sore in the land."—*English Bible*.

"For I find the *dearth* at this time was very great; wheat was at four marks the quarter, malt at two pounds four shillings, pease at two pounds five shillings."—BURNET.

SCATTER. SPREAD. DISPERSE. SPRINKLE. STREW.

SCATTER (A. S. *scateran, to scatter*) is applicable only to separable or separated bodies: as, to scatter seed upon the ground; to scatter papers about a room. It is mostly, but not absolutely, an act of design, but done without exactness. It involves also dissipation from one point or centre, but not so systematically as DISPERSE.

SPREAD (A.S. *sprædan*), on the other hand, applies both to separable and inseparable or unseparated bodies; as, to spread butter upon bread; to spread documents upon a table. Yet the idea of collectiveness is always more or less retained in SPREAD; while it is contradicted and lost in SCATTER. The term SPREAD may indicate extension in one direction, or in more than one, and it carries with it the idea of design.

DISPERSE (Lat. *dispergĕre*, part. *dispersus, to scatter in different directions*) is the consequence of intelligent will, or of mere force; as, the troops were dispersed by the enemy; the sun disperses the clouds. What is especially implied in DISPERSE is the disruption of a previously compact body. SCATTER is a stronger term than DISPERSE when the term is applied to acts of man's volition or the force of circumstances. "The Jews have, by the providence of God, been scattered throughout all lands." A party of pleasure may disperse themselves over the hills. SCATTER and DISPERSE are terms without limit. SPREAD may be with limit as well as design, as when manure is spread over a field, or a given part of it. It may be purposely scattered, or purposely spread; in the former case it would be in patches; in the latter, it would form a continuous covering to the soil.

To SPRINKLE (A. S. *sprencan*) is to cause to fall lightly and scantily in drops, or solid particles like drops, of liquid.

"Our bones lie *scattered* before the pit."—*English Psalms*.

"As touching the *spreading* of mucke, and mingling it with the mould of a land, it is exceeding good to do it when the wind setteth full west."—HOLLAND, *Pliny*.

"Not in a professed history of persecutions, or in the connected manner in which I am about to recite it, but *dispersedly*, and occasionally, in the course of a mixed general history, which circumstance alone negatives the supposition of any fraudulent design."—PALEY.

STREW (A. S. *streowian*) is to scatter so as substantially to spread over an area or surface. Grammatically it is applicable both to the area and the objects upon it. It involves a degree of magnitude in such objects. So we strew flowers but not seeds. We scatter with freedom and at random. We may strew carefully and artistically. We may spread with geometrical exactness.

"She may *strew* dangerous conjectures."
SHAKESPEARE.

SCORN. DESPISE. CONTEMN. DISDAIN. SPURN.

These terms all express a feeling of dislike, coupled with a sense of one's own superiority to a person or object. CONTEMN (Lat. *contemnĕre, to despise*) is less frequently used than phrases into which it enters, as to show or feel contempt. We are not commonly said to contemn individuals, but objects, qualities, character, and the like. Hence there is a moral element inherent in CONTEMN, which does not of necessity belong to DESPISE (Lat. *despĭcĕre, to look down upon*). The naturally proud man despises his inferiors. DESPISE, however, often stands as the verb, to which the noun contempt (instead of *despite*) belongs. CONTEMN lends itself, as the others do not, to a *collective* expression of feeling. Society contemns, but does not disdain or despise or scorn. Men are sometimes called contemners of that which, professing to be good or useful or authoritative, is deemed by them to be wanting in these qualities.

To SCORN (It. *scornare, to break off the horns of an animal;* when used reflexively, *to be ashamed*) and DISDAIN (Old Fr. *desdaigner*, Lat. *dē-, dignari*) are used in stronger senses than CONTEMN and DESPISE. Yet they are not used toward persons, though their conjugate nouns are. We do not say, "He scorned him," but "He scorned his efforts or threats;" nor "I disdain you," but "I disdain your acts, words, insinuations, character," and the like. Yet we should say, "He was treated with scorn," or, "regarded with disdain." DISDAIN shows itself in supercilious haughtiness when exhibited towards persons, and may have no better foundation than a contemptuous disposition. To disdain is to feel unworthy of one's self. We scorn the coward. We are too apt to despise the lowly and weak. We disdain the presumptuous. We despise others for their intrinsic meanness. We disdain them in comparison with ourselves. So if we despise proffered help, it is because we think it so weak as not to be worth having. If we disdain it, it is because we think ourselves too strong to need it. CONTEMPT implies an exercise of judgment on the character or capabilities of another, and an inference drawn disparaging to them. Hence CONTEMPT is used of impersonal things, as a contempt of danger, which means a low estimate of its nature or power to intimidate. There is a further difference between DISDAIN and SCORN. We disdain *on comparison with ourselves personally*. We scorn what is *in itself* contemptible or disgraceful. Alexander disdained to share the Persian empire with Darius. A man of honour scorns to deceive another. Scorn is energetic contempt. The moral element in CONTEMN is apparent in the fact that one can contemn one's superiors in authority, we can only despise, disdain, or scorn those who are our inferiors, or whom we take to be so.

"I am, ridiculously enough, accused to be a *contemner* of universities—that is, in other words, an enemy of learning, without the foundation of which I am sure no man can pretend to be a poet."—DRYDEN.

"It was this that raised his spirits and made him (Job) stand his ground against the opposition of his friends and the *scorn* of his enemies."—STILLINGFLEET.

"For he (Pyrrhus) was a man that could tell how to humble himself towards the great, by whom he might win benefit, and know also how to creep into their credit; and in like manner was he a great *scorner* and *despiser* of such as were his inferiors."—NORTH, *Plutarch*.

"Let not ambition mock their useful toil,
Their homely joys and destiny obscure;
Nor grandeur hear with a *disdainful* smile
The short and simple annals of the poor."
GRAY.

It may be observed that DISDAIN, unlike SCORN or CONTEMPT, may be in some cases a virtue, as where a man disdains to take an unfair advantage of another.

SPURN, consonant to its etymology (A. S. *spurnan*, allied to *spor, a heel*), implies such contempt as shows itself in the repulse of the object. He who is spurned feels himself not only despised, but thrust away.

"The rule of knighthood I disdain and spurn." SHAKESPEARE.

SCREAM. SHRIEK.

A SCREAM (It. *scramare, esclamare, to cry out*) is a cry, shrill, sharp, and sudden, as in fright or pain; and a SHRIEK (compare *screech* and similar imitative words) might be defined nearly in the same way; but screaming may be voluntary or involuntary. Shrieking is only involuntary. We do not shriek, except when suddenly overborne; but we sometimes scream with the object of being heard at a distance. Shriek is more forcible than scream. The ill-tempered child screams with disappointment. A shriek of horror may rise at the sight of a sudden and disastrous accident.

SCURRILOUS. ABUSIVE.

SCURRILITY (Lat. *scurrīlitātem, scurra, a buffoon*) is low and virulent ABUSE (Lat. *ăbūti, to misuse*, part. *ăbūsus*), but without the sustained earnestness of abuse. It depends upon taunts and contemptuous ridicule, rather than upon anything else. There is an argumentative consistency about abuse, whether it be merited or unmerited; while scurrility will condescend to mean, vile, or obscene vituperation. The angry, resentful man may be abusive; the coarse-minded man is scurrilous. Abuse is virulent condemnation. Scurrility is virulent derision.

"The absurd and *scurrilous* sermon which had very unwisely been honoured with impeachment."—MACAULAY.

"Barbarous *abusiveness*."—MILTON.

SECRECY. CONCEALMENT.

CONCEALMENT (Lat. *concēlare, to hide*) may be employed to express the act as well as the state of concealing; while SECRECY (Lat. *sēcrētus*, part. of *sēcernĕre, to set apart*) expresses the state or quality alone. Secrecy involves limited knowledge; while concealment is consistent with total ignorance of the existence of a thing. There cannot be secrecy without concealment; but there may be concealment without secrecy. Concealment is oftener against others; secrecy, for the sake of ourselves. The commission of a crime is commonly both secret and concealed. Secret, in being kept to himself by the author; concealed, as being hidden from the knowledge of others. Secrecy is purposed concealment.

"When King John of France, in order to pay his debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were sworn to *secrecy*."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"Some to the rude protection of the thorn
Commit their feeble offspring; the cleft tree
Offers its kind *concealment* to a few,
Their food its insects, and its moss their nest."
THOMSON.

SECRET. CLANDESTINE.

CLANDESTINE (*clandestīnus, concealed; clam, secretly*) is less wide, but more distinctive in meaning than SECRET (*see above*). CLANDESTINE applies only to matters of human action; while SECRET may be employed of anything unknown. The idea of the clandestine carries with it that of a purposed and unlawful secrecy. When Johnson uses the term clandestine in the following unusual way, "I went to this clandestine lodging, and found, to my amazement, all the ornaments of a fine gentleman," there is still involved the idea of continued secrecy in keeping up a clandestine mode of life.

"An Englishman will do you a piece of service *secretly*, and be distressed with the expressions of your gratitude."—KNOX, *Essays*.

"But it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for any one to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private, and thereby give opportunity to *clandestine* machinations."—LOCKE.

SEDATE. COMPOSED.

COMPOSED (Fr. *composer, to compose, to make up*) relates to a specific state on a specific occasion; SEDATE (Lat. *sēdātus*, part. of *sēdāre, to allay*), to an habitual temper and demeanour. COMPOSED denotes tranquillity, in opposition to any excitement of feeling, as alarm or anger. SEDATE denotes quietness, as opposed to levity or any extravagance of conduct or appearance.

"Go! fair example of untainted youth,
Of modest wisdom and pacific truth;
Composed in sufferings, and in joy *sedate*,
Good without noise, without pretension great."
POPE.

SEDUCE. SUBORN. CORRUPT.

Literally, to SEDUCE (Lat. *sēdūcĕre*) is to draw off or aside.

To SUBORN (Lat. *sŭbornāre*) is to prepare or dispose in an underhanded way, and to CORRUPT (Lat. *corrumpĕre*, part. *corruptus*) is to break up the component particles of a body. The two former are employed of persons only, the last of certain things, as principles, minds, purity, integrity. To lead from the path of purity and right by specious representations or misrepresentations is the idea of SEDUCE. To induce him to do wrong by exciting his self-interest is that of SUBORN. To instil vice, to infect with bad sentiments or principles by any means whatever is that of CORRUPT. We seduce the innocent, the ignorant, the simple, by appearances, by attractive externals, by illusions, tricks, imposition. We suborn the cowardly, the weak, the unprincipled, women, witnesses, servants, judges, prejudiced persons, or those with peculiar failings, by flatteries, promises, threats, and that which touches their interest. We corrupt what is pure, sound, good, virtuous, wholesome, innocent, but accessible to evil influences and capable of perversion, by the force of contagion. The seduced is the dupe or victim of the seducer. The suborned lends himself voluntarily to the process. The corrupted is the prey or spoil of the corrupter. The first falls into a snare. The second yields to a temptation. The third succumbs to an influence.

SEEK. SEARCH.

Both these terms are employed to express the looking after something not in sight. Grammatically, SEEK (A. S. *sécan*) is employed directly of the object sought; while SEARCH (Fr. *chercher*) is applied directly to the place in which it is expected to be found. We seek a thing, and search for it. To search is to seek speculatively, widely, and laboriously. We are said to seek eagerly, to search carefully.

"Ask, and it shall be given you; *seek*, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."—*English Bible.*

"*Search* the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life."—*Ibid.*

SEEM. APPEAR.

SEEM (A. S. *seman, to seem, appear*) is a term of which the meaning rises upon that of APPEAR (Lat. *apparēre*). An object appears when it becomes simply visible to the eye or recognizable to the mind. It seems when it is referred to something beyond itself either in the mind or outside it; as, "such a proposal seems fair." APPEAR expresses more directly the phenomena or facts as they are presented to us; SEEM, the impression of likeness or probability which we derive from them. So the probability of a fact is expressed more naturally by APPEAR; the probability of an inference, by SEEM. "From the state of the ground, it appears that it rained last night." "From the look of the clouds, it seems likely that we shall have rain before long." It seems probable. It appears certain. A seeming likelihood. An apparent truism. APPARENT *sometimes* means obvious; but SEEMING *never* means certain, but always uncertain. To seem is to appear in such a way, that is to appear as possessing certain qualities or a certain character. An object may be said to seem or to appear fine, good, pleasant. It seems such by its conformity to goodness, beauty, pleasantness. It appears such by the impression produced upon yourself. In the one case one compares objects, in the other perceptions. That which appears good has the air of being so, that which seems good is like something else that is good. Resemblance is correlative to difference, appearance to reality. A work of art seems well executed on examination, it appears so perhaps at a superficial glance. "It appears to me," indicates a lighter persuasion of the fact than "it seems to me." After reflexion, do that which seems right, not merely that which appears right.

SELF-WILL. SELF-CONCEIT. SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

The SELF-WILLED person is governed by his own will, and does not yield to the will or wishes of others, is

unaccommodating, uncompliant. The SELF-CONCEITED person has a high and over-weening opinion of his own powers or endowments. The SELF-SUFFICIENT person has the same opinion of his own strength or abilities; hence he despises the assistance as well as the suggestions of others. Self-will is in determination and purpose; self-conceit, in personal judgment and estimation; self-sufficiency, in opinion and action. The self-willed cares nothing for differences of right and wrong, true and false, where his mind is bent upon action; the self-conceited is much concerned about these things, but admits no criterion but his own notions.

SENSIBILITY. TENDERNESS.

SENSIBILITY (Lat. *sensibilitātem*), as it is a moral quality, means susceptibility of feeling.

TENDERNESS (Fr. *tendre*, Lat. *tĕner*) is an analogous term, expressing that quality which is the opposite to hardness of heart. The impressions or affections entertained by the person of sensibility and the person of tenderness are such as are favourable to others with whom they have to deal. Sensibility is a natural disposition to be affected by whatever interests humanity, and to interest itself with such things. Tenderness is a quality which imposes affectionate feelings in a touching degree. Sensibility is excited. Tenderness excites us. A heart of sensibility is easily moved and won. A heart of tenderness attaches itself. The former is comparatively dormant until aroused into action, the other is spontaneously active. The one is like sparks of electricity, the other a sweet, pure, and steady burning flame. Sensibility disposes to tenderness. Tenderness exalts sensibility. The man of sensibility is ever open to pity, clemency, mercy, gratitude, and the feelings generally which prompt us to wish well and do well to others. The man of tenderness has within him the germs of the most active affections, love, friendship, benevolence, charity —those feelings which make us exist for others and in others. Sensibility compassionates, tenderness consoles and relieves. Sensibility makes sacrifices; tenderness loves to make them, and realizes the divine saying, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." There is a sensibility which is cowardice, which shuns through weakness of mind the sight of suffering. There is also an excessive tenderness which cannot deny or resist, and is therefore at the mercy or the abuse of others. This is but a blind and barren passion.

SENSIBLE. SENSITIVE. SENTIENT.

All these terms are derived from the same source, the Lat. *sentire, to feel*. SENSIBLE expresses either a habit of the body or mind, or only a state relating to a particular object, as a person may be sensible of cold, injury, kindness. SENSITIVE expresses a permanent or habitual condition, in which the sense or feeling is quickly acted upon, being naturally keenly alive to external influences. SENTIENT expresses a character of nature, the possession of the power or faculty of feeling, and of reflecting upon the feeling, as, "angels or men are sentient beings." It is the fact that beings are of a sentient nature which qualifies them for being sensible of certain impressions in particular. Sensitive denotes a very energetic, and at the same time a very restricted, property. There is a plant called "the sensitive plant," which is neither sentient nor sensible. SENSITIVE and SENTIENT are always active. SENSIBLE is both active and passive, in the sense of recognizing and recognized by the feelings. When SENSIBLE is employed in the sense of wise or prudent, it denotes the exercise actively of sense, in its meaning of mental perception or understanding. The two uses of SENSIBLE are illustrated in the two following quotations:—

"Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them, and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call *sensible* qualities."—LOCKE

"For, as in the collation it is not the gold or the silver, the food or the apparel, in which the benefit consists, but the will and benevolent intention of him who bestows them; so reciprocally it is the good acceptance, the *sensibleness* of and acquiescence in the benefactor's goodness that constitutes the gratitude."—BARROW.

"This spiritual sword of God's awful word penetrates the inmost recesses of the human mind, pierces to the very line of separation, as it were, of the *sensitive* and the intelligent principle."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"From hence we may gather that the providence of God is over all His works, and that in the formation of *sentient* as well as *unsentient* natures, He had in view that series of changes and events they would produce, and ordered His whole multitude of second causes so as to execute that plan of providence He had in His intention."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature.*

SENTIMENTAL. ROMANTIC.

The SENTIMENTAL person is one of wrong or excessive sensibility, or who imports *mere* sentiment into matters worthy of more vigorous thought.

The ROMANTIC (Old Fr. *romance, Roman,* or *Romant,* originally the growing French language, the "rustic Latin," opposed to the "Latin tongue;" hence applied to compositions in the vulgar tongue; *see* BRACHET, s.v. Roman) creates ideal scenes and objects by the extravagant exercise of the imagination. The sentimental character is soft and sickly; the romantic is extravagant and wild.

"She has even the false pity and *sentimentality* of many modern ladies."—WARTON, *English Poetry.*

"I cannot but look on an indifferency of mind as to the good or evil things of this life as a mere *romantick* fancy of such who would be thought to be much wiser than they ever were or could be."—STILLINGFLEET.

SEPARATE. DETACH. DISJOIN. DISCONNECT. DIVIDE. PART. SEVER. SUNDER.

To SEPARATE (Lat. *sēpărāre, s.e. apart,* and *parare, to prepare*) is employed both of physical and mental objects. We may separate one thing in its entirety from another or from other things, or a part from the whole to which it belongs. The leading idea of SEPARATION is the establishing an interval of distance between objects, or the reversing of contiguity, whether that contiguity be by natural adhesion, or by artificial or casual collocation; permanent inter-removal is the object or result of separation. The interval of space may be great or small.

To DETACH (Fr. *détacher, to unfasten*) is to undo a link or fastening which kept any two things connected. It is a word of physical, not mental or moral, import, generally.

To DISJOIN (Lat. *disjungĕre,* Fr. *joindre, to join*) is the opposite of to *join,* and therefore expresses the reversal of an union which is the effect of design.

DISCONNECT (Lat. *dis-* and *connĕctere, con-, together,* and *nectĕre, to knit*) is a more complex word than DISJOIN, as *connect* is more complex than *join,* and expresses any kind or degree of junction, union, coherence, or even relationship, which is metaphysical junction. To disconnect is to part things which are commonly associated. We disconnect in order to neutralize common or reciprocal action, force, or relationship.

DIVIDE (Lat. *dividere*) is applicable only to the whole and entire object, which is *intrinsically* separated into two or more parts. Yet it is to be observed that, even in physical objects, it is not necessary that the thing divided should have actually ever been one, only it *would be* one but for the division. In this way a wall may be said to divide two houses.

PART (Lat. *partiri,* and *re-, to share*) is very nearly identical. We part in order to neutralize union; but, as we separate what was contiguous, so we part what was whole. PART is often used of such division as involves a separation of parts without destroying the unity of the whole, as to part the hair on the forehead. A current may be parted by a rock. Sometimes it means to distribute portions of a thing. We divide what was one. We detach what was fastened. We disconnect what was associated.

We SUNDER (A.S. *sunder, separate*) what was comprehended.

We SEVER (Old Fr. *sevrer, to separate*) or dissever (which seems only a redundancy) what requires some effort to part. This comes from the fact that SEVER is employed of things which are united in physical growth and organization or some natural union. Both SEVER and SUNDER commonly involve the inferiority of what is severed or sundered to that from which it is taken. SEVER seems to lend itself more readily to expressing *repeated* acts of disconnexion, as to sever limb from limb, where we should hardly use SUNDER. To DIVIDE and to SEPARATE need especially to be distinguished. To divide is to cut or resolve into parts. To separate is to place those parts at a distance from each other. Objects may be divided, yet near. When separated they are mutually removed. The object of division is to preserve unity under certain conditions; of separation, to dissolve unity altogether. Society is divided into classes. The hermit is separated from society. Division usually follows some principle of nature or arrangement. Separations are often unnatural, violent, or unavoidable. Every separation involves a division; but there is many a division without separation.

"The Latin word (colonia) signifies simply a plantation. The Greek word ἀποικία, on the contrary, signifies a *separation* of dwelling, a departure from home, a going out of the house."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"They are, in short, instruments in the hands of our Maker to improve our minds, to rectify our failings, to *detach* us from the present scene, to fix our affections on things above."—PORTEUS.

"The Athenian Sophists taught it (logic) in conjunction with rhetoric and philosophy; but Aristotle brought it to perfection, and seems to have been the first who professedly *disjoined* it from other arts and sciences."—BEATTIE.

"The Episcopal Church of England, before the Reformation connected with the See of Rome, since then *disconnected*, and protesting against some of her doctrines, and against the whole of her authority as binding on our National Church."—BURKE.

"Cæsar had made a law for the *dividing* of the lands of the Campania unto the soldiers."—NORTH, *Plutarch.*

"But, indeed, the chief *parter* of the fray was night."—SIDNEY, *Arcadia.*

"The angels shall come forth, and *sever* the wicked from among the just."—*English Bible.*

"He cutteth the spear in *sunder*."—*English Psalms.*

SERIES. SEQUENCE. SUCCESSION.

SERIES (Lat. *sĕries, a row, a succession*) denotes a number of individuals or units standing in order or following in succession.

SEQUENCE (Lat. *sĕquentia, a following*) denotes of necessity a moving series or the quality of it, in which that which follows does so by virtue of that which went before. Sequence is succession by a regular *force* or law.

SUCCESSION (Lat. *successiōnem, a succeeding*) may be with or without interconnexion. Succession to the throne is according to rule or law. On the other hand, a succession of misfortunes may be without such common rule or cause, but casual. SERIES implies of necessity a number more than two. SEQUENCE and SUCCESSION may denote no more than one thing following upon another. Sequence involves a principle, succession only states a fact. A succession of notes might be struck on a musical instrument with no regard to time, interval, or melody; the diatonic scale is a sequence of eight notes.

"Such divine fatalists make fate to be an implexed *series* or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief."—CUDWORTH.

"Tell my friends,
Tell Athens, in the *sequence* of degree,
From high to low throughout."
SHAKESPEARE.

"Of the same kind is the Dutch tax upon *successions*. Collateral *successions* are taxed according to the degree of relations from five to thirty per cent. upon the whole value of the *succession*."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

SEVERE. AUSTERE.

One is AUSTERE (Lat. *austērus*) in one's manner of life, SEVERE (Lat. *sĕvērus*) in one's manner of thought. The opposite to austerity is luxuriousness, the mean a well regulated life. The opposite to severity is over-indulgence, the mean a just recognition

of law. One is austere in one s self, severe either to one's self or to others. Men have been known of the most austere virtue who have leant to the side of benignity rather than severity toward others. On the other hand, more frequently, men by no means austere in their own lives have visited the faults and sins of others with implacable severity. Severity comes rather from principle and character, austerity from habit. One may admire the austere, and fear the severe man. It is difficult to love either.

SEVERITY. RIGOUR.

SEVERITY (Lat. *sĕvĕrĭtātem*) relates more to the way of thinking and judging, RIGOUR (Fr. *rigueur*, Lat. *rĭgōrem*) to the manner of punishing. Severity is ready to condemn and does not excuse. Rigour abates nothing of the penalty, and does not pardon. We speak of the severity of manners, of the rigour of justice and the law.

SHADE. SHADOW.

Light intercepted produces the effect denoted by these terms. But SHADE (A. S. *sceádan, to separate, to shade*) denotes no more than the general effect of comparative darkness; while SHADOW implies a limit or form in accordance with the object intercepting. The shadow of a tree has an outline agreeing with the shape of the tree itself. The shade of a tree is that variable quantity of ground and atmosphere which is screened from the sun's rays.

"The means by which the painter works, and on which the effect of his picture depends, are light and *shade*, warm and cold colours."—REYNOLDS.

"They say that in the town Syene, which is above Alexandria fifty stadia, at noone tide in the middes of summer, there is no *shadow* at all; and for farther experiment thereof, let a pit be sunke in the ground, and it will be light all over in every corner; whereby it appeareth that the sunne then is just and directly over the place as the very zenith thereof."—HOLLAND, *Pliny*.

SHAKE. TREMBLE. SHUDDER. QUIVER. QUAKE.

SHAKE (A. S. *scacan, to shake*) may be regarded as the generic term, of which the others are modifications.

To TREMBLE (Fr. *trembler*, Lat. *trĕmŭlare*) is said both of persons and things, and is a quick vibratory and involuntary shaking, as in persons from cold or fear; in things from weakness or jarring forces.

To SHUDDER (probably imitative, compare Low Germ. *schuddern*) is only applied to sentient beings, as the effect of fear, horror, aversion, or anticipation.

QUIVER is a quick vibration of the particles of a body resulting from their own inherent elasticity.

To QUAKE (A. S. *cwacian*) is to shake from want of compactness or tenacity in the material affected; as, to quake with fear comes from a loss of muscular consistency; the quaking bog, sand, or moss wants firmness and solidity.

"The foundations of the earth *shook*, and were removed, because He was wroth."—*English Bible*.

"*Tremble*, thou earth, at the presence of the Lord."—*Ibid*.

"Who see dire spectres through the gloomy air
In threatening forms advance, and *shuddering* hear
The groan of wandering ghosts and yellings of despair." BLACKMORE.

"With that at him a *quiv'ring* dart he threw,
With so fell force and villanous despite,
That through his habergeon the fork-head flew." SPENSER.

"Anon she 'gan perceive the house to *quake*,
And all the dores to rattle round about."
Ibid.

SHAKE. AGITATE. TOSS.

Here, as in the case of the intransitive verb, SHAKE is indefinite.

AGITATE (Lat. *ăgĭtāre*), frequentative of *ăgĕre, to drive*) is to shake relatively, that is, to a normal or ordinary state of quietude; as, "the sea is agitated by a storm."

Toss ("the radical image is probably shown in Nor. *tossa, to strew*;" WEDGWOOD) differs from the others in implying change of place in the thing tossed, which is either once or

more than once thrown up so as to fall on another spot.

"The *shake* that is given to one part of the earth by the firing and explosion of subterranean exhalations."—BOYLE.

AGITATE is used of the mind, in its secondary application in regard to passions and emotions; and SHAKE, of what the mind entertains, as, for instance, convictions, beliefs, and the like.

"Winds from all quarters *agitate* the air,
And fit the limpid element for use,
Else noxious." COWPER.

"Fear ye not Me? saith the Lord; will ye not tremble at My presence, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea by a perpetual decree, that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof *toss* themselves, yet can they not prevail, though they roar, yet can they not pass over it."—*English Bible.*

SHALLOW. SUPERFICIAL.

The SUPERFICIAL is that which lies at the surface (Lat. *sŭperfĭcies, surface*), and so is closely related in sense to SHALLOW (compare *shoal*, and *shelf*, A.S. *scylfe*), which is wanting in depth. The terms might, in the majority of cases, be used indiscriminately, as a person of shallow or of superficial understanding. But SHALLOW is, by usage, more frequently associated with matters of understanding; SUPERFICIAL, with matters of observation. A superficial view. A shallow decision. SHALLOW is always a term of reproach; not so SUPERFICIAL. A superficial consideration of a subject may be all that time and opportunities permit. A shallow consideration would indicate want of due investigation or capacity in the investigator. A superficial acquaintance with a subject will lead to a shallow treatment of it.

"It then evidently will appear that upright simplicity is the deepest wisdom, and perverse craft the merest *shallowness*."—BARROW.

"These things are never to be understood without much more than a *superficial* knowledge of the Scriptures, and especially the Scriptures of the New Testament."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

SHIELD. BUCKLER. TARGET.

SHIELD is the generic term (A.S. *scyld*) being a broad piece of defensive armour carried upon the arm, of no material in particular, and of no one shape.

The BUCKLER (O. Fr. *bocler*, Lat. *bŭcŭla, a boss*) was an oblong shield of considerable size almost covering the body.

TARGET (Fr. *targe*) was a small shield, and being small approached the round form or was actually circular.

SHOCK. CONCUSSION.

SHOCK (Fr. *choc*) is a violent and sudden *shake*.

CONCUSSION is from Lat. *concŭtere, con-, together*, and *quătĕre, to shake*). A concussion is the violent collision of two bodies physically. SHOCK is used, besides, in cases where the result is not physical, but mental; as, a shock of the nervous system; a shock to the mind. A concussion of the brain.

"The infidel principles which have been recently diffused with uncommon industry and art, have an immediate tendency to produce in a reading age this *shocking* corruption."—KNOX, *Essays.*

"How can that *concussion* of atoms be capable of begetting those internal and vital affections, that self-consciousness, and those other powers and energies that we feel in our minds?"—BENTLEY.

SHORT. BRIEF. CONCISE. SUCCINCT. SUMMARY.

SHORT (A.S. *scort, sceort; scéran, to shear*) may be regarded as the generic term here, of which the others represent specific forces. Everything may be called short which possesses relative length in an inferior degree, whether naturally or artificially, being either mentally or physically measured, if applied to space and time.

BRIEF (Lat. *brĕvis, short*) is employed only of time and of matters of speech, which have taken comparatively *short time* to utter.

CONCISE (Lat. *concīdere*, part. *concīsus, to cut short*) and SUCCINCT (Lat. *succinctus, girt up, contracted*, part. of *succingĕre*) are employed, not of mere matter as such; both terms signify brevity and comprehensiveness combined; but we speak of a concise phrase or style, a succinct narrative or

account. Conciseness indicates the master of language, who can produce, like the bold style in painting, effect with the least expenditure of words. Succinctness indicates the man of judgment and quick discrimination, who can select from a quantity of material that which is most important and characteristic for purposes of relation.

SUMMARY (Lat. *summārium, a summary, epitome*) is a term applicable to both speaking and acting. It often gains time at the loss of fulness and correctness, indicating mental activity and practical decision, and sometimes unscrupulousness. Where it belongs to exposition in words, it denotes that brevity which comes from touching only main topics and not details.

"After *short* silence then
And summons read, the great consult began." MILTON.

"I shall content myself to show very *briefly* how a religious and virtuous life doth conduce to our future happiness."—TILLOTSON.

"He expresses himself so *concisely*, employs words so sparingly, that whoever will possess his ideas must dig for them, and oftentimes pretty far below the surface."—RICHARDSON, *Life of Milton.*

"A tale should be judicious, clear, *succinct*,
The language plain, and incidents well-link'd." COWPER.

"Now, for this present I will breefely and *summarily* touch those principall points which are confessed and agreed upon as touching the said eclipses."—HOLLAND, *Pliny.*

SHOW. EXHIBITION. REPRESENTATION. SIGHT. SPECTACLE. PAGEANT. SCENE.

SHOW is here the most general and comprehensive term (A. S. *scawian, sceáwian, to look, see, view*). A show is commonly something set forth to be seen of a more or less aggregate or complex character for the amusement of others. We do not speak of the exhibition of a single object, however curious, as a show. Like most simple terms, it has its vulgar side. A show appeals to the eye as a matter of curiosity or imposing effect, rather than to the taste. A show does not absolutely involve design; as a fine show of blossom on fruit-trees.

EXHIBITION (Lat. *exhibītiōnem, a handing out, a delivering*), especially since the establishment of national, local, or international exhibitions, denotes a show of works eminent as works of art or industry. In the case of natural objects, they are shown or exhibited, according as we contemplate their natural beauty or attractiveness, or the skill which has produced, and the taste which has collected them. So we speak sometimes of a flower-show, sometimes of a horticultural exhibition. An exhibition always involves design. It is a preconcerted show.

REPRESENTATION (Lat. *rĕpræsentāre, to manifest, to represent*, in art) is the exhibiting or, as it were, recalling and reproducing an object by art, and may be of one or more than one such object at a time; as, the representation of a beast or bird on canvas; a theatrical representation of an historic scene.

A SIGHT (A. S. *gesiht, sight, view*) is a term expressing not the effort which produces the object contemplated or exhibited, but the interest of the object itself; hence a sight exhibits itself, and may be, and commonly is, natural, not artificial and casual. It may be of a single object, or of many.

SPECTACLE (Lat. *spectāculum, spectare, to look at*) is a sight preconcerted for public view, and full of interest in its details, and striking in its arrangements, being of a complex character, connected with the social life of man

"There is nothing which lies more within the province of a spectator than public *shows* and diversions, and as among these, there are none which can pretend to vie with those elegant entertainments that are *exhibited* in our theatres."—*Spectator.*

"If we consider what Numa ordained concerning images and the *representation* of the gods, it is altogether agreeable unto the doctrine of Pythagoras, who thought that God was neither sensible nor mortal, but invisible, incorruptible, and only intelligible."—NORTH, *Plutarch.*

"Moses said, I will now turn aside and see this great *sight*, why the bush is not burned."—*English Bible.*

The spectacle, being closely allied to human life and manners, differs from

the rest in commonly exciting some sentiment or emotion, as of horror, pity, approbation. The spectacle, therefore, may be striking and imposing, or quite the contrary, so that the feeling raised in the mind may be out of proportion to what is exhibited or displayed, as in the following of Cowper:—

"The paralytic, who can hold her cards,
But cannot play them, borrows a friend's hand
To deal and shuffle, to divide and sort
Her mingled suits and sequences, and sits
Spectatress both and *spectacle*, a sad
And silent cipher, while her proxy plays."

PAGEANT (which originally meant *a scaffold* or *platform*, something put together for use in public shows, Lat. *pangĕre, to make fast*) is an imposing but transient spectacle. Hence it is a favourite term of moralists when they contrast what is powerful and splendid in human life with its short-lived duration.

"Thus unlamented pass the proud away
The gaze of fools and *pageant* of a day."
POPE.

SCENE (Lat. *scena*, Gr. σκηνή, *a tent, booth*) is an assemblage of objects presented to the eye at once, having interrelation, whether in inanimate nature, or composed of living agents, united in place, time, and circumstance of action. A scene impresses us with emotion as of pleasure, admiration, gloom, horror, and does not exist apart from the interest excited by it. It addresses itself to our feelings, as a spectacle to our observation and taste.

"Probably no lover of *scenes* would have had very long to wait for some explosion between parties both equally ready to take offence and careless of giving it."—DE QUINCY.

SHOW. EXHIBIT. DISPLAY. DEMONSTRATE. INDICATE. EVINCE. ARGUE. MANIFEST.

SHOW, here, as in the case of the noun, must be taken as the generic term, of which the rest are specific forms. It is indefinite, and means no more than to bring to view.

EXHIBIT (*see above*) commonly denotes to show in order to attract notice to what is rare or interesting, with more or less of publicity; while show may be public or private to one or to many, and may be even indirect and undesigned. That which is shown is commonly remarkable as a whole, so that it is sufficient to take a general view of it. That which is exhibited is commonly remarkable in detail and challenges examination and inspection.

DISPLAY (Old Fr. *desploier*, Lat. *dis-, abroad*, and *plicare, to fold*) is to exhibit from personal desire that the object should be seen as extensively as possible, and with such publicity as redounds to the honour or importance of the person exhibiting. We exhibit in public. We display for the sake of publicity. It is to spread out in exhibition.

To DEMONSTRATE (Lat. *dēmonstrare*) is to show as the result of argument or scientific experiment. Demonstration is planned or purposed showing, through media specifically chosen or adapted to the purpose. It is to give clear or ocular proof.

INDICATE (Lat. *indĭcāre*) differs from demonstrate in being wanting in such plan and purpose; the indication being in the inherent nature or force of the thing itself. Indication involves a conscious power of judgment and interpretation brought to bear upon the object, which only has a power of indication if reflexion, comparison, and experience are present in the observer. Indication, unlike the preceding, is indirect and uncertain. There can be no degree or question in demonstration which is absolute, while indication is relative and may be in some cases easily misinterpreted. The proper idea of indication is the giving certain information or throwing certain light on an object of which one is ignorant or in search, so as to direct our eyes, our steps, our attention, to see, observe, or find it. The index of a book indicates the divisions, and the place of the subject sought. The finger indicates the distant object which one desires to point out.

EVINCE (Lat. *evincĕre, to prevail entirely*) is to show by particu-

lar and convincing proof. It had originally the sense of conquer or subdue in argument, a sense which is now obsolete. As Milton—

"Error by his own arms is best *evinced*."

It is most correctly employed when it is referred to some conclusion, either true, or maintained to be true; as to evince the truth or falsehood of a statement. There is a loose sense, in which it is used instead of manifest or exhibit; as, "He evinced great emotion." This has perhaps sprung from its likeness in sound to evidence.

ARGUE (Lat. *arguĕre, to make known*) is nearly related to INDICATE, and stands to probability and inference as INDICATE stands to fact. If I say, "Such expressions indicate ill-will," I mean that they point it out as actually existing. If I say, "They argue ill-will," I mean that ill-will is naturally suggested to account for them.

MANIFEST (Lat. *mănĭfestus, manifest*) is, in its simplest aspect, the opposite to *conceal*; but it seems specially applicable to the indirect exhibition of feeling or motive in sentient beings. So we speak of persons manifesting joy or grief at announcements, or manifesting a strong desire for an object, or manifesting signs of impatience. A manifestation is an external, visible, and tangible token of what would otherwise be more or less concealed. But MANIFEST means more than disclose; it is to lay open, not merely before the sight but the observation and the understanding. It is not merely to make visible, but to make evident.

"In some disorders it is no more possible for men to hinder wicked thoughts from taking possession of their minds, or blasphemous words from coming out of their mouths than to hinder any other distemper (for plainly this is one) which may attack any other part of them from *showing* itself by its common effects."—SECKER.

"Instead of the shadows and figures of the Mosaic law, which veiled and in a great measure concealed what they *exhibited*, it presents us with the undisguised truth and very substance."—*Ibid.*

"Some grains must be allowed to a rhetorical *display* which will not bear the rigour of a critical severity."—GLANVILL.

So entirely does demonstration depend upon evidence, that the term is applied, not only to persons, but to the subject matter of the evidence itself, as in the following of Burke:—

"May no storm ever come which will put the firmness of their attachment to the proof, and which, in the midst of confusions and terrors and sufferings, may *demonstrate* the eternal difference between a true and severe friend to the monarchy and a slippery sycophant of the court."

"I believe what you scholars call just and sublime, in opposition to turgid and bombast expression, may give you an idea of what I mean when I say modesty is the certain *indication* of a great spirit, and impudence the affectation of it."—*Spectator.*

"And give me leave to tell you that it is no weak *evincement* of my passion for and concern in your happiness that I can refrain envying you."—BOYLE.

"Eve, thy contempt of life and pleasure seems
To *argue* in thee something more sublime
And excellent than what thy mind contemns." MILTON.

"The magistrate is not to be obeyed in temporals more than in spirituals, where a repugnancy is perceived between his commands and any credited *manifestations* of the Divine will."—PALEY.

SHOW. SEMBLANCE.

SHOW, in the sense in which it is a synonym with SEMBLANCE (Fr. *sembler*, Lat. *sĭmŭlare, similis, like*), has a more varied meaning. Show may denote a *purposed* exhibition; while semblance is naturally inherent. A person may make a show of learning, but there will be a semblance of it if only there actually exist in him some amount of learning, or it be attributed to him by the ignorance of observers. A semblance is a natural show of similarity.

"And to the ground his eyes were lowly bent
Simple in *shew* and voide of malice bad
And all the way he prayed as he went
And often knockt his brest as one that did repent." SPENSER.

"He made an image of entaile
Like to a woman in *semblance*." GOWER.

SHRILL. SHARP.

Although a sound cannot be SHRILL (Low Germ. *schrell, harsh*, in sound as in taste) without being also SHARP (A. S. *scearp, pointed, quick*) yet SHRILL regards not the pitch, but the quality

of the noise. A shrill sound is at once high-pitched, penetrative, and harsh. On the other hand, SHARP is high in pitch as opposed to flat. Power is involved in SHRILL more than in SHARP. A sharp sound may be far from loud, a shrill sound is heard at a distance.

SHRINK. CONTRACT.

SHRINK (A. S. *scrincan, to shrink*) expresses the contraction of conscious beings under the influence of fear; while CONTRACT (Lat. *contrăhĕre*, part. *contractus, to draw together, to shorten*) is seldom used but of physical substances; nor are these said quite indiscriminately to shrink and contract. CONTRACT being the more scientific term of the two, is employed of the shrinking of bodies less in common use. We speak of the shrinking of flannel by washing; of the contraction of metals under the influence of cold. SHRINK is also used of such contraction as intimately affects the particles of which a substance may be composed; while CONTRACT is used of the mere closer collocation of such parts or particles. The rings of the snake do not shrink, but contract. In their *secondary* application, SHRINK belongs to the reluctance to action or endurance; CONTRACT, to the narrowing of the field of observation, or the scope of privilege and indulgence.

"Return, Alpheus; the dread voice is past
That *shrunk* thy streams." MILTON.

"It is given very well in cases of *contraction* and *shrinking* of sinews."—HOLLAND, *Pliny*.

SHUT. CLOSE.

To CLOSE (Fr. *clos*, part. of O. Fr. *clore, to shut*) is merely to put close together.

To SHUT (A. S. *scyttan, scittan, to shut up, lock up*) is to close so as to hinder ingress or egress. So SHUT is a stronger term, capable of implying more substantial obstruction, than CLOSE. The petals of a flower close. The gates of a city are shut at night. Inasmuch, however, as the word CLOSE is simply the Latin equivalent of SHUT, there are numberless cases in which the words may be used indiscriminately. But, like most cases of this kind, the Saxon is the commoner term for physical and common, close for metaphysical and secondary, processes of termination. "He closed his discourse by shutting his book."

"If, after all, some headstrong, hardy lout
Would disobey, though sure to be *shut* out,
Could he with reason murmur at his case,
Himself sole author of his own disgrace?"
COWPER.

"The Lord Himself hath not disdained so exactly to register in the Book of Life after what sort His servants have *closed* up their days on earth."—HOOKER.

SIGNALIZE. DISTINGUISH.

The former term is stronger than the latter. To SIGNALIZE one's self (Lat. *signālis, belonging to a sign*) is eminently and *conspicuously* to DISTINGUISH one's self (Lat. *distinguĕre, to mark with a point or dot*). He distinguishes himself who gains honour. He signalizes himself who performs striking deeds, for which he obtains renown. So SIGNALIZE is especially applicable to individuals; while many may be distinguished.

"The knight of La Mancha gravely recounts to his companion the adventures by which he is to *signalize* himself."—JOHNSON.

"Few are formed with abilities to discover new possibilities, and to *distinguish* themselves by means never tried before. —*Rambler*.

SIGNIFICANT. EXPRESSIVE.

SIGNIFICANT (Lat. *signĭfĭcare, to mean*) is specific; EXPRESSIVE (Lat. *exprĭmĕre*, part. *expressus, to express*) is general. That is expressive which habitually and forcibly shows expression, as opposed to inexpressive. That is significant which strongly expresses or indicates some particular thing. An expressive countenance manifests clearly successive and varied emotions. A gesture is significant which plainly and forcibly illustrates what is on the mind. EXPRESSIVE carries with it the idea of excellence. SIGNIFICANT is neutral for bad or good, and may be either. EXPRESSIVE is restricted to looks and words; as, an expressive eye; an expressive phrase. SIGNIFICANT is applicable to complex actions or measures; as, "Such a measure is significant of a liberal

policy." EXPRESSIVE belongs to the present. SIGNIFICANT is indicative also of the future. The expressive appeals more directly to the senses; the significant, to the understanding. EXPRESSIVE stands to feeling as SIGNIFICANT to fact.

"The new name was always *significant*, and for the most part, when given by Divine authority, predictive of some peculiarity in the character, the life, the achievements, or the destiny of the person on whom it was imposed."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"The murrain at the end of the Third Georgic has all the *expressiveness* that words can give it."—ADDISON.

SIGNIFY. DENOTE.

DENOTE (Lat. *denŏtare, to mark out*) is to SIGNIFY (*see* SIGNIFICANT) by an outward sign, and so is less wide in its application than SIGNIFY, inasmuch as it is always patent and direct, while SIGNIFY may be covert and indirect. There is a distinctness of exposition in DENOTE which does not belong to SIGNIFY. The dove does not signify innocence, nor the lamb gentleness; but they denote those qualities when employed as symbols. As signify stands to sign, so denote stands to symbol. That which denotes marks out plainly; whereas we often require a key to ascertain a signification. The hands of the clock do not signify, they denote, the hour. Simple things or objects are denoted, complex signified.

"Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries *signify* to another, 'This is mine: that is yours; I am willing to give this for that.'"—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"'He hath given to the poor.' These words *denote* the freeness of his bounty, and determine the principal objects thereof."—BARROW.

SILLY. SIMPLE.

SILLINESS (A. S. *sælig, happy, blessed*), like innocence, has deteriorated in meaning. An innocent is now sometimes used for an imbecile or idiotic person. So SILLY meant at first innocent, happy; hence, not up to the world's ways—child*like*, and afterwards child*ish*. Silliness is energetic SIMPLICITY (Fr. *simplicité*, Lat. *simplĭcĭtātem*). The simple person is behind the world, and so in the transactions of life likely to be duped. The silly person wants judgment or experience, and so is continually acting out false ends and mis-estimating the comparative force, value, and significance of things. SILLY is active; SIMPLE, passive. The simple is deceived by others. The silly betrays himself. Simplicity is allied to ignorance; silliness, to folly. In the present sense, SIMPLE is more peculiarly an epithet of persons. SILLY extends farther; as, a silly speech, book, notion, manner. Simplicity is stolid. Silliness is frivolous.

"What can be more *sillily* arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing?"—LOCKE.

"Beseeching your excellence to defend
My *simplenesse*, if ignoraunce offend
In any wise." CHAUCER.

SIMPLE. SINGLE.

SIMPLE (*see* SILLY) denotes the existence of a thing apart from other things of *any* kind; SINGLE (Lat. *singŭlus*, more commonly plur. *singŭli, one apiece*), from other things of the *same* kind. If a direction began, "Take a simple sheet of paper," this would mean that no other article was required. If, "Take a single sheet," this would mean that only one sheet was required.

SIMPLE. PLAIN.

SIMPLE (Lat. *simplex*) marks the opposite to that which is compound, complex, or complicated. That is simple materially which is of one substance, that is simple mechanically which is of uniform structure, and has one force or purpose, that is simple morally which has one purpose or design, as simplicity is in this sense opposed to duplicity.

That is PLAIN (Fr. *plain*, Lat. *plānus*) which is smooth, open, clear, unencumbered, and so obvious, manifest, unmistakeable. That which is simple needs not to be explained, that which is plain has already explained itself. A simple statement is uninvolved, not abstruse, not including many meanings, and so equivocal or ambiguous. A plain state-

ment is not uncertain or obscure, but lies naked and open, so that to look at it or hear it is to understand it. That which is hard to understand is not plain, that which is difficult to understand is not simple. So the simplest expression in a language is not plain to him who does not understand that language. The stammerer is unintelligible, not because he does not speak simply, but because he does not speak plainly. Simplicity regards primarily the nature of the object or subject, plainness the faculties of the person to perceive and understand it. If one man speaks simply, it is the fault of the other if he does not understand plainly.

SINGULAR. EXTRAORDINARY.

There is always something singular (Lat. *singŭlaris, alone of its kind*) in the extraordinary (Lat. *extraordĭnārius, without the usual order*), and something extraordinary in the singular, whether the case be favourably or unfavourably regarded. That which is singular is, as its name indicates, unique, standing aloof from others, having a character of its own. EXTRAORDINARY is that which is out of the common order or the common measure, uncommon, unusual. The extraordinary is unlike its kind. The singular is, as it were, a kind of its own. Rare qualities, exclusive properties, distinctive features make the singular. Excess or defect, greatness or smallness, in relation to an established or natural standard, make the extraordinary. The extraordinary strikes by comparison, the singular by not admitting of it. The force of the magnet is singular. The power of steam is extraordinary. Every man who has any originality or independence of character must be to some extent singular. Every man who is possessed of any force or energy of nature is to some certain extent extraordinary. One may be singular in trivial things, as, for instance, common opinions, or style of dress; but the extraordinary is more pronounced, and therefore more important. Singular is an epithet of things, fine, delicate, rare, subtle, refined. Extraordinary of things lofty, beautiful, sublime, or excellent. When taken in bad part, SINGULAR offends nature, truth, simplicity, justice, propriety; EXTRAORDINARY is extravagant, disproportioned, excessive, uncongenial. The singular surprises, the extraordinary astonishes.

SINUOUS. TORTUOUS.

The difference between these terms is much illustrated by a simple attention to their etymology.

The SINUOUS (Lat. *sĭnus, a fold*) goes in *folds*, the TORTUOUS (Lat. *torquĕre*, part. *tortus, to twist*) goes in *twists*. That is tortuous which twists about, that is sinuous which winds, doubles, and re-doubles, so as to form deep curves or folds. A winding stream which scoops hollows in its banks, is well termed sinuous. A road which is far from straight may well be termed tortuous. SINUOUS is more commonly applied to things which have course and movement, while TORTUOUS expresses the characteristic form. The winding stream has its sinuosities. The path along its bank is tortuous. TORTUOUS has a moral application in which SINUOUS does not share. It involves ideas of violence, covertness, disorder, purposed indirectness, evasion, and the like. A tortuous policy is that which aims covertly, indirectly, evasively, and is wanting in straightforwardness, ease, and simplicity.

SITE. PLACE. SPOT.

The SITE (Lat. *sĭtus*) is the area on which stands a building or a collection of buildings, or some form of human habitation, permanent or temporary, and is not employed in any other relation; as the site of a mansion, or a city, or an ancient camp.

PLACE (Fr. *place*, Lat. *plătĕa, a street or open court*) is, in its broadest acceptation, any portion of space measured off, either actually or by the mind, from other space.

A SPOT (originally meaning the mark made by something dropped or splashed, probably one of many

similar imitative words) is a small extent of space defined with exactness. "I search for the site of an old house. I know, generally, that this is the place to look for it; yet I cannot find the spot."

The *site*, the wealth, the beauty of the place,
Will soon inform thee 'tis imperious Rome,
Rome, the great mistress of the conquered world."

BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

"As in simple space we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points, so in our idea of *place* we consider the relation of distance betwixt anything and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest."—LOCKE.

"A jolly place, said he, in times of old,
But something ails it now; the *spot* is cursed." WORDSWORTH.

SITUATION. POSITION.

The following remarks are in addition to what has been observed elsewhere on these two words. The idea which is common to the two terms SITUATION and POSITION, is that of resting upon something, upon some base. SITUATION expresses the idea of occupying a place, POSITION that of being made to stand. SITUATION embraces all the relations of a thing, POSITION that of direction only. Situation, which is a thing dependent upon circumstances, has no rule to determine it. Position is or is not according to rule. A situation is pleasant or unpleasant, easy or otherwise, happy or otherwise, embarrassing or otherwise. A position just or otherwise, true or false, right or wrong, direct or oblique. We find ourselves in a situation, and take up a position. The situation of an army is the sum of its surrounding circumstances, its position is the ground it has taken up with a view to attack or defence. As employed of the moral state and circumstances of persons, POSITION points rather to their permanent, SITUATION to their occasional state. I am not in a situation to help you, would mean that the circumstances of my present condition do not allow it. I am not in a position to do so, would mean that I do not occupy such a place in life as would give me a vantage ground in any such attempt.

SITUATION. SITE.

Both of these are from the Lat. *Situs, a situation.* A thing stands in a situation, and rests upon a site. The situation embraces all the local aspects and relationships in which a thing is placed. The site is confined to the ground on which it is erected or reposes. In English SITE has no other than a physical meaning. Situation is also circumstantial. We use the term SITE whenever there is a question about *exact* location. Hence the term expresses inaccurately the place on which something existed, or within the area of which it was confined. So we venture to speak of the site of an ancient town, and yet more questionably of an ancient forest or garden.

SITUATION. STATE.

SITUATION has in it more of the accidental and transient, STATE more of the habitual and permanent; an awkward situation, a bad state of health. Sometimes, however, the situation is permanent and the state variable, but this is when they are affected by the peculiar nature of the objects of which they are predicated. The situation of a house is permanent because the house itself is fixed. A man may be in a precarious state of health, because human life is a changeable and uncertain thing. Nevertheless, taken by itself, the state is more lasting than the situation. The situation results from the accidents of position. The state is the whole intrinsic manner of being. Situations vary infinitely. States are definite though abstract, as a state of health or disease, want or competency, a state of nature. Situation is the fluctuating condition of individuals. State is a certain condition of things. Without money in your pocket, though you may have plenty at home, you may chance to find yourself in the situation of a poor man; but it will be no slight consolation to you in your temporary difficulty to feel that at least you are not in a state of

poverty. The mind is in a situation of tranquillity when it is removed beyond the reach of disturbing influences, it is in a state of tranquillity when it is at peace with itself. The actual exemption from troubles constitutes its situation in the first case, the sum of the conditions necessary for its continued peace constitute its state in the second. A state of affairs gives the idea of something less likely soon to alter than a situation of affairs. Your affairs are in a good situation when they afford you an opportunity of advantageous action. They are in a good state when you yourself are prosperous.

SKETCH. DELINEATION. OUTLINE.

The first (Fr. *esquisse, a sketch*) fills up the outline in part, giving a few broad touches, by which a lively though imperfect idea is gained; while OUTLINE gives no more than the bounding lines of the scene or picture. It is not, however, necessary that the contour of a perfect figure should be given by an outline, which may be only partial.

DELINEATION (Lat. *delineare, to mark out a line*) goes further than the others, having for its aim a fuller conception and larger representation. The object of an outline is to give some notion, however meagre; of a sketch, some representation, however imperfect; of a delineation, some amount of accurate knowledge. In the secondary sense, we speak of the outline of a plan, work, or project; a sketch of an object, character, or proceedings, where a *lively*, a delineation where an *accurate*, impression is sought to be conveyed. An outline is drawn for one's own guidance. A delineation is given for the information of another. Delineation lends itself better to mental, as sketch to physical, objects. A delineation is an imperfect description; as a sketch is an imperfect representation. OUTLINE is employed of things literary as well as artistic, and SKETCH of the process of description. Outlines of history, sketches of character, delineations of schemes or projects.

"The method of Rubens was to *sketch* his compositions in colours, with all the parts more determined than *sketches* generally are. From this *sketch* his scholars advanced the picture as far as they were capable; after which he retouched the whole himself."—REYNOLDS.

"Pen the contours and *outlines* with a more even and acute touch."—EVELYN.

"We, in the writings of the Evangelists, have a complete summary of His triennial preaching; we have joined with the detail of many of His miracles the *delineation* of His character, and the history of His wonderful life of piety and love."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

SKIN. HIDE.

The SKIN (A. S. *scin, the skin*) is the external membranous covering of animal bodies. It is used generically for the same covering, whether in life, or after it is stripped from the body, as green, dry, or tanned.

HIDE (A. S. *hýd, the skin, a hide*) is also used of the skin dressed or raw, but commonly used of the undressed skins of pachydermatous animals, as oxen and horses, and especially such as are prepared as leather. It is only used contemptuously of the human skin.

SLACK. LOOSE.

SLACK (A. S. *sleac, slæc, slack, gentle*) is used in secondary physical senses, as a slack pace; but in its primary physical sense it is only employed of such cord-like substances as are capable of tying and tension.

LOOSE (A. S. *leas, false, loose, weak*), on the other hand, has a wider meaning, and extends to substances which do not admit of these, as, to go about loose, which means unfastened. "His coat sits loose." In the moral application we speak of slackness in reference to energy and enterprise; looseness, in reference to principles of conduct or obligation. Looseness is unfixedness. Slackness is fixedness without tension.

"What means the bull,
Unconscious of his strength, to play the coward,
And flee before a feeble thing like man,
That knowing well the *slackness* of his arm,
Trusts only in the well-invented knife."
BLAIR.

"All the bonds and restraints under

which men say, He so far *loosed*, that any man might be free who would concur to his own liberty and enlargement."—BARROW.

SLANT. SLOPE.

A SLANT (Sw. *slinta, to slide*) is a deviation from a perpendicular *line*.

A SLOPE (acc. to WEDGWOOD, hanging like a *slack*, Dut. *slap, rope*) inclines from an horizontal *plane*, and so is a direction downwards. The masts of ships are often purposely made to slant. The side of a hill slopes. The inclined plane is made to slope.

"The *slant* lightning, whose thwart flame driv'n down,
Kindles the gummy bark of fir or pine."
MILTON.

"The *slope* of faces, from the floor to th' roof,
As if one master-spring controlled them all,
Relaxed into a universal grin."
COWPER.

SLEEP. SLUMBER. DOZE.

SLEEP (A. S. *sláp*) is the natural and periodical suspension of the functions of the organs of sense.

SLUMBER (A. S. *slumerian, to slumber*) is to sleep lightly, except in the poetic style, in which it means sleep.

"He at last fell into a *slumber*, and thence into a fast *sleep*."—BUNYAN.

"From carelessness it shall fall into a *slumber*, and from a *slumber* it shall settle into a deep and long *sleep*."—SOUTH.

DOZE (Icel. *dúsa, to doze*) indicates an unsound sleep, such as may be taken at regular hours under indisposition, or at irregular hours at uncertain intervals.

"The one side resembles Cerberus barking for a sop. The other resembles him when, after he has received it, he wraps himself up in his own warm skin and enjoys a comfortable *doze*."—KNOX, *Essays*.

The last of these terms is too familiar to be employed in secondary meanings; but we speak of the slumber of indolence and the long sleep of death.

SLENDER. THIN.

SLENDER (O. Dut. *slinder, thin*) is thin or narrow in proportion to circumference or width, as, a slender stem or stalk of a plant. The proportion of height to circumference is very considerable. It is used in secondary senses, as = feeble, inconsiderable, meagre, spare. A slender hope, argument, pittance, diet.

THIN (A. S. *thyn, thin, lean*) is the generic term. That substance is thin in which there is relatively a small interval between the opposite surfaces. A thing may be thin and short at the same time; but SLENDER denotes proportionate length. THIN has its secondary and analogous senses; as, the opposite to dense, thin air, or thin crops; flimsy, as a thin disguise or pretext.

SLIGHT (Ger. *schlecht, bad, mean*) has the wide sense of wanting in force, mark, and so in strength or importance; as, a slight bruise, a slight figure; hence, secondarily, a slight impression, slight importance.

SLIM (Ger. *schlimm, awry, bad, weak, sly*) is restricted to the human figure, or what is analogous to it, that is, to objects which may be supposed to stand erect, like it, as a tree or a column.

"Hire middel smal, hire armes long and *sclendre*." CHAUCER.

"Where *thinly* scattered lay the heaps of dead." POPE, *Homer*.

"Nor should you suffer yourselves to suspect that the weight of this argument is at all diminished if there be others accounted in the rank of learned men who have affected to think *slightly* of the religion of their country."—WARBURTON.

"A *slim* excuse."—BARROW.

SLOW. TARDY.

SLOW (A. S. *sláw*), the simple and generic term, has many meanings which are not comprised by TARDY (Lat. *tardus, slow*) as, wanting rapidity of movement, a slow stream; long or late in happening, as the time comes slowly; not ready in thought or in action, as slow of speech. TARDY is a term of habit, denoting a habit of being behindhand. Tardiness implies only a slowness antecedent to a certain point, which may be followed by activity; but slowness is characteristic of movement, operation, and process throughout.

"Having uttered some words which we were very sorry we could not understand, he went back to his companions, and the whole body *slowly* retreated."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"Those words of our Lord to Nicodemus express some kind of marvel at his *slowness* of apprehension: 'Art thou a master of Israel and knowest not these things?'"—WATERLAND.

TARDINESS being Latin, and so a more polite term, lends itself more easily to express the idea of slowness in its most abstract form. Yet merely mechanical motion is not expressed by TARDINESS, which is only employed where slowness is contemplated in connexion with some quality which has induced it.

"His *tardiness* of execution exposes him to the encroachments of those who catch a hint and fall to work."—*Idler.*

SMOOTH. EVEN.

That is SMOOTH (A.S. *smēðe, smeð, smooth*) which is so EVEN (A.S. *efen*) as to be absolutely free from all inequalities. That is even which is free from any considerable protuberances and depressions. A polished table-top is smooth. A country in which are no abrupt undulations is even. In their secondary application, we use EVEN of character and temper in a favourable, SMOOTH of demeanour in an unfavourable, sense. A smooth speech or smile is one which avoids offence, but is of doubtful sincerity. Evenness of disposition. Smoothness of tongue.

"So the carpenter encouraged the goldsmith, and he that *smootheth* with the hammer him that smote the anvil."—*English Bible.*

"This *even-handed* justice
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips." SHAKESPEARE.

SOCIAL. CONVIVIAL. SOCIABLE.

SOCIAL (Lat. *sŏcĭālis, sŏcius, a companion*) has the senses of pertaining to society, or the aggregate body of the public, and disposed to mix in friendly converse, or consisting in such converse. It is therefore a term of much wider extent than the other two.

The convivial (Lat. *convīvālis*, pertaining to a *guest, convīvium*) is the social in matters of feasting or festivity. We speak of convivial meetings in reference to the enjoyments of the table; of social meetings, in reference to the interchange of kindly or congenial conversation. SOCIABLE superadds to the idea of social, as a personal quality, a certain aptitude to promote the ends of conversation and society. A man fond of mixing in company, but of a taciturn disposition, is social, not sociable. SOCIAL implies, in short, active, SOCIABLE, passive, aptness for society. He is social who associates with others. He is sociable who is capable of being associated with. Man is a social animal; but all men are not sociable. SOCIAL is a property of the race; SOCIABLE, of the individual. SOCIAL, therefore, refers to the natural desire of men, collectively, to congregate in society; SOCIABLE, to the particular inclination of some to continual intercourse with their neighbours, or with friends and acquaintances, whom, for the most part, they are not scrupulous, diffident, or nice in selecting. Hence SOCIAL is more an epithet of manners or nature; SOCIABLE of persons.

"Thou, in thy secrecy, although alone,
Best with thyself accompanied, seek'st not
Social communication." MILTON.

"Rather he was a man of great benignity and pleasantness, and *sociableness* in his conversation, witness his frequent vouchsafing his presence at feasts and entertainments."—SHARP.

"Kind laughter and *convivial* joy."
AKENSIDE.

SOLE. SOLITARY.

SOLITARY (Lat. *sōlĭtārius*) and SOLE, both derived from the Lat. *sōlus, alone*, differ as synonyms in expressing the former, that oneness which is the result of external, the latter of internal limitation. "The landscape did not furnish even a solitary tree." "This was the sole ground of his defence." This comes of the fact that SOLITARY commonly expresses physical isolation, or isolation as a bare fact; SOLE, isolation morally. SOLITARY is also negative; SOLE, positive. Solitary is that which is simply unaccompanied. SOLE denotes that which is capable of acting by itself. A solitary instance of patriotism; or, the sole

defender of his country's cause. That is sole which is able to exist alone. That is solitary which is compelled to exist apart. The force of SOLE has been exactly hit in a passage given from Sir E. Dering's speeches under the article SOLE in Richardson's Dictionary—

"This ambition of a *sole* power, this dangerous *soleship*, is a fault in our Church indeed."

"Who out of smallest things could without end
Have raised incessant armies to defeat
Thy folly; or with *solitary* hand,
Reaching beyond all limit, at one blow,
Unaided, could have finished thee, and whelmed
Thy legions under darkness." MILTON.

SOLICITUDE. CARE. CONCERN. ANXIETY.

CARE (A. S. *cáru*) is the most indefinite of these, being sometimes attended with pain, and sometimes not, according to the nature of the object and the degree of intensity of mental application; from the corroding care which besets him who can with difficulty find means of subsistence for himself and his family, to the ordinary care which is bestowed upon objects which ought not to be neglected or injured, and is altogether painless.

SOLICITUDE (Lat. *sōlĭcĭtūdĭnem*), ANXIETY (Lat. *anxius*, *angĕre*, *to throttle*), and CONCERN (Fr. *concerner*, *to belong to*, Lat. *concernĕre*, *to sift together*) are all confined to the mind, being not, like care, capable of a practical meaning. Solicitude is made up of desire and a feeling of uncertainty. Anxiety is made up of fear and a feeling of uncertainty. I feel solicitude when I wish strongly that something shall be according to my intentions, hopes, or plans, yet feel the probability of its not being so. I feel anxiety when I desire that harm or disappointment may not come, yet feel from how many sources it may spring up at any moment. Anxiety is against possible evils. Solicitude is for positive good. Solicitude is confined to the present and the immediate future. Anxiety may run out into the distant future. Anxiety is with some persons habitual. Solicitude is felt on specific occasions. Concern is very strong interest, and, specifically, such excitement of feeling as may spring out of this; but as it is felt only in connexion with persons, it differs from the others in being less felt in regard to the future, and more to the present, and even the past. I may feel deeply concerned, not only for what may happen, but also for what *has* happened to my friend. Anxiety and solicitude, on the other hand, belong only to the future.

"Others, in virtue placed felicity—
But virtue joined with riches and long life;
In corporal pleasure, he, and *careless* ease."
MILTON.

"The statesman, lawyer, merchant, man of trade,
Pants for the refuge of some rural shade,
Where, all his long *anxieties* forgot,
Amid the charms of a sequestered spot,
He may possess the joys he thinks he sees."
COWPER.

"Hence we are bid to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, with a holy *solicitude*."—SCOTT, *Christian Life*.

"I strove a thousand ways to lessen her care, and even forgot my own pain in a *concern* for hers."—GOLDSMITH.

SOLID. FIRM. SUBSTANTIAL. COMPACT.

SOLID (Lat. *sŏlĭdus*) denotes that which has firm texture and consistency of parts. It is opposed to liquid, fluid, hollow, or incompact. It differs in degree according to the degree of such firmness or consistency, according as it resists partially or entirely efforts made to penetrate it.

SUBSTANTIAL (Lat. *substantia*) is opposed to that which has no consistency at all. All objects that admit of being handled are more or less substantial.

FIRM (Lat. *firmus*) denotes that which either in its integral form or its component particles resists movement or displacement. Meat, in distinction to drink, is solid food. Substantial food is that which is capable of giving fulness, nourishment, and support to the body. The post driven fast and deep into the ground is firm. The flesh which is not flabby is firm. We use these terms in secondary senses. Solid attainments, substantial benefits, firm convictions, and the like.

"The idea of *solidity* we receive by our touch, and it arises from the resistance which we find in a body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses till it has left it."—LOCKE.

"For if you speak of an acquired, rational, and discursive faith, certainly these reasons which make the object seem credible must be the cause of it, and consequently the strength and *firmity* of my assent must rise and fall together with the apparent credibility of the object."—CHILLINGWORTH.

"Even as his first progenitor, and quits,
Though placed in Paradise (for earth has still
Some traces of her youthful beauty left),
Substantial happiness for transient joy."
COWPER.

That is COMPACT (Lat. *compingĕre*, part. *compactus*, *to fasten together*) of which the particles are densely close, or the component parts so arranged as to occupy little comparative space. It is opposed to diffuse, disjointed, flabby.

"A different spinning every different web
Asks from your glowing fingers; some require
The more *compact*, and some the looser wreath."
DYER.

SOLVE. RESOLVE.

These are the simple and a compound form of the Lat. *solvĕre*, to loose or melt. SOLVE is used when there is but one fixed and positive explanation to be arrived at; RESOLVE, when there is a difficulty to be disposed of. We solve a problem, by doing it. We resolve a difficulty by undoing it. To solve is simply to remove doubt or difficulty. To resolve is to remove it by *referring* it to first principles or corresponding ones. Hence the phrase, "Resolve into." "A body of very considerable weight has to be raised. How is the problem to be solved? It is resolved, or resolves itself, into a question of mechanics."

"And as that Theban monster that proposed
Her riddle, and him who *solved* it not devoured,
That once found out and *solved*, for grief and spite,
Cast herself headlong from th' Ismenian steep,
So, struck with dread and anguish, fell the fiend."
MILTON.

"Positive precepts, though we are used to consider them merely as prescribed, and to *resolve* them commonly into the mere will and pleasure of the Legislator, yet are always founded upon reasons known, perhaps, in part to us, but perfectly known to God; and so they are ultimately *resolvable* into infinite wisdom and goodness."—WATERLAND.

SORRY. GRIEVED. HURT.

SORRY (*see* SORROW) and GRIEVED (Lat. *grăvāre*, *to burden*) differ from the nouns *sorrow* and *grief* in being used in a lighter sense and of more ordinary matters. We are commonly sorry for what is on our own account, and grieved on account of another. To be grieved is more than to be sorry. "I am sorry that I was not at home when you called." "I was much grieved to hear the loss he had sustained."

HURT (*see* HURT) is used of wounded feelings, and denotes the sense of having been treated unfairly, inconsiderately, or without due respect. We are sorry for circumstances. We are grieved at acts and conduct. We are hurt by treatment or behaviour.

"I am *sorry* for thee, friend, 'tis the Duke's pleasure."—SHAKESPEARE.

"He doth not willingly afflict nor *grieve* the children of men."—*English Bible.*

"No man is *hurt*, at least few are so, by hearing his neighbour esteemed a worthy man."—BLAIR.

SOVEREIGN. SUPREME.

The idea involved in the term SOVEREIGN (O. Fr. *soverain*, Lat. *sŭpĕrānus*) is that of the greatest power.

The idea of SUPREME (Lat. *suprēmus*, from the same root *super*) is that of the highest rank. In every case and application, then, the thing which is supreme is the most raised, whether this be in authority, power, influence, or efficacy. So, too, independent and absolute authority makes sovereignty or the sovereign, inasmuch as such authority is above all. Every thing is inferior in rank to that which is supreme. Every thing is subject to the influence of that which is sovereign. A sovereign remedy is efficacious in the supreme degree, and being regarded not as to rank but power is therefore called sovereign and not supreme. God is the supreme Being inasmuch as He is emphatically the

self-existent one, He is the sovereign lord of all things inasmuch as He is the Almighty, and the moral ruler and governor of the universe.

SOUND. SANE. HEALTHY.

SOUND (A.S. *sûnd, sound, healthy*) is extended to all bodies, animate or inanimate, which are materially in their normal condition; not subject, that is, to rupture, decay, or imperfection. Hence it is employed in a secondary sense of what is efficient; as, a sound opinion; sound advice; sound sleep, that is unbroken; sound justice, that is impartial.

SANE (Lat. *sānus*) is, in modern English, seldom employed of the body, but only of the mind. A sane man is a man of sound mind. SOUND is a term conveying some degree of praise. SANE is no more than the opposite to insane.

HEALTHY (A.S. *hǽlð*) denotes more than sound, though it is applicable only to the frames and constitutions of organized things. A sound body is without defect. A healthy body is in the enjoyment of life. A sound tree grows. A healthy tree is luxuriant in growth. Soundness may be tested. Healthiness speaks for itself. It is analogously applied; as, a healthy tone of public morals.

"I would I had that corporal *soundness* now,
As when thy father and myself in friendship
First tried our soldiership."
SHAKESPEARE.

"A happiness that often madness hits on,
Which *sanity* and reason could not be
So prosperously delivered of." *Ibid.*

"Charles of Sweden is of a very vigorous and *healthy* constitution, takes a pleasure in enduring the greatest fatigues, and is little curious about his repose."—BURNET.

It may be observed that, while SOUND and SANE are only expressive of passive qualities, HEALTHY has also an active force, in the sense of imparting health; or a relative force, as consistent with health; as, a healthy draught, a healthy climate.

SPEAK. TALK.

Communication by verbal signs is common to these words. SPEAK (A.S. *spécan*) is indefinite, and may involve one word or many. A person recovering from insensibility may be just able to speak, though not to talk (A.S. *tal, number, tale, talk*), which is to speak consecutively and on divers subjects. The word is allied to "tell." Speech is of one. Talk may be shared by several. To speak is a characteristic of man; to talk, of loquacious man.

"They sat down with him upon the ground seven days and seven nights, and none *spake* a word unto him."—*English Bible.*

"Their *talk*, when it was not made up of nautical phrases, was too commonly made up of oaths and curses."—MACAULAY.

SPECIAL or ESPECIAL. SPECIFIC. PARTICULAR. PECULIAR.

SPECIAL and SPECIFIC are both derived from Lat. *spĕcies;* PARTICULAR is the Lat. *partĭcŭlāris, partem, a part.* Special comes under general, as species under genus. A general rule applies to the largest range of cases; a special rule, to a narrower range; while SPECIFIC and PARTICULAR point to individual cases, yet as coming under the species or the whole. PARTICULAR divides the individual from others; SPECIFIC connects it with what is predicated concerning it. This appears in the verbs *specify* and *particularize.* To particularize is to take the subject to pieces, and show what it is made up of. To specify is distinctly to point out what it is we speak about. We specify by one. We particularize by many in detail.

PECULIAR (Lat. *pĕcŭliaris, relating to pĕcŭlium, one's own property*) qualifies that which belongs to an individual or to a class. PARTICULAR qualifies what belongs to one sort or kind only, exclusively of others; hence PECULIAR stands to PARTICULAR as the individual to the species or genus. The particular flavour of the pine-apple is that which distinguishes it from other kinds of fruit. But if we were doubtful about the taste of a particular pine-apple, we should say that it had a peculiar flavour. As to the substantives, PARTICULARS are minor circumstances, which constitute the details of complex ideas or occurrences;

peculiarities are qualities which attach to individual objects or persons.

"But it is rather manifest that the essence of spirits is a substance *specifically* distinct from all corporeal matter whatsoever."—MORE.

Both SPECIAL and SPECIFIC mean, in the first instance, pertaining to or constituting a species; but SPECIFIC generally means indicative of a particular thing; SPECIAL, relating to a particular purpose. "I mentioned it specifically." "I have reserved it specially." And in this way both seem often to belong to individuals, the whole idea of *species* being lost. A specific Act of Parliament is one definitively pointed out. A special Act of Parliament is one framed to meet a particular case. Hence SPECIAL has sometimes the force of chief, prominent, and the like, as being that to which observation or regard is more particularly directed.

"Our Saviour is represented everywhere in Scripture as the *special* patron of the poor and afflicted."—BISHOP ATTERBURY.

"In fact, all medicines will be found *specific* in the perfection of the science."—COLERIDGE.

"Of this prince there is little *particular* memory."—BACON.

That which is particular is *distinguished from* the rest. That which is peculiar is *unlike* the rest. PARTICULAR is an absolute term; PECULIAR is relative. A particular property is *one*, and not another. A peculiar property belongs to *one thing*, and not to another.

"The gods still listened to their constant prayer,
And made the poets their *peculiar* care."
PITT.

SPECK. SPOT. MOTTLE.

A SPECK (A. S. *specca, a speck, blemish*) is a small spot. So a ground of one colour, as the tawny hide of a leopard, would be called SPOTTED, if the foreign maculations bore some considerable proportion to the ground covered; SPECKLED, if each were inconsiderable in itself, and especially if they were not conspicuous. If they were still further so, and the colours were different, or of different shades, it would be said to be MOTTLED (O. Fr. *mattelé, curdled*).

SPECTATOR. BEHOLDER. OBSERVER.

A SPECTATOR (Lat. *spectātor, spectāre, to look on, to gaze at*) is a looker on. The term is indefinite. He may be concerned or unconcerned with what he sees. The term, however, implies a more or less complex character in that which engages his attention.

The BEHOLDER (A. S. *behealdan, t. hold, observe, guard*) views with some degree of interest what he sees. The OBSERVER looks on attentively, and takes account of particulars, and receives impressions, on which he subsequently reflects. Generally speaking, the spectator is interested or uninterested; the beholder is attentive or inattentive; the observer is close or casual.

"Two powers divine the son of Atreus aid,
Imperial Juno and the martial maid;
But high in heaven they sit, and gaze from far,
The tame *spectators* of his deeds of war."
POPE, *Homer.*

"I frequently offered to turn my sight another way, but was still detained by the fascination of the peeper's eyes, who had long practised a skill in them to recall the parting glances of her *beholders*."—*Spectator.*

"I do love
To note and to *observe*, though I live out
Free from the active torrent; yet I'd mark
The currents and the passages of things
For mine own private use, and know the ebbs
And flows of state." BEN JONSON.

SPECULATION. THEORY.

SPECULATION (Lat. *spĕcŭlāri, to spy out, explore*) is closely akin, etymologically, to THEORY, which is the Greek θεωρία, from θεωρεῖν, *to speculate*. But speculation is carried on by the use of common judgment and common sense upon the transactions of life; theory, upon scientific matters by the exercise of the scientific faculties.

"Sudden fortunes, indeed, are sometimes made in such places by what is called the trade of *speculation*. The speculative merchant exercises no one regular established or well-known branch of business."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"*Theory* is a general collection of infe-

rences drawn from facts and compressed into principles."—PARR.

SPEND. EXPEND.

SPEND (A. S. *spendan, to consume, spend*), is a term which we use indefinitely; EXPEND (Lat. *expendĕre, to weigh out in payment, to expend*), relatively. He who spends simply pays out. He who expends pays out from a particular source and on a particular object. "He spent so much at college," tells no more than the amount. "He expended so much," would mean such a proportion of his income as he set apart for some purpose, whatever it may have been. Yet it deserves to be remarked that EXPEND has generally the character of sober purpose. We spend, not expend, money upon frivolities.

"Why do ye *spend* money for that which is not bread?"—*English Bible.*

"This duty implies a due esteem and valuation of benefits, that the nature and quality, the measure and quantity, the circumstances and consequences of them be well *expended*; else the gratitude is like to be none, or very defective."—BARROW.

SPONTANEOUS. WILLING. VOLUNTARY.

These terms diminish in force in the order here given. SPONTANEOUS (Lat. *spontāneus, of one's own accord*) is employed of that which bursts forth from some inherent force of nature, and may be even independent of will; as, a spontaneous burst of applause. Hence it is applicable to inanimate things. WILLING expresses a free action of the will congenially exercised; but it more commonly relates to what is done in accordance with the desire of others; while VOLUNTARY (Lat. *vŏluntarius*) implies that the motive lay in oneself. "He did it voluntarily," that is, he proceeded to do it of his own accord. "He did it willingly," that is, he readily acceded to the request or proposal to do it. VOLUNTARY is not so strong as WILLING; for WILLING implies a preference of the will; while any deed may be called voluntary which is *not involuntary* or compulsory.

"By *spontaneity* is meant inconsiderate action, or else nothing is meant by it."—HOBBS.

"'Tis impossible but they must wish God would be pleased particularly to signify expressly the acceptableness of repentance, and His *willingness* to forgive returning sinners."—CLARKE.

"Nothing is more certain than that God acts not necessarily but *voluntarily* with particular intention and design, knowing that He does good, and intending to do so freely and out of choice, and when He has no other constraint upon Him but this, that His goodness inclines His will to communicate Himself and to do good."—CLARKE.

SPRING. FOUNTAIN. SOURCE.

The SPRING (A. S. *spring, a spring, fountain-head*) is the hidden origin of the stream where the water rises mechanically from the earth.

The term FOUNTAIN (Fr. *fontaine*), as now employed, denotes a jet or stream of water artificially produced. The water from a fountain falls splashing from some degree of elevation. The Geyser springs of Iceland project themselves to a considerable height into the air like a natural fountain; but, being natural, are not called fountains.

The SOURCE (Fr. *source*, Lat. *sursa, a spring*, BRACHET; from *surgĕre, to rise*) of a stream follows upon the spring, and is measured from the point where the water begins to flow laterally. The two latter are used in a secondary sense; SOURCE, in the way of that which produces a continuous supply; FOUNTAIN, in the higher and more mystical style, as, "The eternal Fount of truth and light;" "The king is the fountain of honour." SPRING is used less often directly, as Bentley, "A secret spring of spiritual joy."

"Upon the *sprynge* of freshe welles,
She stope to dwell and no where elles."
GOWER.

"And in the midst of all a *fountain* stood,
Of richest substance that on earth might be,
So pure and shiny, that the silver flood
Through every channel running one might see."
SPENSER.

"If there is any one English word which is now become virtually literal in its metaphorical application, it is the word *source*. Who is it that ever thought of a *spring* or *fountain* of water in speaking of God as the

source of existence, of the sun as the *source* of light and heat, of land as one of the *sources* of national wealth, or of sensation and reflection as the only *sources* (according to Locke) of human knowledge?—propositions which it would not be easy to enunciate with equal clearness and conciseness in any other manner."—STEWART.

SPY. EMISSARY.

The SPY (Fr. *espier*, now *epier*) is a less formal term than EMISSARY (Lat. *ēmissārius, an emissary, spy, ēmittĕre, to send forth*). A spy is, indefinitely, one set to watch others. In war, or between hostile nations, the spy enters the enemy's camp or territory, but for the mere purpose of observation. His safety depends on his being unrecognized. The emissary is sometimes not afraid of being recognized, and mingles in the councils of the enemy, which he endeavours to influence. The commonest and meanest of men may be spies. A certain degree of intelligence and responsibility are associated with the emissary, who is more fully acknowledged by those who depute him, though not officially; while spies generally carry on their business on their own account. A clever spy may be promoted to be an emissary. A person may turn spy for himself; but appointment makes the emissary. The spy plays a simple and negative part, the part of the emissary is manifold and active. He will raise false reports, or spread suggestions, and is a tool of agitation, while a spy is only a tool of information.

"As each is known to be a *spy* upon the rest, they all live in continual restraint, and having but a narrow range for censure, they gratify its cravings by preying upon one another."—*Idler*.

"But as pain is stronger in its operation than pleasure, so death is in general a much more affecting idea than pain; because there are very few pains, however exquisite, which are not preferred to death; nay, what makes pain itself, if I may say so, more painful is, that it is considered as an *emissary* to this King of Terrors."—BURKE.

STAMMER. STUTTER.

He is said to STAMMER (A. S. *stamor, stammering*) who from any cause speaks inarticulately and disjointedly, as from indecision, want of words, or natural defect of speech. He only is said to STUTTER (an onomatop word, compare Germ. *stottern*) who suffers from the last. The stammerer utters words, though with difficulty. The stutterer is frequently unable to form a word at all.

STANDARD. CRITERION. TEST.

A STANDARD (O. Fr. *estendard*, Lat. *extendĕre*) is a measure of quantity or excellence.

A CRITERION (Gr. κριτήριον, *a standard test*) is a measure of judgment; TEST (with some Lat. *testis, a witness*; with others, Lat. *testum, a clay vessel, i.e. chemist's crucible, a measure of quality*). We employ a standard to demonstrate the degree of excellence which a thing may have reached. We use a criterion as something established and approved, by which facts, principles, or acts are tried, in order to a correct judgment respecting them. A test is a trial or criterion of the most decisive kind, by which the internal properties of things or persons are tried and proved. It is capable of a *more purely physical* application than the others, as, the strength of a rope may be tested by the weight suspended. Coins, weights, and measures are fixed by governments at certain standards for the sake of uniformity in commercial transactions. Manners are a criterion of station and training. Self-denial is in most cases a test of sincerity.

"It is therefore necessary to have recourse to some visible, palpable, material *standard*, by forming a comparison with which all weights and measures may be reduced to one uniform size; and the prerogative of fixing this standard our ancient law vested in the crown."—BLACKSTONE.

"Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be the *criterion?* How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?"—LOCKE.

"Life force and beauty must to all impart,
At once the source, the end, and *test* of art." POPE.

STATE. CONDITION. SITUATION.

STATE (Lat. *stătus, position*) expresses an habitual, or permanent,

CONDITION (Lat. *conditionem, condĕre, to put together*) an accidental, and SITUATION (Lat. *sĭtus, a site*) a relative, aggregate of personal surroundings or circumstances of things. A man is born in a high, low, or intermediate state of life. His house is in good or bad condition, as it wants much or little repair. If it is in a very bad state, it may have to be pulled down. The same house is in an eligible or ineligible situation, according to the relation it bears to aspect, neighbourhood, and the like. If one is in a bad state of health, the restoration will be at least long; if in a bad condition, lighter remedies will be sufficient. All three terms are employed of social relationship. In that case a situation is specific office or employment. The condition of life bears reference to social *rank;* the state of life to social *occupation.* Money will sometimes make men forget their humble condition, and even tempt them to forget the duties of that state of life to which they belong.

"The very nature of a *state* of trial shows us the necessity of being satisfied with God's appointment of it."—GILPIN.

"Whilst the Church of Christ was subject to insults and persecution from the Pagan powers, and in a low and distressed *condition,* the Christians assembled together as often as they could, and took all possible care to instruct and animate and comfort and relieve one another."—JORTIN.

"Thus *situated,* we began to clear places in the woods, in order to set up the astronomer's observatory, the forge to repair our iron work, tents for the sail-makers and coopers to repair the sails and casks in, to land our empty casks, to fill water, and to cut down wood for fuel, all of which were absolutely necessary occupations."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

STATUE. IMAGE.

A STATUE (Fr. *statue,* Lat. *stătua*) is a solid substance carved or moulded into the likeness of a living being. The statue is more or less erect, standing or sitting. We do not speak of a recumbent statue.

The IMAGE (Lat. *ĭmāgĭnem*) is a likeness of a person or thing, and so may be of an inanimate object. The image of an object may be seen in shadow on a wall. In regard to similitudes of the same classes of objects as those represented by statues, the image is generally smaller than the statue, less artistic, and more specifically imitative.

STAY. REMAIN.

To STAY (Lat. *stare, to stand*) is to desist from motion.

REMAIN (Lat. *rĕmānēre*) is to persevere in rest. STAY is not used of impersonal objects; as we say, "when two is taken from four, two remains." To stay is a voluntary act. "I will gladly stay here;" or, "I shall be compelled to remain here." A stone remains, not stays, in the place where it is put. "The only hope that remains," we say, not stays. STAY is in some respects absolute; REMAIN, relative. That stays which no will is exerted to remove. That remains which is left after the exercise of some power or influence, especially such as remove other things in the same condition. STAY has often a reference to future, REMAIN to past, movement. "I was so fatigued with my journey that I determined to stay a day longer;" or, "I shall not remain here more than another day." Practically, the words are often interchangeable. REMAIN can hardly be employed independently when the case is one of human action, but requires the addition of words. "I cannot stay," or, "I cannot remain here any longer."

"After a *stay* of more than two months at Concordia, their number was diminished nearly one-half by sickness, in consequence of the fatigue and hardship which they had suffered by the shipwreck; and the survivors were sent in a small vessel to Europe."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"That an elder brother hath power over his brethren *remains* to be proved."—LOCKE.

STEEPLE. TOWER. SPIRE. BELFRY.

The STEEPLE (A. S. *stépel*) of a church is not, strictly speaking, an architectural feature of it. It is the highest portion of the building, the steep member, and may be a tower or a spire.

The TOWER (Fr. *tour,* Lat. *turrim*) is the steeple when it is of a rectan-

gular form or round, though church towers of the latter kind are very rare except as subordinate towers or turrets. They are also commonly battlemented.

The SPIRE (Fr. *spire*, Lat. *spira*, Gr. *σπεῖρα*, *a coil*) is an elongated pyramidal erection, based upon the tower, and belonging especially to the two intermediate periods of ecclesiastical architecture, the first and second Pointed, being unknown to the early Norman, and often purposely omitted in the Perpendicular style.

A BELFRY is the French *beffroi*; the L. Lat. *berfrēdus*, M. H. G. *bervrit*, *a watch-tower*; which it is interesting to note, if only for the purpose of warning against any connexion with bells, with which it is sometimes associated. It is at present the part of the building in which the bells are commonly hung, but according to its etymology it means not what is expressed by the modern Italian *campanile*, but a watch-tower, or tower of defence.

STOCK. STORE.

A STOCK (A. S. *stoc*, *a stock*, *trunk*) and STORE (Fr. *estorer*, *to build*, *furnish*, Lat. *instaurāre*) are employed to denote a supply of accumulated property or goods. The stock is that which is available as the means of its own increase. The store is that to which additions have to be made. The store is the result of industry; the stock is the source and foundation of it.

"The revenue or profit arising from *stock* naturally divides itself into two parts, that which pays the interest and which belongs to the owner of the *stock*, and that surplus part which is over and above what is necessary for paying the interest."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations*.

"He not only uses the whole profit of the *stock* which he employs in this manner, but a part of the *stock* itself, by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the *storing* and keeping of corn."—*Ibid.*

STORM. TEMPEST. HURRICANE.

STORM (A. S. *storm*, *storm*, *tempest*) being of northern origin, TEMPEST Lat. *tempestas*, *season*, or *weather*), bad weather, of southern origin, and HURRICANE (originally a Carib word, *huracan*) of tropical origin, express the same phenomenon, varied according to the peculiarities of different latitudes. A STORM implies violent wind disturbing clouds, woods, and seas, with rain, or perhaps snow or hail. TEMPEST is violent wind accompanied by rain, thunder, and lightning. HURRICANE is a storm of that degree of intensity which is, strictly speaking, known only within the tropics.

"A daring pilot in extremity,
Pleased with the danger when the waves went high,
He sought the *storms*." DRYDEN.

"The afternoon was *tempestuous*, with much rain, and the surf everywhere ran so high, that although we rowed almost round the bay, we found no place where we could land."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"I shall speak next of *hurricanes*. These are violent storms, raging chiefly among the Caribbee Islands, though by relation Jamaica has of late been much annoyed by them. They are expected in July, August, or September."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

STOUT. FAT. CORPULENT. LUSTY BRAWNY.

STOUT (Old Fr. *estout*, *estot*, *bold*), in our older writers, was employed to express the combination of physical strength and courage, and when it stood for either of these separately it was for the latter. Traces still remain of this use in such phrases as, "A stout heart;" "A stout resistance." It is now commonly used for thick-set or bulky, but not in excess, unless this is specifically said. It describes an appearance characteristic of strength and vigour. It is employed analogously of material substances; as, a stout plank; stout cloth; a stout vessel. In the human subject it respects the state of the muscles and bones.

FAT (A. S. *fætt*) denotes an exhibition of the oleaginous substance deposited in the cells of the adipose or cellular membrane. When this exists in superabundance, the person is said to be CORPULENT (Lat. *corpulentus*, *fleshy*, *fat*). Fat may be local or partial. CORPULENT applies to the whole body.

LUSTY (A. S. *lust*, *desire*, *delight*) is less in use now than formerly. Like

STOUT, it denotes abundance of life and vigour, and thus differs from corpulence, which may be the effect of disease.

BRAWNY (Old Fr. *braon, a piece of flesh*) indicates the union of stoutness or corporal development with muscular power.

"He was to wit a *stout* and sturdy thief,
Wont to rob churches of their ornaments,
And poor men's boxes of their due relief,
Which given was to them for good intents." SPENSER.

"All the superfluous weight of an animal beyond the vessels, bones, and muscles, is nothing but *fat*; but the conversion of the aliment into *fat* is not properly nutrition, which is a reparation of the solids and fluids."—ARBUTHNOT.

"Some labour fasting, or but slightly fed,
To lull the grinding stomach's hungry rage.
Where Nature feeds too *corpulent* a frame,
'Tis wisely done." ARMSTRONG.

"Young and *lusty* as an Eagle."—*English Bible.*

"*Brawny* limbs."—WASHINGTON IRVING.

STRAIN. STRESS. SPRAIN.

STRAIN (Lat. *stringĕre, to draw tight*) is great, perhaps undue, tension, but in a normal way or direction; as when an unusually heavy weight is suspended to a rope. We strain the voice, and, figuratively, we strain an expression; that is, we put a great or undue stretch upon it, so as to make it extend to some meaning which it does not easily and naturally express.

SPRAIN (O. Fr. *espreindre*, Lat. *exprĭmere, to press out, squeeze out*) denotes abnormal and usually sudden straining of the muscles or ligaments of a joint, and belongs to animal bodies.

STRESS (Old Eng. *stresse*, equivalent to *distress*, Lat. *distringere*) is strain, pressure, or force peculiarly and specifically exerted, whether mechanical or voluntary; as, a ship puts into port under stress, that is, peculiar pressure, of weather. We lay great stress, that is, peculiarly strong accentuation, on a particular word, or, in a secondary sense, upon an observation, remark, argument, or consideration. The distinctive idea of STRAIN is force; of SPRAIN, distortion; of STRESS, *specific* force.

"Now every English eye intent
On Branksome's armed towers was bent;
So near they were that they might know
The *straining* harsh of each cross bow."
WALTER SCOTT.

"The single-twyned cordes may no such *stresse* indure,
As caybles brayded threfold may, together wrethed sure." SURREY.

"The sudden turn may stretch the swelling vein,
The cracking joint unhinge, or ankle *sprain*." GAY.

STRAIT. NARROW. TIGHT.

It is to be regretted that the first of these terms seems gradually to have dropped more and more into disuse, till it bids fair to part with itself in two directions, and to divide its meaning between TIGHT and NARROW, neither of which can be equivalent to it. The fundamental idea of the STRAIT is restriction. If restriction from deviation, then the word means *direct*. If restriction from expansion, then it means NARROW.

NARROW (A. S. *nearo, narrow*, not related to "near") is altogether indefinite, as the mere opposite to broad; as, a narrow road, a narrow ribbon.

But STRAIT (Lat. *strictus*, from *stringĕre, to strain or draw tight*. Old Fr. *estroit*, Mod. Fr. *étroit*) denotes that kind of narrowness which is accompanied by some degree of practical pressure, confinement, restriction, or inconvenience. So we speak of straitened circumstances; a strait waistcoat.

TIGHT (Old Eng. part. passive of the verb *to tie*) denotes that which is firmly held together in its component parts, as a tight cask; fitting close to another body, as a tight coat; stretched as a rope, as opposed to loose. It is in the second of these senses that it is synonymous with STRAIT and NARROW.

"*Strait* is the gate, and *narrow* is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."—*English Bible.*

TIGHT originally meant well adapted and close fitting. The notion of violent compression is an after-growth in the use of the word.

"While they are among the English they wear good clothes, and take delight to go neat and *tight*."—DAMPIER'S *Voyages*.

"Placed so *tightly* as to squeeze myself in half my natural dimensions."—KNOX.

STREAM. CURRENT. TIDE.

STREAM (A. S. *streám*) denotes the uniform movement of a fluid or liquid body, or a body which, being composed of separate moving parts or particles, may be regarded as fluid; as, for instance, a crowd in a certain direction. It conveys the idea of uniform force operating as a cause, and a consequent steadiness in the movement of the body.

CURRENT (Lat. *currentem, running*, part. of *currĕre, to run*) expresses no more than a flow of some degree of force, and may be unsteady as to strength and direction. Hence we say, "a steady stream," "shifting currents." Smaller currents sometimes run in different, and even contrary, directions to the main stream.

TIDE (Old Eng. *tide*, meaning *time*, cf. Ger. *zeit, time*) is periodical flux and reflux of the waters of the ocean, or other waters connected with it. It originally meant *season*. So Fuller: "At the *tide* of Christ his birth." In poetry or poetical speech the periodical idea is dropped, and that of *flow* only retained. The secondary uses of the terms correspond with the primary. We go with the stream when we make our opinions or actions accord with prevalent powers and influences. We speak of the current of popular opinion as something which may at any time change its direction; of the current of our thoughts, meaning their temporary direction and flow; and of the tide of folly or of fashion, as a periodically recurrent force.

"*Streams* never flow in vain; where *streams* abound,
How laughs the land, with various plenty crowned!" COWPER.

"It is extremely vexatious to a man of eager and thirsty curiosity to be placed at a great distance from the *fountain* of intelligence, and not only never to receive the *current* of report till it has satiated the greatest part of the nation, but at last to find it muddied in its course and corrupted with taints or mixtures from every channel through which it flowed."—*Rambler*.

"There is a *tide* in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries."
SHAKESPEARE.

STRENUOUS. ENERGETIC.

STRENUOUS (Lat. *strēnuus, active, vigorous*) stands to ENERGETIC (*see* ENERGY) as effort does to force. The strenuous endeavour is that which is made with vigour and perseverance, directed to the gaining of a certain end in a certain way; while the energetic endeavour is only that which is made with lively effort. Hence STRENUOUS is only used of conscious labour, and not abstractedly. Measures and steps may be energetic, but not strenuous; though legislators may make strenuous efforts to carry certain measures, and give them legal force. An energetic attempt may be misdirected; but a strenuous attempt, whether successful or not, indicates a strength of purpose well applied. ENERGETIC qualifies both disposition and act. STRENUOUS act, but not disposition. An energetic act or person. A strenuous endeavour, not a strenuous person. The idea of energy is simple; that of strenuousness is complex, being made up of fearlessness and perseverance, besides energy.

"But what more oft in nations grown corrupt,
And by their vices brought to servitude,
Than to love bondage more than liberty,
Bondage with ease than *strenuous* liberty?"
MILTON.

The original idea of ENERGY, as derived from the Greek philosophy, was the power and mode of operation peculiar to each thing in the order of Nature.

"If, then, we will conceive of God truly, and as far as we can adequately, we must look upon Him not only as an eternal, but also as a Being eternally *energetic*."—GREW.

STRIFE. CONTENTION. DISCORD.

STRIFE (Ger. *streben, to strive*) differs from CONTENTION (Lat. *contentionem, a straining, a contest*) more in the matter of dignity than anything else. STRIFE is the plainer and com-

moner word, employed of plainer and commoner things, and carries with it the idea of low, noisy contention about things which are not worth the words and temper spent upon them. STRIFE is vulgar contention about trifles, and with the selfish and narrow end of mere personal superiority or mastery in talk. CONTENTION involves the idea of something better worth fighting for—some desired possession or end. Both words are commonly used in an unfavourable sense, though not exclusively; for we speak sometimes of a generous strife or contention in a matter of right.

DISCORD (Lat. *discordia*) differs from STRIFE as the negative from the positive. Discord involves want of unity or harmony of will or feeling, and shows itself in an inability to act in concert. Strife is positive and active, expressed by words and acts of violence, and is emphatically emulative; while it is quite possible that discord may exist without emulation. Strife commonly arises from a quarrelsome temper, and contention from a selfish disposition.

"Where there is then no good
For which to *strive*, no *strife* can grow up there
From faction; for none sure will claim in hell
Precedence, none whose portion is so small
Of present pain, that with ambitious mind
Will covet more." MILTON.

"*Contentions* and strivings about the law."—*English Bible.*

Discord, unlike strife and contention, may be not only exhibited by persons, but is inherent in the nature of things, though where this is the case with things moral, it is better expressed by the word *discordance*. In the following passage DISCORD is used for an inherent or essential disharmony, and *discordance* for the operation or manifestation of it:—

"While genuine revelation and sound philosophy are in perfect good agreement with each other, and with the actual constitution of the universe, the errors of the religious on the one side, and the learned on the other, run in contrary directions; and the *discordance* of these errors is mistaken for a *discord* of the truths on which they are severally grafted." — BISHOP HORSLEY.

STRIVE. CONTEND. VIE. STRUGGLE. ENDEAVOUR.

To STRIVE (*see* STRIFE) is the most common and generic of these terms. It signifies simply to use effort, and may be regarded as the verb representing the idea of the noun effort. To make an effort is to strive. It may express such effort relatively to, or irrespectively of, any efforts of others; as, to strive to gain an honest living, or to strive for a prize or mastery. It commonly involves a desirable object, or what is deemed so.

CONTEND (Lat. *contendĕre, to strain, to contend*) denotes such effort as is contravened by other effort. The uppermost idea in STRIVE is effort; in CONTEND, competition.

VIE (? A. S. *wigan, to contend*, or, according to some, Fr. *envier, to challenge*, a term of gamesters, Lat. *invitāre*) is, as its derivation shows, a sort of contending; but it does not imply, as CONTEND does, the substantial acquisition of anything, but something which is indirectly advantageous, or thought to be so; as, to vie with another in the good opinion of a third party; or to vie with others in beauty, or the exhibition of wealth, grandeur, hospitality, and so on. It is capable, as the others are not, of application to inanimate things; as flowers may vie.

STRUGGLE (? A. S. *streccan, to stretch*) denotes such striving as proceeds from necessity, either from the absolute need of the thing struggled for, or from the disproportion of power to the means requisite for attaining the object. Hence there is a desultoriness or irregularity in STRUGGLE which contrasts with a steadiness and regularity in STRIVE.

ENDEAVOUR still preserves, though perhaps faintly, the force of its derivation (Fr. *en devoir*, to put *in duty*, and so act on principle). The characteristic idea of ENDEAVOUR is now principle, though not necessarily conscientious principle. To endeavour is to strive to do that which falls to us to do under the circumstances, that which bears a relation to our duty, wants, or requirements. It is a word of the widest possible application.

Endeavour is consistent, thoughtful, and prolonged effort. We endeavour to do a thing when we combine with effort a calculation of all available means which may be brought to bear on the accomplishment of our purpose.

"The state that *strives* for liberty, though foiled,
And forced t' abandon what she bravely sought,
Deserves at least applause for her attempt,
And pity for her loss." COWPER.

To CONTEND is sometimes used in the simple sense of vigorously maintain; as, "To contend for the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule of faith." Here, however, indirect opposition, at least, though not direct competition, is implied. It may be observed that, while STRIVE is employed of simple physical effort without any competition, as, to strive to ascend a precipitous mountain, CONTEND is not so employed, but only of matters of truth, argument, and the like; as, "to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints."

"When the wills of divers men produce such actions as are reciprocally resistant one to the other, this is called *contention*."—HOBBS.

"We are all embarked in one bottom, and have our mutual dangers to *struggle* with."—GILPIN.

There was in Old English a noun *vie*, meaning a *challenge*, which is now obsolete.

"Though some of the more potent chiefs may *vie* with the king in actual possessions, they fall very short in rank and in certain marks of respect, which the collective body have agreed to pay the monarch."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

The Old English phrase, in connexion with the word ENDEAVOUR, was a reflexive verb, "to endeavour one's self;" in French, *se mettre en devoir*.

"Let us *endeavour ourselves* diligently to keepe the presence of His Holy Spirit."—*Homily for Rogation Week*.

"Daily *endeavour ourselves* to follow the blessed steps of His most holy life."—*English Prayer Book, Collect for Second Sunday after Easter*.

"That by the grace of God they will evermore *endeavour themselves* faithfully to observe such things as they by their own confession have assented unto."—*Ibid., Confirmation Service*.

STUBBORN. OBSTINATE. INVETERATE.

These terms stand to each other as the negative to the positive. To persist in one's own ways of thought or action, in spite of the efforts or wishes of others, is common to both. But an OBSTINATE man *will do* what he has determined upon (Lat. *obstinatus*, part. of *obstĭnare, to be resolved on*). A STUBBORN man (A.S. *styb, stybb, stub, the stump of a tree*) *will not* do what others would have him do. Stubbornness is an asinine exhibition of passive obstinacy. A stubborn resistance, in the secondary sense, might be shown by the walls of a castle against the besiegers; an obstinate resistance, by the defenders.

"Thus the main difficulty is answered; but there is another near as *stubborn*, which this solution likewise removes."—WARBURTON.

"But stubbornness and an *obstinate* disobedience must be mastered with force and blows; for this there is no other remedy."—LOCKE, *On Education*.

INVETERATE (Lat. *invĕtĕrātus*, part. of *invĕtĕrare, to keep for a long time, to render permanent*) unlike the others is not applied directly to persons but to qualities. It marks that which by length of time and habit has taken as it were deep root, or has become so fixed as to be difficult of removal or eradication. Customs, habits, prejudices, feelings, abuses, diseases become inveterate. Bacon used the term in no unfavourable sense when he spoke of "an inveterate and received opinion."

"Heal the *inveterate* canker of our wound." SHAKESPEARE.

Its force now is always unfavourable.

STUDY. LEARN.

LEARN (*see* LEARNING) has a twofold sense which we may call a lighter and a graver. In its lighter sense it means to acquire information without effort, perhaps accidentally. In its graver to acquire with effort a knowledge of facts or principles.

STUDY (Lat. *stŭdium, desire*, pl. *studia, studies*) always implies effort. To study is to labour in order to become wise, to learn is so to labour

with success. Quick minds commonly learn easily, and are often averse to study. To study is a more concentrated application of the mind, so that one can only study one thing at a time, while one may learn many. The more one learns the more one knows. But unhappily it sometimes happens that the more one studies the less one seems to know. Some things men study without learning them, and some they learn without study. Not those who have studied most are most learned, but those who have learned most. Youth is the time for study, but it is only in mature years that we really learn, when the mind is formed to digest what is committed to the memory.

STUPID. DULL.

STUPID (Lat. *stŭpĭdus; stŭpēre, to be stupefied, amazed, dull*) denotes that sluggish, lumpish character of intellect which comes of natural want.

DULL (A. S. *dol, foolish, mistaken*) is not quite the same. It implies slowness, but not necessarily deficiency of intellect. A boy apparently dull may understand a subject well, and retain it when once he has mastered it. The stupid boy will never grasp it at all. Dulness is the heavy clod, which may be tilled and fertilized. Stupidity is the hard rock, on which nothing will grow. Dulness often sees surely but slowly. Stupidity is always gaping through a fog. Dulness is at worst a want of adequate perception. Stupidity is a mental insensateness. Dulness belongs to the province of knowledge; stupidity, to matters of the practical understanding in the affairs of life.

"But bycause that in cunning I am yong, and can yet but creepe, this lewd A B C have I set into learning; for I cannot passen the telling of three as yet; and yf God will, in short time I shall amend this lewdnesse in joyning of syllables, which thyng for *dulnesse* of witte I may not in three letters declare."—CHAUCER, *Testament of Love.*

"Is not your father grown incapable
Of reasonable affairs? Is he not *stupid*
With age?" SHAKESPEARE.

SUBJECT. OBJECT.

These terms are made from different forms of the Lat. *jăcĕre*, part. *jactus, to cast*; the one being what is cast or placed *under*, the other what is cast or placed *over against*. The term OBJECT commonly represents that which is perceived by the sight—sensible images of things; SUBJECT, that which the mind deals with and reflects upon. A shell lying upon the beach is an object of the sea-shore. When taken up and observed, it becomes the subject of contemplation or remark. The object when reflexion is combined with observation becomes a subject, as in the following:—

"An eye like his, to catch the distant goal,
Or, ere the wheels of verse begin to roll,
Like his to shed illuminating rays
On every scene and *subject* it surveys."
COWPER.

"Philosophically, *object* is a term for that about which the knowing *subject* is conversant; what the schoolmen have styled the materia circa quam."—SIR W. HAMILTON.

SUBORDINATE. SUBJECT. SUBSERVIENT.

SUBORDINATE (Lat. *sub, under, ordĭnātus, arranged*) respects the station and office of one person to another, and, when employed of things, denotes an inferior relative degree of importance. In society some act in higher, others in subordinate, capacities. A man's integrity and honour are paramount, his ease and comfort subordinate, considerations. Where subordination carries with it submission or obedience, this comes from the specific nature of the orders or grades as being interrelated.

SUBJECT is amenable to power or influence founded upon a law of relationship natural or conventional; as, a child is subject to his parents.

SUBSERVIENT (Lat. *subservīre, to be subject to*) bears reference to the promotion of ends. One thing is subservient to another when it helps to bring it about. One person is subservient to another when he allows himself to be made a tool of. The leading idea in subordination is relative importance; in subjection, relative power in subservience, relative instrumentality.

"God hath bestowed, for His own wise

reasons, different talents on different men; to one man He hath given ten, to another only one. Now, this *subordination*, in fact, pervades all the works of God."—GILPIN.

"Every man, being as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into *subjection* to any earthly power, but only his own consent, it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of man's consent to make him *subject* to the laws of any government."—LOCKE.

SUBORN. BRIBE.

Of these, BRIBE (O. Fr. *bribe, a gift, a piece of bread*) is the simplest and most comprehensive. Anything may be termed a bribe which is given with a view to corrupt the conduct of another in whatsoever station or relationship.

SUBORN (Lat. *sŭbornāre, to furnish, to furnish secretly, sub, under,* and *ornare, to arrange*) means primarily to procure or provide in a furtive or underhanded way, till it came to be restricted to the legal application of procuring a person to take a false oath. The idea of a gift of value, which is essential to BRIBE, does not belong to SUBORN. A false witness may be suborned by *any* persuasion or inducement. He is *only* bribed when he receives a *valuable* consideration.

"*Subornation* of perjury is the offence of procuring another to take such a false oath as constitutes perjury in the principal."—BLACKSTONE.

"The Roman law, though it contained many severe injunctions against *bribery*, as well for selling a man's vote in the Senate or other public assembly as for the bartering of common justice, yet, by strange indulgence in one instance, it tacitly encouraged this practice, allowing the magistrate to receive small presents, provided they did not in the whole exceed a hundred crowns in the year."—*Ibid.*

SUBSIDE. ABATE.

These words, as here compared, imply a coming down from a previous state; but ABATE (Fr. *abattre, to beat down*) refers to degrees of force or intensity; SUBSIDE (Lat. *subsīdĕre, to sit down, to settle down*) to degrees of quantity, agitation, or commotion. To abate is to diminish in force. To subside is to settle down either materially or analogously. The wind abates. The sea subsides. The popular rage abates. The popular tumult subsides. There are cases in which both words would be equally applicable, according to the point of view from which we regarded the subject. Anger might be said to abate or to subside; the former in regard to its violence, the latter in regard to the agitation and disturbance of mind which accompany it. (*See* ABATE.)

"It is indeed very difficult to conceive how anything which was not deposited here at its creation, or brought here by the diligence of man, could find its way to a place so severed from the rest of the world by seas of immense extent, except the hypothesis which has been mentioned on another occasion be adopted, and the rock be supposed to have been left behind when a large tract of country of which it was part *subsided* by some convulsion of Nature, and was swallowed up in the ocean."—COOK'S *Voyages.*

SUFFER. BEAR. ENDURE.

When SUFFER (Lat. *sufferre, sub, under,* and *ferre, to bear*) is used as an intransitive verb, it implies no more than simply to be in pain of body or mind. So to suffer pain (transitively) means simply to feel it.

BEAR and ENDURE (A. S. *béran,* and Fr. *endurer,* Lat. *indūrāre*) imply some degree of fortitude in the feeling, when used metaphorically, or of moral pressure. We might say, "My suffering is greater than I can bear." In its literal and physical sense, BEAR means to receive the weight or pressure of a thing, whether in a literal or a metaphorical sense, which may be light or heavy, painful, or not. SUFFER, BEAR, and ENDURE have also the secondary sense of tolerate, or sustaining with complacency. In such cases BEAR is the common and generic term, and a difference may be noted between SUFFER and ENDURE. "I cannot suffer his remarks to pass unnoticed," has the sense of allow or permit. "I cannot endure such conduct," has the sense of "I cannot bear up under it. It grieves me." We speak of moral sufferance and physical endurance; the former is active, the latter passive. When employed of moral subjects, as, for instance, the conduct of

men, SUFFER has a much lighter force than ENDURE. "I cannot suffer such behaviour," would imply that the speaker had it in his power authoritatively to stop it. "I cannot endure it," would mean that is excessively irksome or annoying to me, and that I should be glad to be rid of it. BEAR is sometimes to endure becomingly, as ENDURE is to bear resolutely.

"Thou hast given me to possess
Life in Myself for ever; by Thee I live,
Though now to Death I yield, and am his due,
All that of Me can die; yet, that debt paid,
Thou wilt not leave Me in the loathsome grave,
His prey, nor *suffer* My unspotted soul
For ever with corruption there to dwell."
MILTON.

"From henceforth let no man trouble me, for I *bear* in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus."—*English Bible.*

"And I am sure it will be no comfort to them in another world that they were accounted wits for deriding those miseries which they then feel and smart under the severity of. It will be no mitigation of their flames that they go laughing into them; nor will they *endure* them the better because they would not believe them."—STILLINGFLEET.

SUITOR. LOVER. WOOER.

The SUITOR (Fr. *suite, a following*) is the more dignified; LOVER (A. S. *luf, love*) is the more ordinary; WOOER (A. S. *wigan, to woo, marry*) is the more warm and eager. The latter is confined to the courting of the tender sex; the former, not. We have lovers of money, lovers of pleasure, and suitors at court for the favours of monarchs.

"But Cinyras, who daily sees
A crowd of noble *suitors* at his knees,
Among so many knew not whom to choose,
Irresolute to grant, or to refuse."
DRYDEN, *Ovid.*

"The Revolution showed them (the Tories) to have been in this respect nothing but a genuine court party, such as might be expected in a British government, that is, *lovers* of liberty, but greater *lovers* of monarchy."—HUME.

"Yet was she fair, and in her countenance
Dwelt simple truth in seemly fashion.
Long thus I *woo'd* her with due observance,
In hope unto my pleasure to have won,
But was as far at last as when I first begun."
SPENSER.

SULLY. SOIL. TARNISH.

SULLY and SOIL are both derived from the French *souiller, to soil, dirty;* Lat. *sūcŭlāre, to wallow like a pig;* but SOIL is the more comprehensive, and admits of a simply physical application; while SULLY is almost confined to the moral. We speak of sullying brightness and purity; of soiling cleanliness, or the natural hue and condition. A soiled garment. A sullied reputation.

TARNISH (Fr. *ternir, to tarnish*) points not to external disfigurement by the contact of foreign matter, but to the marring of the intrinsic colour or brightness. Dirt soils common things. Impurity sullies things spotless. Damp tarnishes colour or brightness. Brightness and honour may be sullied, cleanness and virtue soiled, brightness and reputation tarnished.

"The over-daring Talbot
Hath *sullied* all his gloss of former honour
By this unheedful, desperate, wild adventure."
SHAKESPEARE.

It may be observed that, in their secondary applications, TARNISH belongs only to the account in which human character is held; SOIL and SULLY, to the character itself as well, by intrinsic defilement or corruption.

"Beside them both, upon the *soiled* grass,
The dead corse of an armed knight was spread,
Whose armour all with blood besprinkled was."
SPENSER.

"So far as they either want anything of original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded and *tarnished* by time, so far are they obscure."—LOCKE.

SUMMIT. TOP. APEX. VERTEX. CULMINATION.

Of these the simplest and most generic is TOP (A. S. *top, a ball, a tuft at the top of anything;* BOSWORTH) which is simply the uppermost portion of anything having some character of verticality.

The SUMMIT (Fr. *sommet*) is the top regarded as the extreme point of elevation. The term, therefore, is not applicable in other cases than those in which may be recognized a gradation

of ascent The summit is the final point in a series of points of altitude.

The APEX (Lat. *ăpex*) is the summit regarded abstractedly, that is as the highest point, but without reference to the ascending scale of altitude from which it is possible to divorce it; as, *e.g.* a futile attempt may be illustrated by trying to make a pyramid stand upon its apex.

The VERTEX (Lat. *vertex*) is the highest point or part, as the crown of the head or the highest part of the heavens.

The CULMINATION (Lat. *culmen, culmĭnis* or *cŏlūmen, a top*) is the vertical point regarded as the point of consummation or arrival. It is to movement what VERTEX is to position. APEX, VERTEX, and TOP are physical, except by metaphorical application. SUMMIT and CULMINATION have their recognized moral meanings, as the summit of ambition, which is the highest point to which it can rise or aspire, the culminating point of success or reputation, which is the point of perfect attainment or honour.

SUPERSEDE. OVERRULE.

SUPERSEDE (Lat. *sŭpersĕdēre, to sit above, to be superior to*) is employed both of persons and facts or operations; OVERRULE, only of the will of persons consciously exercised. When the subject of the verb SUPERSEDE is a person, the object is commonly a person, as when one supersedes another in an appointment; when a thing, the object also is commonly a thing; as, "What he has done supersedes the necessity of further action on my part." What is superseded is a fact or a person. What is overruled is a power or an operation, or a person in regard to them. To overrule is to bring to pass by interference results not purposed or contemplated by the agent. Hence to SUPERSEDE has often a negative, while OVERRULE has a positive effect. He who supersedes, causes that a thing shall not be done. He who overrules, causes that it shall be done in his own way.

"It seems neither decorous in respect to God, nor congruous to reason, that He should do all things Himself immediately and miraculously, Nature being quite *superseded*, and made to signify nothing."—CUDWORTH.

"Had not th' Eternal King Omnipotent
From His stronghold of heaven high *overruled*
And limited their right." MILTON.

SUPERNATURAL. PRETERNATURAL. SUPERHUMAN. MIRACULOUS.

That is SUPERNATURAL (Lat. *supra nātūram*) which is above the order of nature; that is PRETERNATURAL (Lat. *præter naturam*) which is beyond the common operation of nature; that is SUPERHUMAN (Lat. *supra, above,* and *hūmānus, human*) which is beyond the power of man; that is MIRACULOUS (Lat. *mīrācŭlum, a marvel*) which is connected with some act overruling the course of nature. SUPERNATURAL and SUPERHUMAN are applicable to persons as well as properties, powers, and acts. PRETERNATURAL and MIRACULOUS not to persons but only to the rest. It is plain that all may combine in the same event or transaction. Thus to raise the dead is supernatural, as being not a fact of natural experience, preternatural as being the result of no known powers of nature, superhuman as that which man's knowledge and strength could not effect, and miraculous as an astounding transaction modifying the existing laws of nature as known to us, or suspending them, as introducing some new law over and above them.

SUPPLY. FURNISH. PROVIDE. ADMINISTER. EQUIP.

SUPPLY (Lat. *supplēre, to fill up*) is, literally, to fill up; hence, to fill up a deficiency, or furnish what is wanting. Hence it stands related to *want*, as FURNISH (Fr. *fournir, to furnish*) to *use*. What is wanting to make a thing complete must be supplied. What is required for immediate or eventual use must be furnished. "I want a horse. My friend furnishes me with one." "I have lost my horse. My friend supplies me with another." A house is furnished, not supplied, with chairs and tables. A larder is not well furnished, but well supplied with provisions. FURNISH does not neces-

sarily refer to any antecedent want. It denotes simply the place ready for use; as, "His book-shelves were well furnished with books." Hence common wants are said to be supplied. Superfluous luxuries are furnished. Fortune furnishes the rich man's table with delicacies; while the poor man can hardly supply his family with the common necessaries of life.

PROVIDE (Lat. *prŏvĭdēre, to see before one's self, to provide*) is to furnish or supply with care or calculation, as against the future, or so as to secure sufficiency or proportion in the thing provided.

"Why are useful things good? Because they minister to the *supply* of our wants and desires. Why is this *supply* good? Because it satisfies the mind. Why is satisfaction good? Here you must stop."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature.*

"His writings and his life *furnish* abundant proofs that he was not a man of strong sense."

"The pleasures of a healthy infant are so manifestly *provided* for by another, and the benevolence of the *provision* is so unquestionable, that every child I see at its sport affords to my mind a kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God, and of the disposition which directs it."—PALEY.

ADMINISTER (Lat. *ad* and *mĭnistrāre, manus, the hand*) is to afford, give, furnish or supply, but according to a rule and proportion of giving, and so is not employed but of things subject to human arrangement and control. It is more than to dispense, for it is to dispense with discretion and management. We may supply, furnish, or dispense by a single act and on a single occasion, but we administer by a series of acts and in the continuous discharge of official duty.

EQUIP (connected with *skiff* and *ship*) is to fit out with what is required for action. Men are equipped for a journey or expedition when they are supplied with all that they can require for it. Ships are equipped when they are manned, rigged, provisioned, armed, and the like, and troops when they are provided with all necessaries for active service. The form of the word EQUIP and the modern use of equipage tempt a confusion with the Latin *equus, a horse.*

"Then well *equipped* a rapid bark prepared."
HOOLE.

"For forms of government let fools contest,
That which is best *administered* is best."
POPE.

SUPPORT. SUSTAIN.

The idea of keeping up so as to prevent from falling is common to these terms.

SUPPORT (Lat. *supportāre, to carry away*) is applicable to anything superimposed, whether heavy or light.

SUSTAIN (Lat. *sustĭnēre, to uphold*) implies a certain degree of weight in the thing sustained. SUSTAIN implies also greater continuance than SUPPORT. SUPPORT, as regards persons, conveys the idea of help, which is foreign to SUSTAIN. So we might say, "The support which you render me will enable me to sustain my many heavy losses." To sustain is often a more complex matter than to support. Common food, under ordinary circumstances, is sufficient to *support* life. When the body is in the last stage of exhaustion, it will require extraordinary skill and care to *sustain* life. Both are used in secondary senses. Thus we may support a resolution by simply voting for it. It is a harder matter to sustain an argument in its favour.

"The question is not whether a thing be mysterious, for all things are mysterious, but whether the mystery be *supported* by evidence."—GILPIN.

"He is not Creator only once, but perpetual Creator, being the *sustainer* and preserver of the whole universe."—WATERLAND.

SURFACE. SUPERFICIES.

These, which are the same word, the latter being Latin, the former a French modification of it, differ as the more common from the scientific. The SUPERFICIES is the scientific surface. The SURFACE is the popular superficies. A surface is of such or such a colour, smooth or rough. A superficies is plane, and contains such or such extent.

SURPRISE. ASTONISHMENT. CONSTERNATION.

Both these terms express feelings which arise from that which happens

unexpectedly. They differ in mode and in degree.

We are SURPRISED (Fr. *surpris, surprendre*, Lat. *super, prehendĕre, to come upon suddenly*) if that happens which we did not anticipate, or that does not happen which we did. Surprise thus contradicts calculation or expectation. A greater degree of unaccountableness in the cause, or of importance in the effect, raises the surprise into ASTONISHMENT (Old Fr. *estonner*, Mod. Fr. *étonner*). We are surprised at what was unexpected. We are astonished at what is above our comprehension. We are surprised to find a person in the house whom we thought had gone out. We are astonished at meeting one whom we had thought to be in a distant land or dead. There is such a thing as a light and pleasant surprise. Astonishment is no light thing—in short, astonishment is extreme surprise mixed with fear, admiration, or some emotion which exercises considerable influence. The singular surprises, the marvellous astonishes. You are surprised by the delicacy of a work, astonished at the grandeur of a piece of architecture; cleverness surprises, genius astonishes. Surprise is more in the senses and may pass away quickly, astonishment is more in the reason, and may even increase by reflexion. We are *taken* by surprise. We are *struck* with astonishment. We are not surprised by what we expected, nor astonished by what we are familiar with. Astonishment is more in the senses, and comes of things blamable or uncongenial. Surprise is in the mind, and comes of things extraordinary.

CONSTERNATION (Lat. *consternāre, to throw into confusion, to dismay*) is more in the heart and comes of things distressing. The first of these words is seldom used but in a neutral sense, the second equally in a bad or good, the third in a bad. The unexpected surprises, that which surprises by its greatness, astonishes, that which overwhelms, throws us into consternation. We are surprised suddenly, but some degree of reflexion upon a thing is necessary to astonishment. Silly persons and children are easily surprised, those only who are capable of weighing circumstances are astonished. Consternation is produced by a very grievous astonishment which finds us unprepared and powerless to act.

"The ship struck. The shock threw us all into the utmost *consternation.*"—COOK'S *Voyages.*

"Whatever presents itself in a sudden and unexpected manner has, in most cases, a much greater effect upon us than subjects of very superior importance for which we have been gradually prepared. The more sudden, that is, the greater the improbability of its appearing at that instant, and the more unexpected, that is, the greater distance the train of thought was from the expectancy, the more violent will be the first percussion; and this circumstance will give peculiar energy to the exciting cause, whatever its peculiar complexion may be. A strong impulse is given by the very mode of its appearance previous to our being able to acquire a distinct knowledge of its nature. This impulse is the emotion we term *surprise.*"—COGAN.

"*Astonishment* is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended with some degree of horror."—BURKE.

SWELL. HEAVE.

To SWELL (A. S. *swellan*) is to dilate so as to exhibit increased bulk or surface. It is indefinite as to scale or degree. The ocean swells, and sometimes the little finger.

To HEAVE (A. S. *hebban, to lift, heave*) necessarily implies a scale of magnitude and more accelerated motion. The waves of the ocean heave and swell. They heave as they are bodily thrown upwards; they swell, as by that means a greater superficies belongs to each wave. The bosom struggling with emotion heaves, and swells as a consequence of the heaving.

"Though the waters thereof rage and *swell*, and though the mountains shake at the tempest of the same."—*English Psalms.*

"Back to th' assembly roll'd the thronging train,
Desert the ships, and pour upon the plain,
Murmuring they move, as when old Ocean roars,
And *heaves* huge surges to the trembling shores." POPE, *Homer.*

SYMMETRY. PROPORTION.

PROPORTION (*see* PROPORTION) is

that abstract relation in dimensions, of which SYMMETRY (Gr. *συμμετρία*) is an external manifestation. Both denote a due and harmonious admeasurement of the parts to each other and to the whole; though PROPORTION means also this relation, without of necessity implying that it is harmonious, and applies also to numbers as well as magnitude; while SYMMETRY is only employed of the latter. Symmetry is harmonious proportion in structure or construction. It is the graceful conformity of the parts to the whole, or the members to the body. Symmetry is artistically of two kinds —respective and uniform. In the former, opposite sides are equal to each other; in the latter, the same balance co-ordinates the whole. It is of the former that mention seems to be made in the following:—

"*Symmetry* and *proportion* contribute greatly to order, because the one gives despatch to the eye by enabling it to take in objects by pairs, and the other smooths the passage over them by mutual dependence of parts."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature.*

SYSTEM. METHOD.

SYSTEM (Gr. *σύστημα, an organized whole*) regards fixed *subjects* which have rational dependence or connexion.

METHOD (Gr. *μέθοδος, scientific inquiry, method*) regards fixed *processes.* System is logical or scientific collocation. Method is logical or scientific procedure. But, inasmuch as a mode of procedure may be itself harmonized, SYSTEM is frequently used in place of METHOD. We sometimes say, "to go systematically to work," meaning methodically. Method lays down rules for scientific inquiry, and is the way which leads to system. "All method," says Sir W. Hamilton, "is a rational progress—a progress toward an end." When Watts says, "The best way to learn any science is to begin with a regular *system*, or a short and plain scheme of that science well drawn up into a narrow compass," he is recommending a *method.*

T.

TACIT. SILENT. IMPLICIT.

TACIT (Lat. *tăcĭtus, silent, tacēre, to be mute*) is employed only of things abstract, as, a tacit consent, agreement, recognition.

SILENT (Lat. part. *sĭlentĕm*, from *sĭlēre, to be silent*) characterizes either persons or things as opposed in the former case to talkative or talking, and in the latter to noisy or sounding.

"Friendship, when strict, comprehends a *tacit* agreement and covenant between those who enter into it, to look upon the concerns of each other in a great measure as their own."—SECKER.

Silence may have the effect of affirmation and consent, or the opposite. In the one case, it would be equivalent to tacit assent; in the other to tacit denial. It has the latter effect in the following:—

"What the compilers recommended chiefly to our faith, he *silently* passes over, and instead of recommending the same doctrine, seems to throw it quite out."—WATERLAND.

IMPLICIT (Lat. *implĭcĭtus*, part. of *implicare, to involve*) expresses that which has force by virtue of being contained in something else, and is opposed to developed or expressed. That which is tacit may have a negative force, and depend upon what is *not* done or said. That which is implicit has a positive though indirect force by virtue of what *is* said or done. IMPLICIT is a term which belongs to statements of truth or fact; TACIT, to the relations, intercourse, and dealings of men; an implicit assertion, a tacit understanding.

"Which (faith) they generally taught, consisted in an *implicit* believing whatever the Church proposed, without any explicit knowledge of particulars."—BURNET.

TACITURNITY. SILENCE.

As at present employed, SILENCE is more general and less specifically expressive than TACITURNITY (*see above*).

SILENCE may be occasional or habitual.

TACITURNITY (Lat. *taciturnĭtatem*) is habitual. A man may be at once

talkative and silent; but he cannot be at once talkative and taciturn. He is silent who does not speak. He is taciturn who shuns to speak.

"Here, I have said, at least I should possess
The poet's treasure, *silence*, and indulge
The dreams of fancy, tranquil and secure."
COWPER.

"Let it, however, be remembered by those who bring such instances in their own justification, that the cause of Addison's *taciturnity* was a natural diffidence in the company of strangers."—KNOX, *Essays*.

We may infer from such a saying as the above, that taciturnity may spring from other causes besides constitutional temperament. Even a talkative person would be taciturn on any occasion on which he imposed a certain degree of silence upon himself; but this is a limited use of the term TACITURNITY.

TALISMAN. AMULET.

The TALISMAN (Ar. *telesm*) differs from the AMULET (L. Lat. *amulētum*, Ar. *hamalet*) in being something not necessarily worn upon the person. A ring or a staff may be a talisman, if a divinity, a genie, a fairy, or a magician be said to have consecrated it. The amulet is commonly suspended round the neck or sewed in the garments, and inseparably accompanies the individual. The talisman has greater powers, is a more potent charm, than the amulet. The amulet is defensive. It is supposed to preserve from danger, sickness, death. The talisman is more active. It works wonders, is powerful against others, transports from place to place, or renders invisible. Amulets belong to the region of history and fact, at least in part, talismans are purely ideal and magical. Amulets are commonly certain recognized articles, as with the Arabs a verse of the Koran on a slip of parchment. Anything may become a talisman.

TALLY. CORRESPOND. MATCH.

TALLY is from the French *tailler, to cut*. The old tally was a cut or notched stick kept by the purchaser, answering to another in the possession of the seller; a mode of keeping accounts anterior to the common use of writing. Hence, metaphorically, on thing is said to tally with another where a certain agreement exists between them, whether physical or moral. Agreeably to its derivation, TALLY expresses that kind of correspondence which has the nature of evidence. A tally is evidential agreement. Such a juxtaposition of two things as amounts to a probability or proof of some proposition stated relative to one of the two. Evidence which goes to substantiate in one shape what independent evidence substantiates in another shape, is said to tally. So, for instance, an act of an individual may tally with what one has heard of his character and habits generally, and so goes to confirm that account.

"Then the mention of the Sacrament as taken in the antelucan meetings *tallies* exactly with Tertullian's account of the Eucharist."—WATERLAND.

CORRESPOND (Lat. *con-, together*, and *respondēre, to answer*) is a wider term, including the sense of TALLY. It expresses adaptation in design and use; congruity or harmony of appearance, character, arrangement, statement, description, and the like. It expresses agreement of the most remote kind, as where actions are said to correspond with professions, or the contrary, or results with expectations.

MATCH (A. S. *mæcca, a mate*, one of the same *make*) is confined to physical objects and facts, and is not applicable to inferences drawn from the latter. One colour matches another (in nature and appearance). One man matches another (in skill or strength). To match is to produce as similar or equal; or, intransitively, to show one's self or itself as such. Ideas, for instance, tally with descriptions, or correspond to one another; but they never match. On the other hand, we might say, "It would be difficult to match such villainy;' that is, to place a similar instance or fact by the side of it.

"Each object must be fixed in the due place,
And differing parts have *corresponding* grace;

Till, by a curious art disposed, we find
One perfect whole, of all the pieces joined."
DRYDEN.

"No history or antiquity can *match* his policies or his conduct."—SOUTH.

TASK. WORK.

TASK (Old Fr. *tasche*, mod. of which *tâche, a task*) is to WORK (A.S. *weorc*) as the specific to the general. A task is a definite amount of labour, mental or physical, imposed by another, or self-imposed. Work in some form falls to all, and to every man every day. A task falls to him specifically and occasionally. A series of minor tasks may make up the work of the day.

"Dare to be wise, begin; for once begun,
Your *task* is easy; half the *work* is done."
FRANCIS, *Horace.*

TASTE. TACT.

These stand to each other as perception and discrimination to treatment and management.

TASTE (Old Fr. *taster*) is nice perception, the faculty of discerning beauty and excellence, especially in art and manners.

TACT (Lat. *tactus, touch*) is delicacy and sensibility in the special point of dealing with others, according to the variety of human character and circumstances. Hence, tact is the practical application of taste in the affairs of life. But taste only discriminates excellence; tact is subtle, deals with conflicting varieties of temper in persons, and sagaciously recognizes the most politic and effective line of conduct under the circumstances of the person and the case. It is possible to have the most delicate taste without tact. In such a case, the man of taste would be merely offended by the untoward character of a transaction or of those engaged in it, without having the practical skill to adjust it. Taste sees the harmony and disharmony of things. Tact deals with inharmonious elements in human character and conduct, and accommodates them to its own ends. Thus tact involves taste, though taste does not of necessity involve tact.

TASTE. FLAVOUR. RELISH. SAVOUR.

Of these, TASTE (Old Fr. *taster*: Mod. *tâter, to touch or feel*) is the most generic and indefinite, denoting, generally, the faculty or the feeling excited by the application of certain substances to the tongue. It may be pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral.

FLAVOUR (Low Lat. *flāvōrem, a yellow hue*, but possibly the meaning of *flavour* has been modified by O. Fr. *flairer, to exhale an odour*, Lat. *fragrare*: SKEAT, *Etym. Dict.*) is predominating, peculiar, or *distinctive* taste, and is sometimes extended to comprise the meaning of distinctive odour as well as taste, in consonance with the Latin *fragrare, to be fragrant.* There is a certain taste common to all apples, and a certain flavour belonging to specific kinds.

RELISH (Fr. *re-, lécher, to lick again*) is the continued enjoyment of the taste, and is sometimes an artificial flavour, or, at least, artificially employed. It may be a flavour introduced as *accessory* to another, or a stimulant to it. Flavour is either naturally inherent, or artificially imparted, and in either case is inherent in the substance itself. RELISH is used analogously of the enjoyment of any pleasure.

SAVOUR (Lat. *sāporem*, from *sapĕre, to taste or savour*) is, in modern English, of less common use, designating that which tastes as well as smells. The term SAVOUR is, however, very commonly employed in the secondary sense, to which it is now nearly confined; as when we say that a man's actions savour of vanity, that is, betray indications of it. The savour is to the flavour as the manifestation of the character to the character itself.

"The organ of *taste* is the tongue and palate; bodies that emit light, sounds, and smells are seen, heard, and smelt at a distance; but bodies are not tasted but by immediate application to the organ; for till our meat touch our tongues or palates we taste it not, how near soever it be."—LOCKE.

"Had there been a taste in water, be it what it might, it would have infected everything we eat or drink with an importunate repetition of the same *flavour.*"—PALEY.

"Go whither Fate and Inclination strong
Leads thee; I shall not lag behind, nor err
The way; thou leading, such a scent I draw
Of carnage, prey innumerable, and taste
The *savour* of death from all things there that live." MILTON.

"On which with eager appetite they dine;
A savoury bit that served to *relish* wine."
DRYDEN, *Ovid.*

TAUNT. REPROACH.

A TAUNT (Fr. *tancer, to rebuke*, Low Lat. *tentiare*, = *contentiare*, from *contendĕre*) is a species of REPROACH, involving severity and insult. Reproach is dictated, commonly, by a strong sense of justice or of wrong received or exhibited towards another, or of wrong done in any way. TAUNT involves a desire to annoy, as by contemptuousness, provocation, or sarcasm. We may reproach unselfishly. Taunt is always selfish, and is a kind of derision. Strictly speaking, nothing is a reproach to a man but his own actions; but we sometimes taunt others with the meanness of their birth. Hence the common retort that what one is taunted with is no reproach.

"Being *taunted* by the way that he (John Davies) was a Papist, he denied not but that in Oxon he was instructed in the Romish religion by his tutor, and confirmed in the same by Sir Christopher Blount, one of the conspirators, while he was in the Irish wars."—WOOD, *Athenæ Oxon.*

"Consenting to the safeguard of your honour,
I thought your marriage fit; else imputation
For that he knew you might *reproach* your life,
And choke your good to come."
SHAKESPEARE.

TAUTOLOGY. REPETITION.

TAUTOLOGY (Gr. *ταυτολογια, τὸ αὐτό, ταὐτὸ, the same thing*, and *λέγω, to say*) is vain and vicious REPETITION (Lat. *repĕtĕre, to repeat*). Repetition is generic; tautology, specific. Repetition may be needless and faulty, or it may be necessary and emphatic. "That is truly and really *tautology* where the same thing is *repeated*, though under never so much variety of expression." And this variety of expression is necessary to the term, for mere repetition of the same words or phrases is not in itself tautology, but tiresome repetition or reiteration. Yet Warburton says:

"A *repetition* of this kind, made in different words, is called a pleonasm, but when in the same words, as it is in the text in question, if there be any repetition at all, it is then a *tautology*."

Richardson, in his Dictionary, comprises both forces of the word, when he says that tautology is "a repetition, or repeated use of the same words, *or* words of the same or equivalent signification." And this, perhaps, is the best.

TAX. ASSESSMENT. IMPOST. RATE. DUTY. CUSTOM. DUE. TRIBUTE. TOLL. CHARGE. LEVY.

All these terms denote payments in some form or another, made by the people to the government, or by subjects to those who exercise power and authority over them.

TAX (Fr. *taxer*, Lat. *taxāre, to value*) is the most generic, and so admits very readily of a secondary application; as, a tax upon corn, and a tax upon patience. It denotes no more than a compulsory payment according to an estimate, commonly in money, and for defraying the general or any specific expenses of the ruling body, as, an education tax.

"A farmer of *taxes* is of all creditors proverbially the most rapacious."—MACAULAY.

ASSESSMENT (Lat. *assĭdĕre*, part. *assessus, to sit by or near, as assessor*) is a valuation of property or profits for the purpose of taxation, or the specific sum so raised. It is made by authorized persons according to their discretion, as distinguished from a fixed sum demanded by law.

"In the beginning of the civil wars between Charles the First and his Parliament, the latter having no other sufficient revenue to support themselves and their measures, introduced the practice of laying weekly and monthly *assessments* of a specific sum upon the several counties of the kingdom."—BLACKSTONE.

The IMPOST (Fr. *impost*, Lat. *impōnere, impŏsĭtus, to impose*) is a term of wide signification, comprising state-enforced payments, both of money and in kind.

"Trade was restrained, or the privilege granted on the payment of tolls, passages, portages, pontages, and innumerable other vexatious *imposts*, of which only the barbarous and almost unintelligible names subsist at this day."—BURKE.

RATES (Lat. *rătus, reckoned*) are payments upon assessed property or supplies, and are now confined to the smaller local taxes of parishes or local districts, as, rates for the relief of the poor, upon water, gas, houses, highways. We do not speak of rates upon land or commodities.

"I collect out of the Abbay Booke of Burton that XX one were *ratable* at two marks of silver."—CAMDEN.

DUTY (O. Fr. *deu, owed*, Lat. *dēbēre, to owe*), literally, that which is given as a due or debt, is used in the sense of a tax paid upon the importation, exportation, and consumption of goods, as CUSTOM (O. Fr. *costume*—with intermediate changes—from Lat. *consuētūdĭnem*) is upon the same in reference to importation and exportation only, according to the rules of the Custom House, especially in regard to the payment on *exciseable* goods. The ordinary use of the term DUTY is familiar enough. There was a time when the term was used to mean that which was fairly due to individuals.

"When thou receivest money for thy labour or ware, thou receivest thy *duty*."—TYNDALE.

Or, more legally—

"The man shall give unto the woman a ring, laying the same upon the book, with the *accustomed duty* to the priest and clerk."—*English Rubric.*

DUE (*see* DUTY) differs slightly from DUTY in denoting what municipalities, companies, or private persons are entitled to claim on the ground of certain authority, office, occupation, or specific rights; as, the port dues paid by ships on entering a harbour; or church dues for religious services, now called often "fees," as of old "duties."

TRIBUTE (Lat. *tribuĕre, to give*, and that from *trĭbus*, from the old Roman custom of voting money by *tribes*) is enforced and arbitrary payment of a governor upon subjects, or of a government upon a province, especially when subjugated in war. TRIBUTE lends itself more readily than any other of these terms to the secondary meaning of a deferential offering, and in this sense loses all character of compulsoriness, and, indeed, denotes a *voluntary* offering.

"As such we loved, admired, almost adored,
Gave all the *tribute* mortals could afford."
DRYDEN.

TOLL (A. S. *tól, tribute, tax*) meant, anciently, the payment of a sum of money for the privilege of buying and selling within the bounds of a manor; afterwards, more generally, a tax upon any liberty or privilege, and, at present especially, for that of passing over a bridge or along a highway, or of vending goods in a fair or market.

CHARGE (O. F. *charger, to load*) is now commonly restricted to payments on land or incomes accruing from land in rental; as a rent-charge.

LEVY (Fr. *lever, to raise*) is the most widely applicable term of all, being employed of taxes, tolls, tributes, contributions, fines, and troops.

TEDIOUS. IRKSOME.

IRKSOME is from the Old English verb to *irk*, meaning *to tire* and *to become tired*. Compare the Lat. *urgēre, to urge*, and perhaps the word *work*. So Shakespeare:

"To see this sight, it *irks* my very soul."

TEDIOUS, from the Latin *tædium* (*weariness, loathing*), denotes weariness caused by time. The nature of the thing to be done makes it irksome. The time taken up in doing it makes it tedious. Hence TEDIOUS denotes what is felt after a work is begun or a process commenced; while IRKSOME may denote the feeling which prevents one from undertaking it at all.

"The *tedious* length of nine revolving years." POPE.

"All things considered, it was perhaps less *irksome* to live the life of a hermit in a solitary den than to submit to the humours of a bigot, a fanatic, and a merciless tyrant."—JORTIN.

TEEM. ABOUND.

ABOUND (Lat. *abundare*) is generic,

having the wide meaning of possessing largely.

TEEM (Saxon *týman, to teem, propagate*) is specific. It is to abound in such a way as to be prolific of life, or in a manner analogous to this. A river abounds in fish, as to their quantity. It teems with fish, as to their quality of living animals. For, in old English, the word to TEEM meant to be pregnant or to produce, as Shakespeare—

"If she must *teem*,
Create her child of spleen."

Dryden's use of the term is literally correct when he speaks of

"*Teeming* birds,"

i.e., alive and engendering them in abundance.

"His mind *teeming* with schemes of future deceit to cover former villainy."—WALTER SCOTT.

TEMPORARY. TRANSIENT. TRANSITORY. FLEETING. FUGITIVE.

TEMPORARY (Lat. *temporārius*, from *tempus, time*) denotes not only that which lasts but for a time, as opposed to permanent, but that which was *intended* only so to last. A temporary substitute will be superseded when a permanent one has been found. The cessation of that which is temporary has been foreseen and calculated upon, perhaps pre-arranged.

TRANSIENT (Lat. *transīre, to pass over*) denotes that which, *by its own nature* or inherent force, rapidly passes by, and so is of no long continuance.

TRANSITORY (Lat. *transĭtōrius, adapted to passing through, fleeting*) adds to the mere idea of transience that character by virtue of which a thing is transient.

FLEETING expresses the idea of TRANSITORY in a more vivid manner (Icelandic *flíota, quick*), placing, as it were, before the mind's eye the tendency and the fact at the same time. What is transient is in itself momentary or of short duration. What is transitory is *liable* to pass away. Brevity is more denoted by the former; uncertainty, by the latter. Short-lived enjoyments are transient; but it is of the nature of all earthly pleasures to be transitory. FLEETING is still more strong than TRANSIENT. That is transient which stays but for a little while. That is fleeting which hardly stays at all, but seems, even while we contemplate or possess it, to be hurrying past or away. TRANSITORY is capable only of a moral and abstract use, while TRANSIENT and FLEETING are applicable to objects of physical sense, as sights, sounds, or colours.

"For this purpose a large space had been cleared before the *temporary* hut of this chief, near our post, as an area where the performances were to be exhibited."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

"Give them as much as mortal eyes can bear,
A *transient* view of Thy full glories there."
DRYDEN.

"And thou, fair Freedom, taught alike to feel
The rabble's rage, and tyrants' angry steel;
Thou *transitory* flower, alike undone
By proud contempt, or favour's fostering sun,
Still may thy blooms the changeful clime endure." GOLDSMITH.

"'Tis sooner past, 'tis sooner done,
Than summer's rain, or winter's sun;
Most *fleeting* when it is most dear,
'Tis gone while we but say, 'tis here."
CAREW.

While the rest express shortness of duration only as a fact or quality inherent in things, FUGITIVE (Lat. *fŭgĭtīvus*) has the additional force of expressing such as results from character or disposition in living beings.

"The fickleness and *fugitiveness* of servants justly addeth a valuation to their constancy who are standards in a family."—FULLER'S *Worthies*.

TENACITY. PERTINACITY.

TENACITY (Lat. *tĕnācĭtātem*, from *tĕnēre, to hold*) is that quality which leads to holding a thing close and letting it go with reluctance. It is employed of the physical and the moral properties.

PERTINACITY (Lat. *pertĭnax, very tenacious*, adv. *pertĭnăcĭter*) is exclusively a moral quality. Tenacity is passive; pertinacity active. We are tenacious in desiring to keep; pertinacious, in persisting to act. Men may be tenacious in a good sense, as,

to be tenacious of the right or the truth, or of what personally concerns themselves, as to be tenacious of one's reputation. PERTINACIOUS is always somewhat unfavourable. PERTINACITY is an excessive sticking to one's purpose. Persistence at the blameable or weak point becomes pertinacity.

"*Tenaciousness*, even of a resolution taken for opposition's sake, serves either to good or to bad purposes; when to the former, it is called steadiness and bravery; when to the latter, perverseness and obstinacy."—SEARCH, *Light of Nature*.

"The *tenacity* of wax."—*Ibid.*

"For to be like God was the first temptation which robbed man of his innocence, and so *pertinaciously* was this urged upon these two apostles by the men of Lystra, that it is said that Paul and Barnabas could scarcely refrain them from doing sacrifice to them."—SOUTH.

TENDER. OFFER.

We OFFER (*see* OFFER) absolutely or acceptance.

We TENDER (Fr. *tendre*, Lat. *tendĕre*, *to stretch*) when we offer contingently upon the pleasure of another to accept with satisfaction to himself; as, to tender something in satisfaction of a debt. There is more of formality in tendering; more of voluntariness in offering. We offer in the first instance. We commonly tender in return. So we are said to tender (not to offer) or to return thanks.

"His *tendering* upon so fair and easy terms an endless life in perfect joy and bliss, his furnishing us with so plentiful means and powerful aids for attaining that happy state—how pregnant demonstrations are these of unspeakable goodness towards us."—BARROW.

That which is offered to me I may decline or accept as I please; that which is tendered if it be just, adequate, suitable, I am under an *obligation* to accept.

TERRITORY. DOMINION.

Both terms indicate extensive tracts of country; but DOMINION (*see* DOMINION) points to the sovereignty over the land, TERRITORY (Lat. *territōrium*, *a district*) to its extent and to the jurisdiction short of actual sovereignty exercised over it. We speak of the dominions of a king; of the territories of a republic, state, city, or company. The Queen's dominions. The territory of the Hudson's Bay Company.

"The kingdom of England, over which our municipal laws have jurisdiction, includes not by the common law either Wales, Scotland, or Ireland, or any other part of the king's *dominions*, except the *territory* of England alone."—BLACKSTONE.

THEOLOGIAN. DIVINE.

The THEOLOGIAN (Gr. θεολογος, *one who speaks, discourses, of God*) *studies*; the DIVINE (Lat. *divinus*, *divine*) *teaches*. It constitutes a theologian to be learned in theology, whether he expound or not; but the divine teaches in public or writes, and is an ecclesiastic, while the theologian may be a layman. The theologian is sometimes an official referee on matters of theology.

"The old *theologians* and *divines*, who of all philosophers are the most ancient."—HOLLAND, *Plutarch*.

THINK. BELIEVE.

To THINK (A. S. *thencan*, *to think*, *reason*) is used in three senses: 1, to express the ordinary operation of the intellect; 2, an opinion formed in the mind; and 3, a belief in something as nearly, but not quite, certain. As, "Man is a thinking being." "I think him a sensible man." "I think that he has left the house."

To BELIEVE (prefix *be* for *ge-lyfan*, *to believe*) has also two meanings: 1, a decided faith; the other, nearly synonymous with the third meaning of THINK, but with a rather stronger conviction. "I believe so;" or, "I think so, but am not certain." In this sense, BELIEVE rises upon THINK. For instance, I ask another, "Were these words uttered in the course of the conversation?" Answer: "I think so." Question: "But do you say that you believe they were?" In this way, to think is to be disposed to believe; and to believe is to have made up one's mind to think.

THOUGHT. IDEA. IMAGINATION. COGITATION.

The IDEA (*see* IDEA) represents the object; the THOUGHT (*see* THINK) considers it; the IMAGINATION (Lat. *imāginatiōnem*) forms it. The first

paints; the second examines and weighs; the third too often betrays. We have ideas of the sun and moon, or any material objects which we have seen. We have thoughts on moral subjects. We form imagination by combining ideas. The imagination is our own, the thought may be borrowed from another. An idea should be just and true, a thought fine, an imagination brilliant. In argument, especially, men are bound to simplify, adjust, and clear up their ideas. Thoughts ought not to be far-fetched. Imaginations are not to be confounded with realities. The idea belongs both to the external object and to the mind which entertains it. A thought is an act of judgment and comparison among many ideas. Thoughts are more personal than ideas; for some ideas exist necessarily. It cannot be said of any thoughts that they so exist; and so we are not always responsible for false ideas, though we are to be blamed for entertaining wrong thoughts. Right thoughts are based upon exact ideas. A thought is made up of the combination of an idea and a sentiment; and so great and noble thoughts come not only from the intellect but the heart. An idea has, as it were, an independent existence. A thought does not live fully till it is expressed. A good idea is felicitous, appropriate, or useful one. A good thought is the germ of a good action.

COGITATION (Lat. *cōgĭtātionem, a thinking, reflexion*) is a term scientific and metaphysical. It is the employment of the mind in continuous thought. Cogitation is associated with volition and sensation as faculties of human nature. It is a somewhat old-fashioned word, and wears a pedantic air. Cogitation is as it were the taking counsel with one's self.

"He that calleth a thing unto his mind whether by impression or recordation *cogitateth* and considereth, and he that employeth the faculty of his fancy also *cogitateth*, and he that reasoneth doth in like manner *cogitate* and devise."—BACON.

"I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, in the consideration of things themselves, and made use rather of our own *thoughts* than other men's to find it."—LOCKE.

"Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or as the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*."—*Ibid.*

"Every *imagination* of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually."—*English Bible.*

THOUGHTFUL. CONSIDERATE.

The THOUGHTFUL person (*see* THINK) considers carefully, and acts with reflexion in regard to the circumstances of a case.

The CONSIDERATE person (Lat. *consĭdĕrāre, to consider*) does the same in reference to the relation borne to it by other persons. We should be thoughtful of particulars and details, considerate towards the feelings and position of others. There is reflexion in thoughtfulness; anticipation, in considerateness. Considerateness may be positive or negative, or, in other words, may show itself in kindness or forbearance. Thoughtfulness of others is considerateness. But there is also another difference. Thoughtfulness does not overlook circumstances, considerateness does not overlook their consequences. He who is thoughtful is not likely to forget; he who is considerate is not likely to leave things unprovided for.

"*Thoughtfulness* concerning our deportment, our welfare, that of others, and the public, so far as it will really be of use, is a duty of indispensable obligation."—SECKER.

There was a time when CONSIDERATE meant simply reflexive, without any reference to others; as,

"We apply it (the term enthusiasm), through an indolent custom, to sober and *considerate* asserters of important truths as readily as to wild and extravagant contenders about them."—BYROM, *On Enthusiasm.*

And so Milton—

"*Considerate* pride, waiting revenge;"

that is pensive, brooding.

"Æneas is patient, *considerate*, and careful of his people."—DRYDEN.

THREAT. MENACE.

These words being derived, the

former from a Saxon, the latter from a Latin root, differ, as such words so related commonly do, in representing, the former, the physical and ordinary, the latter, the moral and more remote or dignified.

THREAT (A. S. *threat*, 1, *a host*; 2, *a threatening*) may be used of small or great evils. So of the verb THREATEN. One boy may threaten to strike another. On the other hand we speak of the land as MENACED (O. Fr. *menace*, Lat. *mĭnācem*, adj. *full of threats*) with the evils of war or famine. Hence to menace involves the action of conscious beings; while THREATEN is used of common influences and phenomena. The clouds are said to threaten (not to menace) rain. A threat may be confined to words, and a menace to acts: a threatening letter, a menacing attitude.

"*Threatened* this moment and the next implored."

"Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you *menace* him, or lift up the whip to beat him?"—HUME, *On the Human Understanding*.

THROW. HURL. TOSS. CAST. FLING.

THROW (A. S. *thrâwan*) denotes method and some amount of aim.

"I have *thrown*
A brave defiance in King Henry's teeth."
SHAKESPEARE.

HURL, a certain amount of force, and weight in the thing hurled. It is a contraction of *hurtle*, and retains the force of dashing or striking against, contained in Fr. *heurter*.

"And oft the swain,
On some (sheep) impatient seizing, *hurls* them in." THOMSON.

CAST (Icel. *kasta, to cast*) is more dignified, and has less of effort, meaning sometimes little more than to let go; as, to cast anchor.

"Let us *cast* lots for it whose it shall be."—*English Bible*.

Toss denotes no great violence or distance, but a sudden rapid throwing, as of a light body.

"They look upon little matters as unworthy the notice of God, and esteem it derogatory from the Divine Majesty to suppose Him attentive to the crawlings of an emmet, or *tossings* of a feather in a tempestuous air."—SEARCH.

To FLING (one of many similar imitative words, as *flog*, Sw. *flenga, to beat*, Lat. *in-, flĭgĕre*: WEDGWOOD) is to cast forth from self, commonly with an effort of will.

"Tis Fate who *flings* the dice, and as she *flings*,
Of kings makes peasants and of peasants kings." DRYDEN.

TIME. DURATION.

DURATION (Lat. *dūrare, to last*) cannot be conceived but in relation to some object.

TIME (Lat. *tempus*) exists by itself, absolute and independent. Time has been personified by mythologists and poets. Duration is to time what extent is to space. It is the space or time occupied between the beginning of a thing and the end. But this distinction is not all. The word TIME is often used in this sense. Duration is not only a certain quantity of time, but such a quantity regarded under one especial aspect. While a time in this sense may contain a thousand different events, and stands related to a preceding and a subsequent time, DURATION applies only to a solitary fact separated and isolated in time. We are to some extent masters of our time, and may employ it as we will; our duration upon earth is not a matter of our own power.

TIME. SEASON.

TIME (A. S. *tíma*; *time, season*) is here the generic term.

SEASON (Fr. *saison*, Lat. *sătiōnem, sowing-time*) is a certain time; that is, time measured not merely chronologically, but in reference to anything to which it is especially adapted. A season is a fit period; as, youth is the season of enjoyment.

"Our conception of *time* originates in that of motion; and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similarity to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity called *time*, with which they are conceived to co-exist. *Time*, therefore, may be defined the perceived number of successive movements."—GILLIES, *Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics*.

"Still sing the God of *seasons* as they roll.
For me, when I forget the darling theme,
Whether the blossom blows, the summer ray
Russets the plain, inspiring autumn gleams,
Or winter rises in the blackening east,
Be my tongue mute, my fancy paint no more,
And, dead to joy, forget my heart to beat."
THOMSON.

TIMELY. SEASONABLE. OPPORTUNE.

TIMELY means in *good* time; SEASONABLE, in *right* time. Timely aid is that which comes before it is too late. Seasonable aid, that which meets the nature of the occasion.

"And Brett, with his men, manfully endured their charge till more English and Portuguese coming *timely* in to their succour, beat them back into the city."—CAMDEN.

"Mercy is *seasonable* in the time of affliction."—*Ecclesiasticus, English Bible.*

The difference is slight between these and OPPORTUNE (Lat. *opportūnus*) which seems to express more the occurrence of that which by its timeliness aids some particular project or specific course of things. Like TIMELY and unlike SEASONABLE, it qualifies a case rather than a class of cases. Things are opportune for the occasion, and not as a rule. The shower which falls seasonably and in timely preservation of a crop may be inopportune as regards a party of pleasure.

"The murkiest den,
The most *opportune* place, the strong'st suggestion
Our worser senses can, shall never melt
Mine honour into lust."
SHAKESPEARE.

TIMID. TIMOROUS. AFRAID. PUSILLANIMOUS.

AFRAID (for *affrayed*, part. of *affray*, *to frighten*, O. Fr. *effreier*) denotes a temporary state.

TIMID and TIMOROUS (Lat. *timere*, *to be afraid*) denote qualities or habits. TIMID is, however, sometimes employed of the state of mind at the moment, without denoting a permanent quality. TIMOROUS is only used of the permanent quality. TIMID lends itself better to express physical, and TIMOROUS, moral timidity. A timorous disposition is opposed to an adventurous one; a timid disposition, to a courageous one. Extreme caution in statesmen shows itself in timorous measures and a timorous policy. Though of no small moral courage, yet some men, in conditions of physical danger, have shown themselves timid as children.

PUSILLANIMOUS (Lat. *pūsillănĭmis*, *faint-hearted*) is applied to moral beings acting on an important scale, as also to their spirit, measures, conduct, policy. The term is not, for instance, applicable to timid children, but to those in whom courage and decision might be expected or required as manly and responsible agents.

"We are apt to speak of a low and *pusillanimous* spirit as the ordinary cause by which dubious wars terminated in humiliating treaties."—BURKE.

TIRESOME. WEARISOME. TEDIOUS. TROUBLESOME.

TIRESOME and TROUBLESOME are applicable both to things and persons.

WEARISOME and TEDIOUS only to things, and the acts of persons. The force of that which is tiresome (A.S. *tirian*, *to vex*, *irritate*) is more active and energetic, producing a feeling of physical annoyance and exhaustion of patience. WEARISOME (A.S. *wérig*, *weary*, *depressed*) is said of things more continuous in their operation, and producing the impression of monotony and want of relief. A refractory child is tiresome; a long journey through an uninteresting country is wearisome. TEDIOUS (Lat. *tædium*, *weariness*, *loathing*) denotes the weary length of time occupied; TROUBLESOME, that which causes trouble (Fr. *troubler*, Lat. *turbŭlare*, *to disturb*, *turbŭla*, *a crowd*), discomposure, annoyance, or difficulty in our own minds, as when the same child, by his refractoriness, sets us a difficult task in managing him. Such things as vain repetitions, importunate requests, slight disappointments and checks are tiresome. Monotonous tasks and journeys are wearı

some. Prolix speeches are tedious. Complicated tasks, and problems difficult to solve, or threads difficult to unravel, are troublesome.

"This being a religion founded only on temporal sanction, and burdened with a minute and *tiresome* ritual, had the people known it to be only preparatory to another, founded on better promises and easier observances, they would never have borne the yoke of the law."—WARBURTON.

"But no worthy enterprise can be done by us without continual plodding and *wearisomeness* to our faint and sensitive abilities."—MILTON.

"It reqnired no such metaphysical apparatus as Clarke employs, somewhat *tediously*, to prove that all perfections, natural and moral, must be attributes of the self-existent all-perfect Author of all being."—BOLINGBROKE.

"We found walking here exceedingly *troublesome*, for the ground was covered with a kind of grass, the seeds of which were very sharp, and bearded backwards."—COOK'S *Voyages*.

TOLERATE. SUFFER. PERMIT.

One TOLERATES (Lat. *tŏlĕrāre*) things when, having the power to stop them or to escape from them, one refrains to do either.

One SUFFERS them (Lat. *sufferre*) when one does not resist or oppose them, either as overlooking or conniving at them, or as feeling one's inability to prevent.

One PERMITS them (Lat. *permittĕre*) when one gives some degree of consent to them.

TOLERATE and SUFFER are only used of what is bad, or believed to be so, or painful and disagreeable; PERMIT, of things good, bad, or in themselves indifferent. We are sometimes induced to tolerate evils and inconveniences lest worse things happen to us. We suffer as feeling that greater harm may accrue from resistance, or that the remedy may be worse than the disease. Human laws may never permit what the divine law forbids, though they sometimes forbid what that law permits.

TOMB. GRAVE. SEPULCHRE.

TOMB (Fr. *tombe*, L. Lat. *tumba*) at present implies a construction having walls of stone or other such durable material; while

GRAVE (A.S. *græf*, from *grafan*, *to carve*, *to dig*) denotes no more than a simple excavation of the earth for the reception of a dead body.

SEPULCHRE (Lat. *sĕpulchrum*, from *sĕpĕlire*, *to bury*) being a word of Latin origin, and so carrying our minds back to times when the dead were buried in ancient fashions, as, for instance, in sepulchres hewn out of the rock, is naturally a word of rare use, and occurs principally in connexion with some special truth or reflexion. In such expressions the grave represents in a simple manner the end of mortal life; the tomb, the silence and inactivity of death; the sepulchre, the conventional associations of death and burial. To go down to the grave. The silence of the tomb. The sepulchres of departed kings.

TOME. VOLUME.

One VOLUME (Lat. *vŏlūmen*, *a roll*, *a book*) may contain many TOMES (Lat. *tŏmus*, Gr. τόμος), or one tome may contain many volumes. The tome is distinguished by the divisions of the work, the volume by the arrangements of the binder.

TONE. SOUND.

SOUND (Lat. *sŏnus*, *sound*) is no more than the effect produced upon the auditory nerves by the vibration of the waves of the atmosphere, and is determined by the physical structure of the organ, or more generally by the physical character of the substance or cause producing it. A sound is loud or soft.

The TONE (Gr. τόνος, *a stretching*, *tightening*, *a tone*, τείνειν, *to stretch*) is the character of the sound, which does not belong to it till it has reached that point of regularity and distinctness of vibration which constitute a musically appreciable note. The sound of a musical instrument is loud or soft; the tone is high or low-pitched, melodious or not, and the like. Hence the term TONE is capable of a secondary meaning, according to which it expresses the accordance of words or acts with a certain condition of mind, temper, disposition, character, and the

like: as, a high tone of mind; the general tone of his writings.

"To almost every sentiment we utter, more especially to every strong emotion, Nature hath adapted some peculiar *tone* of voice, insomuch that he who should tell another that he was very angry, or much grieved, in a *tone* which did not suit such emotions, instead of being believed, would be laughed at."—BLAIR.

"That which is conveyed into the brain by the ear is called *sound*, though in truth, until it come to reach and affect the perceptive part, it be nothing but motion. The motion which produces in us the perception of sound is a vibration of the air, caused by an exceeding short but quick tremulous motion of the body from which it is propagated, and therefore we consider and denominate them as bodies *sounding*."—LOCKE.

TORMENT. TORTURE.

Both are modifications of the Lat. verb *torquēre, to twist*. As now employed, TORTURE is an excess of TORMENT. So in the verbs, to torment is only a little stronger than to annoy; while to torture is to put to extreme agony. Both are employed both of the body and of the mind.

"Perfect love casteth out fear, because fear hath *torment*."—*English Bible*.

"Such passion here,
Such agonies, such bitterness of pain,
Seem so to tremble through the *tortured* stone,
That the touched heart engrosses all the view.
Almost unmarked the best proportions pass
That ever Greece beheld."
THOMSON.

TORPID. BENUMBED.

The latter (Old Eng. *num, dull, stupid*) denotes a temporary and even transient state, as when the fingers are benumbed with cold.

TORPID (Lat. *torpĭdus, benumbed*) denotes a more continued condition, and is only applicable to creatures in their whole nature, while BENUMBED is applicable to portions of their organization. Hibernating animals (Lat. *hibernāre, to winter*), their faculties being easily benumbed by cold, lie torpid through the winter. In the secondary sense, BENUMBED denotes the operation of an external influence; TORPID, a natural sluggishness of mental constitution or feeling.

"For ere the beech and elm have cast their leaf
Deciduous; when now November dark
Checks vegetation in the *torpid* plant
Exposed to his cold breath, the lack begins."
COWPER.

"Some on a broken crag were struggling cast,
And there by oozy tangles grappled fast;
Awhile they bore the o'erwhelming billows' rage,
Unequal combat with their fate to wage,
Till all *benumbed* and feeble they forego
Their slippery hold, and sink to shades below."
FALCONER, *Shipwreck*.

TOTAL. SUM. AGGREGATE. AMOUNT.

TOTAL (Lat. *tōtus, whole*) is purely arithmetical, or quantitative.

SUM (Lat. *summa*) is not so. We speak of the sum of considerations, observations, and the like.

AGGREGATE (Lat. *aggrĕgare*, part. *aggrĕgatus, to gather into a flock*) is less formal in its force, and points simply to the result of many items, particulars, individuals, or objects brought together, so as to form a collective mass or whole, whatever may have been the nature of the process, voluntary or involuntary, uniform or casual, mental or mechanical, which may have brought them together. The total is the result of computation, the sum is the amount of addition, the aggregate, the collection of numbers or quantity.

The AMOUNT (O. Fr. *amonter, to amount to*) is the relative sum or total in number or quantity; the sum or total as it at present stands, or the point to which it has at present reached. Hence, such phrases as "the whole amount," "the full amount," "the present or actual amount." The total, the sum, and the aggregate are final. The amount may possibly be increased by subsequent additions, or may not amount to so much, or may amount to more on some future occasion. An aggregate of annual subscriptions is not likely to amount to exactly the same sum in two successive years. The total of each year will be different.

TOUCH. CONTACT.

TOUCH (Fr. *touche*) involves both the act or faculty and the state.

CONTACT (Lat. *contingĕre*, part. *contactus, to touch upon*) refers only to the state. A substance is soft to the touch when it comes in contact with us. The physical condition, apart from all volition or sensation, is all that is denoted by contact.

"The fifth and last of our senses is *touch*, a sense spread over the whole body, though it be most eminently placed in the tip of the fingers. By this sense the tangible qualities of bodies are discerned, as hard, soft, smooth, rough, dry, wet, clammy, and the like. But the most considerable of the qualities that are perceived by this sense are heat and cold."—LOCKE.

"The basking sharks will permit a boat to follow them without accelerating their motion, till it comes almost within *contact*."—PENNANT, *British Zoology*.

TOUCHING. PATHETIC.

That which is TOUCHING (Fr. *toucher*) moves the mind in a tender manner by striking it as it were in a sensitive part.

The PATHETIC (Gr. *παθητικός, sensitive*) moves it by the action of tender sentiments continuously exhibited. The pathetic has an uniform tendency to take effect upon all persons susceptible of tender feelings, while that may be touching in one case which would not be in another, as when certain tender associations are excited in connexion with personal experience. That which is touching finds its way gently to the heart, and induces a sweetness of sympathy. That which is pathetic conquers, subdues it, carries it away, sometimes, in spite of itself, fills it, perhaps, with painful sensations. While it is possible to smile at the touching, one weeps at the pathetic. A touching appeal conciliates, a pathetic appeal overpowers. An expression, or a single idea may be touching; but representations, prolonged addresses are pathetic. There is something complex, elaborate, sustained in the pathetic, and a pathetic simplicity is a sort of contradiction of ideas; on the other hand, a touching simplicity is most natural. The exhibition of the noble, the generous, the affectionate, and other such sentiments may be touching, but the presence of some degree of grief or pain or anxiety is needed to make up the pathetic. The artless expression of a child's love for its parent has in it nothing pathetic, yet may be very touching. The touching excites only tenderness, the pathetic may rouse indignation against the cause of the misery or suffering.

TRACK. TRACE. VESTIGE. FOOTSTEP.

TRACK (Fr. *trac*, from *traquer*, a hunting term, *to beat a wood, to surround*) is a mark or impression left by some body or bodies, animate or not, that have passed along a given line of movement; as, the track of a ship in the sea; of a caravan in the sand. It is not a path or road, but the indication of a line of travel (where it is on land) which may become such. A track is a new path, as a path is a beaten track. A track may, however, be no more than a line of travel without visible trace.

TRACE, which has the same origin, is a line, or series of marks or prints. It is more vague than TRACK, and is sometimes used subjectively, that is, as expressive of purely mental investigation, while TRACK is always objective, or external. We speak of the track of wheels, hoofs, or human feet, and of the traces of some body which we cannot verify particularly. A track is a plain, a trace is an uncertain and defective, indication.

A FOOTSTEP is a stepping-place of the foot, and may be made by present feet.

A VESTIGE (Lat. *vestĭgium, a footstep*) is a footstep of the past, and seldom used but in a secondary meaning. In this secondary way, we speak of a vestige as an isolated mark; while a trace implies more or less of continuity and connexion. When as ocular evidences of the past vestiges increase in number and connectedness, they become traces. A skeleton dug up in an uninhabited island, would be a vestige of human life at some unknown period of the past; but the finding in the same neighbourhood of domestic utensils, weapons, and the like, would be to discover traces of

the former occupation of the country. In its secondary application, Footstep rather serves as an emblem of sureness and guidance than of uncertainty. It is well when men tread in the footsteps of the great and wise and good that have gone before them.

"From the Spanish trade in the South Seas running all in one *track*, from north to south, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward, it is in the power of two or three cruisers, properly stationed in different parts of this *track*, to possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea."—Anson's *Voyages*.

"And such is Virgil's episode of Dido and Æneas, where the sourest critic must acknowledge that if he had deprived his Æneis of so great an ornament because he found no *traces* of it in antiquity, he had avoided their unjust censure, but had wanted one of the greatest beauties of his poem."—Dryden.

"There may, perhaps, be some reason to suppose that men became gradually acquainted with the nature and effects of fire by its permanent existence in a volcano, there being remains of volcanoes, or *vestiges* of their effects, in almost every part of the world."—Cook's *Voyages*.

"How on the faltering *footsteps* of decay
Youth presses!" Bryant.

TRADE. Commerce. Traffic. Dealing.

Trade (It. *tratta, a bill of exchange, trading of ships*), denotes, in the first instance, simple drawing from the source of supply, whether at home or from abroad. It is the exchange of commodities for money.

Commerce (Fr. *commerce*, Lat *commercium, trade*) is trade on a large scale between different places and communities, involving the accessories of such trade, the rules and mode of carrying it on. Treaties between different nations, brokerage, ship insurances, and many other such things, associate themselves with the use of the comprehensive term Commerce. An extensive and flourishing commerce has often followed in tracks first opened by a few enterprising traders.

Traffic (Fr. *trafic*, It. *traffico*) is specific and local trade, as along a particular line of road, or between two towns. It is extended in common parlance to comprise not only trading, but travel or intercourse. We speak of the traffic along a main street as comprehending every sort of passenger and carriage frequenting it. It consists in buying and selling the *same* things at profit. It is often used of sordid or iniquitous dealing, as a traffic in slaves, that is in the liberty of men, or in the chastity of women.

Dealing (A. S. *dǽlan, a part, portion*) is, in its primary sense, a dividing or distributing, hence dealing is the doing of a distributing or retailing business, as distinguished from that of a manufacturer or producer. Dealers in particular goods or articles buy them up in portions, according to the state of the market, and make profit on them in detail.

"Thy sin's not accidental, but a *trade*."
Shakespeare.

"The greatness of a state and the happiness of its subjects, how dependent soever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to *commerce*; and as private men receive greater security in the possession of their *trade* and riches from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extensive *commerce* of private men."—Hume, *Essay on Commerce*.

"As soon as he came aboard, he gave leave to his subjects to *traffick* with us; and then our people bought what they had a mind to."—Dampier's *Voyages*.

"They buy and sell, they *deal* and traffic."—South.

TRAIN. Procession. Retinue.

In a Train (Fr. *train*, from *traire*, Lat. *trahĕre, to draw*) there are persons of all conditions; indeed, the fundamental idea of Train is no more than a continuation of connected things in movement. Where trains are personal, they are composed of different individuals, all subordinate to one leading person. But we speak of trains of many things; as a train of ideas.

It is in the personal sense that it is synonymous with Retinue (Fr. *retenue*, from *retenir, to retain*). Retinue is applicable only to persons. We may not speak of a retinue of carriages.

The idea of Procession (Lat. *processionem, a going or marching onwards*) is that of a number of persons or con-

epicuous objects, as carriages, banners, moving in order and in line. The term is, however, civil, and not military. Retinue strictly denotes the retained or engaged followers. A prince entering a public hall with his own retinue might be joined by the authorities of the place, who would follow in his train.

"If we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake or have any thought passing in *train*, one going and another coming without intermission."—LOCKE.

"Ranked in *procession* walk the pious train,
Offering first-fruits, and spikes of yellow grain." DRYDEN, *Ovid.*

"The great Lord Mortimer erected again the round table at Kenilworth, after the ancient order of King Arthur's Table, with the *retinue* of an hundred knights and an hundred ladies in his house, for the entertaining of such adventurers as came thither from all parts of Christendom."—DRAYTON.

TRANSACT. NEGOTIATE.

We TRANSACT (Lat. *transĭgĕre*, part. *transactus*, *to carry through*, *transact*) business generally.

We NEGOTIATE (Lat. *nĕgōtiari*, *to carry on business*) a particular business. No more is involved in TRANSACTION than the performance of a complex action by more than one person. NEGOTIATE implies that in the transaction there is an adjustment of mutual interests. Doing makes transaction; while deliberating is necessary for negotiation. Terms and a common basis have to be found in negotiation, as well as a common end. Transaction is general, negotiation is commercial or political.

"In a country fully stocked in proportion to all the business it had to *transact*, as great a quantity of stock would be employed in every particular branch as the nature and extent of the trade would permit."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"A *negotiator* must often seem willing to hazard the whole issue of his treaty, if he wishes to secure any one material point."—BURKE.

TRANSACTION. PROCEEDING.

A TRANSACTION is something done and completed.

A PROCEEDING (*see* PROCEEDING) is either yet incomplete, or is contemplated in its stages or continuity, not in its consummation. The transactions of the reign of such a monarch denote what was done in that reign. The proceedings involve the acts in detail, motives, and mutual behaviour, as exhibiting justice or injustice, civilization, or the want of it, and the like, and are regarded as events in progress. We speak of the proceedings of individuals, and of the transactions of companies or of individuals collectively. TRANSACTION is sometimes used in the sense of an account of a complex proceeding, as transactions of a philosophical society.

"'Tis said they all, with one consent,
Agreed to draw up th' instrument,
And, for the general satisfaction,
To print it in the next *transaction*."
BUTLER.

TRANSCRIBE. COPY.

To TRANSCRIBE (Lat. *transcrībĕre*) is to write over from something else. It applies only to writing and printing, or the engraving of letters, as inscriptions. Nor does it denote of necessity a similarity of style in the printing to the original, but only an accurate representation of the words and matter.

COPY (Lat. *cōpia*, *plenty*, *a multiplication of the original*) goes beyond writing, as, for instance, to painting, and, moreover, implies something of the character and appearance of the original as reproduced. One may transcribe for the purpose of neatness, cleanliness; one copies for the sake of use and convenience.

"We can distinguish in the present case, as perhaps a good critic may, the peculiarities of the author from those of his *transcribers*."—WATERLAND.

"This order has produced great numbers of tolerable *copyers* in painting, good rhymers in poetry, and harmless projectors in politics."—TATLER.

TRANSGRESS. INFRINGE. VIOLATE. CONTRAVENE.

That which is TRANSGRESSED (Lat. *transgredi*, part. *transgressus*, *to step beyond*) is the moral law generally, or any command to which moral autho-

rity belongs, as if a child should transgress the command of his parent.

That which is VIOLATED (Lat. *violāre, to treat with violence, to profane*) is a known law, obligation, or compact.

That which is INFRINGED (*see* INFRINGE) is civil laws and rights, regulations of minor force, such as the customs of society.

"Human laws oblige only that they be not despised, that is, that they be not *transgressed* without a reasonable cause; but the laws of God must be obeyed in all cases, and there is no cause to break them, and there can be no necessity upon us to commit sin."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

VIOLATE has a wider application than either TRANSGRESS or INFRINGE. It not only involves a more defiant and forcible contradiction and disobedience, but it extends to other matters than those of law and custom, as to principles, and abstract truth, justice, and right. That which ought to restrain may be transgressed; that which ought to be respected may be infringed; that which ought to be held sacred may be violated.

"When it comes to be these men's own case to be oppressed by violence or overreached by fraud, where, then, are all their pleas against the eternal distinction of right and wrong? How, on the contrary, do they then cry out for equity, and exclaim against injustice! How do they then challenge and object against Providence, and think neither God nor man severe enough in punishing the *violators* of right and truth!"—CLARKE.

"We promise that such a course shall be taken with him as may sufficiently testify that we no less heinously brook the *violation* of your right than the infringement of our own authority."—MILTON.

CONTRAVENTION (Lat. *contra, against, vĕnīre, to come*) has regard to positive rule, order, discipline, administration. One contravenes what is laid down or put forth authoritatively. One infringes in those cases in which disobedience involves breach of faith and disregard of contract, formal or implied; as a subject infringes the laws of the realm, or a prince infringes the liberties of his subjects. Transgression is where there is law of any kind, natural, social, political, conventional, divine. Violation audaciously attacks what is essential in nature, manners, society, religion. The undisciplined spirit contravenes, the unfaithful infringes, the licentious transgresses, the reckless violates. Contravention is a fault or offence; infraction an act of dishonesty and injustice. Transgression of disobedience or crime. Violation is enormity and brutality.

"So plain a proposition . . . . was not likely to be *contravened*."—SOUTHEY.

TRANSPARENT. TRANSLUCENT. PELLUCID.

That is TRANSPARENT (Lat. *trans, beyond*, and *pārēre, to appear*) which admits of objects on the other side of it being seen distinctly. That is

TRANSLUCENT (Lat. *translūcentem*, part. of *translucēre, to be translucent or transparent*) which merely admits of a penetration or passage of light through it. Fine glass and pure water are transparent, so are fine fabrics, as gauze, which implies a discontinuity of substance. In this way a leafless hedge may be transparent, but this discontinuity would prevent the application of the term translucent or diaphanous (Gr. διά, *through*, and φαίνειν, *to show*) which is its Greek equivalent. Some stones, as, for instance, that called jade, are translucent.

PELLUCID (Lat. *pellūcĭdus*, for *perlūcidus, transparent*) in our older writers was used in the sense of TRANSPARENT. It now denotes, as in the term "pellucid stream," that which is in its nature transparent, but in fact can only be seen clearly into, and not through, admitting, from the nature of the case, a perfect penetration, but not passage through, of light.

TRANSPORT. TRANSFER.

TRANSPORT (Lat. *transportāre, to carry over or beyond*) is indefinite, TRANSFER (Lat. *transferre, to bear over or beyond*) is definite. Hence the former term may be used independently; the latter involves the mention of the person, point, or locality to which the transference is made. Convicted felons were transported for life, that is, carried beyond the seas. But when they arrived at their destina-

tion, if the penal settlement were over-stocked, it was necessary to transfer them to another. TRANSPORT has only a physical employment. Those things only are transported which are materially movable. TRANSFER is applicable to those things which have a consistence and fixity, but only in a secondary sense. Goods, merchandise, and the like are transported when they are taken away, transferred when they are consigned to other keeping. Houses and public buildings are not commonly transported, but a court of law, a public office, a queen's drawing-room may be transferred or removed to a different building.

TREACHEROUS. TRAITOROUS. TREASONABLE.

TREACHEROUS (Fr. *tricherie, trickery*) is moral, and respects private relationship between man and man.

TRAITOROUS (Lat. *trāditōrem, a betrayer*, from *trādĕre, to deliver or betray*) is civil, social, or political, and respects the relationship between man and any person or power to which he owes allegiance, or any cause to the support of which he is bound by fealty or honour.

That is TREASONABLE (Fr. *trahison; treason, trahir, to betray*) which comes under what has been authoritatively defined to be of the nature of treason. A man's conscience tells him when he is treacherous. His conscience or his understanding would tell him when he had been traitorous; but he might have done a treasonable act through ignorance, and without intent to commit treason, and so find that he had unwittingly made himself amenable to the law.

TREATMENT. USAGE.

TREATMENT (Fr. *traiter, to treat*, Lat. *tractāre*) is casual or occasional, or at least implies no more, unless more be said.

USAGE (Fr. *usage*) is continuous and habitual. A man may meet with ill-treatment in a crowd. Some domestic animals suffer much from ill-usage. It may be observed that treatment is employed of favourable or unfavourable treatment. USAGE is not employed in a favourable sense. Ill-usage is also stronger than ill-treatment. The former is always positive and demonstrative; the latter may be through contempt and neglect.

TRICK. ARTIFICE. STRATAGEM. SUBTERFUGE. MANŒUVRE.

Of these, TRICK (O. Fr. *tricher, to trick*) is the simplest and most generic, the rest being modifications of this fundamental and simple idea. TRICK commonly involves deception for self-interest.

AN ARTIFICE (Lat. *artĭfĭcium, handicraft*) is an elaborate, artful, or ingenious trick. As artifice turns upon false manipulations, arrangements, or appearances, so STRATAGEM (Gr. *στρἀτήγημα, a piece of generalship*) turns upon false judgments and movements. It is an artifice planned for the purpose of gaining a practical end. Children play tricks. Designing persons have recourse to artifice. Those who convert life into a complicated game employ stratagem.

SUBTERFUGE (Lat. *subterfŭgĕre, to flee by stealth*) is something under cover of which one makes an escape. It is an artifice employed to escape censure, or to elude the force of an argument, or to just'fy opinions or actions. TRICK expresses more directly deceptive ingenuity in the agent, which may or may not practically affect others. A trick at cards need not do so. On the other hand, an artifice touches the condition of others to their misleading. The three first involve acts; the subterfuge may be by words or acts, and commonly is made up of both. The term TRICK has other meanings, as a vulgar or unseemly habit; and such manipulation in art as is calculated to produce a telling effect by means not strictly artistic is sometimes called a trick.

"As his pre-eminence depends not upon a *trick*, he is free from the painful suspicions of a juggler, who lives in perpetual fear lest his *trick* should be discovered."—REYNOLDS.

The trick is generally something petty. The artifice is more elabo-

rate and dignified A trick is a cheat on the senses; an artifice, on the understanding; a stratagem, on the reason or judgment. A clever trick dupes us. An ingenious artifice misleads us. A deep stratagem captivates or entraps us. A subterfuge is either transparent, or, if successful, leaves us in the lurch.

"The skill of *artifice*, or office mean."
MILTON.

"I always consider his (the Spectator) making them and their dress so frequently the subject of his lucubrations an innocent *stratagem* to draw their attention to his book, and thus to allure them to the noblest speculations on subjects moral and divine."—KNOX.

"By a miserable *subterfuge*, they hope to render this proposition safe by denying its authority."—BURKE.

In MANŒUVRE (Fr. *manœuvre*, from Mediæval Lat. *mănŭ-ŏpĕra, work of the hand*, contr. *to mănŏpĕra; see* BRACHET) is involved primarily the idea of complicated movements skilfully conducted, and only secondarily that of deception. The manœuvres of a fleet may be to test seamanship, aptitude for fighting, and the like. A manœuvre which deceives is a stratagem. The stratagem is the work of an individual, the manœuvre commonly though not *necessarily* of a body.

"Here I could not shake off old habits so far as to resist the temptation of getting into a post-chaise for the last stage, by which *manœuvre* I took the credit of having travelled like a gentleman."—*Observer*.

TRUTH. VERACITY. VERITY.

TRUTH (A. S. *treowdhe, treówdh, trywdh*) regards things.

VERACITY (Lat. *vĕrācem, true*) regards the true representation of things. We speak of the truth of history, and the veracity of the historian. The thing said is true or not. The relator is veracious or otherwise.

"Those propositions are true which express things as they are; or *truth* is the conformity of those words or signs by which things are expressed to the things themselves."—WOOLASTON.

"*Truth* or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable any of them of being false till the mind passes some judgment upon them, that is, affirms or denies something of them."—LOCKE.

"To the honour of their author (Suetonius), it must be said that he appears to have advanced nothing through flattery or resentment, nor to have suppressed anything through fear, but to have paid an undaunted regard to *veracity*."—KNOX.

TRY. ATTEMPT. ENDEAVOUR.

To TRY is generic (Fr. *trier, to cull, pick out*, Lat. *trĭtāre, to beat the corn from the chaff*).

ATTEMPT (O. Fr. *atempter, to undertake*, Lat. *attentare*), and ENDEAVOUR (Fr. *mettre en devoir, to put in duty*) are specific. We cannot attempt without trying, though we may try without attempting. We attempt with an intention to compass a certain end. When we try, we are altogether uncertain as to the result. An endeavour is a systematic or continuous attempt. A single attempt may be fruitless, yet at last we may succeed in our endeavours. It may be remarked that all three of these terms imply a partial failure where they are used of the past, though not of the future. I shall try, attempt, or endeavour, from the nature of the case, leaves the issue uncertain. I tried, attempted, or endeavoured, implies that success did not follow, inasmuch as if it had, it would, of course, have been stated rather than the fact of the trial.

"A natural and unconstrained behaviour has something in it so agreeable, that it is no wonder to see people *endeavouring* after it. But at the same time it is so very hard to hit when it is not born with us, that people often make themselves ridiculous in *attempting* it."—ADDISON.

Both ATTEMPT and ENDEAVOUR are weightier words than TRY, and involve more dignified or more difficult ends. One may try to do a very commonplace thing. One attempts what is worthy to be called an aim, though not necessarily a high one. Specific and definite design is not so strongly implied in TRY as in ATTEMPT. We attempt to do or get something in particular which is the object of our effort. We sometimes try when we wish to ascertain a result of which we are *ignorant*. Crabb says that when a burglar attempts to break into a

house he tries the locks; but this is another application of the word TRY, to test or put to the proof.

TUMID. TURGID.

TUMID (Lat. *tŭmĭdus, swelling, tŭmēre, to swell*) denotes a swelling proceeding from an alteration of the internal structure; as, tumid flesh, the tumid waves.

TURGID (Lat. *turgĭdus, inflated, turgēre, to swell*) is that which wears a swollen or inflated aspect. Both are employed in a moral sense; as, a turgid style, turgid language; tumid expressions.

"The *tumid* hills.—MILTON.

"*Turgidity* of the eyes.—ARBUTHNOT.

TUMULTUOUS. TUMULTUARY.

TUMULTUOUS expresses that tumult has taken place, and is actually going on; TUMULTUARY, no more than that there is a tendency to tumult. The former expresses confusion and violence and noise; the latter, disorderliness and sedition. A rabble is tumultuary in disposition, or favours tumultuary measures, before it breaks out into tumultuous acts.

"The workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those *tumultuous* combinations, which generally end in nothing but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"Insolence and noise,
The tempest of *tumultuary* joys."
COWPER.

TURGID. BOMBASTIC.

As applied to persons and their style, TURGIDITY (*see* TUMID) denotes an inflated diction; BOMBASTIC (Low Lat. *bombax, cotton*, Gr. *βόμβυξ, a silkworm*) that particular turgidity which is connected with personal pomposity and self-importance, and exaggerates not only style, but facts. A style is bombastic which is inflated and nonsensical. It is turgid when its expressions are pompously inflated, though it may be not otherwise than sound in sense.

"The *turgidness* of a young scribbler."—WARBURTON.

"A theatrical, *bombastic*, windy phraseology of heroic virtue."—BURKE.

TWIRL. TWIST. TWINE. WHIRL.

TWIRL (A. S. *thwiril*, anything that is twirled, as *a churn-staff or flail*) involves the exercise of force so as to be circulatory, and commonly comes from the hand or fingers.

TWIST (A. S. *twi, two*) is to turn sharply from a given line, without of necessity completing a circle, as to twist a stick is to destroy its straightness. To twirl is to turn it rapidly round in the air. The former does not lend itself to secondary meanings. On the other hand, we are said to twist words when we bend them violently to our own meaning. WHIRL is rapidly to twist circularly, having so far the meaning of TWIRL, but more equably, with more violence, and in a larger circle. TWINE is continuous and steady, while twist is a single and perhaps violent act; and has reference to a conversion of condition, by which two or more things flexible and weaker may become one thing *comparatively* inflexible and strong.

TYPE. FORM.

The TYPE (Gr. *τύπος, a blow, form, or impression, τύπτειν, to beat*) is a characteristic FORM (Lat. *forma*); that is, it is the aggregate of characteristic qualities, either an ideal representation or an actual specimen, combining all the particulars of the class which it is employed to illustrate.

"Great Father of the gods, when for our crimes
Thou send'st some heavy judgment on the times,
Some tyrant king, the terror of his age,
The *type* and true vice-gerent of thy rage,
Thus punish him." DRYDEN, *Persius.*

"But supposing the self-subsistence of matter from eternity, could the world, full of innumerable *forms*, spring by an impetus from a dead formless principle?"—BATES.

TYRO. NOVICE.

The TYRO (Lat. *tīro, a recruit*) is primarily a young soldier; hence a beginner in some branch of study with which he is therefore but slightly acquainted.

A NOVICE (Lat. *nŏvĭcius, new, fresh*) is one who is new in any business. Sometimes one newly received into

the church or a religious community. According to their origins are the uses of the terms. A tyro is fresh and unskilled, a novice is new and unfamiliarized. One who is by no means a tyro at learning may be a novice at college.

U.

UGLINESS. DEFORMITY. DISFIGUREMENT.

These terms agree in expressing that character which is the opposite of beauty. UGLINESS (A. S. *óga*, *dread*, adj. *óga-líc*) is the generic term of which the others express species.

As applied to persons, DEFORMITY (*dĕformĭtatem*) belongs to the figure, ugliness to the countenance. Ugliness is superficial as of colour, deformity is of disproportion of parts.

DISFIGUREMENT (Lat. *dis-*, and *fĭgūra*, *form*) conveys the idea of partial deformity by some specific feature regarded by itself or superimposed. *See* DEFACE.

UNCERTAINTY. SUSPENSE. DOUBT.

DOUBT (Lat. *dŭbĭtāre*, *to doubt*) indicates the absence of sufficient study and inquiry; UNCERTAINTY (*see* CERTAIN), the absence of judgment formed; SUSPENSE (Lat. *suspensus*, *hovering*, *hesitating*), the absence of determination. He is doubtful who hesitates from ignorance. He is uncertain who hesitates from irresolution. He is in suspense who cannot decide. It has to be remarked, however, that of late the term SUSPENSE has come to mean that anxiety of mind which comes from ignorance of the intentions of another, where our interests hang on those intentions. Formerly the king would be said to be in suspense who had not made up his mind whether or not to pardon the offender. Now the offender is said to be in suspense until his fate is made known to him. It may be observed that DOUBT is a term of more restricted application than UNCERTAINTY. Doubt is subjective only, uncertainty is both subjective and objective. Doubt exists only in the human mind, but uncertainty both in the mind and the object contemplated. A man is uncertain of the duration of his life because life itself is uncertain.

"All which together seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances which causes such *uncertainty*, disputes, or mistakes when we come to a philosophical use of them."—LOCKE.

In the following passage we have the union of the old sense of SUSPENSE and the new.

"While a great event is in *suspense*, the action warms, and the very *suspense*, made up of hope and fear, maintains no unpleasing agitation in the mind."—BOLINGBROKE.

"Modest *doubt* is called
The beacon of the wise."
SHAKESPEARE.

UNDER. BELOW. BENEATH.

That which we are UNDER (A. S. *under*) is that by which we are covered, overhung, or overtopped. That which we are BELOW (*be-* and *low*) is simply something which is higher than ourselves. That which we are BENEATH (A. S. *benĕðan*) is *much* higher than we.

UNDERTAKING. ENTERPRISE. EXPEDITION.

A work projected is the idea common to both these terms; but an UNDERTAKING denotes something which involves reflexion and perseverance with other mental and moral qualities.

ENTERPRISE (Fr. *entreprise*, *entreprendre*, *to undertake*) involves the personal qualities of activity, courage, endurance, and the like. Undertakings are usually the works of individuals. Enterprises may be made conjointly by bodies of men. An undertaking lies more in the path of ordinary duty. We go out of our way to make enterprises. Undertakings may be from a sense of obligation; enterprises are more speculative, and turn on some prospect of personal gain. The undertaking may be arduous; the enterprise, hazardous. Yet the verb *un-*

dertake has so broad a meaning that it is a common phrase, "to undertake an enterprise."

"These critics, by their very imperfect knowledge of the Hebrew language, which in their time had been a dead language among the Jews themselves for many ages, and by their prejudices against our Saviour, were but ill qualified for their arduous *undertaking*."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"And yet the *undertakers*, nay, performers
Of such a brave and glorious *enterprise*
Are yet unknown."
BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

The EXPEDITION (Lat. *expĕdīre, expedītus, to despatch*) involves as essential that which in UNDERTAKING and ENTERPRISE is only accidental, the idea of distance in the matter undertaken. An expedition is an excursion for some object of consequence, as the procuring of something of value, conquest, search, or scientific discovery. It is understood, if nothing be expressed to the contrary, to be undertaken by a body of persons.

"The *expedition* miserably failed."—PRESCOTT.

UNINTELLIGIBLE. INCOMPREHENSIBLE. INCONCEIVABLE.

These three terms denote equally that which is beyond the reach of the human understanding, but they have their shades of difference.

UNINTELLIGIBLE (Lat. *intellĭgĕre, to understand*) relates to the expression; INCOMPREHENSIBLE (Lat. *incomprĕhensĭbĭlis*) to the nature of the human mind;

INCONCEIVABLE (Lat. *in-, not, concĭpĕre, to conceive*) to the force of the imagination. That which is unintelligible wants distinctness and expression. It is confused, obscure, answers to nothing and states nothing. Indistinct articulation, the combination in the same statement of words bearing incongruous or contradictory forces, is unintelligible. The unintelligible is to be disregarded and avoided. It is often far otherwise with the incomprehensible and the inconceivable. The incomprehensible is above or beyond the grasp of the understanding, while the unintelligible is no object for its exercise. The inconceivable is that for the understanding of which no grounds can be furnished or supposed.

UNION. JUNCTION.

UNION (Lat. *ūnĭōnem*) relates to two or more things which are found to resemble, agree with, or suit one another.

JUNCTION (Lat. *junctĭōnem*) is of two or more things which are brought to a close proximity to one another. UNION denotes the being one, JUNCTION the being joined, hence a conformity belongs to union, collocation to junction. A junction which is so close as to pass into identity, or the production of a third thing, is a union; the union of blue and yellow makes green. The junction of rivers, the junction of armies results in their union. The idea of junction is more material than union, which is more metaphysical; for that is union which has not division, while that is junction which has not separation. Union is force in individuals, in associations, and in communities. Vast areas of common intercourse have been opened by the junction of two lines of railway.

UNIVERSAL. GENERAL.

What is UNIVERSAL (Lat. *ūnĭversus, all taken collectively*) includes every particular.

What is GENERAL includes the majority of particulars. A general rule (Lat. *gĕnus, genĕris, kind*) admits of exceptions. What is universal has no exceptions. Universal is opposed to individual; general, to particular. "The foresight of government is directed to the general welfare." "The Providence of God contemplates the universal good." "The faculty of speech is general, not universal, among men." The general is totality in the gross, the universal is totality in detail.

"For Catholic in Greek signifies *universal*; and the Christian Church was so called, as consisting of all nations to whom the Gospel was to be preached, in contradistinction to the Jewish Church, which consisted for the most part of Jews only."—MILTON.

Although universality does not, strictly speaking, admit of degrees, yet it is sometimes loosely so employed. In

that way, that is general which is most universal, as in the following:—

"A writer of tragedy must certainly adapt himself to the *general* taste, because the dramatic, of all kinds of poetry, ought to be most *universally* relished and understood."—MASON.

UNLIKE. DIFFERENT. (*See* DIFFERENCE.)

DIFFERENT (Lat. *differre, to differ*) is applicable both to quality and number; hence two things may be different (numerically) without being UNLIKE (in character). Furthermore, UNLIKE is negative; DIFFERENT is positive. UNLIKE is wanting in similarity; DIFFERENT is possessing dissimilarity. Things which come under the same genus or species are called different, not unlike; while things specifically distinct are said to be unlike. So a rose is utterly unlike a stone. But both blue and green being colours, we say, "Blue is different from green." Unlikeness is the absence of details in common. Difference is general dissimilarity.

URBANITY. SUAVITY.

Both are forms of polite behaviour. Both are more appropriately said of elders or superiors than of juniors or inferiors. URBANITY (Lat. *urbānĭtātem, refinement, urbānus, belonging to a town or city*) is more than SUAVITY (Lat. *suāvĭtātem, sweetness, pleasantness*), and indeed comprises it. Suavity belongs to the disposition; urbanity, to the manners and demeanour. Suavity shows men as gentle in themselves. Urbanity makes them agreeable to others. Suavity is a matter of looks and voice; urbanity, of observation and words.

"You cannot read and taste his (Horace's) beauties without improving your *urbanity* of manners, together with your knowledge of polite literature."—KNOX.

"I know not whether the curiosa felicitas, or that charm of his writings which resulted from study and happiness united, may not be said to consist in delicacy of sentiment and *suavity* of expression."—*Ibid.*

UTILITY. SERVICE. USE. AVAIL. USEFULNESS.

UTILITY (Lat. *ūtĭlĭtatem*, from *ūtĭlis, useful*) is that abstract quality of anything which makes it of USE, or useful in the concrete. If an improvement were made in a machine, we should speak of the utility of the invention, and of the machine itself as being of greater use or more useful. That is useful which we habitually want for familiar ends, as a useful walking-stick, or which meets more rare and important ends, and fulfils them in a higher manner, and with wider applicability. A useful thing is good for a purpose only.

A SERVICEABLE (Fr. *service; service*) thing is good in itself, having many properties of usefulness. Hence SERVICEABLE is commonly said of those things which have to meet more complex or urgent requirements, or which aid us in effectively compassing some peculiar end. In the case of the useful this requirement is ordinary; in the serviceable, it is extraordinary, or at least uncommon. But USEFUL has a more abstract and general application than SERVICEABLE. Useful knowledge is that knowledge which has in it anavailableness for practical purposes, serviceable knowledge would mean that sort of information which came in to help us under given circumstances. USEFUL points more directly to the quality of the thing, SERVICEABLE to the fact that it is ready for use whenever it may be needed. A distinction has to be observed between utility and USEFULNESS. UTILITY is the active, USEFULNESS the passive, term. Our utility is shown by what we actually do; our usefulness, by what we are able to do. Utility is usefulness exerted. Utility is in action; usefulness in inherent nature, character, property, or quality. Use is the habitual or *systematic* application of that which has usefulness.

"In common life we may observe that the circumstance of *utility* is always appealed to, nor is it supposed that a greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to display his *usefulness* to the public, and to enumerate the services which he has performed to mankind and to society."—HUME.

AVAIL (Fr. *a*, i.e., *ad, to*, and *valoir, valer, to be of worth, to be useful*) expresses practical value, and, like the

term *value*, is wholly indefinite. It points to that kind of usefulness or serviceableness which depends not on adaptation or instrumentality, but on the inherent efficacy of things to effect a purpose. As if it should be said, "Entreaties and tears availed nothing."

"But prayer against His absolute decree,
No more *avails* than breath against the wind
Blown stifling back on him that breathes it forth." MILTON.

V.

VAIN. FRUITLESS. INEFFECTUAL. USELESS.

VAIN (Lat. *vānus*) extends to thoughts, deeds, and efforts. That is vain which wants substance, reality, solidity.

FRUITLESS (Lat. *fructus, fruit*) is generally applied to an undertaking which fails, not from inherent weakness or unsoundness, but from some external obstacle, accidental or designed, which has frustrated it. A man may give the best possible advice to another; but where prejudice and obstinacy exist such advice will be fruitless. On the other hand, USELESS points to what is in itself and permanently uncalculated to compass the end proposed, often implying that means are employed which do not suit the case, or efforts that are misdirected or misemployed. FRUITLESS points to the disappointment of the agent as well as the failure of the act.

INEFFECTUAL (Lat. *in-, not, effectus, an effect*) has no reference to this, and is employed in simple reference to cause and effect, to cases in which the means employed are inadequate to the end proposed. An ineffectual attempt fails. A fruitless attempt disappoints as well as fails. A vain attempt ought never to have been made.

"Full sure, he thought, Troy's fatal hour arrived.
Vain thought! he knew not the designs of That both to Greeks and Trojans he ordained
Hard conflicts yet, and agonies and groans." COWPER, *Iliad.*

"One can scarcely read such accounts as these without condemning the vain efforts of dying patriotism which laboured so *fruitlessly* (may one not almost say so weakly?) to protract the liberty of such a people."—BISHOP HURD.

"But yet the most careful endeavours do not always meet with success, and even our blessed Saviour's preaching, who spake as never man spake, was *ineffectual* to many."—STILLINGFLEET.

"Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses; and it is hardly to be conceived that our infinitely wise Creator should make so admirable a faculty, which comes nearest the excellency of His own incomprehensible being, to be so idle and *uselessly* employed, at least a part of its time here, as to think constantly without remembering any of those thoughts, without doing any good to itself or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the creation."—LOCKE.

VALOUR. COURAGE.

One may have VALOUR (Lat. *vălēre, to be strong*) without COURAGE (Fr. *courage, cœur, the heart*); but the man of courage will not be found destitute of valour. Valour is great boldness in confronting the attacks of a personal enemy, and may, after all, in persons whose trade is not war, be very seldom, if ever, called for. But courage is required every day, and all the day long, against many things which are not swords or clubs, viz., the trials, difficulties, and privations of life, or the approach of death—there is no room here for valour, but all must be met with courage. Valour is chivalrous action, perhaps; but courage is chivalrous feeling as well. And so, *e.g.*, where the man of valour despises only the perils of vengeance, the man of courage may despise its satisfactions.

VANISH. DISAPPEAR.

VANISH (Lat. *vanescĕre, to pass away, to disappear*) betokens a *rapid* DISAPPEARANCE (Lat. *dis-, apart*, and Eng. *appear*); while disappearance is generic, and may be gradual or sudden. Ordinary laws, movements, or causes lead to things disappearing; sudden, unusual, or strange causes, to their

vanishing. That which vanishes is commonly not expected to appear again. That which disappears may do so periodically, and periodically reappear.

"For when he bowed
His hoary head, and strove to drink the flood,
Vanish'd, absorb'd, and at his feet adust,
The soil appeared, dried instant by the gods." COWPER, *Odyssey*.

Thus then he *disappeared*, was rarifyed,
For 'tis improper speech to say he dy'd.
He was exhal'd; his great Creator drew
His spirit, as the sun the morning dew."
DRYDEN.

VARIATION. CHANGE. VARIETY.

VARIATION (Lat. *vărĭatiōnem*) consists in being sometimes of one fashion or appearance, and sometimes of another.

CHANGE (Fr. *changer*, Low Lat. *cambiare*) consists in simply ceasing to be of the same. Hence change may be to an opposite quality or state, while variation is within the limits of the same kind. Variation may be frequent change within limits. The inconstant are liable to change, the fickle and capricious to variation. As successive changes in the same subject constitute variation, so a multitude of different objects is needed to constitute variety. The variation of the magnetic needle. A variety of colours. Modes of human conduct exhibit variation. Natural species exhibit varieties.

VENAL. MERCENARY.

VENAL (Lat. *vēnalis, offered for sale*) is a far stronger term than MERCENARY (Lat. *mercēnarius, hired for wages*). The mercenary character is influenced by desire of gain, rather than by other influences. The venal character is ready to sacrifice honour to gain, and, as it were, to sell himself for profit. The mercenary man merely calculates the profit of all he does. VENAL stands to MERCENARY as sale to hire. The barbarian troops who served in the Roman army for pay were mercenary. The Prætorian guards, who would murder one emperor or elect another for the highest bribe were venal. The venal person parts with his individuality; the mercenary only partially surrenders himself. A saying of Brissot is quoted, "My pen is venal, that it may not be mercenary;" as if he had said, "I sell my writings, that I may not have to let out my pen."

"Oh, through her strain
Breathe thy pathetic eloquence, that moulds
Th' attentive senate, charms, persuades, exalts,
Of honest zeal th' indignant lightning throws,
And shakes Corruption on her *venal* throne." THOMSON.

"Thus needy wits a vile revenue made,
And verse became a *mercenary* trade."
DRYDEN

VENIAL. PARDONABLE.

VENIAL (Lat. *vĕnia, indulgence, pardon*) is nearly equivalent with PARDONABLE (*see* PARDON). PARDONABLE, however, may be employed of things of less moment than VENIAL. We speak of venial sins or offences; of pardonable weaknesses, oversights, mistakes, and the like. This comes of the circumstance that VENIAL is a technical term theologically. Venial are opposed to mortal sins.

"There is no certainty of distinction between the mortal and *venial* sins, there being no catalogues of one and the other, save only that they usually reckon but seven deadly sins, and the rest are, or may be easily by the ignorant supposed to be, *venial;* and even those sins which are under those seven heads are not all mortal, for there are amongst them many ways of changing their mortality into veniality."—BISHOP TAYLOR.

"That most interesting and *pardonable* of human weaknesses, love."—DICKENS.

VERSION. TRANSLATION.

There are certain characteristic points of usage in connexion with these two words which it is easier to note than it would be to define strictly wherein the difference lies.

In the first place, VERSION (Lat. *vertĕre, to turn, to translate*) is commonly employed of ancient renderings of books from one language to another; while TRANSLATION (Lat. *translatiōnem*) is commonly used of such renderings into a modern language. A committee is appointed

for the re-translation of the Scriptures. The translators of the Septuagint version are unknown. But, on the other hand, the term VERSION seems to lend itself peculiarly to express any translation of the Bible; so that we may without impropriety say that when such translators have finished their work, we shall be in possession of a new version of the Scriptures. On the other hand, we should not speak of a new version of the works of Homer. A version implies less strongly than translation the personal action of the translator. When version is so referred to it, has a somewhat different sense. An individual's translation of a passage takes in the ideas of peculiar style, with its degrees of superiority or inferiority; his version of the passage would mean his view of its right representation. A different witness will give a different version of a transaction. The translation is the production of the translator. It is more or less lively, accurate, faithful to the original; the version is a literary, natural, or historical form in which a work appears, and is deposited. It is more or less ancient, authentic, scarce, and the like.

VEXATION. MORTIFICATION. CHAGRIN.

VEXATION (Lat. *verāre, to vex*) rises from troubles of a teasing nature, especially such as are repeated or recurrent. It is the petty crossing of our wishes and views.

MORTIFICATION (Lat. *mortĭfĭcare, to kill, to cause death*) relates to what is more closely personal, as our hopes, pride, and the like. That vexes which annoys; that mortifies which both disappoints and humiliates us; or, while it vexes us, interferes with our self-complacency, and reverses what we had set our minds upon. This is in accordance with the etymology of the term MORTIFY. This means first to destroy the vital power and functions, then to do this in a partial manner, as to abate their vigour by fasting or other bodily discipline, the purpose of this being to bring the passions into subjection, and the soul into a state of humiliation. The term MORTIFY is used of such circumstances as disappointed or humiliated us.

CHAGRIN (literally, *a galling as by hard leather*) is a combination of both the others. Chagrin is the French form *shagreen*, the Eng. of the Turkish *sagri*, the well-known preparation.

"Hear me, and touch Belinda with *chagrin*."—POPE.

"Her taxes are more injudiciously and more oppressively imposed, more *vexatiously* collected."—BURKE.

"How often is the ambitious man *mortified* with the very praises he receives, if they do not rise so high as he thinks they ought!"—ADDISON.

VIBRATION. OSCILLATION.

The former (Lat. *vibrare*) is the result of the inherent elasticity of substances, the latter (Lat. *oscillationem, a swinging*) is the effect of gravitation. Time is measured by the oscillations of the pendulum; tone is determined and constituted by a certain number of vibrations in a given time. A bell which is swung may illustrate at the same time vibration and oscillation—vibration by the elasticity of the metal when struck by the clapper, oscillation when set swinging.

VICE. *See* CRIME.

VICISSITUDE. CHANGE.

AS CHANGE (Fr. *changer*, L. Lat. *cambiare*) is generic, so VICISSITUDE (Lat. *vicissitudĭnem, change, alternation*) is change of state in those things by which men are affected; as the vicissitudes of fortune or the seasons. Mere alteration of state is change in the literal and physical sense. Vicissitude is that which exhibits the character of changefulness.

"Such are the *vicissitudes* of the world through all its parts, that day and night, labour and rest, hurry and retirement endear each other; such are the *changes* that keep the mind in action. We desire, we pursue, we obtain, we are satiated, we desire something else, and begin a new pursuit."—*Rambler*.

VICTORY. CONQUEST. TRIUMPH. SUCCESS.

VICTORY (Lat. *victōria*) is the bringing of defeat upon an enemy or an antagonist.

CONQUEST (Lat. *conquīrĕre*, part. *conquīsītus, to annex*) is the bringing by force of some person or possession into one's own power.

TRIUMPH (Lat. *triumphus*) is the external demonstration of victory by formal public ceremonial, or by a demeanour of exultation.

SUCCESS (Lat. *successus*) is the arrival of a person or a project at the appointed termination. Some degree of struggle against difficulties is implied in success, but it is indefinite; and success may be due as much (or even more) to fortune as to courage, energy, or skill.

VIEW. SURVEY.

To VIEW (O. Fr. *veu*, part. of *voir, to see*) and to SURVEY (O. Fr. *survevir, to overlook*) both denote looking, for the purpose of examination; but VIEW is an instantaneous taking in of the whole of an object. SURVEY denotes a gradual and measured inspection of it in detail. To view a thing is to look *at* it; to survey is to look *over* it.

"In her arch'd recess
He slept the night beside her, and by day
Reclining on the rocks that lined the shore,
And *viewing* wishfully the barren deep,
Wept, groaned, desponded, sighed, and wept again." COWPER, *Odyssey*.

"Let observation, with extensive view,
Survey mankind from China to Peru."
JOHNSON.

VIGOROUS. STRONG. ROBUST.

The VIGOROUS person (Lat. *vĭgor, force, vigour*) may be STRONG of mind, the ROBUST person (Lat. *rōbustus*) is only called so in reference to his bodily constitution. Energy and activity belong to the vigorous. The vigorous is energetic in doing, the strong is powerful in enduring. VIGOROUS expresses activity of mind or body, which may be shown casually, while STRONG and ROBUST belong to permanent states—the former of muscle, the latter of temperament and constitution. A man may do a vigorous thing from sudden excitement or courage. He may be muscularly strong without being constitutionally robust. The strong man can lift a great weight; the robust man can bear fatigue; a vigorous man would attack violently. A strong man would bear up under what might overwhelm another.

VIOLENCE. FORCE.

VIOLENCE (Lat. *vĭŏlentia*) is undue or abnormal FORCE, whether of the powers and influences of Nature or of the will of sentient beings. The violence of men exceeds law. The violence of the elements exceeds the average. (*See* FORCE.)

"*Violences* and extremities of Nature."
—BISHOP TAYLOR.

VIRTUAL. POTENTIAL.

VIRTUAL (Lat. *virtus, strength* or *goodness*) belongs to that which is present, though *not in fact*; POTENTIAL (Lat. *potentia, power*) to that which is present, but *not in act*. Virtual is opposed to formal, potential to actual. The virtual is strong but indefinite. The potential is powerful but inactive. A man is virtually present by his proxy—that is, though he is not present in fact, the effect is as if he were. Man's duration is potentially infinite or eternal—that is, though it be not actually so, it is capable of being made so. Virtuality is practical effectiveness, potentiality is implicit, that is, undeveloped susceptibility, capability, or power.

VIRTUE. HONOUR.

It will be hardly necessary to observe that HONOUR (Lat. *hŏnōrem*) is here taken for the principle and not the award of honour, in which sense it is synonymous with *glory* and *fame*, q.v.

VIRTUE (Lat. *virtūtem*) is the acting upon the rule "Do to others as you would that they should do to you." Virtue is moral excellence, that which gives moral merit and value. Hence the degree of virtue in an action will depend upon the circumstances and the person. A temptation to dishonesty resisted by a rich man may be a common duty, in a poor man the same thing might be a high virtue. The virtuous man acts from a recognition of the force of truth and right, which he believes

ought to have the precedence of all other motives, as being the most worthy; the man of honour thinks and feels in a noble kind of way. He is not a creature of obedience or reflexion, or of imitation; but he thinks and speaks and acts with a sort of loftiness which makes him his own director, a law unto himself. Honour is an instinct of virtue, defective in principle, yet frank and unflinching. It is a natural quality, yet capable of being developed by education, capable of laying down principles and following examples.

VISCERA. Intestines. Entrails. Bowels.

Of these the generic term is Entrails (Fr. *entrailles*). It comprises the rest. The Viscera (Lat. *viscĕra*) are those internal organs which are destined to produce the changes needful to health or life. Such are the heart, liver, lungs, bowels, and the like.

The Intestines (Lat. *intestinus, intus, within*) are properly certain substances internally fleshy and externally membranous, which serve the purpose of digesting, purifying, and distributing the chyle, and voiding the excrements. The viscera are different bodies charged each with its own proper functions. The intestines form one continuous body, though divided into specific portions.

Bowels (Fr. *boyau*, O. Fr. *boyel*) only differs from Intestines as the popular term from the scientific.

VISITANT. Visitor.

Visitors (L. Lat. *visĭtātōrem, vīsĭtāre, to visit*) are always persons.

Visitants is employed with more of poetic latitude to denote any living creatures which visit. An angel might be called a celestial visitant. The birds which come back in the spring may be called the visitants of the grove.

> He alone,
> To find where Adam, sheltered, took his way,
> Not unperceived of Adam, who to Eve,
> While the great *visitant* approached, thus spake." Milton.

> "Distinguishing the familiar friend or relation from the most modest *visitor*." — *Tatler*.

VOTE. Suffrage.

Vote (Fr. *vote*, Lat. *vōtum, a vow*) is generic.

Suffrage (Lat. *suffrāgium, a vote*) is specific. A vote may be given on any subject, being a formal or constitutional expression of opinion on the part of a member of a body in regard to the actions or interests of the body. A suffrage is a vote on certain matters, as on a controverted opinion, or on the appointment of a person to an office of trust. The suffrage seems to imply more than the support implied by a vote. A suffrage is an expression of sentiment, so strong that it carries sometimes the meaning of a petition. It may be added that suffrage is nothing until it is expressed. Vote denotes a power or privilege as well as the exercise of it. A man has a vote and gives it. He gives his suffrage.

> "To *vote* in this way, to *vote* incorruptibly, to *vote* on high motives, to *vote* on large principles, to *vote* honestly, requires a great amount of information."—F. W. Robertson.

> "I ask your voices and your *suffrages*."—Shakespeare.

> "I firmly believe that there is a purgatory, and that the souls therein detained are helped by the *suffrages* (prayers) of the faithful."—*Creed of Pius IV*.

VOUCH. Attest.

Vouching (O. Fr. *voucher, to call*—Lat. *vŏcāre*—a third person to represent one's self when attacked in one's rights; an old law term) is a kind of Attestation (Lat. *attestāri, to bear witness*) in which the witness voluntarily undertakes to make himself responsible for the truth of what he says. Hence the term is sometimes employed in the sense of making a promise for another, or undertaking that he shall do something. Attestation relates to the past, or what has happened; Vouch, also to the future, or what has been undertaken to be done.

> "I write concerning a man so fresh in all people's remembrance, that is so lately dead, and was so much and so well known,

that I shall have many *vouchers* who will be ready to justify me in all that I am to relate."—BURNET.

"*Attestation* of the chief priests and scribes to the fore-appointed place of our Saviour's nativity."—BISHOP HALL.

W.

WANDER. DEVIATE. ERR. STRAY. SWERVE. DIVERGE.

WANDER (A. S. *wandrian, to wander*) is indefinite and continuous. It is the continuous result of mind or purpose. It does not imply a dereliction of any straight line or appointed course, though certain wanderings are of this nature. In wandering there is discontinuity of progress, whether the case be one of bodily or mental wandering. It does not involve of necessity any departure from a line of obligation or right.

DEVIATE (Lat. *de, from*, and *via, a way*) is definite and instantaneous. A person or thing has deviated the moment that it has left an appointed or regular line of movement, plan, or rule. It is, unlike WANDER, applicable to merely mechanical movement.

"There Nature *deviates*, and here *wanders* wild." POPE.

ERR (Lat. *errāre, to wander, to err*) is always purely intellectual, involving a misconception or miscalculation of truth. It is employed only in a secondary sense of moral things in relation to an analogous line or path of rectitude.

STRAY (O. Fr. *estrayer*, L. Lat. *extrarius, a strayed beast*) denotes illicit wandering, as from a direct course, or from a constituted company, or from prescribed limits. It is the result, not so much of deliberate purpose, as of the absence of purpose, and the effect of heedlessness. It is the fault of the young, the idle, and the thoughtless to stray, as it is the lot of humanity at large to err.

SWERVE (Sw. *svarfa, to turn*: LATHAM; cf. Du. *swerven, to wander*) is to deviate from the line of right purposely and consciously, or mechanically.

"Alas! where at this moment is the Church of France? Her altars demolished, her treasures spoiled, her holy things profaned, her persecuted clergy and her plundered prelates *wanderers* on the earth."—BISHOP HORSLEY.

"We have *erred* and *strayed* from Thy ways like lost sheep."—*English Prayer Book*.

"Our affections and passions put frequently a bias so secret and yet so strong on our judgments, as to make them *swerve* from the direction of right reason."—BOLINGBROKE.

DIVERGE (Lat. *divergium, a point of separation, dis-* and *vergĕre, to incline or tend*), unlike the others, is applicable not only to one, but also to two or more moving objects or lines. It may be a conscious or unconscious process, and unlike DEVIATE denotes nothing of error or wrong. I deviate from the path when I do not know it or lose sight of it, I diverge from it to take another.

"The centre of six ways
Diverging each from each like equal rays."
COWPER.

WARRANT. GUARANTEE.

These words are etymologically identical, *warrant* being the English form of the French *guarantir*; and in their primary senses they are identical also, namely, to undertake that something shall be forthcoming from another; as the payment of a debt or the performance of a duty. Hence, to undertake to secure anything to another. But to WARRANT has passed beyond this into the sense of holding a person harmless for doing an act; hence, to authorize.

"Canst thou, and honoured with a Christian name,
Buy what is woman-born, and feel no shame,
Trade in the blood of innocence, and plead
Expedience as a *warrant* for the deed?"
COWPER.

"The treaty of Nimeguen, of which the King of England was *guarantee*."—BURNET.

WASTE. SQUANDER. DISSIPATE.

The two last are modes of the first. To WASTE (A. S. *wéstan*) is primarily to desolate, then to wear away; then to spread, or spread unwarily, un-

necessarily, or without return. He wastes who lavishes. He also very often wastes who neglects.

SQUANDER (probably a nasalized form of *scatter*, with which in East Anglia *squander* is synonymous; and compare O. Germ. *schwenden, to vanish, dwindle*) is always active and positive—to spend lavishly or profusely without need and without return. As to squander is to waste *in the gross*, so to DISSIPATE (Lat. *dissĭpare, to scatter, to squander*) is to waste *in detail*, bit by bit. Want of plan may lead to squandering. Want of self-constraint in the purchase of pleasure in all forms leads to dissipating. Extravagance squanders. Levity dissipates. WASTE is more general than SQUANDER and DISSIPATE. We may waste resources of any kind; as time, opportunities, power, talents. We are not said to squander or dissipate anything but money, or such resources as are analogous to it.

"What honour that,
But tedious *waste* of time, to sit and hear
So many hollow compliments and lies—
Outlandish flatteries?" MILTON.

"And such expense as pinches parents blue,
And mortifies the liberal hand of love,
Is *squandered* in pursuit of idle sports
And vicious pleasures." COWPER.

"We see the vanity of the living in their boundless provision for futurity, and in the *dissipation* of the large fortunes of covetous persons by the extravagance of the heirs." —PRIESTLEY.

WATCH. OBSERVE.

WATCHING (identical with *waking*), (A. S. *wacan, to awake*, act. and neut., and *wæcan, to watch*), is a strict, constant, close, and eager OBSERVATION (Lat. *observāre*).

We OBSERVE with coolness the present state of a case. We watch for what is to take place hereafter. Where we are interested we observe. Where we are suspicious we watch.

WATCHFUL. WAKEFUL. VIGILANT.

He is WAKEFUL who does not or cannot sleep; or, in a more extended sense, whose senses are alive and ready to be acted upon.

He is WATCHFUL who is careful to observe closely.

He is VIGILANT (Lat. *vĭgĭlare, to keep awake*) who is actively watchful. A policeman must be wakeful, or he will go to sleep on his rounds; he must be watchful, or much will escape his notice which he ought to have observed, or robberies will be committed which might have been prevented. He must be vigilant, if he has taken upon himself to act as a detective. We speak of a watchful observer; of a vigilant inquirer.

"He must *watchfully* look to his own steps who is to guide others by his authority and example."—BARROW.

"It is not iron bands nor hundred eyes,
Nor brazed walls, nor many *wakeful* spies."
SPENSER.

"While we watch *vigilantly* over every political measure, and communicate an alarm through the empire with a speed almost equal to the shock of electricity, there will be no danger that a king should establish despotism, even though he were to invade the rights of his people at the head of a standing army."—KNOX

WAVE. BILLOW. SURGE. BREAKER.

WAVE (A. S. *wæg, a wave*) is generic, being an oscillating mass or ridge of fluid, commonly water, though we speak analogously of waves of the atmosphere and of light. The rest are specific.

BILLOW (Dan. *bölge*, connected with *bulge, bilge, bole, belly*, &c. &c.) is the largest kind of sea-wave.

SURGE (Lat. *surgĕre, to rise*) is a swelling and subsiding wave, the term being more commonly used in the plural.

BREAKER is a wave of which the top is separated into foam, and *broken* off from the body of the wave either by the force of the wind or the impact of the body of water upon rocks or a shallow bottom.

WEALTH. AFFLUENCE. OPULENCE. RICHES.

WEALTH (A. S. *wela, well being, riches*) is the simplest and the generic term, denoting at first prosperity, weal as opposed to woe, and after-

wards large possessions of money, goods, or land.

AFFLUENCE (Lat. *affluĕre, to flow towards*) carries with it the idea of large sources and unfailing supplies of the good things of this life, especially of those elegances and luxuries which are the tokens of wealth.

OPULENCE (Lat. *ŏpŭlentia, riches*) carries with it the idea of abundance, as RICHES (Fr. *richesse*, the noun being therefore in English properly singular, not plural) of value. RICHES expresses an abundance of valuable things irrespectively of ownership, as WEALTH may express the same; while AFFLUENCE and OPULENCE are not spoken of irrespectively of the subjects of them; as, riches is a snare to many; the wealth of London is enormous. AFFLUENCE, OPULENCE, and RICHES are used only in the sense of material possessions. AFFLUENCE is hardly applicable, like OPULENCE, to localities. Opulent (not affluent) provinces or cities. So much more strictly relative to persons are wealth, affluence, and opulence, that men's condition might be spoken of as one of either of these; but it would be impossible to speak of a condition of riches. Riches and opulence differ in that riches is an abundance of good things, opulence is the assemblage of enjoyments which riches can procure. A miser is rich, not opulent. Possession and enjoyment are the two conditions of opulence.

"That *wealth* consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion which naturally arises from the double action of money as the instrument of commerce and as the measure of value."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

"Though an unwieldy *affluence* may afford some empty pleasure to the imagination, yet that small pleasure is far from being able to countervail the embittering cares that attend an overgrown fortune."—BOYLE.

The *wealth* of the Medici made them masters of Florence, though it is probable that it was not considerable compared to the united property of that *opulent* republic."—HUME.

"With the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of *riches* consists in the parade of *riches*, which, in their eye, is never so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of *opulence* which nobody can possess but themselves."—SMITH, *Wealth of Nations.*

WIND. BREEZE. BLAST. GALE. GUST.

Of these, WIND (A. S. *wind*) is the most comprehensive and indefinite.

BREEZE (Fr. *brise*, It. *brezza*, Sp. *brisa* (N. E. *wind*), origin unknown; LITTRÉ) is a gentle, orderly wind.

BLAST (A. S. *blæst*) denotes violence or effort of blowing; as the blast of a trumpet, of bellows, of artillery.

A GALE (Icel. *gola, a breeze*) is a strong but steady wind.

A GUST (Icel. *gustr*) is a wind at once violent and fitful, or, rather, it is itself a fit of wind.

WISDOM. PRUDENCE.

PRUDENCE (Lat. *prūdentia*, for *providentia*) is a reasonable foresight.

WISDOM (A. S. *wísdóm*) makes us act and think to the purpose. Prudence prevents us from acting and thinking to the contrary. The one is positive and the other negative. The one seeks to find the right way for accomplishing its ends, the other seeks to make itself acquainted with the wrong with a view to avoiding it. The wise man employs what seems to be the best means of success, walking by the light of reason. The prudent man takes the way that he thinks the most sure, and trusts not himself to unknown paths. Wisdom is higher than prudence, for it has truth for its object, while prudence proposes happiness. Wisdom is reason made perfect by knowledge. Prudence is right reason applied to the conduct of life, and therefore comes largely from experience of life. Wisdom is theoretical, prudence practical. Of all the qualities of the mind wisdom is the highest, and prudence the most useful. Wisdom is not properly a virtue, but only so far as it is brought to bear upon morals. Prudence is one of the cardinal virtues, sharing its place with temperance, justice, and rectitude. Wisdom shows generally the end and the way. Prudence, with its practical knowledge and experi-

ence, will often point out ways with which wisdom does not happen to be cognizant. Wisdom enlightened by knowledge dictates true precepts. Prudence aided by experience recommends reasonable rules. Wisdom takes high and broad views, prudence deals with details of conduct and counts its steps. The one thinks well, the other acts well. It was this wisdom that Solomon asked from on high. And so wisdom guides while prudence cautions. It may be said that wisdom contains prudence as a part of itself. One cannot be wise without being prudent, but one may be after a sort prudent without being wise. So we speak of the Almighty as perfectly wise, not prudent; for they are strong who are wise, but the weak may be prudent. Yet though prudence is only a part of wisdom, wisdom is without it worse than imperfect. Prudence is wisdom's practical safeguard.

WISH. DESIRE.

In WISH (A. S. *wiscan, to wish, to adopt*) the feeling is gentler, and the object more remote.

In DESIRE (Fr. *désir*, Lat. *desĭdĕrium*) the feeling is more eager, and the object more at hand. Wishes are at most warm and strong. Desires may be impetuous and ungovernable. In expressing one's feelings toward others over whom we have authority, it is a much milder form of command to say, "I wish you to do this," than to say, "I desire you to do this," though the feeling prompting the injunction may be the same. The former is the gentler, the latter the more authoritative mode of speech. Desire errs on the side of a want of regulation, wishes on the side of misapprehension of good and of undue number.

"A *wish* is an inactive *desire*. It is the result of that longing after happiness so natural to man in cases where no expectations can be formed, no efforts can be made."—COGAN.

"*Desire* influential to action may be defined that uneasy sensation excited in the mind by the view or by the contemplation of any desirable good which is not in our possession, which we are solicitous to obtain, and of which the attainment appears at least possible."—*Ibid.*

WITNESS. DEPONENT.

The WITNESS (A. S. *witnes, knowledge, testimony*) is he who knows from personal perception or observation, and, in an extended sense, a person who for legal purposes attests generally; while DEPONENT (Lat. *dēpōnĕre, to lay down*; and, afterwards, *to bear witness*) is one who gives his evidence in a court of law. Every deponent is a witness; but every witness is not a deponent, as, for instance, he who witnesses the signing of a document. WITNESS is the generic, DEPONENT the specific and technical term. In law the deponent is one who gives written testimony under oath, which is called a *deposition*, to be used in the trial of a case before a court of justice, as distinguished from the affiant who makes an affidavit or declaration under oath to establish the truth of his statement.

"There is satisfactory evidence that many professing to be original *witnesses* of the Christian miracles passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief in the truth of those accounts, and that they also submitted from the same motives to new rules of conduct."—PALEY.

"The pleader having spoke his best,
Had witness ready to attest,
Who fairly could on oath depose,
When question on the fact arose,
That every article was true;
No further these *deponents* knew."
SWIFT.

WOOD. FOREST. GROVE. BRAKE THICKET. COPSE.

A space of ground covered by trees is the idea common to these terms; but a WOOD (A. S. *wudu*) is smaller than a FOREST (Fr. *forêt*, Lat. *fŏrestis, unenclosed woodland*; *see* BRACHET's account), more cared for and cultivated. The wood is near human dwellings and often visited. It is traversed by frequent footsteps. It is bright with wild flowers, and resounds to the songs of birds. The forest is wild, remote, and unfamiliar, perhaps impenetrable, little trodden by human feet, the resort of the hunter, the haunt of wild animals. In its original meaning the forest did

not necessarily imply trees, though trees naturally grew in most uncultivated solitudes. The term forest meant a space of ground kept for the chase, and belonging to the king or a noble, and subject to peculiar laws.

The GROVE (A. S. *gráf*), connected with the verb *grave* and *groove*, is etymologically a place cut out among trees. The grove differs from the wood and the forest. It is commonly frequented. Its trees are cultivated to their full height, and it is cleared of all underwood. It was of old the site of the temple of some deity, or was a shady retreat of students and philosophers.

WORK, LABOUR. TOIL.

WORK (A. S. *weorc, work, labour*) is the generic term. It may be hard or light.

LABOUR (Lat. *lăbōrem*) is *hard* work.

TOIL (O. Du. *tuyl, labour*, connected with *till*, A. S. *tilian*) is *grievous* work.

WORLDLY. SECULAR. TEMPORAL.

WORLDLY (A. S. *woruld-lic*) means relating to the world, especially relating to *this* world or life in contradistinction to the life to come; as worldly pleasures, affections, maxims, actions, and the like.

SECULAR (Lat. *sæcŭlāris; sæcŭlum, the age or fashion*) means relating to the world, in the sense of worldly fashions, habits, or modes of living.

TEMPORAL (Lat. *tempŏrālis, tempus, time*) means, literally, lasting for a time, as distinguished from eternal. In common parlance, WORLDLY is opposed to heavenly; TEMPORAL, to eternal; SECULAR, to ecclesiastical or religious. SECULAR is morally an indifferent term. The same may commonly be said of TEMPORAL; but WORLDLY has generally a bad sense, as a worldly spirit is one which is imbued by sordid principles of gain, and is wanting in high-mindedness or purity of motive. The Upper House of Parliament in Great Britain consists of Lords spiritual and temporal. The office of a clergyman is ecclesiastical; that of a schoolmaster in itself secular, though the two are often combined in the same person.

"When we have called off our thoughts from *worldly* pursuits and engagements, then, and not till then, are we at liberty to fix them on the best, the most deserving and desirable of objects, God."—ATTERBURY.

"For it is to be considered that men of a *secular* life and conversation are generally so engaged in the business and affairs of this world, that they very rarely acquire skill enough in religion to conduct themselves safely to heaven through all those difficulties and temptations that lie in their way."—SCOTT, *Christian Life.*

"This act
Shall bruise the head of Satan, crush his strength,
Defeating Sin and Death, his two main aims,
And fix far deeper in his head their stings,
Than *temporal* death shall bruise the Victor's heel,
Or them whom He redeems." MILTON.

WRATH. ANGER. CHOLER. IRE. RAGE.

An impatience and disturbance of spirit against others is characteristic of these terms. WRATH (A. S. *wræð, wrath*) is commonly connected with a proud, vindictive, or imperious nature. We speak of the wrath of kings and mighty men, and so the term hardly seems to harmonize with the idea of anger in inferior mortals. We speak especially of the wrath of the Almighty. The term WRATH, unlike ANGER, is inapplicable to the passions of inferior animals. Wrath is violent and continuous anger, accompanied by vindictiveness, or, at least, by a desire of inflicting punishment upon its object.

"A revenger to execute *wrath* upon him that doeth evil."—*English Bible.*

ANGER, on the other hand (Lat. *angŏrem, compression of the neck*, from *angĕre, to choke*, Gr. ἄγχειν, *to press tightly*), is the term to express the common feeling of men, who are ready to feel keen displeasure against wrong, real or supposed, whether in the case of others or themselves. Anger may be selfish or disinterested.

"*Anger* is the strong passion or emotion impressed or excited by a sense of injury

received or in contemplation, that is, by the idea of something of a pernicious nature and tendency being done or intended in violation of some supposed obligation to a contrary conduct."—COGAN.

CHOLER (Fr. *colère*, Lat. *chŏlĕra*, *bile*; from Gr. χολέρα, *the cholera*) denotes the constitutional aspect of anger, or the feeling as it affects the frame, gestures, and countenance of men. The choleric is quick to ANGER, by force of natural temperament.

"His constitution, indeed, inclined him to be *choleric*; but he gained so perfect an ascendant over his passion that it never appeared, except sometimes in his countenance upon a very high provocation."—BOYLE.

IRE (Lat. *īra*) may be taken as sometimes a poetic equivalent of ANGER. But anger is more severe and enduring; ire, more explosive, less reasoning, pretending less of cause and ground of offence.

"Breaches through which the wrath of an *ireful* judge may hereafter break in upon us."—SOUTH.

RAGE (Fr. *rage*, Lat. *răbies*) is a vehement, ungovernable ebullition of anger akin to the influence of a disease, breaking forth into extravagant expressions and violence of demeanour. Wrath may be justifiable, and anger may be just; but rage is a distemper of the soul to be regarded only with abhorrence.

"Anger, in the excess of its violence, when it is excited to a degree of frenzy, so that the mind has totally lost self-command, when it prompts to threats and actions extravagant and atrocious, is termed *rage*."—COGAN.

WREATH. GARLAND. CHAPLET.

WREATH (A. S. *wrædh*) is anything continuously twisted into substantial form or which wears such an appearance, as a wreath of vapour or of flowers.

The GARLAND (O. Fr. *garlande*) is a wreath of leaves, flowers, or feathers.

CHAPLET (O. Fr. *chapelet*, *a little head-dress*) is a garland or wreath to be worn on the head. The chaplet is placed on the person or a statue. The garland is commonly carried in the hand, and the wreath deposited for decoration or commemoration in some particular locality, or suspended upon some object.

WRENCH. WREST. WRING.

WRENCH (A. S. *wrencan*) denotes the combination, in the exercise of force, of pulling and twisting.

WREST (A. S. *wræstan*) denotes the same thing, but superadds the idea of disengagement. A thing is commonly said to be wrenched out, and wrested away, the action of wresting originating in a desire to twist the thing out of some position or possession in which it is held.

WRING (A. S. *wringan*) denotes the exercise of a force by twisting, which does not pass beyond the structure of the thing or substance twisted; as to wring one's hands, to wring a wet cloth. To wring and to wrench may be the work of accident or design; to wrest, always of design. The two former are only used in physical and analogous senses. To wrest has also the moral meaning of distort, as by violent twisting to misinterpret words.

WRITER. PENMAN. AUTHOR. SCRIBE.

Of these, the most generic is WRITER, meaning one who writes, whether by writing be meant literary composition or the mere formation of letters by the pen, or any similar process (A. S. *writan*).

PENMAN is a man who handles a *pen* (Lat. *penna*, *a feather*), and properly means one skilled in the use of the pen mechanically—a master of caligraphy.

AUTHOR (Lat. *auctor*) is one whose pen or writing is the medium of original thoughts. The term has a familiar and a more dignified meaning. A writer of a letter is not termed technically an author, unless the letter passed into a literary form. On the other hand, he who wrote the letter might be called, in the general sense of the term, the author of it, if its contents were canvassed.

SCRIBE (Lat. *scribĕre*, *to write*) is a professional writer officially and publicly appointed, or exercising the art

of transcribing or writing from dictation as a trade. The office belongs to ancient times and foreign countries, rather than to ourselves.

"The crucifixion of Christ under Pontius Pilate is related by Tacitus, and divers of the most remarkable circumstances attending it, such as the earthquake and miraculous darkness, were recorded in the public Roman registers, commonly appealed to by the first Christian *writers*, as what could not be denied by the adversaries themselves."—CLARKE.

"Sanderson calls him a common *penman*, who penciled the dialogue (probably the decalogue) in the Dutch Church, London, his first rise of preferment."—WALPOLE, *Anecdotes of Painting*.

"An *authorless* pamphlet."—FULLER.

"*Scribe* was a name which, among the Jews, was applied to two sorts of officers: 1. To a civil; and so it signifies a notary or, in a large sense, any one employed to draw up deeds and writings. 2. This name *scribe* signifies a church officer, one skilful and conversant in the law to interpret and explain it."—SOUTH.

Y.

YIELD. SUBMIT.

TO YIELD (A. S. *geldan*, *to pay*, *yield*) is to surrender one's self in consequence of external pressure—

"I was not born to *yield*, thou haughty Scot."

It differs somewhat from SUBMIT. At least Milton makes a distinction:

"And courage never to *submit* or *yield*."

TO YIELD is less voluntary than to SUBMIT. We yield when our force has been vainly exerted against force which has proved superior to our own. We sometimes submit because it is prudent, or not altogether uncongenial, or because we recognize superior authority. I yield because I am compelled; I choose whether I will submit or not. Yielding is therefore final and complete. It is possible that submission may be partial. In yielding, the characteristic idea is the mastery over one's own will; in submission, the placing one's self at the will of another. It is true that we may yield to moral as well as to physical force, as we may yield to entreaty; still it is always force to which we yield. One yields after a struggle, one may submit without resistance.

YOUNG. JUVENILE. PUERILE. YOUTHFUL.

YOUNG (Lat. *jŭvĕnis*) denotes the age of youth; the rest its characteristics. JUVENILE denotes the character of youth in regard to its tendencies, training, pursuits, and the like; PUERILE (Lat. *puer*, *a boy*), the character of such actions or thoughts as savour of youth in grown-up persons, whose judgment and tastes are presumed to be mature. YOUTHFUL, on the other hand, denotes the normal character of youth, and expresses the quality which rightly and naturally belongs to the period of youth, and may be expected to manifest itself in connexion with the earlier times of human life. YOUNG is simply opposed to old.

"I have been *young*, and now am old; yet never saw I the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread."—*English Psalms*.

"Here (in 'Romeo and Juliet') is one of the few attempts of Shakespeare to exhibit the conversation of gentlemen, to represent the airy sprightliness of *juvenile* elegance."—JOHNSON.

"'Tis sure a practice that savours much of pedantry, a reserve of *puerility* we have not shaken off from school."—BROWN, *Vulgar Errors*.

"Is she not more than painting can express,
Or *youthful* poets fancy when they love?"
ROWE.

Z

ZEAL. ARDOUR. FERVOUR.

ZEAL, in reference to these other synonyms, is specific, while they are characteristic or habitual. ZEAL (Fr *zèle*, Gr. ζῆλος) is passionate ardour in favour of a person or a cause.

ARDOUR (Lat. *ardor*; *ardĕre*, *to burn*) is simply warmth or heat of passion in love, pursuit, or exertion.

FERVOUR (Lat. *fervor*; *fervĕre*, *to be*

hot) denotes the constitutional state or temperament of individuals. We speak of the fervour of passion, declamation, supplication, desire, as *demonstrative* of warmth. Ardour is more deeply seated; as ardent friendship, love, zeal, devotedness. "The ardour of his friendship prompted the fervour with which he spoke."

"There is nothing in which men more deceive themselves than in what the world calls *zeal*. There are so many passions which hide themselves under it, and so many mischiefs arising from it, that some have gone so far as to say it would have been for the benefit of mankind if it had never been reckoned in the catalogue of virtues."—*Spectator*.

"All martial fire herself, in every breast
She kindled *ardours* infinite, and strength
For ceaseless fight infused into them all."
COWPER.

"Wing'd with the *fervour* of her love."
SHAKESPEARE.

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